# Joint Advanced Warfighting School

## Operational Art and Campaigning Primer AY 09-10



## Joint Operation Planning Process

THESE are the times that try men's souls.  The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of their country; but he that stands by it now, deserves the love and thanks of man and woman.  Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this consolation with us, that the harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph.  What we obtain too cheap, we esteem too lightly: it is dearness only that gives everything its value.  Heaven knows how to put a proper price upon its goods; and it would be strange indeed if so celestial an article as FREEDOM should not be highly rated.

December 23, 1776 - *The Crisis* by Thomas Paine during the
American Revolutionary War.

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## Operational Art and Campaigning

*The primary goal of planning is not the development of elaborate plans that inevitably must be changed; a more enduring goal is the development of planners who can cope with the inevitable change.*

## *Special Acknowledgment*

*It is with great gratitude that we acknowledge the special contributions made by Ms. Monica Clansy. Her unrelenting effects and continuous support enabled this document to be created.*

*Col Mike Santacroce, USMC*

*"The world will little note nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here"*

*Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address, 19 November 1863*

# PLANNING TORNADO



**Strategic Level**

**Operational Level**

**Tactical Level**

"War is no pastime; it is no mere joy in daring and
winning, no place for irresponsible enthusiasts.
It is serious means to a serious end, and all its colorful
resemblance to a game of chance, all the vicissitudes of
passion, courage, imagination, and enthusiasm
it includes are merely its special characteristics."
*Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited. and translated by Michael Howard
and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 98.*

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# INTRODUCTION

> *"The first thing for a commander in chief to determine is what he is going to do, to see if he has the means to overcome the obstacles which the enemy can oppose to him......*
>
> **Napoleon Maxim LXXIX**

This document is published to assist Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) students at the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) during their Operational Art and Campaigning instruction. It is intended to supplement, not replace, joint doctrinal publications. However, as noted by Mr. Doug Johnson in *Doctrine that Works*, "doctrine should set forth principles and precious little more." Therefore this primer is designed to promulgate information from several source documents and best practices to fill in where Joint doctrine departs. This primer should not be used solely to quote Joint Doctrine, Service Doctrine or DOD policy, nor does it relieve the individual from reading and understanding Joint Doctrine as published.

The JAWS Primer presents the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) as described by Joint Doctrine. It is presented in a logical flow which will enable planners to sequentially follow the process. Its focus is on the concepts of operational planning and key Joint doctrine with the main references being Joint Pubs 3-0, 5-0 and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I (The next revision of the CJCSM 3122.XX JOPES Volumes will be APEX Volumes). **The JAWS Primer concentrates its efforts on how Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) and subordinate Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) and their staffs work through the JOPP.**

**Planning**. To succeed in creating an effective campaign and/or contingency plan, the operational CDR must consider and apply a myriad of considerations in its development. These considerations, functions and steps are discussed within this document.

Preparation of plans involves more than just the CCDR's staff. Planning is accomplished in coordination with higher military headquarters; subordinate component headquarters; military allies or coalition partners; other government agencies; and international organizations. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military and the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power of the United States Government (USG). Successful interagency, intergovernmental organization (IGO), and nongovernmental organization (NGO) coordination enables the USG to build international support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that efficiently achieve shared international goals (Law enforcement and intelligence capabilities in the national power compendium will be mentioned; however, national security strategy only reflects DIME).

**Campaign Plans.** The AY 09-10 JAWS Primer updates the Joint planner on the FY08 Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) and how campaign and contingency plans dovetail into this concept. National guidance for campaign plans now resides within the

GEF. The GEF tasks CCDR's to create "campaign plans" designed to achieve theater and functional **strategic end states**. These campaign plans integrate steady-state security cooperation activities, "Phase 0" activities, and ongoing operations. The goal being to consolidate and integrate DOD planning guidance related to operations and other military activities into a single, overarching document. The GEF transitions the DOD's planning from a **contingency-centric approach to a strategy-centric approach**. Rather than initiating planning from the context of particular contingencies, the strategy-centric approach requires commanders to begin planning from the perspective of achieving broad regional or functional objectives. CDRs are required to pursue these strategic end states as they develop their theater or functional strategies, which they then translate into an integrated set of steady-state activities and operations by means of a campaign plan. Campaign plans provide the vehicle for linking steady-state shaping activities to current operations and contingency plans (see Chapter I and IX).

**Contingency Plans.** Under this concept, contingency plans become branches to the campaign plan. Contingency plans are built to account for the possibility that steady-state shaping measures, security cooperation activities, and operations could fail to prevent aggression, preclude large-scale instability in a key state or region, or mitigate the effects of a major disaster. Contingency plans address scenarios that put one or more U.S. strategic end states in jeopardy and leave the U.S. no other recourse than to address the problem at hand through military operations. Contingency Plans should provide a range of military options coordinated with total USG response (see Chapter I).

**Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) System.** You will also find that this document includes the necessary processes and procedures to implement the **APEX System** which as noted is replacing the JOPES. The Secretary of Defense signed the Adaptive Planning (AP) Roadmap II on 05 March 2008 directing the expeditious transition from JOPES to APEX.

The APEX system consists of the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP), captured in this Primer, JP 5-0 and the current JOPES. JOPP is the proven analytical process that provides a methodical approach to planning and begins with planning initiation, moves through mission analysis, COA development, COA analysis and wargaming, COA comparison, COA approval, and plan or order development. JOPP supports APEX through the systematic, on-demand creation and revision of executable plans with up-to-date options, as circumstances require. APEX seeks to meld the best characteristics of the JOPP/DOD experience with planning (contingency and crisis action), and the execution process within a common framework. This new construct supports a significantly faster production of high-quality plans that are more effective and efficient for global operations. Further, the Secretary of Defense has directed that contingency plans undergo a six-month cyclical review process as an interim step towards the maintenance of "living plans." (JOPES Vol. I, 29 Sep 2006)

Both the GEF (discussed in Chapter I and XII) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) direct the use of AP processes and prototype tools for the development of top priority contingency plans during the current planning cycle.

**Context.**  We find ourselves today in a global environment that is characterized by regional instability, failed states, increased weapons proliferation, global terrorism, and unconventional threats to U.S. citizens, interests, and territories.  This environment requires an even greater cooperation between all the elements of national power if we are to be successful as a nation.  To attain our national objectives it will require an efficient and effective use of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power supported by and coordinated with that of our interagency, allies and various intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and regional security organizations.

It is for this reason that this publication purposely blends and attempts to explain the linkage between the CCDR and the rest of the interagency for planning and execution.  We must, as a military, endeavor to be aware of what the rest of the interagency brings to the table while enabling the interagency to help achieve our national objectives as outlined by the President.  We do this by starting with an education in an environment where we interact one on one with our interagency partners.  Most of our service and advanced level schools today have such an environment, and we need to ensure that environment grows, which will in turn enable us to grow wiser as planners.

JAWS JOPP will be reviewed continually and updated annually.  POC and editor is Col Mike Santacroce, USMC, JAWS faculty at santacrocem@ndu.edu, 757-443-6307.

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**Colonel Mike Santacroce, USMC**
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**Campaign Planning and Operational Art**

> Jointnesss:  The future of national and international security lies in interoperability and cooperation among the Services, the interagency, international partners and non-governmental organizations.  Each service brings to the fight unique and critical capabilities, but those capabilities are only as good as the contribution they make to the overall strategic effort. Nobody goes it alone today.
> *-CJCS Guidance for 2007-2008, Admiral M.G. Mullen, USN*

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# CHAPTER I

## Structure of Joint Military Planning

> *"Our Nation's cause has always been larger than our Nation's defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace - a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent."*
>
> **President Bush, West Point, New York, June 1, 2002**

1. **Background**

   a. **Civilian control of the military**. Since the founding of the nation, civilian control of the military has been an absolute and unquestioned principle. The Constitution incorporates this principle by giving both the President and Congress the power to ensure civilian supremacy. The Constitution establishes the President as the Commander-in-Chief, but gives the Congress the power "to declare war," to "raise and support Armies – provide and maintain a Navy – (and) to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."

   b. **Joint Organization before 1900**. As established by the Constitution, coordination between the War Department and Navy Department was effected by the President as the Commander in Chief. **Army and naval forces functioned autonomously** with the President as their only common superior. Despite Service autonomy, early American history reflects the importance of joint operations. Admiral MacDonough's naval operations on Lake Champlain were a vital factor in the ground campaigns of the War of 1812; the joint teamwork displayed by General Grant and Admiral Porter in the Vicksburg Campaign of 1863 stands as a fine early example of joint military planning and execution. However, instances of confusion, poor inter-Service cooperation and lack of coordinated, joint military action had a negative impact on operations in the Cuban campaign of the Spanish-American War (1898). By the turn of the century, advances in technology and the growing international involvement of the United States required greater cooperation between the military departments.

   c. **Joint History through World War I**. As a result of the unimpressive joint military operations in the Spanish-American War, in 1903 the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy created the Joint Army and Navy Board charged to address "all matters calling for cooperation of the two Services." The Joint Army and Navy Board was to be a continuing body that could plan for joint operations and resolve problems of common concern to the two Services. Unfortunately, the Joint Board accomplished little, because it could not direct implementation of concepts or enforce decisions, being limited to commenting on problems submitted to it by the secretaries of the two military departments. It was described as "a planning and deliberative body rather than a center of executive authority." As a result, it had little or no impact on the conduct of joint

operations during the First World War.  Even as late as World War I, questions of seniority and command relationships between the Chief of Staff of the Army and American Expeditionary Forces in Europe were just being resolved.

d.  **Joint History through World War II**.  After World War I, the two Service secretaries agreed to reestablish and revitalize the Joint Board.  Membership was expanded to six: the chiefs of the two Services, their deputies, and the Chief of War Plans Division for the Army and Director of Plans Division for the Navy.  More importantly, a working staff (named the Joint Planning Committee) made up of members of the plans divisions of both Service staffs was authorized.  The new Joint Board could initiate recommendations on its own.  Unfortunately, the 1919 board was given no more legal authority or responsibility than its 1903 predecessor; and, although its 1935 publication, *Joint Action Board of the Army and Navy (JAAN)*, gave some guidance for the unified operations of World War II, the board itself was not influential in the war.  The board was officially disbanded in 1947.

2.  **Today's security environment** is not unlike those of historic times.  The commanders during those eras considered the enemy extremely complex and fluid with continually changing coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and new threats constantly appearing and disappearing.  Today, with the national and transnational threats we face, our political and military leaders conduct operations in an ever-more complex, interconnected, and increasingly global operational environment.  This increase in the scope of the operational environment may not necessarily result from actions by the confronted adversary alone, but is likely to result from other adversaries exploiting opportunities as a consequence of an overextended or distracted United States or coalition.  These adversaries encompass a variety of actors from transnational organizations to states or even ad hoc state coalitions and individuals.

To prepare the United States for today's threats and contingencies we have, over time, established a system of checks and balances to include numerous governmental organizations that are involved in the implementation of U.S. security policy.  However, constitutionally, the ultimate authority and responsibility for the national defense rests with the President.

> "As in a building, which, however fair and beautiful, the superstructure is radically marred and imperfect if the foundation be insecure-so, if the strategy be wrong, the skill of the general on the battlefield, the valor of the soldier, the brilliancy of victory, however otherwise decisive, fail of their effect."
>
> **-A.T. Mahan**

**Figure I-1. National Strategic Direction**

3.   **National Strategic Direction**.  The common thread that integrates and synchronizes the activities of the Joint Staff, COCOMs, Services, and combat support agencies is strategic direction.  As an overarching term, strategic direction encompasses the processes and products by which the President, SecDef, and CJCS provide strategic guidance.  Strategic guidance from civilian and military policymakers is a prerequisite for developing a military campaign plan.

   a.   The President provides strategic guidance through the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Security Presidential Directives (NSPD), and other strategic documents in conjunction with additional guidance from other members of the National Security Council (NSC)[1] (Figure I-1).

   b.   The President and Secretary of Defense (SecDef), through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), direct the national effort that supports combatant and subordinate commanders.  The principal forum for deliberation of national security policy issues requiring Presidential decisions that will directly affect the CCDRs courses of action is the National Security Council.  Knowledge of the history and relationships between elements of the national security structure is essential to understanding the role of joint staff organizations.

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[1]Joint Pub 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, 26 Dec 2006

c.  **The National Security Council System**.  DOD participation in the interagency process is grounded within the Constitution and established by law in the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA 47).

    (1)   The NSC is a product of NSA 47. NSA 47 codified and refined the interagency process used during World War II, modeled in part on Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1919 proposal for a "Joint Plan-Making Body" to deal with the overlapping authorities of the Departments of State, War, and Navy.  Because of the diverse interests of individual agencies, previous attempts at interagency coordination failed due to lack of national-level perspectives, a staff for continuity, and adequate appreciation for the need of an institutionalized coordination process.  Evolving from the World War II experience (during which the Secretary of State was not invited to War Council meetings), the first State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee was formed in 1945.

        (a)   From the earliest days of this nation, the President has had the primary responsibility for national security stemming from his constitutional powers both as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and his authority to make treaties and appoint cabinet members and ambassadors.  The intent of NSA 47 was to assist the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security.  Most current USG interagency actions flow from these beginnings.

        (b)   Within the constitutional and statutory system, interagency actions at the national level may be based on both personality and process, consisting of persuasion, negotiation, and consensus building, as well as adherence to bureaucratic procedure.

    (2)   The NSC is the principal forum for deliberation of national security policy issues requiring Presidential decision.  The NSC advises and assists the President in integrating all aspects of national security policy — domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economic (in conjunction with the National Economic Council).  Together with supporting interagency working groups (some permanent and others ad hoc), high-level steering groups, executive committees, and task forces, **the National Security Council System (NSCS) provides the foundation for interagency coordination in the development and implementation of national security policy.**  The NSC is the President's principal forum for coordinating discussion of national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials.  The council also serves as the President's principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies.

    (3)  **National Security Council Membership**.  The President chairs the NSC.  As prescribed in NSPD-1, the NSC shall have as its regular attendees (both statutory and non-statutory) the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Energy, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.  The Director of Central Intelligence and the CJCS, as statutory advisors to the NSC, shall also attend NSC meetings.  The Chief of Staff to the President and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy are invited to attend any NSC meeting.  The Counsel to the President shall be consulted regarding the agenda of NSC meetings, and shall attend any meeting

when, in consultation with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, he deems it appropriate. The Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall be invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. For the Attorney General, this includes matters both within the jurisdiction of the Justice Department and concerning questions of law. The heads of other executive departments and agencies, as well as other senior officials, shall be invited to attend meetings of the NSC when appropriate.

(4) **NSC Organization.** (Figure I-2) The members of the NSC constitute the President's personal and principal staff for national security issues. The council tracks and directs the development, execution, and implementation of national security policies for the President, but does not normally implement policy. Rather, it takes a central coordinating or monitoring role in the development of policy and options, depending on the desires of the President and the National Security Advisor. National Security Presidential Directive-1 establishes three levels of formal interagency committees for coordinating and making decisions on national security issues. The advisory bodies include:

(a) The NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC) is the senior Cabinet-level interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The Principals Committee meets at the call of and is chaired by the National Security Advisor.



**Figure I-2. National policy-making process is built on consensus**

(b) The NSC/Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) is the senior sub-Cabinet-level (deputy secretary-level) interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The NSC/DC prescribes and reviews the work of the NSC Policy

Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs). The NSC/DC ensures that NSC/PC issues have been properly analyzed and prepared for discussion. The Deputies Committee meets at the call of and is chaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor.

(c) NSC/PCCs are the main day-to-day action committees for interagency coordination of national security policy. NSC/PCCs manage the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the USG, provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSCS, and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the President.

(d) Six NSC/PCCs are established for the following regions:

> **Europe and Eurasia, Western Hemisphere, East Asia, South Asia, Near East and North Africa, and Africa.**

(e) Each of the NSC/PCCs shall be chaired by an official of Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary rank to be designated by the Secretary of State. The oversight of ongoing operations assigned by the Deputies Committee is performed by the appropriate NSC/PCCs, which may create subordinate working groups. Each NSC/PCC includes representatives from the executive departments, and offices and agencies represented in the NSC/DC. Additional NSC/PCCs may be established as appropriate by the President or the National Security Advisor.

(f) Functional NSC/PCCs are established for specific purposes as issues or crises arise and for developing long-term strategies. Currently there are eleven functional NSC/PCCs. Each are chaired by a person of Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary rank designated by the indicated authority[2]:

> ➢ Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs);
>
> ➢ International Development and Humanitarian Assistance (by the Secretary of State);
>
> ➢ Global Environment (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy in concert);
>
> ➢ International Finance (by the Secretary of the Treasury);
>
> ➢ Transnational Economic Issues (by the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy);
>
> ➢ Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs);

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[2] National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD-1) February 13, 2001

➢ Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and Planning (by the Secretary of Defense);

➢ Arms Control (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs);

➢ Proliferation, Counter-proliferation, and Homeland Defense (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs);

➢ Intelligence and Counterintelligence (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs); and

➢ Records Access and Information Security (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs).

(g) During a rapidly developing crisis, the President may request the National Security Advisor to convene the NSC. The NSC reviews the situation, determines a preliminary COA, and tasks the Principals and Deputies Committees.

(h) Under more routine conditions, concerns focus on broader aspects of national policy and long-term strategy perspectives. **National Security Presidential Directives (**NSPDs) outline specific national interests, overall national policy objectives, and tasks for the appropriate components of the executive branch.

(5) **DOD Role in the National Security Council System**

(a) **Key DOD players in the NSCS come from within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff.** The SecDef is a regular member of the NSC and the NSC/PC. The Deputy Secretary of Defense is a member of the NSC/DC. In addition to membership, an Under Secretary of Defense may chair a NSC/PCC.

(b) *The NSCS is the channel for the CJCS to discharge substantial statutory responsibilities as the principal military advisor to the President, the SecDef, and the NSC.* The CJCS regularly attends NSC meetings and provides advice and views in this capacity. The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may submit advice or an opinion in disagreement with that of the CJCS, or advice or an opinion in addition to the advice provided by the CJCS.

(c) The Military Departments which implement, but do not participate directly in national security policy-making activities of the interagency process, are represented by the CJCS.

(d) **Of note and worth mentioning here are the geographic boundary differences between the DOS Bureaus and the DOD geographic commands.** It's important we recognize these seams and boundary differences to ensure smooth coordination between these two interagency partners.

**The DOS has six bureaus covering regional priorities[3]:**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Western Hemisphere Affairs | South and Central Asia | Near East Affairs |
| African Affairs | East Asia and the Pacific | Europe and Eurasian Affairs |

**The DOD has six geographic commands:**



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[3]Department of State/US Agency for International Development FY 2007-2012 Revised Strategic Plan, May 7, 2007

When overlaid with each other we see the potential coordination challenges that face both the DOS and DOD when working across boundaries.  Close coordination is required between DOS Bureaus and DOD geographic COCOM's to ensure national security issues and priorities are addressed.



**U.S. Department of Defense Commanders' Areas of Responsibility**

**U.S. Department of State Regional Bureaus**

Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
Bureau of African Affairs
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Note: State of Alaska assigned to NORTHCOM area of responsibility. Forces based in Alaska remain assigned to PACOM.

### (6)  **The Joint Staff Role in the National Security Council System**

(a)  The Joint Staff provides operational input and staff support through the CJCS (or designee) for policy decisions made by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It coordinates with the COCOMs, Services, and other agencies and prepares appropriate directives, such as warning, alert, and execute orders, for SecDef approval.  This preparation includes definition of command and interagency relationships.

(b) When COCOMs require interagency coordination, the Joint Staff, in concert with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, routinely accomplishes that coordination.

(c)  Within the Joint Staff, the offices of the CJCS, Secretary of the Joint Staff, and the Operations (J-3), Logistics (J-4), Plans and Policy (J-5), and Operational Plans and Joint Force Development Directorates are focal points for NSC-related actions.  The J-3 provides advice on execution of military operations, the J-4 assesses logistic implications of contemplated operations, and the J-5 often serves to focus DOD on a particular NSC matter for policy and planning purposes.  Each of the Joint Staff directorates coordinates with the Military Departments to solicit Service input in the planning process.  The SecDef may also designate one of the Services as the executive agent for direction and coordination of DOD activities in support of specific mission areas.

**The Combatant Commanders' Role in the NSCS:**
Although combatant commanders sometimes participate directly in the interagency process by directly communicating with committees and groups of the NSC system and by working to integrate the military with diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power, the normal conduit for information between the President, SecDef, NSC, and a combatant command is the CJCS. Combatant commanders may communicate with the Deputies Committee during development of the POLMIL plan with the Joint Staff in a coordinating role.

   d.   The SecDef develops the National Defense Strategy (NDS), which establishes broad defense policy goals and priorities for the development, employment, and sustainment of U.S. military forces based on the NSS.

   e.   The CJCS develops the National Military Strategy (NMS) and refines OSD guidance through Joint Doctrine (joint publications), policies and procedures (CJCSIs and CJCSMs) such as CJCSI 3110 series (JSCP) that describes how to employ the military in support of national security objectives.

   f.   **Strategic direction and support of national-level activities**, in concert with the efforts of CCDRs, ensure the following:

   (1) National strategic objectives and termination criteria are clearly defined, understood, and achievable.

   (2) The Active Component is ready for combat and Reserve Components are appropriately manned, trained, and equipped in accordance with Title 10 responsibilities and prepared to become part of the total force upon mobilization.

   (3) Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems and efforts focus on the operational environment.

   (4) Strategic guidance is current and timely.

   (5) DOD, other intergovernmental organizations, allies, and coalition partners are fully integrated at the earliest time during planning and subsequent operations.

   (6) All required support assets are ready.

   (7) Multinational partners are available and integrated early in the planning process.

   (8) Forces and associated sustaining capabilities are deployed and ready to support the JFC's CONOPS.

4.  **Global Context**.  Strategic guidance can at times be overwhelming.  There are currently twelve National Strategies (see Figure I-3) and constantly revised Regional Strategies/Plans that require our attention.  In 1999 the U.S. had one National Strategy with ten supporting strategies from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Joint Staff (JS).  The year 2008 finds us with twelve National Strategies and sixteen OSD and JS supporting strategies for a total of twenty-eight strategies.  (Figure I-4)

**Current National Strategies**
- National Security Strategy – March 2006
- National Strategy for Combating Terrorism – September 2006
- National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications – May 2007
- National Counterintelligence Strategy – March 2005
- National Intelligence Strategy – October 2005
- National Strategy to Combat WMD – December 2002
- National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel – February 2006
- National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace – September 2002
- National Strategy for Homeland Security – October 2007
- National Strategy for Maritime Security – September 2005
- National Strategy for Information Sharing – October 2007
- National Strategy for Victory in Iraq – November 2005

**Figure I-3.  National Strategic Guidance from 2002 to present**



**Figure I-4.  Strategies, snapshot of 1999 and present**

5.  **Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF).**[4]  The year 2008 brings a transition in national guidance with a new strategic guidance hierarchy that includes the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) and Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF), with an aligned Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).  Figure I-5 shows the changes and new focus that the GEF brings to the JSPS and the joint planning community.  The GEF is a single strategic guidance document that directs planning for foreseeable near-term (FY 08-10) operational activities as shown in Figure I-6.  It consolidates and integrates DOD planning guidance related to operations and other military activities into a single, overarching guidance document which takes into account lessons from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and other key operations around the world.

    a.   Key among these lessons – captured in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) – is the idea that the DOD requires a framework for integrating efforts to shape the strategic environment towards deterring major conflicts, precluding major instability from arising, enhancing the governance or military capacity of partner countries, or preparing for catastrophic events.

    b.   Planning and resultant activities or operations should aim to defuse strategic problems before they become crises and resolve crises before they reach a critical stage requiring large-scale military operations.  Steady-state activities should support these ends and, at the same time, set the conditions for success should military operations become necessary.  The campaign plan construct within the GEF is designed to do this.

| Previously | GEF |
|---|---|
| • Planning system largely centered around individual scenarios/contingencies | • Contingency planning done within broader context of strategy and related campaign plan(s) |
| • Primarily focused on COCOMs | • DOD enterprise-wide guidance |
| • Predominant focus on combat operations | • Increased focus on security cooperation, other shaping activities, and stability operations |
| • Planning relatively unconstrained by resource considerations | • Resource constraints explicitly recognized and addressed |
| • COCOM assessments narrowly focused on theater security cooperation plan | • Assessments tied to achievement of campaign plans' strategic end states |

**Figure I-5.  Strategic Planning**

    c.   Should shaping or deterrent measures fail, contingency plans must provide the President, SecDef and CCDR's multiple military options for managing crises or conflicts and ending them on terms favorable to the US.

    d.   Stability operations will likely be a significant component of many contingencies.  Planning should ensure in such cases that the command is prepared to conduct and integrate stability operations in the earliest phases of the operation and throughout its duration.  A plan's concept of operations should be informed by the longer-term need to restore the countries involved to functioning and responsible members of international society. Well-designed stability operations will play a crucial role in achieving this end.

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[4]Guidance for Employment of the Force 2008-2010, May 2008

**GEF Purpose – Consolidate Guidance**

**Consolidating five separate documents forces holistic thinking about previously stove-piped planning**

Global Force Mgmt Guidance — Security Cooperation Guidance — Global Posture Guidance — Contingency Planning Guidance — Nuclear Weapons Planning Guidance

Guidance for Employment of the Force

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

Built together by Task Force

**Figure I-6.  Purpose**

e.   Plans should also reflect the need for theater shaping activities to continue and adapt to strategic conditions as a conflict or crisis evolves.  In many cases these activities will play an important role in building partner capacity or engendering support from critical partners. (Guidance for Employment of the Force 2008-2010)

f.   The GEF consolidates and integrates DOD planning guidance related to operations and other military activities into a single, overarching document.  It replaces guidance the DOD previously promulgated through the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG), Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons (NUWEP), and various policy memoranda related to Global Force Management (GFM) and Global Defense Posture (GDP).  The GEF is built concurrently with the Chairman's planning guidance (JSCP) and with input from State.

(1)   Consolidating this guidance enables the DOD to integrate the major components of planning into a coherent and comprehensive body of effort allowing DOD to provide CCDR's with realistic objectives, priorities, assumptions and resources for employing forces.

(2)   The GEF transitions the DOD's planning from a "contingency-centric" approach to a "strategy-centric" approach.  Rather than initiating planning from the context of particular contingencies, the strategy-centric approach requires commanders to begin planning from the perspective of achieving broad regional or functional objectives.

(3)   Under this approach, planning starts with the National Defense Strategy (NDS), from which the GEF derives theater or functional strategic end states prioritized appropriately for each COCOM.

(4)   CDR's are required to pursue these strategic end states as they develop their theater or functional strategies, which they then translate into an integrated set of steady-state activities and operations by means of a campaign plan.  This approach requires the CDR's to balance their efforts across their areas of responsibility (AORs) and address specific threats or problems within the larger context of their campaign plan.

(5) Campaign plans provide the vehicle for linking steady-state shaping activities to current operations and contingency plans.  They ensure that the various Phase 0 (shaping) components of a COCOMs contingency plans are integrated with each other and the command's broader security cooperation and shaping activities.  The result should be a coherent and balanced approach to achieving the strategic end states assigned to the command.

(6)   Under this concept, contingency plans become "branches" to the campaign plan.  Contingency plans are built to account for the possibility that steady-state shaping measures, security cooperation activities, and operations could fail to prevent aggression, preclude large-scale instability in a key state or region, or mitigate the effects of a major disaster.

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**GEF:  Providing the "What" (policy guidance for planning).**
- **Strategic end states (theater or functional) for campaign planning.**
- **Prioritized contingency planning scenarios and end states.**
- **Global posture and global force management guidance.**
- **Relative security cooperation and global force management priorities.**
- ***Strategic* assumptions.**
- **Provides overarching DOD and USG nuclear policy.**

**JSCP:  Implementing the "What" (provides plan guidance).**
- **Formally tasks campaign, contingency, and posture planning requirements to COCOMs.**
- **Detailed planning tasks and considerations for campaign, contingency, and posture plans.**
- **Specifies type of plan required for contingency plans.**
- ***Planning* assumptions.**
- **Provides detailed guidance to apportion forces.**
- **Nuclear guidance remains in the "Nuclear Supplement to the JSCP."**

(7)    One of the most important features of the GEF is that it complements the security goals outlined in the DOS Joint Strategic Plan (JSP).  Through campaign and contingency planning requires that a COCOMs operations and activities align with national security objectives and complement the DOS's country-specific Mission Strategic Plans (MSPs).  It is critically important that COCOM words and actions complement each other in shaping perceptions to support U.S. policy goals.

6.  **Campaign Plans and Campaign Planning.**[5]  In accordance with strategic policy guidance provided by the GEF, the JSCP tasks CCDRs to develop and execute campaign plans that integrate, synchronize, and prioritize daily activities in support of strategic end states, to include security cooperation and Phase 0 actions.  The intent of the campaign plan is to operationalize CCDRs' strategies and to transition planning from a "contingency-centric" focus to a "strategy-centric" design.  CCDRs will use their campaign plans to articulate resource requirements in a comprehensive manner vice an incremental basis.  Campaign plans also provide a vehicle for conducting a comprehensive assessment of how the COCOM activities are contributing to the achievement of intermediate objectives and strategic end states (also see Chapter IX).

> Campaign Planning:  the process whereby the combatant commander and subordinate joint force commanders **translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts** through the development of an operation plan for a campaign.  Campaign planning may begin during contingency planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after the President or Secretary of Defense selects the course of action during crisis action planning.  Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations <u>exceed the scope of a single</u> major joint operations.
>
> *JP 1-02, 12 April 2001*

7.    The JSCP tasks CCDRs to develop **three different types of campaign plans** as appropriate to address their regional and functional responsibilities (Figure I-7 on the following page).

    a.  **Global campaign plans are developed when achieving strategic end states requires joint operations and activities conducted in multiple AORs**. Global campaign plans establish the strategic and operational framework within which subordinate campaign plans are developed.  The global campaign plan's framework also facilitates coordinating and synchronizing the many interdependent, cross-AOR missions such as security cooperation, intelligence collection and coalition support.  These regional plans, synchronized with both the Theater Campaign Plan and Global Campaign Plan, direct the execution of operations and activities in each GCC's AOR.

_____
[5]Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 2008, 1 March 2008

**Figure I-7. Plans Relationship**

b. **A theater or functional campaign plan** encompasses the activities of a supported CCDR, which accomplish strategic or operational objectives within the CCDR's AOR or functional responsibilities. The campaign plan operationalizes a CCDR's theater or functional strategy and translates strategic concepts into unified actions. The JSCP tasks all CCDRs to develop campaign plans that integrate security cooperation, Phase 0, and other steady state activities, with operations and contingency plans.

c. **Subordinate campaign plans** are developed to the CCDR's Theater Campaign Plan. Where the subordinate campaign plans support Global Campaign Plans, they must be synchronized with the Global Campaign Plan. Subordinate campaign plans should be consistent with the strategic and operational guidance and direction developed by the supported CCDR. The subordinate campaign plans should nest under the CCDR's Theater Campaign Plan, as well as the Global Campaign Plan they support. This nesting provides the mechanism to synchronize and prioritize all steady state activities across the CCDR's planning requirements and eliminate redundant or contradictory activities.

8. Each CCDR's Theater Campaign Plan must include the following elements:

**Security Environment:**
- ➢ **Transnational terrorism**
- ➢ **Spread of WMD**
- ➢ **Regional instability**
- ➢ **Increasing powerful states**
- ➢ **Competition for natural resources**
- ➢ **Natural disasters and pandemics**
- ➢ **Cyber and space vulnerability and competition**
- • **Campaign Plans will address all instruments of national power;**
- • **Campaign plans will include:***
  - ➢ **Security Cooperation***
  - ➢ **Information Operations**
  - ➢ **Intelligence**
  - ➢ **Strategic Communication***
  - ➢ **Interagency Cooperation***
  - ➢ **Alliance/Partner/Coalition contributors**
  - ➢ **Stability Operations**
- • **Campaign Plans**
  - ➢ **Annex – Posture Plans**
  - ➢ **Branch – Contingency Plans**
  - ➢ **Annex - Security Cooperation Plan (if desired)**

***must be addressed at a minimum**

9. **Campaign Plan Development**. Campaign planning operationalizes a COCOM's strategy by comprehensively and coherently integrating all its directed steady-state (actual) and contingency (potential) operations and activities. A COCOM's strategy and resultant campaign plan should be designed to achieve the prioritized end states provided in the GEF and serve as the integrating framework that informs and synchronizes all subordinate and supporting planning and operations. The campaign plan is intended to achieve integration not only across all steady-state activities within a particular COCOM, but also across COCOM's. The GEF guidance does not tell CCDRs how to develop their campaign plans; however, they should be guided by the joint operation planning process described in JP 5-0 and this Primer. The campaign plan should generally follow the five-paragraph APEX Basic Plan format, and information normally contained in key annexes should be addressed.

10. **Global Defense Posture**. The network of host-nation relationships, activities, and footprint of facilities and force that comprise forward US military presence and capabilities for addressing current and future security challenges make up the global defense posture.

   a. Posture plans are required in accordance with the global defense posture guidance issued in the GEF and FY 2010-15 Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF). Theater posture plans must be integrated and synchronized with the CCDR's Theater

Campaign Plan.  The posture plan must demonstrate the CCDR's efforts to integrate posture planning with the campaign plan's theater strategic end states and near-term objectives.

    b.  **Theater Posture Plan.**[6]  Theater posture plans are integrated and synchronized with the CCDR's Theater Campaign Plan and are included as an annex due annually.  The posture plans demonstrate the CCDR's efforts to integrate posture planning with the campaign plan's theater strategic end states and near-term objectives.  The posture plan includes a narrative section providing an overview of the Theater Posture Plan which includes such items as: an overview of major ongoing and new initiatives, status of CCDR's efforts to develop and execute the plan, any existing or emerging risks to assured access and capability in the AOR, proposed costs for executing approved and planned posture changes and any deconfliction required with other DoD efforts.  It also includes a matrix with information on approved/proposed footprint locations and host-nation relationships.  The posture plan concludes with a CCDR's posture plan assessment that addresses the political-military, operational risk, force structure, infrastructure and/or resource implications of posture changes.

    c.  Each GCC (excluding CDRUSNORTHCOM) submit a Theater Posture Plan as an annex to their Theater Campaign Plan annually.  Theater posture plans also inform and support the development of a Global Defense Posture Synchronization Report which is developed annually by OSD and approved by the SecDef.  This synchronization report is a DOD internal document which serves to codify and assess posture plans, integrating these plans across the global defense posture "lines of effort" (strategy development, diplomacy, implementation, and sustainment), and identifying execution issues as needed refinements to the plans.

> **The DOD recognizes three interdependent posture elements used to define, plan for and assess US overseas military presence:**
>
>    ➢ **The nature of host-nation relationships, including associated legal arrangements.**
>    ➢ **The footprint of facilities, personnel, force structure and equipment.**
>    ➢ **The steady-state and surge activities of U.S. military forces.**

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[6]Joint Strategic Capabilities 2008, 1 March 2008

d.  **Summary**.  The National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS), and National Military Strategy (NMS) are shaped by and oriented on national security policies; they provide the strategic direction for combatant commanders (CCDRs).  These strategies integrate national and military objectives (ends), national policies and military plans (ways), and national resources and military forces and supplies (means).  Further, the Guidance for Employment of the Force and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provide CCDRs with specific planning guidance for preparation of their theater campaign plans and contingency plans, respectively (for more information on GEF, JSCP and GFM see Chapter V and XII).

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# CHAPTER II

## Strategic Communication and U.S. Public Diplomacy

> *"America's negative image in world opinion and diminished ability to persuade are consequences of factors other than failure to implement communications strategies. Interests collide. Leadership counts. Policies matter. Mistakes dismay our friends and provide enemies with unintentional assistance. Strategic communication is not the problem, but it is a problem."*
> *-Report of the Defense Science Board*
> *Task Force on Strategic Communication*

1. **Strategic Communication and U.S. Public Diplomacy**

   a.   Public diplomacy is, at its core, about making America's diplomacy public and communicating America's views, values and policies in effective ways to audiences across the world.  Public diplomacy promotes linkages between the American people and the rest of the world by reminding diverse populations of our common interests and values.  Some of America's most effective public diplomacy is communicated not through words, but through our deeds, as we invest in people through education, health care and the opportunity for greater economic and political participation.  Public diplomacy also seeks to isolate and marginalize extremists and their ideology.  In all these ways, public diplomacy is "waging peace," working to bring about conditions that lead to a better life for people across the world and make it more difficult for extremism to take root.

   b.   The goal of public diplomacy is to increase understanding of American values, policies, and initiatives and to counter anti-American sentiment and misinformation about the U.S. around the world.  This includes reaching beyond foreign governments to promote better appreciation of the U.S. abroad, greater receptivity to U.S. policies among foreign publics, and sustained access and influence in important sectors of foreign societies.  Public diplomacy is carried out through a wide range of government programs and activities that employ person-to-person contacts and attempts to reach mass audiences through print, broadcast, and electronic media.  Coordinating these various efforts is critical to the short- and long-term success of U.S. public diplomacy efforts.

   c.   On April 8, 2006, the President established a new Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications.  This committee, to be led by the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, is intended to coordinate interagency activities to ensure that:

   - All agencies work together to disseminate the President's themes and messages;

   - All public diplomacy and strategic communications resources, programs, and activities are effectively coordinated to support those messages; and

- Every agency gives public diplomacy and strategic communications the same level of priority that the President does.

(1) One of the committee's tasks will be to issue a formal interagency public diplomacy strategy. (It is not clear when this strategy will be developed.)

(2) The PCC on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication is the overall mechanism by which we coordinate our public diplomacy across the interagency community[1].

(3) To this end the PCC on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication has established three strategic objectives to govern America's diplomacy and strategic communication with foreign audiences:[2]

- **America must offer a positive vision of hope and opportunity that is rooted in America's Freedom Agenda.**

  *"These values include our deep belief in freedom, and the dignity and equality of every person. We believe all people deserve to live in just societies that are governed by the rule of law and free from corruption or intimidation. We believe people should be able to speak their minds, protest peacefully, worship freely and participate in choosing their government. We want all people, boys and girls, to be educated, because we know education expands opportunity and we believe those who are educated are more likely to be responsible citizens, tolerant and respectful of each other's differences. We want to expand the circle of prosperity so that people throughout the world can earn a living and provide for their families. America has long been a beacon of hope and opportunity for people across the world and we must continue to be that beacon of hope for a better life."[2]*

- **With our partners, we seek to isolate and marginalize violent extremists who threaten the freedom and peace sought by civilized people of every nation, culture and faith. This goal is achieved by:**

  ➢ *Promoting democratization and good governance as a path to a positive future, in secure and pluralistic societies;*

  ➢ *Actively engaging Muslim communities and amplifying mainstream Muslim voices;*

  ➢ *Isolating and discrediting terrorist leaders, facilitators, and organizations;*

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[1]GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy, July 2007 and U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, 14 Dec 2006.

[2]Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC), June 2007.

> *De-legitimizing terror as an acceptable tactic to achieve political ends; and*

> *Demonstrating that the West is open to all religions and is not in conflict with any faith.*

- **America must work to nurture common interests and values between Americans and peoples of different countries, cultures and faiths across the world.**

    *"Far more unites us as human beings than divides us. Especially at a time of war and common threats, America must actively nurture common interests and values. We have shared interests in expanding economic opportunity, promoting peaceful resolution of conflicts, enhancing scientific collaboration, fighting diseases that respect no border, and protecting our common environment. A cornerstone of American policy and public diplomacy must be to identify, highlight and nurture common interests and values."*[3]

The **National Security Strategy of the United States** establishes eight national security objectives:

(1) To champion human dignity;

(2) To strengthen alliances against terrorism;

(3) To defuse regional conflicts;

(4) To prevent threats from weapons of mass destruction;

(5) To encourage global economic growth;

(6) To expand the circle of development;

(7) To cooperate with other centers of global power; and

(8) To transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.

The 2006, "**U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication**," states that public diplomacy and strategic communication should always strive to support our nation's fundamental values and national security objectives. All communication and public diplomacy activities should:

- Underscore our commitment to freedom, human rights and the dignity and equality of every human being;

- Reach out to those who share our ideals;

- Support those who struggle for freedom and democracy; and

- Counter those who espouse ideologies of hate and oppression.

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[3]Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC), June 2007.

d.   U.S. public diplomacy efforts are distributed across several entities, including the White House, State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), and DOD.  Each entity has a distinct role to play in promoting U.S. public diplomacy objectives.

> *"Protecting our nation from the dangers of a new century requires more than good intelligence and a strong military.  It also requires changing the conditions that breed resentment and allow extremists to prey on despair.  So America is using its influence to build a freer, more hopeful, and more compassionate world.  This is a reflection of our national interest; it is the calling of our conscience.*
> *"***President George Bush, State of the Union Address, January 28, 2008**

(1) **The White House.**  The President is the foremost United States Government Strategic Communicator.  The National Security Council and his closest officials follow quickly behind.

(2) **State Department**[4]**.**  The public diplomacy budget request for FY 2009 provides $400.8 million in appropriations to influence foreign opinion and win support for U.S. foreign policy goals.  In addition to advocating U.S. policies, public diplomacy communicates the principles that underpin them and fosters a sense of common values and interests.  Objectives of the national public diplomacy strategy include promoting democracy and good governance and marginalizing extremist leaders and organizations.  An additional $522 million is requested in FY 2009 for educational and cultural exchanges to increase mutual understanding and engage the leaders of tomorrow.  Aligned with other public diplomacy efforts, these people-to-people programs are uniquely able to address difficult issues and lay foundations for international cooperation.

The State Department has lead responsibility for implementing U.S. public diplomacy efforts, including international exchange programs, which account for more than half of the department's public diplomacy spending.  State's efforts are directed by the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, who oversees the operations of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of International Information Programs, and the Bureau of Public Affairs.

(a) **FY 2009 DOS Budget Requests tied to Public Diplomacy:**

➢ **Development Assistance**.  The FY 2009 request of **$1.63 billion** for Development Assistance will focus on programs to promote transformational diplomacy in Developing and Transforming countries.

➢ **Economic Support Fund.  $3.32 billion** for the **Economic Support Fund** (ESF).  Rebuilding and Developing countries require ESF resources to create the stable environment necessary for the country to address the needs of its people and contribute productively to the international community. ESF focuses on economic support under special economic, political, or security conditions.

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[4]U.S. Department of State Budget In-brief, FY 2009.

➢ **International Disaster and Famine Assistance**. The FY 2009 request of $298 million will provide funds for the management of humanitarian relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance to countries affected by natural and man-made disasters, and support for disaster mitigation, prevention, and preparedness. The request funds the purchase of commodities, including temporary shelter, blankets, supplementary food, potable water, medical supplies, and agricultural rehabilitation aid, including seeds and hand tools.

➢ **International Military Education and Training (IMET).** $90.5 million for IMET for FY 2009. The IMET program addresses U.S. peace and security challenges by strengthening military alliances around the globe and building a robust international coalition to fight the Global War on Terror.

➢ **P.L. 480 - Title II**. The FY 2009 request for Title II Food Aid is $1.22 billion. Title II Food Aid of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (Public Law 480) is requested by the Department of Agriculture and administered by USAID. Title II provides U.S. food assistance in response to emergencies and disasters around the world via the World Food Program and private voluntary organizations. Title II resources have been critical to saving lives by preventing famines and providing urgent relief to victims of natural disasters and civil strife. The FY 2008 supplemental request was for $350 million.

➢ **Transition Initiatives**. The FY 2009 request of $40 million for the Transition Initiatives account will be used to address the opportunities and challenges facing conflict-prone countries and those making the transition from initial crisis stage of a complex emergency to the path of sustainable development and democracy.

➢ **Total - Broadcasting Board of Governors.** FY 2009 funding request for $699 million.

➢ **Millennium Challenge Corporation**. The President's request of **$2.225 billion** in his fiscal year FY 2009 budget for the **Millennium Challenge Corporation** (MCC) supports the continuing development of an agency designed to provide transformative assistance to those countries that govern justly, support economic freedom and invest in their people.

➢ **Peace Corps.** The FY 2009 budget request provides **$343.5 million** for the Peace Corps, an increase of $12.7 million over the estimated FY 2008 level.

(3) **USAID.** Although USAID and the State Department are separate organizations, both report to the Secretary of State. Therefore, a joint effort ensures that the two organizations focus on achieving common goals, finding economies of scale, and promoting new synergies. USAID's role in public diplomacy is focused on telling America's assistance story to the world. To the degree that U.S. assistance plays a role in fostering a positive view of the United States, the efforts of other assistance agencies, such as the Middle East Partnership Initiative, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and the Peace Corps are also part of U.S. public diplomacy efforts. The Director of Foreign Assistance has developed a new Strategic Framework for U.S. Foreign Assistance, within which the DOS and USAID are developing a fully integrated process for foreign assistance policy, planning, budgeting, and implementation. In FY 2008 for

the first time, all $20.3 billion of U.S. foreign assistance under authority of the DOS and USAID, as well as resources provided by MCC, were applied to the achievement of a single overarching goal-*transformational diplomacy*. That dollar amount for Foreign Operations has increased for FY 2009 to 26.1 billion.

> ***Transformational diplomacy***
> "To help build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system."
> **-Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, FY 2008**

> Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, State has expanded its public diplomacy efforts globally, focusing particularly on countries in the Muslim world considered to be of strategic importance in the war on terrorism. Since 2001, State has increased its public diplomacy resources, particularly in regions with significant Muslim populations. That funding trend has continued more recently, with increases of 25 percent for the Near East and 39 percent for South Asia from 2004 to 2006, though public diplomacy staffing levels have remained largely the same during that period. The Secretary of State recently announced plans to reposition some staff to better reflect the department's strategic priorities, including plans to shift 28 public diplomacy officers from posts in Europe and Washington, D.C., to China, India, and Latin America, as well as to the Muslim world.
> *-GAO Testimony before House Appropriations Committee, 03 May 2006*

(4) **Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG).** Overall, the BBG's stated mission is to promote the development of freedom and democracy around the world by providing foreign audiences with accurate and objective news about the U.S. and the world. The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) advances the national security interests of the United States by promoting freedom and democracy and enhancing understanding through multimedia communication of accurate, objective, and balanced news, information, and other programming about America and the world to audiences overseas. The BBG is in the forefront of combating global extremism. Of its 155 million worldwide weekly audiences, 60 million reside in the critically important areas of the Middle East and South Asia. The BBG pursues this mission through the collective efforts of the Voice of America, Radio/TV Marti, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, Radio Sawa, and the Alhurra satellite television network. The BBG's FY 2009 budget request is $699.5 million.[5]

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[5]Broadcasting Board of Governors, FY 2009 Budget Request.

BBG- On October 1, 1999, the bipartisan Broadcasting Board Governors (BBG) became the independent federal agency responsible for all U.S. government and government sponsored, non-military, international broadcasting. This was the result of the 1998 Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (Public Law 105-277), the single most important legislation affecting U.S. international broadcasting since the early 1950s. The Board is composed of nine bipartisan members with expertise in the fields of journalism, broadcasting, and public and international affairs. Eight members are appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed by the U.S. Senate. The ninth, an ex-officio member, is the Secretary of State.

"While several recent reports on public diplomacy have recommended an increase in spending on U.S. public diplomacy programs, several embassy Officials stated that, with current staffing levels, they do not have the capacity to effectively utilize increased funds. According to State data, the department had established 834 public diplomacy positions overseas in 2005, but 124, or roughly 15 percent, were vacant. Compounding this challenge is the loss of public diplomacy officers to temporary duty in Iraq, which according to one State official, has drawn down field officers even further. Staffing shortages may also limit the amount of training public diplomacy officers receive. According to the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, "the need to fill a post quickly often prevents public diplomacy officers from receiving their full training."
*-GAO-06-707T, 03 May 2006*

2. **Strategic Communication and Department of Defense**

**Strategic Communication.** Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.
*JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 Apr. 01*

    a. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) identified capability gaps in each of the primary supporting capabilities of Public Affairs, Defense Support to Public Diplomacy, and Information Operations. As a result, the Department of Defense has focused on properly organizing, training, equipping and resourcing key communication capabilities. This effort includes developing new tools and processes for assessing, analyzing and delivering information to key audiences as well as improving linguistic skills and cultural competence. These primary supporting communication capabilities are being developed with the goal of achieving a seamless communication across the U.S. Government. Also, by emphasizing greater cultural awareness and language skills, the QDR acknowledges that victory in this long war depends on information, perception, and how and what we communicate as much as application of kinetic effects.

b.   Strategic communication is a natural extension of strategic direction, and supports the President's strategic guidance, the SecDef's NDS, and the CJCS's NMS.  Strategic communication planning and execution focus on capabilities that apply information as an instrument of national power to create, strengthen or preserve an information environment favorable to U.S. national interests.  Strategic communication planning establishes unity of U.S. themes and messages, emphasizes success, accurately confirms or refutes external reporting on U.S. operations, and reinforces the legitimacy of U.S. goals.  This is an interagency effort, which provides an opportunity to advance U.S. regional and global partnerships.  CCDRs will coordinate strategic communication efforts with OSD, the Joint Staff, and USSTRATCOM to ensure unity of effort. Planning should demonstrate how the CCDRs communication strategy supports campaign and contingency plan end states.

c.   Joint operation planning must include appropriate **strategic communication** components and ensure collaboration with the Department of State's diplomatic missions. CCDRs consider strategic communication during peacetime security cooperation planning, and incorporate themes, messages, and other relevant factors in their theater campaign plans.  During contingency and crisis action planning (CAP), CCDRs review strategic communication guidance during mission analysis, and their staffs address strategic communication issues, as appropriate, in their staff estimates.  CCDRs will brief the SecDef on their strategic communication planning during Contingency Planning and CAP In-Process reviews (IPRs), discussed in Chapter VI, Contingency Planning.

> During crises, DOD communicates to foreign audiences through military spokespersons, news releases, and media briefings.  *For example*, the U.S. military supported relief efforts for the Asian tsunami, deploying approximately 13,000 personnel to deliver food and medical supplies.  These activities provide US public diplomacy and public affairs channels with the content and context to foster good will toward the United States.

d.   The predominant <u>military</u> activities that <u>promote strategic communications themes and messages</u> are **information operations (IO), public affairs (PA), and defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD).**

> **"Terrorists don't want a lot of people dead,**
> *they want a lot of people watching."*
> -Brian Jenkins, Senior Advisor to the president of the RAND Corporation, Public Policy

**Information Operations (IO)**: The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.

**JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 Apr 2001**

**Public Affairs (PA):** Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense.

**JP 3-61, 9 May 2005**

**Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD).** Those activities and measures taken by the Department of Defense components to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts of the United States Government.

**JP 5-0, 26 Dec 2006**

   e.   The public affairs officer (PAO) is the CDR's principal spokesperson and senior advisor on public affairs (PA).  To gain such a position of trust, the PAO must have the ability to provide information to the media, to the CDR, and to the supporting forces in near real time.  The key to success in this endeavor is not limited to planning, training, and equipping PAOs, but integrating PA operations into all levels of the command.  Whereas the media may have access to tactical units during hostilities, PAOs may have access to information and to senior-level staff officers on a continuing basis.

      (1) CDRs and staffs at all levels should anticipate external interest in operations as part of the normal planning process and be prepared to respond.  Well-planned PA support should be incorporated in every phase of operations.  Regardless of the type or scope of military operations, PA will facilitate making accurate and timely information available to the public.

      (2) There are normally two key officers who are responsible to the CDR for the PA program: the joint force PAO and the joint information bureau (JIB) director.  The joint force PAO, with appropriate staff support, is on the CDR's personal staff and is directly responsible for all the CDR's PA requirements.  The joint force PAO also provides oversight of subordinate JIB(s).  The JIB director, with supporting JIB staff, is responsible for coordinating all media operations within the operational area, and provides and coordinates support to the CDR through the joint force PAO.  The CDR, with the assistance of the joint force PAO and the JIB director, directs the PA program in a manner that most efficiently contributes to the overall success of the command.

f.    PA and IO activities directly support military objectives, counter adversary disinformation and deter adversary actions.  Although both PA and IO require planning, message development and media analysis, the efforts differ with respect to audience, scope and intent, and must remain separate.  CDRs must ensure appropriate coordination between PA and IO activities consistent with the DOD Principles of Information[6] (DODD 5122.5, 27 Sept 2000), policy or statutory limitation and security.  Effective coordination and collaboration with IO is necessary for PA to maintain its institutional credibility.  Successful PA operations require institutional credibility to maintain public trust and confidence.  CDRs should structure their organizations to ensure PA and IO functions are separate.  PAOs should work directly for the CDR, and all supporting PA activities should be organized under the PAO.[7]

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**DODD 5122.5, September 27, 2000**
**PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION**

➤   Information shall be made fully and readily available, consistent with statutory requirements, unless its release is precluded by national security constraints or valid statutory mandates or exceptions.  The "Freedom of Information Act" will be supported in both letter and spirit.

➤   A free flow of general and military information shall be made available, without censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed Forces and their dependents.

➤   Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the Government from criticism or embarrassment.

➤   Information shall be withheld when disclosure would adversely affect national security, threaten the safety or privacy of US Government personnel or their families, violate the privacy of the citizens of the United States, or be contrary to law.

➤   The DOD's obligation to provide the public with information on DOD major programs may require detailed Public Affairs (PA) planning and coordination within the DOD and with the other Government Agencies.  Such activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public; propaganda has no place in DOD public affairs programs.

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(1) **PA and IO Relationship.**  PA has a role in all aspects of DOD's missions and functions.  Communication of operational matters to internal and external audiences is one part of PA's function.  In performing duties as one of the primary spokesmen, the PA officer's interaction with the IO staff enables PA activities to be coordinated and deconflicted with IO.  While audiences and intent differ, both PA and IO ultimately support the dissemination of information, themes, and messages adapted to their audiences.  Many of the nation's adversaries' leaders rely on limiting their population's knowledge to remain in power; PA and IO provide ways to get the joint forces' messages to these populations.  There also is a mutually supporting relationship between the

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[6] DODD 5122.5, 27 Sept 2000

[7] JP 3-61 Public Affairs, 9 May 2005

military's PA and DSPD efforts and similar PA and Public Diplomacy activities conducted by U.S. embassies and other agencies.  Defense Support for Public Diplomacy (DSPD) reinforces U.S. strategic communication objectives in support of the U.S. National Security Strategy and regional engagement initiatives.

(a) PA capabilities are related to IO, but PA is not an IO discipline or psychological operations (PSYOP) tool.  PA activities contribute to IO by providing truthful, accurate and timely information, using approved DOD public affairs guidance to keep the public informed about the military's missions and operations, countering adversary propaganda, deterring adversary actions, and maintaining trust and confidence of the U.S. population, and our friends and allies.  PA activities affect, and are affected by, PSYOP, and are planned and executed in coordination with PSYOP planning and operations.  PA must be aware of the practice of PSYOP, but should have no role in planning or executing these operations.

(b) PA activities affect, and are affected by, military deception (MILDEC) operations.  PA operations should be planned, coordinated and deconflicted with MILDEC operations consistent with policy, statutory limitations, and security.  PA must be aware of the practice of MILDEC operations, but should have no role in planning or executing these operations.  PA statements and releases must be coordinated with MILDEC to ensure deception plans are not revealed or compromised.

(2) **Synchronization.**  Synchronized planning of PA, DSPD, and IO is essential for effective strategic communication.  Interagency efforts provide and promote international support for nations in the region and provide an opportunity to advance our regional and global partnerships.  CCDRs should ensure that their IO, PA, and DSPD planning is consistent with overall U.S. Government (USG) strategic communication objectives.  Since PA and IO both ultimately support the dissemination of information, themes, and messages adapted to their audiences, their activities must be closely coordinated and synchronized to ensure consistent themes and messages are communicated to avoid credibility losses for both the joint force and PA spokesmen.[8]

g.  **Strategic Communication Process.**  CCDRs support USG policies and decisions through their actions and communication activities.  Planning and coordination of these actions and communication activities is performed through a strategic communication process directed by the CDR and informed by input from the chain of command and other non-military organizations and partners.  The intent is to inform and influence intended foreign audiences about a wide array of joint operations, including transition to and from hostilities, security operations, military forward presence, and stability operations.  These communication actions are primarily accomplished through PA, IO capabilities, CMO, and military-to-military activities.  The synchronization of PA, IO, CMO, and military-to-military activities is essential for effective strategic communication.

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[8]JP 3-08, Vol I, 17 March 2006

At the operational level, CCDRs, staffs, and Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) should consider the impact that PA, IO, CMO, and military-to-military actions have on the joint operation and on the interagency process. One or more of these elements may also participate in **defense support to public diplomacy** initiatives that directly support DOS public diplomacy goals.

> While CCDRs directly control assigned PA and IO assets, they do not direct those assets engaged in public diplomacy, which are the responsibility of DOS or the local U.S. embassy. This highlights the difference between the CCDR's communication strategy and the interagency nature of strategic communication.

h. **JIACG.** The JIACG can assist in the CCDR's effort to ensure planning for IO, PA, CMO, and military-to-military actions are consistent with overall USG strategic communication objectives. CCDRs should consider including their JIACGs in the communication process to support communication planning and actions that are directly related to the CCDR's communication strategy while supporting the intended effects in all situations. Each of the communication activities under the direction of the CCDRs has the ability to influence and inform key foreign audiences through words and actions to foster understanding of U.S. policy and advance U.S. interests. Collaboratively, they can help shape the operational environment. CCDRs plan, execute, and assess these activities to implement security cooperation plans in support of U.S. embassies' information programs, public diplomacy, and PA programs directly supporting DOD missions (more on JIACGs will follow in later chapters).

> The **JIACG** is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between USG civilian and military operational planners. Representing USG agencies at the combatant command headquarters, the JIACG is a multi-functional, advisory element that facilitates information sharing across the interagency community. JIACG members provide links back to their parent civilian agencies to help synchronize joint force operations with the efforts of USG agencies and departments.
> **(USJFCOM, JWFC, JIE, Commanders Handbook for the JIACG, 1 March 2007)**

i. **Strategic Communication/Plan Levels.** Level 3 (CONPLAN) and level 4 (OPLAN) plans include a strategic communication annex (Annex "Y"). This annex will contain a proposed strategic communication strategy, which includes synchronized information objectives, audiences, themes, and actions to deliver these communications for interagency coordination and implementation. The strategic communication matrix in JOPES Vol. I offers a worksheet to ensure key strategic communication points are considered.

j.   Implementation of a strategic communication strategy requires multiple assets and associated activities to deliver themes and messages.  These can include U.S. and international public diplomacy means, such as senior communicators and figures at home and abroad, respective U.S. and other foreign embassies in the participating nations, public affairs activities, and specific marketing initiatives.[9]

k.   Strategic Communication Integration Groups (SCIG).  Figure I-4 below represents DOD support to the USG strategic communication process.  Standing groups, called Strategic Communication Integration Groups at the Interagency, DOD, and COCOM levels will synchronize strategic communication and assess effects on our national, regional and global objectives.  Strategic communication will be a readily recognizable process within COCOMs.  The process may consist of boards, cells and working groups, and will be coordinated at an appropriate level within the command to positively impact decision cycles.  Integration of strategic communication will include not only PA and IO, but other directorates and external organizations, as appropriate, that affect strategic communication objectives.



**Figure I-4.  DOD Support of USG Strategic Communication**

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[9]JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, 26 December

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# CHAPTER III

# Integrating the Interagency

**U.S. Department of Defense Commanders' Areas of Responsibility**

**U.S. Department of State Regional Bureaus**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs | Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs | Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs |
| Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs | Bureau of African Affairs | Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs |

Note: State of Alaska assigned to NORTHCOM area of responsibility.
Forces based in Alaska remain assigned to PACOM.

# Coordination Challenges
# Geographic COCOMs and DOS Bureaus

| **Geographic COCOMs:** | **DOS Bureaus Covering Geographic COCOMs:** |
|---|---|
| AFRICOM | African Affairs and Near East Affairs |
| CENTCOM | Near East, African, South and Central Asian Affairs |
| EUCOM | Europe Eurasian Affairs |
| NORTHCOM | Western Hemisphere Affairs |
| PACOM | East Asia and Pacific Affairs |
| SOUTHCOM | Western Hemisphere Affairs |

# Introduction to the Interagency and Contingency/Crisis Operations

**PRIMARY UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND DEPARTMENTS**
United States Department of Agriculture
Department of Commerce
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Justice
Department of State
Department of Transportation
Department of the Treasury
Central Intelligence Agency
National Security Council
Peace Corps
United States Agency for International Development/
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
Environmental Protection Agency

**The chapters in this section summarize
interagency players that are engaged primarily with
planners during the JOPP and execution.**

1. **Background**

    a.   In May 1997, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56 "Managing Complex Contingency Operations" was signed, directing the creation of a cohesive program of education and training targeted at Executive agencies.  PDD 56 provided recommendations to promote cohesive planning and management for complex crises.  Its main objective was to create a cadre of professionals familiar with interagency planning and implementation.

    b.   The expression "complex contingency operations," in the words of the National Security Advisor at the time, refers to "crises, including some resulting from natural disasters, that require multi-dimensional responses composed of several components such as political, diplomatic, intelligence, humanitarian, economic, and security: hence the term "complex contingency operations."  The PDD defined "complex contingency operations" as peace operations such as the peace accord implementation operation conducted by NATO in Bosnia (1995-present) and the humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq called Operation Provide Comfort (1991); and foreign humanitarian assistance operations, such as Operation Support Hope in central Africa (1994) and Operation Sea Angel in Bangladesh (1991).

> The interagency is not a formal structure, which resides in a specific location and has its own hierarchy and resources, but a community of agencies that depend on an established process for coordinating executive branch decision-making. Each major policy issue has different sets of actors and different sets of formal and informal guidelines that govern interagency activities.
>
> *JP 3-08*

c.  "Success" in complex foreign crises requires that the interagency simultaneously address all aspects of a crisis -- diplomatic, political, military, humanitarian, economic and social -- in a coordinated fashion. Early operations, such as Restore Hope in Somalia, were plagued by the absence of any integrated planning and by communication and coordination difficulties that resulted from unclear lines of responsibility. The U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and forces deployed under the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II) between late 1992 and early 1995 operated with vague or unclear strategic interests, objectives, and responsibilities during the transfer of policy oversight from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. This contributed to the ensuing calamity and eventual failure and withdrawal of UNOSOM II. While a planning and management procedure involving the entire U.S. policy community might have improved the prospects for success in that ill-fated intervention, the U.S. experience in Somalia challenged the Washington interagency community to examine and correct its policymaking processes and procedures.

d.  These problems were exacerbated by the fact that some of the agencies involved were not regular participants in the national security management structure and most civilian agencies were not organized to respond rapidly to crisis situations. Nearly all participants in the interagency process recognize that coordination problems exist, and many have first-hand experience in the difficulties that arise when these problems are not addressed. Also, unless otherwise directed, PDD-56 did not apply to domestic disaster relief or to relatively routine or small-scale operations, nor to military operations conducted in defense of U.S. citizens, territory, or property, including counter-terrorism and hostage-rescue operations and international armed conflict.

e.  On February 13, 2001 National Security Presidential Directives (NSPD) replaced both Presidential Decision Directives and Presidential Review Directives as an instrument for communicating presidential decisions about the national security policies of the U.S. National security now includes the defense of the U.S. of America, protection of our constitutional system of government, and the advancement of U.S. interests around the globe. National security also depends on America's opportunity to prosper in the world economy. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, established the National Security Council to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. That remains its purpose. The NSC shall advise and assist the president in integrating all aspects of national security policy as it affects the U.S. - domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economics (in conjunction with the National Economic Council (NEC)). The National Security Council system is a process to coordinate executive departments and

agencies in the effective development and implementation of those national security policies.

f.   The most senior interagency organization is the National Security Council (NSC) and, as discussed earlier, it includes six statutory members:  the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Treasury and the National Security Advisor.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Director of Central Intelligence serve as advisors to the Council.  In practice, each administration has chosen to include additional cabinet-level officials to participate in NSC deliberations in response to the President's expressed need for policy advice on national security affairs.

> The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.
> **National Security Act of 1947**

g.   Under the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council administers the interagency process for national security matters.  It emphasizes the need for integration of agency policy to improve overall effectiveness of national security decision-making.

h.   Reporting to the Council are a number of subordinate committees.  Although each administration adjusts these structures as it sees fit, the structure described in Chapter I has been fairly consistent through a number of administrations and will likely be similar to any structure put in place in the future.  In the Bush Administration, NSPD 1 sets the structure of the groups that report to the National Security Council.

i.   It is essential that the necessary resources be provided to ensure that we are prepared to respond in a robust, effective manner.  To foster a durable peace or stability in these situations and to maximize the effect of judicious military deployments, the civilian components of an operation must be integrated closely with the military components.

j.   While agencies of government have developed independent capacities to respond to complex contingencies, military and civilian agencies should operate in a synchronized manner through effective interagency management and the use of special mechanisms to coordinate agency efforts.  Integrated planning and effective management of agency operations early on in an operation can avoid delays, reduce pressure on the military to expand its involvement in unplanned ways, and create unity of effort within an operation that is essential for success of the mission.

2. **Functions of the Interagency Process**

a.   Regardless of how an administration may choose to structure its NSC, the role of the interagency community in the day-to-day management of national security issues remains fairly similar:

- Identify policy issues and questions
- Formulate options
- Raise issues to the appropriate level for decision within the NSC structure
- Make decisions where appropriate
- Oversee the implementation of policy decisions.

b.   The process involves extensive coordination within and among the agencies of the executive branch.  The benefit of the process is that it is thorough and inclusive--each organization brings its own practices and skills to the interagency process.  The drawback is that it can also be slow and cumbersome--each agency also brings its own culture, philosophy and bureaucratic interests.

c.   For the majority of policy issues, the benefits of involving all appropriate actors in the decision-making process outweigh the inefficiencies.  However, when the interagency community has to manage the USG response to a crisis, the inefficiencies inherent in the normal workings of the interagency process can be crippling.

3. **Crisis Management**

There are three characteristics of crisis management that distinguish it from the normal policy-making process.  **First**, the amount of time available for deliberation is comparatively short.  Therefore, the interagency community must have well-established procedures for producing timely policy direction.  **Second**, decisions concerning the response to a crisis must not only be coordinated in Washington, but also must be coordinated and implemented in an integrated manner in the field.  Consequently, the Washington interagency community must not merely decide policy direction, but also carry out the initial planning for the implementation of those decisions.  **Third**, a crisis often involves agencies within the USG that are not normally part of the national security policy-making structure.  Any crisis procedures must not only include these agencies, but also ensure that their perspectives are adequately integrated into the overall USG response.

4. **Interagency Planning During a Crisis**

a.   NSPD-1 abolished the Interagency Working Groups established under PDD/NSC-56. It assigned the oversight of all ongoing and future operations to the appropriate regional NSC/PCCs, which may also choose to create subordinate working groups to provide coordination for operations.

b.   When an incident of national importance arises, information about the potential contingency or crisis, specifically an assessment of the situation to include ongoing U.S.

actions, is provided to the appropriate Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) which manages the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the U.S. Government.  There are six regional and eleven functional NSC/PCCs established under NSPD-1 and each chaired by a person of Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary rank.  Issues are then framed for discussion in the Deputies Committee.  The Deputies Committee further refines the issues and prepares policy options for the Principals Committee.  The Principals Committee then recommends appropriate action to the President.

c.    Although in some cases individual agencies may undertake initial planning for a contingency or crisis, official interagency planning does not begin until the Deputies authorize it.  After authorization, the Deputies Committee tasks the appropriate PCC to begin planning.

d.    The PCC oversees the integrated planning and implementation procedures.  The first task of the PCC is to begin developing the integrated plan.  The integrated plan forces the interagency to discuss and agree on the critical elements of the operation, including the mission, objectives and desired endstate.  The plan also articulates an overall concept of operations for U.S. participation.  Integrated planning should be used whenever the resources of multiple U.S. agencies are called upon to support U.S. objectives in a contingency or crisis.

e.    The Deputies Committee will review the complete plan, including all component mission area plans.  The objective is to synchronize the individual mission area plans.  As a result of this process, the President is provided with a coherent strategy for his final approval and the interagency community is able to transmit coordinated guidance to those tasked to conduct the operations.

f.    After the PCC circulates the strategic-level guidance for the operation (as embodied by the final integrated plan), the initial planning work of the Washington interagency community is completed and focus shifts to the operational and tactical levels.  Once the operation begins, the PCC must monitor the operation's execution and continuously reassess the situation on the ground.  The PCC can recommend modifications to the strategy and implement changes as they are approved.  This is especially important during the transition between phases of the operation and in preparing for the hand-off to either a follow-on operation or the host nation.  This monitoring function is critical whether the operation appears to be going well or not.  When lives of U.S. citizens are at risk and significant U.S. interests are involved, the interagency must provide vigilant oversight.

g.    The PCC is also responsible for conducting the after-action review, which analyzes the operation and distills lessons learned for future operations.  This allows those planning for future operations to benefit from past USG experiences.[1]

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[1]Interagency Management of Complex Crisis Operations Handbook, January 2003, National Defense University and NSPD-1, PDD-56

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# Comparison of United States Agency Organizational Structures

## 1. Overview

   a. **One difficulty of coordinating operations among U.S. agencies is determining counterparts among them**. Another significant difficulty is the determination of the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for a given interagency activity. Organizational differences exist between the military hierarchy and other United States Government (USG) departments and agencies, particularly at the operational level where counterparts to the geographic combatant commander seldom exist. Further, overall lead authority in a contingency or crisis operation is likely to be exercised not by the geographic combatant commander, but by a U.S. ambassador or other senior civilian, who will provide policy and goals for all USG agencies and military organizations in the operation.

   b. Decision making at the lowest levels is frequently thwarted because field coordinators may not be vested with the authority to speak for parent agencies, departments, or organizations. Figure III-1 from JP 3-08, 17 March 2006, below depicts comparative organizational structures using the three "levels of planning."

| COMPARISON OF UNITED STATES AGENCY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | **ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES** | **EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS & AGENCIES** | **STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT** |
| **STRATEGIC** | Secretary of Defense Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Chiefs of Staff Combatant Commander (1) | National Headquarters Department Secretaries Ambassador/Embassy (3) | Governor |
| **OPERATIONAL** | Combatant Commander Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) (2) Defense Coordinating Officer/Defense Coordinating Element | Ambassador/Embassy Liaisons (4) Federal Coordinating Officer or Principal Federal Official Regional Office | State Adjunct General State Coordinating Officer Office of Emergency Services Department/Agency |
| **TACTICAL** | CJTF<br><br>Components Service Functional | Ambassador/Embassy Field Office US Agency for International Development (USAID)/ Office of Foreign Disaster Response Team (DART)/ Liaison (5) Response Team US Refugee Coordinator | National Guard County Commissioner Mayor/Manager<br><br>County City (e.g., Police Department) |

1. The combatant commander, within the context of unified action, may function at both the strategic and operational levels in coordinating the application of all instruments of national power with the actions of other military forces. United States Government (USG) agencies, nongovernmental agencies (NGOs), regional organizations, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and corporations toward theater strategic objectives.
2. The CJTF, within the context of unified action, functions at both the operational and tactical levels in coordinating the application of all instruments of national power with the actions of other military forces, USG agencies, NGOs, regional organizations, IGOs, and corporations toward theater operational objectives.
3. The Ambassador and Embassy (which includes the country team) function at the strategic operational, and tactical levels and may support joint operation planning conducted by the combatant commander or CJTF.
4. Liaisons at the operational level may include the Foreign Policy Advisor or Political Advisor assigned to the combatant commander by the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency liaison officer, or any other US agency representative assigned to the Joint Interagency Coordinating Group or otherwise assigned to the combatant commander's staff.
5. USAID's OFDA provides its rapidly deployable DART in response to international disasters. A DART provides specialists, trained in a variety of diaster relief skills, to assist U.S. embassies and USAID missions with the management of USG response to disasters.

**Figure III-1. Comparison of United States Agency Organizational Structures**

2.  **Organizational Environments**

a.   In order for the interagency process to be successful, it should bring together the interests of multiple agencies, departments, and organizations.  This cohesion is even more complex than the multidimensional nature of military combat operations.  When the other instruments of national power — diplomatic, informational, and economic — are applied, the complexity and the number and types of interactions expand significantly.  The essence of interagency coordination is the effective integration of multiple agencies with their diverse perspectives and agendas.

b.   **The nature of interagency bureaucracy**.  Interagency coordination processes tend to be bureaucratic and diffused, inhibiting the concentration of power within a small or select group of agencies.  The executive branch of the Federal government is organized by function with each department performing certain core tasks.  In executing national security policy, the NSC plays a critical role in overcoming bureaucracy and orchestrating interagency cooperation for its members.

(1) **Core values and requirements**.  Each agency has core values and legal requirements that form the foundation upon which key functions of the agency grow.  In any interaction, all participants must be constantly aware that each agency will continuously cultivate and create external sources of support and maneuver to protect its values and goals.

(2) **Insular vision**.  Individual agency perspective and agendas complicate policy development.  Protection of their institutional prerogatives is often an important driver of the various USG agencies' position, which may not always coincide with a common approach to international security issues.  Agencies often do not recognize another agency's crisis and therefore fail to collaborate externally.

(3) **Reduction of uncertainty**.  Many bureaucracies try to standardize their operations, but often fail to prepare for crisis management.  Uncertainty increases in a crisis and it is likely that compromises will be made.  Compromise may bring the sacrifice of power, security, or prestige.  Uncertainty allows for the coexistence of varying views about the likely outcomes of a given action; these differences in viewpoint often lead to conflicting interests.  An organization will seek to reduce uncertainty and lessen the threat to its own stability.  Information can reduce uncertainty and increase an organization's power.  Thus, information equates to power in interagency coordination, as it provides those who possess it a decided advantage in the decision-making process.

c.   **Consensus within the Department of Defense.**  Before attempting to gain consensus in the interagency arena, it must first be attained within DOD.  The various elements — Office of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, Defense agencies and DOD field activities, Military Departments, and COCOMs — should develop a common position on the appropriate military role in interagency coordination before broadening the discussion to include other agencies,

departments, and organizations.  DOD has a common culture, procedures, and a hierarchical structure.

    d.  **Establishing unifying goals.**  Reaching consensus on unifying goals is an important prerequisite.  Consensus must be constantly nurtured, which is much more difficult if the goals are not clear or change over time.  At the national level, this consensus is usually attained by the NSC staff and usually results in an NSC committee meeting Statement of Conclusions, a Presidential Directive (PD), or an integrated plan establishing the goals of an operation and establishing interagency responsibilities.  The objective is to ensure all USG agencies clearly understand NSC policy objectives and subsequent responsibilities.  Some compromise that limits the freedom of individual agencies may be required to gain consensus.  The greater the number of agencies and the more diverse the goals, the more difficult it is to reach consensus.  A crisis — such as the acts of terrorism of *September 11, 2001* — increases the likelihood that compromises will be made and a consensus can be reached.  Because a common unifying goal is so important, a great deal of time is spent on clarifying and restating the goals.  Because a common threat brings a coalition together, the differences often revolve around ways and means.  Many techniques that have been developed in previous coalition operations may be useful in facilitating interagency, intergovernmental organization (IGO), and non-governmental organization (NGO) cooperation.

    e.  **Mutual needs and interdependence.**  After developing an understanding of other agencies, determine the mutual needs of all participating agencies.  All organizations will strive to maintain their interests, policies, and core values.  These must be considered to facilitate interagency cooperation.  Functional interdependence means that one organization relies upon another to attain an objective.  We need to create an interdependence that is a strong and potentially lasting bond between agencies, departments, and organizations.  For example:

    (1) While not agencies, but organizations, IGOs and NGOs effectively conducted relief operations in Somalia and the early evolutions in the Balkans in the 1990s with the security provided by the Armed Forces of the United States.  These organizations may be able to provide you with excellent information on your area of interest.  For example, on any given day DHL (Dalsey, Hillblom and Lynn**)** may already be flying into an area that we are just starting to look at.  They already may have a communications network, logistics chain and excellent contact with the local populous.

    (2) The Armed Forces of the United States cannot conduct a long-range deployment without Department of State (DOS) securing overflight and en route basing agreements.  Resource interdependence is based on one organization providing certain capabilities that another organization lacks.  This support includes such resources as manpower, logistics, training augmentation, communication, and money and establishes a framework for cooperation.  These interdependencies can develop over time and lead the way to true interagency cooperation.  Ensuring that all organizations share the responsibility for the job and receive appropriate recognition only strengthens these

bonds of interdependence. The purpose of such recognition is to wed all of the engaged agencies to the process by validating and reinforcing their positive participation.[2]

    f.  **Consider Long-Term and Short-Term Objectives.** Long- and short-term objectives should be considered separately. At the strategic level of war, the CCDR may work with policy coordinating committees through the SecDef (in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)) who participates in NSC and ministerial-level discussions, setting long-term policy goals. The CCDR will also confront short-term operational objectives and coordinate with ambassadors, their country teams, multinational and interagency staffs, and task forces.

3.  **Building Coordination.** Harnessing the power of disparate organizations with competing priorities and procedures is a daunting task. The following basic Steps support an orderly and systematic approach to building and maintaining coordination:

    a.  **Forge a Collective Definition of the Problem in Clear and Unambiguous Terms.** Differences in individual assumptions and organizational perspectives can often cloud a clear understanding of the problem. Appropriate representatives from relevant agencies, departments, and organizations, to include field offices, should be involved in planning from the outset. This may include the deployment of an interagency assessment team.

    b.  **Understand the Objectives, End State, and Transition Criteria for Each Involved Organization or Agency.** CDRs and decision makers should seek a clearly defined end state supported by attainable objectives and transition criteria. Not all agencies and organizations will necessarily understand or agree to clearly define the objective with the same sense of urgency or specificity of military planners.

    c.  **Understand the Differences Between U.S. National Objectives, End State and Transition Criteria and those of IGOs and NGOs.** Although appropriate IGOs and NGOs may participate at some level in defining the problem, ultimately their goals and objectives are independent of our own.

    d.  **Establish a Common Frame of Reference.** Differences in terminology and — in the case of foreign organizations — the use of English as a second language complicates coordination. The meaning of the terms "safe zone" or "neutral" to a JFC may have completely different connotations to another agency representative. The operational impact of this potential for misunderstanding is grave. The semantic differences commonly experienced among the Services grow markedly in the interagency, IGO, and NGO arenas. To mitigate this problem, CDRs and their staffs must anticipate confusion and take measures to clarify and establish common terms with clear and specific usage. A good start is to provide common access to JP 1-02,

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[2]Appendixes in Vol II of JP 3-08, March 2006, describe the authority, responsibilities, organization, capabilities and core competencies, and pertinent contact information for many of these agencies, departments, and organizations.

*Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.* This clarification is particularly important for the establishment of military objectives.

e.  **Develop Courses of Action (COAs) or Options.** These should address the problem and achieve the objectives. **CDRs and their staffs should focus on the military enabling capabilities that contribute to national security policy objective attainment and are part of the interagency plan of action.** Resource-sensitive problems require flexible and viable options to lead to good solutions. Providing too few or clearly impractical options or recommending the "middle of the road" approach merely for the sake of achieving consensus is of little service to decision makers. Open debate within the interagency, IGO, and NGO community facilitates the formulation of viable options. Cooperation and synchronization are achieved when interagency coordination allows consideration of all positions. The military planner or CDR's voice will be but one among many at the interagency, IGO, and NGO table.

f.  **Capitalize on Experience.** Review the after-action reports and lessons learned using the Joint and Services lessons learned systems, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) Essential Task Matrix: (http://www.state.gov/s/crs/rls/52959.htm), and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI): (https://pksoi.army.mil/lessons_learned_research/lessons_learned.cfm) to assess proposed COAs. Although usually less formal, agencies outside Department of Defense frequently have their own systems in place, which should be reviewed whenever possible to capitalize on operational experience.

g.  **Establish Responsibility.** A common sense of ownership and commitment toward resolution is achievable when all participants understand what needs to be done and agree upon the means to accomplish it. The resources required for a mission must be painstakingly identified, with specific and agreed upon responsibility assigned to the agencies that will provide them. To receive proper reimbursement from other USG agencies or IGOs for materiel support, careful responsibility and accounting procedures should be established.[3]

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**NEED FOR TRANSITION PLANNING**

In Rwanda, after the 1994 genocide, the provision of potable water was critical to saving thousands of lives. While the Armed Forces of the United States perhaps have the greatest capacity to purify water, this service could not be provided indefinitely. Effective interagency coordination enabled the identification of other sources of reverse osmosis water purification units, associated equipment, support funding, and mutually agreed-upon timelines and procedures for transitioning from military support to IGO and NGO control. Also in 1994, in Haiti the well-conceived transition planning, performed as part of overall interagency coordination, provided for superb transition execution and management. This transition enabled the Armed Forces of the United States to hand over responsibility for key tasks to other agencies, departments, and organizations in a virtually seamless manner.
*Various Sources*

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[3]See JP 1-06, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Financial Management During Joint Operations.

## Local Governance

| | Initial Response | Transformation | Fostering Sustainability |
|---|---|---|---|
| | *Goal: Determine governance structure and establish foundation for citizen participation* | *Goal: Promote legitimate political institutions and participatory processes* | *Goal: Consolidate political institutions and participatory processes* |
| Local Governance Mandate | *Restore essential local public services *Establish mechanisms for local level participation, taking into account history and culture *Establish temporary liaison process between national and local governing institutions | *Determine whether decentralization is appropriate, and if so, its scale and form *Avoid unnecessary conflict with traditional structures | *Provide for local participation in decision-making and for budgetary transparency and oversight *Match revenues with responsibilities *Institutionalize liaison process between national and local governing structures |
| Staffing and Training | *Develop transparent process to vet local officials and civil servants *Initiate local service delivery training and support | *Initiate local level strategic planning *Devise training for officials and staff Establish performance-based civil service system | *Institutionalize training of service delivery, local government, and civil society representatives *Regularize procedures and standards for staffing |
| Services, Resources and Facilities (See Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure, General Infrastructure) | *Assure resources for personnel, supplies, and equipment to deliver essential local services *(I) Identify, rehabilitate, secure, and maintain basic facilities to enable delivery of essential local services | *Create knowledge base and political consensus for rational fiscal policy *Match revenues with responsibilities *(I) Do strategic planning and develop capital improvement budgets for local infrastructure *(I) Seek consensus on local role in national level infrastructure planning that affects localities | *Institutionalize monitoring and evaluation capabilities *Fine tune revenue and disbursement assignments *Ensure access by local governments to market-disciplined national sources of financing |

*Example: Post-Conflict Reconstruction ESSENTIAL TASKS, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization United States Department of State, April 2005*

   h.  **Plan for the Transition of Key Responsibilities, Capabilities, and Functions.** In most multiagency operations, civilian organizations will remain engaged long after the military has accomplished its assigned tasks and departed the operational area. Therefore, prior to employing military forces, it is imperative to plan for the transition of responsibility for specific actions or tasks from military to nonmilitary entities.  This process must begin at the national level.  When interagency, IGO, and NGO transition planning does not occur, military involvement may be needlessly protracted.  As campaign and operation plans and orders are developed, effective transition planning should also be a primary consideration.  CDRs and their staffs should anticipate the impact of transition on the local populace and other organizations.

i.  **Direct All Means Toward Unity of Effort.**  Unity of effort in an operation ensures all means are directed to a common purpose.  Because DOD will often be in a supporting role in this process, it may not be responsible for determining the mission or specifying the participating agencies.  Appropriate organization, C2, and most importantly an understanding of the objectives of the organizations involved, are all means to build consensus and achieve unity of effort, regardless of role.  The reciprocal exchange of information is also a critical enabler in ensuring unity of effort.

4.  **Media Impact on Coordination**

    **The media can be a powerful force in shaping public attitudes and policy development**.  The media often has a dramatic influence on the interagency, IGO, and NGO process — whether at the strategic decision-making level of the NSC or in the field as IGOs and NGOs vie for public attention and necessary charitable contributions. As discussed in Chapter Two, CDRs and their staffs should consider the impact that public affairs (PA) and media relations have on the operation and in the interagency process. The White House Office of Global Communications is the lead agency for developing the national communication strategy.  The State Department's Bureau of International Information Programs is the strategic international communications service for the U.S. foreign affairs community.  CDRs and their staffs should plan for PA activities to function in coordination with national-level communication initiatives.  All participating agencies and organizations need to establish and agree early in the planning process on procedures for media access, issuing and verifying credentials, and briefing, escorting, and transporting of media members and their equipment.  Planners must include the development of PA guidance as part of the interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination before executing the plan.  This guidance provides a common reference for all military and other governmental organizations.  Responsibility for interaction with the media should be established clearly so that, to the extent possible, the media hears a constant theme.  CDRs should identify appropriate spokespersons, and plans should include when, how, and from which locations they will address media.

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# Department of State (DOS)

1. **Overview**

   The Department of State (DOS) is the agency of the USG responsible for planning and implementing the foreign policy of the United States.  As the lead U.S. foreign affairs agency, DOS formulates, represents, and implements the President's foreign policy.  The Secretary of State, the ranking member of the Cabinet and fourth in line of presidential succession, is the President's principal advisor on foreign policy and the person chiefly responsible for U.S. representation abroad.  (See Appendix I)

2. **The Department of State Overseas**

   a.   The United States has diplomatic relations with some 180 of the 191 countries in the world and with many IGOs. DOS takes the leading role in maintaining and improving relationships with these countries and organizations.  DOS is represented by its core staff of 6,700 Foreign Service personnel.  They are located in Washington D.C., and distributed among our nearly 260 U.S. embassies, consulates-general, consulates, and missions to international diplomatic organizations overseas.

   b.   A U.S. mission is the basic unit for the conduct of bilateral diplomacy with foreign governments overseas.  They are headed by a chief of mission (COM), normally an ambassador — who is a Presidential appointee and the President's personal representative.  As such, the COM is the senior U.S. official in the country.  By law, COMs coordinate, direct, and supervise all USG activities and representatives posted in the foreign country to which they are accredited.  Bilateral COMs do not, however, exercise control of U.S. personnel attached to and working for the head of a U.S. Mission to an IGO or U.S. military personnel operating under the command of a geographic CCDR.  Each bilateral COM has an agreement with the geographic CCDR delineating which Defense Department personnel fall under the responsibility of each for security.

   c.   Overseas, the Foreign Service is assisted by another 10,000 career Foreign Service National employees, who are mostly citizens of the host country.  Also, more than 1,600 U.S. Marines are on deputation to DOS as Marine Security Guards.

3. **Capabilities and Core Competencies**

   a.   As the lead foreign affairs agency, DOS has the primary role in:

   (1) Leading interagency coordination in developing and implementing foreign policy.

   (2) Managing the foreign affairs budget and other foreign affairs resources, manages the allocation of resources in conducting foreign relations.

(3) Leading and coordinating U.S. representation abroad, conveying U.S. foreign policy to foreign governments and IGOs through U.S. embassies and consulates in foreign countries and diplomatic missions to international organizations.

(4) Conducting negotiations and concluding agreements and treaties on issues ranging from trade to nuclear weapons.

(5) Coordinating and supporting international activities of other U.S. agencies and officials.

b.   All foreign affairs activities — U.S. representation abroad, foreign assistance programs, countering international crime, foreign military training programs, the services the Department provides, and more — are paid for by the foreign affairs budget, which represents little more than 1% of the total federal budget.  This small investment is the key to maintaining U.S. leadership, which promotes and protects the interests of our citizens by:

(1) Promoting peace and stability in regions of vital interest.

(2) Creating jobs at home by opening markets abroad.

(3) Helping developing nations establish stable economic environments that provide investment and export opportunities.

(4) Bringing nations together to address global problems such as cross-border pollution, the spread of communicable diseases, terrorism, nuclear smuggling, and humanitarian crises.

c.   The services the Department provides include:

(1) Protecting and assisting U.S. citizens living or traveling abroad.

(2) Assisting U.S. businesses in the international marketplace.

(3) Coordinating and providing support for international activities of other U.S. agencies (local, state, or federal government), official visits overseas and at home, and other diplomatic efforts.

(4) Keeping the public informed about U.S. foreign policy and relations with other countries and providing feedback from the public to administration officials.

d.   A key DOS function is assembling coalitions to provide military forces for U.S.-led or other multinational operations.  We enlist support for operations led by the UN Peacekeeping Office, pursuant to a Security Council resolution, and for regional or sub-regional peacekeeping effort.  In coordination with the NSC and DOD, DOS contacts foreign governments at the highest level to request participation of their forces in a

planned multinational operation.  When forces are offered for U.S. led operations, the DOS may formally accept them from the foreign government and arrange for military-to-military contact between the foreign and U.S. forces to resolve the terms of cooperation. Once a foreign government has committed its forces to the multinational effort, DOS and DOD officials work together to ensure that the foreign government remains informed of the direction of the effort and committed to participation.

4. **Interagency Relationships**

a. **The State Department's principal roles in its relationship with DOD are to ensure that Defense activities support national foreign policy and to facilitate Defense activities overseas.**  In performance of the first role, DOS attends interagency meetings, initiates requests for DOD support, responds to requests from the Joint Staff and OSD and CDRs for a foreign policy review of DOD proposed activities, and alerts DOD to Defense activities of foreign policy concern that have come to DOS attention.  In its role as facilitator of Defense activities overseas, DOS approaches foreign governments through high-level visits, diplomatic representations by U.S. missions overseas, or contact with foreign government representatives in the U.S. to negotiate agreements or obtain authorization for Defense activities in the sovereign territory of the foreign country.

b. **In recognition of the impact that DOD activities have on U.S. foreign affairs, DOS has assigned a single bureau, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM), to be its primary interface with DOD.**  PM Bureau manages political-military relations throughout the world, including training and assistance for foreign militaries, and works to maintain global access for U.S. military forces.  PM promotes responsible U.S. defense trade, while controlling foreign access to militarily significant technology, through export controls.  PM also coordinates U.S. programs that help rid countries of landmines and other conventional weapons.  PM helps protect national security by leading interagency efforts to plan for future crises — including planning U.S. responses to cyber-attacks against vital computer networks or to nuclear, biological, or chemical attacks overseas.

c. DOS is also the coordinator of the process for interagency consideration of proposals to enter into treaties or other formal agreements with foreign governments, known as the "Circular 175" process.  <u>No USG agency is permitted to enter into a formal agreement of any kind with a foreign government, nor even propose an agreement, until it has received "Circular 175" authorization</u>.  The "Circular 175 procedure" refers to regulations developed by the State Department to ensure the proper exercise of the treaty-making power.  Specifically, the Circular 175 procedure seeks to confirm that the making of treaties and other international agreements by the United States is carried out within constitutional and other legal limitations, with due consideration of the agreement's foreign policy implications, and with appropriate involvement by the State Department. There are two kinds of Circular 175 requests:

(1) One calls for the approval of full powers to sign treaties that the President will send to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification.  Since under international law

full powers may be issued only by heads of State and Foreign Ministers, approval of full powers is not a delegable function.

(2) The more typical Circular 175 request is an action memorandum from a bureau or office in the State Department to a Department official at the Assistant Secretary level or above, seeking authority to negotiate, conclude, amend, extend, or terminate an international agreement.  A "blanket" Circular 175 authorization may be appropriate where a series of agreements of the same general type are to be negotiated according to a more or less standard formula.

d.   Overseas, DOS provides the support structure for the representatives of the Departments of Defense, Commerce, Agriculture, Justice, and Homeland Security; the Peace Corps; USAID; and other USG foreign affairs agencies to enable them to conduct U.S. relations with foreign governments and intergovernmental organizations.  In missions that conduct bilateral affairs with the government of a foreign country, the COM coordinates the efforts of the interagency country team, composed of the chief in-country representative of the foreign affairs agencies, to achieve a unified, consistent foreign policy toward the host country.



| CIA | Central Intelligence Agency | DOE | Department of Energy |
|---|---|---|---|
| DHHS | Department of Health and Human Services | DOJ | Department of Justice |
| DHS | Department of Homeland Security | DOS | Department of State |
| DOA | Department of Agriculture | DOT | Department of Transportation |
| DOC | Department of Commerce | EPA | Environmental Protection Agency |
| DOD | Department of Defense | TREAS | Department of Treasury |
| | USAID    US Agency for International Development | | |

**Figure III-2.  Integrating the Interagency**

5. **Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Structure in Foreign Countries**

   a.   **The Mission.**  As discussed earlier, the U.S. has bilateral diplomatic relations with some 180 of the world's 191 countries.  The U.S. bilateral representation in the foreign country, known as the diplomatic mission, is established in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, of which the U.S. is a signatory.  DOS provides the core staff of a mission and administers the presence of representatives of other USG agencies in the country.  A mission is led by a COM, usually the ambassador, but at times the chargé des affaires, ad interim (the chargé), when no U.S. ambassador is accredited to the country or the ambassador is absent from the country.  The deputy chief of mission (DCM) is second in charge of the mission and usually assumes the role of chargé in the absence of the COM.  For countries with which U.S. has no diplomatic relations, the embassy of a friendly country often accepts the duty of watching out for U.S. affairs in the country and at times houses an interests section staffed with USG employees.  In countries where an IGO is headquartered, the U.S. has a multilateral mission to the IGO in addition to the bilateral mission to the foreign country.

      (1) **The Ambassador.**  The ambassador is the personal representative of the President to the government of the foreign country or to the IGO to which he or she is accredited.  In the absence of the President of the United States, the Ambassador is the highest ranking U.S. official in the country to which he or she is accredited and is personally responsible for the conduct of all USG interests and personnel in the country.  The Ambassador reports to the President through the Secretary of State or directly, and represents all U.S. agencies, not just the DOS.  The COM is responsible for recommending and implementing national policy regarding the foreign country or IGO.  He or she grants, and may withdraw or withhold, country clearance to all U.S. personnel who seek to enter the foreign country.  He or she oversees the activities of all USG employees in the country including all military personnel, but the COM does not exercise command authority over military personnel under a CCDR, nor does the COM exercise command authority over U.S. troops serving under an international organization's command.  The President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints the ambassador.  The ambassador has extraordinary decision-making authority as the senior USG official on the ground during crises.

      (2) **The Deputy Chief of Mission.**  The DCM is chosen from the ranks of career foreign service officers through a rigorous selection process to be the principal deputy to the ambassador.  Although not appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, the DCM wields considerable power, especially when acting as the COM while in chargé status.

      (3) **The Embassy.**  The headquarters of the mission is the embassy, located in the political capital city of the HN, and is to have regular access to the HN leadership.  Although the various USG agencies that make up the mission may have individual headquarters elsewhere in the country, the embassy is the focal point for interagency

coordination. The main building of the embassy is termed the chancery; the ambassador's house is, technically, "the Embassy" but it is known as the residence. Each embassy has an associated consular section, frequently located in the chancery, to provide services to U.S. citizens (i.e., most also issue visas to foreigners wishing to travel to the U.S.).

(4) **Consulates.** The size or principal location of commercial activity in some countries necessitates the establishment of one or more consulates — branch offices of the mission located at a distance from the embassy. A consulate is headed by a principal officer. In addition to providing consular services, the consulate is the focal point of interagency coordination for the assigned consular district.

b. **The Chief of Mission.** The bilateral COM has command authority over all USG personnel in country, except for those assigned to a COCOM, a USG multilateral mission, or an IGO. The COM may be accredited to more than one country. The COM interacts daily with DOS's strategic-level planners and decision-makers. The COM provides recommendations and considerations for crisis-action planning directly to the geographic CCDR and CDR of a JTF. While forces in the field under a geographic CCDR are not under the command of a COM, the COM may grant or deny country clearance to U.S. forces to enter the country to which he or she is accredited. COMs and CCDRs confer regularly to coordinate U.S. military activities with the foreign policy direction being taken by the USG toward the host country. The COM's political role is crucial to the success of military operations involving the Armed Forces of the United States. In addition, each COM has a formal agreement with the geographic CCDR detailing which DOD personnel fall under the force protection responsibility of each.

c. **The Country Team.** The country team, headed by the COM, is the senior in-country interagency coordinating body. It is composed of the COM, DCM, the senior member of each U.S. department or agency in country, and other USG personnel as determined by the COM. Each member presents the position of his or her parent organization to the country team and conveys country team considerations back to the parent organization. The COM confers with the country team to develop foreign policy toward the host country and to disseminate decisions to the members of the mission.

(1) The country team system provides the foundation for rapid interagency consultation and action on recommendations from the field and effective execution of U.S. programs and policies, including many of those conducted by regional CCDRs. Under the country team concept, agencies are required to coordinate their plans and operations and keep one another and the COM informed of their activities. Country team members who represent agencies other than the State Department are routinely in contact with their parent agencies. Issues arising within the country team can become interagency issues at the national level if they are not resolved locally or when they have broader national implications.

(2) **In almost all bilateral missions, DOD is represented on the country team by the U.S. Defense Attaché's Office (USDAO) and the Security Assistance Organization (SAO)** (called by various specific names, such as the Office of Defense Cooperation, the Security Assistance Office, the Military Group, etc., largely governed by the preference of the receiving country). The USDAO and the SAO are key military sources of information for interagency coordination in foreign countries.

(a) **USDAO.** The USDAO is an office of Service attachés managed by the Defense Intelligence Agency. A U.S. defense attaché (DATT) heads the defense attaché office in country and is a member of the country team. The DATT is normally the senior Service attaché assigned to the mission. The attaches serve as liaisons with their HN counterparts and are valuable sources of information for the COM and CCDR on the military affairs of the HN. The DATT may be accredited to more than one country. The Service attachés report to the ambassador, but coordinate with and represent their respective Military Departments on Service matters. The attachés assist in the foreign internal defense (FID) program by exchanging information with the CCDR's staff on HN military, political, humanitarian, religious, social, and economic conditions and interagency coordination.

(b) **SAO.** The SAO, the most important FID-related military activity under the supervision of the COM, oversees the provision of U.S. military assistance to the HN. The SAO — which may comprise a military assistance advisory group, another military activity, or a security assistance officer — operates under the direction of the COM but reports administratively to the CCDR and is funded by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. The SAO assists HN security forces by planning and administering military aspects of the security assistance program. The SAO also helps the country team communicate HN assistance needs to policy and budget officials within the USG. In addition, the SAO provides oversight of training and assistance teams temporarily assigned to the HN. The SAO is prohibited by law from giving direct training assistance. Instead, training is normally provided through special teams and organizations assigned to limited tasks for specific periods (e.g., mobile training teams, technical assistance teams, quality assurance teams).

(c) **U.S. Defense Representative (USDR).** The USDR will normally be the senior military official assigned to permanent duty with the mission. The USDR is the in-country focal point for planning, coordinating, and executing support to USG officials for in-country U.S. defense issues and activities that are not under the purview of the parent DOD components. The USDR is also the in-country representative of the SecDef, the CJCS, and the geographic CCDR and is responsible (under the direction of the COM) for coordinating administrative and security matters for all DOD elements assigned to the country, except those identified in the COM/CCDR MOU as under the latter's responsibility for force protection purposes.

d. **Geographic Combatant Commands.** To effectively bring all instruments of national power to theater and regional strategies as well as campaign and operation plans, **CCDRs are augmented with representatives from other USG agencies**.

(1)  The Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) participates in deliberate, crisis, and transition planning.  Representing USG agencies at the HQ of the geographic and selected functional COCOMs, each JIACG is a multi-functional, advisory element that represents the civilian departments and agencies and facilitates information sharing across the interagency community.  **It provides regular, timely, and collaborative day-to-day support for planning, coordination, preparation, and implementation of interagency activities.** Specific objectives are to:

(a)  Improve operational interagency campaign planning and execution.

(b)  Exercise secure collaboration processes and procedures with participating agencies.

(c)  Promote habitual relationships among interagency planners.

(2)  Geographic CCDRs and, increasingly, JTF CDRs are assigned a political advisor (POLAD) by DOS.  The POLAD provides USG foreign policy perspectives and diplomatic considerations and establishes linkages with U.S. embassies in the AOR or joint operations area (JOA) and with DOS.  The POLAD supplies information regarding objectives of DOS that are relevant to the geographic CCDR's theater strategy or CDR, joint task force's (CJTF's) plans.  The POLAD is directly responsible to the CCDR or CJTF and can be of great assistance in interagency coordination.

(3)  Other USG agencies may detail liaison personnel to COCOM staffs to improve interagency coordination.  For example, intelligence representatives may be assigned to staffs of geographic COCOMs to facilitate intelligence and antiterrorism support.

6.  **DOS/USAID FY 2009 Budget Request Highlights**

a.   Fiscal Year 2009 International Affairs Budget for the Department of State, USAID and other foreign affairs agencies totals $39.5 billion.  The President's budget did not include a detailed FY 2009 supplemental request within the Budget.  Instead, when needs are better known, the Administration will request additional funds for foreign operations, including costs related to supporting freedom in Iraq and building a stable Afghanistan.

b.   A strategic priority of the Foreign Assistance Budget request is strengthening the core capabilities of USAID to effectively deliver U.S. foreign assistance on the ground with local partners, where programs have the greatest impact.  Any effort to improve development initiatives will require a significantly increased overseas presence, together with expanded technical and stewardship capabilities.  The FY 2009 request includes funding for 300 new Foreign Service Officers for USAID.

c.   **Peace and Security (P&S):** Programs funded under this objective help nations establish the conditions and capacity to achieve peace, security, and stability and respond effectively to threats to national or international security and stability. The FY 2009

budget provides $7.7 billion, representing more than one-third of the State-USAID portion of this year's request.  Compared to the FY 2008 appropriation, funding under this objective increases by 13% (counter-terrorism, bilateral and multilateral military engagement, transnational crime, eliminating weapons of mass destruction, and combating trafficking in persons).

d. **Governing Justly and Democratically (GJD):**  Consistent with the President's Freedom Agenda, programs under this objective promote freedom and strengthen effective democracies with the goal of moving countries along a continuum toward democratic consolidation.  GJD assistance supports the rule of law and human rights, good governance, political competition and consensus-building and civil society and access to information. The FY 2009 budget includes $1.7 billion for programs under this objective, representing 8% of the State-USAID portion of the Foreign Assistance budget request.  Compared to the FY 2008 appropriation, the request for FY 2009 represents an increase of $364 million or 27% for GJD programs overall.  Highlights of the request include funding for the 2009 Afghanistan elections, post-elections assistance to democratic forces in Pakistan, and increased assistance toward promoting democracy in authoritarian regimes such as Burma and Zimbabwe.

e. **Investing in People (IIP):** This program objective provides funding to programs that help nations achieve sustainable improvements in the well-being and productivity of their populations through effective and accountable investments in education, health, and other social services and protection for especially vulnerable populations.  The FY 2009 budget provides $7.7 billion or more than one third of the State-USAID portion of the Foreign Assistance budget request for FY 2009. The $6.8 billion requested for the health program area is dominated by funding for HIV/AIDS ($5.1 billion), maternal and child health ($704.1 million), malaria ($385.5 million), and family planning and reproductive health ($332 million). The request also includes $25 million for the President's new Neglected Tropical Diseases Initiative. The FY 2009 request for $758 million for education includes funding to ramp up efforts in the second year of the President's Initiative to Expand Education to the World's Poorest, adding $61 million for basic education in six countries and $33 million for Communities of Opportunity in up to ten countries, as well as to address the basic education needs of students currently enrolled in U.S. program supported schools, and support exchange programs in higher education designed to strengthen leadership capacities for economic and democratic development. For FY 2009, approximately 31% of total funding for this objective is requested for global programs.

f. **Economic Growth (EG):** The FY 2009 request of $2.3 billion for Economic Growth represents an increase of 6% over the FY 2008 enacted level. The FY 2009 request includes a significant shift in regional focus, with funding for EG programs in Africa increasing by 29%, to $628 million. This strategic reallocation reflects both concern with Africa's continued economic marginalization and optimism that the growing commitment of many African countries to economic reform and transformation offers an historic opportunity to finally break the cycle of poverty and instability in that region. EG programs promote transformational, long-term development by supporting the efforts of developing countries to improve and streamline their governance, combat

corruption, create a hospitable business environment, and empower the poor to take advantage of trade and other market opportunities. EG programs also stress the importance of public-private partnerships, and recognize that private sector-led economic growth provides the only means for developing countries to generate the funds they need to invest in their own people's education, health, and other needs, and to eventually emerge from dependence on foreign aid.

g.   **Humanitarian Assistance (HA):**  Funding under this objective saves lives, alleviates suffering, and minimizes the economic costs of conflict, disasters, and displacement.  The FY 2009 budget provides $2.1 billion, representing 9% of the State-USAID portion of the Foreign Assistance budget request for FY 2009.  However, HA funding is generally not done on a country-by country basis and a request for Iraq and Afghanistan is not specifically included in the FY 2009 request.  Three HA accounts – $897 million of the P.L. 480 Title II food aid request that is counted towards the HA objective, Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA, requested at $762 million in HA) and International Disaster and Famine Assistance (IDFA, requested at $298 million) – represent 92% of the HA objective.  Along with the President's Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) fund, all are centrally managed as contingency accounts in order to maintain sufficient flexibility for funds to be quickly provided during crises to save lives, alleviate human suffering, meet refugee and migration needs, and reduce the economic and social impact of disasters as they occur.

# United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/ Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)

1. **Overview**

   a.   USAID plays both a major role in U.S. foreign policy and a principal role in interagency coordination.  USAID falls under the policy direction of the Secretary of State.  The United States has reformed foreign assistance organization, planning and implementation in order to maximize the impact of our foreign assistance dollars to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives.  The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) now serves concurrently as the Deputy Secretary of State and Director of United States Foreign Assistance.  In this capacity, the Director of Foreign Assistance has developed a Strategic Framework for U.S. Foreign Assistance, within which the Department of State and USAID are developing a fully integrated process for foreign assistance policy, planning, budgeting, and implementation.  All $26.1 billion of U.S. foreign assistance for FY 2009 under authority of the Department of State and USAID, as well as resources provided by Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) (see Appendix J for more MCC information), are being applied to the achievement of a single overarching goal—transformational diplomacy:

   > *To help build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.*

   b.   USAID administers and directs the U.S. foreign economic assistance program and acts as the lead Federal agency for U.S. foreign disaster assistance.  USAID works largely in support of DOS and manages a worldwide network of country programs for economic and policy reforms that generates sound economic growth, encourages political freedom and good governance, and invests in human resource development.  Response to natural and manmade disasters is one of the Agency's primary missions.

2. **Authority and Responsibilities**

   a.   USAID administers a wide variety of programs in the developing world, Central and Eastern Europe, and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, as reflected in their FY 2009 funding request.  It administers certain U.S. bilateral assistance programs including the Child Survival and Health Programs Fund ($1.57 billion); the Development Assistance (DA) account, and other specialized DA accounts for credit programs and disaster assistance ($1.63 billion); the Economic Support Fund ($3.32 billion); Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States (AEEB) ($275 million); Assistance for the Independent States of the former Soviet Union (FSA) under the Freedom Support Act ($346 million); and Public Law 480, title II, ("Food For Peace") ($1.22 billion)

b. USAID focuses much of its efforts on six areas of special concern: agriculture, the environment, child survival, HIV/AIDS ($4.77 billion FY09), population planning, and basic education. It directs all developmental assistance programs under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Public Law 480, Title II ("Food for Peace") and similar legislation.

c. USAID is also the principal agency charged with coordinating the USG response to declared disasters and emergencies worldwide. Through its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the Agency administers the President's authority to provide emergency relief and long-term humanitarian assistance in response to disasters as declared by the ambassador (also known as the Chief of Mission (COM)) within the affected country or higher Department of State authority. USAID/OFDA may also expedite interventions at the operational and tactical levels through NGOs, IGOs, and other sources of relief capacity.

d. The Administrator of USAID is the Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance.

e. When a disaster declaration has been made by the Ambassador, USAID coordinates the USG response. The Director of OFDA has primary responsibility for initiating this response. The Administrator of USAID, as the Special Coordinator, has delegated the authority to coordinate response to international disasters to OFDA, which is organized under the Agency's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance ($1.33 billion FY09). USAID/OFDA responsibilities include:

(1) Organize and coordinate the total USG disaster relief response.

(2) Respond to embassy and/or mission requests for disaster assistance.

(3) Initiate necessary procurement of supplies, services, and transportation.

(4) Coordinate assistance efforts with operational-level NGOs.

3. **Organizational Structure**

a. USAID consists of a central HQ staff in the Washington, D.C., area and a large number of overseas missions, offices, and regional organizations (see Figure III-3 on the following page).

**UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

| | |
|---|---|
| AFR | African |
| ANE | Asia and the Near East |
| BHR | Bureau of Humanitarian Response |
| CFO | Chief Financial Officer |
| CIO | Chief Information Office |
| E & E | Europe and Eurasia |
| GDA | Global Development Alliance |
| LAC | Latin America and the Caribbean |

**Figure III-3.  United States Agency for International Development**

b.  **Staff Offices and Functional Bureaus.**  Four staff offices and five functional bureaus are responsible for USAID's overall policy formulation, program management, planning, inter and intra-agency coordination, resource allocation, training programs, and liaison with Congress.  International disaster assistance activities are coordinated by OFDA.

c.  **Geographic Bureaus.**  Four bureaus (Africa; Asia and the Near East; Europe and Eurasia; and Latin America and the Caribbean) are the principal USAID line offices, with responsibility for the planning, formulation, and management of U.S. economic development and/or supporting assistance programs in their areas.  There are three types of country organizations; USAID Missions, Offices of USAID Representative, and USAID Sections of the embassy.  In every Embassy, the senior USAID representative is a member of the country team and is under the authority of the Ambassador.

d.  **Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.** OFDA consists of the Office of the Director and three functional divisions: Disaster, Response and Mitigation Division;

Operations Division; and Program Support Division.  It also operates a Crisis Management Center to coordinate disaster assistance operations when necessary, 24 hours a day (Figure III-4 on the following page).

e.  **OFDA Regional Advisors.**  OFDA has regional advisors stationed in Bangkok, Thailand; Katmandu, Nepal; and Nairobi, Kenya.  They are emergency response experts and consultants, long experienced with USAID.  All have security clearances and are known to government officials and UN, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and NGO representatives as well as senior officials in U.S. embassies and USAID missions and offices.



**Figure III-4.  Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance**

f.  **Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART).**  OFDA has developed a response capability called DART as a method of providing rapid response assistance to international disasters.  A DART provides specialists trained in a variety of disaster relief skills to assist U.S. embassies and USAID missions with the management of the USG response to international disasters.  The structure of a DART is dependent on the size, complexity, type and location of the disaster, and the needs of the embassy and/or USAID mission and the affected country.

4. **Capabilities and Core Competencies.** USAID/OFDA's capabilities include the following:

a. To respond to longer-term, complex emergencies such as civil strife, population displacement, and other manmade disasters.

b. To provide useful, and at times critical, information in these areas through its collection of data on U.S. disaster assistance, world disaster histories, U.S. and other donor country actions in case reports, country preparedness reports, and commodity use.

c. To obligate up to $50,000 in cash, in cooperation with the U.S. embassy or mission, for supplies or services to assist disaster victims. (The Agency's International Disaster Assistance budget includes a $75 million appropriation each year for contingency operations.)

d. To make cash grants to local government relief organizations or international voluntary agencies handling emergency relief.

e. To purchase needed relief supplies.

f. To access important data through its Disaster Assistance Logistics Information System.

g. To transport relief supplies to the affected country.

h. To reimburse other USG agencies for disaster relief services.

i. To acquire disaster relief supplies from OFDA stockpiles.

j. To provide additional funds to support activities in the following essential sectors: shelter, water and sanitation, health, food, logistics, and technical assistance.

k. To maintain stockpiles of standard relief commodities in Maryland (United States), Panama, Italy, Guam, and Thailand.

5. **Interagency Relationships**

a. USAID/OFDA has established relationships with several USG agencies and dozens of NGOs and IGOs. In carrying out its responsibilities, USAID/OFDA draws on these agencies and organizations, as required, to coordinate the USG's response to foreign disasters. Similarly, these agencies and organizations look to USAID/OFDA for advice and assistance, as appropriate, in handling their assigned responsibilities. USAID/OFDA currently has agreements with the following:

- USDA's U.S. Forest Service and the Interior Department's Bureau of Land Management, for emergency managers, logisticians, communicators and firefighting experts.
- U.S. Public Health Service and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, for health assessment and to provide medical personnel, equipment, and supplies.

- U.S. Geological Survey, for notification and assessment of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions.

- NOAA, for typhoon, hurricane, and cyclone reporting and assessment.

- FEMA, for training in disaster management, emergency preparedness, and relief for host-country disaster specialists.

- DOD, for matters concerning defense equipment and personnel provided to the affected country and for arranging DOD transportation.  Department of Defense Directive 5100.46, *Foreign Disaster Relief*, establishes the relationship between DOD and USAID/OFDA.

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It is the policy that the DOD Components will participate in foreign disaster relief operations only after a determination is made by the Department of State that foreign disaster relief shall be provided.  The Department of State will then send a request to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), which indicates:

-The country(s), international organizations and/or individuals to be assisted; the form of assistance requested; the types and amounts of material and services requested; the amount of funds allocated to the Department of Defense accompanied by symbols showing the chargeable appropriation, allotment, and obligation accounts; and such other information as is needed to permit effective participation by the DOD Components in a foreign disaster relief operation.

- Subject to overriding military mission requirements, the Department of Defense, as appropriate, will respond rapidly to Department of State requests.  Nothing in this Directive should be construed as preventing a military commander at the immediate scene of a foreign disaster from undertaking prompt relief operations when time is of the essence and when humanitarian considerations make it advisable to do so.  The commander should report at once the action taken and request guidance in accordance with the provisions of this Directive.

*DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief*

b.   The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs) is DOD's primary point of contact.  The Joint Staff point of contact for the DOD Foreign Disaster Relief/Humanitarian Assistance Program is the Chief, Logistics Readiness Center, and J-4.  When USAID/OFDA requests specific services from DOD (typically airlift), USAID/OFDA pays for those services/commodities.  The geographic CCDR can directly coordinate with OFDA to obtain military and civilian assistance efforts. Additionally, DOD independently has statutory authority to respond to overseas manmade or natural disasters when necessary to prevent loss of life.  Under the statute's implementing executive order (EO), the SecDef provides such assistance at the direction of the President or in consultation with the Secretary of State.

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# The Nongovernmental Organizations' Connection to Joint Operations

1. **Overview**

   a.   Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, NGOs are frequently on scene before the U.S. military and are willing to operate in high-risk areas.  They will most likely remain long after military forces have departed. **NGOs are independent, diverse, flexible, grassroots-focused, primary relief providers.**

   b.   NGOs provide assistance to over 250 million people annually.  Because of their capability to respond quickly and effectively to crises, they can lessen the civil-military resources that a CDR would otherwise have to devote to an operation.  Although philosophical differences may exist between military forces and NGOs, **short-term objectives are frequently very similar**.  Discovering this common ground is essential.  A very important issue to keep in mind when dealing with NGOs is that they will likely object to any sense that their activities have been co-opted for the achievement of military objectives.  Their mission is one of a humanitarian nature and not one of assisting the military in accomplishing its objectives.  Ultimately, activities and capabilities of NGOs must be factored into the CDR's assessment of conditions and resources and integrated into the selected COA.

   c.   **The Role of NGOs.**  NGOs are playing an increasingly important role in the international arena.  Working alone, alongside the U.S. military, or with other U.S. agencies, NGOs are assisting in all the world's trouble spots where humanitarian or other assistance is needed.  NGOs may range in size and experience from those with multimillion dollar budgets and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief to newly created small organizations dedicated to a particular emergency or disaster. **The capability, equipment and other resources, and expertise vary greatly from one NGO to another.**  NGOs are involved in such diverse activities as education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, and development programs.  The sheer number of lives they affect, the resources they provide, and the moral authority conferred by their humanitarian focus enable NGOs to wield a great deal of influence within the interagency and international communities.  In fact, individual organizations are often funded by national and international donor agencies as implementing partners to carry out specific functions.  Similarly, internationally active NGOs may employ indigenous groups, such as the Mother Teresa Society in Kosovo, as local implementing partners.

   d.   **The Increasing Number of NGOs. A JTF or MNF may encounter scores of NGOs in a JOA.**  In 1999 in Kosovo, more than 150 IGOs and NGOs had applied to be registered in the province.  Over 350 such agencies are registered with the USAID. Inter-Action, a U.S.-based consortium of NGOs has a membership of over 160 private agencies that operate in 180 countries.  The International Council of Voluntary Agencies has a predominantly European membership numbering in the hundreds.  Over 1,500 NGOs

around the world are registered with the UN's Department of Public Information, while over 2,400 have 'consultative status' with its Economic and Social Council.  It is important to note that NGOs may not vet their members as thoroughly as government and military organizations.  Some NGOs have had involvement in funding and facilitating the travel of terrorist elements.  While this is not the norm, it is an issue that merits consideration in the interagency, IGO, and NGO operations environment.

e.  **Military and Nongovernmental Organization Relations.**  Whereas the military's initial objective is stabilization and security for its own forces, **NGOs seek to address humanitarian needs first and are often unwilling to subordinate their objectives to achievement of an end state which they had no part in determining**. The extent to which specific NGOs are willing to cooperate with the military can thus vary considerably.  NGOs desire to preserve the impartial character of their operations, accept only minimal necessary assistance from the military, and ensure that military actions in the relief and civic action are consistent with the standards and priorities agreed on within the civilian relief community.

(1) The extensive involvement, local contacts, and experience gained in various nations make private organizations valuable sources of information about local and regional affairs and civilian attitudes, and they are sometimes willing to share such information on the basis of collegiality.  Virtually all IGO and NGO operations interact with military operations in some way — they use the same (normally limited) lines of communications; they draw on the same sources for local interpreters and translators; and they compete for buildings and storage space.  Thus, sharing of operational information in both directions is an essential element of successful civil-military operations (CMO).

(2) While some organizations will seek the protection afforded by armed forces or the use of military transport to move relief supplies to, or sometimes within, the operational area, others may avoid a close affiliation with military forces, preferring autonomous, impartial operations.  This is particularly the case if U.S. military forces are a belligerent to a conflict in the operational area.  Most NGOs are outfitted with very little, if any, equipment for personal security, preferring instead to rely upon the good will of the local populace for their safety.  **Any activity that strips an NGO's appearance of impartiality, such as close collaboration with one particular military force, may well eliminate that organization's primary source of security.**  NGOs may also avoid cooperation with the military out of suspicion that military forces intend to take control of, influence, or even prevent their operations.  CDRs and their staffs should be sensitive to these concerns and consult these organizations, along with the competent national or international authorities, to identify local conditions that may impact effective military-NGO cooperation.

(3) PA planning should include the identification of POCs with NGOs that will operate in the JOA.  Military spokespersons should comment on NGO operations based on approved PA guidance and make referrals of media queries to the appropriate organization's spokesperson.

f.  **Military Support of NGOs.**  The SecDef may determine that it is in the national interest to task U.S. military forces with missions that bring them into close contact with (if not support of) IGOs and NGOs.  In such circumstances, it is mutually beneficial to closely coordinate the activities of all participants.  A climate of cooperation between IGOs, NGOs, and military forces should be the goal.  The creation of a framework for structured civil-military interaction, such as a CMOC, allows the military and NGOs to meet and work together in advancing common goals.  Taskings to support IGOs and NGOs are normally for a short-term purpose due to extraordinary events.  In most situations, logistics, communications, and security are those capabilities most needed.  It is, however, crucial to remember that in such missions the role of the armed forces should be to enable, not perform, IGO and NGO tasks.  Military CDRs and other decision makers should also understand that mutually beneficial arrangements between the armed forces and other organizations may be critical to the success of the campaign or operation plan.

*See Vol II, JP 3-08, Appendix B "Nongovernmental Organizations." Annex A of Appendix B contains "Inter-Action's Geographic Index of NGOs."*

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# The Role of Intergovernmental Organizations

1.  **The Role of Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) may be established on a global or regional basis and may have general or specialized purposes.** NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are regional security organizations, while the African Union (formerly the Organization of African Unity) and the Organization of American States are general regional organizations. A new trend toward sub-regional organizations is also evident, particularly in Africa where, for example, the Economic Community of West African States has taken on some security functions. These organizations have defined structures, roles, and responsibilities, and may be equipped with the resources and expertise to participate in complex interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination. The following describes formal or informal ties between the United States and some of the largest of these regional and IGO security organizations.

    a.  **The United Nations.** Coordination with the UN begins at the national level with DOS, through the U.S. permanent representative (PERMREP) to the UN, who has the rank and status of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary. The U.S. PERMREP is assisted at the U.S. Mission to the UN by a military assistant who coordinates appropriate military interests primarily with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO).

> **UNOCHA Mission Statement:**
> "To mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors in order to: alleviate human suffering in natural disasters and emergencies; promote preparedness and prevention efforts to reduce future vulnerability; facilitate sustainable solutions by addressing root causes; and advocate for the rights of the people in need."

    (1) Civil Military Coordination Section (CMCS): UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) is the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basis strategies range from coexistence to cooperation with the military, with a strong emphasis attached to coordination as a shared responsibility. The focal point for UN-CMCoord in the United Nations system is the Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). Based in Geneva, Switzerland, the Section provides the international community with a range of services including common training, support for exercises, internationally agreed guidelines and operational capabilities.

(2) **The UN normally conducts peace operations or FHA under the provisions of a resolution or mandate from the Security Council or the General Assembly.** Mandates are developed through a political process which generally requires compromise, and sometimes results in ambiguity.  As with all military operations, UN mandates are implemented by U.S. forces through orders issued by the SecDef through the CJCS.  During such implementation, the political mandates are converted to workable military orders.

(3) **UN Peace and Humanitarian Organizational Structure.**  The UN HQ coordinates peace operations (PO) and FHA around the world.  It does not, however, have a system for planning and executing these operations that is comparable to that of the United States.  The UN organizational structure consists of the HQ and the operational field elements.  Thus, there is a strategic and tactical-level equivalent to the Armed Forces of the United States, but no operational counterpart.

(a) **At the HQ, the Secretariat plans and directs missions.**  Normally, the UNDPKO serves as the HQ component during contingencies involving substantial troop deployments.  Some 'peace building' missions with small numbers of military observers are directed by UNOCHA.  UNOCHA is a coordinating body that pulls together the efforts of numerous humanitarian/relief organizations and is the vehicle through which official requests for military assistance are normally made.

(b) Supplemental U.S. support by temporary augmentation from the Joint Staff and Service HQ staffs may be provided for specific requirements.  UN special missions, such as the UN Protection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, operate under the direction of the UN Secretary General (SYG).

(c) Field level coordination is normally determined on an ad hoc basis, depending on which relief organization is playing the major role.  The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Program, and UNDPKO are often the logical candidates.  UNOCHA may deploy a field team to coordinate FHA, or the Emergency Relief Coordinator may designate the resident UN coordinator as Humanitarian Coordinator.  Coordination with the UN Resident Coordinator may be degraded if UN personnel are pulled out in the face of increased threats.

(d) In certain situations the UN SYG may appoint a Special Representative who reports directly to the SYG but also advises UNDPKO and UNOCHA at UN HQ.  The Special Representative may direct day-to-day operations, as was the case in the UN operation in Cambodia.

(4) **United States Military Support.**  The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, and Executive Order 10206 (Support of Peaceful Settlements of Disputes) authorize various types of U.S. military support to the UN, either on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis.

(a)  U.S. military operations in support of the UN usually fall within Chapter VI (Peaceful Settlement of Disputes) or Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) of the UN Charter.[4]

(b) UN-sponsored peace operations normally employ a multinational force (MNF) under a single CDR.  The MNF CDR is appointed by the SYG with the consent of the UN Security Council and reports directly to the SYG's Special Representative or to the SYG.  **When the United States provides support to an UN-sponsored peace operation, the U.S. military structure that is used to conduct multinational operations normally is a JTF.**  The CJTF should expect to conduct operations as part of an MNF.  U.S. forces may participate across a range of military operations in concert with a variety of USG agencies, military forces of other nations, local authorities, IGOs, and NGOs.

(c) **The chain of command from the President to the lowest U.S. CDR in the field remains inviolate.**  On a case-by-case basis, the President may place U.S. forces participating in multilateral peace operations under UN auspices under the operational control (OPCON) (with modifications) of a competent UN CDR for specific UN operations authorized by the Security Council.  <u>The President retains and will never relinquish command authority over U.S. forces</u>.  The greater the U.S. military role, the less likely it will be that the United States will agree to have a UN CDR exercise OPCON over U.S. forces.  OPCON for UN multilateral peace operations is given for a specific time frame or mission and includes the authority to assign tasks to U.S. forces already deployed by the President and to U.S. units led by U.S. officers. Within the limits of OPCON, a foreign UN CDR cannot change the mission or deploy U.S. forces outside the operational area agreed to by the President, nor may the foreign UN CDR separate units, divide their supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or change their internal organization.

b.  **The North Atlantic Treaty Organization.**  The NATO experience exemplifies the interagency process on a regional level.  Its evolution has been propelled, often in the face of crisis, by the demands for cooperation that characterize every regional effort.  The durability of NATO is testament to its success in interagency coordination.

(1) NATO membership presently consists of 26 nations.

(2) Coordination of U.S. efforts within NATO begins with the Presidential appointment of a PERMREP, who has the rank and status of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary and is a COM under the Foreign Service Act of 1980.  As with any treaty, U.S. commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty reflects the balance between the power of the President to conduct foreign policy and Congress' power of the purse.  Congress has authorized and regularly funds logistic support for elements of the armed

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[4]See Vol II of JP 3-08, Annex E, "United Nations," of Appendix C, "Regional and Intergovernmental Organizations," for details regarding the UN Charter and Chapter VI and VII of that charter or see: http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/

forces deployed to NATO outside the United States and permits cross-servicing agreements in return for reciprocal support. Beyond day-to-day operations, training exercises, and logistics authorized by statute, employment of U.S. military force with NATO requires Presidential action and may be subject to congressional review, including those employments authorized and limited by the War Powers Act.

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**NATO Member Countries**

**NATO is an Alliance that consists of 26 independent member countries:**

**Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Rep, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.**

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   c. **Public Affairs Planning with Intergovernmental Organizations.**[5] The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD (PA)) provides overall PA guidance and coordinates PA actions affecting IGOs. Planning for support to UN missions will normally include coordination with UN press office personnel through OASD (PA). JTF PA efforts should include the identification of POCs and authorized spokespersons within each IGO.

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[5]See Vol II of JP 3-08, Appendix C for a detailed discussion of these and other "Regional and Intergovernmental Organizations."

# Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization and Nongovernmental Organization

## An Overview

1. **Overview**

   a. **Interagency coordination** is the coordination that occurs between agencies of the U.S. Government (USG), including the Department of Defense (DOD), for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. Similarly, in the context of DOD involvement, inter-governmental organization (IGO) and nongovernmental organization (NGO) coordination refers to coordination between elements of DOD and IGOs or NGOs to achieve an objective.

   b. The integration of U.S. political and military objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into action has always been essential to success at all levels of operation.

   c. The global environment that is characterized by regional instability, failed states, increased weapons proliferation, global terrorism, and unconventional threats to U.S. citizens, interests, and territories, requires even greater cooperation. Attaining our national objectives requires the efficient and effective use of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power supported by and coordinated with that of our allies and various intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and regional security organizations.

   d. Military operations must be strategically integrated and operational and tactically coordinated with the activities of other agencies of the USG, IGOs, NGOs, regional organizations, the operations of foreign forces, and activities of various host nations (HN) agencies. Sometimes the JFC draws on the capabilities of other organizations, sometimes the JFC provides capabilities to other organizations, and sometimes the JFC merely deconflicts his activities with those of others. These same organizations may be involved in pre-hostilities operations, activities during combat, and in the transition to post-hostilities activities. Roles and relationships among agencies and organizations, COCOMs, U.S. state and local governments, and overseas with the U.S. chief of mission (COM), and country team in a U.S. embassy, must be clearly understood. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military and the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power. Successful interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination helps enable the USG to build international support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that efficiently achieve shared goals.

2. **Coordinating Efforts**

   a. A common thread throughout the range of military operations is the involvement of a large number of agencies and organizations — many with indispensable practical

competencies and significant legal responsibilities — that interact with the Armed Forces of the United States and our multinational counterparts.

   b.   **The Military Component.**  Military forces have long coordinated with the headquarters (HQ) or operating elements of USG departments and agencies to include the Department of State (DOS), Department of Justice (DOJ), and Department of Transportation, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the adjutants general of the 50 states and four territories.  Increasingly, participants include state and local agencies, additional USG agencies and departments (e.g., Department of Homeland Security (DHS), coalition partners, IGOs such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), NGOs such as Doctors Without Borders and Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, the United Nations (UN), and agencies of the HN.

   (1) **Because the solution to a problem seldom, if ever, resides within the capability of just one agency, campaign and operation plans (OPLANs) must be crafted to recognize the core competencies of the myriad agencies,** coordinating military activities and resources with those of other agencies to achieve the desired end state.

   (2) In a national emergency, civil support (CS) operation, or complex contingency operation (CCO), DOD and the military often serve in a supporting role to other agencies and organizations.  CDRs and their staffs should develop an understanding of how military operations and capabilities can be coordinated with those of other agencies and organizations to focus and optimize the military's contributions to accomplish the desired end state.

   c.   **A Forum of Expertise.**  Each U.S., federal, state or local agency, IGO, and NGO brings its own culture, philosophy, goals, practices, and skills to the task of coordination. The military also brings its own organizational dynamics, characteristics, ideas, and values.  This diversity is a strength of the interagency, IGO, and NGO process. In one collective forum, the process integrates many views, capabilities, and options.

   d.   **Gathering the Right Resources.**  During this period of great instability and uncertainty, the challenge to our nation's leadership, CDRs at all levels, and the civilian leadership of agencies and organizations is to recognize what resources are available and how to work together to effectively apply them.  Despite potential philosophical and operational differences, all efforts must be coordinated to create an atmosphere of cooperation that ultimately contributes to national unity of effort.  Therefore, pursuit of interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination and cooperation as a process should be viewed as a means to mission accomplishment, not an end in itself.  While some loss of organizational freedom of action is often necessary to attain full cooperation, a zeal for consensus should not compromise the authority, roles, or core competencies of individual agencies.

   e.   Within the USG, the National Security Strategy (NSS) guides the development, integration, and coordination of all the instruments of national power to accomplish national objectives.  The President signs the NSS, and the **National Security Council**

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**(NSC) is the principal policy-making forum responsible for the strategic-level implementation of the NSS**. This coordination sets the stage for strategic guidance provided to the COCOMs, Services, and various DOD agencies, and forms the foundation for operational and tactical level guidance.

3. **The Growing Requirement for Close Coordination**

    a. **The number of ongoing and potential operations requiring integrated U.S. interagency, IGO, and NGO activities has expanded dramatically over the past few years.** Moreover, given the nature of the challenges facing the U.S. and the international community, this trend is likely to continue. Several factors contribute to this.

    b. During the Cold War, ideological divisions prevented the UN and other actors from stepping in to prevent or end conflicts that were often proxies for superpower competition. With the end of this bipolar world system, however, the UN and other organizations have instituted record numbers of peace operations (PO) and complex contingency operations (CCOs). In order to resolve these crises, such operations inevitably require close cooperation between various organizations that contribute military, humanitarian, political, economic, and other forms of expertise and resources.

    c. The National Security Strategy of September 2002 and March 2006 note that the U.S. is now threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones that willingly or unwittingly provide a haven for terrorists. The terrorist threat is further compounded by state sponsors of terrorism and by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the means to deliver them over long distances. Meeting these challenges requires the integration of all instruments of U.S. national power – economic measures to cut off terrorist financing, diplomatic initiatives to eliminate terrorists' political support, informational activities to combat extremist ideologies, and military operations to take action against identified threats.

4. **Command Relationships**

    a. **Within the USG, the Armed Forces and other USG agencies perform in both supported and supporting roles with other commands and agencies**. However, this is not the support command relationship as described in joint doctrine. Relationships between the Armed Forces and other government agencies, IGOs, and NGOs should not be equated to the command and control (C2) of a military operation. During combat operations such as OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM or in foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations such as PROVIDE COMFORT, DOD was the lead agency and was supported by other agencies. When DOD is tasked to provide CS, its forces perform in a supporting role. **Whether supported or supporting, close coordination between the military and other non-DOD agencies is key.**

    b. NGOs do not operate within military, governmental, or IGO hierarchies. If

formed, **the civil-military operations center (CMOC)[6] is the focal point where U.S. military forces coordinate any support to NGOs**.  As private organizations, NGOs are very unlikely to place themselves in a supporting role to the military.  They may, however, accept grant funding from IGOs or USG agencies like United States Agency for International Development (USAID), thereby taking the role of "implementing partners." While this relationship is not as strong as command authority or even a contract, it does give the granting agency oversight authority over how the funds are spent.

5.  **Considerations for Effective Cooperation**

    a.  **Coordination and integration among the joint force and other government agencies, IGOs, and NGOs should not be equated to the C2 of a military operation.** Military operations depend upon a command structure that is often very different from that of civilian organizations.  These differences may present significant challenges to coordination efforts.  The various USG agencies' different, and sometimes conflicting, goals, policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques make unity of effort a challenge.  Still more difficult, some IGOs and NGOs may have policies that are explicitly antithetical to those of the USG, and particularly the U.S. military.

    b.  The military tends to rely on structured decision-making processes, detailed planning, the use of standardized techniques and procedures, and sophisticated C2 systems to coordinate and synchronize operations.  Civilian agencies may employ similar principles but may not have the same degree of internal C2 as the U.S. military.  Across agency lines, IGO and NGOs tend to coordinate because there is a perceived mutually supportive interest, not because of any formalized C2.  **Close, continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation** are necessary to overcome confusion over objectives, inadequate structure or procedures, and bureaucratic and personal limitations.  Action will follow understanding.

    c.  As USG involvement in PO and CCOs increased during the 1990s, the Executive Branch responded by promulgating two Presidential Directives (PDs) that have significantly shaped subsequent interagency coordination.

    (1) **PDD-25,** *U.S. Policy – Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, was signed in May 1994 as the result of an interagency review of our nation's peacekeeping policies and programs.  This policy remains in effect for the Bush Administration until revoked or superseded by a subsequent directive. This review aimed to develop a comprehensive peace operations policy framework suited to the realities of the post-Cold War period.  PDD–25 addressed six major issues of reform and improvement.  One in particular defined interagency policy, lines of authority, roles, and missions for DOD and DOS when coordinating peace operations.  Described in PDD–25 as "improving the way the USG manages and funds peace operations," supporting direction follows:

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[6]For additional information on the CMOC, refer to JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, and JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs.

(a)   The policy directive created a new "shared responsibility" approach to managing and funding UN peace operations within the USG.  Under this approach, DOD took lead management and funding responsibility for those UN operations that involved U.S. combat units and those that are likely to involve combat (e.g., UN Charter Chapter VII).  This approach ensured that military expertise was brought to bear on those operations with a significant military component.  DOS retained lead management and funding responsibility for traditional peacekeeping operations that did not involve U.S. combat units.  In all cases, DOS remains responsible for the conduct of diplomacy and instructions to embassies and our UN mission in New York.

(b) PDD–25 therefore, elevated DOD to the status of lead federal agency (LFA) for certain PO, thereby requiring it to lead the planning and management of operations that have combat units and for peace enforcement missions, in coordination with operations with other nonmilitary organizations.

(2) **Managing Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations**

(a) The Bush administration recently issued NSPD-44 "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization," which gives responsibility to the Department of State to coordinate, lead, and strengthen USG efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization missions and to harmonize efforts with U.S. military plans and operations.

(b) DOD Directive 3000.05 "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations" outlines how Department of Defense will fulfill its role as defined under NSPD-44.  It notes that integrated civilian and military efforts are key to successful stability operation and charges Department of Defense to work closely with USG departments and agencies, foreign governments, global and regional international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. USD(P), with CJCS support, is responsible for representing the Secretary in discussions on stability operations policy and strategy with other USG departments and agencies, foreign governments, IOs, NGOs, and the private sector.  COCOMs are responsible for engaging relevant partners in coordination with USD(P) and CJCS.

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# DOD and Interagency Coordination: Foreign Operations

1. **The Political-Military Domain.** Within the Executive Branch, DOS is the lead foreign affairs agency, assisting the President in foreign policy formulation and execution. As such, DOS oversees the coordination of DOD external POLMIL relationships with overall U.S. foreign policy. External POLMIL relationships of DOD include:

- Bilateral military relationships.

- Coalition military forces.

- Multilateral mutual defense alliances.

- Treaties and agreements involving DOD activities or interests, such as technology transfer, armaments cooperation and control, international aviation, law of the sea, nuclear regulation, and environmental pollution.

- Use of U.S. military assets for humanitarian or peace operations (including those conducted under UN auspices).

2. **Theater Focus.** The geographic CCDR implements DOD external POLMIL relationships within the AOR. The CCDR's regional focus is similar to the regional focus of DOS's geographic bureaus, though the geographic boundaries differ. Most other USG foreign affairs agencies are regionally organized as well, again with varying geographic boundaries. Within a theater, **the geographic CCDR is the focal point for planning and implementation of regional and theater military strategies that require interagency coordination, but the development of those strategies is improved by early knowledge of the HN "terrain" and input from the COMs and country teams in the HNs involved.** In contrast, the DOS focal point for formulation and implementation of regional foreign policy strategies requiring interagency coordination is the geographic bureau at DOS headquarters in Washington, D.C. Although the geographic CCDR will often find it more expeditious to approach the U.S. bilateral COMs for approval of an activity in regional HNs, often the political effect of the proposed U.S. military activity goes far beyond the boundaries of the HN. In such cases, the CCDR should not assume that the approval of one COM corresponds to region-wide approval of DOS, but instead should obtain approval from the COM in each HN affected or ensure that the CCDR has DOS support for a region-wide approach.

3. In a complex contingency operation (CCO), coordination between DOD and other USG agencies will normally occur within the NSC/PCC and, if directed, during development of the POLMIL plan. During lesser operations and operations not involving armed conflict, the CCDR's staff may deal directly with a COM or members of the country team regarding issues that do not transcend the boundaries of the HN. In some operations, a special envoy of the President or a special representative of the UN Secretary General may be involved.

4.  **The joint interagency coordination group (JIACG)** is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners.  Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the CCDR and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported CCDR, the JIACG provides the CCDR with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments.  JIACGs complement the interagency coordination that takes place at the strategic level through the NSCS.  Members participate in contingency, crisis, and transition planning, and provide links back to their parent civilian agencies to help synchronize joint task force (JTF) operations with the efforts of civilian USG agencies and departments.

> "Interaction with the US Department of State and the United Nations was critical throughout the operation.  Ambassador Oakley and I spoke regularly to coordinate the efforts of the DOS and our military operations in the ARFOR [Army forces] sector.  His support for our operation was superb and he played a key role in communicating with the leadership of the Somali clans.  We followed his lead in operations, just as we fully supported the operations of the DOS."
>
> *Major General Steven L. Arnold, USA*
> *Operations Other Than War in a Power Projection Army:*
> *Lessons from Operation RESTORE HOPE and Hurricane*
> *Andrew Relief Operations, Strategic Studies Institute,*
> *US Army War College, 1994*

5.  **Campaign Planning and Interagency Coordination.**  Campaign planning generally applies to the conduct of combat operations, but CCDRs and subordinate JFCs may be required to develop campaign plans across the range of military operations.  A joint campaign plan is based on the CDR's concept, which presents a broad vision of the required military aim or end state, and how operations will be conducted to achieve objectives.  Thus, a campaign plan is an essential tool for laying out a clear, definable path linking the mission to the desired end state.  Such a plan enables CDRs to help political leaders visualize operational requirements for achieving objectives.  Given the systematic military approach to problem solving and the usual predominance of resources, it is often the CCDR who formally or informally functions as the lead organizer of many operations.

    a.  **Strategic Guidance.**  The President and/or SecDef will promulgate strategic guidance to provide long-term, intermediate, or ancillary objectives.  **The CCDR will determine how to implement guidance at the theater or operational level to achieve strategic objectives.**  Theater-level campaign planning is linked to operational art, which provides a framework to assist CDRs in using resources efficiently and effectively, including interagency assets, when producing campaign plans.  Among the many operational considerations, the CCDR's guidance must define the following:

        (1) What military or **related political and social conditions** (objectives) must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal?  **(Ends)**

(2) What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition?  **(Ways)**

(3) How should resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions?  **(Means)**

(4) What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing a particular sequence of actions?  (Considered during COA analysis)

(5) What organizational/command arrangements will be established for the joint or Service forces tasked to accomplish the mission (unity of command)?

b.  **To frame a campaign plan involving interagency coordination, the CDR must address this area within the context of all the instruments of national power.** The CDR will be guided by the interagency provisions of the POLMIL plan, when provided, and will disseminate that guidance to the joint force in Annex V, the Interagency Coordination Annex of the CCDR's OPLAN.[7]  For interagency transition and exit criteria, Annex V lays out to the greatest degree possible what the CCDR desires as the entry and exit conditions for the USG civilian agencies during the operation.  It notes that interagency participation could be involved at the earliest phases of the operation or campaign starting with flexible deterrent options.  Linking the interagency actions with the phases of the operation assists in the scheduling and coordination.  Crucially important to the plan is the orderly flow of operations to the desired end state and an efficient end of direct U.S. military involvement.  The development of Annex V should enhance early operational coordination with planners from the other USG agencies that will be involved in the operation's execution or its policy context.  During deliberate interagency planning, heavy COCOM involvement, participation, and coordination will be critical to success.

6.  **Plan Development and Coordination.**  Although contingency planning is conducted in anticipation of future events, there may be situations which call for an immediate U.S. military response, e.g., noncombatant evacuation operation or foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA).  CCDRs frequently develop COAs based on recommendations and considerations originating in one or more U.S. embassies.  In this regard, the country team is an invaluable resource because of its interagency experience and links to Washington D.C.  The JIACG can provide additional collaboration with operational planners and USG agencies.  Emergency action plans in force at every embassy cover a wide range of anticipated contingencies and crises and can assist the CDRs in identifying COAs, options, and constraints to military actions and support activities.  The staffs of geographic COCOMs also consult with the Joint Staff and other key agencies not represented on the country team or a JIACG to coordinate military operations and support activities.  **Initial concepts of military operations may require revision based on**

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[7]Developed in December 1999, Appendix V (Planning Guidance, Annex V - Interagency Coordination) to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual, Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) (3122.03B, Joint Operations Planning and Execution System, Volume II, Planning Formats and Guidance, 28 Feb 2006), remains an essential ingredient at the NSC and policy coordinating committee in producing POLMIL plans.

**feasibility analysis and consideration of related activities by IGOs or NGOs, particularly regarding logistics.** For example, primitive seaport and airport facilities may limit the ability to move massive amounts of supplies and constrain operations. Such information is frequently provided to the country team that, in turn, may be in contact with relief organizations in country. Directly or indirectly, refinement of the military mission should be coordinated with other USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs to identify and minimize mutual interference.

    a. **Mission planning** conducted by the geographic CCDR **should be coordinated with the DOS, DOJ, and Department of Energy, through the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,** to facilitate definition and clarification of strategic aims, end state, and the means to achieve them. CDRs and planners should consider specific conditions that could produce mission failure, as well as those that mark success. CDRs must ensure that unity of effort with other agencies contributes to the USG's overall strategic aims and objectives. As part of Plan Assessment, and with approval of the Secretary of Defense, the CCDR may present his plan's Annex V (Interagency Coordination) to OSD/Joint Staff Annex V working group for transmittal to the NSC for managed interagency staffing and plan development. In advance of authorization for formal transmittal of Annex V to the NSC, the CCDR may request interagency consultation on approved Annex V elements by the Joint Staff/OSD working group. Additionally, during this Step, the CCDR may present his plan for multinational involvement.[8]

    b. The geographic CCDR and staff should be continuously engaged in interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination by establishing working relationships with relevant organizations and agencies long before CAP and military resources are required. As situations requiring CAP develop, the normal flow of the State Department and other agencies reporting from the field will increase significantly. This will be amplified by informal contacts between the CCDR's staff (including the POLAD and JIACG) and appropriate embassies as well as the relevant bureaus at the State Department. Such informal communications greatly facilitate the development of viable COAs, but should not be used to circumvent established, authoritative planning and direction processes (Figure III-5 on the following page).

    c. **During campaign planning, the command should identify the target audiences to be reached.** The JFC's public affairs officer (PAO) must coordinate with civil affairs, information operations, embassy public affairs officers, the intelligence community, IGOs, and NGOs to develop and deconflict communications strategies and tactics in line with the JFC's intent. **The desired end state, essential tasks leading up to the end state, and exit criteria must be clearly expressed to the U.S. and international media in order to gain and maintain public understanding and support.** USG agencies and organizations must determine and coordinate the best methods to communicate their messages to avoid contradicting each other and present the USG's message coherently (Strategic Communications in Chapter Two).

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[8]Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Vol I, 29 Sept 2006

**MODEL FOR COORDINATION BETWEEN MILITARY AND NONMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS - FOREIGN OPERATIONS**

Figure III-5. Model for Coordination Between Military and Non-military Organizations-Foreign Operations

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# Organizing for Success

## Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination

1. **Organizing for Success** with Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organizations.

   a.   When contingency or crisis action planning is required, the degree to which military and civilian components can be integrated and harmonized will bear directly on its efficiency and success.  **To the extent feasible, joint planning should include key participants from the outset, including input from COMs and country teams.**  The CCDR through his strategic concept builds the interagency, IGO, and NGO activities into Annex V of the OPLAN.  Subordinate JFCs build interagency, IGO, and NGO participation into their operations.  Within the AOR and the JOA, appropriate decision-making structures are established at COCOM, JTF HQ, and tactical levels in order to coordinate and resolve military, political, humanitarian, and other issues.

   b.   In concert with the NSC, DOD, and Joint Staff, CCDRs should:

       (1) Recognize all USG embassies, agencies, departments, IGOs, and NGOs that are or should be involved in the operation.  In most cases, initial planning and coordination with USG agencies will have occurred within the NSC, DOD, the Military Services, and the Joint Staff.

       (2) Understand the authoritative interagency, IGO, and NGO hierarchy, to include the lead agency identified at the national level, and determine the agency of primary responsibility.  Understand the differences between roles and responsibilities of DOD, the CJCS, the Joint Staff, and the Services in domestic and foreign operations. Understand the different command arrangements in domestic and foreign operations.

       (3) Define the objectives of the response.  These should be broadly outlined in the statement of conclusions from the relevant NSC, NSC/PC, or NSC/DC meetings that authorized the overall USG participation.  Within the military chain of command, they are further elaborated in tasking orders that include the CDR's intent.

       (4) Define COAs for the assigned military tasks, while striving for operational compatibility with other USG agencies.

       (5) Cooperate with each embassy, agency, department, or organization and obtain a clear definition of the role that each plays.  In many situations, participating agencies, departments, and organizations may not have representatives either in theater or collocated with the COCOM's staff.  It is then advisable for the CCDR to request temporary assignment of liaison officers (LNOs) from the participating agencies,

departments, and organizations to the COCOM or JTF HQ. In some cases, it may be useful or even necessary for the military to send LNOs to other selected organizations.

(6) Identify potential obstacles arising from conflicting departmental or agency priorities. Early identification of potential obstacles and concurrence as to solutions by all participants is the first step toward resolution. Too often these obstacles are assumed to have been addressed by another agency, department, or organization. If the obstacles cannot be resolved, they must immediately be forwarded up the chain of command for resolution.

(7) Military and civilian planners should identify resources relevant to the situation. Determine which agencies, departments, or organizations are committed to provide these resources in order to reduce duplication, increase coherence in the collective effort, and identify what additional resources are needed.

(8) Define the desired military end states, plan for transition from military to civil authority, and recommend exit criteria.

(9) Maximize the joint force assets to support long-term goals. The military's contribution should optimize the varied and extensive resources available to complement and support the broader, long-range objectives of the local, national or international response to a crisis.

(10) Coordinate the establishment of interagency assessment teams that can rapidly deploy to the area to evaluate the situation. These can include ad hoc multilateral teams or teams organized under the auspices of an IGO, such as the UN or OSCE.

(11) Implement crisis action planning (CAP) for incidents or situations involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that may require interagency coordination to achieve U.S. objectives.

# Civil-Military Operations Center

1. **Overview**

   a. **Civil-Military Operations Center.**[9]  The ability of the JTF to work with all organizations and groups is essential to mission accomplishment.  A relationship must be developed between military forces, USG agencies, civilian authorities, IGOs, NGOs, and the population.

   b.  A CMOC is formed to:

   (1) Carry out guidance and institute JFC decisions regarding CMO.

   (2) Perform liaison and coordination between military organizations and other agencies, departments, and organizations to meet the needs of the populace.

   (3) Provide a partnership forum for military and other participating organizations.  Many of these organizations consider the CMOC merely as a venue for informal discussions.

   (4) Receive, validate, and coordinate requests for routine and emergency military support from the IGOs and NGOs.  Forward these requests to the joint force HQ for action.



**KEY TERM**

**CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER**

- Established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander.

- May be established by commanders at any echelon as the situation requires

- Coordinates activities of engaged military forces, and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, host nation, and regional and international organizations

- There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent

   c. **CMOCs are tailored for each mission.** When a CMOC is established, the CJTF should invite representatives of other agencies, which may include the following:

   - USAID/OFDA representatives.

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[9]For further guidance on CMOC, refer to JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.

- DOS, country team, and other USG representatives.

- Military liaison personnel from participating countries.

- Host country or local government agency representatives.

- Representatives of IGOs and NGOs.

d.   The CMOC is the way U.S. forces generally organize for this purpose (Figure III-6 below).  Despite its name, the CMOC is a coordinating body and generally neither sets policy nor conducts operations.  The organization of the CMOC is theater- and mission-dependent — flexible in size and composition.  During large-scale FHA operations, if a Humanitarian Operation Center (HOC) is formed by the host country or UN, the CMOC becomes the focal point for coordination between the military and civilian agencies involved in the operation.  When possible, the CMOC should collocate with the HOC to facilitate operations and assist in later transition of any CMOC operations to the HOC.  A CDR at any echelon may establish a CMOC to facilitate coordination with other agencies, departments, organizations, and the HN.  More than one CMOC may be established in an AOR or JOA (such as occurred in Rwanda), and each is task-organized based on the mission.



**Figure III-6.  Notional Composition of a CMOC**

e.   During Operation SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda, the UN deployed an organization called the On-Site Operations Coordination Center, which had essentially the same functions as a CMOC and provided a clearinghouse for exchanging information between agencies and with the UN.

f.   The CJTF must carefully consider where to locate the CMOC.  Security, FP, and easy access for agencies and organizations are all valid considerations.  The location must be distinct and separate from the joint force operations center, regardless if geographically collocated.  If security conditions permit, every effort should be made to locate the CMOC "outside the wire" in order to maximize participation by IGOs and NGOs that want to minimize the appearance of close association with military operations.

g.   **Political representatives in the CMOC may provide the CJTF with avenues to satisfy operational considerations and concerns, resulting in consistency of military and political actions.**  Additionally, the CMOC forum appeals to NGOs because it avoids guesswork by providing these organizations a single point of coordination with the military for their needs.

(1) To obtain the necessary interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination and international cooperation needed to meet mission objectives, CMOC players must rely upon trust, shared visions, common interests, and capabilities.

(2) **A JFC cannot dictate cooperation among engaged agencies.**  However, working together at the CMOC on issues of security, logistic support, information sharing, communications, and other items, can build a cooperative spirit among all participants.

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**CMOC IN PROVIDE COMFORT**

Humanitarian relief organizations operating in southern Turkey and northern Iraq coordinated their activities with those of the JTF through the CMOC.  The CMOC was collocated with the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) that coordinated the activities of the UN and other humanitarian relief organizations.  The CMOC was coequal with the traditional J-staff sections.  CMOC military officers coordinated activities with both State Department officials and relief workers.  The CMOC in Turkey demonstrated the efficiency and effectiveness of the concept.  It provided a focal point for coordination of common civil-military needs and competing demands for services and infrastructure, rather than relying on random encounters between relief workers and staff officers.

*--SOURCE: Operations Other Than War, Vol. 1, Humanitarian Assistance, Center for Army Lessons Learned, December 1992*

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h.   **A CMOC conducts meetings as required** to highlight requirements — especially humanitarian requirements of the population — and to identify organizations able and willing to meet these needs. Validated requests go to the appropriate JTF or

agency representative for action.  Figure III-7, below depicts some of the CMOC functions.

**CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER FUNCTIONS**

- Providing nonmilitary agencies with a coordinating point and information exchange for activities and matters that are civilian-related.
- Coordinating relief activities with US and/or multinational commands, United Nations, host-nation, and other nonmilitary agencies.
- Providing interface with State Department public affairs officers, US Agency for International Development (USAID), and the country team.
- Assisting in the transfer of operational responsibility to nonmilitary agencies.
- Facilitating and coordinating activities of the joint force, other on-scene agencies, and higher echelons in the military chain of command.
- Receiving, validating, coordinating, and monitoring requests from humanitarian organizations for routine and emergency military support.
- Coordinating the response to requests for military support with Service components.
- Coordinating requests to nonmilitary agencies for their support.
- Coordinating with disaster assistance response teams deployed by USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.
- Convening ad hoc mission planning groups to address complex military missions that support nonmilitary requirements, such as convoy escort, and management and security of refugee camps and feeding centers.
- Convening follow-on assessment groups.

**Figure III-7. CMOC Functions**

i.  **Liaison Teams.**  Once established in the JOA and operating primarily from the CMOC, or HOC, if established, liaison teams work to foster a better understanding of mission and tactics with other forces, facilitate transfer of vital information, enhance mutual trust, and develop an increased level of teamwork.

(1) **Liaison is an important aspect of joint force C2.**  Liaison teams or individuals may be dispatched from higher to lower, lower to higher, laterally, or any combination of these. In multinational operations, liaison exchange should occur between senior and subordinate commands and between lateral or like forces.

> "Instead of thinking about warfighting agencies like command and control, you create a political committee, a civil-military operations center — CMOC — to interface with volunteer organizations.  These become the heart of your operations, as opposed to a combat or fire support operations center."
> *General A. C. Zinni, USMC*
> *Commander, US Central Command*

(2) **The need for effective liaison is vital when a JTF is deployed and operating in a CCO in conjunction with MNFs.**  The likelihood that a JTF may operate with not only traditional allies, but also with nations with whom the U.S. does not have a long history of formal military cooperation, requires the CJTF to plan for increased liaison and advisory requirements.

(3) **Qualifications of a JTF LNO assigned to a national or multinational operation include** a solid knowledge of doctrine, force capabilities, language proficiency, regional expertise, and cultural awareness.  Civil affairs or coalition support teams may be available to serve as LNOs.  The use of contracted interpreters to augment a liaison team may be another option.

j.  **Humanitarian Operations Center.**[10]  **During large-scale FHA operations** when it becomes apparent that the magnitude of a disaster will exceed a HN's capacity to manage it unilaterally; **the HN may want to establish a HOC to facilitate the coordination of international aid**.

(1) **Although the functions of the HOC and CMOC are similar, there is a significant difference.**  The CMOC is established by and works for the CJTF.  The HOC is normally established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the UN, or possibly OFDA during a U.S. unilateral operation.  HOCs, especially those established by the UN, are horizontally structured organizations with no command or control authority, where all members are ultimately responsible to their own organizations or countries.  The U.S. ambassador or designated representative will have a lead role in the HOC.

(2) The HOC membership should consist of representatives from the affected country, the U.S. embassy or consulate, joint force (most likely from the CMOC), OFDA, UN, IGOs, NGOs, and any other major players.

(3) The HOC coordinates the overall U.S. relief strategy, identifies logistic requirements for the various organizations, and identifies, prioritizes and submits requests for military support to appropriate agencies.  Requests for military support may be submitted to the JTF through the CMOC.

(4) An end state goal of the HOC should be to create an environment in which the HN is self-sufficient in providing for the population's humanitarian needs, and no longer requires external assistance.

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[10]For further information on HOC, refer to JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

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# Combatant Commander and the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) Integration

1. **Mission**

     The JIACG effort is focused on acquiring, vetting, and managing the flow of information to enhance joint operation planning by offering a broader decision-making context that includes civilian USG agencies both in Washington, D.C., and in the AOR. The JIACG interacts with the command group, and the COCOM staff directorates on a daily basis to stay abreast of changing issues.  It draws on the command's planning and operations expertise within the headquarters to ensure relevant and timely connections are made with USG agencies and activities.  It leverages the experience, expertise, and core competencies of members by having selective USG agency representatives permanently assigned to the JIACG.  The result is a fusing of USG agency operational intentions and capabilities with military planning and operations to achieve a harmonization of effort.

2. **Cooperation Requirement**

     Unlike the military, most USG agencies are not equipped and organized to create separate staffs at all levels of war.  Whereas the military is prepared to coordinate at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, USG agencies and departments are more apt to operate at the strategic level in Washington, D.C., and in the field at the tactical level. For example, although some regional coordination and projects occur to some extent within the bureaus of the Department of State (DOS) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), detailed regional operational planning is less common.  This disparity complicates coordination efforts at the operational level and may require military staffs interacting with interagency representatives at multiple levels.  The JIACG at the operational level can potentially mitigate the effects of this problem.

3. **JIACG Role**

     a.  **The primary role of the JIACG is to enhance interagency coordination**.  The JIACG is a fully integrated participant on the CCDR's staff with a daily focus on joint strategic planning with its three subsets: security cooperation planning, joint operation planning, and force planning.  It provides a capability specifically organized to enhance situational awareness of interagency activities to prevent undesired consequences and uncoordinated activity.

     b.  This <u>advisory</u> element on the CCDR's staff facilitates information sharing and coordinated action across the interagency community.  However, the JIACG does not make policy, task, or replace existing lines of authority or reporting.

4. **Employment**

    a.  The JIACG has a small full-time core element consisting primarily of USG civilian personnel with extensive interagency experience. The core element is an important contributor in providing guidance, facilitation, coordination, and synchronization of interagency equities in the area of responsibility (AOR). **It is a separate staff directorate or element of approximately twelve personnel with a capability of being augmented with virtual or additional collocated members.** Key interagency participants in the AOR are the U.S. missions which include the U.S. ambassadors/chiefs of mission, country teams, defense attaché offices, and the security assistance offices; foreign policy advisor/political advisor; interagency executive steering council; DOS, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization; Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element); Joint Force Coordination Authority for Stability Operations; and the USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.

    b.  **A major enabler to interagency connectivity is the JIACG's use of collaboration tools with the** COCOM **staff, each member's home headquarters, and other USG departments and agencies not represented on the** COCOM **staff.** Collaboration provides the ease of communication and the depth of detail that is the lifeblood of JIACG employment. It enhances efforts in developing and maintaining habitual relationships with key civilian individuals, organizations and agencies that can provide specific expertise. A robust, established reach-back capability that leverages collaborative technology allows the JIACG to maintain these relationships during operations, reducing the need for a large forward command and control footprint.

5. **Organization**

    a.  **Roles and Responsibilities. The JIACG provides the CCDR with the primary and readily available integration venue for coordinating interagency efforts with joint force actions at theater strategic and operational levels.** Their role is to enhance the interchange among USG agencies and military organizations and provide the CCDR with a capability specifically organized to enhance situational awareness of USG agency activities and keep agencies and military organizations informed of each other's efforts to prevent undesired consequences and uncoordinated USG activity. Accordingly, the JIACG:

        (1) Participates in COCOM security cooperation, joint operation planning, and assessment.

        (2) Advises the CCDR on USG policies, positions, and strategic planning efforts, as appropriate. JIACG members provide information to COCOM planners on their parent agencies' current policies, positions on developing policies, and potential resources and assets that may be useful.

        (3) Provides interagency planning perspective during joint operations.

(4) Informs the COCOM of interagency approaches, support requirements, capabilities and limitations.

(5) Establishes habitual relationships and collaborative links to planners within USG agencies.

(6) Arranges interfaces for planning and rehearsal exercises and other joint operation planning activities.

(7) Facilitates communications with JTF staff and component planners regarding interagency issues.

(8) Supports the deployment and employment of S/CRS teams within the AOR.

6. **Design**

a. When security cooperation, contingency, or crisis action planning is required, the degree to which military and USG agencies are integrated and harmonized will bear directly on efficiency and success. Joint operation planning should include key participants from the outset. The CCDR, through the strategic concept, builds interagency activities into Annex V, *Interagency Coordination*, of the OPLAN.

> **Annex V is required for all Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved contingency plans and provides a single source reference for the CCDR to request interagency activities and to lay the groundwork for interagency coordination.**

b. Subordinate JFCs and components should also build interagency participation into their operations. Within the AOR, appropriate decision-making structures are established at COCOM and JTF headquarters and tactical levels to coordinate and resolve military, political, humanitarian, and other issues. The JIACG provides the CCDR the means for organizing for successful interagency coordination focused at the operational level and below.

c. The JIACG is fully integrated into the COCOM staff and is a primary participant in the planning process. It provides the CCDR with a standing capability to enhance situational awareness of USG agency activities and to keep all engaged USG agencies informed of each other's efforts to prevent the undesired consequences of uncoordinated activity.

d. A full-time, fully-resourced operational JIACG broadens the CCDR's understanding of the operational environment and the range and availability of response options. If the decision is made to employ joint forces, the CCDR may retain the JIACG in-place at the COCOM headquarters and integrate selected members of the JIACG into the JTF.

7.  **JIACG Focus.**[11] The JIACG can aid military planners at all levels by focusing on the following:

a.  Identify interagency partners that are or should be involved in the operation. In most cases, initial planning and coordination with USG agencies will have occurred in the National Security Council (NSC), DOD, the JS, and Services.

b.  Understand and clarify, if required, the interagency hierarchy.

c.  Clarify the objectives of the response that should be outlined in the statement of conclusions from the relevant NSC, National Security Council/Principals Committee (NSC/PC), or NSC/DC meetings that authorized the overall USG participation.

d.  Review COAs for the assigned military tasks and determine the operational compatibility with USG agencies.

e.  Cooperate with each interagency participant and obtain a clear definition of the role that each plays.  In some situations, they may not have representatives either in theater or be collocated with the COCOMs staff.  The JIACG can advise and recommend that the CCDR request temporary assignment of liaison officers from the participating agencies and departments.

f.  Identify potential obstacles arising from conflicting priorities.  Early identification of potential obstacles and concurrence to solutions by all participants is the first step toward resolution.  Often these obstacles are assumed to have been addressed by another agency or department.  If the obstacles cannot be resolved by the JIACG, they may be forwarded up to the appropriate level for resolution.

g.  Identify resources relevant to the situation.  Determine which interagency participants are committed to provide these resources to reduce duplication, increase coherence in the collective effort, and identify what additional resources are needed.

h.  Assist military planners in defining the appropriate military end state, plan for the transfer to civil authority, and recommend redeployment considerations.

i.  Recommend the ways and means to optimize the varied and extensive resources available to complement and support the broader, long-term objectives during and after the response to a crisis.

j.  Coordinate the establishment of interagency assessment teams that can rapidly deploy to the area to evaluate the situation.

k.  Participate and contribute to CAP for incidents or situations involving a threat to the U.S., its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that may require interagency coordination to achieve U.S. objectives.

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[11]Commander's Handbook for the JIACG, USJFCOM, JWC, JI&E, 1 March 2007

8. **Interagency Connectivity.**[12]

    a.   The JIACG develops and maintains habitual relationships with key civilian individuals, organizations, and agencies.  These relationships are established through collaboration early in the planning process and become the basis for expanding the JIACG's core capabilities and situational awareness as a crisis develops.  A robust, established reach-back capability allows the JIACG to maintain these relationships during operations.  JIACG connectivity should include, but not be limited to:

        (1) The operational and planning environment in the CCDR's joint operations center, operations planning group, crisis action center, joint planning group, the joint intelligence operations center, and the SJFHQ.  The JIACG closely monitors these organizations, but does not duplicate their efforts.

        (2) USG agencies and departments.

        (3) COCOM Service components.

        (4) USG offices and missions located within the AOR.

        (5) Centers of excellence, which may include organizations or institutions such as NGOs, academia, and industry that have particular expertise in areas such as governance. Examples include National Defense University, Foreign Service Institute, Institute for Defense Analysis, and the Kennedy School of Government.

    b.   The inclusion of USG civilian agency personnel into the JIACG allows for the integration of expertise into command planning and enhances information sharing between USG agencies and the military.

9. **Joint Strategic Planning.**

    a.   **Security Cooperation** Planning. The JIACG maintains an understanding of the AOR, allowing it to make major contributions to the CCDR's theater campaign plan. Guided by the theater campaign plan, the JIACG, in concert with the FPA/POLAD's linkage to the DOS regional bureau and U.S. ambassadors/COMs in the AOR, ensures the thinking of other Washington agencies is identified and integrated into the work of the COCOM staff.  The goal is to establish an enhanced level of interagency cooperation in the COCOM to prevent a crisis or mitigate its effect.

        (1) Security cooperation is the means by which DOD encourages and enables countries and organizations to work to achieve strategic objectives.  It consists of a

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[12]For further discussion of facilitating coordination and cooperation with USG agencies, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I.

focused program of bilateral and multilateral defense activities conducted with foreign countries to serve mutual security interests and build defense partnerships. These efforts also should be aligned with and support strategic communication themes, messages, and actions. The SecDef identifies security cooperation objectives, assesses the effectiveness of activities, and revises goals when required to ensure continued support for U.S. interests abroad. Although they can shift over time, examples of typical security cooperation objectives include: creating favorable military regional balances of power; advancing mutual defense or security arrangements; building allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and preventing conflict and crisis.

(2) DOD senior civilian and military leadership, in conjunction with CCDRs, Service Chiefs, and support agencies, focus their activities on achieving the security cooperation objectives identified by the SecDef. Security cooperation planning links these activities with security cooperation objectives by identifying, prioritizing, and integrating them to optimize their overall contribution to specified U.S. security interests.

(3) In response to the direction in the *Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF)* CCDRs, Service Chiefs, and combat support agency directors prepare strategies in accordance with GEF strategic end states for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff review and SecDef approval, with the CCDRs as the supported CDRs. These strategies serve as the basis for theater campaign planning. Collaboration among the COCOMs, Services, and combat support agencies is essential. Equally important is the close coordination with USG agencies that represent other instruments of national power, particularly with the ambassadors/COMs in the CCDRs' AORs. The functional COCOMs, Services, and DOD agencies communicate their intended security cooperation activities to the supported CCDRs, execute their activities in support of approved security cooperation strategies, and assist in the annual assessment of the effectiveness of their security cooperation activities.

b. **Joint Operation Planning**

(1) **Contingency Planning**

(a) The JIACG core element maintains a comprehensive understanding of potential crisis regions in the AOR. Its engagement with the COCOM planning elements will be driven by a number of requirements: current events, theater campaign plan activities, strategic end states and assumptions derived from the GEF, *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Unified Command Plan (UCP) and DOS/USAID Strategic Plan..*

(b) JIACG planners will be key participants in developing and updating routine contingency plans. Their expertise will be a crucial backstop against which J-5 and SJFHQ (CE) planners can clarify and confirm strategic guidance, planning assumptions, and engaged USG agency roles and missions. Their expertise will be particularly useful during transition operations and plan congruence and support to U.S.

embassy mission performance plans, USAID Five-Year Plans, and USG agency regional planning goals.

(c) JIACG planners should be closely involved with J-5 planners' efforts to update existing plans and interagency coordination annexes (Annex V to OPLANs), as well as developing new plans for crisis response and deterrence.

(d) Each instrument of national power has a finite capacity. Interagency activities must be planned in a synchronized manner to maximize and focus the efforts of multiple USG agencies toward a military end state. The JIACG role in advising the CCDR of interagency priorities and actions is important in setting the stage for handoff from the preponderant military phases of the operation to the USG civilian agency dominated phases.

(2) **Crisis Action Planning (CAP)**

(a) **Pre-Crisis**

<u>1</u>   Designated members of the JIACG monitor events in the AOR as part of their daily activities.  They are responsible for assisting the CCDR and the COCOM staff's understanding of USG agency activities, both in the AOR and in Washington D.C., that impact on current and future operations.

<u>2</u>   JIACG members augment and are integrated into the COCOM prior to and during operations.  The number and assignment of JIACG members is mission and event dependent, particularly in planning and execution efforts that require interagency coordination.  The implementation of mission tasks embodies parallel, simultaneous, multiagency efforts through time.  The JIACG tracks and recommends adjustments to the military tasks in collaboration and coordination with engaged USG agencies and multinational partners to create and reinforce unified action across all mission areas.

<u>3</u>   In a developing crisis, the JIACG's knowledge and understanding of the planning and policy objectives at the national level assist the COCOM staff in developing and recommending an OPLAN that harmonizes military and civilian operational response actions.  The daily roles and responsibilities of the JIACG shift to focus on the potential crisis and expand to become an integral part of the overall crisis prevention effort.

<u>4</u>   The JIACG, through its continuing coordination with external USG civilian agencies, refines its collaboration by aligning the right membership to support the developing OPLANs and OPORDs. JIACG crisis response activities and actions facilitate the initial situational awareness of the crisis action team and operations planning group, support flexible deterrent options and force enhancement execution, and make preparation to deploy designated member(s) to the crisis area or forward headquarters, as required.

(b) **Crisis**

    <u>1</u>   When a crisis occurs, information is provided to the appropriate NSC/PCC, usually by assistant secretary-level representatives of the appropriate USG agencies. Issues are analyzed and framed by the NSC/PCC for discussion within the NSC/DC. The NSC/DC further analyzes the issues and develops policy options for the NSC/PC. The NSC/PC then recommends appropriate action to the President. Although initial planning may be undertaken early in the COCOM, official interagency planning does not commence until the NSC/DC authorizes it and tasks the NSC/PCC to begin POLMIL planning.

    <u>2</u>   The NSC/PCC provides oversight of interagency planning and develops the POLMIL plan. The POLMIL plan describes the concept of operations for U.S. participation and addresses the mission and national strategic objectives and end state and is further used to harmonize interagency plans and actions.

    <u>3</u>   The JIACG continues to monitor the evolving situation by maintaining a physical and/or virtual presence in the CCDR's joint operations center and joint intelligence operations center. The JIACG augments these centers, as required. Once a situation is identified as a crisis, JIACG members are integrated into the COCOM staff as prescribed in local instructions and directives. The JIACG will assist the SJFHQ (CE) and the JTF, when formed, to provide interagency connectivity by either deploying or providing reach-back. The JIACG becomes the responsible staff element for integrating information and understanding of USG agency activities. Its members respond to and assist in answering information requirements that fill critical gaps in the CAP effort.

    <u>4</u>   JIACG actions are the most dynamic during the stabilize and transfer to civil authority phases. Its virtual network builds on the previous collaborative planning efforts and adjusts to changing mission tasks. This underscores the need to identify the right interagency participants, engage them in the military plan, surface issues and discontinuities, and reach agreement on task responsibility early in the process.

    <u>5</u>   As the transition process continues over time, the roles among USG agencies will likely change as intermediate military objectives are achieved. These role adjustments will include the transfer of responsibilities and relationships among military and USG agencies. JIACG collaboration and coordination with USG agencies assists the operations team in sorting accountability among the participants at the operational level for execution of multi-functional tasks.

(c) **Post-Crisis**

    <u>1</u>   The U.S. military has long been involved in post-crisis stability operations and will likely continue to be so involved. However, the U.S. military should not be viewed as the dominant participant in reconstruction efforts. Although military force has a primary role in initially establishing a stable environment, myriad USG agencies have a comparative advantage in addressing the wide range of reconstitution needs. NGOs, the private sector, IGOs, multilateral banks, and civilian agencies from

multiple donor nations all have a role in addressing security, civil administration, governance, justice and reconciliation, economic and social needs.

       <u>2</u>   Post-crisis recovery and reconstitution implementation, like transition, is guided by national security policy objectives. They build on the OPLAN and adjust to events on the ground. Moreover, the tasks and accountability among various agencies and donors will probably change over time. These adjustments will likely modify supported and supporting roles among military and civilian, international, private, and commercial agencies and organizations. JIACG habitual relationships and collaboration with USG agencies assist the CCDR in adapting to the changing roles and responsibilities among the participants.

       <u>3</u>   When pre-planned conditions are met, the recovery and reconstitution authority will transfer to civilian leadership. This civilian authority should have immediate access to the JFC, military logistics, security support, and consultations on interagency planning and execution. The JIACG role as an interlocutor is substantial. The expanding number of civilian organizations and agencies that will have actual or perceived equities in post-crisis operations will need immediate access to military planning and/or resources for coordinating support requirements.

       <u>4</u>   One final responsibility of the NSC/PCC during post-crisis, with considerable input from the COCOM JIACG, is to conduct an after-action review that analyzes the actions conducted during the crisis and prepares lessons learned for consideration during future operations.

10. **The Way Ahead**

   a.   The JIACG represents an important capability - thinking and operating collaboratively using networked systems and providing an interagency perspective in response to the operational environment. The establishment and employment of a JIACG can significantly improve security cooperation, contingency, and crisis action planning, and recovery and reconstitution. The JIACG provides each CCDR with a standing capability to enhance situational awareness of interagency activities and keep the military and USG agencies and departments informed of each other's efforts to prevent undesired consequences and uncoordinated USG activities.

   b.   The joint doctrinal underpinnings of the JIACG are found in the two volumes of JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination during Joint Operations*. Volume I discusses the interagency, IGOs, and NGOs and provides fundamental principles and guidance to facilitate coordination between DOD and USG agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and regional organizations. Volume II describes USG agencies and departments and key IGOs and NGOs, their core competencies, basic organizational structures, and relationship, or potential relationship, with the Armed Forces of the Unites States.

   c.   Other publications, such as the three Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manuals (CJCSM) that comprise the *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System*

*(JOPES)*, JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, and JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, provide additional techniques and procedures. These processes and related products represent the baseline for incorporating the JIACG into joint operation planning. The JIACG construct is intended to improve our ability to respond to the nature and challenges of today's operational environment. It builds on rather than replaces these core processes.

d.  The JIACG is the CCDR's lead organization for interagency coordination providing guidance, facilitation, coordination, and synchronization of interagency activities within the area of responsibility (AOR). The JIACG will interact with Department of State (DOS), which has primary responsibility for IGOs; and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which is the USG agency that maintains the most direct relationship with NGOs (many of which receive USAID funding to carry out programs). The JIACG will help the CCDRs and staffs gain a common picture and shared understanding of the operational environment that promotes unified action with all interagency partners.

# CHAPTER IV

# INTEGRATING THE RESERVES

## *RESERVE COMPONENTS: FULL PARTNERS IN THE TOTAL FORCE*

**Title 10 United States Code 10102** states the purpose of each reserve component is to *"provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever, during and after the period needed to procure and train additional units and qualified persons to achieve the planned mobilization, more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components."*

The **Reserve Components (RC)** now comprise approximately 44% of the Total Force and are a key part of America's Total Force defense as well as an essential partner in military operations ranging from Homeland Defense, Homeland Security, peace-keeping, humanitarian relief, engagement programs and small-scale contingencies to major theater war.  The new defense strategy proposed in the recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) calls for a portfolio of military capabilities.  This capabilities-based approach will continue to find the Reserve Components supporting the Active forces across the full spectrum of military missions.

### The seven reserve components of the U.S. military are:

- ➤ Army Reserve
- ➤ Navy Reserve
- ➤ Marine Corps Reserve
- ➤ Air Force Reserve
- ➤ Coast Guard Reserve

National Guard of the United States

- ➤ Air National Guard of the United States
- ➤ Army National Guard of the United States

1. **Foundations of the Total Force**

The reserve components are the embodiment of the American tradition of the citizen-soldier dating back to the first English settlement at Jamestown, Virginia, in 1607.  From those earliest days of militia companies, the first militia regiments were organized by the General Court of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1636 and from the Pequot War in 1637 to today, the citizen soldier has been present in all our wars.

They are regionally based and recruited (unlike their active duty counterparts) and, in the case of the Army and Air National Guard, are the organized state militias referred to in the U.S. Constitution. Members of the reserve components are generally required to perform, at a minimum, 39 days of military service per year. This includes monthly drill weekends and fifteen days of annual training.

While organized, trained, and equipped nearly the same as the active duty, the reserve components often have unique characteristics. This is especially true of the National Guard, which performs both federal and state missions. In addition, reserve components often operate under special laws, regulations, and policies.

a. **United States Army Reserve (USAR).** The Army Reserve's mission, under Title 10 of the U.S. code, is to provide trained and ready Soldiers and units with the critical combat service support and combat support capabilities necessary to support nation strategy during peacetime, contingencies and war. The Army Reserve is a key element in the Army multi-component unit force, training with Active and National Guard units to ensure all three components work as a fully integrated team. The Army Reserve has more than 2,000 units in the United States, Guam, the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico and Germany, each one trained in a specialized skill and ready to support Army missions around the world. The Army Reserve contributes to the Army's Total Force by providing 100% of the: Chemical Brigades, Internment Brigades, Judge Advocate General Unit, Medical Groups, Railway Units, Training and Exercise Divisions and Water Supply Battalions. It provides more than two-thirds of the Army's: Civil Affairs Units, Psychological Operations Units, Transportation Groups, Motor Battalions, Chemical Battalions, Hospitals, Medical Brigades, Theater Signal Commands and nearly half of the Army's Petroleum Battalions, Adjutant General Units, Petroleum Groups, Transportation Command, Terminal Battalions and Public Affairs Units.

The USAR traces its origins to the creation of the Medical Reserve Corps in 1908. In 1916, Congress passed the National Defense Act, which created the Officers' Reserve Corps, Enlisted Reserve Corps, and Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC). After the war, the Officers' and Enlisted Reserve Corps were combined into the Organized Reserve Corps, a name that lasted into the 1950s. The Korean War saw more than 240,000 soldiers of the Organized Reserve called to active duty. While the Korean War was still underway, Congress began making significant changes in the structure and role of the Reserve. These changes transformed the Organized Reserve Corps into the U. S. Army Reserve (USAR). This new organization was divided into a Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve and Retired Reserve.

b. **United States Navy Reserve (USNR).** The mission of the U.S. Navy Reserve Force is to provide mission-capable units and individuals to the Navy and Marine Corps Team throughout the full range of operations from peace to war. Today's Navy Reserve represents 20% of the Navy's total assets and is a significant force multiplier that the fleet must have to meet its growing global commitments. The Navy Reserve provides the full range of Navy operations with mission-capable units and personnel during peacetime and war. The Navy Reserve Force consists of the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve and the Retired Reserve numbering over 690,000 men and women. The "Ready Reserve" is

made up of "Selected Reserve" personnel and "Individual Ready Reserve" (IRR) personnel. The Selected Reserve, or SELRES, is the Navy's primary source of immediate mobilization manpower and represents those Reservists who are paid, either as weekend drillers, or who serve as Full Time Support (FTS) on active duty status in the training and administration of the Navy Reserve Force program. Other reserve categories include the Standby Reserve and the Retired Reserve.

The tradition of state naval militia forces originates in the colonial days. Several of the states had their own naval militias. Some of these militia units augmented the Federal Navy during the Civil War. The Navy Department in 1887 prepared a plan of organization where the Secretary of the Navy was given authority to lend each state having a naval militia one of the Navy's older ships, as well as equipment, to "promote drills and instruction." The Navy Reserve was officially established 3 March 1915, by combining 17 state Naval militias into a single federal force.

c. **United States Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR).** The mission of the USMCR is to prepare and provide units and individual Marines to augment and reinforce active forces for employment across the complex spectrum of crisis and conflict. The Marine Corps has fully embraced an integrated Total Force Generation Model. This model, implemented this past summer, lays out an activation and deployment schedule for Marine units. The Total Force Generation Model is based on one-year activation and includes a seven-month deployment, which is standard for battalion-sized Marine units and smaller, followed by approximately five years in a normal drill status. The model provides for approximately 6,000 Reserve Marines on active duty at any one time (3,000 deployed and 3,000 preparing to deploy or returning from deployment).

(1) The Selected Reserve population numbers almost 39,600 and is comprised of Reserve Unit Marines, Active Reserve Marines, Individual Mobilization Augmentees, and Reserve Marines in the training pipeline. An additional 60,000 Marines are included in the Individual Ready Reserve, representing a significant pool of trained and experienced prior-service manpower.

(2) The USMCR, since its establishment, has been responsible for providing trained units and qualified individuals to be mobilized for active duty in time of war, national emergency or contingency operations. The USMCR, established by the Naval Appropriations Act (1916), provided for the wartime expansion of the Corps without changing its statutory regular strength. The initial legislation focused on establishing the mobilization status of individuals, not units. In World War I, 7,500 Marines (including 277 women) were reservists. Aware that its war plans required two to three times as many Marines as it could maintain on active duty, Headquarters Marine Corps gave its reserve program greater attention in the interwar period, especially training junior officers. Of the 600,000 men and women who served in the Marine Corps in World War II, about two thirds fell into some reserve category.

d. **United States Air Force Reserve (USAFR)**. The purpose of the Air Force Reserve as derived from Title 10 United States Code is to:

*"Provide combat-ready units and individuals for active duty whenever there are not enough trained units and people in the Regular component of the Air Force to perform any national security mission."*

(1) The Air Force Reserve was conceived as a "stand-by" force for national emergencies, but has evolved into a Major Command, the Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC), of the active duty Air Force that performs many missions in common with the Air Force and some missions that are unique.  The Air Force Reserve Command's mission is to support the Air Force mission to defend the United States through control and exploitation of air and space by supporting Global Engagement.  The AFRC plays an integral role in the day-to-day Air Force mission and is not a force held in reserve for possible war or contingency operations.  The Air Force Reserve performs about 20 percent of the Air Force missions and is divided into 33 wings and 7 groups, some with their own aircraft and others that share resources with the active duty Air Force.  The "wings" report to three numbered Air Forces, the 22nd, the 10th and the 4th, and these report to the Air Force Reserve Command, headquartered in Robins Air Force Base, Georgia. The Air Force Reserve has facilities at 67 locations.

(2) The total membership of the Air Force Reserve is 67,500. Of those, 77 percent are Enlisted and 23 percent are Officers. The Headquarters of the Air Force Reserve is at Robins Air Force Base, Georgia and the Command Structure starts with the President of the United States.

(3) The National Defense Act of 1916 authorized 296 officers and 2,000 enlisted men to serve in the Aviation Section of the Army's Signal Reserve Corps.  During World War I, the First Aero Reserve Squadron was formed in New York State.  It was mobilized in 1917 and sent to France.  Concurrent with the Air Force attaining separate status in September 1947, the **USAFR** was created on April 14, 1948.  President Harry Truman called for the formation of the Air Force Reserve in 1948, just a year after the United States Air Force was formed. Originally, the Reserve was conceived as a "stand by" force for emergencies. In February 1997, the Air Force Reserve changed from a Field Operating Agency to a Major Command.

e.  **United States Coast Guard Reserve (USCGR)**.  The mission of the Coast Guard Reserve is to provide highly trained and well-qualified personnel available for active duty in time of war and national emergency, and for augmentation of regular Coast Guard forces during a serious natural or man-made disaster, accident, or catastrophe.  The USCGR is the reserve component of the United States Coast Guard.  It is organized, trained, administered, and supplied under the direction of the Commandant of the Coast Guard through the Director of Reserve and Training.  The reserves normally train two days a month and may perform up to 15 days of Active Duty for Training a year.  The Coast Guard Reserve has about 8,000 men and women in service, most of them integrated directly with Coast Guard units.

(1) Congress established a volunteer service on 23 June 1939 termed "the Coast Guard Reserve."  This service was composed primarily of boat owners and its mission was to promote boating safety and to assist the Coast Guard with the protection of lives

and property on navigable waters.  On 19 February 1941, this organization's name was changed to "the Coast Guard Auxiliary."  Simultaneously, Congress established the present United States Coast Guard Reserve as a military service.  The Coast Guard, an agency of the United States Department of Homeland Security during peacetime, can be transferred to the Department of the Navy by the President during a time of war.

2.  **Reserve vs. National Guard.**  The National Guard is the organized militia reserved to the states under Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States.  The <u>state</u> National Guard is divided up into units stationed in each of the 50 states and U.S. territories and operates under their respective state governor or territorial government. The National Guard may be called up for active duty by the state governors or territorial commanding generals to help respond to domestic emergencies and disasters, such as those caused by hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes.

> *"To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."*

a.   The definition of the term "reserve" varies depending on the context. In one context, as used here, it applies to all seven of the reserve components of the U.S. military.  In another context, it applies to only the five reserve components directly associated with the five active duty military services, but not to the Army National Guard or the Air National Guard.

b.   In most respects, the Army National Guard and Air National Guard are very similar to the Army Reserve and Air Force Reserve, respectively.  The primary difference lies in the level of government to which they are subordinated.  The Army Reserve and Air Force Reserve are subordinated to the federal government, while the National Guards are subordinated to the various state governments, except when called into federal service by the President of the United States or as provided for by law.  For example, the Virginia Army National Guard and Virginia Air National Guard are subordinated to the state of Virginia and report to the governor of Virginia as their commander-in-chief.

c.   This unique relationship descends from the colonial and state militias that served as a balance against a standing federal army, which many Americans feared would threaten states' rights. The militias were organized into the present National Guard system with the Militia Act of 1903.

> ***Posse Comitatus* (Latin): Power of the county.**
> **The whole force of the county.**

d.   Besides the theoretical check on federal power, the distinction between the federal military reserves and the National Guard permits state governors to use their personnel to

assist in disaster relief and to preserve law and order in times of crisis.  The latter is permitted because the National Guard is not subject to the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act unless they are under federal jurisdiction.  The restrictions, however, do apply to the four of the other five reserve components just as it does with their active duty military counterparts.  The United States Coast Guard and United States Coast Guard Reserve are not subject to the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act because they are the only Armed Force of the United States that is not part of the United States Department of Defense.

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Title 10 of the United States Code
10 U.S.C. § 375. Restriction on direct participation by military personnel.  *"The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to ensure that any activity (including the provision of any equipment or facility or the assignment or detail of any personnel) under this chapter does not include or permit direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law."*

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3.  **National Guard vs. National Guard of the United States.**  While the National Guard is a militia force organized by each state, the National Guard of the United States is a **reserve federal military force** of the United States armed forces.  The National Guard of the United States is a joint reserve component of the United States Army and the United States Air Force and are made up of National Guard members from the states appointed to federal military service under the consent of their respective state governors.  The National Guard of the United States maintains two subcomponents:  the Army National Guard of the United States for the Army and the Air Force's Air National Guard of the United States.  The Army National Guard of the United States is made up of federally recognized members of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard of the United States is made up of federally recognized members of the Air National Guard.

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In peacetime, the governor of each respective state or territory commands the National Guard.  When ordered to active duty for mobilization or called into federal service for emergencies, units of the Guard are under the control of their respective service secretary.  The Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS) is the oldest RC of the United States armed forces and was so designated in 1903 defense legislation formally changing the organized militia to the National Guard.

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4.  **National Guard of the United States**

   a.  **The National Guard of the United States.**  The
National Guard of the United States is a reserve military force
composed of state National Guard militia members or units under
federally recognized active or inactive armed force service for
the United States.  The National Guard of the United States is a
joint reserve component of the United States Army and the
United States Air Force and maintains two subcomponents: the Army National Guard of
the United States for the Army and the Air Force's Air National Guard of the United
States. Established under Title 10 and Title 32 of the U.S. Code, state National Guard
serves as part of the first-line defense for the United States.  The National Guard has both
a federal and state mission.  The dual mission, a provision of the U. S. Constitution,
results in each guardsman holding membership in the National Guard of his or her state
and in the National Guard of the United States.

   •  **Federal Mission.**  The National Guard's federal mission is to maintain well-
trained, well-equipped units available for prompt mobilization during war and provide
assistance during national emergencies.  The National Guard's units (or any Reserve
Component forces) may be activated in a number of ways as prescribed by public law.
Most of the laws for Federal Mission operations are in Title 10 of the U.S. Code.  When
serving under Title 10, "active duty" means full-time duty in the active military service of
the United States.  Title 10 allows the President to "federalize" National Guard forces by
ordering them to active duty in their reserve component status or by calling them into
Federal service in their militia status.

   •  **State Mission.**  The state National Guard is divided into units stationed in the
50 states, three U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia.  They operate under their
respective state governor or territorial government.  At the state level, the governors
reserve the ability, under the Constitution of the United States, to call up members of the
National Guard to help respond to domestic emergencies and disasters, such as those
caused by hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes, and snowstorms.

5.  The **National Guard Bureau (NGB)** is a joint activity
under the Department of Defense and administratively heads
the United States National Guard.  The NGB, both a staff and
operating agency, administers the federal functions of the
Army and the Air National Guard.  As a staff agency, the
NGB participates with the Army and Air staffs in developing
and coordinating programs that directly affect the National
Guard.  As an operating agency, the NGB formulates and
administers the programs for training, development, and maintenance of the Army
National Guard and Air National Guard.  It acts as the channel of communication
between the Army, Air Force, the 50 states, three territories (Puerto Rico, Guam, Virgin
Islands), and the District of Columbia where National Guard units are located.  Chief of
the National Guard Bureau, who is a four-star general in the Army or Air Force, heads
the National Guard Bureau.

a. **Air National Guard of the United States.**  The Air National Guard of the United States' official birth date was 18 September 1947, the same day the Air Force became a separate Service.  Prior to this, between World War I and World War II the Air Guard had formed 29 observation squadrons as part of the Army Air Forces.  Dramatic military budget cuts by President Harry S. Truman after V-J Day and his determination to split defense dollars evenly among the Army, Navy, and Air Force compelled the latter to plan for a far smaller active duty force than it had envisaged during World War II.  The reserve components had to help fill the gap and today, the Air Force and Air Guard are the most integrated of all the RC.

- **Federal Mission.**  The Air National Guard's federal mission is to maintain well-trained, well-equipped units available for prompt mobilization during war and provide assistance during national emergencies (such as natural disasters or civil disturbances).  During peacetime, the combat-ready units and support units are assigned to most Air Force major commands to carry out missions compatible with training, mobilization readiness, humanitarian and contingency operations such as Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.  Air National Guard units may be activated in a number of ways as prescribed by public law. Most of the laws may be found in **Title 10 of the U.S. Code**.  The Air National Guard provides almost half of the Air Force's tactical airlift support, combat communications functions, aeromedical evacuations and aerial refueling. In addition, the Air National Guard has total responsibility for air defense of the entire United States.

- **State Mission.**  When Air National Guard units are not mobilized or under federal control, they report to the governor of their respective state, territory (Puerto Rico, Guam, Virgin Islands) or the commanding general of the District of Columbia National Guard.  Each of the 54 National Guard organizations is supervised by the adjutant general of the state or territory.  Under state law, the Air National Guard provides protection of life, property and preserves peace, order and public safety.  These missions are accomplished through emergency relief support during natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes and forest fires; search and rescue operations; support to civil defense authorities; maintenance of vital public services and counterdrug operations.  Title 32 of the United States Code outlines the role of the United States National Guard.

b. **Army National Guard of the United States.**  The Army National Guard of the United States is the oldest Reserve Component of the United States armed forces and designated in 1903 defense legislation formally changing the organized militia to the National Guard.  The National Guard is the organized militia reserved to the states under Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States.  The National Guard has both a federal and state mission. The dual mission, a provision of the U. S. Constitution, results in each guardsman holding membership in the National Guard of his or her state and in the National Guard of the United States.

- **Federal Mission**.  The Army National Guard's federal mission is to maintain well-trained, well-equipped units available for prompt mobilization during war and provide assistance during national emergencies (such as natural disasters or civil disturbances).  The Army National Guard's units (or any Reserve Component forces) may be activated in a number of ways as prescribed by public law. Most of the laws for Federal Mission operations are in Title 10 of the U.S. Code.  When serving under Title 10, "active duty" means full-time duty in the active military service of the United States.  Title 10 allows the President to "federalize" National Guard forces by ordering them to active duty in their reserve component status or by calling them into Federal service in their militia status.

- **State Mission.**  The Army National Guard exists in all 50 states, three territories and the District of Columbia.  The state, territory or district leadership are the Commanders in Chief for each Guard.  Their Adjutants General are answerable to them for the training and readiness of the units.  At the state level, the governors reserve the ability, under the Constitution of the United States, to call up members of the National Guard in time of domestic emergencies or need.  Guard units respond to battle fires or helping communities deal with floods, tornadoes, hurricanes, snowstorms or other emergency situations.

> The Army National Guard is reorganizing into 28 brigade combat teams and 78 support brigades as a part of the Army's transformation plan.  When the reorganization is complete, brigades will have 3,000 to 4,000 soldiers whereas the former Army organization was principally structured around large, mostly mechanized, divisions of around 15,000 soldiers each.

> Title 10 of the United States Code outlines the role of armed forces in the United States Code.
>
> It provides the legal basis for the roles, missions and organization of each of the services as well as the United States Department of Defense.  Each of the five subtitles deals with a separate aspect or component of the armed services.
>
> Subtitle A -- General Military Law
> Subtitle B -- Army
> Subtitle C -- Navy and Marine Corps
> Subtitle D -- Air Force
> Subtitle E -- Reserve Components
>
> The current Title 10 was the result of an overhaul and renumbering of the former Title 10 and Title 34 into one title by an act of Congress on 1956-08-10.

> Title 32 of the United States Code outlines the role of the United States National Guard in the United States Code.
>
> 32 U.S.C. ch.1—Organization
> 32 U.S.C. ch.3—Personnel
> 32 U.S.C. ch.5—Training
> 32 U.S.C. ch.7—Service, Supply, And Procurement
> 32 U.S.C. ch.9—Homeland Defense Activities
>
> *"In accordance with the traditional military policy of the United States, it is essential that the strength and organization of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard as an integral part of the first line defenses of the United States be maintained and assured at all times. Whenever Congress determines that more units and organizations are needed for the national security than are in the regular components of the ground and air forces, the Army National Guard of the United States and the Air National Guard of the United States, or such parts of them as are needed, together with such units of other reserve components as are necessary for a balanced force, shall be ordered to active Federal duty and retained as long as so needed."*

6. **Reserve component categories**

All members of a reserve component are assigned to one of three reserve component categories:

a. The **Ready Reserve** comprises military members of the Reserve and National Guard, organized in units or as individuals, liable for recall to active duty to augment the active components in time of war or national emergency. The Ready Reserve consists of three reserve component subcategories:

(1) The **Selected Reserve** consist of those units and individuals within the Ready Reserve designated by their respective Services and approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as so essential to initial wartime missions that they have priority over all other Reserves. The Selected Reserve consists of additional sub-subcategories:

- **Drilling Reservists in Units** are trained unit members who participate in unit training activities on a part-time basis.

- **Training Pipeline (non-deployable account)** personnel are enlisted members of the Selected Reserve who have not yet completed initial active duty for training (IADT) and officers who are in training for professional categories or in undergraduate flying training.

- **Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs)** are trained individuals assigned to an active component, Selective Service System, or Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA) organization's billet which must be filled on or shortly after mobilization.  IMAs participate in training activities on a part-time basis with an active component unit in preparation for recall in a mobilization.

- **Active Guard/Reserve (AGR)** are National Guard or Reserve members of the Selected Reserve who are ordered to active duty or full-time National Guard duty for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the reserve component units.

(2) **Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)** personnel provide a manpower pool composed principally of individuals having had training, having previously served in an active duty component or in the Selected Reserve, and having some period of their military service obligation (MSO) remaining.

(3) **Inactive National Guard (ING)** are National Guard personnel in an inactive status in the Ready Reserve, not in the Selected Reserve, attached to a specific National Guard unit, who are required to muster once a year with their assigned unit but do not participate in training activities. On mobilization, ING members mobilize with their units.

b.  The **Standby Reserve** consists of personnel who maintain their affiliation without being in the Ready Reserve, who have been designated key civilian employees, or who have a temporary hardship or disability.  They are not required to perform training and are not part of units, but create a pool of trained individuals who could be mobilized if necessary to fill manpower needs in specific skills.

- **Active Status List** are those Standby Reservists temporarily assigned for hardship or other cogent reason; those not having fulfilled their military service obligation or those retained in active status when provided for by law; or those members of Congress and others identified by their employers as "key personnel" and who have been removed from the Ready Reserve because they are critical to the national security in their civilian employment.

- **Inactive Status List** are those Standby Reservists who are not required by law or regulation to remain in an active program and who retain their Reserve affiliation in a nonparticipating status, and those who have skills which may be of possible future use to the Armed Force concerned.

- The **Retired Reserve** consists of all Reserve officers and enlisted personnel who receive retired pay on the basis of active duty and/or reserve service; all Reserve officers and enlisted personnel who are otherwise eligible for retired pay but have not reached age 60, who have not elected discharge, and are not voluntary members of the Ready or Standby Reserve; and other retired reservists under certain conditions.

7.  **Mobilization.**  Individual service members or entire units of the reserve components may be called into active duty (also referred to as mobilized, activated, or called up), under several conditions:

a. **Full Mobilization** requires a declaration of war or national emergency by the United States Congress, affects all reservists (including those on inactive status and retired members), and may last until six months after the war or emergency for which it was declared.

b. **Partial Mobilization** requires a declaration of national emergency, affects only the Ready Reserve, and is limited to a maximum of one million personnel activated for no more than two years.

c. **Presidential Reserve Call-Ups** do not require a declaration of national emergency but require the President to notify Congress and is limited to 200,000 Selected Reservists and 30,000 Individual Ready Reservists for up to 270 days.

d. The **15-Day Statute** allows individual service secretaries to call up the Ready Reserves for up to 15 days per year for annual training or operational missions.

e. **RC Volunteers** may request to go on active duty regardless of their reserve component category, but the state governors must approve activating National Guard personnel.

8. The chart on the following page (see Figure IV-1) depicts the relationship between Office of the Secretary of Defense, Service Secretaries, Chiefs of the Services, and their respective Reserve components. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs responsibility is to advise the Secretary of Defense on Reserve Component issues and exercise policy oversight over the National Guard and Reserve. The National Guard and Reserve Chiefs report directly to the Chiefs of Staff of their respective Service in their responsibilities to organize, train, man and equip the force. Activated Reserve Component units and individuals report to their combatant commander as the Active force does. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) is a joint staff of the Departments of the Army and of the Air Force. It is the channel of communications between the Departments of Army and Air Force and the States on all matters pertaining to the National Guard. The primary functions of the NGB are coordination between the Services and the States on the policy and resourcing of the National Guard in its federal/national security mission. The Directors of the Army and Air National Guard are Service Staff officers and members of the NGB.

9. **Summary**

The national defense strategy is based on the ability to project U.S. forces globally and sustain operational tempo in a theater upon deployment. A significant element of this strategy is an increased reliance upon Guard and Reserve forces. A seamless Total Force is key to fielding a fighting force capable of supporting multiple missions including protecting America's homeland. The National Guard and Reserves have been and continue to be an integral part of the total force in support of our National Security and National Military Strategies.

**Figure IV-1. Control of Reserves**

Prior to the 20th Century, Militia service was a common trait among presidents of the United States. Eighteen of America's forty-three presidents have served in colonial or state militias' and two have served in the National Guard. Among these, three served in colonial militias (Washington, Jefferson and Madison), 15 served in state militias, one in the Army National Guard (Truman) and one (George W. Bush) has served in the Air National Guard.

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**Presidents with Militia service:**
George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Andrew Jackson, William Harrison, John Tyler, James Polk, Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan, Abraham Lincoln, Ulysses Grant, Rutherford B. Hayes, James Garfield, Chester Arthur, Benjamin Harrison, William McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and George W. Bush.

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**URLS for Reserve and National Guard Component Websites**:

Office of the Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs:  http://www.defenselink.mil/ra/

Marine Forces Reserve: www.marforres.usmc.mil

Navy Reserve: http://www.navyreserve.com/

Air Force Reserve: www.afrc.af.mil

Army National Guard: www.arng.army.mil

Air National Guard: http://www.ang.af.mil
Army Reserve: http://www.army.mil/usar
Coast Guard Reserve: www.uscg.mil/hq/Reserve/reshist.htm

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# CHAPTER V

# JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING

1.  **Joint Strategic Planning**.  Joint planning integrates military actions with those of other instruments of national power and our multinational partners in time, space, and purpose to achieve a specified end state.  Joint strategic planning provides strategic guidance and direction to the Armed Forces of the United States and consists of three subsets: **security cooperation planning, force planning and joint operation planning** (Figure V-1).



**Figure V-1.  Joint Strategic Planning**

   a.   Joint strategic planning occurs primarily at the national-strategic and theater-strategic levels to help the President, SecDef, and other members of the NSC formulate political-military assessments, define political and military objectives and end states, develop strategic concepts and options, and allocate resources.  At the national- strategic level, the CJCS, in consultation with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), performs joint strategic planning to:

   (1) Advise and assist the President and SecDef regarding the strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the United States and the preparation of policy guidance.

(2) Advise the SecDef on program recommendations and budget proposals to conform to priorities established in strategic plans.

(3) Transmit the strategic guidance and direction of the President and SecDef to the COCOMs, military Services, and combat support agencies.

b. **The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS).** At the national level, military planning is conducted within the framework of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). The JSPS establishes the administrative framework for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to advise the SecDef, President and to provide strategic direction to the CCDR's. JSPS is the primary means by which the CJCS performs joint strategic planning. JSPS also considers the projected force contributions of our allies. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is charged by the National Security Act of 1947 with preparing strategic plans and providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces. The JSPS provides the framework for strategic planning and direction of the armed forces.

(1) Joint strategic planning begins the process which creates the forces whose capabilities form the basis for theater operation plans. It ends with planning guidance for the CCDR to develop strategic and contingency plans. JSPS constitutes a continuing process in which each document, program, or plan is an outgrowth of preceding cycles and of documents formulated earlier and in which development proceeds concurrently.

(2) The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is the primary means by which the CJCS, in consultation with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the CCDRs, departments, and other services, carries out his statutory responsibilities to assist the President and SecDef in providing strategic direction of the armed forces. The CJCS:

- Requires development of and reviews strategic plans.

- Prepares and reviews contingency plans. Advises the President and SecDef on requirements, programs, and budgets.

- Provides net assessments on the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies relative to potential adversaries.

(3) JSPS is a flexible and interactive system intended to provide supporting military advice to the DOD Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) and strategic direction for use in JOPES[1]. Through the JSPS, the JCS and the CCDRs:

- Review the national security environment and U.S. national security objectives.

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[1]APEX is replacing JOPES, the next revision of the CJCSM 3122.XX JOPES Volumes will be APEX Volumes.

- Evaluate the threat.

- Assess current strategy and existing or proposed programs and budgets.

- Propose military strategy, programs, and forces necessary to achieve those national security objectives in a resource-limited environment consistent with policies and priorities established by the President and SecDef.

(4) Although all JSPS documents are prepared in consultation with other members of the JCS and the CCDRs, the final approval authority for all JSPS documents is the CJCS. Most JSPS documents are published biennially; however, all documents are subject to annual review and may be changed as required. The products of JSPS that gives direction to strategic and operational planning are the GEF and JSCP.

(5) The products of the JSPS, such as the NDS, GEF and the NMS and JSCP, provide the strategic guidance and direction for joint strategic planning to the CCDR and for the other categories of military planning. CCDRs prepare strategic estimates, strategies, and plans to accomplish their assigned missions based on strategic guidance and direction from the President, SecDef, and CJCS. CCDR's and their subordinate JFCs primarily accomplish theater strategic and operational level planning. It is at this level where campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within their operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by, establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events.

2. **Security Cooperation Planning**. Security Cooperation is the means by which the DOD encourages and enables countries and organizations to work with us to achieve strategic objectives. Because security cooperation guidance is incorporated in the GEF campaign guidance, security cooperation planning should be incorporated within the combatant command's broader campaign and contingency planning efforts, to include the integration and synchronization of Phase 0 and security cooperation activities.

a. Security cooperation planning consists of a focused program of bilateral and multilateral defense activities conducted with foreign countries to serve mutual security interests and build defense partnerships. Security cooperation efforts also should be aligned with and support strategic communication themes, messages, and actions. The SecDef identifies security cooperation objectives, assesses the effectiveness of security cooperation activities, and revises goals when required to ensure continued support for U.S. interests abroad. Although they can shift over time, examples of typical security cooperation objectives include: creating favorable military regional balances of power, advancing mutual defense or security arrangements, building allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and preventing conflict and crisis.

b. The GEF gives a framework to CCDR's for integrating efforts to shape the strategic environment. It gives the CDR's theater or functional strategic end states

prioritized appropriately for each combatant command. CDR's are required to pursue these strategic end states as they develop their theater or functional strategies, which they then translate into an integrated set of steady-state activities and operations by means of a campaign plan. This approach requires CDR's to balance their efforts across their AORs and address specific threats or problems within the larger context of their campaign plan.

c. The Department of Defense's (DOD) senior civilian and military leadership — in conjunction with CCDRs, Service Chiefs, and support agencies — focus their activities on achieving the security cooperation objectives identified by the SecDef and President within the GEF. Security cooperation planning links these activities with security cooperation objectives by identifying, prioritizing, and integrating them to optimize their overall contribution to specified U.S. security interests within a CCDR's theater campaign plan. Security cooperation activities are grouped into eight focus areas (see Figure V-2 on the following page):

(1) **Operational Access and Global Freedom of Action** – Gain unfettered access to and freedom of action in all operational domains. Support global defense posture realignment and larger U.S. political and commercial freedom of action and access needs.

(2) **Operational Capacity and Capability Building** – Build usable, relevant and enduring Partner capabilities while achieving U.S. and Partner objectives.

(3) **Interoperability with U.S. Forces/Support to U.S. Capabilities** – Develop operational and technical capabilities, doctrine, and tactics, techniques and procedures with Partner nations to enable effective combined operations or improve a collective defense capability.

(4) **Intelligence and Information Sharing** – Gain and/or share specific kinds of intelligence or information and developing shared assessments of common threats.

(5) **Assurance and Regional Confidence Building** – Assure Allies and Partners, enhance regional stability and security, reduce the potential for inter- or intra-state conflict and international consensus building, and/or expand community of like-minded states dedicated to more peaceful and secure international order.

(6) **Defense/Security Sector Reform** – Assist Allies with transforming their defense/security establishments to become publicly accountable, well-managed and subject to the rule of law.

(7) **International Defense Technology Collaboration** – Promote technological collaboration, foster mutually beneficial exchange of technology and defense equipment, gain access to foreign technology and reduce the overall cost of defense to the U.S. taxpayer.

(8) **International Suasion and Cooperation** -- Build cooperative political-military relationships with key security influencers and offset counterproductive influence in key regions and international organizations

**Figure V-2. Security Cooperation Activities**

d.   Joint Publication *(JP) 3- 08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination during Joint Operations Vol. I,* discusses how to facilitate security cooperation with U.S. Government agencies, and inter-governmental, nongovernmental, and regional security organizations.

3.  **Force Planning**

a.   **Force planning**[2] at the national strategic level, is associated with creating and maintaining military capabilities.  It is primarily the responsibility of the Services and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and is conducted under the administrative control that runs from the SecDef to the Secretaries of the Military Departments to the Service Chiefs.  The Services recruit, organize, train, equip, and provide forces for assignment to COCOMs and administer and support these forces.  In areas peculiar to special operations, USSOCOM has similar responsibility for special operations forces (SOF), with the exception of organizing Service components.

b.   At the theater strategic level, force planning encompasses all those activities performed by the supported CCDR, subordinate component CDRs, and support agencies to select, prepare, integrate, and deploy the forces and capabilities required to accomplish an assigned mission.  Force planning also encompasses those activities performed by force providers to develop, source, and tailor those forces and capabilities with actual units.

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[2]JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, 26 Dec 2006, Chapter III, describes this aspect of force planning in greater detail.

4. **Joint Operation Planning**

a. **Joint operation planning** is the overarching process that guides CCDR's and/or JFCs in developing plans for the employment of military power within the context of national strategic objectives and national military strategy to shape events, meet contingencies, and respond to unforeseen crises. Planning is triggered when the continuous monitoring of global events indicates the need to prepare military options. It is a collaborative process that can be iterative and/or parallel to provide actionable direction to CDRs and their staffs across multiple echelons of command.

b. Joint operation planning includes all activities that must be accomplished to plan for an anticipated operation — the mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment of forces. **Planners recommend and CDRs define criteria for the termination of joint operations and link these criteria to the transition to stabilization and achievement of the end state.**

c. **Stability operations** are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

(1) Per *DODD 3000.05, November 28, 2005* all military plans shall address stability operations requirements throughout all phases of an operation or plan as appropriate. Stability operations dimensions of military plans shall be:

(a) Exercised, gamed, and, when appropriate, red-teamed (i.e., tested by use of exercise opposition role playing) with other U.S. Departments and Agencies.

(b) Integrated with U.S. Government plans for stabilization and reconstruction and developed when lawful and consistent with security requirements and the Secretary of Defense's guidance, in coordination with relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector.

d. **Global Force Management (GFM) and Force Projection.** At any given time there could be multiple requirements to employ military forces. Each operation could have a different strategic priority, and could be of a different size and scope. To effectively support multiple requirements, and apply the right level of priority and resources to each, requires **effective global force management**. Although the emphasis of this primer is on overseas deployments and redeployments, deployments within the homeland are possible in support of homeland defense and civil support. Deployments

within the homeland follow the same basic processes as those overseas; however, the timelines can be shorter. The national importance of these missions is reflected in the elevated movement priorities that can be invoked by the President or SecDef. Airlift movement priorities are outlined in the *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 4120.02*, *Assignment of Movement Priority*. Surface transportation (commercial and organic) within the homeland can be a viable option for units within a reasonable distance of the operational area and should be considered when planning for and conducting these operations.

(1) **Background.** GFM has transformed the former reactive force management process into a near real-time, proactive process. Historically, the DOD conducted strategic force management through a decentralized, ad hoc process that framed decision opportunities for the SecDef. For OEF and OIF, the SecDef made crisis action planning force management decisions in response to a COCOM's request for forces or capabilities. To support these decisions, the CJCS hosted ad hoc "wargames" to identify forces to support those OEF/OIF requests and determine risk mitigation options.

(a) GFM enables the SecDef to make proactive, risk-informed force management decisions by integrating and aligning the three processes of force assignment, apportionment, and allocation in support of the NDS, joint force availability requirements, and joint force assessments. This process facilitates alignment of operational forces against known allocation requirements in advance of planning and deployment preparation timelines.

(b) The end result is a timely allocation of forces/capabilities necessary to execute COCOM missions (including Theater Security Cooperation tasks), timely alignment of forces against future requirements, and informed SecDef decisions on the risk associated with allocation decisions while eliminating ad hoc assessments. The CDR, USJFCOM has been designated as the Primary Joint Force Provider for identifying and recommending sourcing solutions, in coordination with the Military Departments and other COCOMs, from all forces and capabilities except designated forces sourced by USSOCOM, USSTRATCOM and USTRANSCOM as addressed in the UCP to the CJCS.

(2) The UCP, "Forces For Unified Commands Memorandum" (Forces For), the JSCP and JP1, "Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States," are the baseline documents that establish the policy and procedures in support of GFM. Global Force Management will include: (1) direction from the SecDef as to assignment of forces to COCOMs, (2) the forces/capabilities allocation process that provides access to all available forces – including military, DOD, and other federal agency resources—to support COCOM s for both steady state and rotational requirements and requests for capabilities or forces in response to crises or emergent contingencies, (3) include apportionment guidance provided in the JSCP, and (4) inform joint force, structure, and capability assessment process.

(3) <u>The Assignment, Allocation, and Apportionment Relationship</u> [3]

   (a) The current relationship among the three force management processes are complex. The purpose of GFM is to transform these three stove-piped processes into a predictive, streamlined, and integrated process supported by net-centric tools that integrates risk management. Authorities that govern the three processes are as follows:

   1   <u>Assignment</u>. The President, through the UCP, instructs the SecDef to document his direction for assigning forces in the "Forces For." Pursuant to title 10, USC, section 162, the Secretaries of the Military Departments shall assign forces under their jurisdiction to unified and specified COCOMs to perform missions assigned to those commands. Such assignment shall be made as directed by the SecDef, including direction as to the command to which forces are assigned.

   2   <u>Allocation</u>. A force assigned to a COCOM may be transferred from the command to which it is assigned only by authority of the SecDef, and under procedures prescribed by the SecDef and approved by the President. Under this authority, the SecDef allocates forces between CCDRs. When transferring forces, the Secretary will specify the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish).

   3   <u>Apportionment</u>. Apportionment is the distribution of forces and capabilities as the starting point for planning. Pursuant to title 10 USC, section 153, "the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be responsible for preparing strategic plans, including plans which conform with resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to be effective." Pursuant to the JSCP, "apportioned forces are types of combat and related support forces provided to CCDRs as a starting point for planning purposes only; forces are apportioned to support the National Defense Strategy, with the intent of allowing senior leaders to consider the competing force demands associated with the possible execution of multiple plans. Forces apportioned for planning purposes may not be those allocated for execution." The Chairman apportions forces to COCOMs based on the SecDef's GEF.

   (b) The relationships among the assignment, allocation, and apportionment processes will transition over time to a single, integrated, capabilities-based process that supports the NDS. To further enable this transition, GFM informs the Department's assessment processes by identifying sporadic or persistent unsourced/hard to source (UHTS) forces/capabilities. The objective is to identify strategic/military risk proactively and develop mitigation options given an imbalance among:

   - the current force/capability supply (those forces/capabilities assigned to COCOMs as well as those forces/capabilities that remain assigned to their Military Departments);

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[3]Global Force Manning Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) FY 2008-2009, June 4 2008. Also see Chapter XVI of this Primer, Key-Step 7

- current force/capability demand (forces/capabilities allocated to COCOMs in support of COCOM assigned missions); and
- potential future demand (forces /capabilities apportioned to COCOMs for planning).

(c) Aligning the three processes under GFM was an interim step. As the GFM Data initiative, Adaptive Planning initiative, and DoD Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) field usable tools and capabilities, GFM will enable the Military Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to manage force availability. GFM will also enable the designated Joint Force Providers to monitor force availability over time, identify risks to execute CCDR missions, forecast sourcing challenges to execute contingencies, and project Reserve Component (RC) unit mobilization/availability.

(4) **Process.**[4] The GFM process begins and ends with the SecDef. GFM aligns force apportionment, assignment, and allocation methodologies in support of the National Defense Strategy and joint forces availability requirements. It provides comprehensive insights into the global availability of U.S. military forces and provides senior decision makers a process to assess quickly and accurately the impact and risk of proposed changes in forces/capability assignment, apportionment, and allocation. GFM goals are to:

- Account for forces and capabilities committed to ongoing operations and constantly changing unit availability.

- Identify the most appropriate and responsive force or capability that best meets the COCOM requirement.

- Identify risk associated with sourcing recommendations.

- Improve ability to win multiple overlapping conflicts.

- Improve responsiveness to unforeseen contingencies.

- Provide predictability for rotational force requirements.

(a) The global force management process provides global force visibility across OPLANS and on-going operations. Global force visibility is achieved by applying joint force structuring processes and data elements to force planning for contingencies and crises, detailed deployment and employment planning, and sound reporting procedures.

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[4] For additional information, see Guidance for Employment of the Force 2008, Global Force Management Implementation Guidance FY 2008-2009, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, (JOPES) Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures), and CJCSM 3122.02C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, (JOPES) Volume III (Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution). DODI 8260.03, August 23, 2006, Organization and Force Structure Constraint (OFSC) for Global Force Management (GFM).

(b) Global force visibility is preserved through effective force and phase planning for contingencies and crises; detailed deployment planning; and sound reporting procedures. The global force management process enables the military to be managed in a way that allows the President and SecDef to deploy the force where and when it is needed. It allows the Joint Staff to rapidly source the force needed for a specific CONOPS from a global, rather than regional, perspective and to surge capabilities when needed into crisis theaters from disparate locations worldwide. The U.S. military's global presence must be managed dynamically, ensuring that our joint capabilities are employed to the greatest effect. Under this concept, forces are allocated to CCDRs as needed and sourced from anywhere in the world. Supported CCDRs use an approved operational order (OPORD) TPFDD as the primary means of communicating force requirements for an operation. The request for forces (RFF) (i.e., capabilities) process is used to obtain additional requirements not already authorized or approved.

(c) **During the initial and subsequent deployments, DOD leadership may use RFFs and deployment orders (DEPORDs) in lieu of the TPFDD.** Deployments under subsequent DEPORDs as a result of RFFs can significantly impact the flow of forces. CDRs and their staffs must understand the associated impact of additional force flow that had not been previously planned.

e. Planning also addresses mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of forces.

(1) Joint operation planning encompasses the full range of activities required to conduct joint operations. These activities include the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of forces.

(a) **Mobilization.**[5] Mobilization is the process of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies by assembling and organizing personnel and materiel for active duty military forces, activating the Reserve Components (RC) including federalizing the National Guard, extending terms of service, surging and mobilizing the industrial base and training bases, and bringing the Armed Forces of the U.S. to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency.

<u>1</u>  There are two processes implied in this description: the military mobilization process by which the nation's Armed Forces are brought to an increased state of readiness, and the national mobilization process of mobilizing the national economy to meet non-defense needs as well as sustaining the Armed Forces across the range of military operations. From the joint operation perspective, the Total Force Policy shifted a significant percentage of military missions from the Active Component contractor personnel, and host-nation support (HNS). This policy also ensured

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[5]JP 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning, 11 January 2006 provides fundamental principles and guidance for the planning and conduct of joint military mobilization and demobilization.

that mobilization actions would be considered for most military operations. Mobilization and demobilization are also functions of the joint operation planning process which complement and support the deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of joint forces in crisis and war.

2   As shown in Figure V-3 below, there are four mobilization tenets that describe the characteristics of successful mobilization **and provide the foundation for mobilization doctrine. The four tenets that provide the foundation for mobilization doctrine are as follow**s:

a   **Objective** includes the clearly defined, attainable, and decisive objectives that are imperative to joint operations. CDRs and operational and mobilization planners must coordinate their efforts to ensure that the time necessary for mobilization actions is clearly understood, and the resulting impacts clearly identified and addressed.

b   **Unity of effort** demands the integrated efforts of the nation's military and supporting resource areas toward achievement of common objectives.

c   **Flexibility** is necessary to develop an appropriate response in a crisis, overcome unforeseen problems, adapt to uncertainties, and adjust to the friction of war.

d   **Timeliness** is the mobilization of all resources essential to achieving overwhelming force on the battlefield at the right time and place. It is also essential to seizing and maintaining the initiative.



**MOBILIZATION TENETS**

OBJECTIVE

UNITY OF EFFORT

FLEXIBILITY

TIMELINESS

**Figure V-3.  Mobilization Tenets**

3   The members of the joint planning and execution community (JPEC) plan and execute joint military mobilization. The primary executors of mobilization are the Military Departments. They develop mobilization plans to support the CCDRs' operation plans. They are guided in these efforts by policy and resource levels established by the Secretary of Defense and by planning tasks specified by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). As part of their operation planning responsibilities, CCDRs determine mobilization requirements

and, based on additional planning guidance, the CCDRs incorporate information on capabilities required into campaign plans, operation plans, and operation orders. The Joint Staff is responsible for integrating the mobilization plans of the Military Departments and supporting DOD agencies, recommending resource priorities and allocations, recommending levels of mobilization, and monitoring the status and progress of mobilization execution.

        4   The mobilization annex of the JSCP guides the Military Departments and CCDRs in preparing mobilization plans that support the operation plans developed in the contingency planning process. Mobilization planning guidance in the JSCP is focused on the areas of manpower and industrial mobilization. The mobilization estimate of the situation provides a tool for mobilization planners to make a systematic appraisal of mobilization requirements and options. A mobilization base must be maintained at all times and requires a pool of resources. The two most critical resources are manpower and industrial base capacity due to the time and expense involved in developing skilled military and civilian personnel and technologically sophisticated military equipment. The JPEC uses crisis action planning procedures to plan, mobilize, and deploy forces in time-sensitive situations. Successful mobilization planning and execution during crises depends on the availability of accurate data regarding the readiness of RC units and personnel, pre-trained individual manpower, civilian employees, and other required support. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommends to the Secretary of Defense the assets that are to be called up and their planned use when RC forces are mobilized and National Guard forces are federalized to augment the AC.

        (b) **Deployment.** Deployment encompasses the movement of forces and their sustainment resources from their original locations to a specific destination to conduct joint operations. It specifically includes movement of forces and their requisite sustaining resources within the U.S., within theaters, and between theaters. Deployment operations encompass four major nodes for distribution process: (1) point of origin, (2) port of embarkation (POE), (3) port of debarkation (POD), and (4) destination; and three segments: (1) point of origin to POE, (2) POE to POD, and (3) POD to destination. Geographic CCDRs are responsible for coordinating with the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and supporting CCDRs to provide an integrated transportation system from origin to destination during deployment operations.

        1   Supported CCDRs are responsible for deployment operations planned and executed during joint force missions in their AORs. Supported CCDRs have four major responsibilities relative to deployment operations: (1) build and validate movement requirements based on the CONOPS; (2) determine predeployment standards; (3) balance and regulate the transportation flow; (4) and manage effectively. The primary task for supporting COCOMs is to ensure that the supported CCDR receives the timely and complete support needed to accomplish the mission. Supporting CCDRs have five major deployment responsibilities: source, prepare, and verify forces; ensure units retain their visibility and mobility; ensure units report movement requirements rapidly and accurately; regulate the flow; and coordinate effectively. Normally, several functional COCOMs are involved in every phase of a joint operation. Four functional COCOMs

that could be involved in deployment of the joint force are U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and USTRANSCOM.

2   Deployment planning is based primarily on mission requirements and the time available to accomplish the mission.  During deployment operations (deployment, JRSOI, and redeployment), supported CCDRs are responsible for building and validating requirements, determining predeployment standards, and balancing, regulating, and effectively managing the transportation flow.

3   Supporting COCOMs and agencies source requirements not available to the supported CCDR and are responsible for: verifying supporting unit movement data; regulating the support deployment flow; and coordinating effectively during deployment operations.  This chapter discusses several other factors that may impact deployment planning and examines considerations and procedures concerning deployment operations. Based upon the supported CCDR's guidance, planners must assess the AOR's environment and determine deployment requirements for supporting the JFC's CONOPS. Transportation feasibility must be included in the COA development.

4   Regardless of whether contingency planning or CAP is used, joint planning determines the requirements for joint force employment to achieve the military objectives.  Once the supported CCDR's strategic concept is approved by the CJCS, it becomes the CONOPs upon which further planning is developed.  Planning is based on CCDR(s) and Service(s) guidance and joint doctrine.  The supporting and subordinate CDRs use the supported CCDR's CONOPS and the apportioned or allocated combat forces as the basis to determine necessary support, including forces and sustaining supplies for the operation (mission analysis).  The supported CCDR's staff organization is established and command relationships are formulated to assist the CDR in determining priorities and assigning tasks for conducting deployment operations. Supported CCDRs may task assigned Service components with the majority of responsibility for deployment operations based upon various factors (e.g., dominant user, most capable Service).  Each supporting or subordinate CDR who is assigned a task in the CCDR's strategic concept prepares a supporting plan.  The CCDR consolidates these plans to build a recommended phasing of forces and support, and performs a transportation analysis of the entire movement from the POE to the final destination.  In essence, the supported CCDR uses the information to validate the adequacy of the theater and determine whether the infrastructure is satisfactory for employment of assets, forces, facilities, and supporting systems. Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) provides the framework for determining methods of accomplishing the assigned tasks.  Following these actions, the supported CCDR, with USTRANSCOM support, hosts the TPFDD refinement conference.  (JP 3-35, *Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations*, discusses joint deployment planning in greater detail.)

(c) **Employment.**  Employment encompasses the use of military forces and capabilities within an operational area (OA).  Employment planning provides the foundation for, determines the scope of, and is limited by mobilization, deployment, and sustainment planning.  Employment is primarily the responsibility of the supported CCDRs and their subordinate and supporting CDRs.  JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*,

JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, this publication, and numerous other publications in the Joint Doctrine system discuss joint employment planning in greater detail.

(d) **Sustainment.**  Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment.  The focus of sustainment in joint operations is to provide the CCDR with the means to enable freedom of action and endurance and extend operational reach.  Effective sustainment determines the depth to which the joint force can conduct decisive operations, allowing the CCDR to seize, retain and exploit the initiative.  Sustainment is primarily the responsibility of the supported CCDRs and their Service component CDRs in close cooperation with the Services, combat support agencies, and supporting commands.

(e) **Redeployment.**  Redeployment encompasses the movement of units, individuals, or supplies deployed in one area to another area, or to another location within the area for the purpose of further employment.  Redeployment also includes the return of forces and resources to their original location and status.  Redeployment is primarily the responsibility of supported CDRs and their Service component CDRs, in close cooperation with the supporting CCDRs and USTRANSCOM.  Similar to deployment, redeployment operations encompass four phases: redeployment planning, pre-redeployment activities, movement, and JRSOI.  Redeployment operations are dependent on the supported CCDR's defined end state, concept for redeployment, or requirements to support another JFC's CONOPs.

Redeployment planning is the responsibility of the losing supported CDR or the gaining supported CDR when the redeployment is to a new operational area.  Operational employment normally ends with termination or transition of the joint force mission.  Operations terminate when stated national strategic end state conditions or objectives are achieved.   Transition occurs when control of the ongoing mission is transferred to another organization or when a change of mission is brought about by changing circumstances or objectives.  Decisions made concerning the termination of operations, separation of belligerents, withdrawal timetables, residual forces and reserve stocks to remain in the host country will shape the pace and nature of the redeployment. *JP 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations*, discusses joint deployment planning in greater detail.

(f) **Demobilization.**  Demobilization encompasses the transition of a mobilized military establishment and civilian economy to a normal configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality.  It includes the return of Reserve Component units, individuals, and materiel stocks to their former status.  Demobilization is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments and Services, in close cooperation with the supported CDRs and their Service component CDRs.  JP 4-05, *Mobilization Planning*, discusses demobilization planning in greater detail.

f.   **Operation Phasing Model**.  The phasing model (Figures V-4, V-5 and V-6) has six phases: shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize the environment, and enable civil authority.  **Each phase must be considered during operation planning and**

**plan assessment.** This construct is prescriptive in nature and is meant to provide planners a consistent template while not imparting additional constraints on the flexibility of CDRs. CDRs are not obligated to execute all phases, but are expected to demonstrate consideration of all phases during their planning. The six phases are described below.



**Figure V-4. Relationship of Global and Theater Shaping**

(1) <u>Shape</u>. Shaping Operations are focused on partners, potential partners and those that might impede our efforts or provide indirect support to adversaries. Shaping supports deterrence by showing resolve, strengthening partnership and fostering regional security. Insofar as the influencing of potential adversaries is concerned, shaping utilizes inducement and persuasion. Shaping activities set the foundations for operational access as well as develop the relationships and organizational precursors that enable effective partnerships in time of crisis.

> **Inducement**: Increases the benefits of and/or reduces the cost of compliance (increasing overall utility of complying with our demands).
>
> **Persuasion**: Alters the preferences against which the costs and benefits are evaluated (changing the decision context).

(a) Participation in effective regional security frameworks with other instruments of national and multi-national power is critical. Pre-crisis shaping activities

by their nature rely heavily on the non-military contributors to unified action.  For example:

The U.S. State Department is the lead agency for U.S. foreign policy, leads the individual country teams, funds security assistance and is responsible for the integration of information as an instrument of national power.  Also, the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) has the mission to lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife.

(b) Ultimately, shaping operations will support the achievement of an endstate that provides a global security environment favorable to U.S. interests.

(c) The Joint Force, as part of a larger multinational and interagency effort, conducts continuous, anticipatory shaping operations that build partnerships with governmental, non-governmental, regional and international organizations, and reduces the causes of conflict and instability in order to prevent or mitigate conflict or other crises and set the conditions for success in other operations- all aimed at a secure global environment favorable to U.S. interests.[6]

(d) Joint, interagency and multinational operations are executed continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined national strategic and strategic military objectives.  They are designed to assure success by **shaping perceptions** and influencing the behavior of both adversaries and allies, developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, improving information exchange and intelligence sharing, and providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access.  Shape phase activities must adapt to a particular theater environment and may be executed in one theater in order to create effects and/or achieve objectives in another.  Planning that supports most "shaping" requirements typically occurs in the context of day-to-day security cooperation, and COCOMs may incorporate Phase 0 activities and tasks into the SCP/Theater Campaign Plan.  Thus, these requirements are beyond the scope of this document and JP 5-0.  However, contingency and Crisis Action Planning requirements also occur while global and theater shaping activities are ongoing, and these requirements are satisfied in accordance with the CJCSM 3122 series.  Moreover, the JOPP Steps described in Chapter XI, "The Joint Operation Planning Process," are useful in planning security cooperation activities as well as developing OPLANs and OPORDs.

(2) Deter.[7]  The intent of this phase is to deter undesirable adversary action by demonstrating the capabilities and resolve of the joint force.  It differs from deterrence that occurs in the shape phase in that it is largely characterized by **preparatory actions**

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[6]Military Support to Shaping Joint Operating Concept, 1 Feb 2007

[7]Deterrence Operations, Joint Operating Concept, December 2006

that specifically support or facilitate the execution of subsequent phases of the operation/campaign. Deterrence supports shaping by helping to reassure states that cooperative partnership with the U.S. will not result in an unacceptable threat. Insofar as the influencing of potential adversaries is concerned, deterrence deals with coercive forms of influence.



**Figure V-5. Phasing Model – Linear View**

(a) Deterrence operations convince adversaries not to take actions that threaten U.S. vital interests by means of decisive influence over their decision-making. Decisive influence is achieved by credibly threatening to deny benefits and/or impose costs, while encouraging restraint by convincing the actor that restraint will result in an acceptable outcome. Because of the uncertain future security environment, specific vital interests may arise that are identified by senior national leadership. Deterrence strategy and planning must be sufficiently robust and flexible to accommodate these changes when they occur.

> - **Coercion**: Increases the cost and/or reduces the benefits of defiance (decreasing the overall utility of defying our demands)
> - **Deterrence:** Demand that the adversary refrain from undertaking a particular action linked to a threat to use force if it does not comply
> - **Compellence:** Demand that the adversary undertake a particular action linked to a threat to use force if it does not comply

(b) An adversary's deterrence decision calculus focuses on their perception of three primary elements:

    <u>1</u>   The <u>benefits</u> of a course of action

    <u>2</u>   The <u>costs</u> of a course of action

    <u>3</u>   The <u>consequences of restraint</u> (i.e., costs and benefits of not taking the course of action we seek to deter)

> The central idea of Deterrence Operations is to decisively influence the adversary's decision-making calculus in order to prevent hostile actions against U.S. vital interests. This is the "end" or objective of joint operations designed to achieve deterrence.

(c) Joint military operations and activities contribute to the "end" of deterrence by affecting the adversary's decision calculus elements in three "ways":

    <u>1</u>   Deny Benefits

    <u>2</u>   Impose Costs

    <u>3</u>   Encourage Adversary Restraint

(d) The "ways" are a framework for implementing effective deterrence operations. These "ways" are closely linked in practice and often overlap in their application; however, it is useful to consider them conceptually separate for planning purposes. Military deterrence efforts must integrate all three ways across a variety of adversaries and deterrence objectives. Deterrence ways are not either/or propositions. Rather, when properly leveraged to convince an adversary his best option is <u>not</u> taking a course of action aimed against U.S. vital interests, they are complementary and synergistic. Because future threats will be increasingly transnational, these military deterrence efforts will likely involve synchronized actions by multiple JFCs worldwide.

(e) <u>The central idea is implemented at the operational level by</u>:

    <u>1</u>   Tailoring Deterrence Operations to Specific Adversaries and Contexts

    <u>2</u>   Dynamic Deterrence Assessment, Planning, and Operations

    <u>3</u>   Deterring Multiple Decision-Makers at Multiple Levels

    <u>4</u>   Characterizing, Reducing, and Managing Uncertainty

(f) The specific military "means" required to credibly threaten benefit denial and cost imposition, or otherwise encourage adversary restraint, will vary significantly by adversary and situation. Military objectives and means cannot be considered in isolation; these objectives may change over time and must be synchronized with the application of the other instruments of national power. Some aspects of these military means may contribute more directly to warfighting (i.e., defeat) than deterrence. However, it is

possible to identify key joint capabilities (and deterrence-related attributes of those capabilities) that must be planned for regardless of their warfighting utility.

(g) The military means of Deterrence Operations fall into two categories: (1) those that <u>directly</u> and decisively influence an adversary's decision calculus, and (2) those that <u>enable</u> such decisive influence.

<u>1</u> <u>Direct</u> means include:

- Force Projection

- Active and Passive Defenses

- Global Strike (nuclear, conventional, and non-kinetic)

- Strategic Communication

<u>2</u> <u>Enabling</u> means include:

- Global Situational Awareness (ISR)

- Command and Control (C2)

- Forward Presence

- Security Cooperation and Military Integration and Interoperability

- Deterrence Assessment, Metrics, and Experimentation

(h) Once a crisis is defined, these actions may include mobilization, tailoring of forces and other predeployment activities; initial deployment into a theater; employment of ISR assets to provide real-time and near-real-time situational awareness; setting up of transfer operations at enroute locations to support aerial ports of debarkation in post-chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives attack configurations; and development of mission-tailored C2, intelligence, force protection, transportation, and logistic requirements to support the JFC's concepts of operations.

(i) CCDRs continue to engage multinational partners, thereby providing the basis for further crisis response. Liaison teams and coordination with other agencies assist in setting conditions for execution of subsequent phases of the campaign or operation. Many actions in the deter phase build on security cooperation activities from the previous phase and are conducted as part of security cooperation plans and activities. They can also be part of stand-alone operations.

(3) <u>Seize the Initiative</u>. JFCs seek to seize the initiative in combat and noncombat situations through the **application of appropriate joint force capabilities**. In combat operations this involves executing offensive operations at the earliest possible time, forcing the adversary to offensive culmination and setting the conditions for decisive operations. Rapid application of joint combat power may be required to delay, impede, or halt the adversary's initial aggression and to deny the initial objectives. If an adversary has achieved its initial objectives, the early and rapid application of offensive combat power can dislodge adversary forces from their position, creating conditions for

the exploitation, pursuit, and ultimate destruction of both those forces and their will to fight during the dominate phase. During this phase, operations to gain access to theater infrastructure and to expand friendly freedom of action continue while the JFC seeks to degrade adversary capabilities with the intent of resolving the crisis at the earliest opportunity. In all operations, the JFC establishes conditions for stability by providing immediate assistance to relieve conditions that precipitated the crisis.



**Figure V-6. Notional Operation Plan Phases Versus Level of Military Effort**

(4) <u>Dominate</u>. The dominate phase focuses on **breaking the enemy's will** for organized resistance or, in noncombat situations, control of the operational environment. Success in this phase depends upon overmatching joint force capability at the critical time and place. This phase includes full employment of joint force capabilities and continues the appropriate sequencing of forces into the Operational Area (OA) as quickly as possible. When a campaign or operation is focused on conventional enemy forces, the dominate phase normally concludes with decisive operations that drive an adversary to culmination and achieve the JFC's operational objectives. Against unconventional adversaries, decisive operations are characterized by dominating and controlling the operational environment through a combination of conventional, unconventional, information, and stability operations. Stability operations are conducted as needed to ensure a smooth transition to the next phase and relieve suffering. In noncombat situations, the joint force's activities seek to control the situation or operational

environment.  Dominate phase activities may establish the conditions for an early favorable conclusion of operations or set the conditions for transition to the next phase.

(5) <u>Stabilize the Environment</u>.  The stabilize phase is required when there is **no fully functional, legitimate civil governing authority present**.  The joint force may be required to perform limited local governance, integrating the efforts of other supporting/contributing multinational, IGO, NGO, or USG agency participants until legitimate local entities are functioning.  This includes providing or assisting in the provision of basic services to the population.  The stabilize phase is typically characterized by a change from sustained combat operations to stability operations.  Stability operations are necessary to ensure that the threat (military and/or political) is reduced to a manageable level that can be controlled by the potential civil authority or, in noncombat situations, to ensure that the situation leading to the original crisis does not reoccur and/or its effects are mitigated.  Redeployment operations may begin during this phase and should be identified as early as possible.  Throughout this segment, the JFC continuously assesses the impact of current operations on the ability to transfer overall regional authority to a legitimate civil entity, which marks the end of the phase. See Chapters III and X for greater detail on Interagency, NGO, IGO and Stability Operations.

(6) <u>Enable Civil Authority</u>.[8]  This phase is predominantly characterized by **joint force support to legitimate civil governance in theater**.  Depending upon the level of indigenous state capacity, joint force activities during Phase VI may be at the behest of that authority or they may be under its direction.  The goal is for the joint force to enable the viability of the civil authority and its provision of essential services to the largest number of people in the region.  This includes coordination of joint force actions with supporting or supported multinational, agency, and other organization participants; establishment of MOEs; and influencing the attitude of the population favorably regarding the U.S. and local civil authority's objectives.  DOD policy is to support indigenous persons or groups promoting freedom, rule of law, and an entrepreneurial economy and opposing extremism and the murder of civilians.  The joint force will be in a supporting role to the legitimate civil authority in the region throughout the enable civil authority phase.  Redeployment operations, particularly for combat units, will often begin during this phase and should be identified as early as possible.  The military end state is achieved during this phase, signaling the end of the campaign or operation.  Operations are concluded when redeployment is complete.  COCOM involvement with other nations and agencies, beyond the termination of the joint operation, may be required to achieve the national strategic end state.

6.  **Organization and Responsibility**

a.   Joint operation planning is an inherent command responsibility established by law and directive.  This fundamental responsibility extends from the President and SecDef, with the advice of the CJCS, to the CCDRs and their subordinate JFCs.  Joint

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[8]JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, 26 December 2006.  See Chapter III for greater detail on Interagency, NGO, IGO and Enabling Civil Authorities.

force Service and functional components conduct component planning that could involve planning for the employment of other components' capabilities, such as when the joint force air component CDR (JFACC) plans for the employment of all air assets made available. The CJCS transmits the orders of the President and the SecDef to the CCDRs and oversees the COCOMs' planning activities. The JCS function in the planning process as advisers to the President, NSC, and SecDef.

b. The CJCS, CCDRs, and subordinate JFCs have primary responsibility for planning the employment of joint forces. Although not responsible for directing the COCOMs' Service forces in joint operations, the Military Departments participate in joint operation planning through execution of their responsibilities to: organize, train, equip, and provide forces for assignment to the COCOMs; administer and support those forces; and prepare plans implementing joint strategic mobility, logistic, and mobilization plans.

c. Headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in joint operation planning or committed to conduct military operations are collectively termed the **Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC)**.[9] Although not a standing or regularly meeting entity, the JPEC consists of the CJCS and other members of the JCS, the Joint Staff, the Services and their major commands, the COCOMs and their subordinate commands, and the combat support agencies.

d. **In-Progress-Reviews**. For Contingency Plans, *CJCSI 3141.01C* prescribes four periodic In-Progress-Reviews (IPRs) at successive Steps in the planning process that stress the importance of strategic communication between the SecDef / CJCS and the CCDR's. IPRs give the SecDef / CJCS visibility on the contingency plan while the plan is being developed or reviewed. These IPRs constitute a disciplined dialogue naming strategic leaders to shape plans as they are developed. Further, they expedite planning by ensuring that the plan addresses the most current strategic assessments and needs. They generate valuable feedback for planning staffs and provide a forum for guidance on coordination with the interagency and multinational communities. IPRs provide the opportunity for discussion of key issues or concerns, identification and removal of planning obstacles, and resolution of planning conflicts. IPRs ensure that plans remain relevant to the situation and the SecDef's intent throughout their development. IPRs occur during each of the four functions of the planning process; strategic guidance, concept development, plan development and plan assessment. Each of these Steps will include as many IPRs as necessary to complete the plan (Figure IV-7 on the following page). For those plans not designated "top priority" IPR's will be conducted with the SecDef's designated representative. As you step through this document you should note an IPR review for each Planning Function.

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[9] JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, 26 December 2006

**Joint Operation Planning Activities, Functions, and Products**

Situational Awareness

Operational Activities — Planning — Execution

Planning Functions:
- Strategic Guidance
- Concept Development
- Plan Development
- Plan Assessment (Refine, Adapt, Terminate, Execute)

Six Month Review Cycle

IPR — Approved Mission

IPR — Approved Concept

IPR — Approved Plan

Base Plan
Concept Plan
Operation Plan

Products:
- Warning Order
- Planning Order
- Operation Order
- Alert Order
- Execute Order
- Deployment Order

IPR in-progress review

Figure V-7.  JOPES Operational Activities, Functions, and Products

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# CHAPTER VI

# CONTINGENCY PLANNING

1.  Contingency Planning.  Under the Guidance for the Employment of the Force, campaign plans provide the vehicle for linking steady-state shaping activities to current operations and contingency plans.  Contingency plans under this concept become "branch" plans to the overarching theater campaign plan.  Contingency plans are built to account for the possibility that steady-state shaping measures, security cooperation activities, and operations could fail to prevent aggression, preclude large-scale instability in a key state or region, or mitigate the effects of a major disaster.  Contingency plans address scenarios that put one or more U.S. strategic end states in jeopardy and leave the United States no other recourse than to address the problem at hand through military operations.  Military operations can be in response to many scenarios, including armed aggression, regional instability, a humanitarian crisis, or a natural disaster.  Contingency Plans should provide a range of military options coordinated with total USG response.

   a.   Contingency Planning is planning that occurs in non-crisis situations.  A **contingency** is a situation that likely would involve military forces in response to natural and man-made disasters, terrorists, subversives, military operations by foreign powers, or other situations as directed by the President or SecDef.  Following the guidance provided by the JSPS, CDRs prepare, submit, and continuously refine their plans.  Planning guidance is provided in the GEF, JSCP, Strategic Guidance Statements (SGS) and through SecDef and CCDR in-progress reviews (IPRs), which exist to stimulate disciplined dialogue between the supported CCDR, the SecDef and other appropriate senior leaders.

   b.   Contingency Planning is an iterative process and is adaptive to situational changes within the operational and planning environments.  The process allows for changes in plan priorities, changes to the review and approval process of either a single plan or a category of plans, and contains the flexibility to adjust the specified development time line for producing and refining plans.  Contingency Planning facilitates the transition to Crisis Action Planning (CAP).[1]

   c.   Contingency Planning begins when a planning requirement is identified in the GEF, JSCP, or a planning order, and continues until the requirement no longer exists.  The JSCP links the JSPS to joint operation planning, identifies broad scenarios for plan development, specifies the type of joint OPLAN required, and provides additional planning guidance as necessary.  A CCDR may also initiate Contingency Planning by preparing plans not specifically assigned but considered necessary to discharge command responsibilities.  If a situation develops during a Contingency Planning cycle that warrants Contingency Planning but was not anticipated in the GEF/JSCP, the SecDef,

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[1]Specific Contingency Planning procedures are given in JOPES Vol. I, 29 Sept 2006, Enclosure C and other portions.

through the CJCS, tasks the appropriate supported CCDR and applicable supporting CCDRs, Services, and combat support agencies out-of-cycle to begin Contingency Planning in response to the new situation. The primary mechanism for tasking contingency plans outside of the GEF/JSCP cycle will be through strategic guidance statements from the SecDef and endorsed by message from the CJCS to the CCDRs (Figure VI-1).

## The Joint Planning Process



Figure VI-1. The Joint Planning Process

    d.  Plans are produced and updated periodically to ensure relevancy. Contingency Planning most often addresses military options requiring combat operations; however, plans must account for other types of joint operations across the range of military operations. For example, operations during Phase IV (Stabilize) of a campaign and most stability operations are very complex and require extensive planning and coordination with non-DOD organizations, with the military in support of other agencies. Contingency Planning occurs in prescribed cycles in accordance with formally established procedures that complement and support other DOD planning cycles. In coordination with the JPEC, the Joint Staff develops and issues a planning schedule that coordinates plan development activities and establishes submission dates for joint OPLANs. The CJCS can also direct out-of-cycle Contingency Planning when circumstances warrant disruption of the normal planning cycle.

e.  Contingency Planning encompasses four **levels of planning detail**, with an associated planning product for each level.

(1) **Level 1 Planning Detail — CDR's Estimate/Concept of Operations/Course of Action**.  This level of planning involves the least amount of detail, and focuses on producing a developed COA.  The product for this level can be a COA briefing, command directive, CDR's estimate, or a memorandum.  The CDR's estimate provides the SecDef with military COAs to meet a potential contingency.  The estimate reflects the supported CDR's analysis of the various COAs available to accomplish an assigned mission and contains a recommended COA.

(2) **Level 2 Planning Detail — Base Plan**.  A base plan describes the CONOPS, major forces, concepts of support, and anticipated timelines for completing the mission.  It normally does not include annexes or a TPFDD.

(3) **Level 3 Planning Detail — CONPLAN**.  A CONPLAN is an operation plan in an abbreviated format that may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD.  It includes a base plan with selected annexes (A, B, C, D, J, K, S, V, Y and Z) required by the JFC and a supported CDR's estimate of the plan's feasibility.  It may also produce a transportation feasible TPFDD if applicable.

(4) **Level 4 Planning Detail — OPLAN**.  An OPLAN is a complete and detailed joint plan containing a full description of the CONOPS, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a TPFDD.  It identifies the specific forces, functional support, and resources required to execute the plan and provide closure estimates for their flow into the theater.  OPLANs can be quickly developed into an OPORD.  An OPLAN is normally prepared when:

(a) The contingency is critical to national security and requires detailed prior planning.

(b) The magnitude or timing of the contingency requires detailed planning.

(c) Detailed planning is required to support multinational planning.

(d) The feasibility of the plan's CONOPS cannot be determined without detailed planning.

(e) Detailed planning is necessary to determine force deployment, employment, and sustainment requirements, determine available resources to fill identified requirements, and validate shortfalls.

f.  **Contingency Plan Management**.[2]  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviews contingency plans specified in the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JSCP),

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[2]CJCSI 3141.01C, 12 Sept 2006, and JOPES Vol I, Enclosure D, guide the Contingency Plan review process

combined military plans, military plans of international treaty organizations, and as otherwise specifically directed by the Secretary of Defense.

(1) The Joint Staff Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (DJ-7) is responsible for the plan management processes for all contingency plans, to include plans maintained by the Joint Staff Director of Operations (DJ-3) that are not in execution. DJ-3 is responsible for managing the process of developing operations plans in a crisis action environment, overseeing the execution of operations, and maintaining subject matter experts (SME) on all J3 developed plans.

(2) The J-7/Joint Operational War Plans Division (JOWPD) serves as the office of primary responsibility (OPR) within the Joint Staff for all contingency plan matters, to include bilateral military plans and military plans of international treaty organizations not specifically designated otherwise. This consists of both the management of contingency plans and the plan review process, including but not limited to review of the TPFDD, final plan, and facilitation of contingency plan IPRs with the SecDef.

(3) JOWPD is the primary liaison for the CCDR with both the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OCJCS) and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) for development of contingency plans and the plan review process.

(4) To achieve rapid planning with greater efficiency, this process features early and detailed planning guidance and frequent dialogue during these four Steps in the form of IPRs between senior leaders and planners to promote an understanding of, and agreement on, the mission, planning assumptions, threat definitions, interagency, and allied planning cooperation, risks, courses of action, and other key factors.

g. Contingency Plan Approval Authority and Alignment:

(1) Contingency plans are categorized as follows:

(a) Top Priority Plans

1 Selected plans briefed to the SecDef.

2 Plans delegated to the VCJCS and USD (P); forwarded to the SecDef for administrative approval.

(b) GEF-Directed Plans Unique to Specific Commands:

1 USD(P) / VCJCS recommend plan approval or disapproval to SecDef / CJCS.

2 SecDef approves final plan via a paper process.

(c) Plans Common to all CDRs or in Support of Treaty Agreements.

<u>1</u>    Approved by the CCDR unless SecDef assigns oversight of plan development to USD(P) / VCJCS, who then recommend plan approval to SecDef / CJCS.

<u>2</u>    CCDR approves final plan.

<u>3</u>    Not submitted for review unless SecDef directs.

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# CHAPTER VII

# CRISIS ACTION PLANNING

1.  **Crisis Action Planning (CAP)**.  The planning process for both contingency and crises action planning is the same, though different products are produced.  A **crisis** is an incident or situation involving a threat to the U.S., its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests.  It typically develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that the President or SecDef considers a commitment of U.S. military forces and resources to achieve national objectives.  It may occur with little or no warning.  It is fast-breaking and requires accelerated decision making.  Sometimes a single crisis may spawn another crisis elsewhere.  JOPES Vol. I, 1 Sept 2006, provides additional crisis-action planning procedures for the time-sensitive development of OPORDs for the likely use of military forces in response to a crisis.

2.  **Relationship to Contingency Planning**.  CAP provides a process for responding to crises spanning the full range of military operations.  Contingency Planning supports Crisis Action Planning by anticipating potential crises and operations and developing contingency plans that facilitate execution planning during crises.  **Contingency Planning prepares for a hypothetical military contingency based on the best available intelligence, while using forces and resources projected to be available for the period during which the plan will be effective.**  It relies heavily on assumptions regarding the political and military circumstances that will exist when the plan is implemented.  Even though every crisis situation cannot be anticipated, the distributed collaborative environment, detailed analysis, and coordination which occurs during Contingency Planning may facilitate effective decision-making, execution, and redeployment planning as a crisis unfolds.  During CAP, assumptions and projections made in similar contingency plans are replaced with facts and actual conditions.  Figure VII-1, on the following page, compares contingency and Crisis Action Planning with time, environment, forces etc.

    a.  CAP encompasses the activities associated with the time-sensitive development of OPORDs for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned, attached, and allocated forces and resources in response to an actual situation that may result in actual military operations.  While Contingency Planning normally is conducted in anticipation of future events, CAP is based on circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs.  There are always situations arising in the present that might require U.S. military response.  Such situations may approximate those previously planned for in Contingency Planning, though it is unlikely they would be identical, and sometimes they will be completely unanticipated.  The time available to plan responses to such real-time events is short.  In as little as a few days, CDRs and staffs must develop and approve a feasible COA, publish the plan or order, prepare forces, ensure sufficient communications systems support, and arrange sustainment for the employment of U.S. military forces.

| | **Contingency Planning** | **Crisis Action Planning** |
|---|---|---|
| | | |

| | **Contingency Planning** | **Crisis Action Planning** |
|---|---|---|
| Time Available to Plan | As defined in authoritative directives (normally 6 + months) | Situation dependent (hours, days, or up to 12 months) |
| Environment | Distributed, collaborative planning | Distributed, collaborative planning and execution |
| JPEC Involvement | Full JPEC participation. Note: JPEC participation may be limited for security reasons. | Full JPEC participation. Note: JPEC participation may be limited for security reasons |
| Functional Processes | Situation Awareness and Planning | Situation Awareness, Planning, and Execution |
| Components | Strategic Guidance, Concept Development, Plan Development, Plan Maintenance & Supporting Plan Development | Strategic Guidance, Concept Development, Plan Development, Plan Maintenance & Supporting Plan Development, Execution |
| Document Assigning Planning Task | Chairman issues (1) JSCP, (2) Planning Directive, or (3) Warning Order for short-suspense planning | Chairman issues WARNORD, PLANORD or SecDef approved ALERTORD |
| Forces For Planning | Apportioned in JSCP | Allocated in WARNORD, PLANORD, or ALERTORD |
| Planning Guidance | Chairman issues JSCP or Warning Order. Combatant commander issues planning directive and TPFDD LOI | Chairman issues WARNORD, PLANORD, or ALERTORD. Combatant commander issues WARNORD, PLANORD or ALERTORD and TPFDD LOI to subordinates, supporting commands and supporting agencies |
| COA Selection | Combatant commander selects COA and submits strategic concept (CSC) to Chairman for review and approval | Combatant commander develops Commanders Estimate with recommended COA |
| CONOPS Approval | Chairman approves CSC, disapproves or approves for further planning | President/Secretary of Defense approve COA |
| Final Planning Product | OPLAN or CONPLAN | OPORD |
| Final Planning Product Approval | Combatant commander submits final plan to Chairman for review and approval | Combatant commander develops approved COA (CONOPS) into detailed OPORD |
| Execution Document | N/A | Chairman issues SecDef approved EXORD Combatant Commander issues EXORD |

**Figure VII-1. Comparing Contingency and Crisis Action Planning**

b.  In a crisis, situational awareness is continuously fed by the latest intelligence and operations reports.  An adequate and feasible military response in a crisis demands flexible procedures that consider time available, rapid and effective communications, and relevant previous planning products whenever possible.

c.  In a crisis or time-sensitive situation, the CCDR uses CAP to adjust previously prepared Contingency Plans.  The CCDR converts these plans to executable OPORDs or develops OPORDs from scratch when no useful Contingency Plan exists.  To maintain plan viability it is imperative that all Steps of the JOPP are conducted and thought through, although some may be done sequentially. Time-sensitivities are associated with CAP and the JOPP may be abbreviated for time.

d.  CAP activities are similar to Contingency Planning activities, but CAP is based on dynamic, real-world conditions vice assumptions.  CAP procedures provide for the rapid and effective exchange of information and analysis, the timely preparation of military COAs for consideration by the President or SecDef, and the prompt transmission of their decisions to the JPEC.  CAP activities may be performed sequentially or in parallel, with supporting and subordinate plans or OPORDs being developed concurrently.  The exact flow of the procedures is largely determined by the time available to complete the planning and by the significance of the crisis.  Capabilities such as collaboration and decision-support tools will increase the ability of the planning process to adapt quickly to changing situations and improve the transition from Contingency Planning to CAP.  The following paragraphs summarize the activities and interaction that occur during CAP.  Refer to *JOPES Volume I* for detailed procedures.

(1) When the President, SecDef, or CJCS decides to develop military options, the CJCS issues a **Planning Directive** to the JPEC initiating the development of COAs and requesting that the supported CDR submit a **CDR's Estimate** of the situation with a recommended COA to resolve the situation.  Normally, the directive will be a WARNORD, but a PLANORD or ALERTORD may be used if the nature and timing of the crisis warrant accelerated planning.  In a quickly evolving crisis, the initial WARNORD may be communicated vocally with a follow-on record copy to ensure that the JPEC is kept informed.  If the directive contains force deployment preparation or deployment orders, SecDef approval is required.

(2) The WARNORD describes the situation, establishes command relationships, and identifies the mission and any planning constraints.  It may identify forces and strategic mobility resources, or it may request that the supported CDR develop these factors.  It may establish tentative dates and times to commence mobilization, deployment or employment, or it may solicit the recommendations of the supported CDR regarding these dates and times.  If the President, SecDef, or CJCS directs development of a specific COA, the WARNORD will describe the COA and request the supported CDR's assessment.  A WARNORD sample can be found in *JOPES Volume I*.

(3) In response to the WARNORD, the supported CDR, in collaboration with subordinate and supporting CDRs and the rest of the JPEC, reviews existing joint

OPLANs for applicability and develops, analyzes, and compares COAs.  Based on the supported CDR's guidance, supporting CDRs begin their planning activities.

(4) Although an existing plan almost never completely aligns with an emerging crisis, it can be used to facilitate rapid COA development.  An existing OPLAN can be modified to fit the specific situation.  An existing CONPLAN can be fully developed beyond the stage of an approved CONOPS.  The Time Phased Force Deployment Lists (TPFDD) related to specific OPLANs are stored in the JOPES database and available to the JPEC for review.

(5) The CJCS, in consultation with other members of the JCS and CCDRs, reviews and evaluates the supported CDR's estimate and provides recommendations and advice to the President and SecDef for COA selection.  The supported CDR's COAs may be refined or revised, or new COAs may have to be developed to accommodate a changing situation.  The President or SecDef selects a COA and directs that detailed planning be initiated.

(6) On receiving the decision of the President or SecDef, the CJCS issues an alert order (ALERTORD) to the JPEC to announce the decision.  The SecDef approves the ALERTORD.  The order is a record communication that the President or SecDef has approved the detailed development of a military plan to help resolve the crisis.  The contents of an ALERTORD may vary, and sections may be deleted if the information has already been published, but it should always describe the selected COA in sufficient detail to allow the supported CDR, in collaboration with other members of the JPEC, to conduct the detailed planning required to deploy, employ, and sustain forces.  However, the ALERTORD does not authorize execution of the approved COA.

(7) The supported CDR develops the OPORD and supporting TPFDD using an approved COA.  Understandably, the speed of completion is greatly affected by the amount of prior planning and the planning time available.  The supported CDR and subordinate describe the CONOPS in OPORD format.  They update and adjust planning accomplished during COA development for any new force and sustainment requirements and source forces and lift resources.  All members of the JPEC identify and resolve shortfalls and limitations.

(8) The supported CCDR submits the completed OPORD for approval to the SecDef or President via the CJCS.  After an OPORD is approved, the President or SecDef may decide to begin deployment in anticipation of executing the operation or as a show of resolve, execute the operation, place planning on hold, or cancel planning pending resolution by some other means.  Detailed planning may transition to execution as directed or become realigned with continuous situational awareness, which may prompt planning product adjustments and/or updates.

(9) In CAP, plan development continues after the President decides to execute the OPORD or to return to the pre-crisis situation.  When the crisis does not lead to execution, the CJCS provides guidance regarding continued planning under either crisis-action or Contingency Planning procedures.

e.   CAP provides the CJCS and CCDRs a process for getting vital decision-making information up the chain of command to the President and SecDef.  CAP facilitates information-sharing among the members of the JPEC and the integration of military advice from the CJCS in the analysis of military options.  Additionally, CAP allows the President and SecDef to communicate their decisions rapidly and accurately through the CJCS to the CCDRs, subordinate and supporting CDRs, the Services, and combat support agencies to initiate detailed military planning, change deployment posture of the identified force, and execute military options. It also outlines the mechanisms for monitoring the execution of the operation.

f.   **Abbreviated Procedures**.  The activities in the preceding discussion have been described sequentially.  During a crisis, they may be conducted concurrently or even eliminated, depending on prevailing conditions.  In some situations, no formal WARNORD is issued, and the first record communication that the JPEC receives is the PLANORD or ALERTORD containing the COA to be used for plan development.  It is also possible that the President or SecDef may decide to commit forces shortly after an event occurs, thereby significantly compressing planning activities.  No specific length of time can be associated with any particular planning activity.  **Severe time constraints may require crisis participants to pass information verbally**, including the decision to commit forces.

> "No matter where we fight in the future, no matter what the circumstances, we will fight as a joint team. We will have fingers on that team that are individual services, but when it comes to the fight we want the closed, clenched fist of American military power.  The days of single service warfare are over."
>
> **Admiral David E. Jeremiah, USN**
> **Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**
> **25 March 1993, Naval War College**

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# CHAPTER VIII

# PLANNING and FUNCTIONS

1. **Planning**

    a.   Contingency Planning and CAP share common planning activities and are interrelated.  Joint operation planning embodies **four subordinate functions**: **(1) Strategic Guidance, (2) Concept Development, (3) Plan Development, and (4) Plan Assessment.**



**Figure VIII-1.  Planning Functions**

    b.   **Planning Functions**

        (1) **Strategic Guidance - Function I**.  The President, Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman, with appropriate consultation, formulate suitable and feasible military objectives to counter threats.  The CCDR may provide input through one or more CDR's Assessments.  This function is used to develop planning guidance for preparation of COAs.  This process begins with an analysis of existing strategic guidance (e.g., a JSCP for Contingency Planning or a CJCS Warning Order, Planning Order or Alert Order in CAP).  The primary end product is a CCDR's <u>mission statement</u> for Contingency Planning and a <u>CDR's assessment (OPREP-3PCA) or CDRs estimate</u> in Crisis Action Planning.[1]

        (2) **Concept Development - Function II.**  During Contingency Planning, the supported CDR develops the CCDR's concept of operations, for SecDef approval, based

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[1] More details are provided in Enclosure C of JOPES Vol. I.

on SecDef, CJCS, and Service Chief planning guidance and resource apportionment provided in the JSCP and Service documents. In Crisis Action Planning, concept development is based on situational awareness guidance, resource allocations from approved Contingency Plans, and a CJCS Planning Order, or Alert Order. Using the CCDR's mission statement, COCOM planners develop preliminary COAs and staff estimates. COAs are then compared and the CCDR recommends a COA for SecDef approval in a CDR's Estimate. The CCDR also requests SecDef guidance on interagency coordination. The approved COA becomes the basis of the CONOPS containing conflict termination planning, supportability estimates, and, time permitting, an integrated time-phased database of force requirements, with estimated sustainment.[2]

(3) **Plan Development - Function III.** This function is used in developing an OPLAN, CONPLAN or an OPORD with applicable supporting annexes and in refining preliminary feasibility analysis. This function fully integrates mobilization, deployment, employment, conflict termination, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities. Detailed planning begins with SecDef approval for further planning in a non-crisis environment or a CJCS Warning Order, Alert Order or Planning Order in a Crisis Action Planning situation; it ends with a SecDef-approved Plan or OPORD.

(4) **Plan Assessment – Function IV.** During this function, the CCDR refines the complete plan while supporting and subordinate CDRs, Services and supporting Agencies complete their supporting plans for his review and approval. All CDRs continue to develop and analyze branches and sequels as required or directed. The CCDR and the Joint Staff continue to evaluate the situation for any changes that would trigger plan revision or refinement.

(a) The Joint Staff, Services, COCOMs, and Agencies monitor current readiness and availability status to assess sourcing impacts and refine sourcing COAs should the plan be considered for near-term execution.

(b) The CCDR may conduct one or more IPR(s) with the Secretary of Defense during Plan assessment. These IPR(s) would likely focus on branches/options and situational or assumption changes requiring major reassessment or significant plan modification/adaptation, but might also include a variety of other pertinent topics (e.g., information operations, special access programs, nuclear escalation mitigation).[3]

2. **Conflict Termination Planning.** Clearly defined strategic objectives are key to defining a conflict's terminal conditions. The process of explicitly and clearly defining terminal conditions is an important one, since it requires careful dialogue between civilian and military leadership which may, in turn, offer some greater assurances that the defined end state is both politically acceptable, ending conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests, and its allies, and militarily attainable.[4] More on Termination Criteria in Chapter XVI.

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[2] JOPES Vol. I, 29 Sept 2006, B-16

[3] See Enclosures D of JOPES Vol. I and CJCSI 31410.01C for additional details on IPRs.

[4] JOPES Vol. I, 29 Sept 2006, B-13

# Chapter IX

# OPERATIONAL ART, THE JOINT OPERATIONS CYCLE, AND CAMPAIGN DESIGN

## I. *Operational Art in the Strategic Context*

1.  Grand Strategy as the basis for Operational Art

    a.    Military operations do not occur in a vacuum, and the preeminent aspect of any military campaign is the grand strategic context in which it occurs.  Military effectiveness depends at least partly on the military's appreciation of and consistency with that context.  Pursuing and maintaining the necessary levels of consistency is the realm of operational art.

    b.    Clausewitz's musing that "war is nothing but the continuation of politics by other means[1]" makes no inference that military campaigns are simple interruptions to grand strategy.  To the contrary, war is a dynamic integral component of grand strategy for which standard civil planning systems are often insufficient.  And so, it is through the application of operational art that military operations and engagements are objectively linked with the activities of those other elements of national[2] power in compliance with grand strategy.  Figure IX-1 below depicts this.



**Figure IX-1.  Operational Art Maintains the Linkages**

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[1] Clausewitz, *On War* (Paret / Howard Translation), Author's notes of 10 July, 1827.
[2] Or international - in the case of multi-national endeavors

d.    How operational art is actually performed is a matter of important discussion in the joint forum.  It is clear that it is not embodied in the processes of grand strategic policy development or integration.  It is equally clear that it is not a component of classic military planning processes.  Operational art occurs unevenly somewhere between the two.

e.    When applied either in campaign or operational planning, operational art reveals itself through the elements of operational design, which demonstrate a cohesive central concept or 'big idea' behind the military action that is equal to the functional complexity, dynamicity and the temporal depth of the military challenges.

2.   Military Campaigns within Grand Strategy.  It is less necessary to understand which military activities do and do not constitute military campaigns, than it is to identify among them which may require the application of operational art.

> **Campaigns:** "a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space."
> **JP 1-02**

a.    From the joint definition it might be rightly construed that any set of military activities leading to accomplishment of multiple strategic or operational objectives could qualify as a 'campaign.' Based on the general applicability of the term then, campaigns of all types may exist in military documentation.

b.    JP 3-0 is more prescriptive in its use of campaign as a term.  It describes Global, Theater, and Subordinate campaigns, and strongly suggests they occur only at joint levels.[3]  Current strategic documentation[4] applies JP 3-0's campaign categories on a limited set of theater and functional campaigns that invariably connote a requirement for delivery of applicable campaign plans.

(1) **Global Campaigns.**  U.S. strategic documentation specifies non-regional military responsibilities that require the development of campaign plans.  These campaigns may overlap functionally, geographically and temporally with other campaigns including those specified Theater Campaign Plans to be discussed in the following paragraphs.

(a) Global Campaigns imply military investment toward the long-term achievement and maintenance of global objectives in concert with, and primarily in support of other elements of U.S. national power.  They do not typically represent military approaches as central to overcoming the inherent challenges.

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[3] See JP 3-0 (CH 1), pp IV-22, IV-23.

[4] The Guidance on Employment of Forces (GEF) is an example of where these campaign specifications are made.

(b) Global Campaign Plans entail many typical military planning products, but are not as dependent on organically military concepts for their full expression.

(c) Global Campaign Plans exist in some form for all tasks specified in strategic documentation, and have a strong basis in interagency and defense guidance. Their refinement often entails careful, even bureaucratic processes of COCOM-moderated policy integration at very high levels.

(d) Due to the interdependent commitment of the various instruments of U.S. national power and the necessity for national-civil control exerted over these, Global Campaigns are also an uncomfortable sphere for classic military-directed planning efforts alone, even when they are simply under revision.

(e) Selected sub-components of Global Campaigns may better reflect military characteristics and suggest greater benefits to be obtained through military planning approaches. These campaign components would themselves suggest greater relevance to the focused application of operational art.

(2) **Theater Campaigns.** U.S. strategic documentation establishes geographically distinct campaigns for each of the regional COCOMS. These may overlap functionally and temporally with Global Campaigns and adjacent Theater Campaigns.

(a) Given the leading role of other U.S. government agencies in the U.S.'s whole-of-government approaches to each regional command Area of Responsibility (AOR), preparing these campaign plans is also highly interdependent with interagency planning activities. COCOM planning processes will reflect this.

(b) Similar to Global Campaigns, selected internal components of Theater Campaigns may better reflect distinct military characteristics, and suggest greater benefits to be obtained through the focused application of military planning and operational art.

(3) **Subordinate Campaigns.** These represent logical sub-divisions of the Global and Theater Campaigns and occur in two forms: contingencies and actual crises. While these two types may closely reflect one another in cases where preplanned contingencies are realized through active crises, they still require separate treatment through operational art.

(a) Subordinate Campaigns are typically designed, planned and executed with a purpose of reestablishing the viability of the Global and Theater Campaign plans. In the case of crises, this is because those theater level plans have been demonstrated as temporarily ineffective or untenable. Designated as branches or sequels within the Theater Campaigns, selected sub and trans-regional issues are considered 'subordinate' to Theater Campaigns, and are discussed below.

(b) Contingencies.  Strategic documentation directs contingency planning for specific hypothetical scenarios.  These are only imperfectly nested with the Global and/or Theater Campaigns, and planning them may depend on interdependent inputs, outputs and activity among COCOMs and supporting agencies.

    <u>1</u>   These contingencies do not technically reflect current realities, and so the inputs and outputs from non-defense collaborative agents may be poorly formed or not provided.  In addition to the potential variability of the military's own inputs, this incomplete prior knowledge makes contingencies reliant on a careful re-application of operational art if and when they are confirmed through the emergence of a related crisis.

    <u>2</u>   Due to the dynamic nature of the set of specific contingencies recognized in strategic documentation, not all have completed operational concepts or plans, but rather are prepared and maintained in a priority.  And, as the assigned priorities for planning among these contingencies or the contingencies themselves change, new planning requirements will arise.

    <u>3</u>   COCOMs and subordinate JFCs will add hypothetical scenarios of their own as branches and sequels within their established Global, Theater and Subordinate Campaigns.  These must also be considered Subordinate Campaigns for the purposes of operational art.

    <u>4</u>   Whether through revalidation of the existing operational concepts, or through the bottom up redevelopment of new campaign concepts, contingency campaigns are comfortable fodder for the application of operational art.

(c) Crises.  Operational crises represent exceptions to, or aberrations within established Global, Theater or Subordinate Campaign plans.  Anticipated or not, these sorts of campaigns justify robust military planning processes and the application of operational art even when they bear a close resemblance to prepared contingency plans.  As they do represent real and urgent military problems, they also define the most critical domain for operational art.

    <u>1</u>   Crisis-related campaigns are typically designed, planned and executed with the ultimate purpose of reestablishing the viability of the Global and Theater Campaign plans given that they have been demonstrated as temporarily ineffective or untenable.

    <u>2</u>   Depending on their resemblance to relevant contingencies, these crises may require little more than a careful review of the operational design suggested within an approved contingency plan.

    <u>3</u>   When there is a significant divergence from available contingency plans, a crisis may suggest a complete review of the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE), strategic and operational assumptions, strategic ways, ends and means.

# II. *Operational Art and the Joint Operations Cycle*

1. **Joint Force Commanders and Operational Art**

   a.   Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate the conditions necessary for success before, during and after the commitment of forces.  It helps JFCs and their staffs order their thoughts and understand the conditions for victory before seeking battle, thus avoiding unnecessary battles.

   b.   In applying operational art, the JFC draws on judgment, perception, experience, education, intelligence, boldness, and character to visualize the outcome of military action.  He combines his personal qualities with those of his staff to analyze, plan, prepare, execute, and assess the COE and develop coherent and suitable operational concepts.

   c.   Among many considerations, operational art requires JFCs to answer the following questions.

      (1)  What conditions represent achievement of the objectives? (Ends)

      (2)  What sequence of actions is most likely to create those conditions? (Ways)

      (3)  What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)

      (4)  What are the likely costs or risks inherent in performing that sequence of actions?

   d.   Operational art helps JFCs overcome the ambiguity and uncertainty of a complex operational environment as its central ideas govern the deployment of forces, as well as their commitment to or withdrawal from joint operations, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve military operational and strategic objectives.

   e.   Operational art promotes unified action between the various elements of national power by helping JFC's and their staffs understand how to better facilitate the integration of other agencies and multinational partners toward achieving the recognized end states.

   f.   The JFC also leverages operational art to consider the sustainment and the arrangement of military forces and their related efforts in time, space, and purpose.  This includes fundamental methods associated with synchronizing military forces and capabilities.

2. **The Joint Operations Cycle**

   a.   The Joint Operations Cycle is both cognitive and physical and consists of several activities performed prior to, during and after operations to deliver on the benefits of operational art.  The major formal activities are planning, preparation, execution and continuous assessment.  These may or may not be further supported by formalized

operational design activities which include diagnosis, dialog, design, learning, and re-design woven with continuous assessment into the joint operations cycle (Figure IX-2). These activities are overlapping and recurrent as circumstances demand.



**Figure IX-2. The Joint Operations Cycle**

b. JFCs use the Joint Operations Cycle to help them determine when and where to perform leadership actions such as making decisions, issuing guidance, providing command presence, and terminating the operations.

c. Following is a description for each of the processes and sub-processes inherent in the Joint Operations Cycle:

(1) **Design**. Operational art is best applied through the conduct of operational design –the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or joint operation plan and its subsequent execution.

> *Design is not a function to be accomplished,*
> *but rather a living process.*

(a) The purpose of operational design is to achieve a greater understanding, a proposed solution based on that understanding, and a means to learn and adapt. While operational art is the manifestation of informed vision and creativity, operational design is the practical extension of the JFC's creative processes whereby he synthesizes his own intuition with the analytical and logical products of staff work to arrive at a single and comprehensive understanding of the COE, and of what must be done militarily.

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(b) Design does not stop once planning is concluded.  Even during execution, JFCs and their staffs continue to consider design elements and through a learning and redesign process, adjust both current operations and future plans as the joint operation unfolds and central campaign concepts are refined.

(c) Operational design is particularly helpful during COA determination as the conceptual framework established through design provides an objective basis for evaluating and selecting COAs, and subsequently developing a detailed operational plan.

(d) Design and planning are qualitatively different yet interrelated activities essential for solving complex problems.  While planning activities receive consistent emphasis in both doctrine and practice, design remains largely abstract and is rarely practiced through any distinguishable approach.  Presented a problem, staffs often rush directly into planning without clearly understanding the complex environment of the situation, purpose of military involvement, and approach required to address the core issues.  Design informs and is informed by, planning and operations.  It establishes the intellectual foundation that aids in continuous assessment of operations of the COE.  JFCs should personally lead relevant design processes and communicate the resulting framework to other JFCs for planning, preparation, and execution.

<u>1</u>    It is important to understand the distinction between design and planning (Figure IX-3 below).  While both activities seek to formulate ways to bring about preferable futures, they are cognitively different.



**Figure IX-3.  Design and Planning Continuum**

<u>2</u>    Planning applies established procedures to solve a largely understood problem within an accepted framework.  Design inquires into the nature of a problem to conceive a framework for solving that problem.  In general, planning is problem solving, while design is problem setting.  Where planning focuses on generating a plan—a series

of executable actions—design focuses on learning about the nature of an unfamiliar problem.

     <u>3</u>   When situations do not conform to established frames of reference—when the hardest part of the problem is figuring out what the problem is—planning alone is inadequate and design becomes essential. In these situations, absent a design process to engage the problem's essential nature, planners default to doctrinal norms; they develop plans based on the familiar rather than an understanding of the real situation. Design provides a means to conceptualize and hypothesize about the underlying causes and dynamics that explain an unfamiliar problem. Design provides a means to gain understanding of a complex problem and insights towards achieving a workable solution.

     <u>4</u>   This insight is what Joint doctrine calls JFC's visualization (JP 3-0). JFCs begin developing their design upon receipt of a mission. Design precedes and forms the foundation for staff planning. However, design is also continuous throughout the operation. As part of assessment, JFCs continuously test and refine their design to ensure the relevance of military action to the situation. In this sense, design guides and informs planning, preparation, execution, and assessment (Joint Operations Cycle). However, a plan is necessary to translate a design into execution.

     <u>5</u>   Operational design may occur in two primary forms. The first and most basic is through the conduct of formalized military planning and merely reflects the intuition of the JFC communicated specifically to his staff in the form of inputs to planning. A second more intensive form is Campaign Design (CD), which while similar in its desired outcome, has a more limited applicability. This concept remains under development in joint doctrine, but has occasionally been practiced as a distinct JFC-driven planning activity on key complex operational problems. CD places much greater demands on the involvement of the JFC and other key participants above and beyond normal planning activities.

     <u>6</u>   Given the difficult and multifaceted problems of operations today, dialog among the JFC, principal planners, members of the interagency team, and host-nation (HN) representatives helps develop a coherent design. This involvement of all participants is essential. The object of this dialog is to achieve a level of situational understanding at which the approach to the problem's solution becomes clear. The underlying premise is this: when participants achieve a level of understanding such that the situation no longer appears complex, they can exercise logic and intuition effectively. As a result, design focuses on framing the problem rather than developing courses of action.

   (e) **The Design Process**. Design may occur by any means deemed appropriate by the JFC. The result of this process should be a framework that forms the basis for the coherent and complete joint campaign or operation plan and the conceptual linkage of ends, ways, and means.[5]

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[5]FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, Dec 2006

**Figure IX-4.  The Iterative Design Process**

      <u>1</u>    Conceptually, the design process will follow a logical progression through five sub-processes of Diagnosis, Dialog, Design, Learning, and Redesign.  The preceding Figure IX-4 taken from joint COIN doctrine depicts this progression for a high-level counterinsurgency challenge.  The original diagnosis of objective COE factors on the left leads through commander-driven dialogue toward the recognition of a central campaign purpose around which are designed conceptual approaches for interagency action.  Learning occurs through execution leading to redesign where the CD cycle repeats itself.  This establishes the design process that must be applied iteratively throughout the Joint Operations Cycle as assessments and/or changes in the COE might suggest.

      <u>2</u>    As previously indicated, design normally occurs through the natural involvement of JFC's in their own planning processes.  When it occurs through Campaign Design, it may occur either in advance, in-stride or following the conduct of formal operational planning.

> Designing is creative and is best accomplished through discourse.
> Discourse is the candid exchange of ideas without fear of
> retribution that results in a synthesis and a
> shared visualization of the operational problem.

<u>3</u>   The specific application of design through the distinctive process of Campaign Design is provided as Section III of this chapter.

(f)  **Elements of Operational Design**.  The elements of operational design described in Figure IX-5 are tools to help JFCs and their staffs visualize the campaign or operation and shape the CONOPS.

## ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN

**DESIGN ELEMENTS**

Termination
End State & Objectives
Effects
Center of Gravity
Decisive Points
Direct versus Indirect
Lines of Operations

**Joint Operation Planning Process**

Operational Reach
Simultaneity & Depth
Timing & Tempo
Forces & Functions
Leverage
Balance
Anticipation
Synergy
Culmination
Arranging Operations

Operational Art

National Strategic End State

Systems Perspective of the Operational Environment

Arrangement of Capabilities in Time, Space, and Purpose

Linkage of Ends, Ways, and Means

Course of Action

Commander's Intent

Concept of Operations

JOINT OPERATIONS

**Figure IX-5.  Operational Art and Design**

<u>1</u>   JFCs and their staffs use a number of operational design elements to help them visualize the arrangement of actions in time, space, and purpose to accomplish their mission.  These elements can be used selectively in any joint operation; however, their application is broadest in the context of a joint campaign or major operation.

<u>2</u>   Some elements (e.g., objectives, COGs, LOOs) can be described tangibly in the text or graphics of an operation order or plan.  Other elements (e.g., balance, synergy, leverage) typically cannot be described in this manner.  These elements will vary between COAs according to how the JFC and staff develop and refine the other elements of design during the planning process.  For example, in the JFC's judgment, one COA could result in better **balance** and **leverage,** but not provide the **tempo** of operations that result from another COA.  In the end, the JFC must be able to visualize these intangible elements and draw on judgment, intuition, and experience to select the

best COA. Their detailed application to joint operation planning is provided in JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning,* 26 Dec, 2006.

      3    When produced apart from the effective application of operational art, these elements may be linked less coherently, or applicable only to a portion of the overall military approach.

(2) **Plan**

(a) Planning focuses on the physical actions intended to directly affect the enemy or environment. Planners typically are assigned a mission and a set of resources; they devise a plan to use those resources to accomplish that mission. Planners start with a design (whether explicit or implicit) and focus on generating a plan—a series of executable actions and control measures. Planning generally is analytic and reductionist. It breaks the design into manageable pieces assignable as tasks, which is essential to transforming the design into an executable plan. Planning implies a stepwise process in which each step produces an output that is the necessary input for the next step.[6]

> Though design precedes planning, it continues throughout planning, preparation and execution.

(b) Planning is the process by which JFCs and staff translate the JFC's visualization or design into a specific course of action for preparation and execution, focusing on the expected results. Planning involves having a desired end state and describing the conditions and most effective methods to achieve it. It includes formulating one or more courses of action for accomplishing the mission. JFCs and staffs consider the consequences and implications of each course of action. Once the JFC selects a course of action, planning continues until the plan or order is published. Planning also continues through execution of an operation. At minimum, staffs refine plans for branches and sequels throughout an operation.

(c) Plans forecast, but do not predict. A plan is a continuous, evolving framework of anticipated actions that guides subordinates through each phase of the joint operation. Any plan is a framework from which to adapt, not an exact blueprint. The measure of a good plan is not whether execution transpires as planned, but whether the plan facilitates effective action in the face of unforeseen events. Good plans foster initiative, account for uncertainty and friction, and mitigate risk.

(d) Scope, complexity, and length of planning horizons differ between strategic, operational and tactical planning. Campaign planning coordinates major actions across significant time periods. Planners integrate service capabilities with those

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[6]FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, Dec 2006. , FM 5-0, 26 Dec 2006, Joint Operations, MCDP 5, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 5, Planning, 21 July 1997.

of Joint, interagency, multinational and non-governmental organizations. Comprehensive, continuous, and adaptive planning characterizes successful Joint operations. Detailed discussion of planning through the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) are provided in Chapters XIV thru XVI of this Primer.

(3) **Prepare**

(a) Preparation consists of activities by the joint community before execution to improve its ability to conduct the operation including, but not limited to, the following: subordinate and supporting plan refinement, possible rehearsals, ISR, coordination, and movement. It creates conditions that improve friendly forces' chances for success. It facilitates and sustains transitions, including those to branches and sequels.

(b) Preparation requires staff, supporting and subordinate coordination. Mission success depends as much on preparation as planning. Rehearsals of concepts (ROC drills) help staffs, supporting commands and subordinates to better understand their specific role in upcoming joint operations.

(c) Several preparation activities begin during planning and continue throughout a joint operation. Many preparation activities continue during execution. Un-committed forces prepare for identified contingencies and look to the joint operation's next phase or branch. Committed JFC's revert to preparation when they reach their objectives, conduct a branch plan or reach their termination criteria.

(4) **Execute**

(a) Execution is putting a plan into action by applying all elements of national power to accomplish the mission and using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions. Whether the plan is a Theater Campaign Plan or a subordinate crisis-action plan in the form of an Operations Plan, execution begins by focusing on a concerted action to shape, deter, seize, retain, and/or exploit the initiative. This represents Phase 1 of the current joint phasing model. In Phase II, joint forces seize the initiative as soon as possible and dictate the terms of action throughout a joint operation. Retaining the initiative requires constant effort. It enables JFCs to compel the adversary to accept action on terms established by friendly forces while maintaining our own freedom of action.

(b) Operationally, seizing the initiative requires leaders to anticipate events so their forces can see and exploit opportunities before the adversary does. This is when assessment, the J2, and IO planners will be critical. Once the initiative is seized, Joint forces exploit the opportunities it creates. Initiative requires constant effort to force adversaries to conform to friendly purposes and tempo while retaining friendly freedom of action. JFCs place a premium on audacity and making reasoned decisions under

uncertain conditions. The JFC's intent and aggressiveness of subordinates create conditions for exercising disciplined initiative.[7]

(5) **Assess**

(a) Assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and progress of a joint operation. It involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes to actual events to determine the overall effectiveness of force employment. Assessment measures the effectiveness of operations. More specifically, assessment helps JFCs determine progress toward accomplishing tasks and achieving objectives and the end state. It helps identify opportunities, counter threats, and any needs for course correction. It results in modifications to plans and orders. This process of continuous assessment occurs throughout the joint planning process.

(b) Assessment and learning enable incremental improvements to the design. The aim is to rationalize the problem— to construct a logical explanation of observed events and subsequently construct the guiding logic that unravels the problem. The essence of this is the mechanism necessary to achieve success. This mechanism may not be a military activity—or it may involve military actions in support of nonmilitary activities. Once JFCs understand the problem and what needs to be accomplished to succeed, they identify the means to assess effectiveness and the related information requirements that support assessment. This feedback becomes the basis for learning, adaptation, and subsequent design adjustment.[8]

(c) Not all joint operations proceed smoothly toward the desired end state. JFCs examine instances of unexpected success or failure, unanticipated adversary actions, or operations that simply do not progress as planned. They assess the causes of success, friction, and failure, and their overall impact on the force and the operation. JFCs and staffs continuously assess an operation's progress to determine if the current order is still valid or if there are better ways to achieve the end state. Assessments by staff sections form the foundation of running estimates. Assessments by JFCs allow them to maintain accurate situational understanding and revise their visualization or operational design appropriately.

(d) Assessment precedes and guides every activity within the joint operation process and concludes each operation or phase of an operation. Assessment entails two distinct tasks: continuously monitoring the situation and the progress of the operations, and evaluating the operation against measures of effectiveness and measures of performance. Effective assessment requires criteria for evaluating the degree of success in accomplishing the mission. Criteria can be expressed as measures of effectiveness and a measure of performance.

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[7]FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, Dec 2006. , FM 5-0, 26 Dec 2006, Joint Operations, MCDP 5, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 5, Planning, 21 July 1997.

[8]FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, Dec 2006.

<u>1</u>  A *measure of effectiveness* is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an endstate, an objective, or the creation of an effect.

<u>2</u>  A *measure of performance* is a criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment.

(e)  Many aspects of operations are quantifiable.  Examples include movement rates, fuel consumption and weapons effects.  While not easy, assessing physical aspects of joint operations can be straightforward.  However, the dynamic interaction among friendly forces, adaptable adversaries, and populations make assessing many aspects of operations difficult.  For example, assessing the results of planned actions to change a group of people to support their central government is very challenging.  In instances involving assessing change in human behavior, assessment relies on understanding trends and indicators over time to make judgments concerning the success of given actions.

(f)  Just as JFCs devote time and staff resources to planning, they must also provide guidance on *what to assess and to what level of detail*.  Depending on the situation and the echelon of command, assessment may be a detailed process (formal assessment plan with dedicated assessment cell or element).  Alternatively, it may be an informal process that relies more on the intuition of the JFC, subordinate CDR's, and staff's.

(g)  When assessing operations, JFCs and staff's should avoid excessive analysis.  Excessive time and energy spent developing elaborate assessment tools and graphs squanders resources better devoted to other elements of the operations process.  Effective JFCs avoid overburdening subordinates and staffs with assessment and collection tasks beyond their capabilities.  As a general rule, the level at which a specific operation, task, or action occurs should be the level at which such activity is assessed.  This focuses assessment at each level and enhances the efficiency of the overall assessment process.

d.  **Summary.**  While working through the JOPP within the next chapters, keep in mind that *planning, preparation, execution, and continuous assessment, along with design* make up the ***Joint Operations Cycle***.  Even though every operation is different, all operations follow a cycle of planning, preparation, execution and <u>continuous assessment</u>.  These activities are cyclic, but not discreet. They overlap and recur as circumstances demand.

# III.   *Campaign Design (CD) Applicability and Process*

**"If I were given one hour to save the planet, I would spend fifty-nine minutes defining the problem and one minute resolving it."**
                                                                                                  **-Albert Einstein**

1.   Choosing whether or not to invest in Campaign Design (CD) as a distinct process is an important issue. This section discusses the general applicability and a "conceptual" approach to the conduct of CD as a method for application of *operational art* and *operational design.[9]*  It does not attempt to discuss the intellectual foundation and justification for the process which is sufficiently described in the design discussion provided above, or within other documents.  This section is a working document and your thoughts and inputs are encouraged.

> **An important note on terms**.  Much anxiety exists about precision in the use of language, and the questionable utility of new concepts, which by necessity, tap into our well-worn joint lexicon.  The following discussion uses no terms other than **Campaign Design (CD)** in any exclusive way except when joint terms are used in a context applicable only to specific and named military processes and/or products. In those cases, the terms will be *capitalized for clarity.*

2.   CD is best applied as a complementary process to operational planning, but may occur as a standalone function in other specific situations as determined by the JFC. However, it is not universally applicable to military planning at any level.  Following are discussions of relevant factors for selection of CD processes, and a proposed conceptual approach for its application.

3.   **CD Applicability**.  Whether or not CD occurs deliberately, through an ad hoc approach, or not at all, every significant military endeavor in history will be construed to have had an implicit CD.

   a.   The elements of operational design, either applied in advance, or retrospectively inferred, will be subjected to historical scrutiny – both in and out of context – revealing the successes and failures of judgment by the associated military commanders, who either did or did not prepare strategies equal to their military problems.

   b.   More importantly, the seizure of opportunities for future military success and/or averting the risk of future military failure are thought to rely at least partly on the deft

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[9]As of publication of FM 3 FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5, '**campaign design**' (or '**design**') has been established as the terminology for a specific kind of military thinking and planning process.  The term also loosely defines the deliverables of that process.  CD relates closely to other established processes, and in many ways emulates them.  It may also be useful characterized as a logical precursor for any of them.

application of operational art at appropriate levels in the military hierarchy. Emerging doctrine[10] now offers CD as a delivery mechanism for operational art in those complex situations where campaign-level strategies or designs may be relevant.

c. CD may be applied to any military endeavor when it suits the JFCs' command style, and the intellectual resources are available to carry it out. However, the extensive sub-division of campaigns may place competitive and possibly redundant demands against intellectual and planning resources among multiple stakeholders in complex, multi-national or inter-agency endeavors.[11]

(1) Classic military planning processes are already designed to deliver coherent and sufficient products at their own echeloned level. This includes relevant elements of operational design.

(2) These processes rarely require the complement of a sweeping review of the strategic landscape, and a re-framing of already circumscribed military problems. Broad perspectives are always in demand, but novelty and dynamic problem re-framing have much less general applicability through the echelons.

4. **CD – A Critical Choice.** Choosing whether or not to invest in Campaign Design as a distinct process is a potentially important issue which depends on several factors including: the nature of the commander; the availability, suitability and sufficiency of relevant higher-echelon designs, plans or strategies; and, the need for diplomacy and/or operational security concerning a JFC's long-range intentions. Each of these factors is discussed in turn. Once considered, these should suggest to a JFC the applicability of CD to his military problem.

a. **The Affinity of a JFC for Military Intellectualism**

(1) It is more likely that JFCs will choose to conduct CD rather than be directed to do so by higher military authorities. The basis for their judgment on the need for a CD will turn primarily on their preference for and tolerance of the military intellectualism that CD implies.

(2) In order to carry out CD, JFCs must be willing to invest in a robust and potentially free-wheeling dialogue, and to fight through diverse ideas to better synthesize their own operational concepts.

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[10]FM 3 FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5, established the initial concept of **Campaign Design.** Further work by the US Army as reflected in ***TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500: Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design (CACD)*** demonstrates the Army's intent to further investigate and develop CD concepts for more practical application among service planning processes**.** Best practices published as ***Insights*** by the US Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center demonstrate a similar intent in the joint arena.

[11]This concept of sub-division doesn't work well with US Air Force concepts of Centralized Control / Decentralized Execution, but does fit conceptually with Army and Marine Corps and joint emphasis on Mission Command.

(a)  Higher authorities have no basis in authority for dictating the conduct of CD and are therefore far more likely to task military subordinates for extracted concepts, detailed plans, or specific reporting against a set of campaign metrics.

(b)  CD-like processes might be intolerable for JFCs who are already confident in their view of challenges and their chosen operational approach.  For these, there will be only rare instances where CD is seen as necessary.

(c)  Other JFCs may be much more willing to adopt CD– even for less complex operational challenges.  For these JFCs, a constant dialogue and structured challenge to their own operational paradigms might be the norm.

(d)  The changing operational situation, and competing demands on the JFC's time and attention will dramatically affect his perception of flexibility to engage in CD.

(e)  A low-end investment in CD might be represented by the straightforward application of operational art as discussed in the previous section.  Through normal planning processes, JFCs provide guidance and approval of products, as well as entertain questions relating to these from staffs and subordinated CDRs.  However, this level of dialogue might prove insufficient to the demands of more complex, distributed, or protracted military endeavors.

(f)  There are academic extremes for CD that might prove inappropriate under most real-world circumstances.  SOD[12] is an example of a high investment in military intellectualism, and might prove unsuitable to the demands of a carefully scoped, time-sensitive military emergency.

(g)  This is not to say that practical JFCs are anti-intellectual, or conversely that intellectual JFCs are unpractical.  It is to say that the personal characteristics of the JFCs must be considered as the primary basis for a prudent decision to take on CD.  This is simple enough in that JFCs are the ones who must consider their own preferences and circumstances in order to decide for CD.

(h)  Many will argue that *commander-centric intuitive approaches* are more needed than staff-centric analytic approaches.  There is much potential validity in this statement which gives rise to the dire need for earnest commander involvement in design-related activities.  Nonetheless, it remains the case that both commander and staff actions can be accomplished, and that the *reasoning* provided by staff work might very well activate the *intuition* of the commander.[13]

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[12]Systemic Operation Design (SOD) is a structured method of operational inquiry that allows a commander to frame and analyze a problem through an iterative process of hypothesis testing and observation, and synthesize through discourse a robust commander's visualization for an approach to the original problem that can be communicated as the basis for an operational plan.  The concept remains under continuous refinement by its original author, Shimon Naveh.  John F. Schmitt has also published a document entitled "A Systemic Concept for Operational Design" providing an original model for this concept which provides alternative approaches or additional discussion for many of the issues addressed in this chapter.

[13]See Schimitt, p. 27 for a well-supported discussion of this.

(3) Considering all these issues, the JFC must perceive a significant return on his investment from the conduct of CD.

b. **Geographic and Temporal Subdivision of the Military Engagement**.  As military activities are distributed across time and space, it may be appropriate to further sub-divide campaigns in acknowledgement of the potential for their separate unified command, or the separately dynamic evolution of their operational approaches.

(1) Such sub-divisions should not occur automatically as enforcement of arbitrary or illogical boundaries and borders in time and space.  This might lead to poorly integrated strategic approaches.

(2) Changes of commanders, the rotation of joint forces, or the crossing of geographic borders/boundaries should not automatically convey a requirement or entitlement for a distinct campaign.  Sub-division of these types must conform to the fundamental logic of the strategic problem and demonstrate alignment with and against recognizable and distinct operational objectives.

(3) Annual or seasonal campaigns may not be sufficiently distinct for CD purposes unless achievement or non-achievement of key operational objectives separates them.

(4) This same holds true for geographic separation between interdependent joint forces.  If they operate according to a common logic, the geographic separations themselves should not convey the distinction of a separate campaign.

c. **Poor Utility of a Militarily Clarified View of the Future**

(1) The final factor to consider may be the perceived need for diplomacy or operational security concerning the development and promulgation of a JFC's futuristic vision in sensitive collaborative endeavors.

(a) This may occur in situations where allies, coalition partners or others have fundamentally distinct and/or even irreconcilable views about the underlying challenges and objectives of a campaign.  In these cases, useful discussion and acceptable resolution of those distinctions may not occur through a JFC-driven dialogue.

(b) Envisaging the outcome of future phases of a campaign may also cause more harm than good where key policy issues remain unresolved, and where a military presumption of outcome may be seen as insulting or disruptive.  This may be true in situations where the estimation of future operational approaches hinges on too many dynamic variables in the more immediate future.

(c) In such cases, JFCs may choose to invest in a more exclusive dialogue toward development and refinement of operational design elements, but might refrain from promulgating the outcome of these in the form of military planning products or a CD.

d. **Campaign Design Applicability Summary**

(1) All major military actions in history will be estimated to have had a CD – or central concept.  Whether or not this CD was prepared explicitly in advance, or simply inferred from the record of the military engagement is a matter of choice by the JFC, that choice may occur as an act of omission.  If the choice for CD is made deliberately, it will have considered:

> ➤ The Affinity of the JFC for Military Intellectualism.
> ➤ The Geographic and Temporal Subdivision of Military Engagements.
> ➤ The Poor Utility of a Militarily Clarified View of the Future.

(2) Once these factors are duly considered, the JFC must himself choose to invest and sustain his investment in CD toward the delivery of enhanced Commander's Appreciation, intent and a more robust operational design.

5. **The Emerging Campaign Design Process**

a. Both Operational Design and Campaign Design (CD) have been characterized as a process of Diagnosis, Dialog, Design, Learning and Redesign all feeding into the Joint Operations Cycle.

b. Further work on joint and service doctrine relating to the practical application of design as a discrete function has yet to deliver approved practical techniques and procedures.

c. Nonetheless, selected emerging concepts for the application of CD warrant further consideration in the context of operational art and campaign planning.

d. As discussed in Section II, operational design occurs naturally in the course of operational planning.  However, when carried out through CD, design might be effectively synchronized with the Joint Operations Cycle at any one of three points: *Up-front*; *In-stride*; or *Follow-up*.

(1) *Up-front CD* occurs in advance of formal operational planning and the initiation of joint operations.  Here CD produces relevant elements of operational design as a singular expression of a JFC's campaign vision and as a key *input* element to operational planning.

(2) **In-Stride CD** occurs in the context of active joint operational planning where the JFC *simultaneously* considers the broader campaign problem while working to ensure a prompt response to detailed guidance from higher authorities.

(3) **Follow-up CD** occurs following a period of joint operations execution sufficient to allow greater *circumspection* on the part of the JFC.

(4) **Up-front** and **Follow-up** CD efforts do not require further description by steps as they can be conducted in any manner which facilitates an effective and progressive dialogue toward development, delivery and implementation of coherent campaign concepts. For **In-stride** CD efforts JFCs should closely consider the progressive stages of their own CD methodology as they relate to the doctrinal steps of JOPP.

e.  Following is a further expansion of a conceptual approach to CD as it might occur **In-Stride** with, but not as an integral component of JOPP. This may be useful for the application of CD until it has been codified in joint doctrine.

6.  ***An Expanded Conceptual Approach to CD***:

> ***An Important Caution*** *– Any effort to further **prescribe** an approach to creative thinking is fraught with danger and is sure to insult highly intuitive JFCs who might have their own view of the way forward. Underlying the Systemic Operational Design (SOD) theory is the need for decision- makers to frame and structure their own unique inquiry into the operational problem. As such, every CD effort – whether **In-stride** with operational planning or not – must be flexibly applied. CD Stages, deliverables and further descriptive steps should be taken only as a potential framework for the CD effort. **Commander's Appreciation** and **Situational Understanding** are truly the only required outputs of CD, and any sound operational planning process can extract the rest.*

a.  As shown previously on Figure IX-3, CD makes a conceptual progression from diagnosis of the campaign problem to a JFC-directed dialogue to the design of a conceptual campaign approach. Once delivered in a directive format (i.e., an OPORD, FRAGO or OPLAN) and implemented, the CD is subjected to continuous assessment, refinement and learning. Learning is followed by prudent re-design.

b.  The following table, Figure IX-6, depicts CD stages and key products in parallel to JOPP steps and products. The JOPP steps and products are discussed in detail in the following chapters. Relationships between the two must be applied flexibly and products exchanged in a manner that does not threaten the quality of the JFC's thinking processes or preclude delivery of a timely orders product.

| Campaign Design (CD) | | Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **STAGE** | **KEY PRODUCT** | **KEY PRODUCT** | **STEP** |
| 1: Frame the CD Approach – JFC's CD Process Guidance | CD Process Guidance | Strategic/ Theater Guidance | 1. Planning Initiation |
| 2: Envision the Operational Environment<br><br>2a: Strategic Framing<br><br>2b: Operational Framing | Situational Understanding<br>Assumptions<br>Purpose<br>Intent<br>Identification of Risk | Situational Understanding<br>Assumptions<br>Mission Statement<br>Planning Guidance<br>Intent<br>CCIR<br>Staff Estimates | 2. Mission Analysis |
| 3: Develop the Campaign Focus<br><br>3a: Campaign Concept Design<br><br>3b: Campaign Concept Assessment | Refined Purpose<br>Refined Intent | Approved COAs<br>Planning Directive | 3. Course of Action (COA) Development |
| 4: Develop the Commander's Visualization for the Campaign | Vision of Resolution | | |
| 5: Consolidate the CD<br><br>5a: Conduct CD Refinement<br><br>5b: CD Packaging | CDR's Appreciation<br>Refined Assumptions<br>Refined Vision of Resolution | Increased Situational Understanding<br>Wargaming Record<br>Identification of Risk | 4. COA Analysis / Wargaming |
| | | Refined COAs<br>COA Selection Rationale<br>Staff COA Recommendation | 5. COA Comparison |
| | | COA<br>CDR's Estimate | 6. COA Approval |
| 6: CD Implementation | CD Implementation Instructions | OPORD / OPLAN | 7. Plan/Order Development |
| 7: CD Socialization | Improved CDR's Appreciation | | |
| 8: CD Assessment through Execution | CD Refinement Instructions | Plan Execution | |
| 9: Conduct CD Redesign | Refined CD | | |

**Figure IX-6.  Comparison of CD Stages / Products to JOPP Steps / Products**

c. **Further Description of Expanded CD Conceptual Stages**

(1) **Stage 1: Frame the CD Approach – JFC's CD Process Guidance.** When used, this guidance is delivered prior to JIPOE and Mission Analysis. It clarifies the JFC's intention for development and use of a CD. It further conveys his intended approach for completing CD as a process. As a supplement to standard commander's initial planning guidance, it may also clarify how and the CD is to be considered distinct in any way from the classical products of the imminent operational planning process.

(2) **Stage 2: Envision the Operational Environment.** Occurring during JIPOE and Mission Analysis, this stage establishes for the JFC the best achievable understanding of the OE in all of its relevant aspects. It is comprised of two sub-stages: Strategic and Operational Framing – which are conceptually nested and interactive. The results of Stage 2 are best confirmed by the conduct of the Mission Analysis briefing to the JFC. At a minimum, this phase will result in the initial expression of assumptions, JFC intent including an operational Purpose and Endstate, and may also include an identification of strategic or operational risk.

(3) **Stage 3: Develop the Campaign Focus.** Occurring prior to and throughout COA Development and COA Analysis, this stage establishes and refines the central concepts for the JFC's CD. It is comprised of two sub-stages first to design and then to qualitatively assess the effectiveness of the JFC's selected concepts. In this context, revisions to the campaign concept occur iteratively until a coherent campaign concept emerges to the satisfaction of the JFC. The results of Stage 3 are best confirmed by the complete consideration of COA Analysis inputs by the JFC. At a minimum, this stage will result in a refined expression of JFC intent, and a coherent and integrated concept for the application of all relevant elements of operational design.

(4) **Stage 4: Develop the Commander's Visualization for the Campaign.** Occurring during COA Comparison and Approval, this stage establishes the key elements of the campaign design in a single cogent and compelling demonstration of operational art as it relates to the given problem set. This stage may simply produce an expanded intent statement, or a novel Vision of Resolution (VoR) which focuses on and accentuates those key aspects of the JFC's chosen operational approach. This may require relegation of selected operational design elements to secondary status to allow for emphasis on the central ideas.

(5) **Stage 5: Consolidate the CD.** Occurring following COA Approval, this stage establishes the remaining elements of the campaign design within a complete package that fully conveys the JFC's Commander's Appreciation for the operational problem set. It is comprised of two sub stages first to refine, and then to package CD products. This stage will produce stand-alone operational concepts which should include clarified statements of the newly framed operational problem, related assumptions, the JFC intent, visualization, and all products needed to fully reflect the integration of the elements of operational design.

(6) **Stage 6: CD Implementation.** Occurs during Order Development, this stage clarifies the JFC's intent for the implementation of the CD. Implementation instructions should be prepared which specify the JFC's desire for promulgation and maintenance of the CD as a component of, or distinct from, operational plans and orders. In instances where the current operational plan is more confined or restrained than the full campaign problem set, the CD must be established as a longer-ranging guide to campaign thinking. The CD and its implementation instructions might be sensibly established within the annexes of standard orders.

(7) **Stage 7: CD Socialization.** Occurring following Order Development, this stage establishes conditions where the JFC is able to test his newly authoritative design against the views of collaborative partners, higher authorities and subordinates alike. This should occur whether or not these were closely included in the CD's original development. Socialization activities may be iterative and will often be quite protracted. Nonetheless, these activities are necessary to solidify agreement on the fundamental aspects of the operational problem, and if possible build consensus behind the JFC's approach. This will all lead to an improved level of Commander's Appreciation for the JFC, and improved potential for unified effects.

(8) **Stage 8: CD Assessment through Execution.** Occurring during the execution of an operational plan, this stage explicitly analyzes the effectiveness and relevance of the CD. This stage also considers the feedback received through socialization. As critical deficiencies are identified within the CD, it is duly refined. This process may occur as a simple amendment to the CD details. But, if the identified deficiency is deemed by the JFC as sufficiently challenging to the established CD, he may opt to initiate a formal process of CD redesign. At some point the CD might be considered sufficiently refined and authoritative to justify the conduct of full-blown campaign planning with the CD applied as initial JFC guidance.

(9) **Stage 9: Conduct CD Redesign.** This stage is only applied by the JFC as triggered by his consideration of Stage 8 outputs, or by his own intuitive sense that a revised campaign approach may be needed.

(10) When completed through Stage 8 (or Stage 9 when applicable) a robust, effective, and adaptive CD will result, which can be effectively shared with multi-national and interagency partners and actively implemented throughout the related operational plans, orders and strategies.

6. **Campaign Design Summary**: CD provides a unique and intensive approach to better achieve the design aspects of planning under operational art. As of yet, it has not been developed into an approved practical concept. Nonetheless, it has been established as distinct from classic planning functions and even from previous characterizations of operational art. With further refinement, CD might prove useful as an approach to support campaign planning at any point in the Joint Operations Cycle.

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# CHAPTER X

# STABILIZATION PLANNING, RECONSTRUCTION, CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION and SECURITY

The United States must prepare for integrated military and civilian operations to meet irregular and traditional challenges worldwide.  Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are two fronts in the Long War: much of the effort will be in countries with which we are not at conflict and will require dispersed and protracted operations against an agile, adaptive enemy.  Traditional adversaries will attempt to exploit our vulnerabilities by focusing their efforts away from the U.S. military's competitive advantage in conventional combat.

In this environment, meeting critical national security priorities will often require U.S. forces to conduct military operations in the midst of civilian populations.  Success will increasingly depend on maximizing the good will and cooperation of these populations and minimizing the risk of adverse consequences from our actions – such as increased local support for extremists and their violent ideologies.

U.S. operations throughout the 1990s, along with the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan that followed, have demonstrated the need to improve the stability operations capabilities of U.S. armed forces.  The South Asian earthquake and the East Asian tsunami provided additional lessons for the U.S. military in disaster response and humanitarian interventions.

The skills required for those missions are also vital for success in meeting irregular challenges by which our enemies are likely to confront us.  Recent strategic and operational guidance recognizes this:

- The Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) establish that U.S. forces need to be as capable in stability operations and irregular warfare as in major combat.

- Three of the five main lines of operation in the Department's Plan for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) are non-kinetic: e.g., deterring tacit and active support for violent extremists.

Even though our enemies have been driven to emphasize irregular tactics, DOD continues to emphasize the kinetic lines of operations, traditional or irregular, at the expense of the non-kinetic.  The results for the U.S. are increased costs and higher risks of failure.

Without successful implementation of the tasks set out in DOD Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, U.S. forces will not be prepared to conduct the non-kinetic lines of operations in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) or future major combat operations

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effectively.  Success in the Long War requires the integration of combat operations to kill or capture enemy forces with military and civilian stability operations focused on civilian populations.

Although these points have been absorbed throughout the Defense Department over the last several years at the conceptual level, the Department and the larger U.S. government still spend inadequate effort on population-centered stability operations designed to create conditions inhospitable to the enemy.  Enemy-centered warfare that does not profoundly take into account the need to secure, influence, and support local populations will be insufficient to meet U.S. military and political objectives.

1.  **Stability Operations**[1]

   a.   These missions, tasks, and activities seek to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, or humanitarian relief.  Many of these missions and tasks are the essence of civil military operations (CMO).

   b.   To reach the national strategic end state and conclude the campaign/operation successfully, **JFCs must integrate and synchronize stability operations —** missions, tasks, and activities to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, or humanitarian relief — **with offensive and defensive operations** within each major operation or campaign phase.  **Planning for stability operations should begin when joint operation planning is initiated**.  These plans likely will be conducted in coordination with and in support of HN authorities, OGAs, IGOs, and/or NGOs.  The Joint Operations Plan when executed may produce a successful military resolution, however, if the long term civil stability is not also successfully concluded then our long-term national interests may still be threatened.  The level of effort put into the stability and reconstruction phase of the plan needs to be as detailed, maybe even more detailed, than the dominance phase.  It may certainly unfold as more complex given the potential operational environment.

2.  **Interagency Coordination and Coordination with Intergovernmental and Nongovernmental Organizations**

   a.   **Reconstruction, Stabilization (R&S) and Conflict Transformation.**  Planning for reconstruction, stabilization (R&S) and conflict transformation involves the whole of government for planning and execution.  The success of the USG in complex R&S environments will depend heavily upon the ability to plan and respond quickly and

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[1]The USG has several very good sources on stability operations and planning; for DOD guidance on SSTR, refer to DODD 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations along with the US Army 3-07 Stability Operations, October 2008. For DOS guidance on USG reconstruction and stability (R&S) and conflict transition refer to USG Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation, November 1, 2007.

effectively through an integrated, interagency approach to the interdependent civilian and military responsibilities on the ground. To address this challenge, the President has designated through NSPD-44 that the Secretary of State coordinate and lead integrated USG efforts to prepare, plan, conduct, and assess R&S activities in coordination with IGO, OGA and NGO partners.



**National Security Strategy of the United States** — "Some conflicts pose such a grave threat to our broader interests and values that conflict intervention may be needed to restore peace and stability."

**National Security Presidential Directive 44** — "The United States should work with other countries and organizations to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary...."

**National Defense Strategy of the United States** — "The inability of many states to police themselves effectively or to work with their neighbors to ensure regional security represents a challenge to the international system."

**National Military Strategy of the United States** — "Winning decisively will require synchronizing and integrating major combat operations, stability operations and significant post conflict interagency operations to establish conditions of stability and security favorable to the United States."

**Department of Defense Directive 3000.05** — "Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities...."

**Figure X-I. Strategy and Policy References for Stability Operations**

> NSPD-44 outlines the President's vision for promoting the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation of reconstruction and stabilization assistance. This policy is significant for two reasons: it was his administration's first attempt at defining national policy for interagency integration, and it was the first time that any administration implemented interagency policy focused on stability operations. In addition, NSPD-44 formally acknowledged that the stability of foreign states served the broader national interests of the United States, recognizing stability operations as a necessary capability of the Federal government.

b.   The Secretary of State has delegated responsibility for NSPD-44 to the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), who will coordinate these tasks with other civilian agencies and the DOD to ensure unified action. The Core Mission of S/CRS is to lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.

> **Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization:**
> - Lead USG development of a civilian response capability for stability operations.
> - Develop strategies and plans for stability operations.
> - Coordinate USG responses, including foreign assistance and foreign economic cooperation, in stability operations.
> - Ensure coordination among the USG agencies.
> - Coordinate USG stability operations with foreign governments, international and regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector entities.
> - Develop plans to build partner capacity for security.

    c.  S/CRS is also coordinating the launch of the Civilian Response Corps, a partnership of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Departments of State, Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, and Treasury. In the 2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act, Congress provided up to $75 million in initial funding for the Active and Standby components of the Civilian Response Corps. The Civilian Response Corps is a group of civilian federal employees and, eventually, volunteers from the private sector and state and local governments, who will be trained and equipped to deploy rapidly to countries in crisis or emerging from conflict, in order to provide reconstruction and stabilization assistance. The President has requested $248.6 million in the Fiscal Year 2009 budget for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI), which includes the Civilian Response Corps.

> **If fully funded the Civilian Response Corps will:**
> - Create 250 full-time positions for members of the Active component of the Civilian Response Corps across the eight participating U.S. departments and agencies. These "first responders" are experts who can deploy to a crisis with as little as 48 hours' notice.
> - Train 2,000 "Standby" members of the Civilian Response Corps in the same eight departments and agencies. These are current federal employees who volunteer to undertake additional training and to be available to serve in stabilization missions in case of need. Standby Members are deployable within 30 days for up to 180 days.
> - Recruit and train 2,000 "Reserve" members of the Civilian Response Corps: volunteers from the private sector and state and local governments who will bring additional skills and capabilities that do not exist in sufficient quantities in the federal government, such as police officers, city administrators, and port operators.

(1) **Approaches to R&S Planning**

(a) **Conflict Transformation Approach**.  Lessons learned from the 1990's show that R&S operations require different approaches from typical development or security engagements.  These insights coalesced around a guiding principle: conflict transformation.  Conflict transformation entails a two-pronged approach to R&S operations: building local institutional capacity and reducing the sources of conflict and instability.  While the USG has many years of experience in building institutional capacity (from military's train and equip programs to USAID's extensive capacities to support nascent governing structures), we have limited experience and even more limited success at targeting drivers of conflict.

> Conflict transformation focuses on converting the dynamics of conflict into processes for constructive, positive change. *Conflict transformation* is the process of reducing the means and motivations for violent conflict while developing more viable, peaceful alternatives for the competitive pursuit of political and socioeconomic aspirations.

An important lesson learned of the past two decades of R&S operations is that international attention can be fickle and short-lived. With few exceptions, there has been a consistent drop-off in international resources (financial, military, and diplomatic) after two to three years. Therefore, the approach to conflict transformation should focus on a two to three-year timeframe, which reflects the likely window of opportunity to get the country on a sustainable positive trajectory before international attention and assistance diminishes.

(b) **Whole of Government Approach**.  A whole of government approach is driven by the search for those combinations of USG resources and activities that reinforce progress made in one sector or enable success in another.  In order to do this, the interagency must, to the greatest degree possible, resist seeing its resources (financial, diplomatic, military, development, intelligence, economic, strategic communications, law enforcement, consular, commerce) as belonging to any one agency, service or entity.  All are instruments of USG power.

(c)  It is imperative, therefore, that all of the USG actors that are involved in the R&S operation **must be present in the planning process** that ultimately determines how the various instruments are arrayed towards achieving the specific conflict transformation goal in partnership with the host nation and, if present, our international partners.  Policy and strategy should be determined through a civilian led process wherein the USG defines its strategic objectives, integrates them with partners and as much as possible, the host nation, and collaborates with IGO's and NGO's to achieve coherency.

(d) A primary challenge for integrating civilian and military planning into a whole-of-government planning process is to address the differing planning capacity and culture in civilian agencies compared to the DOD.  Internal agency transformation

initiatives along with the broader NSPD-44 process seek to address many of the cultural and resources constraints to sustained civilian presence in planning.

> A coherent whole of government approach requires early and high-level participation of both national and multinational civilian and military participants.  This process necessitates active dialog and reciprocal information sharing with intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, the host-nation government, and the private sector, when necessary.

(e) Successful whole of government planning and operations requires:

- All USG instruments of power are represented, actively participating and integrated into the process;

- There is a common understanding of the environment and the problem USG activities are seeking to solve;

- There is unity of purpose, or in non-military terms, a shared USG goal, and unity of effort to achieve that goal through comprehensive integration and synchronization of activities at the implementation level; and

- There is joint determination of resources/capabilities to be aligned to achieve plan.

(f) Application of whole of government approach ensures that:

- Planners consider all possible USG capabilities to achieve identified objectives;

- Planning groups include necessary personnel from all relevant sectors and agencies;

- Planners approach problems in a multi-sectoral way and avoid stove piped responses;

- On-going or existing policies and programs are reassessed and integrated into new objectives and desired outcomes; and

- Planners consider and incorporate multinational, interagency capabilities, activities, and comparative advantages in view of the application of the elements of national power.

3.  **Military Considerations.**[2]  DOD stability, security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) operations are not uniquely different than the interagency approach, R&S and

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[2]A detailed description of stability operations major mission areas is found in the Department of Defense Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept Version 2.0. and in the US Army Stability Operations, October 2008.

conflict transformation. What DOD brings that is unique is the capability of the U.S. military forces that are prepared to establish or maintain security and/or order when civilians cannot do so. The DOD has long conducted activities now termed military support to SSTR operations, yet there had previously been no enduring institutional mandate for sustained proficiency in what were considered lesser contingencies during and immediately after the Cold War. Stability operations have increasingly become a central operational mission for the U.S. Armed Forces, highlighted by recent experience in the Balkans, Haiti, Somalia, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and other shorter-duration actions around the globe. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief continue to require employment of the capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces as demonstrated in relief operations in Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the United States. The 2004 Defense Science Board (DSB) report, *Transition to and from Hostilities*, noted that the United States has been involved in some form of stability operation every 18-24 months, and the cumulative cost of these operations exceeds the cost of recent major combat operations. DOD Directive 3000.05 was created to address these requirements by designating stability operations as a core U.S. military mission and establishing Departmental policy to create and sustain key capabilities necessary for military support to SSTR (DOD Directive 3000.05, April 1, 2007).

In its strategic context, military victory is measured in the attainment of the national strategic end state and associated termination criteria. Implementing military CDRs should request clarification of the national strategic end state and termination criteria from higher authority when required. Essential considerations in ensuring that the longer-term stabilization and enabling of civil authority which is required to achieve those national strategic objectives is supported following the conclusion of sustained combat. These considerations: stability, security, transition and reconstruction, along with other operations may often primarily support OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs to restore civil authority, rebuild the infrastructure, and reestablish commerce, education, and public utilities. Planning for these operations should begin when the JOPP is initiated. Among many considerations outlined in JP 3-0, Chapter IV, "Planning, Operational Art and Design, and Assessment," the JFC and staff should consider conducting early collaborative planning with interagency and multinational members, harmonizing the civil and military effort, and establishing the appropriate organization to conduct operations during the "stabilize" and "enable civil authority" phases.

a. **Balance and Simultaneity.** JFCs strive to apply the many dimensions of military power simultaneously across the depth, breadth, and height of the operational area. Consequently, JFCs normally achieve concentration in some areas or in specific functions and require economy of force in others. However, major operation and campaign plans must feature an **appropriate balance between offensive and defensive operations and stability operations in all phases**. Most importantly, **planning for stability operations should begin when joint operation planning is initiated**. Planning for the transition from sustained combat operations to the termination of joint operations and then a complete handover to civil authority and redeployment must commence during plan development and be ongoing during all phases of a campaign or major operation. An uneven focus on planning offensive and defensive operations in the "dominate" phase

may threaten full development of basic and supporting plans for the "stabilize" and "enable civil authority" phases and ultimately joint operation momentum.  Even while sustained combat operations are ongoing, there will be a need to establish or restore security and control and provide humanitarian relief as succeeding areas are occupied or bypassed.  Figure X-2 illustrates the notional balance between offensive, defensive, and stability operations throughout a major operation or campaign.



**Figure X-2.  Notional Balance of Offensive, Defensive, and Stability Operations**

b.  DOD Directive 3000.05 dictates priority in SSTR to the same level as major combat operations.  This broader strategic imperative places increased emphasis on activities benefiting the indigenous peaceful population within a CDR's area of operations rather than traditional direct action against enemy forces and formations.  The conceptual shift from "enemy-centric" to "population-centric" effects is reflected in the major mission elements comprising SSTR: "establish and maintain a safe, secure environment; deliver humanitarian assistance; reconstruct critical infrastructure and restore essential services; support economic development; establish representative, effective governance and the rule of law; and conduct strategic communications."

c.  To achieve these ends, DOD is enhancing agility across the organization using capabilities in new combinations to conduct and support SSTR operations.  As noted in the recent DOD Report to Congress, *Joint Field Training and Experimentation on*

*Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations* - "military action alone cannot bring long-term peace and prosperity; therefore we need to include all elements of national and institutional power."  The objective is to synchronize DOD activities with those of other U.S. Government agencies and international partners in coherent campaigns that improve civil security, promote effective governance, and foster economic stability.  To achieve our national objectives, stability operations require unity of purpose and synchronized, timely efforts in all diplomatic, defense, and development activities to build partner capacity and address the causes of conflict. In recognition of this need, the President issued NSPD-44 in December 2005 and tasked all U.S. Departments and Agencies to participate in the process to improve U.S. Government capabilities for these missions.

   d.   The greatest challenge to the U.S. Government's ability to conduct SSTR operations is the lack of integrated capability and capacity of civilian agencies with which the military must partner to achieve success.  The U.S. Armed Forces can fill some of these gaps in civilian capacity in the short-term, but strategic success in SSTR operations will only be possible with  (1) a robust architecture for unified civil-military action, and  (2) substantially more resources devoted to making civilian U.S. Departments and Agencies operational and expeditionary. Stability operations capabilities are best employed in concert with other U.S. Government agencies, and where appropriate, international and private sector partners. Achieving unified action cannot occur without parallel developments in the capability and capacity of other government agencies to contribute to deployable civilian-military teams engaged in institution building, essential services, governance, and economic stabilization, such as the **Advanced Civilian Teams** envisioned by the **Interagency Management System,** (Figure X-3) or the **Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)** currently operating in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Although the military will prepare to perform necessary tasks to establish and maintain order when civilians cannot do so, these effects are more comprehensively achieved when assisted by robust teams of civilian experts engaged in key supporting activities associated with institution building.

   e.   Recognizing that civilian Federal agencies lack capability to operate in high-risk environments, DOD Directive 3000.05 establishes the policy that DOD will work closely with relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies to create effective civilian-military teams for stability operations.  The DOD shall give stability operations "priority comparable to combat operations," and U.S. military forces shall be prepared to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. In the first year of implementing DOD Directive 3000.05, (2005) there had been significant progress toward these goals.  The DOD has restructured principal agencies to add additional emphasis on stability operations.  Two key elements of this restructuring include the recent enlargement of the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations Capabilities, who has the responsibility for implementing the Directive, and the establishment of a division within the Army G-3/5 dedicated to stability operations.  This restructuring contributed to the improvements we see today in those areas most likely to generate systemic change in DOD, including doctrine, training, education, experimentation, and planning.

**Figure X-3.  New Interagency Management System**

**INTERAGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ORGANIZATION.[3]**

The Interagency Management System (IMS) for reconstruction and stabilization was approved by senior decision-makers in March 2007, along with triggering mechanisms for planning operations. The IMS consists of three elements which are flexible in size and composition to meet the particular requirements of the situation and to integrate personnel from all relevant agencies:

➢ Country reconstruction and stabilization group (CRSG). A Washington-based decision-making body equivalent to a policy coordinating committee with a planning and operations staff.

➢ Integration planning cell (IPC). A civilian planning cell deployed to the relevant geographic combatant command or multinational headquarters to integrate and synchronize civilian and military planning.

➢ Advance civilian team. A team consisting of one or more subordinate interagency management and coordination field advance civilian teams that deploy to support the chief of mission.

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[3]Statement before House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Washington, DC. October 30, 2007. John E. Herbst, Coordinator for Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization.  Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations: Learning from the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Experience.

f.   The Military Departments have expanded their training, education, and leader development policies to enhance language skills, regional knowledge, and understanding of foreign cultures.  The COCOMs continue to integrate stability operations considerations into plans, exercises, and training.  Regional security cooperation strategies seek to enhance the capacity and will of partner nations to support stability operations missions, with the ultimate goal of preventing conflict in fragile regions.  In addition, the Defense Intelligence Community has taken steps to build a nascent capability to better support stability, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism operations with information and analysis on foreign host populations in areas or countries in which U.S. or Coalition forces operate or may operate in the future.

g.   The DOD, with and through the COCOMs, is taking additional steps to improve interagency capability and capacity for integrated whole-of-government stability operations by exchanging liaisons, providing military personnel to support planning and operations of other U.S. Government Agencies, and seeking enhanced synchronization of interagency activities such as information sharing, security cooperation, and foreign assistance.

h.   The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned oversight within the Joint Staff to the Vice Director of Strategic Plans and Policy, and an office under the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate has been established for coordination with OSD and within the Interagency for the development of strategy, plans, and resources related to stability operations, security assistance and maintenance of coherent U.S. Government capacity building objectives, and to ensure better integration of civilian and military capabilities in support of the National Security Strategy.  Within the U.S. Armed Forces, each of the Geographic COCOMs has appointed a general or flag level officer as the Joint Force Coordinating Authority for stability operations, and established working groups focused on stability operations capabilities.  Similarly, the Military Departments have appointed a general or flag level officer as the proponent for stability operations initiatives and identified working groups to integrate stability operations concepts and requirements into Service developmental plans and programs.  This increased institutional leadership focus on stability operations is accompanied by several organizational changes to implement the policies of the Directive.

*The Presidential Report on Improving Interagency Support for United States 21st Century National Security Missions and Interagency Operations in Support of Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations* provides details on the interagency strategy to achieve unified whole-of-government action in SSTR and related operations.

4.  **Civil-Military Integration.**  Most all operations will require some civil-military integration.  The degree of integration depends on the complexity of the operation and mission (e.g., large-scale Peace Operation (PO)).  Presidential directives guide participation by all U.S. civilian and military agencies in such operations.  Military leaders must work with the other members of the national security team in the most skilled, tactful, and persistent ways to promote unified action, which is made more difficult by the agencies' different and sometimes conflicting policies, procedures, and decision-making processes.

a.   Expeditionary civil-military teams are essential to SSTR operations, particularly in post-conflict countries.  The current Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept utilized in Iraq and Afghanistan employs military Civil Affairs teams to augment PRTs led by the Department of State and supported by other U.S. Government Agencies and international partners.  The proposed Interagency Management System under NSPD-44 integrates relevant aspects of the PRT experiences into the Advanced Civilian Team.  This approach institutionalizes a capability for integrated civilian and military teams for stabilization and reconstruction operations.

b.   Until civilian experts can be mobilized (Civilian Reserve Corps), military personnel can provide interim support to repair critical infrastructure and help to stabilize the economic and government sectors by establishing a safe and secure environment.  For example, military Civil Affairs, engineers, police, and Judge Advocate officers provide interim capability to help stabilize essential service sectors while civilian development capabilities are mobilized and brought to bear, together with the efforts of the legitimate government and indigenous population.  Military capacity is also useful in initial efforts to restore critical infrastructure such as the Army Corps of Engineers and the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence management of infrastructure rehabilitation in Iraq and Afghanistan.  However, extensive development activities are best implemented by civilian experts with the support of military forces focused on security operations.  As noted in the *Presidential Report on Improving Interagency Support*, significant structural improvements in – and funding for – the expeditionary capability and capacity of civilian Federal agencies are needed for responsive civilian-military teams to conduct integrated stability operations.[4]

5.   Integration and coordination among the military force and OGAs, NGOs, and IGOs should not be equated to the C2 of a military operation.  As noted in Chapter III, CCDRs and subordinate JFCs are likely to operate with other government agencies (OGA), foreign governments, non-governmental organizations (NGO), and inter-governmental organizations (IGO) in a variety of circumstances.  The nature of interagency coordination demands that CDRs and joint force planners consider all instruments of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective.  Other agencies may be the lead effort during some operations with DOD providing support; however, U.S. military forces will remain under the DOD command structure while supporting other agencies.  In some cases, a federal agency with lead responsibility is prescribed by law or regulation, or by agreement between the agencies involved. Military operations depend upon a command structure that is often very different from that of civilian organizations.  These differences may present significant challenges to coordination.  Still more difficult, some NGOs and IGOs may have policies that are explicitly antithetical to those of the United States Government (USG), and particularly the U.S. military.  In the absence of a formal command structure, JFCs may be required to build consensus to achieve unified action.  Robust liaison facilitates understanding, coordination, and mission accomplishment.

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[4]Report to Congress on the Implementation of DOD Directive 3000.05 Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, Secretary of Defense, April 1, 2007

a.  **Formal Agreements.**  Formal agreements, such as memoranda of understanding or terms of reference, are more common among military organizations and OGAs or host nations (HN) than between military organizations and NGOs.  Although formal agreements may be established, CDRs should not expect that formal agreements with NGOs exist.  Heads of agencies or organizations and authorized military CDRs negotiate and co-sign these agreements.

b.  **Information Sharing.**  Unified action requires effective information sharing among DOD, OGAs, and state and local agencies, with the Director of National Intelligence playing a key role.  Accordingly, JFCs should develop habitual relationships, procedures, and agreements with the individual agencies.  For example, DOD support to homeland security (HS) requires detailed coordination and information sharing with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

c.  **Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG).**  As discussed in Chapter III, the JIACG is an element of a Geographic CCDRs (GCC) staff which, as an interagency staff group establishes or enhances regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between OGA (e.g., Central Intelligence Agency, DOS, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U.S. Treasury Department) representatives and military operational planners at the COCOMs.  There is currently no standardized structure for the JIACG.  Its size and composition depends on the specific operational and staff requirements at each COCOM.  The JIACGs complement the interagency coordination that takes place at the national level through DOD and the National Security Council System.  JIACG members participate in contingency, crisis action, security cooperation, and other operational planning.  They provide a conduit back to their parent organizations to help synchronize joint operations with the efforts of OGAs.

As an example, the U.S. Central Command's Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) contributes to interagency transparency and unity of effort.  To enhance interagency cooperation, U.S. Central Command has developed Memoranda of Understanding with a number of U.S. Government Agencies that facilitate integrated planning and help to leverage interagency capabilities for essential stability operations missions and tasks.  This effort to build capabilities and capacities of interagency and coalition partners is a core part of U.S. Central Command's Theater Strategy and the supporting Theater Campaign Plan.  The PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq, some of which are provided by coalition partner nations, spearhead the effort to create combined civilian-military teams capable of helping national, provincial, and local governments transform into responsible leading partners.  U.S. Central Command's Functional Capability Board leverages lessons from these activities to identify and prioritize stability operations capabilities that can effectively employ the diplomatic, security, economic, and informational activities of U.S. Government, international, and private sector organizations.

d.  **Joint Task Force Staff.**  There are several means available at the JTF level to conduct interagency coordination.  This coordination can occur in the various boards, centers, cells, and/or working groups established within the JTF.  The CDR, JTF (CJTF), and OGAs also may agree to form an executive steering group to coordinate actions.

e.  **Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC).**[5]  As discussed in Chapter III, one method to facilitate unified action and conduct on-site interagency coordination for civil-military operations[6] (CMO) is to establish a CMOC (Figure X-4).  The CMOC serves as the U.S. forces' primary technique to interface among the local populace and institutions, humanitarian organizations, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational military forces, and other civilian agencies of the USG.  There is no established structure for a CMOC; its size and composition depend on the situation. Members of a CMOC may include representatives of U.S. military forces, OGAs, multinational partners, HN organizations (if outside the United States), IGOs, and NGOs. Civil Affairs (CA) units may be used to establish the CMOC core.  As a coordination center, the CMOC is neither a unit nor an organization.  If there is a host-nation government, it has the presumptive right to establish the mechanisms for civil-military coordination in the form commonly known as a humanitarian operations center.  The structure of a humanitarian operations center can be formal or informal.



**Figure X-4.  Notional CMOC (Bn and above)**

Through a structure such as a CMOC, the JFC can gain a greater understanding of the roles of IGOs and NGOs and how they influence mission accomplishment.

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[5]For additional guidance on interagency coordination, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination during Joint Operations.

[6]For further guidance on CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.

6. **Stability Considerations by Phase**

   a. **Considerations for Shaping**

   (1) **General.** JFCs are able to take actions before committing forces to assist in determining the shape and character of potential future operations. In many cases, these actions enhance bonds between future coalition partners, increase understanding of the region, help ensure access when required, strengthen future multinational operations, and prevent crises from developing.

   (2) **Stability Operations.** Activities in the "shaping" phase primarily will focus on continued planning and preparation for anticipated stability operations in the subsequent phases. These activities should include conducting collaborative interagency planning to synchronize the civil-military effort, confirming the feasibility of pertinent military objectives and the military end state, and providing for adequate intelligence, an appropriate force mix, and other capabilities. Stability operations in this phase may be required to quickly restore security and infrastructure or provide humanitarian relief in select portions of the operational area to dissuade further adversary actions or to help ensure access and future success.

   b. **Considerations for Deterrence (Preparing the Operational Area)**

   (1) **General.** Before the initiation of hostilities, the JFC must gain a clear understanding of the national and military strategic objectives; desired and undesired effects; COGs and decisive points; actions likely to create those desired effects; and required joint, multinational, and nonmilitary capabilities matched to available forces. The JFC must visualize how these operations can be integrated into a campaign with missions that are communicated via CDR's intent throughout the force. An early analysis and assessment of the adversary's decision-making process must be performed to know what actions will be an effective deterrent. Emphasis should be placed on setting the conditions for successful joint operations in the "dominate" and follow-on phases.

   (2) **Stability Operations.** Joint force planning and operations conducted prior to commencement of hostilities should establish a sound foundation for operations in the "stabilize" and "enable civil authority" phases. JFCs should anticipate and address how to fill the power vacuum created when sustained combat operations wind down. Accomplishing this task should ease the transition to operations in the "stabilize" phase and shorten the path to the national strategic end state and hand over to another authority. Considerations include:

   (a) Limiting the damage to key infrastructure and services.

   (b) Establishing the intended disposition of captured leadership and demobilized military and paramilitary forces.

   (c) Providing for the availability of cash.

(d) Identifying and managing potential "stabilize" phase enemies.

(e) Determining the proper force mix (e.g., combat, military police, civil affairs (CA), engineer, medical, multinational).

(f) Availability of HN law enforcement and Health Service Support (HSS) resources.

(g) Securing key infrastructure nodes and facilitating HN law enforcement and first responder services.

(h) Developing and disseminating strategic communication (SC) themes to suppress potential new enemies and promote new governmental authority.

(3) **Civil Affairs (CA)** units contain a variety of specialty skills that may support the joint operation being planned. CA units can assess the civil infrastructure, assist in the operation of temporary shelters, and serve as liaisons between the military and civil organizations. Establishing and maintaining military-to civil relations may include interaction among U.S., allied or coalition, HN forces, as well as OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. CA forces can provide expertise on factors that directly affect military operations to include culture, social structure, economic systems, language, and HNS capabilities. CA may be able to perform functions that normally are the responsibility of local or indigenous governments. Employment of CA forces should be based upon a clear concept of CA mission requirements for the type operation of being planned.

c. **Considerations for Seizing the Initiative**

(1) **General.** As operations commence, the JFC needs to exploit friendly advantages and capabilities to shock, demoralize, and disrupt the enemy immediately. The JFC seeks decisive advantage through the use of all available elements of combat power to seize and maintain the initiative, deny the enemy the opportunity to achieve its objectives, and generate in the enemy a sense of inevitable failure and defeat. Additionally, the JFC coordinates with OGAs to facilitate coherent use of all instruments of national power in achieving national strategic objectives.

(2) **Stability Operations.** The onset of combat provides an opportunity to set into motion actions that will achieve military strategic and operational objectives and establish the conditions for operations at the conclusion of sustained combat. Operations to neutralize or eliminate potential "stabilize" phase enemies may be initiated. National and local HN authorities may be contacted and offered support. Key infrastructure may be seized or otherwise protected. Intelligence collection on the status of enemy infrastructure, government organizations, and humanitarian needs should be increased. PSYOP used to influence the behavior of approved foreign target audiences, in support of military strategic and operational objectives, can ease the situation encountered when sustained combat is concluded.

d.  **Considerations for Dominance**

(1) **General.**  JFCs conduct sustained combat operations when a "coup de main" is not possible.  During sustained combat operations, JFCs simultaneously employ conventional and special operations forces and capabilities throughout the breadth and depth of the operational area.

(2) Operations to neutralize or eliminate potential "stabilize" phase enemies continues.

e.  **Considerations for Stabilization**[7]

(1) **General.**  Operations in this phase ensure the national strategic end state continues to be pursued at the conclusion of sustained combat operations.  These operations typically begin with significant military involvement to include some combat, then move increasingly toward enabling civil authority as the threat wanes and civil infrastructures are reestablished.  As progress is made, military forces will increase their focus on supporting the efforts of HN authorities, OGAs, IGOs, and/or NGOs.  National Security Presidential Directive–44 assigns U.S. State Department the responsibility to plan and coordinate U.S. government efforts in stabilization and reconstruction.  SecState is responsible to coordinate with SecDef to ensure harmonization with planned and ongoing operations.  Military support to SSTR operations within the JOA are the responsibility of the JFC.

(2) **Several LOOs may be initiated immediately** (e.g., providing humanitarian relief, establishing security).  In some cases the scope of the problem set may dictate using other nonmilitary entities which are uniquely suited to address the problems.  The goal of these military and civil efforts should be to eliminate root causes or deficiencies that create the problems (e.g., strengthen legitimate civil authority, rebuild government institutions, foster a sense of confidence and well-being, and support the conditions for economic reconstruction).  With this in mind, the JFC may need to address how to harmonize CMO with the efforts of participating OGAs, IGOs, and/or NGOs.

(3) **Forces and Capabilities Mix.**  The JFC may need to realign forces and capabilities or adjust force structure to begin stability operations in some portions of the operational area even while sustained combat operations are still ongoing in other areas.  For example, CA forces and human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities are critical to supporting "stabilize" phase operations and often involve a mix of forces and capabilities far different than those that supported the previous phases.  Planning and continuous assessment will reveal the nature and scope of forces and capabilities required.  These forces and capabilities may be available within the joint force or may be required from another theater or from the Reserve Component (RC).  The JFC should anticipate and request these forces and capabilities in a timely manner to facilitate their opportune employment.

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[7]For further guidance, refer to DODD 3000.05, Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations.

(4) **Stability Operations**

(a) As sustained combat operations conclude, military forces will shift their focus to stability operations, which likely will involve combat operations. Of particular importance will be CMO, initially conducted to secure and safeguard the populace, reestablishing civil law and order, protect or rebuild key infrastructure, and restore public services. U.S. military forces should be prepared to lead the activities necessary to accomplish these tasks when indigenous civil, USG, multinational or international capacity does not exist or is incapable of assuming responsibility. Once legitimate civil authority is prepared to conduct such tasks, U.S. military forces may support such activities as required/necessary. SC will play an important role in providing public information to foreign populations during this period.

(b) The military's predominant presence and its ability to command and control forces and logistics under extreme conditions may give it the de facto lead in stability operations normally governed by other agencies that lack such capacities. However, some stability operations likely will be in support of, or transition to support of, U.S. diplomatic, UN, or HN efforts. Integrated civilian and military efforts are key to success, and military forces need to work competently in this environment while properly supporting the agency in charge. To be effective, planning and conducting stability operations requires a variety of perspectives and expertise and the cooperation and assistance of OGAs, other Services, and alliance or coalition partners. Military forces should be prepared to work in integrated civilian military teams that could include representatives from other U.S. departments and agencies, foreign governments and security forces, IGOs, NGOs, and members of the private sector with relevant skills and expertise. Typical military support includes, but is not limited to, the following:

<u>1</u>   Work as part of an integrated civilian-military team ensuring security, developing local governance structures, promoting bottom-up economic activity, rebuilding infrastructure, and building indigenous capacity for such tasks.

<u>2</u>   CA forces are organized and trained to perform CA operations and activities that support CMO conducted in conjunction with stability operations. PSYOP forces will develop, produce, and disseminate products to gain and reinforce popular support for the JFC's objectives. Complementing conventional forces, other SOF will conduct FID to train, advise, and support indigenous military and paramilitary forces as they develop the capacity to secure their own lands and populations. (For further guidance on SOF, refer to JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.)*

<u>3</u>   **Counterintelligence (CI) activities** to safeguard essential elements of friendly information. This is particularly pertinent in countering adversary HUMINT efforts. HN authorities, IGOs, and NGOs working closely with U.S. forces may pass information (knowingly or unknowingly) to adversary elements that enable them to interfere with stability operations. Members of the local populace often gain access to U.S. military personnel and their bases by providing services, such as laundry and cooking, and provide information gleaned from that interaction to seek favor with a belligerent element, or they may actually be belligerents. The JFC must consider these

and similar possibilities and take appropriate actions to counter potential compromise. CI personnel develop an estimate of the threat and recommend appropriate actions.

        <u>4</u>  **Public Affairs (PA) operations** to provide command information programs, communication with internal audiences, media and community relations support, and international information programs. See Chapter II.

        <u>5</u>  Reconstruction, engineering, logistics, law enforcement, HSS, etc., needed to restore essential services.

        (c) During stability operations in the "stabilize" phase, **protection** from virtually any person, element, or group hostile to U.S. interests must be considered. These could include activists, a group opposed to the operation, looters, and terrorists. Forces will have to be even more alert to force protection and security matters after a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high yield explosive (CBRNE) incident. JFCs also should be constantly ready to counter activity that could bring significant harm to units or jeopardize mission accomplishment. **Protection may involve the security of HN authorities and OGA, IGO, and NGO members if authorized by higher authority.**[8]

        (d) Personnel should stay alert even in an operation with little or no perceived risk. **JFCs must take measures to prevent complacency and be ready to counter activity that could bring harm to units or jeopardize the operation.** However, security requirements should be balanced with the military operation's nature and objectives. In some stability operations, the use of certain security measures, such as carrying arms, wearing helmets and protective vests, or using secure communications may cause military forces to appear more threatening than intended, which may degrade the force's legitimacy and hurt relations with the local population.

        (e) **Restraint.** During stability operations, military capability must be applied even more prudently since the support of the local population is essential for success. The actions of military personnel and units are framed by the disciplined application of force, including **specific ROE**. These ROE often will be more restrictive and detailed when compared to those for sustained combat operations due to national policy concerns. Moreover, these rules may change frequently during operations. Restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence characterize the environment. The use of excessive force could adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short- and long-term goals. The use of nonlethal capabilities should be considered to fill the gap between verbal warnings and deadly force when dealing with unarmed hostile elements and to avoid raising the level of conflict unnecessarily. The JFC must determine early in the planning stage what nonlethal technology is available, how well the force is trained to use it, and how the established ROE authorize its employment. This concept does not preclude the application of overwhelming force, when appropriate,

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[8]For contractors, the GCC must evaluate the need for force protection support following the guidelines of DOD Instruction 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces.

to display U.S. resolve and commitment.  The reasons for the restraint often need to be understood by the individual Service member, because a single act could cause adverse political consequences.

(f) **Perseverance.**  Some "stabilize" phases may be short, others may require years to transition to the "enable civil authority" phase.  Therefore, the patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national strategic end state conditions, for as long as necessary to achieve them, often is the requirement for success.

(g) **Legitimacy.**  Joint stability operations need to sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the emerging or host government.  During operations where a government does not exist, extreme caution should be used when dealing with individuals and organizations to avoid inadvertently legitimizing them.  Effective SC can enhance perceptions of the legitimacy of stability operations.

(h) **OPSEC.**  Although there may be no clearly defined threat, the essential elements of U.S. military operations should be safeguarded.  The uncertain nature of the situation, coupled with the potential for rapid change, require that OPSEC be an integral part of stability operations.  OPSEC planners must consider the effect of media coverage and the possibility coverage may compromise essential security or disclose critical information.

(i)  The PO fundamentals of consent, impartiality, transparency, credibility, freedom of movement, flexibility and adaptability, civil-military harmonization, and mutual respect discussed in JP 3- 07.3, *Peace Operations*, likely will apply to stability operations in the "stabilize" phase.

f.  **Considerations for Enabling Civil Authority**[9]

(1) **General.**  In this phase the joint operation normally is terminated when the stated military strategic and/or operational objectives have been met and redeployment of the joint force is accomplished.  This should mean that a legitimate civil authority has been enabled to manage the situation without further outside military assistance.  In some cases, it may become apparent that the stated objectives fall short of properly enabling civil authority.  This situation may require a redesign of the joint operation as a result of an extension of the required stability operations in support of U.S. diplomatic, HN, IGO, and/or NGO efforts.

(2) **Peace Building.**  The transition from military operations to full civilian control may involve stability operations that initially resemble peace enforcement operations (PEO) to include counterinsurgency operations, antiterrorism, and counterterrorism, and eventually evolve to a peace-building (PB) mission.  PB provides the reconstruction and societal rehabilitation that offers hope to the HN populace.

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[9]For further guidance on considerations for termination of operations, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, 26 Dec 2006 and JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

Stability operations establish the conditions that enable PB to succeed. PB promotes reconciliation, strengthens and rebuilds civil infrastructures and institutions, builds confidence, and supports economic reconstruction to prevent a return to conflict. The ultimate measure of success in PB is political, not military. Therefore, JFCs seek a clear understanding of the national/coalition strategic end state and how military operations support that end state.

(3) **Transfer to Civil Authority.** In many cases, the U.S. will transfer responsibility for the political and military affairs of the HN to another authority. JFCs may be required to transfer responsibility of operations to another authority (e.g., UN observers, multinational peacekeeping force, or North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]) as the termination criteria. This probably will occur after an extended period of conducting joint or multinational stability operations and PB missions as described above. Overall, transfer likely will occur in stages (e.g., HN sovereignty, PO under UN mandate, termination of all U.S. military participation). Joint force support to this effort may include the following:

(a) **Support to Truce Negotiations.** This support may include providing intelligence, security, transportation and other logistic support, and linguists for all participants.

(b) **Transition to Civil Authority.** This transfer could be to local or HN federal governments, to a UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) after PEO, or through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to a NGO in support of refugees.

(4) **Redeployment**

(a) **Conduct.** Redeployment normally is conducted in stages — the entire joint force likely will not redeploy in one relatively short period. It may include waste disposal, port operations, closing of contracts and other financial obligations, disposition of contracting records and files, clearing and marking of minefields and other explosive ordnance disposal activities, and ensuring that appropriate units remain in place until their missions are complete. Redeployment must be planned and executed in a manner that facilitates the use of redeploying forces and supplies to meet new missions or crises. Upon redeployment, units or individuals may require refresher training prior to reassuming more traditional roles and missions.

(b) **Redeployment to Other Contingencies.** Forces deployed may be called upon to rapidly redeploy to another theater. CDRs and their staffs should consider how they would extricate forces and ensure that they are prepared for the new contingency. This might include such things as a prioritized redeployment schedule, identification of aerial ports for linking intra- and inter-theater airlift, the most recent intelligence assessments and supporting geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) products for the new contingency, and some consideration to achieving the national strategic objectives of the original contingency through other means.

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# CHAPTER XI

# JOINT OPERATION PLANNING PROCESS

1. **The Complementary Relationship between JOPES and JOPP**

    a.   JOPES and JOPP are not competitive, they are complementary.  JOPES is the integrated joint command and control system used to develop situation awareness, support military operation planning, execution, and monitoring activities for both conventional and nuclear situations (including theater-level nuclear and chemical defense plans).  JOPES incorporates policies, procedures, personnel, and facilities by interfacing with automated data processing (ADP) and reporting systems.

    b.   JOPES provides a necessary formal, overarching system that is designed to provide procedures and focus for the interaction between COCOMs, the Joint Staff, and others for initial formal planning requirements (CPG) and interaction between key leaders (SecDef, CJCS, etc.).  JOPES is an overarching and comprehensive process.

    c.   The JOPES process applies to the formal development and implementation of operation plans and orders prepared in response to the President of the United States, Secretary of Defense, or Chairman.  It specifies the policies, procedures, and formats to be used to develop and execute plans.  To assist the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC)  (which consists of the Chairman and other members of the JCS, the Joint Staff, the Services and their major commands, the COCOMs and their component commands, Sub-unified commands and subordinate components, joint task forces and subordinate components and the combat support agencies), JOPES is supported by a networked suite of information technology applications, tools, and databases, which reside in the Global Command and Control System (GCCS).  The GCCS provides the primary ADP support for JOPES and provides senior-level decision makers and their staffs with enhanced capability to plan and conduct joint military operations.  JOPES encompasses the full spectrum of processes, procedures, and actions supporting every facet of the planning, decision-making, and execution continuum.

    d.   However, JOPES is not sufficient for the large majority of planning that occurs by organizations below COCOMs that have no formal JOPES requirements, nor for day-to-day planning that occurs at all levels during plan design and execution.  The JOPP provides a common, approved planning process for these organizations and circumstances.

    e.   The JOPP provides a necessary supporting process for organizations that have no JOPES requirements.  JOPES by itself is not sufficient for planning at the operational level, and JOPP by itself is not sufficient for most requirements covered by JOPES.  The purpose of the JOPP is to fill a void that has existed in Joint Doctrine.

f.    The JOPP supplements and complements JOPES policy by expanding on the joint operation planning process, operational design, and aspects of planning that occur during ongoing operations.

> **Example:**  A Combatant Command might prepare a level 4 OPLAN per JOPES to meet a CPG requirement.  The combatant commands Service components might provide input to the plan (TPFDD and other info), but will develop their component plans based on tasks given to them in the combatant commander's plan.  They will do their mission analysis and COA development (discussed in JOPES), conduct their COA analysis, wargaming, and comparison (not discussed in JOPES),etc.  They will consider various elements of operational design in conjunction with JOPP as they develop their plans.  The **JOPP** is the fundamental process for all joint planning.  Contingency and Crisis Action Planning are structured using the JOPP.

g.    Campaign and operation planning blends operational design and the iterative Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP).  JOPP is an orderly, analytical planning process consisting of a set of logical steps to analyze a mission, develop and compare potential courses of action (COA), select the best COA and produce a plan or order.

h.    JOPP is a four-function, seven-step process that culminates with a published Operations Order (OPORD) in CAP and results in an OPLAN, Concept Plan (CONPLAN), Base Plan or CDRs Estimate during Contingency Planning.

2.    The four functions of the JOPP are: **Strategic Guidance, Concept Development, Plan Development,** and **Plan Assessment.**  Each of these functions is further broken down into steps.  The Concept Development Function contains an additional 13 Key-Steps (Figure XI-1 and XI-2).

a.    **Function I – Strategic Guidance** consists of two steps; Planning Initiation and Mission Analysis.

b.    **Function II – Concept Development** consists of four steps; COA Development, COA Analysis and Wargaming, COA Comparison and COA Approval.

c.    **Function III – Plan Development** consists of Plan or Order Development.

d.    **Function IV – Plan Assessment**.

**THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING**

Function 1: Strategic Guidance

Step 1: Initiation

Step 2: Mission Analysis — Approved Mission

Function 2: Concept Development

Step 3: Course of Action (COA Development)

Step 4: COA Analysis and Wargaming

Step 5: COA Comparison

Step 6: COA Approval — Approved Concept

Function 3: Plan Development

Step 7: Plan or Order Development — Approved Plan

Function 4: Plan Assessment

Assessment — Refine/adapt, Terminate or Execute

**Figure XI-1.  The Joint Operation Planning Process**

3.  JOPP underpins planning at all levels and for missions across the full range of military operations.  It applies to both supported and supporting JFCs and to joint force component commands when the components participate in joint planning.  This process is designed to facilitate interaction between the CDR, staff, and subordinate headquarters throughout planning.  JOPP helps CDRs and their staffs organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and CDR's intent, and develop effective plans and orders.[1]

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[1]JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, 26 Dec 2006.

# Joint Operation Planning Process

**Step 1, Planning Initiation**
- National guidance
- Theater strategy

**Function IV Plan Assessment**

**Function I Strategic Guidance/Direction**

**Step 2, Mission Analysis 13 Key-steps**
- Revised mission statement
- CDR's initial intent
- Initial Planning Guidance
- CCIR

Planning Initiation

Mission Analysis

**Function II Concept Development**

**Plan Assessment**
- MOE/MOP

Plan Assessment

COA Development

**Step 3, COA Development**
- Revised staff estimates
- Viable COA's & Sketches
- Tentative Task Organization
- Planning Directive Published

**Joint Operation Planning Process**

**Function III Plan Development**

COA Analysis/Wargaming

**Step 4, COA Analysis And Wargaming**
- Potential decision points
- Advantages and disadvantages
- Potential branches and sequels
- Risk assessment
- Task Organization adjustments

Plan/Order Development

**Step 7, Plan or Order Development**
- Develop executable CONOPS
- Command relationships
- Theater structure
- Sustainment
- Subordinate tasks by phase
- Synchronization
- TPFDD

COA Comparison

**Step 5, COA Comparison**
- Evaluated COA's
- Recommended COA
- COA selection rationale

COA Approval

**Step 6, COA Approval**
- COA Modifications
- CCDRs COA selection
- CDR's Estimate

**Figure XI-2.  Joint Operation Planning Process**

4.  **Joint Planning Group**.  The Joint Planning Group is typically organized within the J-5 Directorate.  The JPG is responsible to the J-5 and CDR for driving the command's planning effort.  Effectiveness of the JPG will be measured, in part, by the support provided to it by the principal JTF staff officers (J-1 through J-6).  The composition of the JPG is a carefully balanced consideration between group management and appropriate representation from the JTF staff and components.  JPG membership will vary based on the tasks to be accomplished, time available to accomplish the tasks, and the experience level of the JPG members.  Representation to the JPG should be a long-term assignment to provide continuity of focus and consistency of procedure (Figure XI-3).

**JOINT PLANNING GROUP COMPOSITION**

**INFORMATION OPERATIONS CELL**

IO Planner(s)
C2W Planner(s)
Deception Planners(s)
JSOTF Rep
JPOTF Rep

**ORDERS CELL**

Warning Order
Planning Order
Operation Order
Commander's Estimate
Other Related Orders

**INFO MGT CELL**

Message Boards
RFI Control
GI&S
Suspense Mgt.
Agendas

**JPG**

**PLANNING CELL**

Core Planners
DJTFAC
LNOs/Reps as Required

POSSIBLE SUBCELLS
Mission Analysis
COA Development
WARNORD
COA Analysis
COA Comparison
Synch Matrix
Decision Support Temp
Commander's Estimate
OPORD Development
Branch Plans

**DEVELOPMENT CELL**

JOPES/TPFDD Planner
USTRANSCOM LNO
J-4 Transportation
Other Related Orders

**REPRESENTATIVES TO THE JPG**

| Component LNOs | | JTF Staff | Supporting Combatant Commands LNOs | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AFFOR | JPOTF | J-1 | POLAD | USSPACECOM |
| ARFOR | JFACC | J-2 | Surgeon | USTRANSCOM |
| NAVFOR | JFLCC | J-3/JOC | PAO | USSTRATCOM |
| MARFOR | JSOTF | J-4 | SJA | NORAD |
| | JFMCC | J-5 | JTCS | |
| | | J-6 | | |
| | | Engineer | | |

**Figure XI-3. Joint Planning Group**

5. **Staff Estimates**.[2]   The CDR's staff must function as a single, cohesive unit—a professional team.  Each staff member must know his own duties and responsibilities in detail and be familiar with the duties and responsibilities of other staff members.

a.   The staff must establish and maintain a high degree of coordination and cooperation, both internally and with staffs of higher, lower, and adjacent units.  The staff's efforts must always focus on supporting the CDR and on helping him support his subordinate units.  *CDRs can minimize risks by increasing certainty*. The staff supports the CDR by providing better, more relevant, timely, and accurate information; making estimates and recommendations; preparing plans and orders; and monitoring execution.

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[2]Staff estimate format.  The staff estimate format contained in CJCSM 3122.01A, Appendix T, 29 Sep 2006, standardizes the way staff members construct estimates.  The J2 (with input assistance from all staff members) will still conduct and disseminate the initial Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment as a separate product. The Commanders Estimate format is located as enclosure J of the same document.

b.   The primary product the staff produces for the CDR, and for subordinate CDRs, is understanding, or **situational awareness**.  True understanding should be the basis for information provided to CDRs to make decisions.  Formal staff processes provide two types of information associated with understanding and decision making.  All other staff activities are secondary.   The first is situational awareness information, which creates an understanding of the situation as the basis for making a decision.  Simply, it is understanding oneself, the enemy, and the terrain or environment.  The second type of information, **execution information**, communicates a clearly understood vision of the operation and desired outcome after a decision is made.  Examples of execution information are conclusions, recommendations, guidance, intent, concept statements, and orders.

c.   Mission analysis, facts and assumptions, and the situation analysis (of the area of operations, area of interest, adversary, friendly, and support requirements, etc.) furnish the structure for the staff estimate.  The estimate consists of significant facts, events, and conclusions based on analyzed data.  It recommends how to best use available resources.  Adequate, rapid decision-making and planning hinge on good, timely command and staff estimates.  They are the basis for forming viable courses of action.  Failure to make estimates can lead to errors and omissions when developing, analyzing, and comparing COAs, developing or executing plans.

d.   **Essential qualities of estimates**

(1) CDRs control tempo by making and executing decisions faster than the adversary.  Therefore, CDRs must always strive to optimize time available.  They must not allow estimates to become overly time-consuming.  However, they must be comprehensive and continuous and must visualize the future.

(2) *Comprehensive* estimates consider both the quantifiable and the intangible aspects of military operations.  They translate friendly and adversary strengths, joint weapons systems, training, morale, and leadership into combat capabilities.  The estimate process requires a clear understanding of the operational environment and the ability to visualize the operational or crisis situations requiring military forces or interagency support.  Estimates must provide a timely, accurate evaluation of the operation at a given time.

(3) The demand on the $C^2$ system is *continuous* as opposed to cyclical.  Estimates must be as thorough as time and circumstances permit.  The CDR and staff must constantly collect, process, and evaluate information.  They update their estimates:

- when the CDR and staff recognize new facts.
- when they replace assumptions with facts or find their assumptions invalid.
- when they receive changes to the mission or when changes are indicated.

(4) Estimates for the current operation can often provide a basis for estimates for future missions as well as changes to current operations.  Technological advances and near-real-time information estimates ensure that estimates can be continuously updated.

(5) Estimates must *visualize the future* and support the CDR's operational visualization.  They are the link between current operations and future plans.  The CDR's vision directs the end state.  Each subordinate unit CDR must also possess the ability to envision the organization's end state. Estimates contribute to this vision.

e.  **Types of estimates.**  The CDR and his staff make estimates that apply to any operational situation and all levels of command.  They use estimates to look at possible solutions to specific operational missions and requirements.  These estimates can form the cornerstone for staff annexes to orders and plans.  The coordinating staff and each staff principal develop facts, assessments, and information that relate to their functional field or operating system.  Types of estimates generally include, but are not limited to:

- CDR's estimate.
- Operations estimate.
- Personnel estimate.
- Intelligence estimate.
- Logistics estimate.
- Civil-military operations estimate.
- Signal estimate.
- Special staff estimates.

(1) **Commander's Estimate**

(a) The CDR's estimate, like the operations estimate, is an analysis of all the factors that could affect a mission.  The CDR integrates his personal knowledge of the situation, his analysis of METT-T factors, the assessments of his subordinate CDRs, and any relevant details he gains from his staff.  Once the CCDR has made a decision on a selected COA, provides guidance, and updates his intent, the staff completes the CDR's Estimate.  The CDR's Estimate provides a <u>concise narrative statement</u> of how the CCDR intends to accomplish the mission, and provides the necessary focus for campaign planning and OPLAN/OPORD development.  Further, it responds to the establishing authority's requirement to develop a plan for execution.

(b) Estimate analysis includes risk assessment, force protection, and effective utilization of all resources.  The estimate also includes visualizing all reasonable COAs and how each COA would affect friendly forces.

(c) The CDR's and operations estimates generally follow the same format. The CDR uses his personal estimate as a cross-check of his staff's estimates.

(2) **Operations Estimate.**  The J3 prepares the operations estimate, which considers all elements that can influence the current operations and feasible future courses of action.  It results in a recommendation to the CDR.  To prepare this estimate, the J3 must *understand*:

- strategic direction.
- CDR's intent (one and two echelons above).
- risk assessment.
- current task organization (two echelons below).
- joint operational status of supporting commands/components, such as locations, capabilities (including level of training, effectiveness, degree of mobility, type of equipment, and limitations), and current or pending missions.
- availability and capabilities of joint assets, such as air and space support, naval or amphibious assets.
- other information, such as location, status, and mission of Transportation Command and other supporting commands.

(3) **Personnel Estimate.**  The J1 prepares the personnel estimate, which is an analysis of how all human resources and personnel factors impact effectiveness before, during, and after the operation.  It includes a current overall personnel status of the joint organization, its subordinate commands, and any attached or supporting elements. Personnel status includes assessments of the following tangible and intangible factors:

- Medical evacuation and hospitalization.
- Command-strength maintenance.
- Replacements.
- Readiness.
- Organizational climate.
- Cohesion.
- Discipline, law and order.

The personnel estimate predicts losses (where and when losses could occur) and when, where, and if such losses cause the culmination of an operation.  It contains the J1's conclusions and recommendations about the feasibility of supporting the operation.

(4) **Intelligence Estimate**

(a) Intelligence plays a critical role across the range of military operations. CDRs use intelligence to anticipate the battle, visualize and understand the full spectrum of the battlespace, and influence the outcome of operations.  Intelligence enables CDRs at all levels to focus their combat power and to provide full-dimensional force protection across the range of military operations.

(b) Intelligence focuses on enemy military capabilities, centers of gravity (COGs), and potential courses of action (COAs) to provide operational and tactical CDRs the information they need to plan and conduct operations.  It enables the JFC to visualize, understand, and identify when and where to apply combat power to exploit enemy vulnerabilities and capitalize on opportunities with minimum risk.  The J-2 must modify and tailor intelligence support to meet the unique challenges presented in each operation.  In addition, the nature and intensity of a potential threat can change suddenly and dramatically.  For example, a peacekeeping operation may abruptly transition to a combat peace enforcement operation should any of the belligerents fail to honor the terms of the truce.  Therefore, intelligence resources at every echelon should be structured to provide support that is proactive, aggressive, predictive, and flexible.

(c) Joint intelligence operations begin with the **identification of a need for intelligence regarding all relevant aspects of the battlespace, especially the adversary**.  These intelligence needs are identified by the CDR and all joint force staff elements, and are formalized by the J-2 as intelligence requirements early in the planning process.  Those critical pieces of intelligence the CDR must know by a particular time to plan and execute a successful mission are identified as the CDR's PIRs.  PIRs are identified at every level and are based on guidance obtained from the mission statement, the CDR's intent, and the end state objectives.  **Intelligence requirements** provide the basis for current and future intelligence operations, and are prioritized based on consumer inputs during the planning and direction portion of the intelligence process.  The J-2 provides the focus and direction for collection requirements to support the COCOM or subordinate joint force.[3]  The J2 prepares the intelligence estimate.  Both the J2 and the J3 examine the area of interest to identify intelligence-collection needs.  It's important to note that Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) is a staff process, not just a J2 process, and should be driven by the chief of staff.

(5) **Logistics Estimate.**  The J4 prepares the logistics estimate, which provides an accurate and current assessment of logistical capabilities, environment, subordinate command capabilities, and any attached or supporting elements.  The logistics estimate is an analysis of how logistical factors can affect mission accomplishment.  It contains the J4's conclusions and recommendations about the feasibility of supporting the operation.  This estimate includes how the functional areas of supply, transportation, services, maintenance, labor, facilities, and construction affect various COAs.

(6) **Civil-Military Operations Estimate.**  The J5 prepares the Joint civil-military operations (CMO) estimate in relation to the operation and environment.

(7) **Signal Estimate.**  The J6 prepares the communications estimate in relation to the operational requirements and environment.

(8) **Special Staff Estimates.**  Each special staff officer creates their own staff estimate in relation to the situation and their functional responsibilities.

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[3]Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 7 October 2004.

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# CHAPTER XII

# STRATEGIC GUIDANCE / STRATEGIC DIRECTION — Function I

> "Strategic thought is inevitably highly pragmatic.  It is dependent on the realities of geography, society, economics, and politics, as well as on other, often fleeting factors that give rise to the issues and conflicts war is meant to resolve."
>
> **Peter Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy, 1986,**
> **Princeton University Press, p.3**

1.  **Function I — Strategic Guidance/Strategic Direction** is the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the activities of the Joint Staff, COCOMs, Services, and combat support agencies with those of the other national agencies and departments.  As an overarching term, **strategic direction** encompasses the processes and products by which the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide **strategic guidance**.[1]  Two key documents that provide that integration are the Guidance on Employment of the Force (GEF) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

   a.  The GEF, JSCP and Unified Command Plan (UCP) are the principle source of guidance for COCOM steady-state campaign, contingency and posture planning efforts. The GEF, guidance from the President and SecDef, supersedes the 2005 Contingency Planning Guidance, 2007 Security Cooperation Guidance, and the 2004 Nuclear Weapons Planning Guidance and various policy memoranda related to Global Force Management (GFM) and Global Defense Posture (GDP).  The GEF translates the NSS and the NDS into guidance that supports planning and efforts and complements the security goals outlined in the DOS Joint Strategic Plan (JSP).  The 2008 NDS describes the broad policy and strategic context within which the DOD operates and establishes key department-level planning parameters and priorities.

      The NDS identifies five major "ends," achieved by five "ways" that employ eight "means."

      (1) **Ends**.  Five ends guide defense policy and planning:

> ➢  Defend the homeland
> ➢  Win the Long War
> ➢  Promote security
> ➢  Deter conflict
> ➢  Win our nation's wars

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[1] JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, 26 December 2006.

(2) **Ways.**  Five ways achieve the NDS's ends:

> ➢ Shape the choices of key states
> ➢ Prevent adversaries from acquiring or using WMD
> ➢ Strengthen and expand alliances and partnerships
> ➢ Secure US strategic access and retain freedom of action
> ➢ Integrate and unify our efforts; a new "Jointnesss"

(3) **Means.**  At the broadest level the DOD employs eight means to achieve its ends:

> ➢ The Total Force
> ➢ Strategic communications
> ➢ Intelligence and information
> ➢ Organizational excellence
> ➢ First-class technology and equipment
> ➢ Alliances and partnerships
> ➢ Security cooperation
> ➢ Global posture

b.   The GEF directs CCDRs to develop campaign plans designed to accomplish assigned strategic end states.  Campaign plans integrate steady-state security cooperation activities, "Phase 0" activities, and ongoing operations.  The goal is to consolidate and integrate DOD planning guidance related to operations and other military activities into a single, overarching document.  The GEF transitions the DOD's planning from a contingency-centric approach to a strategy-centric approach.  Rather than initiating planning from the context of particular contingences, the strategy-centric approach requires commanders to begin planning from the perspective of achieving broad regional or functional objectives.

c.   Under this approach, planning starts with the NDS, from which this document derives theater or functional strategic end states prioritized appropriately for each CCDR.

d.   CDRs are required to pursue these strategic end states as they develop their theater or functional strategies, which they then translate into an integrated set of steady-state activities and operations by means of a campaign plan.

e.   Campaign plans provide the vehicle for linking steady-state shaping activities to current operations and contingency plans. They ensure that the various "Phase 0" components of a combatant command's contingency plans are integrated with each other and the command's broader security cooperation and shaping activities.

f.   Under this concept, contingency plans become "branches" to the campaign plan. Contingency plans are built to account for the possibility that steady-state shaping

measures, security cooperation activities, and operations could fail to prevent aggression, preclude large-scale instability in a key state or region, or mitigate the effects of a major disaster. Contingency plans address scenarios that put one or more US strategic end states in jeopardy and leave the United States no other recourse than to address the problem at hand through military operations. Military operations can be in response to many scenarios, including armed aggression, regional instability, a humanitarian crisis, or a natural disaster. Contingency Plans should provide a range of military options coordinated with total USG response.

g. The GEF will be revised every two years with updates issued in interim years. USD(P), after SECDEF review and approval, will issue interim strategic guidance statements (SGS), as required, to provide updated contingency or campaign plan guidance.

h. The JSCP normally will not repeat the guidance that is presented in the GEF. The two documents are complementary not repetitive. The JSCP implements the strategic policy direction provided in the GEF and initiates the planning process for the development of campaign, campaign support, contingency, and posture plans. The JSCP does this by translating and consolidating GEF regional and functional guidance into specific campaign and contingency planning requirements to CCDRs. The JSCP provides specific planning tasks that link to GEF strategic end states, priorities, and security cooperation activities. These planning tasks are not objectives and clearly nest under the strategic end states specified in the GEF. The CCDR is expected to develop intermediate objectives that contribute to the achievement of the GEF strategic end states.

2. Strategic Guidance will focus largely on solidifying guidance, agreeing on the framework assumptions and planning factors, establishing a common understanding of adversaries and their intentions, conducting initial interagency and/or coalition coordination (as authorized), and producing an approved CCDR mission statement. These outcomes form the foundation for continued planning. **Strategic Guidance is not always written, it can and will take other forms as well (i.e., State of the Union, presidential speeches, press releases, NSS, PD's, etc**.).

a. The Strategic Guidance IPR (IPR-A). IPR-A will focus largely on solidifying guidance, agreeing on the framework assumptions and planning factors, establishing a common understanding of adversaries and their intentions, conducting initial interagency and/or coalition coordination (as authorized), and producing an approved CCDR's mission statement. These outcomes form the basis for continued planning. Subsequent IPRs may revisit, refine, modify, or amend these outcomes as required.

b. The CCDR incorporates guidance from IPRs into subsequent planning. The transition into the next function of concept development is marked by a decision to have military options developed. The SecDef may include specific guidance for course of action development.[2]

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[2]Responsibilities for the Management and Review of Contingency Plans (CJCSI 3141.01C) 12 Sept 2006.

3.  Strategic direction and supporting national-level activities, in concert with the efforts of CCDRs, ensure the following:

   -- National strategic objectives and termination criteria are clearly defined, understood, and achievable;

   -- Active Component is ready for combat and Reserve Components are appropriately manned, trained, and equipped in accordance with Title 10 responsibilities and prepared to become part of the total force upon mobilization;

   -- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems and efforts focus on the operational environment;

   -- Strategic guidance is current and timely;

   -- DOD, other intergovernmental organizations, allies, and coalition partners are fully integrated at the earliest time during planning and subsequent operations;

   -- All required support assets are ready;

   -- Multinational partners are available and integrated early in the planning process;

   -- Forces and associated sustaining capabilities deploy ready to support the JFC's CONOPS.

# CHAPTER XIII

# PLANNING INITIATION

| | |
|---|---|
| **Step #1** | **PLANNING INITIATION** |
| Step #2 | MISSION ANALYSIS |
| Step #3 | COA DEVELOPMENT |
| Step #4 | COA ANALYSIS & WARGAMING |
| Step #5 | COA COMPARISON |
| Step #6 | COA APPROVAL |
| Step #7 | PLAN OR ORDER DEVELOPMENT |

1. **Step 1 — Planning Initiation.** Linkage between Plan Initiation and National Strategic End State. The first step in the Joint Operation Planning Process is Initiation. Prior to joint operations, planning begins when an appropriate authority recognizes a potential for military capability to be employed in response to a contingency or crisis. JOPP begins when the President, SecDef or CJCS decides on potential military options and directs CCDRs through guidance contained in the Guidance for Employment of the Force, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Strategic Communication Guidance, and related strategic guidance statements (when applicable). However, CCDRs and other CDRs may initiate planning on their own authority when they identify a planning requirement not directed by higher authority. The CJCS may also issue a Warning Order in an actual crisis. Military options normally are developed in combination with other nonmilitary options so that the President can respond with all the appropriate instruments of national power.[1] The military options normally are developed in combination with other non-military options so that the President can respond with all the appropriate instruments of national power. For contingency planning purposes, the JSCP serves as the primary guidance to begin planning and COA development. CCDR's and other CDR's also may initiate COA development on their own authority when they identify a planning

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[1] JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, 26 December 2006.

requirement not directed by higher authority. Planning is continuous once execution begins. However, planning initiation during execution is still relevant when there are significant changes to the current mission or the commander receives a mission for follow-on operations. The J-5 typically focuses on future planning of this nature while the J-3 focuses on current operations.

2.  Strategic end states are approved by the President with input from his closest advisors, staff, and administration officials. These strategic end states form the foundation that subordinate agencies, departments, and military planners use to develop strategic objectives that will support the overarching desired national end state. A clear understanding of desired political goals and endstate is imperative at the strategic level to ensure that all elements of national power are applied effectively. For the military, clear delineation of strategic end state is essential to ensuring that military force can be effectively and efficiently applied when necessary to support strategic success.

3.  Current military doctrine recognizes three levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical. These three levels overlap. Planning and execution at each level is reliant on planning and execution at other levels. Clearly delineated strategic end state form the nucleus from which military plans at all levels evolve.  Proper or improper identification of strategic end state affects how military leaders plan and utilize military power to support attainment of strategic objectives. An incorrect interpretation of the strategic end state can lead to failure to accomplish the desired strategic end state.

4. Some have argued that the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) lacks a sound strategy that is in part reflected in the lack of a strategic end state and clear objectives for the military. Specifically, issues have been raised regarding OIF and OEF and what appears to be a lack of a clearly defined national strategic end state and goals.

5.  During this step, peacetime Contingency Planning tasks are transmitted (primarily via the JSCP), forces and resources are apportioned, and planning guidance is issued to the supported CCDR.  During Contingency Planning, CCDR's prepare plans primarily in direct response to tasking in the JSCP.

4.  Strategic requirements or tasking for the planning of major contingencies may require the preparation of several alternative plans for the same requirement using different sets of forces and resources in order to preserve flexibility.  For these reasons, contingency plans are based on reasonable assumptions (**hypothetical situation with reasonable expectation of future action**).

THE NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY
OF THE
UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

SEPTEMBER 2002

National
Drug Control
Strategy

The White House
February 2003

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
HOMELAND
SECURITY

OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY

2002
National Money
Laundering
Strategy

July 2002

THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION
OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES
AND KEY ASSETS

FEBRUARY 2003

NATIONAL
STRATEGY FOR
COMBATING
TERRORISM

FEBRUARY 2003

NATIONAL STRATEGY TO
COMBAT WEAPONS
OF MASS
DESTRUCTION

DECEMBER 2002

THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO
SECURE
CYBERSPACE

FEBRUARY 2003

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# CHAPTER XIV

# MISSION ANALYSIS

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|---|---|
| Step #1 | **PLANNING INITIATION** |
| Step #2 | **MISSION ANALYSIS** |
| Step #3 | **COA DEVELOPMENT** |
| Step #4 | **COA ANALYSIS & WARGAMING** |
| Step #5 | **COA COMPARISON** |
| Step #6 | **COA APPROVAL** |
| Step #7 | **PLAN OR ORDER DEVELOPMENT** |

1.  **Step 2 — Mission Analysis:**  The mission analysis process helps to build a common understanding of the problem to be solved and boundaries within which to solve it by key stakeholders.  Mission analysis is used to study the assigned mission and to identify all tasks necessary to accomplish it. Mission analysis is critical because it provides direction to the commander and the staff, enabling them to focus effectively on the problem at hand.

   **Primary products** of mission analysis are a restated mission statement, the initial intent statement, CDR's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR), and initial planning guidance (IPG).

2.  The CDR is responsible for analyzing the mission and restating the mission for subordinate CDRs to begin their own estimate and planning efforts.  Mission analysis is used to study the assigned mission and to identify all tasks necessary to accomplish it. Mission analysis is critical because it provides direction to the CDR and the staff, enabling them to focus effectively on the problem at hand.  There is perhaps no step more critical to the JOPP.

> One product of the mission analysis process is the mission statement. Your initial mission analysis as a staff will result in a *"tentative" mission statement.* This tentative mission statement is a *recommendation* for the commander based on mission analysis. This recommendation is presented to the commander for approval normally during the mission analysis brief.

3.   A primary consideration for a supported CCDR during mission analysis is the **national strategic end state** — that set of national objectives and related guidance that define strategic success from the President's perspective. This end state will reflect the broadly expressed Political, Military, Economic, Social, Informational, Infrastructure (PMESII) and other circumstances that should exist after the conclusion of a campaign or operation. The CCDR also must consider multinational objectives associated with coalition or alliance operations.

4.   The supported CCDR typically will specify a **theater strategic end state**. While it will mirror many of the objectives of the national strategic end state, the theater strategic end state may contain other supporting objectives and conditions. This end state normally will represent a point in time and/or circumstance beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power as the primary means to achieve remaining objectives of the national strategic end state.

5.   CCDR/JFCs include a discussion of the national strategic end state in their initial planning guidance. This ensures that joint forces understand what the President wants the situation to look like at the conclusion of U.S. involvement. The CCDR and subordinate JFCs typically include the **military end state** in their CDR's intent statement.[1]

6.   During mission analysis, it is essential that the tasks (specified and essential task(s)) and their purposes are clearly stated to ensure planning encompasses all requirements; limitations (restraints-can't do, or constraints–must do) on actions that the CDR or subordinate forces may take are understood; and the correlation between the CDRs' mission and intent, and those of higher, and other CDRs is understood.

7.   The joint force's mission is the task or set of tasks, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The JFC and staff can accomplish mission analysis through a number of logical tasks**. Of these two, the __purpose__ is preeminent. The CDR can adjust his task to ensure he accomplishes the purpose. This is a critical aspect of *mission type orders* and the ability of subordinate CDRs to re-task themselves during rapidly changing circumstances and still fulfill the CDR's intent.**

8.   While all of these tasks will be addressed during the plan development process, it is critical to focus on the mission essential task(s) to ensure unity of effort and maximum

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[1]JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, 26 Dec 2006

use of limited resources.  The mission essential task(s) defines success of the assigned mission.

> ***Auftragstaktik* (Mission Type Order)**:  Order issued to a lower unit that includes the accomplishment of the total mission assigned to the higher headquarters, or one that assigns a broad mission (as opposed to a detailed task), without specifying how it is to be accomplished.

9.  The mission analysis step has an additional **13\*** Key-Steps:

> **\*NOTE:**  JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, 26 Dec 2006 on pp. III-21 lists 15 Mission Analysis Key-Steps.  This document recognizes and addresses all **15** Key-Steps of Joint Doctrine, but numerates only **13** Key-Steps in the following way:  First, JP 5-0's "Review strategic communication guidance" is addressed by this document within Key-Step 1 and 2 (Analysis of higher CDR's mission and intent and determine own specified, implied, and essential tasks).  Secondly, JP 5-0's Key-Step of "Develop Assumptions" will be addressed within this document Key-Step 3, "Determine known facts, assumptions, current status, or conditions."  Also, Key Step 6 of this document addresses Decisive Points along with COG and Critical Factor determinations.  This is done to allow a logical flow for planners to follow.

- **Key-Step — 1:**  Analyze Higher CDR's Mission and Intent

- **Key-Step — 2:**  Task Analysis, Determine Own Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks

- **Key-Step — 3:**  Determine Known Facts, Assumptions, Current Status, or Conditions

- **Key-Step — 4:**  Determine Operational Limitations
  - o Constraints – "Must do"
  - o Restraints – "Can't do"

- **Key-Step — 5:**  Determine Own Military End State, Objectives and Initial Effects

- **Key-Step — 6:**  Determine Own and Enemy's Center(s) of Gravity, Critical Factors and Decisive Points

- **Key-Step — 7:**  Conduct Initial Force Structure Analysis (Apportioned Forces)

- **Key-Step — 8:**  Conduct Initial Risk Assessment

- **Key-Step — 9:** Determine CDR's CCIR
  - CFFI
  - PIR

- **Key-Step — 10:** Develop Tentative Mission Statement

- **Key-Step — 11:** Develop Mission Analysis Brief

- **Key-Step — 12:** Prepare Initial Staff Estimates

- **Key-Step — 13:** Publish CDR's Planning Guidance and Initial Intent

10.  Although some Key-Steps occur before others, mission analysis typically involves substantial parallel processing (spiral development) of information by the CDR and staff, particularly in a CAP situation.  A primary example is the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE).  JIPOE is a continuous process that includes defining the operational environment, describing the effects of the operational environment, evaluating the adversary, and determining and describing adversary potential and most dangerous COA(s).  This planning process must begin at the earliest stage of campaign or operations planning and must be an integral part of, not an addition to, the overall planning effort.

11. **Planning Organization.**  Organizing the planning team and setting goals and objectives within a specific timeline can sometimes be as time consuming as the plan itself. If you enter the planning process with the following information/guidelines defined and understood the actual planning process will go much smoother:

- **Define clear organization planning responsibilities**
  - **Who leads what efforts (topic, geographic, functions)**

- **Define the process for planning**
  - **Planning organizations**
  - **Product production/transition between organizations**

- **Information flow to**
  - **Higher**
  - **Lower**
  - **Adjacent**

- **Integrate other elements**
  - **Coalition**
  - **Interagency**
  - **Host Nation**

- **Be sustainable in a 24/7/365 cycle**
  - **Rapidly integrate Augmentees**

# CHAPTER XV

# MISSION ANALYSIS and JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION of the OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (JIPOE) and INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION of the INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPIE)

1.  **Overview**

a.   The Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB) process has recently been renamed Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.  The change takes into consideration human factors and non-military elements of the operational environment that have impact on the application of national power.  However, the conventional JIPOE process normally does not adequately address the information environment.

b.   A sub process of JIPOE has evolved due to the recognition of this fact by intelligence professionals to attempt to define the information environment, describe its effects on operations, evaluate the adversary's information situation within the information environment and finally determine the courses of action (COA) an adversary could execute within the information environment.  This process is referred to as *Intelligence Preparation of the Information Environment*, or IPIE, which is considered a best practice, but not yet captured in doctrine.  As you read through this section you'll be provided with a description and understanding of JIPOE and the products that are produced.  The final piece within this section will explain the Information Environment and IPIE.[1]

2.  **Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment**

a.   JIPOE is a continuous process which enables joint force CDRs (JFCs) and their staffs to visualize the full spectrum of adversary capabilities and potential COAs across all dimensions of the operational environment.  JIPOE is a process that assists analysts to identify facts and assumptions about the operational environment and the adversary.  This facilitates campaign planning and the development of friendly COAs by the joint force staff.  JIPOE provides the basis for intelligence direction and synchronization that supports the COA selected by the JFC.  JIPOE's main focus is on providing situational awareness and understanding of the operational environment and a predicative intelligence estimate designed to help the JFC discern the adversary's probable intent and most likely and most dangerous COA.

b.   Understanding JIPOE is **critical to mission success**.  Intelligence must be integrated with the overall plan from beginning to end utilizing the JOPP.  JIPOE is a product of the intelligence staff estimate and is an integral part of **the mission analysis**

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[1]JFSC, Joint Information Operations Planning Handbook, March 2008

**process.** JIPOE is the analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the joint force CDR's decision-making process. The primary purpose of the JIPOE is to support the CCDR's decision-making and planning by seeking to understand the operational environment and identifying, assessing, and estimating the enemy's COG, critical factors, capabilities, limitations, intentions, and enemy COAs **(ECOA)** that are most likely to be encountered based on the situation. Although JIPOE support to decision-making is both dynamic and continuous, it must also be "front loaded" in the sense that the majority of analysis must be completed early enough to be factored into the CDR's decision-making effort. JIPOE supports mission analysis by enabling the CDR and staff to visualize the full extent of the operational environment, to distinguish the known from the unknown, and to establish working assumptions regarding how adversary and friendly forces will interact within the operational environment. JIPOE also assists CDRs in formulating their planning guidance by identifying significant adversary capabilities and by pointing out critical operational environment factors, such as the locations of key geography, attitudes of indigenous populations, and potential land, air, and sea avenues of approach.

c.   The analysts look at the operational environment from a systems perspective – looking at the operational environment major sub systems and then providing an assessment of the interrelationships between these systems. One approach is to examine the political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure aspects of the operational environment, which are factors generally referred to as PMESII and desired effects. The PMESII construct offers a means to capture this information. Each PMESII factor is relevant and should be looked at critically when analyzing the operational environment. Understanding this environment has always included a perspective broader than just the adversary's military forces and other combat capabilities within the operational area. The planning, execution and assessment of joint operations require a holistic view of all *systems* (both military and non-military) that comprise the operational environment.

d.   In addition to analyzing the conventional general military intelligence (GMI) products, JIPOE should analyze the environment from a systems perspective. Intelligence identifies and analyzes adversary and neutral systems and estimates how individual actions on one element of a system can effect other system components.

> A "system" is a functionally related group of elements forming a complex whole. (*JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 Apr 2001*)

e.   Using the JIPOE process, the joint force J-2 manages the analysis and development of products that provide a systems understanding of the operational environment. This analysis identifies a number of nodes related to identified friendly objectives and effects—specific physical, functional, or behavioral systems, forces, information, and other components of the system. JIPOE analysts also identify links— the behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes. Link and nodal analysis provide the basis for the identification of adversary COGs and decisive points

for action to influence or change adversary system behavior.  This methodology also provides the means by which intelligence personnel develop specific indicators of future adversary activity and support J3/5 COA development.  It also enables analysts to understand how specific actions activities within the operational environment will "effect" other aspects of the operational environment.

> An "effect" is the physical or behavioral state of a system that result
> from an action, a set of actions, or another effect.
> *JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 Apr 2001*)

f.   JIPOE from a systems approach may require extensive resources (i.e., personnel with the proper expertise on the various aspects of the operational environment, and extensive collaboration).  Although conceptually it is a sound practice, it may not always be possible to conduct a comprehensive JIPOE in this manner unless it is on a focused target set and operational environment, and sufficient time is allotted for this effort.  It is critically important for intelligence personnel to understand the external resources available to support this effort.  Like all intelligence collection and analysis, it is never complete, requiring continual update throughout planning and execution.

g.   **JIPOE consists of four major steps**:
(1) define the operational environment;
(2) describe the effects of the operational environment;
(3) evaluate the adversary; and
(4) determine adversary COAs. Analysts use the JIPOE **process** to analyze, correlate, and fuse information pertaining to all aspects of the operational environment.  The operational environment consists of the air, land, sea, space and associated adversary, friendly, and neutral systems.  JIPOE is conducted both prior to and during joint force operations, as well as during planning for follow-on



missions.  The most current information available regarding the adversary situation and the operational environment is continuously integrated into the JIPOE process.

h.   **The Staff Planners Role in JIPOE.**  The joint force J-2 has primary responsibility for planning, coordinating, and conducting the overall JIPOE analysis and production at the joint force level.  However, JIPOE is a staff process – not just a J-2 process, and should be driven by the chief of staff.  To ensure you're obtaining relevant

and accurate intelligence support material for the CDR, and to ensure the most efficient and productive use of intelligence resources, the staff should take an active role in meeting with the J-2 and those analysts working on your production requirements. The staff provides information and data on the operational environment relative to their staff areas of expertise. They now also know you and understand intelligence in context with the operation you are planning or executing.



**Figure XV-1. Define the Operational Environment**

i. **Step 1 — Define the Operational Environment**. (See Figure XV-1) During Step 1, the joint force staff assists the JFC and component CDRs in determining the dimensions of the joint force's operational environment by identifying the significant characteristics of the operational environment and gathering information relating to the operational environment and the adversary. The joint force J-2 staff works with other joint force and component command staff elements**, including the IO planning staff**, to formulate an initial survey of adversary, environmental, and other characteristics that may impact the friendly joint mission. Additionally, the joint force staff must also recognize that **the operational environment extends beyond the geographic dimensions of land, air, sea, and space**. It also includes nonphysical dimensions, such as the electromagnetic spectrum, automated information systems, and public opinion. These nonphysical dimensions may extend well beyond the joint force's designated operational areas, which will also impact determining the **Area of Interest**, or, according to the Joint Pub 1-02, *"that area of concern to the CDR, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces that could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission*." Understanding which characteristics are

significant is done in context with the adversary, weather and terrain, neutral or benign population or elements, and most importantly with the JFC's intent and the mission, if specified. The significant characteristics, once identified, will provide focus and guide the remaining steps of JIPOE. Therefore, **it is essential to conduct effective analysis of the operational environment to ensure the "right" characteristics were identified as significant.** Identifying the wrong significant characteristics or simply not addressing them jeopardizes the integrity of the operation plan.

(1) The joint force J-2 staff evaluates the available intelligence data bases to determine if the necessary information is available to conduct the remainder of the JIPOE process. In nearly every situation, there will be gaps in the existing data bases. The gaps must be identified early in order for the joint force staff to initiate the appropriate intelligence collection requirements. The joint force J-2 will use the JFC's stated intent and initial PIR to establish priorities for intelligence collection, processing, production, and dissemination. The joint force J-2 staff initiates collection operations and issues RFIs to fill intelligence gaps to the level of detail required to conduct JIPOE. As additional information and intelligence is received, the J-2 staff updates all JIPOE products. **If any assumptions are repudiated by new intelligence, the CDR, the J-3, and other appropriate staff elements should reexamine any evaluations and decisions that were based on those assumptions.**

(2) **Products from step one** may include assessments of each significant characteristic, overlays of each, if applicable, and an understanding and graphical depiction of the operational area and possibly of the area of interests and entities therein which could affect our ability to accomplish our mission.



**Figure XV-2. Describe the Effects of the Operational Environment**

j.  **Step 2 — Describe the Effects of the Operational Environment.** (See Figure XV-2).  **Step 2, describing the operational environment effects, focuses on the environment.**  The first action in describing operational environment effects is to analyze the military aspects of the terrain.  The famous acronym that aids in addressing the various aspects of the operational environment is OCOKA - observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach.  **This analysis is followed by an evaluation of how these aspects of the operational environment will affect operations for both friendly and adversary forces.**

(1) Products developed during this step might include overlays and matrices that depict the military effects of geography, meteorological (METOC) factors, demographics, and the electromagnetic and cyberspace environments.  **The primary product from JIPOE produced in step 2 is the Modified Combined Operations Overlay (MCOO)** is shown in Figure XV-3.  The MCOO is "*a JIPOE product used to portray the effects of each battlespace dimension on military operations.  It normally depicts militarily significant aspects of the operational environment, such as obstacles restricting military movement, key geography, and military objectives.*"  Areas of the operational environment where the terrain predominantly favors one COA over others should be identified and graphically depicted.  The most effective graphic technique is to construct a MCOO by depicting (in addition to the restricted and severely restricted areas already shown) such items as **avenues of approach and mobility corridors, counter-mobility obstacle systems, defensible terrain, engagement areas, and key terrain**.  Refer to *Joint Pub 2-01.3 JTTP for JIPOE* for more information concerning the types of MCOOs generated during step 2 of JIPOE.



**Figure XV-3.  Combined Obstacle Overlay**

(2) A MCOO generally has standardized overlays associated with it.  However, it is not a standardized product with respect to what it should portray simply because a CDR's requirements are based on his mission and intent – and they differ with each operation.  Therefore, the MCOO should portray the relevant information necessary to support the CDR's understanding of the battlespace and decision-making process in context with his mission and intent.  The results of terrain analysis should be disseminated to the joint force staff as soon as possible by way of the intelligence estimate (included in the order), documented analysis of the operational area, and the MCOO.

(3) Operational environments that you'll be analyzing are broken down into dimensions, as follows:



    (a)  Land dimension

    (b)  Maritime dimension

    (c)  Air dimension

    (d)  Space dimension

    (e)  Electromagnetic dimension

    (f)  Cyberspace dimension

    (g)  Human dimension

    (h)  Analysis of weather effects

    (i)  Other characteristics of the operational environment

<u>1</u>     **Land Dimension.**  Analysis of the land dimension of the operational environment concentrates on terrain features such as transportation systems (road and bridge information), surface materials, ground water, natural obstacles such as large bodies of water and mountains, the types and distribution of vegetation, and the configuration of surface drainage and weather.  Observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, avenues of approach, and mobility corridors are examples of what is required to be evaluated to understand the terrain effects on your plan (Figure XV-4).



**Figure XV-4.  Land Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay**

2   **Maritime Dimension.**   The maritime dimension of the operational environment is the sea and littoral environment in which all naval operations take place, including sea control, power projection, and amphibious operations.  Key military aspects of the maritime environment can include maneuver space and chokepoints; natural harbors and anchorages; ports, airfields, and naval bases; sea lines of communications (SLOCs), and the hydrographic and topographic characteristics of the ocean floor and littoral land masses (Figure XV-5).



**Figure XV-5.  Maritime Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay**

3 **Air Dimension.** The air dimension of the operational environment is the environment in which military air and counter-air operations take place. It is the operating medium for fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, air defense systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, cruise missiles, and some theater and anti-theater ballistic missile systems. The surface and air environments located between the target areas and air operations points of origin are susceptible to METOC conditions, surface and air borne missiles, lack of emergency airfields, restrictive air avenues of approach and operating altitude restrictions to name a few (Figure XV-6).



**Figure XV-6. Air Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay**

<u>4</u>    **Space Dimension.**  The space dimension of the operational environment begins at the lowest altitude at which a space object can maintain orbit around the earth (approximately 93 miles) and extends upward to approximately 22,300 miles (geosynchronous orbit).  Forces that have access to this medium are afforded a wide array of options that can be used to leverage and enhance military capabilities.  However, space systems are predictable in that they are placed into the orbits that maximize their mission capabilities.  Once a satellite is tracked and its orbit determined, space operations and intelligence crews can usually predict its function and future position (assuming it does not maneuver).  The path a satellite makes as it passes directly over portions of the earth can be predicted and displayed on a map as a satellite ground track (Figure XV-7).



**Figure XV-7.  Space Modified Combined Overlay Obstacle**

5   **Electromagnetic Dimension**.  The electromagnetic dimension of the operational environment includes all militarily significant portions of the electromagnetic spectrum, to include those frequencies associated with radio, radar, laser, electro-optic, and infrared equipment.  It is a combination of the civil electromagnetic infrastructure; natural phenomena; and adversary, friendly, and neutral electromagnetic OB (Figure XV-8).



**Figure XV-8.  Electromagnetic Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay**

6    **Cyberspace Dimension.**  The use of information systems to support military operations has significantly increased the importance of the cyberspace dimension of the operational environment.  Cyberspace provides the environment in which IO such as computer network attack (CNA) and computer network defense are conducted.  The ever-increasing complexity of information systems and networks places both military and civilian data bases at risk from this new type of warfare.  The effects of the cyberspace environment should be evaluated by identifying and prioritizing those information systems and networks deemed most critical to the planning and conduct of military operations.  The relative vulnerability of each critical system can be graphically portrayed in the form of a cyberspace vulnerability assessment matrix, which is another tool for environmental assessment (Figure XV-9).

## CYBERSPACE VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT MATRIX

### INFORMATION SYSTEMS
### (IN ORDER OF CRITICALITY)

| | KEYLINK | INTECH | VANTAG | InfoSys4 | PROLOG | PrimeNet |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HARDWARE | Medium | High | Low | High | Medium | Low |
| NETWORKS | Medium | Medium | High | Medium | Low | Low |
| SOFTWARE | Low | High | Low | Medium | Medium | Medium |
| DATA | Low | Medium | Medium | High | Low | Low |
| PROCEDURES | Low | High | High | Medium | High | High |
| OPERATORS | Medium | Medium | Low | High | High | Medium |
| BACKUP OR ALT SYSTEM AVAILABLE? | YES (PROLOG) | NO | YES (PrimeNet) | NO | YES (KEYLINK) | YES (VANTAG) |

Low   Medium Vulnerability   High Vulnerability

**Figure XV-9.  Cyberspace Vulnerability Assessment Matrix**

7    **Human Dimension**.  The human dimension of the operational environment consists of various militarily significant sociological, cultural, demographic, and psychological characteristics of the friendly and adversary populace and leadership.  It is the environment in which IO, such as psychological operations (PSYOP) and military deception are conducted.  The analysis of the human dimension is a two-step process that:  (1) identifies and assesses all human characteristics that may have an impact on the behavior of the populace as a whole, the military rank and file, and senior military and civil leaders; and  (2) evaluates the effects of these human characteristics on

military operations. Psychological profiles on military and political leaders may facilitate understanding an adversary's behavior, evaluating an adversary's vulnerability to deception, and assessing the relative probability of an adversary adopting various COAs.

8    **Analysis of Weather Effects.**  Weather affects the operational environment in two ways: it can interact with, and thereby modify, the environmental characteristics of each battlespace dimension; or it can have a direct effect on military operations regardless of operational environment dimension.  The analysis of weather effects is a two-step process in which:  (1) each military aspect of weather is analyzed; and  (2) the effects of weather on military operations are evaluated.  The joint force METOC officer is the source for weather information, and assists the joint force staff in determining the effects of METOC on adversary and friendly military operations.  The overall effects of forecasted weather can be summarized in the form of a weather effects matrix (Figure XV-10).



**Figure XV-10.  Weather Effects Matrix**

9    **Others characteristics of the operational environment**.  Other characteristics include all those aspects of the operational environment that could affect friendly or adversary COAs that fall outside the parameters of the categories previously discussed.  Because the relevant characteristics will depend upon the situation associated with each mission, there can be no definitive listing of characteristics appropriate under all circumstances.  For example, the characteristics of the operational environment that may be relevant to a sustained humanitarian relief operation will be very different from those required for a joint combat operation against an adversary.  Some examples to be addressed while evaluating the battlespace environment are time, political and military

constraints, environmental and health hazards, infrastructure, industry, agriculture, economics, politics, and history.  The country characteristics of an adversary nation should be developed through the analytic integration of all the social, economic, and political variables listed above.  Country characteristics can also provide important clues as to where a nation may use military force and to what degree.

k.  **Step 3 — Evaluate the Adversary**.  (See Figure XV-11)  **Step three of the JIPOE process**, evaluating the adversary, **identifies and evaluates the adversary's military and relevant civil COG, critical vulnerabilities (CVs), capabilities, limitations, and the doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) employed by adversary forces, absent any constraints that may be imposed by the operational environment described in step two.**  Failure to accurately evaluate the adversary may cause the command to be surprised by an unexpected adversary capability, or result in the unnecessary expenditure of limited resources against adversary force capabilities that do not exist.



**Figure XV-11.  Evaluate the Adversary**

(1)  **A COG can be viewed as the set of characteristics, capabilities, and sources of power from which a system derives its moral or physical strength, freedom of action, and will to act** (more on COG in Mission Analysis Key-Step 6).  The COG is always linked to the objective.  If the objective changes, the center of gravity also could change.  At the **strategic level**, a COG could be a military force, an alliance, a political or military leader, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national will.  At the **operational level** a COG often is associated with the adversary's military capabilities — such as a powerful element of the armed forces — but could include other capabilities in the operational environment.  Since the adversary will protect the center of gravity, the COG invariably is found among strengths rather than among weaknesses or vulnerabilities.  **CDRs consider not only the enemy** COGs, but also identify and protect their own COGs, which is a function of the J-3.

(2) The analysis of friendly and adversary COGs is a key step within the planning process. **Joint force intelligence analysts identify adversary COGs.** The analysis is conducted after gaining an understanding of the various systems in the operational environment. The analysis addresses political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure systems of the operational environment, including the adversary's leadership, fielded forces, resources, population, transportation systems, and internal and external relationships. **The goal is to determine from which elements the adversary derives freedom of action, physical strength (means), and the will to fight.** The J-2 then attempts to determine if the tentative or candidate COGs truly are critical to the adversary's strategy. This analysis is a linchpin in the planning effort. After identifying friendly and adversary COGs, JFCs and their staffs must determine how to protect or attack them, respectively. An analysis of the identified COGs in terms of critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities is vital to this process.



(3) **Understanding the relationship among the COGs not only permits, but also compels, greater precision in thought and expression in operational design**. Planners should analyze COGs within a framework of three **critical factors** — critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities — to aid in this understanding. **Critical capabilities** are those that are considered crucial enablers for a center of gravity to function as such, and are essential to the accomplishment of the adversary's assumed objective(s). **Critical requirements** are essential conditions, resources, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational. **Critical vulnerabilities** are those aspects or components of critical requirements that are deficient, or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack in a manner achieving decisive or significant results. Collectively, the terms above are referred to as *critical factors*. In general, a JFC must possess sufficient

operational reach and combat power to take advantage of an adversary's critical vulnerabilities.   Similarly, a supported CDR must protect friendly critical capabilities within the operational reach of an adversary.  **As a best practice, the J-2 will act as a "red cell" in helping to identify the friendly forces COG and conduct COG analysis to support an understanding of what must be protected**.

(4) In addition to the initial results of COG analysis, the **primary products from JIPOE** produced in JIPOE step three are doctrinal templates, descriptions of the adversary's preferred tactics and options, and the identification of high-value targets (HVTs), which are "*targets that the enemy CDR requires for the successful completion of the mission.  The loss of high-value targets would be expected to seriously degrade important enemy functions throughout the friendly CDR's area of interest.*"

(5) **Adversary models depict how an opponent's military forces prefer to conduct operations under ideal conditions**.  They are based on a detailed study of the adversary's normal or "doctrinal" organization, equipment, and TTP.  Adversary models are normally completed prior to deployment, and are continuously updated as required during military operations.  The **models consist of three major parts**:  **(1)** graphical depictions of adversary doctrine or patterns of operations (**doctrinal templates**), **(2) descriptions of the adversary's preferred tactics and options**, and **(3)** the **identification of high-value targets (HVTs)**.

(6) **Doctrinal templates** illustrate the employment patterns and dispositions preferred by an adversary when not constrained by the effects of the operational environment.  They are usually scaled graphic depictions of adversary dispositions for specific types of military (conventional or unconventional) operations such as movements to contact, anti-surface warfare operations, insurgent attacks in urban areas, combat air patrols, and aerial ambushes.  JIPOE utilizes single-service doctrinal templates that portray adversary and, sea, air, special, or space operations, and produces joint doctrinal templates that portray the relationships between all the adversary's service components when conducting joint operations.

(7) In addition to the graphic depiction of adversary operations portrayed on the doctrinal template, an adversary model must also include a **written description of an opponent's preferred tactics**.  This description should address the types of activities and supporting operations that the various adversary units portrayed on the doctrinal template are expected to perform.  It also contains a listing or description of the options (branches) available to the adversary — should either the joint operation or any of the supporting operations fail — or subsequent operations (sequels) if they succeed.

(8) **The adversary model must also include a list of HVTs.**  HVTs are those assets that the adversary CDR requires for the successful completion of the joint mission (and supporting missions) that are depicted and described on the joint doctrinal template.  These targets are identified by combining operational judgment with an evaluation of the information contained in the joint doctrinal template and description.  Assets are identified that are critical to the joint mission's success, that are key to each component's supporting operation, or that are crucial to the adoption of various branches or sequels to

the joint operation.  The joint targeting community collaborates in the identification of HVTs with the responsible producers for various intelligence product category codes.

l.  **Step 4 — Determine Adversary Courses of Action (COAs).**  (Figure XV-12) The first three steps of the JIPOE process help to satisfy the operational environment awareness requirements of the JFC and subordinate CDRs by analyzing the effects of the battlespace environment, assessing adversary doctrine and capabilities, and identifying adversary COGs.  The **fourth step of the JIPOE process seeks to go beyond operational environment <u>awareness</u> to help the JFC attain <u>knowledge</u> of the operational environment** (i.e., a detailed understanding of the adversary's probable intent and future strategy).  The process for step four provides a disciplined methodology for analyzing the set of potential adversary COAs in order to identify the COA the adversary is most likely to adopt, and the COA that would be most dangerous to the friendly force or to mission accomplishment.



**Figure XV-12.  Determine Adversary Courses of Action**

(1) The first activity in JIPOE step four is to identify **the adversary's likely objectives and desired end state** by analyzing the current adversary military and political situation, strategic and operational capabilities, and the country characteristics of the adversary nation, if applicable.  The JIPOE analyst should begin by identifying the adversary's overall strategic objective, which will form the basis for identifying subordinate objectives and desired end states.

(2) During this step, a consolidated list of all potential adversary COAs is constructed.  At a minimum this list will include  **(1)** all COAs that the adversary's doctrine considers appropriate to the current situation and accomplishment of likely objectives,  **(2)** all adversary COAs that could significantly influence the friendly mission, even if the adversary's doctrine considers them suboptimal under current conditions, and  **(3)** all adversary COAs indicated by recent activities or events.  Each COA is generated based on what we know of the adversary and how they operate

(learned from step 3 of JIPOE) to determine if the adversary can in fact accomplish the COA. If not, it is eliminated. J-2 analysts' study how an adversary operates compared to the environment it must operate within, which we analyzed during step 2 of JIPOE. Essentially, they superimpose the doctrinal adversary mode of operation on the environment. The result of this analysis is a full set of identified adversary COAs – time permitting. **Adversary COAs that meet specific criteria** are then completed. Much like friendly forces determine if their COAs meet specific criteria, J-2 personnel must also weigh the identified adversary COAs against certain criteria. The criteria generally includes: **(1) suitability, (2) feasibility, (3) acceptability, (4) uniqueness, and (5) consistency with their own doctrine**.

(3) Each COA should be developed in the amount of detail that time allows. Subject to the amount of time available for analysis, each adversary COA is developed in sufficient detail to describe, **(1)** the type of military operation**, (2)** the earliest time military action could commence, **(3)** the location of the sectors, zones of attack, avenues of approach, and objectives that make up the COA, **(4)** the OPLAN, to include scheme of maneuver and force dispositions, and **(5)** the objective or desired end state. **Each COA should be developed in the order of its probability of adoption, and should consist of a situation template, a description of the COA, and a listing of HVTs.**

(4) A full set of identified adversary COAs are evaluated and ranked according to their likely order of adoption. The purpose of the prioritized list of adversary COAs is to provide a JFC and his staff with a starting point for the development of an OPLAN that takes into consideration the most likely adversary COA as well as the adversary COA most dangerous to the friendly force or mission accomplishment. The primary products produced in JIPOE step four are the situation template and matrix, and the event template and matrix.

For more information on JIPOE, refer to *JP 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.* Also, see *JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, 26 Dec 2006, JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 Sept 06* and *JFSC, Joint Information Operations Planning Handbook, Sept 2006.*

2. **Intelligence Preparation of the Information Environment (IPIE)**

a. IPIE is a "best practice," and like JIPOE, it continues to evolve as we realize how critical a thorough understanding of the information environment is in modern warfare, and how valuable an accurate portrayal of the information environment is in facilitating effective planning and execution of information operations. However, to be valid, IPIE must be conducted as part of the J-2's JIPOE efforts. If conducted in isolation, IPIE will fail to provide a picture of the information environment consistent with the other operating environments (i.e., land, sea, air, and space) and threat COAs generated by the J-2 staff.

b. IPIE follows the same doctrinal principles and four-step methodology as JIPOE. However, IPIE differs from JIPOE in *purpose, method and endstate*. The *purpose* of IPIE is to gain an understanding of the information environment and to determine how the threat will operate within it. The *focus* is on analyzing the threat's information

systems and the use of those systems to gain a relative information advantage. The *end state* is the identification of the threat vulnerabilities that friendly forces can exploit with IO and threat information capabilities against which friendly forces must defend.

> **The Information Environment.**
> "The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information."

c.   The information environment consists of three dimensions, (1) physical dimension, (2) information dimension, and (3) cognitive dimension. There is only one reality and that exists within the physical dimension. Actions within the physical dimension are converted into selected data, information, and knowledge in the information dimension, which are interpreted in the mind of individuals to develop perceptions, awareness, understanding, beliefs, and values, etc., that friendly forces would like them to.

> **The Physical Dimension.** The physical dimension is composed of the command and control (C2) systems, and supporting infrastructures that enable individuals and organizations to conduct operations across the air, land, sea, and space domains. It is also the dimension where physical platforms and the communications networks that connect them reside. This includes the means of transmission, infrastructure, technologies, groups, and populations. Comparatively, the elements of this dimension are the easiest to measure, and consequently, combat power has traditionally been measured primarily in this dimension.
>
> **The Information Dimension.** The informational dimension is where information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, displayed, and protected. It is the dimension where the C2 of modern military forces is communicated, and where commander's intent is conveyed. It consists of the content and flow of information. Consequently, it is the informational dimension that must be protected.
>
> **The Cognitive Dimension.** The cognitive dimension encompasses the mind of the decision maker and the target audience (TA). This is the dimension in which people think, perceive, visualize, and decide. It is the most important of the three dimensions. This dimension is also affected by a commander's orders, training, and other personal motivations. Battles and campaigns can be lost in the cognitive dimension. Factors such as leadership, morale, unit cohesion, emotion, state of mind, level of training, experience, situational awareness, as well as public opinion, perceptions, media, public information, and rumors influence this dimension.
>
> **Joint Pub 3-13, Feb 2006**

d.   IPIE strives to understand the relationship between the three dimensions as it pertains to the operation being executed or planned and those factors that can affect successful mission accomplishment within the defined operational environment and outside of it. Understanding the relationship between the dimensions enables one to understand the first, second and third order effects of an action that takes place in the physical domain. Thus, IO planners can more effectively plan IO initiatives to achieve

desired effects, contribute to ensuring the CDR avoids scenarios that could achieve undesired effects, and also act as advisors to those who must understand the second and third order effects of actions planned to take place or that have taken place within the battlespace.  Keep in mind that the operational environment affected may extend beyond that of the geographic area within which friendly forces operate.  Needless to say, the foundation for effectively interpreting actions within the information environment is sound intelligence.

e.    From an IO perspective, **the operational environment is the conceptual volume in which the CDR seeks to dominate the enemy.**  The operational environment expands and contracts in relation to the CDR's ability to acquire and engage the enemy, or can change as the CDR's vision of the operational environment changes.  It encompasses all three dimensions and is influenced by the operational dimensions of time, tempo, depth, and synchronization.  The operational environment is not assigned by a higher CDR nor is it constrained by assigned boundaries.  A command's operational environment is determined by the range of direct fire weapons, artillery, aviation, and electronic warfare (EW).  The operational environment extends beyond the area of operation and may include the home station of a deploying friendly force.  **For IO, the** operational environment **is the volume of space in which friendly forces can influence the information environment.**  The information environment potentially expands the command's operational environment as the effects of IO elements like psychological operations and public affairs can extend well beyond the range of conventional weapon systems.

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# CHAPTER XVI

# MISSION ANALYSIS KEY-STEPS

1. **Key-Step — 1:  Analyze Higher CDR's Mission and Intent.**  Receipt of Mission. The decision-making process begins with the receipt or anticipation of a new mission. This can either come from an order issued by higher headquarters, or derived from an ongoing operation.

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**Upon receipt of strategic tasking:**
- Planners analyze the tasking to determine where the use of military power would be appropriate.
- Analyze each strategic objective to determine if we can accomplish it with military power or support its accomplishment.

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a.   As soon as a new mission is received, a warning order is issued to the staff alerting them of the pending planning process.  The staff prepares for the mission analysis immediately on receipt of a warning order by gathering the tools needed to do mission analysis.  Once the new mission is received, the CDR and the staff must do a quick initial assessment.  It is designed to optimize the CDR's use of time while preserving time for subordinate CDRs to plan and complete combat preparations.  This assessment:

- Determines the time available from mission receipt to mission execution.

- The staff assesses the scope of the assigned mission, intent, end state, objectives, and other guidance from the next higher command, JSCP, etc. (purpose, method, endstate).

- Determines the time needed to plan, prepare for, and execute the mission for own and subordinate units.

- Determines the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE).

- Determines the staff estimates already available to assist planning.

- Determine whether the mission can be accomplished in a single operation, or will likely require a campaign due to its complexity and likely duration and intensity.

b.   At the CCDR level, this would be strategic guidance issued by the President, Secretary of Defense or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  The commander must draw broad conclusions as to the character of the forthcoming military action. The CDR should not make assumptions about issues not addressed by the higher CDR and if **the higher headquarters' directive is unclear, ambiguous, or confusing, the CDR should seek clarification.**

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c.  A main concern for a commander during mission analysis is to study not only the mission, but also the intent of the higher commander. Within the breadth and depth of today's operational environment, effective decentralized control cannot occur without a shared vision.  Without a commander's intent that expresses that common vision, unity of effort is difficult to achieve.  In order to turn information into decisions, and decisions into actions that are "about right," commanders must understand the higher Commander's Intent.  While the Commander's Intent has previously been considered inherent in the mission and concept of operations, most often you will see it explicitly detailed in the plan/order.  Successfully communicating the more enduring intent allows the force to continue the mission even though circumstances have changed and the previously developed plan/concept of operations is no longer valid.

d.  The higher CDR's Intent is normally found in Paragraph 3, Execution, of the higher CDR's guidance.  The intent statement of the higher echelon CDR should then be repeated in paragraph 1, Situation, of your own Operations Plan (OPLAN) or Operations Order (OPORD) to ensure that the staff and supporting CDRs understand it.  Each subordinate CDR's Intent must be framed and embedded within the context of the higher CDR's Intent, and they must be nested both horizontally and vertically to achieve a common military endstate.

e.  Staff officers must update their staff estimates and other critical information constantly.  This information allows them to develop assumptions that are necessary to the planning process.  Staff officers must be aggressive in obtaining this information.  Reporting of this information must be a push system versus a pull system.  Subordinate units must rapidly update their reports as the situation changes.

f.  The critical product of this assessment is an initial allocation of available time, especially in a Crisis.  The CDR and the staff must balance the desire for detailed planning against the need for immediate action.  The CDR must provide guidance to subordinate units as early as possible to allow subordinates the maximum time for their own planning and preparation for operations.  This, in turn, requires aggressive coordination, deconfliction, integration, and assessment of plans at all levels, both vertically and horizontally.

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**OIF Lessons Learned at the COCOM Level**
- Planning organization is critical
- Planning is evolutionary, embrace change as a constant
- Must explain military operations in simple terms
- Risk is different at each level

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g.  As a general rule, the CDR allocates a minimum of two-thirds of available time for subordinate units to conduct their planning and preparation.  This leaves one-third of the time for the CDR and his staff to do their *planning*.  They use the other two-thirds for their own preparation.

h.   Time, more than any other factor, determines the detail with which the staff can plan.  Once time allocation is made, the CDR must determine whether or not to do the full JOPP, or to abbreviate the process.

2.  **Key-Step — 2:  Determine Own Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks.** Any mission consists of two elements: the task(s) to be accomplished by one's forces and their purpose.  If a mission has multiple tasks, then the priority of each task should be clearly expressed.  Usually this is done by the sequence in which the tasks are presented. There might be a situation in which a commander has been given such broad guidance that all or part of the mission would need to be deduced.  Deduction should be based on an appreciation of the general situation and an understanding of the superior's objective. Consequently, deduced tasks must have a reasonable chance of accomplishment and should secure results that support the superior commander's objective.

> **(Task Analysis).  State the task(s):**  The task is the job or function assigned to a subordinate unit or command by higher authority.  A mission can contain a single task, but it often contains two or more tasks. If there are multiple tasks, they normally will all be related to a single purpose.

a.   Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks, by reviewing strategic communication guidance and other documents used during Function I, Strategic Guidance and Initiation, in order to develop a concise mission statement.  Specified and implied strategic tasks are derived from specific Presidential, SecDef guidance, national (or multinational) planning guidance documents such as the JSCP, the UCP, or from CCDR initiatives.  The national military objectives form the basis of the campaign's mission statement.

(1) **Specified task** — A task that is specifically assigned to an organization by its higher headquarters.  Tasks *listed* in the mission received from higher headquarters are specified or stated (assigned) tasks.  They are what the higher CDR wants accomplished. The CDR's specified tasks may be found in paragraph 3b, (Execution-Tasks) section of the order, but could also be contained elsewhere, for example in the JSCP or other National guidance.

> **Specified Tasks (examples)**
> - Assures allies, coalition partners and friends in the African Region of the U.S. commitment to uphold treaty obligations (AFCOM Security Cooperation Strategy)
> - Prepare CONPLAN w/TPFDD for the defense of Country Blue in case of external aggression and in support of U.S. interests (JSCP)

(2) **Implied task** — After identifying the specified tasks, the commander identifies additional major tasks necessary to accomplish the assigned mission.  Though

not facts, these additional major tasks are implied tasks, which are sometimes deduced from detailed analysis of the order of the higher commander, known enemy situation, and the commander's knowledge of the physical environment. Therefore, the implied tasks subsequently included in the commander's restated mission should be limited to those considered critical to the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Implied tasks do not include routine or standing operating procedures (SOPs) that are performed to accomplish any type of mission by friendly forces. Hence, tasks that are inherent responsibilities of the commander (providing protection of the flank of his own unit, reconnaissance, deception, etc.) are not considered implied tasks. The exceptions are only those routine tasks that cannot successfully be carried out without support or coordination of other friendly commanders. An example of an implied task is if the JTF CDR was given a specified task to seize a seaport facility, the implied task might be the requirement to establish maritime superiority within the area of operations before the assault.

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**Implied Tasks (examples)**

- Develop/Expand FID program
- Secure lines of communication in region to ensure unfettered flow of forces and equipment

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(3) **Essential task** — Essential tasks are determined from the list of both specified and implied tasks. They are those tasks that must be executed to achieve the conditions that define mission success. Depending on the scope of the mission's purpose, some of the specified and implied tasks might need to be synthesized and re-written as an essential task. Only essential tasks should be included in the mission statement.

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**Essential Tasks (example)**

- Defend Country Blue
- Secure international support for the conduct of military operations
- Maintain/Restore regional stability

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3. **Key-Step — 3: Determine Known Facts, Assumptions, Current Status, or Conditions.** The staff assembles both facts and assumptions to support the planning process and initial planning guidance. **What does the organization know about the current situation and status?**

a. A **fact** is a statement of information known to be true (such as verified locations of friendly and adversary force dispositions).[1]

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[1]JP 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, 26 Dec 2006

> **Facts (examples)**
> - Country Red is providing support (direct and indirect) to the insurgency in Blue
> - The U.S. has an embassy in Red
> - Red has a mutual defense pact with Country Orange
> - Blue's elections are in October 20XX
> - Blue airfields would require extensive improvements to support modern operations

b.  **Assumptions.**  An assumption is used in the absence of facts that the commander needs to continue planning. It is a supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action. An assumption encompasses the issues over which a commander normally does not have control.

- If you make an assumption, you must direct resources towards turning it into a fact (intelligence collection, RFI etc.) and/or develop a branch plan.

- Assumptions that address gaps in knowledge are critical for the planning process to continue.

- **Subordinate commanders must treat assumptions given by the higher headquarters as facts.** If the commander or staff does not concur with the higher commander's planning assumptions, they should be challenged before continuing with the planning process. All assumptions should be continually reviewed.

- When dealing with an assumption, changes to the plan may need to be developed should the assumption prove to be incorrect.

- Because of their influence on planning, the fewest possible assumptions are included in a plan.

- A **valid assumption** has three characteristics: it is *logical, realistic, and essential* for the planning to continue. Assumptions should be continually re-validated.

- Assumptions are made for both friendly and adversary situations.  The planner should assume that the adversary would use every capability at his disposal (i.e., nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC), asymmetric approach, etc.) and operate in the most efficient manner possible.

- Planners should never assume an adversary has less capability than anticipated, nor assume that key friendly forces have more capability than has been demonstrated.

| **Assumptions (examples)** |
|---|
| • LOC's outside the theater will remain open (JSCP). |
| • Annual pre-planned U.S. force movements (rotational and temporarily deployed) continue at historic levels. |
| • U.S. will have access to all ports in Blue. |
| • NATO countries will provide basing and over-flight. |
| • Red supported terrorists will conduct operations in Blue in attempt to destabilize the government. |

(1) Assumptions are used in the planning process at each command echelon. Usually, commanders and their staffs should make assumptions that fall within the scope of their operational environment. We often see that the higher the command echelon, the more assumptions will be made. Assumptions enable the commander and the staff to continue planning despite a lack of concrete information. They are artificial devices to fill gaps in actual knowledge, but they play a crucial role in planning. A poor assumption may partially or completely invalidate the entire plan—to account for a possible wrong assumption, planners should consider developing branches to the basic plan. Assumptions should be kept at a minimum.

(2) Assumptions are not rigid. Their validation will influence intelligence collection. They must be continuously checked, revalidated, and adjusted until they are proven as facts or are overcome by events. Ask yourself three simple questions while considering an assumption:

- *Is it logical?*
- *Is it realistic?*
- *Is it essential for planning?*

(3) Probably one of the most important considerations of an assumption is that if you cannot validate the assumption during the planning process by either rejecting it or turning it into a fact then you **MUST** consider a branch plan to cover the possible repercussions of an invalid assumption during execution.

4. **Key-Step — 4: Determine Operational Limitations (Limiting Factors): Constraints/Restraints.** Operational limitations are actions required or prohibited by higher authority and other restrictions that limit the CDR's freedom of action, such as diplomatic agreements, political and economic conditions in affected countries, host nation issues and support agreements.

a. A **constraint** is a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that *dictates an action*, thus restricting freedom of action (must do). The superior's directive normally indicates circumstances and limitations under which one's own forces will initiate and/or continue their actions. Therefore, the higher commander may impose some constraints on the commander's freedom of action with respect to the actions to be conducted. These constraints will affect the selection of COAs and the planning process. Examples include tasks by the higher command that specify: "Be prepared to . . . "; "Not earlier than . . . "; "Not later than . . ."; "Use coalition forces . . ." Time is often a constraint, because it affects the time available for planning or execution of certain tasks.

> Constraint example; General Eisenhower was required to liberate Paris instead of bypassing it during the 1944 campaign in France.

> Constraint example; Simultaneous Humanitarian Assistance Operation beginning the same day as the air campaign on the kick off of Operation Enduring Freedom.

b. A **restraint** is a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that *prohibits an action*, thus restricting freedom of action (can't do).

> Restraint example; General MacArthur was prohibited from striking Chinese targets north of the Yalu River during the Korean War.

> Restraint example; President Musharraf's request that the American plan for Afghanistan not involve the Indian government nor their military.

c. Some operational limitations are commonly expressed as **Rules of Engagement (ROE)**. Operational limitations may restrict or bind COA selection or may even impede implementation of the chosen COA. These ROE or operational limitations become more complex in multinational or coalition operations. CDRs must examine the operational limitations imposed on them, understand their impacts, and develop options that minimize these impacts in order to promote maximum freedom of action during execution.[2]

*Note: Constraints and restraints collectively comprise "operational limitations" on the commander's freedom of action. Remember restraints and constraints do not include doctrinal considerations. Do not include self-imposed limitations during this portion of the process.*

5. <u>**Key-Step Five: Determine Termination Criteria, Own Military End State, Objectives and Initial Effects**</u>

> **"One should not take the first step in war without considering the last."**
> Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Edited and translated by Michael Howard

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[2] JP 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, 26 Dec 2006

a. **Termination of Joint Operations**

(1) Because the very nature of termination criteria begins shaping the futures of contesting nations or groups, it is imperative that we fundamentally understand what termination criteria are. What *military conditions* must be produced in the theater to achieve the strategic goal and how those military conditions serve to leverage the transition from war to peace is a fundamental aspect of conflict termination. It is important to recognize that these conditions defined during mission analysis may change as the operation planning, and then the operation unfolds. Nonetheless, the process of explicitly and clearly defining terminal conditions is an important one, since it requires careful dialogue between civilian (strategic) and military (operational) leadership which may, in turn, offer some greater assurance that the defined end state is both politically acceptable and militarily attainable.

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**Termination Criteria**

- In many cases, military power can be applied to establish a specified condition that serves as a transition point for the application of other instruments to augment or replace military efforts.
- Other means of power will provide the driving force for achievement of the objectives.
- The planner must determine what that point is and define the conditions that exist at that point in time and space.
- Those conditions are event driven rather than time driven to define the point at which the President no longer requires the military instrument of power.
- This list of conditions comprises the *termination criteria.*
    - We re-write this list into paragraph format that contains the CDR's vision.
    - We call this the military end state.

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(2) Based on the President's strategic objectives that comprise a desired national strategic end state, the supported JFC can develop and propose **termination criteria** which are the **specified standards approved by the President or the SecDef that must be met before a joint operation can be concluded.** Military operations seek to end war on favorable terms. Knowing when to end a war and how to preserve the objectives achieved are vital components of campaign design and relate to theater-strategic planning. Before hostilities begin, the theater CDR must have a clear sense of what the endstate is. He also needs to know whether (and how) ending the conflict at the point he has recommended will contribute to the overall strategic goals,[3] so conflict termination can be considered the link or leverage between endstate and post hostilities.[4]

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[3] Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 14 May 2007, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 December 2006.

[4] *Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning*, James W. Reed, Parameters, Summer 1993.

The design and implementation of leverage and the ability to know how and when to terminate operations are part of the overall implementation of operational design. Not only should termination of operations be considered from the outset of planning, but it should also be a coordinated effort with appropriate other government agencies (OGA), international governmental organizations (IGO), non-governmental organizations (NGO), and multi-national partners.

> **Termination Criteria (example)**
> - Blue borders are secure
> - A stable security environment exists in Blue, Red, and Orange
> - Red no longer poses a threat to regional countries
> - Non-DOD agencies and/or international agencies effectively lead and conduct reconstruction and humanitarian assistance operations
> - US military forces return to shaping and security cooperation activities

(3) If the termination criteria have been properly set and met, the necessary leverage should exist to prevent the enemy from renewing hostilities and to dissuade other adversaries from interfering. Moreover, the national strategic end state for which the United States fought should be secured by the leverage that U.S. and multinational forces have gained and can maintain.

(4) As discussed, in order to have acceptable termination criteria, it is of utmost importance to have an achievable national strategic endstate based on clear national strategic objectives.[5] One of the first **considerations** in Operational Design that a CDR must address is:

> "*What conditions are required to achieve the objectives?*" **(Ends)**

(5) This **consideration** requires clarity first on strategic objectives (Pres, SecDef) before operational military objectives (COCOM, JFC) are defined. This <u>consideration</u> also requires a measure of clarity on those "*conditions*" which are required to achieve the strategic objectives. Those conditions are the conflict termination criteria which is the bridge over which armed conflict transitions into a post-conflict phase and between the political objectives and the desired strategic end state.[6]

(6) The CDR will be in a position to provide the President, SecDef and CJCS with critical information on enemy intent, objectives, strategy, and chances of success. CDRs consider the nature and type of conflict, the objectives of military force, the plans and operations that will most affect the enemy's judgment of cost and risk, and the impact of military operations on alliance and coalition warfare.[7] Military strategic

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[5]Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 14 May 2007

[6]*Joint Operational Warfare, Dr. Milan Vego*, 20 September 2007, IX-180

[7]FM 100-5, *Operations*, June 1993, FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations* (Initial Draft)

advice to political authorities regarding termination criteria should be reviewed for military feasibility, adequacy, and acceptability as well as estimates of time, costs, and the military forces required to reach the criteria.[8]

The CDR will then formulate termination criteria that he reasons will set the enduring conditions to achieving the military and strategic endstates. Those properly conceived termination criteria are key to ensuring that the achieved military objectives endure.



**Figure XVI-1. Termination Criteria are set during Pre-hostilities and are the bridge from Hostilities to Post-Hostilities.**

(7) To facilitate development of effective termination criteria, it must be understood that U.S. forces must follow through in not only the "dominate" phase, but also the "stabilize" and "enable civil authority" phases to achieve the *leverage* sufficient to impose a lasting solution.[9]

(8) Further, development of a military end state is complementary to and supports attaining the specified termination criteria and national strategic end state. As stated, the termination of operations must be considered from the outset of planning in a coordinated effort with relevant agencies, organizations, and multinational partners. This ability to understand how and when to terminate operations is instrumental to operational design.[10]

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[8]Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 14 May 2007

[9]JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, 26 December 2006; JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, 17 September 2006.
[10]*Ibid*

(9) There are three approaches to obtaining national strategic objectives by military force:

     1   Imposed settlement; destroy critical functions and assets and/or adversary military capabilities.

     2   Negotiated settlement; political, diplomatic and military.  Negotiating power springs from two sources: military success and military potential.  In the past 200 years, more than half of the wars have ended in negotiated settlements.  However, some wars may not have a formal ending, because the defeated side is unwilling to negotiate or because there is no one with whom to negotiate.  Such conflicts are often transformed into insurgency and counterinsurgency, as is currently the case in Afghanistan and Iraq.[11]

     3   Indirect Approach; erode adversary's power, influence, and will; undermine the credibility and legitimacy of their political authority; and undermine their influence and control over, and support by, the indigenous population.  This is in relation to the irregular challenges posed by non-state actors and is irregular warfare.[12]

(10)  In its strategic context, military victory is measured in the attainment of the national strategic end state and associated termination criteria.  Termination criteria for a negotiated settlement will differ significantly than those of an imposed settlement.

> The success of Desert Storm militarily was astounding, but Saddam Hussein reminded the world for the next twelve years that the political victory was incomplete. In April 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) completed the task of ousting Saddam Hussein, but a political victory in Iraq remains unsecured today.
> **The Theater Commander: Planning for Conflict Termination; Colonel John W. Guthrie, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA.**

(11)  At the operational level, then, the military contribution should serve to increase (or at least not decrease) the leverage available to national decision-makers during the terminal phases of a conflict.

(12)  One could view conflict termination not as the end of hostilities, but as the transition to a new post-conflict phase characterized by both civil and military problems. This consideration implies an especially important role for various civil affairs functions. It also implies a requirement to plan the interagency transfer of certain responsibilities to national, international, or nongovernmental agencies. Effective battle hand-off requires planning and coordination before the fact.[13]

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[11]*Joint Operational Warfare*, Dr. Milan Vego, 20 September 2007, p. IX-178.

[12]Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 14 May 2007.

[13]*Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning*, James W. Reed, Parameters, Summer 1993.

> "Those who can win a war well can rarely make a good
> peace, and those who could make a good peace
> would never have won the war."
> **Winston Churchill, My Early Life: A Roving Commission**

(13)  **Termination Summary**.  Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve achieved advantages is essential to achieving the national strategic end state.  When and under what circumstances to *suspend* or *terminate* military operations is a *political* decision.  Even so, it is essential that the CJCS and the supported JFC advise the President and SecDef during the decision-making process.  The supported JFC should ensure that political leaders understand the implications, both immediate and long term, of a suspension of hostilities at any point in the conflict.  Once established, the national strategic objectives enable the supported CDR to develop the military end state, recommended termination criteria, and supporting military objectives.

 <u>1</u>  Planners must plan for conflict termination from the outset of the planning process and update these plans as the campaign evolves.  To maintain the proper perspective, they must know what constitutes an acceptable political-military end state (i.e., what military conditions must exist to justify a cessation of combat operations?).  In examining the proposed national strategic end state, the CCDR and the staff must consider whether it has reasonable assurance of ending the fundamental problem or underlying conditions that instigated the conflict in the first place.

 <u>2</u>  When addressing conflict termination, campaign planners must consider a wide variety of operational issues, to include disengagement, force protection, transition to post-conflict operations, and reconstitution and redeployment.  Planners must also anticipate the nature of post-conflict operations, where the focus will likely shift to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR); for example, peace operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, or enforcement of exclusion zones.

 <u>3</u>  In formulating the theater campaign plan, the CCDR and staff should consider the following:

 <u>a</u>  Conflict termination, end of the joint operation, is a key aspect of the campaign planning process.

 <u>b</u>  Emphasize backward planning; decision makers should not take the first step toward hostilities or war without considering the last step.

 <u>c</u>  Define the conditions of the termination phase.  The military objectives must support the political aims — the campaign's conflict termination process is a part of a larger ***implicit bargaining process***, even while hostilities continue.  The military contribution can significantly affect the political leverage available to influence that process.

 <u>d</u>  Consider how efforts to eliminate or degrade an opponent's command and control (C2) may affect, positively or negatively, efforts to achieve the termination

objectives. Will opponents be able to affect a cease-fire or otherwise control the actions of their forces?

    <u>e</u> Interagency coordination plays a major role in the termination phase. View conflict termination not just as the end of a joint operation and disengagement by joint forces, but as the transition to a new post-hostilities phase characterized by both civil and military problems.[14]

    <u>4</u> Since war is fought for political aims, it is only successful when such aims are ultimately achieved. Success on the battlefield does not always lead to a successful strategic endstate. Making sure that it does requires the close collaboration of political and military leaders. As noted, a period of post-hostilities activities may exist in the period from the immediate end of the hostilities to the accomplishment of the national strategic goals and objectives, and it is imperative that this be recognized and planned for.

> "The object of war is a better state of peace — even if only from your own point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you devise."
> *B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (2nd revised edition) New York: Penguin Group, 1991*

 b. **End States.** Once the termination criteria are understood, operational design continues with the determination of the *strategic and military end states and objectives*.



The end state gets to "why" we are developing a campaign plan and seeks to answer the question: "How does the U.S. strategic leadership want the OE (i.e., the region and/or potential adversary) to behave at the conclusion of the campaign?"

Objectives normally answer the question of "what" needs to be done to achieve the end state. As you might expect, the distinction between end states and objectives can be very vague.

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[14] JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, 26 December 2006

In designing and planning, we must recognize and define two mutually supporting end states in a single campaign – a national strategic endstate and a theater-strategic/military endstate.

(1) The *national strategic end state* describes the President's political, informational, economic, and military vision for the region or theater when operations conclude. National strategic end states are derived from President/SecDef guidance that is often vague. More often than not, senior military leaders will assist the President/SecDef in developing that end state. Below is an example of a national strategic end state:

> "An economically viable and stable Country X, without the capability to coerce its neighbors."

(2) The *theater strategic or military end state* is a subset of the national strategic end state discussed above and generally describes the *military conditions* that must be met to satisfy the objectives of the national strategic end state. (We will develop our military endstate after analyzing the tasks required by strategic direction.) Strategic objectives clarify and expand upon endstate by **clearly defining** the decisive goals that must be achieved in order to ensure we achieve U.S. policy, for example:

- Country X deterred from coercing its neighbors
- X ceases support to regional terrorism
- X's WMD inventory, production and delivery means reduced
- Provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) enforced and adversary complies with all requirements of the resolution.

Getting the answers to the above decisive goals is what makes mission analysis different at this level when compared to the tactical level – you will not find the clear and definitive guidance in one location that you may be used to. There is no "higher order" to cut and paste from. Instead the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, National Security Presidential Directives (NSPD), SecDef and Presidential speeches, and verbal guidance all provide input to help define an end state and corresponding objectives. With so many sources of guidance, consistency is normally an issue to overcome. Though not directive in nature, guidance contained in various U.S. interagency and even international directives, such as UNSCRs, will also impact campaign end states and objectives.

(3) This end state normally will represent a point in time or circumstance beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power to achieve remaining objectives of the national strategic end state. While the military end state typically will mirror many of the conditions of the national strategic end state, it may

contain other contributory or supporting conditions. Aside from its obvious role in accomplishing both the national and military strategic objectives, clearly defining the military end state conditions promotes unified action, facilitates synchronization, and helps clarify (and may reduce) the risk associated with the joint campaign or operation. CDR's should include the military end state in their planning guidance and CDR's intent statement.[15]

(4) The CJCS or the supported CCDR may recommend a military end state, but the President or SecDef should formally approve it. A clearly defined military end state complements and *supports attaining the specified termination criteria and objectives associated with other instruments of national power.* The military end state helps affected CCDRs modify their theater strategic estimates and begin mission analysis even without a pre-existing OPLAN. The CCDR must work closely with the civilian leadership to ensure a clearly defined military end state is established and that the military objectives support the political ones, and will lead to the desired endstate. This backward planning cycle ensures a military victory with lasting political success.

(5) The CCDR also should anticipate that military capability likely would be required in some capacity in support of other instruments of national power, potentially before, during, and after any required large-scale combat. CDR's and their staffs must understand that many factors can affect national strategic objectives, possibly causing the end state to change even as military operations unfold. A clearly defined end state is just as necessary for situations across the range of military operations that might not require large-scale combat. While there may not be an armed adversary to confront in some situations, the JFC still must think in terms of ends, ways, and means that will lead to success and end state attainment.

(6) Remember that a primary consideration for a supported CCDR during mission analysis is the **national strategic end state** — that set of national objectives and related guidance that define strategic success from the President's perspective. This national strategic end state will reflect the "broadly" expressed political, military, economic, social, informational, and other circumstances that should exist after the conclusion of a campaign or operation. Below is an example of a broad national strategic end state directly from the *Chairman's National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, 1 Feb 2006*:

> "Violent extremist ideology and terrorist attacks eliminated as a threat to the way of life of free and open societies. A global environment that is inhospitable to violent extremism, wherein countries have the capacity to govern their own territories, including both the physical and virtual domains of their jurisdictions. Partner countries have in place laws, information sharing, and other arrangements, that allow them to defeat terrorists as they emerge, at the local and regional levels."

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[15]JP 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, 26 Dec 2006

(7) **The theater strategic or military end state** is a subset of the national strategic end state discussed above, and generally describes the military conditions that must be met to satisfy the objectives of the strategic end state. Often, the military end state is achieved before the national strategic end state. While it will mirror many of the objectives of the national strategic end state, the theater strategic end state may contain other supporting objectives and conditions. An example of a theater strategic or military end state:

> "A defeated Country X where WMD delivery, production, and storage, as well as conventional force projection capabilities, are destroyed, and its remaining military is reorganized to adequately defend its borders."

(8) JFCs include a discussion of the national strategic end state in their initial planning guidance. This ensures that joint forces understand what the President wants the situation to look like at the conclusion of U.S. involvement. The CCDR and subordinate JFCs typically include the **military end state** in their *Chairman's National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism,* 1 Feb 2006's intent statement.

> "My intent is to persuade country X through a show of coalition force to stop intimidating its neighbors and cooperate with diplomatic efforts to abandon its WMD programs. If X continues its belligerence and expansion of WMD programs, we will use force to reduce X's ability to threaten its neighbors, and restore the regional military balance of power. Before U.S. and coalition forces redeploy, X's military will be reduced by half, its modern equipment destroyed, its capability to project force across its borders eliminated, and its WMD stores, production capacity, and delivery systems eliminated."

c.  **Objectives**. *An objective is a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every military operation is directed.* Objectives and their supporting effects provide the basis for identifying tasks to be accomplished.

**Termination Criteria and End States**

**Strategic Objectives**

**Military Objectives**

**Effects**

**Tasks**

(1) **Objectives <u>prescribe</u> friendly goals.**  They constitute the aim of military operations and are necessarily linked to political objectives (simply defined as: what we want to accomplish).  Military objectives are one of the most important considerations in campaign and operational design.  They specify what must be accomplished and provide the basis for describing campaign effects.

(2) **A clear and concise endstate allows planners to examine objectives that support the endstate**.  Objectives describe what must be achieved to reach the endstate.  These are usually expressed in military, political, economic, and informational terms and help define and clarify what military planners must do to support the achievement of the national strategic endstate.  Objectives developed at the national-strategic and theater-strategic levels are the defined, decisive, and attainable goals towards which all operations-not just military operations-and activities are directed within the JOA.

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**National Strategic Objectives from
"The National Defense Strategy" March 2005:**

- Secure the United States from direct attack
- Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action
- Strengthen alliances and partnerships
- Establish favorable security conditions

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(3) Objective statements do not suggest or infer the ways and means for accomplishment.  Passive voice is a convention that can assist a CDR in distinguishing an objective from an effect and state objectives without inferring potential ways and means, thereby broadening the range of possible actions to achieve the objectives.

(4) An objective statement should have the following attributes:

- Establishes a single goal: a desired result, providing one concise "end" toward which operations are directed.
- Is specific: identifies the key system, node or link to be affected
- Link to higher-level objectives directly or indirectly
- Unambiguous as possible
- Uses passive voice
- Prescriptive in nature
- Does not infer causality: no words (nouns or verbs) that suggest ways and/or means

(5) Objectives are written as concise descriptive statements: *Country Red is no longer a threat to regional peace*.  *Country Blue's IRBM capability is eliminated*.

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(6) At the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the SecDef set eight mission objectives for the operation. The eight mission objectives for <u>Operation Iraqi Freedom</u> were:

- End the regime of Saddam Hussein.
- Eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
- Capture or drive out terrorists.
- Collect intelligence on terrorist networks.
- Collect intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction activity.
- Secure Iraq's oil fields.
- Deliver humanitarian relief and end sanctions.
- Help Iraq achieve representative self-government and ensure its territorial integrity.

(7) The stated U.S. military objectives for **Operation Enduring Freedom** were:

- The destruction of terrorist training camps and infrastructure within Afghanistan.
- The capture of al Qaeda leaders.
- The cessation of terrorist activities in Afghanistan.
- Make clear to Taliban leaders that the harboring of terrorists is unacceptable.
- Acquire intelligence on al Qaeda and Taliban resources.
- Develop relations with groups opposed to the Taliban.
- Prevent the use of Afghanistan as a safe haven for terrorists.
- Destroy the Taliban military allowing opposition forces to succeed in their struggle.
- Military force would help facilitate the delivering of humanitarian supplies to the Afghan people.

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(8) Strategic military objectives define the role of military forces in the larger context of national strategic objectives.  This focus on strategic military objectives is one of the most important considerations in operational design.  The nature of the political aim, taken in balance with the sources of national strength and vulnerabilities, must be compared with the strengths and vulnerabilities of the adversary and/or other factors in the operational environment to arrive at reasonably attainable strategic military objectives.  Strategic objectives must dominate the planning process at every juncture.[16]

(9) Objectives may change over time.  You may see a change in operational level objectives that still support strategic or national level objectives.  You may even see changes in strategic objectives that of course will affect both operational and tactical level objectives.  Figure XVI-2 on the following page is an historical example of how objectives can change throughout a conflict due to operational necessity and strategic guidance.

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During Desert Storm the U.S. Central Command's sweeping envelopment maneuver was    brilliantly effective, not only because it neutralized the Republican Guard forces, the Iraqi army's center of gravity,  it also placed a significant allied force in position to threaten Baghdad, thus creating added incentive for Iraq to agree to an early cease-fire.  An operational decision had affected an opponent's strategic calculus by creating additional allied leverage.

**Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning, James W. Reed, Parameters, Summer 1993**

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[16]JP 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, 26 Dec 2006.

**Figure 2**

## Korea Changing Fronts

*FURTHEST EXTENT OF US GROUND ADVANCE. 1950*

*FINAL CEASE-FIRE LINE,*

*THE "PUSAN PERIMETER,"*

KOREA

High Ground Above 200 Meters

0    50 MILES

MAP 2

SOURCE:  CENTER FOR MILITARY HISTORY,

From: Ebb And Flow, November 1950-July 1951
Center of Military History, 1990
By Billy C. Mossman

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CHANGING OBJECTIVES
The Korean War—A case of changing political and national
objectives while engaged in combat.

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The Korean War clearly demonstrates the linkage between the political and military
objectives.  The political objectives changed three times during the conflict,
mandating major revisions of and limitations to the campaign plans.

**OBJECTIVE**:  Free the Republic of Korea

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea invaded the Republic of Korea on 24 June 1950.  President Harry S Truman heeded the request of the United Nations Security Council that all members "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel armed attack and restore international peace and security in the area."[15] This translated into guidance to United Nations Command Far East Command, then commanded by Gen Douglas MacArthur, "to drive forward to the 38th parallel, thus clearing the Republic of Korea of invasion forces."[16] MacArthur accomplished this by first heavily reinforcing the remaining pocket of South Korean resistance around Pusan with United States military forces.  Using these forces he pushed northward and executed the highly successful amphibious landing of two divisions behind enemy lines at Inchon.  Airpower was used to wage a comprehensive interdiction campaign against the enemy's overextended supply routes.  United Nations forces achieved the original objective by October 1950.

**OBJECTIVE, CHANGE 1**:  Free All of Korea

In view of the success at Inchon and the rapid progress of United Nations forces northward, the original objective was expanded.  "We regarded," said Secretary of Defense Marshall, "that there was no . . . legal prohibition against passing the 38th parallel."[17] The feeling was that the safety of the Republic of Korea would remain in jeopardy as long as remnants of the North Korean Army survived in North Korea.[18] This was expressed in a UN resolution on 7 October 1950 requiring "all necessary steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea."[19] MacArthur then extended the counteroffensive into North Korea.  However, the enemy's logistic tail extended northward into the People's Republic of China. Because the United Nations and United States did not want to draw China into the war, targets in China were off-limits.  For this reason, use of airpower was limited largely to close air support.  United Nations forces advanced to near the Chinese border.  The second objective was achieved, temporarily at least, by November 1950.

**OBJECTIVE, CHANGE 2**:  Seek Cease-Fire, Resolve by Negotiation

On 26 November 1950, the Chinese Communists launched a massive counterattack that shattered the United Nations forces, forcing a retreat from North Korea.  MacArthur realized he was in a no-win situation and requested permission to attack targets in China.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff's (JCS) guidance was neither to win nor to quit; they could only order him to hold.  They vaguely explained that, if necessary, he should defend himself in successive lines and that successful resistance at some point in Korea would be "highly desirable," but that Asia was "not the place to fight a major war."[20]
On 14 December, at the request of the United States, the United Nations adopted a resolution proposing immediate steps be taken to end the fighting in Korea and to settle existing issues by peaceful means. "On 9 January 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed MacArthur that while the war would be limited to Korea, he should inflict as much damage upon the enemy as possible."[21] Limiting the conflict to Korea negated our ability to use naval and airpower to strategically strike enemy centers of gravity located within China.  On 11 April 1951, Truman explained the military objective of Korea was to "repel attack. . . to restore peace. . . to avoid the spread of the conflict."[22] The political objectives and the military reality placed MacArthur in a difficult situation.  MacArthur proved unwilling to accept these limited objectives and was openly critical of the Truman administration.  Truman relieved him of command.
-The massive Chinese attacks mounted in January and April of 1951 failed because of poor logistical support.  United Nations forces sought to exact heavy casualties upon the enemy rather than to defend specific geographical objectives.  As the Chinese and North Koreans pressed forward, their lines of communication were extended and came under heavy air interdiction attack.  By May 1951, United Nations forces had driven forward on all fronts.  With communist forces becoming exhausted, negotiations for a cease-fire began on 10 July 1951.  The quest for the third objective finally ended on 27 July 1953 with implementation of a cease-fire that is still in force.

17. Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, vol. 1 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1989), 293.
18. Ibid., 297.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. William Manchester, American Caesar (New York: Dell Publishing, 1983), 617.
23. Futrell, 302.
24. Ibid. Joint *Air Operations Planning Course, Warfare Studies Institute, 3 January 2005, pg 14-15*

**Figure XVI-2.  Changing Objectives**

Sometimes military and political objectives become decisive points in the operational design because they are essential not only to reach the endstate, but critical to affecting the enemy's center(s) of gravity or protecting friendly center(s) of gravity. Above all, keep in mind that while objectives can be rephrased as decisive points, decisive points are <u>not</u> synonymous with objectives. Objectives always refer to endstate. Decisive points always refer to operational level center(s) of gravity.

*Operational Design: A Methodology for Planners*,
Dr. Keith Dickson, Professor of Military Studies, JFSC

d. **Effects**. One of the most confusing aspects encountered in recent joint doctrinal changes has been the infusion of *effects* language and processes into the planning process. The issue is made even more difficult in view of the conceptual overlap between *effects theory* with the established principles of operational art. There have been numerous effects related models promulgated by a number of agencies. These include Effects-Based Operations (EBO) and Effects-Based Planning (EBP). Neither of these terms are codified in U.S. joint doctrine, though one will often see them used in some staffs. Presently, joint doctrine simply uses the term "effects."

(1) Effects help CDR's and their staffs understand and measure conditions for achieving objectives. **An effect is a physical and/or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect**. A **desired effect** can also be thought of as a condition that can support achieving an associated objective, while an **undesired effect** is a condition that can inhibit progress toward an objective.

**Termination Criteria and End States**

**Strategic Objectives**

**Military Objectives**

**Effects**

**Tasks**

<u>Effects are derived from objectives</u>. They help bridge the gap between objectives and tasks by describing the conditions that need to be established or avoided within the JOA to achieve the desired end state.

(2) The use of effects planning is not new; good CDR's and staffs have always thought and planned this way.  Effects should not be over-engineered into a list of equations, data bases and checklists.  The use of effects during planning is reflected in the steps of JOPP as a way to clarify the relationship between objectives and tasks and help the CDR and staffs determine conditions for achieving objectives.

(3) Before one can appreciate the commonality between operational art and effects-based concepts, it is important to understand the fundamental tenets of operational art. This primer cannot detail all aspects of operational art, and those unfamiliar with operational art must first gain an awareness of this theoretical framework before launching into operational-level planning.  This lack of knowledge of operational art is often the source of much of the current disconnect found in many effects-based concepts. The most critical of these is the nature of the *objective* and its relationship to the *center of gravity* (COG).  Please review the discussion on the COG under Key-Step 6.

Operational design is defined by joint doctrine as, "The conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent execution."  Central to operational design is for the planning staff to understand the Desired End State and requisite objectives necessary to achieve the Desired End State. An objective is a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every military operation is directed.  Objectives and their supporting effects provide the basis for identifying tasks to be accomplished.  Joint operation planning integrates military actions and capabilities with those of other instruments of national power in time, space, and purpose in unified action to achieve the JFC's objectives.

(4) As observed Key-Step 6, an enemy's COG is inextricably linked to its objective (just as the friendly COG is linked to its own objectives).  In fact, this is a critical aspect to determining an enemy's COG, a fact that is generally unclear in effects–based concepts.  An enemy's interconnected system in the PMESII is MEANINGLESS if one does not first (correctly) assess an enemy's probable end state and objectives.  One must remember that the *raison d'être* for a COG is to accomplish an objective.

(5) Destroy or defeat an enemy's COG and you have severely inhibited an enemy's ability to achieve his objective (unless another source of power assumes the role of COG).  In a theoretical construct, one should see an enemy COG as something that stands between the friendly COG and the friendly objective(s).  Thus, an operation is invariably focused upon an enemy's COG in order to achieve **FRIENDLY** objectives.

(6) **Effects vs. Objectives**

1    The next point that often serves to confuse joint planners is the role of effects in the COG-Objective construct.  Joint doctrine defines an effect as:

> **Effect:** (1) The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect.  (2) The result, outcome, or consequence of an action.  (3) A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom.    JP 3-0, 17 September 2006

<u>2</u>    Thus, an effect is an outcome from an action, and in its simplest terms it is the condition that one hopes for (if a desired effect) upon the accomplishment of a task or action assigned to a subordinate command.  In operational art terms, an effect may be considered as the consequence from attacking / controlling a decisive point or an enemy's critical vulnerability / requirement / and / or capability enroute to the defeat of an enemy's COG.  A desired effect should become apparent as the planning staff completes its COG analysis and is often found in the commander's planning guidance and/or intent.  **An effect, however, is not necessarily an end onto itself.**  Rather, an effect's purpose should be to ensure a friendly COG's progress to its respective objective (s).  Figure XVI-3 offers a graphic depiction of the concept.



**Figure XVI-3. Effects vs. Objectives (NWC 4111H)**

<u>3</u>    Figure XVI-3 illustrates the relationship between objectives / effects / and COGs.  Upon determination of one's own objectives and COG, the planning staff assesses an enemy's probable objective (s) and its related COG.  The friendly operations are then focused upon defeating the enemy COG enroute to the friendly objective.  Since a direct attack upon the enemy COG is frequently impractical (or too costly), friendly COAs will most often focus on attacking through a combination of critical vulnerabilities (CVs), critical requirements (CRs), Critical Capabilities (CCs), and decisive points (DPs) that are integral to the enemy COG.  If, as depicted in Figure XVI-3, the enemy COG being attacked is at the strategic level of war, these attacks / operations become tasks for subordinate commands / functions / agencies against the applicable CVs / CRs / CCs / DPs.  The successful accomplishment of these subordinate operations produced desired effects (either facilitating the friendly COG and / or degrading the enemy COG).  These effects, coupled most likely with other friendly induced effects from other complementary operations, are intended to combine/to defeat/degrade the enemy COG and allow for the accomplishment of the friendly strategic objective.

> **"Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result in humiliation and disaster."**
> General Sherman

(7)  The language used to craft effects is as critical as the language used to describe objectives and tasks.  Effects' planning focuses all elements of national and international power to achieving national/coalition and theater strategic objectives.

<u>1</u>   Although joint doctrine does not prescribe a specific convention for writing a desired effect statement, **there are four primary considerations.**

- Each desired effect should link directly to one or more objectives
- The effect should be measurable
- The statement should not specify ways and means for accomplishment
- The effect should be distinguishable from the objective it supports as a condition for success, not as another objective or a task.

<u>2</u>   The effect should be distinguishable from the objective it supports as a condition for success, not as another objective or a task. The same considerations apply to writing an undesired effect statement.

(8) During mission analysis, the CDR considers how to achieve national and theater-strategic objectives, knowing that these likely will involve the efforts of other U.S. agencies and multinational partners.

(9) At the operational and tactical levels, subordinate CDRs use the effects and broad tasks prescribed by the JFCs as the context in which to develop their supporting mission plans.  **Normally, the effects established by the JFCs have been developed in collaboration with subordinate commands and supporting agencies**.  At a minimum, the development of effects should have the full participation by the JFCs, as well as empowered representatives from interagency organizations.

(10)    The use of effects in planning helps CDRs and staffs use other elements of operational design more effectively by clarifying the relationships between Centers of Gravity (COG), Lines of Operation (LOO), Decisive Points, and Termination Criteria. The JFC and planners continue to develop and refine effects throughout JOPP planning steps.  Monitoring progress toward attaining desired effects and avoiding undesired effects continues throughout execution.[25]

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[25]JP 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, 26 Dec 2006.

(11)    With a common set of desired and undesired effects, the CDR can issue guidance and intent to his staff and components, and work with other stakeholders to accomplish fused, synchronized, and appropriate actions on Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information (PMESII) systems within the operational environment (beyond MIL on MIL) to attain the desired effects and achieve objectives.

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**Operational Design and Effects**

- Developed by *COCOM* based on an assessment of the operational environment and objectives.
- *Integrate,* to extent possible, all *"stakeholder"* input – JTF, Embassy (s) and other non military stakeholders.
- Achieved by the *cumulative* outcome of the **DIME** tasks/activities executed over time - multiple phases.
- A JTF CDR *may develop* specific effects within his JOA to facilitate attainment of the campaign effects and objectives.  These must be nested within those developed by the higher command.

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(12) Key to the effects is full participation of all of the players-military and other elements of national power – in a fully inclusive process of assessing, planning and eventually directing actions.

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**Why Use Effects**

- Establishes *clear links* between what we want to do (*objectives*), to what has to be done to achieve objectives (*effects*) and the actions (*tasks*) required to achieve desired effects.
- Recognizes that today's adaptive adversary operates within a *complex, interconnected operational environment.*  Focus on creating effects on its major sub systems (PMESII) – desired and undesired.
- Provides a *format* for better *integration* of interagency by focusing *operational level* planning on effects, not tactical tasks.
- Uses military actions to set the conditions for and exploits the affects of interagency actions – military may not be the decisive national (*DIME*) capability.
- Provides a means to measure *progress* in achieving *objectives.*

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*EFFECTS IN THE PLANNING PROCESS-THE BOTTOM LINE*

While the commander and unit SOP will dictate how the staff will apply effects based processes, for the purposes of this primer, one may find the following considerations of use:

1.  **Operational Design –**

    a.  Apply the constructs of operational art. Ensure clarity between objectives and desired effects.

    b.  When assessing possible enemy COGs, ensure the JIPOE is inclusive of the full PMESII (as appropriate to the level of operation) in its analysis.  Recognize the duplication of the concept of nodes and links with the terminology of COG deconstruction.  To avoid confusion, do not use both sets of terminology in the same analysis.

2.  **Commander's Intent –** If the commander has expressed specific desired effects and success criteria, ensure they are captured in the commander's intent and/or planning guidance.

3.  **Assessment –** Select and assess meaningful criteria as appropriate, though continue to maintain a broader perspective that cannot be conveyed by color-coded indicators.

    a.  **Tasks.**  Theater tasks are those actions that the CCDR must execute in order to achieve the strategic effects which support overarching strategic objectives.  These tasks are designed to be the broad theater strategic tasks from which subordinates derive their own operational and tactical tasks.

> **Task:**  An action or activity (derived from an analysis of the mission and concept of operations) assigned to an individual or organization to provide a capability.

- Termination Criteria and End States
- Strategic Objectives
- Military Objectives
- Effects
- Tasks

(1) Once the JFC and staff understand the objectives and effects that define the operation, they then match appropriate tasks to desired effects.  Task determination begins during mission analysis, extends through COA development and selection, and

provides the basis for the tasks eventually assigned to subordinate and supporting commands in the operation plan or order.

> - Objectives prescribe friendly goals.
>   - Effects describe the state of system behavior in the operational environment.
>     - Tasks direct friendly action.

(2) The JFC emphasizes the development of effects-related tasks early in the planning process because of the obvious importance of these tasks to objective accomplishment. **Each of these tasks aligns to one or more effects, reflects action on a specific system or node, is written in active voice, and can be assigned to an organization in the operation plan or order.** Support tasks such as those related to logistics and communications also are identified during mission analysis.

(3) **Assessment. Mission success criteria** describe the standards for determining mission accomplishment. The JFC may include these criteria in the planning guidance so that the staff and components better understand what constitutes mission success. When these criteria are related to the termination criteria, which typically apply to the end of a joint operation and disengagement by joint forces, this often signals the end of the use of the military instrument of national power. **Mission success criteria** can also apply to any joint operation, subordinate phase, and joint force component operation. These criteria help the JFC determine if and when to move to the next major operation or phase.

(a) The initial set of these criteria determined during mission analysis becomes the basis for **assessment**. Assessment uses **measures of performance (MOPs)** and **measures of effectiveness (MOEs)** to indicate progress toward achieving objectives. If the mission is unambiguous and limited in time and scope, mission success criteria could be readily identifiable and linked directly to the mission statement. For example, if the JFC's mission is to evacuate U.S. personnel from the U.S. embassy in Grayland, then the mission analysis could identify two primary success criteria: **(1)** all U.S. personnel are evacuated and **(2)** evacuation is completed before D-Day. However, more complex operations may require MOEs and MOPs for each task, effect, and phase of the operation. For example, if the JFC's specified tasks are to ensure friendly transit through the Strait of Gray, eject Redland forces from Grayland, and restore stability along the Grayland-Redland border, then mission analysis should indicate many potential success criteria — measured by MOEs and MOPs — some for each desired effect and task.

(b) Measuring the status of tasks, effects, and objectives becomes the basis for reports to senior commanders and civilian leaders on the progress of the operation. The CCDR can then advise the President and SecDef accordingly and adjust operations as required. Whether in a supported or supporting role, JFCs at all levels should develop their mission success criteria with a clear understanding of termination criteria established by the CJCS and SecDef.

(4) **Assessment Process and Measures.  The assessment process uses MOPs to evaluate task performance at all levels of war and MOEs to determine progress of operations toward achieving objectives.**  MOEs help answer questions like: "are we doing the right things, are our actions producing the desired effects, or are alternative actions required?"  MOPs are closely associated with task accomplishment.  MOPs help answer questions like: "was the action taken, were the tasks completed to standard, or how much effort was involved?"  Well-devised measures can help the commanders and staffs understand the causal relationship between specific tasks and desired effects.

(a) **MOEs assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment.**  They measure the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect; they do not measure task performance.  These measures typically are more subjective than MOPs, and can be crafted as either qualitative or quantitative.  MOEs can be based on quantitative measures to reflect a trend and show progress toward a measurable threshold.

(b) **MOPs measure task performance.**  They are generally quantitative, but also can apply qualitative attributes to task accomplishment.  MOPs are used in most aspects of combat assessment, since the latter typically seeks specific, quantitative data or a direct observation of an event to determine accomplishment of tactical tasks.  But MOPs have relevance for noncombat operations as well (e.g., tons of relief supplies delivered or noncombatants evacuated).  MOPs also can be used to measure operational and strategic tasks, but the type of measurement may not be as precise or as easy to observe.

(5) The assessment process and related measures should be **relevant, measurable, responsive,** and **resourced** so there is no false impression of accomplishment.  Quantitative measures can be helpful in this regard.

(a) **Relevant.**  MOPs and MOEs should be relevant to the task, effect, operation, the operational environment, the end state, and the commander's decisions.  This criterion helps avoid collecting and analyzing information that is of no value to a specific operation.  It also helps ensure efficiency by eliminating redundant efforts.

(b) **Measurable.**  Assessment measures should have qualitative or quantitative standards they can be measured against.  To effectively measure change, a baseline measurement should be established prior to execution to facilitate accurate assessment throughout the operation.

Both MOPs and MOEs can be quantitative or qualitative in nature, but meaningful quantitative measures are preferred because they are less susceptible to subjective interpretation.

(c) **Responsive.**  Assessment processes should detect situation changes quickly enough to enable effective response by the staff and timely decisions by the commander.  The JFC and staff should consider the time required for an action or actions to produce desired results within the operational environment and develop indicators that

can respond accordingly.  Many actions directed by the JFC require time to implement and may take even longer to produce a measurable result.

(d) **Resourced.**  To be effective, assessment must be adequately resourced.  Staffs should ensure resource requirements for data collection efforts and analysis are built into plans and monitored.  Effective assessment can avoid duplication of tasks and unnecessary actions, which in turn can help preserve combat power.

The planning staff may find the UJTL as a helpful starting point for crafting assessment criteria for an operation.  For example, using the same Grayland Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) scenario mentioned earlier, the UJTL offers the following Task description and potential measures:

## UJTL TASK:

### (U) ST 8.4.3 Coordinate Evacuation and Repatriation of Noncombatants from Theater

**Task Description**: To use all available means, including commercial, theater military, host nation (HN), and third-country resources to evacuate US dependents, U.S. government (USG) civilian employees, and private citizens (U.S. and third-country) from the theater and support the repatriation of appropriate personnel to the U.S. Such operations are conducted in support of the Department of State. Theater organizations at various echelons provide support (for example, medical, transportation, and security) to noncombatants. (CJCSI 3110.14, CJCSM 3122.03, JP 1-0, JP 3-07, JP 3-07.5)

**Potential Measures offered by the UJTL**

| | | |
|-----|---------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| M1 | Days | To organize and deploy fully operational joint task force (JTF). |
| M2 | Hours | To evacuate noncombatants (once combatant commander directed to conduct evacuation). |
| M3 | Hours | To evaluate situation and present recommendations to decision maker(s). |
| M4 | Percent | Of U.S. citizens and designated foreign nationals accounted for by name during evacuation. |
| M5 | Percent | Of U.S. citizens and designated foreign nationals accounted for. |
| M6 | Percent | Of U.S. citizens and designated foreign nationals evacuated. |
| M7 | Percent | Of U.S. citizens desiring, evacuated. |
| M8 | Percent | Of evacuees available and desiring evacuation, moved (in accordance with (IAW) operation plan (OPLAN) timelines). |
| M9 | Yes/No | Noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) plans include actions in the event of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) attack. |

**CAUTION**: Operations have always required assessment—this is nothing new. One should, however, be alert to the potential pitfalls encountered by a staff that becomes so enamored with color-coded MOE/MOP indicators that it fails to remember the nature of warfare. The operational environment is constantly changing as enumerable human and environmental factors exert their influences. The enemy also has a vote, and is fighting to win. Friction has not disappeared from the operational environment and friendly intelligence collection and analysis are often flawed. And finally, as noted above, not everything is easily quantifiable—commanders and their staffs will also have to rely on their experience and intuition.

Where applicable, the theater tasks are linked to appropriate Universal Joint Tasks in the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL  CJCSM 3500.04D, 17 August 2006).  This association further develops the scope of these tasks while providing further linkage to Joint Capability Areas (JCA) association, capability gap identification, and CCDR resource/Planning Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) planning.

6. **Key-Step — 6: Determine Own and Enemy's Center(s) of Gravity (COG), Critical Factors and Decisive Points.**

> **"The adversary's COG… would be attacked carefully, with measured means, because its indiscriminate destruction, while useful in defeating military forces, might bring undesirable consequences in rebuilding that same society."**
> *Creating A New Center OF Gravity: A New Model For Campaign Planning,* Watson, Bryan C.

a. Clausewitzian concepts such as friction, fog and culminating points, to name a few, abound in our military vernacular. But arguably, none has been discussed, debated nor written on more than the Clausewitzian concept of center of gravity (COG) or main point. For the U.S. military the origins of the COG concept are rooted in the Cold War. The COG concept matured in the American mindset largely during an era when the U.S. military was focused heavily (and almost exclusively) on producing doctrine that would win wars decisively against a conventional traditional military force and nation state, "especially in such places as the Fulda Gap."[26]

The COG concept has served us for years as a giant lens for focusing strategic and operational efforts to achieve decisive results. However, for the current generation of military professionals, the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have evoked a disquieting epiphany: battlefield victory is useless without an ensuing political victory.[27] The ongoing military efforts in these countries finds the U.S. military engaged in prolonged insurgencies and postwar reconstruction operations far removed from decisive battle. Furthermore, the strategic landscape suggests that the future for the U.S. military will be rife with other such "ambiguous and uncomfortable wars—and their aftermath."[28] This has evoked a corresponding renaissance in American doctrinal thinking and with it, not surprisingly, a number of proposals to redefine the COG. [29]

As we discuss accepted definitions for COG in this document we must also strive to understand today's ambiguous environment and take what we learn here and acclimate and adjust ahead of an adaptable adversary.

To understand the concept of COG we must begin with a discussion on the COG as a focal point for identifying critical factors; sources of strength as well as weaknesses and systemic vulnerabilities.

Joint doctrine defines *center of gravity* as the set of characteristics, capabilities, and sources of power from which a system derives its moral or physical strength, freedom of

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[26] Rudolph M. Janiczek, A Concept At The Crossroads: Rethinking The Center Of Gravity, October 2007.

[27] This enduring dictum also comes to us courtesy of Clausewitz: "The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and the means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose." On War, p. 87.

[28] Max G. Manwaring, The Inescapable Global Security Arena, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002, p. 2.

[29] Rudolph M. Janiczek, A Concept At The Crossroads: Rethinking The Center Of Gravity, October 2007.

action, and will to act.[30] This definition states in modern terms the classic description offered by Clausewitz, "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends," the point at which all our energies should be directed."

(1) Centers of gravity can be categorized as either physical or moral, and **they are not limited in scope to military forces**. A **physical** COG, such as a capital city or a military force, is typically easier to identify, target, and assess. Physical COGs can often be influenced solely by military means. However, the ongoing U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan exemplify the notion that active conflict can outlast the neutralization of a perceived COG. Neither the demise of the Taliban nor the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime brought an end to violence in either theater. In each case, the U.S. military finds itself engaged with elements of the former regimes as well as a multitude of other groups with varying interests and motivations. At a minimum, the nature of the COG has changed in each case.[31] This change, or evolution of the COG may be exploited by understanding the civil dimension or **moral** COG. The moral centers of gravity are dynamic and inherently related to human factors: civilian populations, a charismatic or key leader, powerful ruling elite or strong-willed populace. Influencing a moral COG is far more difficult and typically cannot be accomplished by military means alone. The intangible and complex nature of moral COG and their related vulnerabilities necessitates the collective, integrated efforts of the instruments of power.

As an example, it is a common understanding that access to, and influence over, civilian populations is a source of strength for insurgent movements and arguably terrorist networks.[32] As noted in FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 "the ability to generate and sustain popular support, or at least acquiescence and tolerance, often has the greatest impact on the insurgency's long-term effectiveness. This ability is usually the insurgencies center of gravity." Engaging the civil COG and/or vulnerabilities utilizing a focused interagency approach during the planning process the CDR may ultimately shape, mitigate a threat, or gain awareness over it, degrading the insurgencies long term effectiveness.

> **The source of strength, or civil COG, for those responsible for the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was the civilian population. Planners of the genocide recruited Hutu Burundi refugees and militias from the lower economic classes. A combination of anti-Tutsi propaganda and physical threats fueled their massive participation in the slaughter. According to interviews with survivors of the massacres, most of the 50,000 recruited killers were peasants just like their victims. Any organization tasked to stop the killing would have had to influence the civil COG— the peasant population.** Sele, Richard K., *Engaging Civil Centers of Gravity and Vulnerabilities.*

(2)    At the strategic level, a COG might be an alliance, a political or military leader, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national will. At the operational level a COG often is associated with the adversary's military capabilities — such as a powerful element of the armed forces — but could include other factors in the operational environment associated with the adversary's civil, political, economic, social, information, and infrastructure systems.

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[30]JP 1-02,*DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 12 April 2001,  JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, 26 Dec, 2006.

[31] Sele, Richard K., Engaging Civil Centers of Gravity and Vulnerabilities.

[32] Ibid

During the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War the coalition itself was identified as a friendly strategic COG, and the CCDR took measures to protect it, to include deployment of theater missile defense systems.

(3)     There is no certainty that a single COG will emerge at the strategic and operational levels.  It is possible that no COG will emerge below the strategic level. At the tactical level, the COG concept has no utility; for us to speak of a tactical COG the tactical level of war would have to exist independent of the operational and strategic level. It is commonly accepted that the tactical equivalent of the center of gravity is the objective.  Modern writings and understanding of the COG has evolved beyond the term's pre-industrial roots to include the possibility of multiple COGs existing at the strategic and operational levels.

(4)     At all levels, COGs are interrelated.  Strategic COGs have associated decisive points that may be vulnerable at the operational level, just as operational COGs may be vulnerable to tactical-level actions.  Therefore, analysis of friendly and enemy COGs is a continuous and related process that begins during planning and continues throughout a major operation or campaign. Figure XVI-4 below shows a number of characteristics that can be associated with a COG.

## COG Analysis Example

COG analysis is not only on the adversary, but also on ourselves.  Others on the joint force staff conduct similar analysis to identify friendly COGs, but it *should* be conducted from both a friendly and adversarial perspective, i.e., Red Team.

| Threat | Friendly |
|---|---|
| **COG** Adversary's Armored Corps | **COG** U.S. Military Forces |
| **CC** Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) | **CC** Strategic Mobility from the Continental U.S. or Supporting Theater |
| **CR** (1) Mobile Launchers; (2) Command & Control Capabilities; & (4) Network of Radars | **CR** (1) Sea & Air Lines of Communication; (2) Air & Sea Mobility Platforms; (3) Sea & Air Ports of Debarkation |
| **CV** Network of Radars | **CV** Long Sea & Air Lines of Communication |

**Figure XVI-4, Threat and Friendly Physical COG Analysis Example**[33]

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[33]Joint Information Operations Planning Handbook, March 2008.

(5) The essence of "operational art" lies in being able to produce the right combination of effects in time, space, and purpose relative to a COG to neutralize, weaken, destroy (consistent with desired end state/CDRs intent), or otherwise exploit it in a manner that best helps achieve military objectives and attain the military end state.  **In theory**, this is the most direct path to mission accomplishment.  While doing this the CDR must also plan for protecting friendly potential COGs such as agreements with neutral and friendly nations for transit of forces, information and networks, coalition relationships, and U.S. and international public opinion.

*COGs are not vulnerabilities, however,* within every COG lies inherent vulnerabilities that when attacked can render those COGs weaker and even more susceptible to direct attack and eventual destruction.  **This process cannot be taken lightly, since a faulty conclusion resulting from a poor or hasty analysis can have very serious consequences, such as the inability to achieve strategic and operational objectives at an acceptable cost.**  Planners must continually analyze and refine COGs.

An additional insight on the COG is provided by Antulio Echevarria in his Strategic Studies Institute paper, *Clausewitz's Center of Gravity; It's Not What We Thought*. Echevarria maintains that the COG needs to be redefined as a "focal point," not as a strength or weakness or a source of strength. A COG is more than a critical capability; it is the point where a certain centripetal force seems to exist, something that holds everything else together.  As an example he offers the following:

**" …al-Qa'ida cells might operate globally, but they are united by their hatred of apostasy. This hatred, not Osama bin Laden, is their CoG. They apparently perceive the United States and its Western values as the enemy CoG (though they do not use the term) in their war against "apostate" Muslim leaders. Decisively defeating al-Qa'ida will involve neutralizing its CoG, but this will require the use of diplomatic and informational initiatives more than military action.**

**Commanders and their staffs need to identify where the connections—*and the gaps*—exist in the enemy's system as a whole before deciding whether a center of gravity exists. The CoG concept does not apply if enemy elements are not connected sufficiently. In other words, successful antiterrorist operations in Afghanistan may not cause al-Qa'ida cells in Europe or Singapore to collapse."**

   b. The adversarial context pertinent to COG analysis takes place within the broader operational environment context.  A systems perspective of the operational environment assists in understanding the adversary's COGs.  In combat operations, this involves knowledge of how an adversary organizes, fights, and makes decisions, and of their physical and psychological strengths and weaknesses.  Moreover, the CCDR and staff must understand other operational environment systems and their interaction with the military system (Figure XVI -5).  **This holistic understanding helps CDRs and their staffs identify COGs, <u>critical factors</u>, and <u>decisive points</u> to formulate lines of operations (LOO)** (LOO discussed in detail in Chapter XVII) **and visualize the CONOPS.**[34]

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[34]JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, 17 September 2006.

**Figure XVI -5.  Characteristics of Center Gravity**

 "All too often, the center of gravity is understood as being one of the enemy's vulnerabilities.  On the contrary, a center of gravity is found invariably among critical strengths-never critical weaknesses or critical vulnerabilities." *Operational Warfare, Milan N. Vego, 2000*

(1) **Critical factors.**  All COGs have inherent "**critical capabilities**" — those means that are considered crucial enablers for the adversary's COG to function and essential to the accomplishment of the adversary's assumed objective(s).  These critical capabilities permit an adversary's COG to resist the military end state.  In turn, all critical capabilities have essential "**critical requirements**" — those essential conditions, resources, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational.  **Critical vulnerabilities** are those aspects or components of the adversary's critical requirements which are deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack that will create decisive or significant effects disproportionate to the military resources applied.  Collectively, these are referred to as "**critical factors**."

(a) Critical factors, including *capabilities* and *vulnerabilities*, become decisive points as they are identified and friendly forces can operate against them.  They become apparent only after thoroughly analyzing the opponent's centers of gravity.  Some of the critical factors may lie beyond the reach or ability of the military forces to affect them.  For example, the continuing sympathy of a broad ethnic group toward an insurgent group may be a critical capability for the insurgents.  However, affecting that affinity lies beyond the capability of the military force in the JOA, and therefore it does not become a decisive point.

> "Another error is to confuse a decisive point with the center of gravity. Although closely related, decisive points are not necessarily sources of strength; they could be found among critical weaknesses. These weaknesses are only relevant if they are open to attack and facilitate an attack on the enemy center of gravity. Once the center of gravity is determined, decisive points are identified and targeted."
>
> *Operational Warfare, Milan N. Vego, NWC 2000 p.30;, Bruce L. Kidder, Center of Gravity: Dispelling the Myths (Carlisle Barracks, PA. US Army War College, 1996), p.12*

<u>1</u>   *Critical capabilities* are the essential conditions, resources, and means required for a center of gravity to be fully operational. They are the attributes of a center of gravity that can affect friendly force operations within the context of a given scenario, situation, or mission. Critical capabilities may vary between phases of an operation, function at various echelons, or change in character as an operation progresses. At the operational and tactical levels, critical capabilities represent a potential for action: they possess an ability to inflict destruction, seize objectives or create effects, or prevent friendly forces from achieving mission success. For example, critical requirements can include the resources necessary to deploy a force into combat, the popular support a national leader needs to remain in power, or the perceived legitimacy required to maintain popular support. Critical capabilities are also the primary means through which to isolate, dislocate, disintegrate, or destroy a COG.

<u>2</u>   *Critical vulnerabilities* are aspects or components of those critical requirements that are deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack in a manner that will create decisive or significant effects. CDRs may neutralize, weaken, or destroy an adversary's COG by attacking through critical vulnerabilities. For example, an enemy armored Corps could represent an operational-level COG. Deficient mobile air defenses protecting the enemy corps could be a critical vulnerability that friendly forces could exploit.

**Critical capabilities and vulnerabilities are interrelated. The loss of one critical capability may expose vulnerabilities in other critical capabilities; the loss of a critical capability may initiate a cascading effect that accelerates the eventual collapse of a COG. The analysis of a COG and its critical factors will reveal these systemic relationships and their inherent vulnerabilities.**

(b) Critical factors are the keys to protecting or neutralizing COGs during a campaign or major operation. To achieve success, the force must possess sufficient combat power and operational reach to affect critical factors. Similarly, CDRs must protect those friendly critical capabilities within the enemy's operational reach.

<u>1</u>   Operational Approach. *Direct versus Indirect.* **Operational approach is the manner in which a CDR attacks the enemy center of gravity.** The essence of COG analysis lies in determining an approach to the COG that can neutralize, weaken, or destroy it.

<u>a</u>　**The *direct approach* is to apply combat power directly against the enemy's center of gravity or principal strength.** In most cases, however, the enemy COG is well-protected and not vulnerable to a direct attack.

<u>b</u>　**The *indirect approach* is to attack the enemy center of gravity by applying combat power against a series of decisive points that avoid enemy strengths.**

In theory, direct attacks against enemy COGs resulting in their neutralization or destruction is the most direct path to victory — if it can be done in a prudent manner (as defined by the military and political dynamics of the moment). Where direct attacks against enemy COGs mean attacking into an opponent's strength, CCDRs should seek an indirect approach until conditions are established that permit successful direct attacks. In this manner, the enemy's critical vulnerabilities can offer indirect pathways to gain leverage over its COGs. For example, if the operational COG is a large enemy force, the joint force may attack it indirectly by isolating it from its C2, severing its LOCs, and defeating or degrading its protection capabilities. In this way, CCDRs employ a synchronized and integrated combination of operations to weaken enemy COGs indirectly by attacking critical requirements, which are sufficiently vulnerable.

(2) **COG analysis** is thorough and detailed; faulty conclusions drawn from hasty or abbreviated analyses can adversely affect operations, waste critical resources, and expose forces to undue risk (Figure XVI-6). A thorough, systemic understanding of the operational environment facilitates identifying and targeting enemy COGs. This understanding requires detailed knowledge of how adversaries and enemies organize, fight, and make decisions. Knowledge of their physical and psychological strengths and weaknesses is also needed. In addition, CDRs should understand how military forces interact with the other systems (political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure) within the operational environment. This understanding helps planners identify decisive points and COGs, and formulate lines of operation. As each center of gravity is identified, analysis is further refined by understanding the operational approach to each center of gravity and the decisive points associated with them.[35]

(a) **<u>Decisive Points</u>**. Decisive points emerge from an analysis of end state, objectives, and center(s) of gravity. A *decisive point* is a place, key event, or enabling system that allows CDRs to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an operation. Decisive points are not COGs; they are keys to attacking or protecting their critical requirements. When it is not feasible to attack a COG directly, CDRs focus operations to weaken or neutralize the critical requirements (critical vulnerabilities) upon which it depends. These critical vulnerabilities are decisive points, providing the indirect means to weaken or collapse the COG. Operational level decisive points provide the greatest leverage on COGs.[36]

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[35]FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*, 21 June 2006.

[36]FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*, 21 June 2006.

(b) Some decisive points are geographic, such as port facilities, transportation networks and nodes, and bases of operations.  Other physical decisive points may include elements of an enemy force.  Events, such as commitment of the enemy operational reserve or reopening a major oil refinery, may also be decisive points.  A common characteristic of decisive points is their relative importance to the COG; the nature of a decisive point compels the enemy to commit significant effort to defend or marginalize it.  The loss of a decisive point weakens a COG and may expose more vulnerabilities as it begins to collapse.

(c) Decisive points assume a different character during stability or civil support operations. They may be less tangible and more closely associated with critical events and conditions.  For example, they may include repairing a vital water treatment facility, establishing a training academy for national security forces, securing a major election site, or quantifiably reducing crime.  In Hurricane Andrew relief operations in 1992, for example, reopening schools became a decisive point.  None of these decisive points are physical, yet all are vital to establishing the conditions for a transition to a legitimate civil authority.  In an operation predominated by stability tasks, this transition is typically a supporting condition of the desired end state.

(d) A situation typically presents more decisive points than the force can control, destroy, or neutralize with available resources.  Through critical factors analysis, CDRs identify the decisive points that offer the greatest leverage on COGs.  They designate the most important decisive points as objectives and allocate enough resources to achieve the desired results on them.  Decisive points that enable CDRs to seize, retain or exploit the initiative are crucial.  Controlling these decisive points during operations helps CDRs retain and exploit the initiative.  If the enemy maintains control of a decisive point, it may exhaust friendly momentum, force early culmination, or facilitate a counterattack.  Decisive points shape the design of operations.  They help CDRs select objectives that are clearly decisive relative to the end state; they ensure that vital resources are focused only on those objectives that are clearly defined, attainable, and directly contribute to establishing the conditions that comprise that end state.

(e) Decisive points are always oriented on the key vulnerabilities that can only be identified through the COG or another method of systems analysis.  Generally, CDRs attack adversary vulnerabilities at decisive points so that the results they achieve are disproportional to the military and other resources applied.  Consequently, CDRs and their staffs must analyze the operational environment and determine which systems' nodes or links or key events offer the best opportunity to affect the enemy's COGs or to gain or maintain the initiative.  The CDR then designates them as decisive points, incorporates them in the LOOs, and *allocates sufficient resources* to produce the desired effects against them.

# Enemy Operational Center of Gravity Analysis

CV:
CR 1.1: Intl'Assets
CR 1.1: Dissatisfaction
CR 1.2: Not Joint
CR 1.2: Contractors
CR 1.2: Supply

CR 1.2: Training

CR 1.1 Pay/Morale

CR 1.3: Fear

CR 2.2: Logistics

CR 2.4: Equipment

CV:
CR 2.1: Infrastructure
CR 2.1 & 2.2: Borders
CR 2.2: Supply
CR 2.3: Approach
CR 2.4: Maint.
CR 2.4: Age
CR 2.5: Not joint
CR 2.6: Dispersal
CR 2.6:Depth

CR 2.1: LOC

CR 2.3: Trans

CC #1: Loyalty

CR 5.3: Green Borders

CR 5.2: Red Motivation

CC #2: Employment Capability

CR 2.5: Training

CoG: Enemy Military

CR 5.1: C2

CC #5: Red-Orange Alliance

CR 2.6: C2

CR 3.1: Log

CV:
CR 5.1: Interop.
CR 5.2/3: Green/Red border Threat
CR 5.2/3: EU and US Dip. Pressure
CR 5.2/3: Economic/Oil infrastructure thru Red

CR 41: Agreements

CC #4: External Tech Assistance

CC #3: Off Military Equip

CR 3.2: Reserve

CR 4.2: LOC

CR 3.3: Outside Assistance

CR 4.2: Logistics'

CR 3.4: C2

CV:
CR 3.1: Maintenance
CR 3.2: Time
CR 3.2: Amount
CR 3.3: Agreements
CR 3.3: LOC
CR 3.3: Logistics
CR 3.4: Air / OAS
CR 3.4: Mines

CV:
CR 4.1: Coalition Leverage
CR 4.2: Inbound routes
CR 4.3: Cost
CR 4.3: Distance

**Figure XVI-6. Example; Enemy Operational Center of Gravity and Critical Factors**

*JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Dec 2006* describes Lines of Operations as the linkage of several decisive points associated with the COG and the objectives of the campaign. Lines of operations may be physical or logical, or both. Physical lines of operations *connect a series of decisive points over time to lead to defeat of the enemy or control of a geographic area.* Logical lines of operation link multiple *decisive points, in logic or purpose, to defeat the enemy or achieve an objective.* Logical lines are most useful to describe CCDR operations when positional or geographic reference to an enemy has less relevance. Determining lines of operation to shape friendly operations oriented on decisive points begins with COG analysis, continues through COA development and analysis, and is refined continuously as the strategic concept of the campaign is developed. More on LOO's in following chapters.

 c. No COG discussion is complete until we look at the whole operational environment and take a comprehensive look at all the systems in this environment relevant to the mission and operation at hand. A system is a functionally related group of elements forming a complex whole. A system's view to understanding the operational environment considers more than just an adversary's military capabilities, order of battle, and tactics. Instead, it strives to provide a perspective of interrelated systems **political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure** (PMESII), and others, that comprise the operational environment relevant to a specific operation (Figure XVI-7). A

system's perspective provides the CCDR and staff with a common frame of reference for collaborative planning with other government agencies' (OGA) counterparts to determine and coordinate necessary actions that are beyond the CCDR's command authority.



**XVI-7.  Identifying Centers of Gravity**

"The traditional military-centric single center of gravity focus that worked so well in the cold war doesn't allow us to accurately analyze, describe, and visualize today's emerging networked, adaptable, asymmetric adversary.  This adversary has no single identifiable 'source of all power.'  Rather, because of globalization, the information revolution, and, in some cases, the non-state characteristic of our adversary, this form of adversary can only be described (and holistically attacked) as a system of systems." (*Insights on Joint Operations: The Art and Science, Gen (Ret) Gary Luck, September 2005*)

d.  **Center of Gravity Determination**.[37]  (The discussion below which frames the COG analysis process is provided by the Naval Warfare School).  While primarily a strategic and operational level concern, the identification of both the enemy and friendly centers of gravity is an essential element of any plan.  If the staff gets this part wrong, the operation will at best be inefficient and, at worst, end in failure.  The commander and staff should be deeply involved in a dialogue with the higher joint force headquarters planning staff during this critical analysis.  While tactical-level organizations may not be party to the formulation of a COG analysis, they most certainly will be participants in the execution of the resulting tactical objectives and tasks that are derived from the analysis. Therefore, even tactical commanders and their planning staffs should be familiar with the process and reasoning used for the COGs analysis in order to place their own operations in the proper context.

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[37]Naval War College, NWC 4111H, *Joint Operations Planning Process Workbook*, January 2008.

e.   The purpose of this section is to provide the planner with a brief review of each of the information requirements displayed earlier in this chapter.  This section is not intended to replace the extensive study of the nuances of COG analysis that all planners should strive to master; rather, it is intended to identify information requirements and to offer some considerations in the application of the collected data.  The reader will note that the JOPP has the staff collecting information for both the enemy and friendly COGs.  Neither can be identified nor considered in a vacuum—a common staff planning mistake.  The struggle between opposing forces employing their unique means and ways to achieve their respective ends (objectives) is a dynamic that can only be appreciated if they are viewed collectively.  While the explanations and examples provided below are for enemy COGs analysis, the process is the same for determining and analyzing friendly COGs.  The only differences are in the planning actions taken once the analysis is completed.  Planners develop courses of action that focus on defeating the enemy's COG while at the same time mitigating risks to their own COG.

f.   Figure XVI -8 illustrates the flow used to identify a COG and to determine the ways in which it can be attacked.  Each step of the process, as it corresponds to the numbers in Figure XIV-5, is described below.  Later in this section an example, Desert Storm Enemy COG Analysis, is provided.

(1) **Step 1:  Identifying the Objective(s)**.  Identifying the objective is a critical first step.  Before one can determine a COG, the objective(s) must be identified.  If this portion of the analysis is flawed, then the error infects the remainder of the process.  The planner should first determine the ultimate (strategic or operational) objectives and then the supporting intermediate (operational or major tactical) objectives.  The operational objectives should show a direct relationship to the strategic objectives.  If this linkage between strategic and operational objectives cannot be established, the objectives are suspect.  Objectives, and particularly strategic objectives, usually have requirements/tasks that fall primarily into the responsibility of instruments of power other than the military.  These are still important to identify since the military may have a supporting role in their accomplishment.

(2) **Step 2:  Identify Critical Factors**.  Critical factors are those attributes considered crucial for the accomplishment of the objective.  These factors that in effect describe the environment (in relationship to the objective) must be identified and classified as either sufficient (critical strength) or insufficient (critical weakness).  Critical factors are a cumulative term for critical strengths and critical weaknesses of a military or nonmilitary source of power; they can be quantifiable (tangible) or unquantifiable (intangible); critical factors are present at each level of war; they require constant attention because they are relative and subject to changes resulting from the actions of one's forces or of the enemy's actions.  It is important while conducting the analysis for this step that planners maintain a sharp eye on the objectives identified in the first step— each level of war has critical factors that are unique to that level.

(a) The questions that should be asked when determining critical factors for the enemy are:

---

- "What are the attributes, both tangible and intangible, that the enemy has and must use in order to attain his strategic (operational) objective?"

These are critical strengths.  The second question is,

- "What are the attributes, both tangible and intangible, that the enemy has and must use in order to achieve his strategic (operational) objective, but which are weak and may impede the enemy while attempting to attain his objective?"

These are critical weaknesses.

(b) The answers to these two questions will produce a range of critical strengths and critical weaknesses associated with specific levels of war.  One should note that, like the close relationship expected to be found between strategic and operational objectives, there will undoubtedly be some critical strengths and critical weaknesses that have a similar close relationship between the corresponding critical factors.  For example, a strategic critical weakness, such as a strategic leader having a tenuous communications link to his fielded forces, may also create an operational critical weakness for fielded forces unable to reliably communicate with their higher command.



**Figure XVI -8.  Center of Gravity Flow Chart**

(3) **Step 3: Identify the Centers of Gravity.**  Joint doctrine defines a COG as "The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act." (JP 3-0) While the definition is helpful for assisting in the identification of the operational COG, when considering the strategic COG, a planner should be alert to the fact that the definition is not focused upon only the military aspects of the analysis.  In view of the discussion in the first step, when strategic objectives are being identified planners should consider the broader application of the definition, remembering that the role of instruments of power other than the military may prevail.

The COGs at each level of war should be found among the listed critical strengths identified within the critical factors of Step Two.  While all of the identified strengths are

critical, the planner must deduce which among those capabilities identified rise(s) above all others in importance in accomplishing the objective (that is, those tangible and intangible elements of combat power that would accomplish the assigned objectives). This critical strength is the COG. This does not diminish the importance of the other critical strengths; however, it forces the planner to examine closely the relationships of the various critical strengths to one another and the objective. This close examination of interrelationships could be improved by using a systems perspective of the operational environment. Such a study may well offer the planner an enhanced understanding of an adversary's COG and its interdependencies. See JP 5-0 for more information on the systems approach to COG refinement. This analysis of these relationships will prove important in the next step.

(4) **Step 4: Identify Critical Capabilities.** Joint doctrine defines a critical capability as:

> "a means that is considered a crucial enabler for a COG to function as such and is essential to the accomplishment of the specified or assumed objective(s)."

(a) If the COG is a physical force (often the case at the operational level), the commander and staff may wish to begin their examination of critical capabilities by reviewing the integration, support, and protection elements of the enemy's combat power as they apply to the COG.

(b) Many of these elements are often found in the joint functions as described in the Universal Joint Task List (C2, intelligence, sustainment, protection, fires, and movement and maneuver). Moreover, these capabilities often are located within the critical strengths and weaknesses identified in Step Two.

(c) The planner should be alert for two major considerations. First, although a capability is a critical strength, if it bears no relationship to the identified COG, it cannot be considered a critical capability. The second consideration is that although some capability may be perceived as a critical weakness, if it is an essential enabler for the enemy COG, then it is a critical capability, albeit weak in nature.



Center of Gravity (COG) is enabled by Critical Capabilities (CC)

COG – Center of Gravity
CC – Critical Capability

(5) **Step 5: Identify Critical Requirements.** Once a COG's critical capabilities are identified, the next step is for the staff to identify those essential conditions, resources, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational.

(a) These are the critical requirements that support each of the critical capabilities. This is essentially a detailed view of what comprises a critical capability.

> Example: a critical capability for an operational COG to accomplish its mission might be its ability to exert C2—its ability to receive direction as well as communicate directives to subordinates. The critical requirements might include <u>tangible</u> requirements such as: communication nodes, antennas, frequency bands, individual command posts, spare parts, bandwidth, specific satellites, and so forth. It may also include <u>intangibles</u> such as commander's perceptions and morale.

**Note:** Planners should be cautious at this point. One is often presented with a wealth of potential targets or tasks as each critical capability is peeled back and the numerous supporting critical requirements are identified. There is often a temptation to stop at this point of the analysis and begin constructing target lists. Such an action could result in a waste of resources and may not be sufficient to achieve the desired effects. The planner should find the sixth step as a more effective way to achieve the defeat of a COG.



A Critical Capability (CC) is composed of Critical Requirements (CR)

COG – Center of Gravity
CC – Critical Capability
CR – Critical Requirement

(6) **Step 6: Identify Critical Vulnerabilities.** Joint doctrine defines a critical vulnerability as "an aspect of a critical requirement which is deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack that will create decisive or significant effects."[38]

The planner should contemplate those critical capabilities and their supporting critical requirements in this regard, keeping in mind that these weaknesses must bear a direct relationship to a COG and its supporting critical capabilities for it to be assessed as a critical vulnerability. Striking a weakness that bears no such relationship is simply a measure taken to harvest "low hanging fruit" that offers no decisive benefit. The planner should also take this opportunity to consider the previously assembled lists of critical

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[38]JP 3-0, *Joint Planning*, 17 Dec 2006.

strengths and critical weaknesses from Step Two to determine if there are any critical factors with a close relationship to the COG that were not captured in the previous critical capability/critical requirement steps (steps four and five).



Note: While the planner first seeks critical weaknesses within the critical capabilities and supporting critical requirements as implied by the definition, there might be opportunities found in critical strengths that provide decisive or significant results disproportionate to the military resources applied. An example might be the integrated air defense (IAD) that is protecting an operational COG. While this critical capability might be assessed as strength, its neutralization and the subsequent opening of the COG to direct attack may be assessed by the commander as more favorable in regard to the amount of resources and time expended to achieve the desired effects.

(7) **Step 7: Identify Decisive Points.** Joint doctrine defines decisive points as "a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success."[39] As with all previous steps, the value of a DP is directly related to its relationship to a COG and its objective:

(a) In the example shown in the figure above XVI -9, from a friendly COG perspective, DPs 1 and 4, which provide access to the friendly COG, must be protected from attacks by the enemy COG. Decisive Points 2 and 3, which provide decisive access to the enemy COG, become *friendly objectives* or tasks. If there is no relationship, it is not a DP. *A DP is neutral in nature; that is, it is by definition as important to both the enemy and friendly commanders.*

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[39]JP 3-0, Joint Planning, 17 Dec 2006.

**Figure XVI-9.  Theoretical Relationship of Two Opposing COGs and Their Decisive Points**

(b) If, for example, an APOD/SPOD complex is a DP for a friendly commander, enabling that commander to project the COG through it on the way to the objective, then the enemy commander will also assess the complex as a threat to the enemy COG and should attempt to deny the friendly force commander control of the DP. In both cases, this DP, if within the capability of the force, will undoubtedly become an objective or task assigned to both enemy and friendly subordinate commands.  Using this APOD/SPOD DP example, one might find the friendly joint force commander assigning the JFMCC the tactical task of "Seize Redland SPOD NLT D+2 in order to support the flow of JTF Blue Sword forces into Redland."

> **Notes:** Objectives always refer to the endstate whereas DP refers to the operational COG.
> **Dr. Keith Dickson, Operational Design: A Methodology for Planners**

> Functional/Physical LOO are derived from Decisive Points.
> **Dr. Keith Dickson, Operational Design: A Methodology for Planners**

**Note:**  The planner must remember that this is a dynamic process.  Any changes in the information considered in the first two steps of this process require the staff to revalidate its conclusions and subsequent supporting operations.  As objectives change, the sources of power required to achieve the desired end state might also change.  As new sources of strength appear in the operational environment, how do they interact?

(c)  The Table below provides an example enemy COG analysis (note that the same must be done for the friendly COG to ensure measures are taken to protect one's

own COG).  This example is not intended to be exhaustive and serves only as an illustrative example, exploring only a single critical capability and its associated critical requirements, and offering simply a selection of DPs.

## Enemy Center of Gravity Determination

### Desert Storm Enemy COG Analysis

Identify

| 1a.  Strategic Objectives (s) |
| --- |
| • Retain Kuwait as 19th Province |
| • Enhance Saddam Hussein's hold on power |
| • Increase Iraq's political and military influence in the Arab world |
| • Increase Iraq's power and influence within OPEC |
|  |
| **1b.  Operational Objective(s)** |
| • Defeat or neutralize a coalition attack to liberate Kuwait |
| • Prevent coalition forces from obtaining air superiority |
| • Prevent coalition forces from obtaining sea control in the northern part of the Persian Gulf |
|  |
| **2a.  Critical Strengths Integrated Air Defense (IAD)** |
| • WMD |
| • Land-based ballistic missiles (Scuds) |
| • Republican Guards in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) |
| • Forces are in defensive positions |
| • Saddam  and his strategic C2 |
| • Combat experienced units and commanders |
| • Missile-armed surface combatants |
| • Sea Mine inventories and delivery platforms |
|  |
| **2b.  Critical Weaknesses** |
| • World Opinion:  Arab world outrage |
| • Long and exposed Land |
| • LOCs from Iraq to KTO |
| • Combat skills and readiness of the Air Force |
| • Numerical and qualitative inferiority of naval forces |
| • Low morale and poor discipline of regular forces |
| • Class IX for weapon systems |
| • Inadequate forces to protect the Iraq-Iranian border |
|  |
| **3a.  Strategic COG** |
| Saddam and his inner circle security apparatus |
|  |
| **3b.  Operational COG** |
| Republican Guards in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) |
|  |
| **Note:  For the sake of brevity, this example will only examine the Operational COG** |

**4. Critical Capabilities**
- Sustain Rep Guard forces in KTO (Log)
- Receive strategic direction and provide directives to subordinate units (C3)
- Protect forces from coalition airpower (Integrated Air Defense –IAD)
- Employ conventional defensive forces as a screening force
- Maintain organizational morale

**Note: For the sake of brevity, this example will only examine the Operational COG.**

**5. Critical Requirements**
- Radar Sites
- Communication nodes
- Iraqi Air Force
- Class IX for IAD systems
- Resupply for Class V
- Morale of fixed site crews

**6. Check CVs**

√  Radars vulnerable to jamming
√  Air Force
√  LOCs & Class IX

## Decisive Points

(Note—Selected Samples, not an exhaustive listing)

- APODS & SPODS in Saudi Arabia
- Strait of Hormuz
- APODS in Turkey
- Kuwait SPOD

7. **Key-Step — 7:  Conduct Initial Force Structure Analysis (Apportioned Forces)**

   a. **Analysis of Available Forces and Assets**

   •  Review forces that have been provided for planning and their locations (if known).

   •  Determine the status of reserve forces and the time they will be available.

   •  Referring back to your specified and implied tasks, now determine what broad force structure and capabilities are necessary to accomplish these tasks (e.g., is a Carrier Battle Group or a forcible entry capability required?).

   •  Identify shortfalls between the two.
   - Example:
     **Task**: Seize APOD.
     **Observation:** No forced entry capability (MEU, Airborne)

b. **Availability of Forces for Joint Operations**

(1) For availability of forces joint operation planning uses three terms as defined in the GEF, JSCP and Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) — **assigned**, **allocated**, and **apportioned** — to define the availability of forces and resources for planning and conducting joint operations.

(a) **Assigned.**  The President, through the UCP, instructs the SecDef to document his direction for assigning forces in the "Forces For."  Pursuant to title 10, USC, section 162, the Secretaries of the Military Departments shall assign forces under their jurisdiction to unified and specified COCOMs to perform missions assigned to those commands.  Such assignment shall be made as directed by the SecDef, including direction as to the command to which forces are assigned.  CCDRs exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over assigned forces.  Forces are assigned or reassigned when the transfer of forces will be permanent or for an unknown period of time, or when the broadest level of command authority is required or desired.  Assigned forces are listed in the *Forces for Unified Command Memorandum* or as the SecDef designates.  A force assigned to a COCOM may be transferred from that command only as directed by the Secretary of Defense.

(b)  **Allocated.**  A force assigned to a COCOM may be transferred from the command to which it is assigned only by authority of the SecDef, and under procedures prescribed by the SecDef and approved by the President. Under this authority, the SecDef allocates forces between CCDRs. When transferring forces, the Secretary will specify the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish).  In the general sense, **allocation** is the **distribution at execution** of limited resources among competing requirements for employment.

(c)  **Apportioned.**  Apportionment is the distribution of forces and capabilities as the starting point for planning.  Pursuant to title 10 USC, section 153, "the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be responsible for preparing strategic plans, including plans which conform with resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to be effective."  Pursuant to the JSCP, "apportioned forces are types of combat and related support forces provided to CCDRs as a starting point for planning purposes only; forces are apportioned to support the National Defense Strategy, with the intent of allowing senior leaders to consider the competing force demands associated with the possible execution of multiple plans. Forces apportioned for planning purposes may not be those allocated for execution." The Chairman apportions forces to COCOMs based on the SecDef GEF.  In the general sense, **apportionment** is the **distribution for planning** of limited resources among competing requirements.  Specific apportionments (such as air sorties and forces for planning) are described as apportionment of air sorties and forces for planning, and so forth.  The Global Force Management (GFM) guidance apportions major combat forces for Contingency Planning.  Allocated forces are those that are projected to be available for employment during the period of time for which the plans are effective.  They may include those assigned and those expected through mobilization.  They may be more or less than the forces actually allocated for CAP.  During force planning, CCDRs assume that apportioned forces will be made available for execution.

(2) **Global Force Management (GFM) Guidance**.  The objective for Global Force Management (GFM) is to establish a transparent and universal process to manage, assess and display the worldwide disposition of U.S. forces. This includes U.S. force availability, readiness and capability in order to assess the risks associated with proposed allocation, assignment and apportionment options (see Chapter V).

The GFM guidance integrates complementary assignment, apportionment, and allocation processes into a single management process in support of the National Defense Strategy and joint force availability requirements.  GFM provides comprehensive insights into the global availability of U.S. military forces and supports senior decision makers with a process to assess quickly and accurately the impact and risk of proposed changes in forces or capability assignment, apportionment, and allocation.

c.  **Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).  The JSCP provides military strategic and operational guidance** and direction to CCDRs and Service Chiefs for preparation of OPLANs and security cooperation plans **based on current military capabilities.**  It is the primary vehicle through which the CJCS exercises responsibility to provide for the preparation of joint operation plans.  The JSCP implements the strategic policy provided in the GEF and initiates the planning process for the development of campaign, campaign support, contingency, and posture plans.

(1) <u>Force Apportionment Guidance</u>.  Apportioned forces are combat and related support capabilities provided to CCDR's for planning purposes only. Apportionment supports the overlapping requirements of the NDS and the NMS. "Available forces" are apportioned without consideration to readiness status; however, apportioned forces are what a CCDR can reasonably expect to be available but not necessarily allocated for use when a contingency plan transitions to execution.

(2) <u>Force Apportionment</u>.  In the FY08 JSCP the resourcing of CCDRs' campaign plans follows a different force apportionment construct than used in previous JSCPs. Rather than apportioning forces that might not be available as a result of current operations, the new JSCP group's forces into three apportionment bins:

- Bin "A" – Forces committed (GWOT / OIF / OEF). The SecDef can dip into this bin for high priority planning efforts.
- Bin "B" – Forces available for planning
- Homeland Defense Bin

(3) In concert with the Global Force Management (GFM)[40] concept, force resourcing guidance is provided to the Global Force Management Board (GFMB) for operations and shaping activities (see Figure XVI-10 on the following page).  The GFMB is chaired by the Joint Staff J3, and comprised of representatives from the Joint Staff,

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[40]GFM is a Department of Defense process to align force apportionment, assignment, and allocation methodologies to support joint force availability requirements, enable comprehensive insight into global availability of U.S. military forces, and provide senior decision makers a vehicle to quickly and accurately assess the impact and risk of proposed allocation, assignment, and apportionment changes.

Services, and combatant commands.  The GFMB assesses and prioritizes combatant command requests for rotational capabilities, provides a prioritized list of combatant command requests to the Joint Force Provider (JFP) to use in identifying joint solutions for military capabilities among the Services, and frames any contentious issues for decision by the SecDef (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure XVI-10).

(4) U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) serves as the JFP for conventional forces not assigned to U.S. Strategic command (USSTRATCOM), US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), or U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).  The JFP, working through its assigned Service components, provides global sourcing recommendations via a Rotational Force Schedule (RFS) to fill GFMB validated rotational force requirements (Steps 3 and 4 in Figure XVI-10). After GFMB review, the RFS is submitted to the SecDef for approval (Step 5 in Figure XVI-10). The SecDef-approved RFS provides rotational authority for named forces to deploy in support of CCDR requirements (Step 6 in Figure XVI-10).



**Figure XVI-10.  GFM Process For Sourcing Both Apportion (Forces For Planning) and Execution Requirements.**

8. **Key-Step — 8:  Conduct Initial Risk Assessment**

> Risk management is the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk costs with mission benefits.

a.   Throughout the history of armed conflict, government and military leaders have tried to reckon with the effect of casualties on policy, strategy, and mission accomplishment.  Government and military leaders consider battle losses from different perspectives.  However, both must balance the following against the value of national objectives:

- Effects of casualties.
- Impact on civilians.
- Damage to the environment.
- Loss of equipment.
- Level of public reaction.

b.   War is inherently complex, dynamic, and fluid.  It is characterized by uncertainty, ambiguity, and friction.  Uncertainty results from unknowns or lack of information.  Ambiguity is the blurring or fog that makes it difficult to distinguish fact from impression about a situation and the enemy.  Friction results from change, operational hazards, fatigue, and fears brought on by danger.  These characteristics cloud the operating environment; they create risks that affect a CDR's ability to fight and win.  In uncertainty, ambiguity, and friction, both danger and opportunity exist.  Hence, a leader's ability to adapt and take risks are key traits.

c.   **Principles.**  The basic principles that provide a framework for implementing the risk management process are—

(1) *Integrating risk management into mission planning, preparation, and execution.*  The CDR and staff continuously:  identify hazards and assess risks; develop and coordinate control measures; determine the level of residual risk for accident hazards in order to evaluate courses of action (COAs); and integrate control measures into staff estimates, operation plans (OPLANs), operation orders (OPORDs), and missions.  CDRs assess the areas in which they might take risks and approve control measures that will reduce risks.  Leaders ensure that all subordinates understand and properly execute risk controls.  They continuously assess variable hazards and implement risk controls.

(2) *Making risk decisions at the appropriate level in the chain of command.*  The CDR should address risk guidance in his CDR's guidance.  He bases his risk guidance on established Joint and other appropriate policies and on his higher CDR's direction, and then gives guidance on how much risk he is willing to accept and delegate.  Subordinates seek the higher CDR's approval to accept risks that might imperil the next higher CDR's intent.

(3) *Accepting no unnecessary risk.* CDRs compare and balance risks against mission expectations and accept risks only if the benefits outweigh the potential costs or losses. CDRs alone decide whether to accept the level of residual risk to accomplish the mission.

d. **Accepting Risk**. Accepting risk is a function of both risk assessment and risk management. The approach to accepting risk entails an identification and assessment of threats, addressing risk, defining indicators, and observing and evaluating.

e. **Identify threats** to the force. Consider all aspects of mission, enemy, terrain, and weather, time, troops available and civilian (METT-TC) for current and future situations. Sources of information about threats include reconnaissance, intelligence, experience/expertise of the CDR and staff, etc.

f. **Assess Threats.** Assess each threat to determine the risk of potential loss based on probability and severity of the threat. Probability may be ranked as frequent: occurs often, continuously experienced; likely: occurs several times; occasional: occurs sporadically; seldom: unlikely, but could occur at some time; or unlikely: can assume it will not occur. Severity may be catastrophic: mission is made impossible; critical: severe mission impact; marginal: mission possible using alternate options; or negligible: minor disruptions to mission. Determining the risk is more an art than a science. Use historical data, intuitive analysis, and judgment to estimate the risk of each threat. Probability and severity levels are estimated based on the user's knowledge of probability of occurrence and the severity of consequences once the occurrence happens. The level of risk is assessed by a combination of the threat, its probability of occurring, and degree of severity. The levels of risk are:

- **extremely high:** loss of ability to accomplish mission;

- **high:** significantly degrades mission capabilities in terms of required mission standard;

- **moderate:** degrades mission capabilities in terms of required mission standards;

- **low:** little or no impact on accomplishment of the mission.

g. **Address Risk, Determine Residual Risk, and Make Risk Decision.** For each threat, develop one or more options that will eliminate or reduce the risk of the threat. Specify who, what, where, when, and how. Determine any residual risk and revise the evaluation of the level of risk remaining. The CDR alone then decides whether or not to accept the level of residual risk. If the CDR determines that the risk is too great to continue the mission or a COA, then the CDR directs the development of additional measures to account for the risk, or the COA is modified or rejected.

h. **Define Indicators.** Think through the threat—what information will provide indication that the risk is no longer acceptable? Ensure that subordinates and staff are informed of the importance of communicating the status of those indicators.

i.  **Observe and Evaluate.**  In execution, monitor the status of the indicators and enact further options as warranted.  After the operation, evaluate the effectiveness of each option in reducing or eliminating risk.  For options that were not effective, determine why and what to do the next time the threat is identified.

j.  **Applying Risk Management.**  Risk management requires a clear understanding of what constitutes unnecessary risk, when the benefits actually do outweigh costs, and guidance as to the command level to make those decisions.  When a CDR decides to accept risk, the decision must be coordinated with the affected units; where and how the CDR is willing to accept risk are detailed in each COA.

➢  Risk management assists CDRs in conserving lives and resources and avoiding or mitigating unnecessary risk, making an informed decision to execute a mission, identifying feasible and effective control measures where specific standards do not exist, and providing reasonable alternatives for mission accomplishment.

> Risk is characterized by both the probability and severity of a potential loss that may result from hazards due to the presence of an enemy, an adversary, or some other hazardous condition.
>
> FM 100-14

➢  While risk cannot be totally eliminated, it can be managed by a systematic approach that weighs the costs—time, personnel, and resources—against the benefits of mission accomplishment.  CDRs have always risk managed their actions: intuitively, by their past experiences, or otherwise.  Risk management won't prevent losses but, properly applied, it allows the CDR to take necessary and prudent risks without arbitrary restrictions and while maximizing combat capabilities.

➢  Risk management does not inhibit CDRs' flexibility and initiative, remove risk altogether (or support a zero defects mindset), require a GO/NO-GO decision, sanction or justify violating the law, or remove the necessity for development of standing operating procedures (SOPs).  Risk management should be applied to all levels of war, across the range of military operations, and all phases of an operation to include any branches and sequels of an operation.  To alleviate or reduce risk, CDRs may change the CONOPS or concept of fire support, execute a branch plan, or take other measures to reduce or bypass enemy capabilities.

•  **Safety** is crucial to successful training and operations and the preservation of military power.  High-tempo operations may increase the risk of injury and death due to mishaps.  Command interest, discipline, risk mitigation measures, and training lessen those risks.  The JFC reduces the chance of mishap by conducting risk assessments, assigning a safety officer and staff, implementing a safety program, and seeking advice from local personnel.  Safety planning factors could include the geospatial and weather data, local road conditions and driving habits, uncharted or uncleared mine fields, and special equipment hazards.

- To assist in risk management, CDRs and their staffs may develop or institute a risk management process tailored to their particular mission or operational area. Figure XVI -11 is a generic model that contains the likely elements of a risk management process.[41]



**Figure XVI -11. Risk Management Process**

k. JP 5-00.2, *JTF Planning Guidance and Procedures,* 13 Jan 1999 and the U.S. Armies Field Manual No. 100-14, *Risk Management,* 23 April 1998 utilizes a Risk Management Process that have broken risk management into a five-step process of identifying and controlling hazards to conserve combat power and resources. Also, the *United Kingdom Joint Warfare Publication* 5-00, *Joint Operations Planning,* March 2004 has an excellent Annex on Risk Management. The five steps of risk management are:

- Step 1. Identify hazards.
- Step 2. Assess hazards to determine risks.
- Step 3. Develop controls and make risk decisions.
- Step 4. Implement controls.
- Step 5. Supervise and evaluate.

(1) Steps 1 and 2 together comprise the *risk assessment*. In Step 1, individuals identify the hazards that may be encountered in executing a mission. In Step 2, they determine the direct impact of each hazard on the operation. The risk assessment provides for enhanced situational awareness. This awareness builds confidence and allows soldiers and units to take timely, efficient, and effective protective measures.

(2) Steps 3 through 5 are the essential follow-through actions to effectively *manage risk.* In these steps, leaders balance risk against costs—political, economic, environmental, and to combat power— and take appropriate actions to eliminate

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[41] JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, 17 September 2006.

unnecessary risk. During execution, as well as during planning and preparation, leaders continuously assess the risk to the overall mission and to those involved in the task.

Finally, leaders and individuals evaluate the effectiveness of controls and provide lessons learned so that others may benefit from the experience.

> Sizing up opponents to determine victory, assessing dangers and distances is the proper course of action for military leaders.
>
> Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, "Terrain"

(3) Risk decisions should be based upon awareness rather than mechanical habit. Leaders should act on a keen appreciation for the essential factors that make each situation unique instead of from conditioned response. Throughout the entire operational continuum, the CDR must consider U.S. Government civilians and contract support personnel in his risk management process. Hazards can exist, regardless of enemy or adversary actions, in areas with no direct enemy contact and in areas outside the enemy's or adversary's influence.

l. When you conduct a preliminary risk assessment you must determine what *obstacles* or *actions* may preclude mission accomplishment. The first two steps of the three-step risk management process are the *identification of risk* and the *assessment of its hazard*.

(1) **Identify risk:** Assess the probability and severity of loss linked to known or assumed hazards.

(2) **Assessment of the risk(s) hazard:** The condition with the potential to cause injury, illness or death of personnel; damage to, or loss of, equipment or property; or mission degradation.

(3) The third element of risk assessment is **risk management,** the process by which decision makers reduce or offset risk.[42]

m. Operational risk is the CDR's conceptual balance between danger and opportunity; it considers the resources available, the component's mission and the operational environment. The rewards of meeting the desired objectives or effects must outweigh the potential costs associated with mission accomplishment. While the CDR must ultimately make the decisions what risks the strategy and forces will assume, the staff's role is to identify critical decision and risk points, provide supporting information and ensure the CDR's risk decisions are considered throughout operational planning and execution.

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[42]JP 5-00.2, *JTF Planning Guidance and Procedures*, 13 January 1999.

n.  The CDR expresses guidance regarding risk in several ways.  The CDR's risk estimate is based on the mission, his or her experience, higher headquarters' guidance and staff estimates.  With these considerations, the CDR formulates initial staff guidance, followed by an intent statement during the mission analysis step.  The CDR expresses an estimate of risk every time he or she provides guidance.  Some risk factors permit quantitative analysis, while others will be wholly qualitative.  Probability and statistics support risk analysis, but the CDR will have to address operational risk subjectively when supporting information is unavailable.  See below chart for example operational risk matrix.

| Risk Identification | Mission Risk Assessment | | | Controls (mitigation) | Residual Mission Risk |
| | Probability | Severity | Risk | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Outside interference with  theater LOCs | Likely | Critical | High | - Patrols<br>- ISR<br>- Escorts | Moderate |
| Blue infrastructure inadequate to support deployed forces | Likely | Marginal | Moderate | - Site surveys<br>- LOG ADVON<br>- LOG afloat | Low |
| Blue forces conduct active asymmetric ops | Likely | Negligible | Moderate | - Force Protection<br>- IO / PSYOP<br>- CMO | Low |
| Yellow / Orange conduct coordinated attacks with Red | Frequent | Critical | High | - Deter / Dissuade (DIME)<br>- Force Planning | Low |
| Air strike and/or missile strike against Blue | Likely | Marginal | Moderate | - ISR<br>- Air Defense<br>- Deter / Dissuade | Low |

**Example Operational Risk Matrix**

o.  Risk vs. Gamble.  The difference between a risk and a gamble is that you can recover from a risk, but you can't from a gamble.  Ensure that when conducting your Risk Analysis that if your risk mitigation fails, you still will not.

> "If you can recover from the loss, it's a risk.  If not, it's a gamble"
> Field Marshal Erwin Rommel

9. **Key-Step — 9:  Determine CDR's CCIR:  CDR's Critical Information Requirements**.  CCIRs are elements of information required by the CDR that directly affect decision-making.  CCIRs are a key information management tool for the CDR and help the CDR assess the operational environment and identify decision points throughout the conduct of operations.  *CCIRs are established by the CDR* and should be developed and recommended by staffs as part of the planning process.

a.  Characteristics of CCIRs result from the analysis of information requirements (XVI-12) in the context of a mission, CDR's intent, and the concept of operation.  CDRs designate CCIRs to let their staffs and subordinates know what information they deem necessary for decision-making.  In all cases, the fewer the CCIRs, the better the staff can focus its efforts and allocate scarce resources.  Staffs may recommend CCIRs; however, they keep the number of recommended CCIRs to a minimum.  *CCIRs are not static*.  CDRs add, delete, adjust, and update them throughout an operation based on the information they need for decision-making.  To assist in managing CCIRs, CDRs should adopt a process to guide the staff.  This process should include specific responsibilities for development, validation, dissemination, monitoring, reporting, and maintenance (i.e., modifying/deleting).[43]



**Figure XVI-12.  Information Requirements Categories**

b.  **Commanders Critical Information Requirement (CCIR)**

(1) CCIRs comprise information requirements identified by the CDR as being critical to timely information management and the decision-making process that affect successful mission accomplishment.  CCIRs result from an analysis of information requirements in the context of the mission and the CDR's intent.  Described below are

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[43]JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, 17 September 2006.

the two key subcomponents; **friendly force information requirements (FFIR) and Priority Intelligence Requirement (PIRs).**

(a) *PIR.* Those intelligence requirements for which a CDR has an anticipated and stated priority in the task of planning and decision making.[44]

(b) *FFIR*. Information that the CDR and staff need about the forces available for the operation.[45]

(c) The information needed to verify or refute a planning assumption is an example of a CCIR. As mentioned earlier, CCIRs are not static. **They are situation-dependent, focused on predictable events or activities, time-sensitive, beg a decision by the CDR when answered, and always established by an order or plan**.



"Commander's Critical Information Requirements"

*Commanders Critical Information Requirement...An information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision-making. The two key elements are friendly force information requirements and priority intelligence requirements.*
Joint Pub 3-0, *Joint Operations*

• Two Categories:
 • Priority Intelligence Requirement (PIR) - An intelligence requirement, stated as a priority for intelligence support, that the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or the environment.
 • Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR) - Information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities.

(d) **CCIR** *previously* **had three categories; (1) PIR, (2) EEFI, and (3) Friendly Force Information Requirement (FFIR).** As alluded to above, PIR remains a category of CCIR, as does FFIR. The third category of CCIR, EEFI, has been eliminated as a category of CCIR. EEFI was defined as "*key questions likely to be asked by adversary officials and intelligence systems about specific friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities, so they can obtain answers critical to their operational effectiveness*." In reality, one can still expect to hear the term used in the operating forces because many CDRs believe it is still necessary to provide guidance to his staff concerning operational security, therefore it is mentioned here.

(e) We have all heard the proverbial "a CCIR is so important that when answered, one must wake up the CDR." **There are general criteria that apply to CCIR that planners must consider when proposing them to the CDR for approval:** (1) answering a CCIR must beg a decision by the CDR, and not necessarily by the staff, and (2) the information or intelligence necessary to answer or satisfy a CCIR must be critical to the success of the mission. Keep in mind that a CCIR cannot be a CCIR unless approved by the CDR. This criterion also pertains to PIRs, which is the subject of the next section.

c. **Priority Intelligence Requirement**

(1) PIRs are normally identified during JIPOE and refined during mission analysis and course of action development. JIPOE provides basic intelligence oriented on understanding the battlespace and adversary. The intelligence enables the J-2 to identify PIRs based on what intelligence critical to mission accomplishment is lacking.

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[44]Joint Pub 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 12 April 2001.
[45]*Ibid.*

**The J-2 will normally recommend PIRs to the CDR for approval. IO planners can have input into PIRs.** Input can be submitted through several personnel, including J-2 personnel supporting the IO cell, the J-2 or Deputy J-2, the J-2 Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) CDR, J-2 Watch Officer in the Joint Operations Center (JOC), or Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE) Watch Officer or Senior Analysis.

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**Priority Intelligence Requirements**
- PIRs are the commander's statements of the force's critical intelligence needs.
  - The J-2 is responsible for assisting the commander in determining PIRs.
- Keep PIRs to a minimum.

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(2) PIRs are meant to *focus intelligence operations*. The J-2 will rarely, if ever, have all the intelligence collection assets and personnel necessary to satisfy all requirements. The preponderance of the level of effort for the J-2's organization and assets will direct their focus of effort on answering PIR. Therefore, it is important that the number of PIRs remain low. Otherwise everything becomes a priority and PIRs no longer serve their intended purpose since there is no longer a focus for intelligence operations.

d. **A Conceptual look at Intelligence requirements.** More often than not, intelligence requirements are worded in a manner that does not enable a collection asset or resource to answer it directly.

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**Intelligence requirement-** "*any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a need for the collection of information, or the production of intelligence,*" and "*a requirement for intelligence to fill a gap in the command's knowledge or understanding of the battlespace or threat forces.*"
*Joint Pub 1-02*

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e. If an intelligence requirement cannot be collected on directly, then it must be dissected into *information requirements*.

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**Information requirement-** "*those items of information regarding the adversary and the environment that need to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence requirements of a commander.*"
*Joint Pub 1-02*

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f. Information requirements are worded in a manner that enables a collection manager to task an asset to collect on it directly. It is basically an intelligence requirement broken down into "*bite size chunks*," and when an asset collects on and answers these "bite size chunks," an answer to the intelligence requirement can be determined. If an intelligence requirement is worded in a manner that enables the

collection manager to task a collection asset to collect directly on it, then it is not required to be broken down into information requirements. Otherwise, one or more information requirements will normally be drafted to support answering an intelligence requirement.

(1) There are various methods that can be used to break down an intelligence requirement into information requirements. Either the submitter of a Request for Information (RFI) can attempt to break it down, or the J-2 analysts can do so upon receipt of a validated intelligence requirement. Either way can be effective, but if the first method is attempted, one can expect J-2 personnel to modify the information requirements to facilitate collection or processing of the intelligence necessary to answer the intelligence requirement.

**A Conceptual Look at Intelligence Requirements**

"Any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a need for the collection of information or the production of intelligence." → **Intelligence** Requirement

"Those items of information regarding the adversary and the environment that need to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence requirements of a commander." → **Information** Requirement

**A Conceptual Look at Requirements**

**Intelligence** Requirement → **Priority Intelligence Requirement (PIR)**

**Information** Requirement → **Essential Element of Information (EEI)**

EEIs = Information requirements that, when answered, answer a PIR.

(2) Since a PIR is an intelligence requirement, it too may have to be dissected in the same manner as a standard intelligence requirement. **The information requirements that must be answered to answer a PIR are called Essential Elements of Information, or EEI.** They are simply information requirements that receive a special title due to their importance, i.e., because they are tied to a PIR. According to the *Joint Pub 2-0, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*, "*those information requirements that are most critical or that would answer a PIR are known as essential elements of information (EEIs)*."

(3) Useful unclassified reference documents for drafting intelligence and information requirements are the ***Intelligence Requirements Handbooks*** published by the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA). They are also available electronically at: http://genwebcache01.mcia.usmc.smil.mil/portal/page/portal/MCIA%20Pages, on the SIPRNET or by contacting MCIA at DSN 278-6146 or COMM 703-784-6146.

(4) Examples pulled from doctrine and from the Information Operation GIRH are as follows. These examples contain a select sample of EEIs; however, there could be any number of EEIs necessary to support answering a PIR.



A Conceptual Look at Requirements - Example

PIR — e.g., How can terrorist structures that exist in Venasella affect our ability to operate within urban and rural areas?

EEI —
- What motivates these terrorist groups?
- Are their activities confined to urban or rural areas?
- What are their national connections?
- What are their international connections or external support apparatus?
- Are they state sponsored?
- Do they possess popular support? If so, from what ethnic or societal group?



A Conceptual Look at Requirements - Example

PIR — e.g., Will the adversary attack within the next 72 hours?

EEI —
e.g., Has the artillery subordinate to the XX Corps deployed forward?

Have all naval combatants sortied?

Have combat aircraft redeployed to forward airfields?

g. **Requests for Information (RFI)**

(1) If we cannot answer intelligence or information requirements with existing resources, then we must generate an RFI. However, keep in mind that RFIs must be satisfied at the LOWEST possible level – that is you! If you cannot find the information that satisfies your intelligence or information requirement, then begin generating an RFI.

(a) **If you determine that you must submit an RFI, there are certain responsibilities** associated with doing so. **First,** you must **conduct the initial research.** While this sounds trivial, it is often overlooked. We've already mentioned that you must answer the question at the lowest level. That level is yours! The answer to your question may lie in a readily available document or on the Internet - whether it is classified or unclassified. While it may be easier to simply "pass the buck" and let someone else do the work for you, it will always delay the answer and slow down the entire process.

> **Request for Information**
> "Any specific time-sensitive ad hoc requirement for intelligence information or products to support an ongoing crisis or operation not necessarily related to standing requirements or scheduled intelligence production. A request for information can be initiated to respond to operational requirements and will be validated in accordance with the theater command's procedures."

Two excellent sources that can immediately be visited to begin initial research are the ***INTELINK*** homepage on both SIPRNET and JWICS, located at http://www.ismc.sgov.gov and http://www.ic.gov, respectively. Each page contains a "**Google**" search capability just as the NIPRNET does if you choose to use open sources. Depending on your search string, you can significantly increase the timeframe by which you can find an answer to your RFI.

(b) **Second, if you are unsuccessful in your initial search, then you must clearly articulate your requirement.** Be as specific as possible, but avoid using language associated with a specific occupation that may appear foreign to the person who must review and validate your RFI. Additionally, **avoid asking for a particular intelligence collection asset to satisfy your requirement.** It is the Collection Manager's job to determine the most effective manner to satisfy your requirement.

(c) **Third, you must justify your request.** Clearly articulate why your request is so important compared to the hundreds of others? Stating, "because the general wants it" is not good enough. You must clearly and accurately justify your request for it to be accepted and prioritized. If you can tie your requirement to a PIR, it may be prioritized higher than other requirements which may not be.

> **RFI Responsibilities**
>
> *Conduct Initial Research*
> *Clearly State the Requirement*
> *Justify the Request*
> *Provide an Accurate LTIOV*

(d) **Fourth, you must truthfully determine and document the "Latest Time Information is of Value," or LTIOV**. We have already mentioned this is the time beyond which the information will no longer be useful to you. When identifying this time, ensure it is accurate. Obviously, you will want your answer immediately, but if you really don't need it for a week, then state that. This helps the collection manager to prioritize requests and free collection assets to perform other priority missions until assets or resources are available to support your requirement.

(e) Prior to submitting an RFI via the means established by the J-2, you should ask four questions to validate your efforts. The questions represent validation criteria that should be met prior to submitting the RFI. When this criterion is met, then your RFI can be submitted.

1 **Requestors Questions:**

a Is the answer to the question relevant to executing or planning my mission?

b Have I thoroughly searched existing, accessible repositories for this information?

> c   Have I provided concise, yet sufficient detail to enable the RFI Manager to understand the intelligence requirement that I need answered?
>
> d   Is my stated LTIOV realistic?

The RFI Manager will receive your RFI and ask at least five questions to determine if it will be validated or not.

> 2   **RFI Manager's Questions:**
>
> a   Does the information justify the dedication of scarce intelligence resources?
>
> b   Does it duplicate an existing requirement?
>
> c   Has the requirement been previously satisfied?
>
> d   Does the RFI pertain to only one intelligence requirement?
>
> e   Can I retrieve the information required by the LTIOV?

g.  If the RFI Manager decides it cannot be validated, you should expect a phone call or email explaining why. If your RFI is validated, then it will be prioritized against other validated "intelligence" or "information" requirements. **The RFI will then evolve into either a production requirement or a collection requirement. A production requirement is submitted when new, finished intelligence derived from original research is required to satisfy all or a portion of the RFI. A collection requirement is submitted when insufficient information exists to answer an RFI.** A production requirement is submitted to the "Analysis & Production Cell," and a collection requirement is submitted to the "Collection Management Cell" for action. The RFI Manager will normally confer with each cell (or section) to receive their estimate of supportability prior to submitting it either to one cell or the other as a whole or a portion thereof to each of them. If it takes the efforts of both cells to satisfy the requirement, the RFI Manager will work with personnel from each cell to determine which portion of the requirement each will satisfy. Each cell will in turn take their portion of the RFI for action.

**NOTIONAL INFORMATION OPERATIONS CELL**

| CI | Counterintelligence | JSOTF | Joint Special Operations Task Force |
| CMO | Civil-military Operations | | |
| CND | Computer Network Defense | MILDEC | Military Deception |
| CNO | Computer Network Operations | OPSEC | Operations Security |
| EW | Electronic Warfare | PAO | Public Affairs Office |
| EWCC | Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell | PSYOP | Psychological Operations |
| IA | Information Assurance | Rep | Representative |
| IO | Information Operations | SOF | Special Operations Forces |
| JCMOTF | Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force | STO | Special Technical Operations |
| JPOTF | Joint Psychological Operations Task Force | USSTRATCOM | United States Strategic Command |

**Figure XVI-13. Notional Information Operations Cell**

h.   The RFI Manager could be co-located with the Collection Management Cell, or they could occupy a separate and distinct RFI Management Cell.  **To learn more about the RFI process and the organization that supports it, planners should direct their questions to either the J-2, Deputy J-2, or directly to the RFI Manager or Collection Manager.  Each can offer insight into how the process is managed and how the organization was established to support it.**

i.   **Requesting National Intelligence Support.**  If organic or attached intelligence capabilities within a JTF cannot satisfy an RFI, it will likely be forwarded to the higher headquarters, i.e., to the COCOM JIOC, requesting that they satisfy the RFI with their organic or attached intelligence capabilities.  RFI's are normally submitted to higher via *Community On-line Intelligence System for End Users and Managers* (COLISEUM).  Likewise, if the CCDR JIOC cannot satisfy the RFI, it is then submitted via COLISEUM to the Defense JIOC (DJIOC), requesting that it be satisfied with national intelligence capabilities.

COLISEUM is a production management tool used throughout the Defense Intelligence Production Community.  The tool allows all users to register and track requests for information and production requirements, perform research for existing requirements or answers, and manage/account for production resources.  COLISEUM is a web-based application available throughout the Intelligence Community.
-   SIPRNET URL: http://coliseum-trng-s.dia.smil.mil
-   JWICS URL: http://www.coliseum.ic.gov
-   24/7 Operations Support Center/Support Desk: 202-231-135/5136 or DSN 428

j.  **The COCOM JIOC is the primary focal point for providing intelligence support to the COCOM.**  The COCOMs JIOCs are the primary intelligence organizations providing support to joint forces at the operational and tactical levels. The JIOC fuses the in-theater capabilities of all Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Service, combatant support agency, and combat command ISR assets into a central location for intelligence planning, collection management, tasking, analysis and support. The JIOC concept seamlessly combines all intelligence functions, disciplines, and operations in a single organization, ensures the availability of all sources of information from both COCOM ISR assets and national intelligence resources, and fully synchronizes and integrates intelligence with operation planning and execution.  Although a particular JIOC cannot be expected to completely satisfy every RFI, it can coordinate support from other intelligence organizations, both lower, higher, and laterally.

k.  As the lead DOD intelligence organization for coordinating intelligence support to meet COCOM requirements, the DJIOC coordinates and prioritizes military intelligence requirements across the COCOMs, combat support agencies, reserve component, and Service intelligence centers.  The DJIOC formulates recommended solutions to de-conflict requirements for national intelligence with USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR) and DNI representatives to ensure an integrated response to COCOM needs.  It is the channel through which joint force's crisis-related and time-sensitive intelligence requirements are tasked to the appropriate national agency or command, when they cannot be satisfied using assigned or attached assets.

l.  **National Augmentation Support.**  One of the most effective means that a CCDR or JTF J-2 can facilitate having crisis-related RFI's satisfied in a relatively rapid manner is to request and exploit the capabilities of a National Intelligence Support Team, or NIST.  At the request of a CCDR, the DJIOC may deploy a NIST to support a CDR, JTF (CJTF), during a crisis or contingency operation.  The NIST is a nationally sourced team composed of intelligence and communications experts from DIA, CIA, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), NSA, or other IC agencies as required.  The NIST mission is to provide a tailored, national level, all-source intelligence team to deployed CDRs during crisis or contingency operations.  NIST supports intelligence operations at the JTF HQ and is traditionally collocated with the J-2.  In direct support of the JTF, the NIST will perform functions as designated by the J-2.  The NIST is designated to provide a full range of intelligence support to a CJTF, from a single agency element with limited ultra-high frequency voice connectivity to a fully equipped team with the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) video-teleconferencing capabilities. NIST provides coordination with national intelligence agencies, analytical expertise, indications and warning (I&W), special assessments, targeting support, and access to national data bases, and facilitates RFI management.

m.  **Decision Support**.[46] CCIR support the CDR's future decision requirements and are often related to Measures of Effectiveness and Measures of Performance.  PIR are

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[46]JP 2-01, *Joint and National Support to Military Operations*, 7 Oct 2004.

often expressed in terms of the elements of PMESII while FFIR are often expressed in terms of DIME.  All are developed to support specific decisions the CDR must make.

10. **Key-Step — 10:  Develop Mission Statement**

   a.   Mission Statement.  One product of the mission analysis process is the mission statement.  Your initial mission analysis as a staff will result in a _tentative mission statement_.  This tentative mission statement is a _recommendation_ for the CDR based on mission analysis. It will serve to identify the broad options open to the CDR and to orient the staff. This recommendation is presented to the CDR for approval normally during the mission analysis brief.  **It must be a clear, concise statement of the essential tasks to be accomplished by the command and the purpose of those tasks.**  Although several tasks may have been identified during the mission analysis, the proposed mission includes only those that are essential to the overall success of the mission.  The tasks that are routine or inherent responsibilities of a CDR are not included in the proposed mission.  The proposed mission becomes the focus of the CDR's staff's estimates.  It should be continually reviewed during the planning process to ensure planning is not straying from this critical focus (or that the mission requires adjustment).  It is contained in paragraph 1 of the CDR's estimate and paragraph 2 of the basic OPLAN or OPORD.



**Who**
USXXCOM

**What**
Essential tasks
identified in the analysis

_Built from your
essential tasks_

**Why**
Purpose of the
operation

**Where**
Joint Operations
Area location

**When**
When directed, no later than…

   b.   The mission statement should be a short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization's essential task (or tasks) and purpose — a clear (**brevity and clarity)** statement of the action to be taken and the reason for doing so.  The mission statement contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and why, but seldom specifies how.  These five elements of the mission statement answer the questions:

- Who will execute the tasks (unit/organization)?
- What is the essential task(s) (mission task) ?
- When will the operation begin (time/event i.e., O/O, when directed)?
- Where will the operation occur (AO, objective)?
- Why will we conduct the operation (for what purpose)?

c.  Clarity of the joint force mission statement and its understanding by subordinates, before and during the joint operation, is vital to success.  The mission statement along with the CDRs' intent, provide the primary focus for subordinates during planning, preparations, execution and assessment.[47]

d.  No mission statement should be written and not revisited thereafter; it's important to revisit it during the entire plan development process to ensure that it meets the needs of the CDR and the national leadership.  A sample CCDR's mission statement could look like this:

> **"When directed, CDRUSXXCOM deters regional aggressors; if deterrence fails, CDRUSXXCOM defends the country of X and defeats external aggressors and conducts stability and support operations in order to protect U.S. interests and the Government of X."**

e.  The who, where, when of the mission statement is straightforward.  The what and why, however, are more challenging to write clearly and can be confusing to subordinates.

- The <u>what</u> is a task and is expressed in terms of action verbs (for example, deter, defeat, deny, conduct, provide, contain, isolate, etc).  These tasks are measurable and can be grouped by actions by friendly forces and effects on adversary forces/capabilities.  The what in the mission statement is the essential task(s) to be accomplished.  It may be expressed in terms of either actions by a friendly force or effects on an adversary force.  CDRs should utilize doctrinal approved tasks.  These tasks have specific meaning, are measurable, and often describe results or effects of the tasks relationship to the adversary and friendly forces.

Example | *Tasks List*

**Terrain**
- Seize
- Secure
- Clear
- Occupy
- Retain
- Recon

**Enemy**
- Disrupt
- Defeat
- Destroy
- Block
- Contain
- Fix
- Canalize
- Delay
- Interdict
- Isolate
- Penetrate
- Suppress
- Neutralize
- Feint
- Demonstration
- Ambush
- Bypass

**Friendly**
- Screen
- Guard
- Cover
- Withdraw
- Attack by fire
- Support by Fire
- Follow & Assume
- Follow & Support
- Breach
- Disengage
- Exfiltrate
- Infiltrate

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[47] JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, 17 September 2006.

- The <u>why</u> puts the task(s) into context by describing the reason for conducting the task(s). It provides the mission purpose to the mission statement-why are we doing this task(s)? The purpose normally describes using a descriptive phrase and is often more important than the task because it provides clarity to the task(s) and assists with subordinate initiatives.

<div style="border:1px solid black; padding:1em; text-align:center;">

**Purposes (In order to…)**

| | |
|---|---|
| • *Allow* | • *Influence* |
| • *Cause* | • *Open* |
| • *Create* | • *Prevent* |
| • *Deceive* | • *Protect* |
| • *Deny* | • *Restore* |
| • *Divert* | • *Support* |
| • *Enable* | • *Surprise* |

</div>

11. **<u>Key-Step — 11:  Develop and Conduct Mission Analysis Brief (</u>**<u>See Figure XIV-14 on the following page.).</u>   Upon conclusion of the Mission Analysis and JIPOE, the staff will present a Mission Analysis Brief to the CDR.  The purpose of the Mission Analysis Brief is to provide the CDR with the results of the preliminary staff analysis, offer a forum to surface issues that have been identified, and an opportunity for the CDR to give his guidance to the staff and to approve or disapprove of the staff's analysis. However, modifications to this brief may be necessary based on the CDRs availability of relevant information.  Figure XVI-14 on the following page, shows an *example* of a Mission Analysis Briefing format from CJCSM 3500.05A, *JTFHQMTG,* 1 September 2003.

a.   The mission analysis briefing should not be a unit readiness briefing.  Staff officers must know the status of subordinate and supporting units and brief relevant information as it applies to the situation.

b.   The mission analysis briefing is given to both the CDR and the staff.  This is often the only time the entire staff is present, and the only opportunity to ensure that all staff members are starting from a common reference point.  Mission analysis is critical to ensure thorough understanding of the task and subsequent planning.

c.   The briefing focuses on relevant conclusions reached as a result of the mission analysis.  This helps the CDR and staffs develop a shared vision of the requirements for the OPLAN and execution.

**Figure XVI-14**

12. **Key-Step — 12:  Prepare Initial Staff Estimates.**  As discussed earlier, the development of an effective CDR's estimate must be supported by mission analysis, planning guidance, and *staff estimates*.

    a.   Early staff estimates are frequently given as oral briefings to the rest of the staff. They are continually ongoing and updating based on changes in the situation.  In the beginning, they tend to emphasize information collection more than analysis.  The CJCSM 3122 *(JOPES VOL I)* contains sample formats for staff estimates.  (Also, see the JOPP Chapter of this publication.)

b.  **The role of the staff is to support the CDR in achieving situational understanding, making decisions, disseminating directives, and following directives through execution**.  The staff's effort during planning focuses on developing effective plans and orders and helping the CDR make related decisions.  The staff does this by integrating situation-specific information with sound doctrine and technical competence.  The staff's planning activities initially focus on **mission analysis**, which develops information to help the CDR, staff, and subordinate CDRs understand the situation and mission.  Later, during COA development and comparison, the staff provides recommendations to support the CDR's selection of a COA.  Once the CDR approves a COA, the staff coordinates all necessary details and prepares the plan or order.

c.  Throughout planning, staff officers prepare recommendations within their functional areas, such as system, weapons, and munitions capabilities, limitations, and employment; risk identification and mitigation; resource allocation and synchronization of supporting assets; and multinational and interagency considerations.  Staff sections prepare and continuously update **staff estimates** that address these and other areas continuously throughout the JOPP.  The staff maintains these estimates throughout the operation, not just during pre-execution planning.

d.  Not every situation will require or permit a lengthy and formal staff estimate process.  During CAP, the CDR may review the assigned mission, receive oral staff briefings, develop and select a COA informally, and direct that plan development commence.  However, Contingency Planning will demand a more formal and thorough process.  Staff estimates should be shared collaboratively with subordinate and supporting CDRs to help them prepare their supporting estimates, plans, and orders.  This will improve parallel planning and collaboration efforts of subordinate and supporting elements and help reduce the planning times for the entire process.[48]

13. **Key-Step — 13:  Approval of Mission Statement, develop CDR's Intent and publish Initial Planning Guidance**

a.  **Restated Mission Statement**. Immediately after the mission analysis briefing, the CDR approves a restated mission.  This can be the staff's recommended mission statement, a modified version of the staff's recommendation, or one that the CDR has developed personally. Once approved, the restated mission becomes the unit mission.

> It is the one overriding expression of will by which everything in the order and every action by every commander and soldier in the army must be dominated, it should, therefore, be worded by the commander himself
> **Field Marshal Viscount William Joseph Slim, Defeat into Victory, Batting Japan in Burma and India, 1942-1945, Cooper Square Press, p. 211.**

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[48]JP 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, 26 Dec 2006.

b.  **CDRs Intent**.  The intent statement is the CDRs' personal vision of how the campaign will unfold.  Generally, the CDR will write his own intent statement.  Frequently the staff will provide substantial input(s).  The CDR's intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the military end state.  It provides focus to the staff and helps subordinate and supporting CDRs take actions to achieve the military end state without further orders, even when operations do not unfold as planned.  It also includes where the CDR will accept risk during the operation.  At the theater strategic level, commander's intent must necessarily be much broader – it must provide an overall vision for the campaign that helps staff and subordinate commanders understand the intent for integrating all elements of national power and achieving unified action.  **The CCDR must envision and articulate how military power and joint operations will dominate the adversary and support or reinforce the interagency and our allies in accomplishing strategic success**.  Through his intent, the commander identifies the major unifying efforts during the campaign, the points and events where operations must dominate the enemy and control conditions in the OE, and where other elements of national power will play a central role.  The intent must allow for decentralized execution.

(1)  It provides the link between the mission and the concept of operations by stating the method that, along with the mission, are the basis for subordinates to exercise initiative when unanticipated opportunities arise or when the original concept of operations no longer applies.  If the CDR wishes to explain a broader purpose beyond that of the mission statement, he may do so.  The mission and the CDR's intent must be understood two echelons down.  The intent statement at any level must support the intent of the next higher CDR.

(2)  The initial intent statement normally contains the purpose and military end state as the initial impetus for the planning process; it could be stated verbally when time is short.  The CDR refines the intent statement as planning progresses.  The CDR's approved intent is written in the "Execution" paragraph as part of the operation plan or order.

(3)  A well-devised intent statement enables subordinates to decide how to act when facing unforeseen opportunities and threats, and in situations where the concept of operations no longer applies.  This statement deals primarily with the military conditions that lead to mission accomplishment, so the CDR may highlight selected objectives and effects.  The statement also can discuss other instruments of national power as they relate to the mission and the potential impact of military operations on these instruments.  The CDR's intent may include the CDR's assessment of the adversary CDR's intent and an assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable during the operation.

(4)  Remember, the CDR's intent is not a summary of the CONOPs.  It should not tell specifically how the operation is being conducted, but should be crafted to allow subordinate CDRs sufficient flexibility and freedom to act in accomplishing their assigned mission(s) even in the "fog of war."  While there is no specified joint format for CDR's intent, a generally accepted construct includes the purpose, method, and end state:

- **Purpose:** The reason for the military action with respect to the mission of the next higher echelon. The purpose explains why the military action is being conducted. This helps the force pursue the mission without further orders, even when actions do not unfold as planned. Thus, if an unanticipated situation arises, participating CDRs understand the purpose of the forthcoming action well enough to act decisively and within the bounds of the higher CDR's intent.

- **Method:** The "how," in doctrinally concise terminology, explains the offensive form of maneuver, the alternative defense, or other action to be used by the force as a whole. Details as to specific subordinate missions are not discussed.

- **End State:** Describes what the CDR wants to see in military terms after the completion of the mission by the friendly forces.

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**Commander's Intent (P/M/E)**

**<u>Purpose</u>:** Maintain Green's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

**<u>Method</u>:** USXXCOM forces will secure LOCs to ensure a rapid build-up of forces in the JOA. The utilization of HN support will be maximized. Forces will deploy into theater under the auspices of participation in C/J exercises demonstrating C/J force capabilities. IO will be optimized to communicate capability and coalition resolve against Red aggression. During these exercises, C/J forces will be positioned throughout the JOA with the capability to rapidly project full spectrum combat power against Red forces violating Green sovereignty.

**<u>End State</u>:** Red forces withdrawn from forward staging bases and postured at their peacetime locations. These forces will be incapable of conducting rapid force build-up (>7 days ) threatening Green.

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c. **Initial Planning Guidance.** After approving the mission statement and issuing their intent, CDRs provide the staff (and subordinates in a collaborative environment) with enough additional guidance (including preliminary decisions) to focus the staff and subordinate planning activities during course of action development. As a minimum, the initial planning guidance should include the mission statement; assumptions; operational limitations; a discussion of the national strategic end state; termination criteria; military end state military objectives; and the CDRs initial thoughts on desired and undesired effects. The planning guidance should also address the role of agencies and multinational partners in the pending operation and any related special considerations as required.[49]

(1) The CDR approves the derived mission and gives the staff (and normally subordinate CDRs) initial *planning guidance*. This guidance is essential for timely and

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[49] JP 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, 26 Dec 2006.

effective COA development and analysis. The guidance should precede the staff's preparation for conducting their respective staff estimates. The CDR's responsibility is to *implant a desired vision* of the forthcoming combat action into the minds of the staff. Enough guidance (preliminary decisions) must be provided to allow the subordinates to plan the action necessary to accomplish the mission consistent with his and the SecDef's intent. The CDR's guidance must focus on the *essential tasks* and associated objectives that support the accomplishment of the assigned national objectives. It emphasizes in broad terms when, where, and how the CDR intends to employ combat power to accomplish the mission within the higher CDR's intent.

(2) The CDR may provide the planning guidance to the entire staff and/or subordinate CDRs or meet each staff officer or subordinate unit CDR individually as the situation and information dictates. The guidance can be given in a written form or orally. No format for the planning guidance is prescribed. However, the guidance should be sufficiently detailed to provide a clear direction and to avoid unnecessary efforts by the staff or subordinate CDRs.

(3) The content of planning guidance varies from CDR to CDR and is dependent on the situation and time available. Planning guidance <u>may</u> include:

— Situation

— The derived mission – including essential task(s) and associated objectives

— Purpose of the forthcoming military action

— Information available (or unavailable) at the time

— Forces available for planning

— Limiting factors (constraints and restraints) – including time constraints for planning

— Pertinent assumptions

— Tentative Courses of Action (COAs) under consideration: friendly strengths to be emphasized or enemy weaknesses the COAs should attack, or specific planning tasks

— Preliminary guidance for use (or non-use) of nuclear weapons

— Coordinating instructions

— Acceptable level of risk to own and friendly forces

— Information Operations guidance

(4) Planning guidance can be very explicit and detailed, or it can be very broad, allowing the staff and/or subordinate CDR's wide latitude in developing subsequent COAs. However, no matter its scope, the content of planning guidance must be arranged in a logical sequence to reduce the chances of misunderstanding and to enhance clarity. Moreover, one must recognize that all the elements of planning guidance are *tentative only*. The CDR may issue successive planning guidance during the decision-making process. Yet, the focus of his staff should remain upon the framework provided in the

initial planning guidance. The CDR should provide subsequent planning guidance during the rest of the plan development process.

(5) Initial planning guidance includes <u>Termination Criteria</u> and <u>Mission Success Criteria</u>. These criteria become the basis for assessment and include <u>measures of performance and measures of effectiveness</u>.

(a) **Termination.** As discussed earlier, but worth a quick review, when and under what circumstances to suspend or terminate a military operation is a political decision. Effective planning cannot occur without a clear picture of the military end state and termination criteria. Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve achieved advantages is essential to achieving the national strategic end state. Even so, it is essential that the CJCS and the supported JFC advise the President and SecDef during the decision-making process. The supported JFC should ensure that political leaders understand the implications, both immediate and long term, of a suspension of hostilities at any point in the conflict. Once established, the national strategic objectives enable the supported CDR to develop the military end state, recommended termination criteria, and supporting military objectives. Termination criteria typically apply to the **end of a joint operation and disengagement by joint forces**. This often signals the end of the use of the military instrument of national power.

(b) **Mission success criteria** describe the standards for determining mission accomplishment. The JFC includes these criteria in the initial planning guidance so that the joint force staff and components better understand what constitutes mission success. Mission success criteria can apply to any joint operation, phase, and joint force component operation. These criteria help the JFC determine if and when to move to the next major operation or phase.

<u>1</u>   The initial set of criteria determined during mission analysis becomes the basis for **assessment** (see Function IV, Plan Assessment, within this document for more details). Assessment uses **measures of performance (MOPs)** and **measures of effectiveness (MOEs)** to indicate progress toward achieving objectives.

<u>a</u>   Measure of performance –  A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment, also called **MOP.**[50]

<u>b</u>   Measure of effectiveness – A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect, also called **MOE.** The CCDR should develop MOE to serve as tools in determining the degree to which mission objectives are met. MOE's should be developed for quantitative or qualitative standards as a means to evaluate operations and guide decision-making. Accurate and effective MOE contribute to mission effectiveness in many ways. MOE's will vary with mission; however, planners should ensure that MOE's posses the following characteristics:

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[50]JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, 17 Sep 2006.

- **Appropriate.** MOEs should correlate to the audience objectives.

- **Mission-related.** MOEs must reflect the CDR's desired end state and the specific military objectives to reach the end state.

- **Measurable.** Quantitative MOEs reflect reality more accurately than non-quantitative MOEs, and hence, are generally the measure of choice when the situation permits their use.

- **Numerically reasonable.** MOEs should be limited to the minimum required to effectively portray the measure of the attainment.

- **Universally understood and accepted.** MOEs should be clear and concise based among the various government agencies, HN, and others to ensure that all concerned focus on efforts desired as well as the criteria for transition and termination of the military role.

- **Useful.** MOEs should detect situation changes quickly enough for the CDR to immediately and effectively respond.

2  If the mission is unambiguous and limited in time and scope, mission success criteria could be readily identifiable and linked directly to the mission statement. For example, if the JFC's mission is to *evacuate all U.S. personnel from the U.S. embassy in Grayland*, then mission analysis could identify two primary success criteria: **(1)** all U.S. personnel are evacuated and **(2)** established ROE are not violated.

> **<u>Possible MOEs in FHA operations could include:</u>**
> - Drops in mortality rates in the affected population, below a specified level per day.
> - Increase in water available to each disaster victim per day to various levels established for human consumption, to support sanitation measures, and for livestock consumption.
> - Decreases in population of displaced persons in camps to a level sustainable by the effected country or HN military organizations.
> - Decrease in incidence of disease to an acceptable or manageable level. An increase in the presence and capabilities of NGOs, PVOs, and IOs.
> - When the capabilities of the JTF are no longer unique to the overall humanitarian effort.

<u>3</u>    However, more complex operations will require MOEs and MOPs for each task, effect, and phase of the operation.  For example, if the JFC's specified tasks are to *ensure friendly transit through the Straits of Gray, eject Redland forces from Grayland, and restore stability along the Grayland-Redland border*, then mission analysis should indicate many potential success criteria — measured by MOEs and MOPs — some for each desired effect and task.

<u>4</u>    Measuring the status of tasks, effects, and objectives becomes the basis for reports to senior CDRs and civilian leaders on the progress of the operation.  The CCDR can then advise the President and SecDef accordingly and adjust operations as required.  Whether in a supported or supporting role, JFCs at all levels must develop their mission success criteria with a clear understanding of termination criteria established by the CJCS and SecDef. [51]

*See Assessment Chapter XXIII for more details on MOE/MOP*

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[51]JP 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, 26 Dec 2006.

# CHAPTER XVII

# CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT – FUNCTION II

1. **Function II — Concept Development**

   a.   During the concept development step, CCDRs develop, analyze, and compare viable COAs and develop staff estimates that are coordinated with the Military Departments when applicable.  Analysis includes wargaming, operational modeling, and initial feasibility assessments.

   b.   A **Concept Development IPR** (IPR-C) will focus largely on the concept of operation, the enemy situation, interagency coordination, multinational involvement (if applicable) and capability requirements.  For IPR-C, the CCDR's estimate broadly outlines how forces will conduct integrated, joint operations to accomplish the mission. Among other elements and as appropriate, it communicates:

   — Recommended COAs and supporting rationale

   — Descriptions and assessments of alternate COAs and the friendly COAs

   — Feasible enemy COAs and comparison of enemy and friendly COAs

   — CDRs intent and desired end state

   — Assessed strategic and operational centers of gravity (COG)

   — Estimated level and duration of the operation

   — Nature, purpose, time-phasing and interrelationship of operations, including specific relationships to strategic communication

   — Branches, sequels, or other options, including warning and response times, that involve scenarios likely to confront the command

   — Gross transportation feasibility

   — Potential interagency and/or multinational involvement

   — The concept for sequencing the operation

   c.   As you work through the Concept Development Function you will be visualizing and thinking through the entire operation or campaign from end to start, start to end.  It's important to emphasize here, as discussed in Chapter III, operations and campaigns are broken into phases which are a way to view and conduct a complex joint operation in manageable parts.  You will determine requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space and purpose.  Doctrine now standardizes phasing in OPLANs within all COCOMs. The main purpose of phasing is to integrate and synchronize related activities, thereby enhancing flexibility and unity of effort during execution.  Reaching the end state often requires arranging a major operation or campaign in several phases.  Phasing assists CCDRs and staffs by helping them to visualize and think through the entire operation or campaign and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and

purpose. Phases are designed to be conducted sequentially, but activities from a phase may continue into subsequent phases.

d. The staff writes (or graphically portrays) the CONOPS in sufficient detail so that subordinate and supporting CDRs understand their mission, tasks, and other requirements and can develop their supporting plans accordingly. During CONOPS development, the CDR determines the best arrangement of simultaneous and sequential actions and activities to accomplish the assigned mission consistent with the approved COA. This arrangement of actions dictates the sequencing of forces into the OA, <u>providing the link between the CONOPS and force planning</u>. The link between the CONOPS and force planning is preserved and perpetuated through the TPFDD structure. This structure must ensure unit integrity, force mobility, and force visibility as well as the ability to rapidly transition to branches or sequels as operational conditions dictate. Planners ensure that the CONOPS, force plan, deployment plans, and supporting plans provide the flexibility to adapt to changing conditions, and are consistent with the CCDR's intent.

e. If the scope, complexity, and duration of the military action you contemplate warrants a campaign, then the staff outlines the series of military operations and associated objectives and develops the CONOPS for the preliminary part of the campaign in sufficient detail to impart a clear understanding of the CDR's concept of how the assigned mission will be accomplished.

f. During CONOPS development, the CCDR must assimilate many variables under conditions of uncertainty to determine the essential military conditions, sequence of actions, and application of capabilities and associated forces to create effects and achieve objectives. **CCDRs and their staffs must be continually aware of the higher-level objectives and associated effects that influence planning at every juncture.** If operational objectives are not linked to strategic objectives, the inherent linkage or "nesting" is broken and eventually tactical considerations can begin to drive the overall strategy at cross-purposes.

2. **COA Development Preparation and Considerations**:

- Time Available
- Political Considerations
- Flexible Deterrent Options
- Lines of Operation

a. **Time Available**. The CDR, and the nature of the mission will dictate the number of COAs to be considered. Staff sections continually inform course of action development by an ongoing staff estimate process to ensure suitability, feasibility, acceptability, and compliance with Joint Doctrine (deviations from Joint Doctrine should be conscious decisions and not the result of a lack of knowledge of doctrinal procedures). Additionally, staffs ensure completeness (answers Who, What, When, Where, How).

b. **Political Considerations**. Planning for the use of military forces includes a discussion of the political implications of their transportation, staging, and employment. The CCDR's political advisor is a valuable asset in advising the CCDR and staff on

issues crucial to the planning process, such as overflight and transit rights for deploying forces, basing, and support agreements.  Multinational and coalition force concerns and sensitivities must also be considered.

(1) **Political objectives drive the operation at every level from strategic to tactical.**  There are many degrees to which political objectives influence operations: ROE restrictions and basing access and overflight rights are examples.  Two important factors about political primacy stand out.  *First*, all military personnel should understand the political objectives and the potential impact of inappropriate actions**.**  Having an understanding of the political objective helps avoid actions which may have adverse political effects.  It is not uncommon today in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) for junior leaders to make decisions which have significant political implications.  *Secondly*, CDRs should remain aware of changes not only in the operational situation, but also to changes in political objectives that may warrant a change in military operations. These changes may not always be obvious.

(2) The integration of U.S. political and military objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into action have always been essential to success at all levels of operation.  The global environment that is characterized by regional instability, failed states, increased weapons proliferation, global terrorism, and unconventional threats to U.S. citizens, interests, and territories, requires even greater cooperation.

(3) Today's adversary is a dynamic, adaptive foe who operates within a complex, interconnected operational environment.  Attaining our national objectives requires the efficient and effective use of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) instruments of national power and systems taxonomy of the multi-dimensional political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure (PMESII).  This situational understanding supported by and coordinated with that of our allies and various intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and regional security organizations is critical to success.

(4) Military operations must be strategically integrated and operational and tactically coordinated with the activities of other agencies of the USG, IGOs, NGOs, regional organizations, the operations of foreign forces, and activities of various host nation (HN) agencies.  Sometimes the JFC draws on the capabilities of other organizations; sometimes the JFC provides capabilities to other organizations; and sometimes the JFC merely deconflicts his activities with those of others.  These same organizations may be involved in pre-hostilities operations, activities during combat, and in the transition to post-hostilities activities.  Roles and relationships among agencies and organizations, COCOMs, U.S. state and local governments, and overseas with the U.S. chief of mission (COM), and country team in a U.S. embassy, must be clearly understood.  Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military and the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power.  Successful interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination helps enable the USG to build international support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that efficiently achieve shared goals.

c.  **Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs).**  Flexible deterrent options are preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions carefully tailored to send the right signal and influence an adversary's actions.  They can be established to dissuade actions before a crisis arises or to deter further aggression during a crisis.  FDOs are developed for each instrument of national power — diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and others (financial, intelligence and law enforcement -DIMEFIL) — but they are most effective when used in combination with other instruments of national power.

(1) FDOs facilitate early strategic decision-making, rapid de-escalation and crisis resolution by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths.  Examples of FDOs for each instrument of national power are listed in Figures XVII-1 through XVII-4.  **Key goals of FDOs are:**

(a)  Deter aggression through communicating the strength of U.S. commitments to treaty obligations and peaceful development.

(b)  Confront the adversary with unacceptable costs for its possible aggression.

(c)  Isolate the adversary from regional neighbors and attempt to split the adversary coalition.

(d)  Rapidly improve the military balance of power in the OA.



**EXAMPLES OF REQUESTED ECONOMIC FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS**

- ► Freeze or seize real property in the United States where possible
- ► Freeze monetary assets in the United States where possible
- ► Freeze international assets where possible
- ► Encourage US and international financial institutions to restrict or terminate financial transactions
- ► Encourage US and international corporations to restrict transactions
- ► Embargo goods and services
- ► Enact trade sanctions
- ► Enact restrictions on technology transfer
- ► Cancel or restrict US-funded programs
- ► Reduce security assistance programs

**Figure XVII-1.  Examples of Requested Economic Flexible Deterrent Options**

(2) **FDOs Implementation.**  The use of FDOs must be consistent with U.S. national security strategy (i.e., the instruments of national power are normally used in combination with one another), therefore, continuous coordination with interagency

partners is imperative.  All operation plans have FDOs, and CCDRs are tasked by the JSCP to plan requests for appropriate options using all instruments of national power.[1]

      (3) **Military FDOs.**  Military FDOs underscore the importance of early response to a crisis.  Deployment timelines, combined with the requirement for a rapid, early response, generally requires military FDO force packages to be light; however, military FDOs are not intended to place U.S. forces in jeopardy if deterrence fails (risk analysis should be an inherent step in determining which FDOs to use, and how and when to use them).  Military FDOs are carefully tailored to avoid the classic "too much, too soon" or "too little, too late" responses.  They rapidly improve the military balance of power in the operational area (OA), especially in terms of early warning, intelligence gathering, logistic infrastructure, air and maritime forces, information operations, and force protection assets, without precipitating armed response from the adversary.  Military FDOs are most effective when used in concert with the other instruments of power.  They can be initiated before or after, and with or without unambiguous warning 3.  (Figure XVII-2).[2]



**EXAMPLES OF REQUESTED MILITARY FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS**

- ▶ Increase readiness posture of in-place forces
- ▶ Upgrade alert status
- ▶ Increase intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
- ▶ Initiate or increase show-of-force actions
- ▶ Increase training and exercise activities
- ▶ Maintain an open dialogue with the news media
- ▶ Take steps to increase US public support
- ▶ Increase defense support to public diplomacy
- ▶ Increase information operations
- ▶ Deploy forces into or near the potential operational area
- ▶ Increase active and passive protection measures
- ▶ Ensure consistency of strategic communications messages

**Figure XVII-2.  Examples of Requested Military Flexible Deterrent Options**

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[1]JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, 17 Sep 2006.

[2]JP 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, 26 Dec 2006.

**EXAMPLES OF REQUESTED INFORMATIONAL FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS**

- ► Promote US policy objectives through public policy statements
- ► Ensure consistency of strategic communications themes and messages
- ► Encourage Congressional support
- ► Gain US and international public confidence and popular support
- ► Maintain open dialogue with the news media
- ► Keep selected issues as lead stories
- ► Increase protection of friendly critical information structure
- ► Impose sanctions on communications systems technology transfer
- ► Implement psychological operations

**Figure XVII-3.  Examples of Requested Informational Flexible Deterrent Options**

**EXAMPLES OF REQUESTED DIPLOMATIC FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS**

- ► Alert and introduce special teams (e.g., public diplomacy)
- ► Reduce international diplomatic ties
- ► Increase cultural group pressure
- ► Promote democratic elections
- ► Initiate noncombatant evacuation procedures
- ► Identify the steps to peaceful resolution
- ► Restrict activities of diplomatic missions
- ► Prepare to withdraw or withdraw US embassy personnel
- ► Take actions to gain support of allies and friends
- ► Restrict travel of US citizens
- ► Gain support through the United Nations
- ► Demonstrate international resolve

**Figure XVII-4.  Example of Requested Diplomatic Flexible Deterrent Options**

So far within Mission Analysis we've discussed the process of operational design in the following steps:

- *End State* (in terms of desired strategic political-military outcomes).

- *Objectives* that describe the conditions necessary to meet the end state.

- Desired *effects* that support the defined objectives.

- Friendly and enemy *center(s) of gravity (COG)* using a systems approach.

- *Decisive points* that allow the joint force to affect the enemy's COG and look for decisive points necessary to protect friendly COGs.

Now let's look at identifying **lines of operation** that describe how decisive points are to be achieved and linked together in such a way as to overwhelm or disrupt the enemy's COG.

3. **Lines of Operation (LOO).** LOO can be thought of as the analytical bridge between the outcomes of the mission analysis process and the development of COA's. It is important to conduct LOO analysis prior to COA development to ensure COAs achieve military objectives. As JFCs visualize the design of the operation, they may use several **lines of operation** (LOO) to help visualize the intended progress of the joint force toward achieving operational and strategic objectives.

a. In operational design, lines of operation describe how decisive points are linked to operational objectives. Joint doctrine defines *lines of operation* as "lines that define the orientation of the force in time, space, and purpose in relation to an adversary or objective." They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives.

- CDRs establish the military conditions and end state for each operation, developing lines of operations that focus efforts to create the conditions that produce the end state.

- Subordinate CDRs adjust the level of effort and missions along each line of operation. Lines of operation are formulated during course of action development and refined through continual assessment.[3]

b. **Lines of operation must be derived from decisive points**. The kinds of decisive points related to a line of operation define the description of the line of operation. This is why decisive points must be determined first before defining lines of operation. Lines of operation are the least understood portion of operational design and therefore tend to be misapplied. The importance of well-defined and understood lines of operation is basic to linking decisive points, center(s) of gravity, objectives, and endstate. Properly defined, lines of operation provide clarity and distinction and provide the rationale for everything that the joint force does. Therefore, poorly defined lines of operation weaken the plan and lead to confusion. Lines of operation should be broadly defined to encompass a more flexible way of thinking. Logical lines are descriptive and collective in nature and *refer to conditions*. Physical lines of operation should also be seen as *relating to functions* or *functional components* of the joint force.

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[3]FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*, 21 June 2006.

> "Having determined in order, endstate, objectives and effects, center(s) of gravity, decisive points, and lines of operation, planners then can link lines of operation to decisive points and examine the how and where certain decisive points support multiple lines of operation."
>
> **Operational Design: A Methodology for Planners, Dr. Keith D. Dickson, Professor of Military Studies, Joint Forces Staff College**

c.   Lines of operation define the orientation of the force in time and space or purpose in relation to an adversary or objective.  CDRs may describe the operation along LOO that are **physical**, **logical**, or **both**.  Logical and physical LOO are not mutually exclusive and JFCs often combine them.  Normally, joint operations require CDRs to synchronize activities along multiple and complementary LOO working through a series of military strategic and operational objectives to attain the military end state.  There are many possible ways to graphically depict LOO, which can assist planners to visualize/conceptualize the joint operation from beginning to end and prepare the OPLAN or OPORD accordingly.

d.   From the perspective of unified action, there are many diplomatic, economic, and informational activities that can affect the sequencing and conduct of military operations along both physical and logical LOO.  Planners should consider depicting relevant actions or events of the other instruments of national power on their LOO diagrams.

(1) A **physical line of operation** connects a series of decisive points over time that lead to control of a geographic objective or defeat of an enemy force.  *CDRs use physical LOO to connect the force with its base of operations and objectives when positional reference to the enemy is a factor*.  *Physical lines of operation* (Figures XVII-5 and XVII-6) define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy.  They connect a series of decisive points that, over time, lead to control of a geographic objective or enemy force.  Operations designed using physical lines of operation generally consist of a series of cyclic, short-term events executed according to a well-defined, finite timeline.  Major combat operations are typically designed using physical lines of operation.  These tie offensive and defensive operations to the geographic and positional references of the AO.  CDRs synchronize activities along complementary lines of operation to attain the end state.  Physical LOO may be either *interior* or *exterior*.



**Figure XVII-5.  Sample Physical Line of Operation**

**Figure XVII-6. Physical Lines of Operation**
(*FM 3-0, Full Spectrum Operations, 21 June 2006*)

(a) **Interior and Exterior Lines.** The concept of interior and exterior lines applies to both maneuver and logistics. If a force is interposed between two or more adversary forces, it is said to be operating on interior lines. Thus the force is able to move against any of the opposing forces, or switch its resources over a shorter distance than its adversary. Such a concept depends on the terrain and the state of mobility of both sides. In Figure XVII-7 below, the defending force (Force B) has a shorter distance to move in order to reinforce its force elements in contact. The attacking force (Force A) has a greater distance to travel to switch resources across its three operations (A1, A2, A3).[4]



**Figure XVII-7. Interior and Exterior Lines**

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[4]*Joint Doctrine Publication 01* (JDP 01), United Kingdom, dated March 2004.

(b) A force operates on **interior lines** when its operations diverge from a central point and when it is therefore closer to separate adversary forces than the latter are to one another. Interior lines benefit a weaker force by allowing it to shift the main effort laterally more rapidly than the adversary, and provide increased security to logistical support operations.

(c) A force operates on **exterior lines** when its operations converge on the adversary. Successful operations on exterior lines require a stronger or more mobile force, but offer the opportunity to encircle and annihilate a weaker or less mobile opponent. Assuring strategic mobility enhances exterior LOO by providing the JFC greater freedom of maneuver.[5]

<u>1</u>  The relevance of interior and exterior physical lines depends on the relationship of time and distance between the opposing forces. Although an adversary force may have interior lines with respect to the friendly force, this advantage disappears if the friendly force is more agile and operates at a higher operational tempo. Conversely, if a smaller force maneuvers to a position between larger but less agile adversary forces, the friendly force may be able to defeat them in detail before they can react effectively. A joint operation may have *single* or *multiple* physical LOO.

<u>a</u>  A **single LOO** has the advantage of concentrating forces and simplifying planning.

<u>b</u>  **Multiple LOO**, on the other hand, increase flexibility and create opportunities for success. Multiple LOO also make it difficult for an adversary to determine the objectives of the campaign or major operation, forcing the adversary to disperse resources to defend against multiple threats. The decision to operate on multiple lines will depend to a great extent on the availability of resources.

(2) Physical lines of operation reflect the more traditional linkage of decisive points, objectives, and end state. However, using physical lines of operations alone does not project the operational design beyond the defeat of the enemy force. Combining physical and logical lines of operation allows CDRs to project operational design beyond the current phase of the operation to set the conditions for an enduring peace. It allows them to consider the less tangible aspects of the operational environment in which the other instruments of national power are predominant. CDRs can visualize post-hostility operations from a far more conceptual perspective. The resulting operational design reflects the thorough integration of full spectrum operations across the spectrum of conflict.[6]

(3) **Logical LOO (LLO)** are used by the JFC to visualize and describe the operation when *positional reference to an enemy or adversary has less relevance*. In

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[5] JP 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, 26 Dec 2006.

[6] FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*, 21 June 2006.

contrast to physical LOO, a **logical** line of operations focuses more on depicting a logical arrangement of tasks, effects, and/or objectives. LLO typically can link multiple decisive points with the logic of purpose to defeat an enemy or achieve an objective (XVII-8). This situation is common in many joint operations, particularly from the theater-strategic perspective. In a linkage between objectives and forces, only the logical linkage of LOO may be evident. LLO are particularly useful when working with interagency and multinational partners in either a supporting or supported capacity. For example, a JFC can reflect the tasks and objectives of agencies along separate LOO and relate these to tasks and objectives along the military LOO. LLO also help CDRs visualize how military means can support nonmilitary instruments of national power and vice versa.[7]

      (a) CDRs use LLO to link the logic of purpose – conditions and effects – with a series of conceptual decisive points or objectives to the conditions that define the end state. Operations designed using LLO are typically focused on conditions rather than physical objectives. LLO combine the complementary, long-term effects of stability tasks with the cyclic, short-term events characteristic of combat operations. LLO also help CDRs visualize how military means can support nonmilitary instruments of national power.

      (b) Using LLO, CDRs develop tasks and missions, allocate resources, and assess the effectiveness of the operation. The CDR may specify which LLO represents the decisive operation and which are shaping operations. CDRs synchronize activities along multiple LLO to achieve the conditions that compose the desired end state.[8]

      (c) In stability or civil support operations, CDRs typically visualize the operation along LLO (Figure XVII-8 and XVII-9). LLO in stability operations are normally focused in five complementary areas – combat operations, regional security, civil security, civil control, and civil action (reconstruction or restoration of essential services, and governance). As the operation continues, CDRs may modify them based on assessments of the situation. Within a civil support operation, LLO will normally focus on support to civil authority, support of law enforcement, critical asset protection, and restoration of essential services. Each operation, however, will be unique; CDRs develop and modify logical lines of operations according to the situation.

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[7]JP 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, 26 Dec 2006.

[8]FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*, 21 June 2006.

**Figure XVII-8. Example Logical Lines of Operation (stability)**

(d) Success in one LLO reinforces successes in the others. There is no list of LLO that applies in all cases. LLO are directly related to one another. They connect objectives that, when accomplished, support achieving the end state. Operations designed using LLO typically employ an extended, event-driven timeline with short-, mid-, and long-term goals.



FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, Dec 2006

**Figure XVII-9. Example Logical Lines of Operation for a Counterinsurgency**

(e) CDRs determine which LLO apply to their AO and how the LLO connect with and support one another:

For example, CDRs may conduct offensive and defensive operations to form a shield behind which simultaneous stability operations can maintain a secure environment for the populace. Accomplishing the objectives of combat operations/civil security operations sets the conditions needed to achieve essential services and economic development objectives. When the populace perceives that the environment is safe enough to leave families at home, workers will seek employment or conduct public economic activity. Popular participation in civil and economic life facilitates further provision of essential services and development of greater economic activity. Over time such activities establish an environment that attracts outside capital for further development. Neglecting objectives along one LLO risks creating vulnerable conditions along another that insurgents can exploit. Achieving the desired end state requires linked successes along all LLO.

(f) CDRs at all levels should select the LLO that relate best to achieving the desired end state in accordance with the CDR's intent. The following list of possible LLO is not all inclusive. However, it gives CDRs a place to start:

- Conduct information operations.
- Conduct combat operations/civil security operations.
- Train and employ HN security forces.
- Establish or restore essential services.
- Support development of better governance.
- Support economic development.

(g) These lines can be customized, renamed, changed altogether, or simply not used. CDRs may combine two or more of the listed LLO or split one LLO into several. For example, IO are integrated into all LLO; however, CDRs may designate a separate LLO for IO if necessary to better describe their intent (XVII-10). Likewise, some CDRs may designate separate LLO for combat operations and civil security operations.[9]

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[9]FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, Dec 2006.

**Figure XVII-10. Example Goals and Objectives along Logical Lines of Operation**

(4) An operational design composed of both physical and logical lines of operation reflects the characteristics and advantages of each. With this approach, it is vital for the CDR to synchronize actions across the lines of operation, creating complementary and reinforcing effects. This ensures that the lines of operation converge on a well-defined, commonly understood end state that is composed of the set of conditions initially outlined in the CDR's intent (XVII-11). [10]



**Figure XVII-11. Campaign Planning Schematic, LtCol Mike Mahaney-JAWS AY06-07**
**See Key below:**

**1.** Decisive Points are sequenced in time and space on LOO. They are the key to unlocking the COG, and without their completion the COG cannot be defeated or neutralized. This sequencing can be assisted by Phases.

**2**. Lines of Operation can be environmental or functional or a mixture of both. They should not be decided until the Decisive Points have been derived and the critical path identified.

**3.** Operational Pauses may be introduced where necessary. Momentum must be maintained elsewhere.

**4.** Culmination Point is reached when an operation or battle can just be maintained but not developed to any great advantage.

**5.** Branches are contingency plans which can be introduced to Lines of Operation whenever necessary, and are continuously refined as the campaign develops.

**6.** Sequels are contingency plans introduced when phases are not completed as planned.

**7.** The adversary COG at the operational level is that which most resists the end-state. Without the neutralization or destruction of the adversary's COG, the end-state cannot be reached. Activity, necessary to finally achieve the end-state conditions, may take place after its destruction or neutralization, but this will not be decisive or critical. It may be useful to show own COG as it is the thing that needs protecting most, and is therefore that which the adversary is likely to direct his efforts against.

**8.** The end-state provides the focus for campaign planning and all activities should be judged against their relevance to its achievement. The operational end-state will usually be given by the Military Strategic Authority and may be a list of objectives or a statement. It needs analysis in order to identify measurable conditions which together indicate that the end-state has been achieved.

**9.** It may be useful to include a line showing key events. These might be the deadline for compliance with a UN resolution, the date an adversary 2nd Echelon force might be ready for combat, the estimated time for the completion of mobilization, or the holding of the first free and fair elections.

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[10]FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*, 21 June 2006.

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# CHAPTER XVIII

# COA DEVELOPMENT

| | |
|---|---|
| Step #1 | PLANNING INITIATION |
| Step #2 | MISSION ANALYSIS |
| Step #3 | COA DEVELOPMENT |
| Step #4 | COA ANALYSIS & WARGAMING |
| Step #5 | COA COMPARISON |
| Step #6 | COA APPROVAL |
| Step #7 | PLAN OR ORDER DEVELOPMENT |

**COA Determination** (spans Step #3 through Step #6)

1. **Step 3 — COA Development:**

   a. **COA Development.**  A COA is any force employment option open to a CDR that, if adopted, would result in the accomplishment of the mission of the campaign.  For each COA, the CDR must envision the employment of own/friendly forces and assets as a whole, taking into account externally imposed limitations, the area of operations, and the conclusions previously drawn during the mission analysis and the CDR's guidance.  However, there are a few more considerations prior to actually developing your COA's.  You must first consider your time available, political considerations, any flexible deterrent options and off course, lines of operations.

   b. **Defining the COA.**  Each COA is a broad statement of a possible way to accomplish the mission.  A COA consists of the following information:

   -WHO (type of forces) will execute the tasks/ take the action?

   -WHAT type of action or tasks are contemplated?

   -WHEN will the tasks begin?

   -WHERE will the tasks occur?

-WHY (for what purpose) the action is required (relate to end state)?

-HOW will the available forces be employed?

The staff converts the approved COA into a concept of operations. COA determination consists of four primary activities: *COA development, analysis and wargaming, comparison, and approval.*

2. **Tentative Courses of Action.** The output of COA development are **tentative COAs** (with sketch if possible, Figure XVIII-1) in which the CDR describes for each COA, in broad but clear terms, what is to be done, the size of forces deemed necessary, and time in which force needs to be brought to bear. Tentative COAs allow for initial conceptualization and broad descriptions of potential approaches to the conduct of operations that will accomplish the desired end state. The CCDR gives the staff their preliminary thoughts on possible and acceptable military actions early in the planning process to provide focus to their efforts, allowing them to concentrate on developing COAs that are the most appropriate.



**Figure XVIII-1. Course of Action Development**

a. A *tentative COA* should be simple, brief, yet complete. The COA sketch contains the general arrangement of forces, the anticipated movement or maneuver of those forces, a brief description of the concept of operation, and major tasks to components. The COA's should have descriptive titles. Distinguishing factors of the COA may suggest titles that are descriptive in nature. A COA should answer the following questions:

(1) How much force is required to accomplish the mission?

(2) Generally, in what order should coalition forces be deployed?

(3)  Where and how should coalition aerospace, naval, ground and special operation forces be employed in theater?

(4)  What major tasks must be performed and in what sequence?

(5)  How is the coalition to be sustained for the duration of the campaign?

(6)  What are the command relationships?



**Phase 0: Shaping**
Task: Dissuade (ME: JFMCC)
Purpose: Stabilize the region by encouraging Algeria/Libya to accept political solution

**Phase 1: Deter**
Task: Dissuade (ME: JFACC)
Purpose: Discourage Algerian/ Libyan attack into Tunisia

**Phase 2: Seize the Initiative**

**Phase 3: Dominate**
Task: Destroy (ME: JFLCC)
Purpose: Remove all foreign adversaries from Tunisia and ensure they no longer pose as regional threats.  Re-establish Tunisian borders and control of EBOF

**Phase 4: Stabilize**
Task: Secure (ME: JFLCC)
Purpose: Maintain recognized borders and rebuild Tunisian defense capability

**Phase 5: Enable Civil Authorities**
Task: Secure
Purpose: Transition defense of Tunisia to host nation
Reserve Phases 3 – 4: MEB

**Figure XVI-13.  Course of Action Example**

3.   To develop *tentative* COAs, the staff must focus on key information necessary to make decisions and assimilate the data in mission analysis.  Usually, the staff develops no more than three COAs to focus their efforts and concentrate valuable resources on the most likely scenarios.  All COAs selected for analysis must be **valid**.  A valid COA is one that is **adequate, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable,** and **complete.**

   a.   **Adequate -** Can accomplish the mission within the CDR's guidance.

   b.   **Feasible -** Can accomplish the mission within the established time, space, and resource limitations.

c. **Acceptable** - Must balance cost and risk with the advantage gained.

d. **Distinguishable** - Must be sufficiently different from the other courses of action.

e. **Complete** - Must incorporate:

   (1) Objectives (including desired effects) and tasks to be performed

   (2) Major forces required

   (3) Concepts for deployment, employment, and sustainment

   (4) Time estimates for achieving objectives

   (5) Military end state and mission success criteria

4.   The staff should reject potential *tentative* COAs that do not meet all five criteria.  A good COA accomplishes the mission within the CDR's guidance and positions the joint force for future operations and provides flexibility to meet unforeseen events during execution.  It also gives components the maximum latitude for initiative.  Embedded within COA development is the application of operational art.  Planners can develop different COAs for using joint force capabilities (operational fires and maneuver, joint force organization, etc.) by varying the elements of operational design (such as phasing, line of operations, and so forth).

5.   During COA development, the CDR and staff continue *risk assessment*, focusing on identifying and assessing hazards to mission accomplishment.  The staff also continues to revise intelligence products.  Generally, at the theater level, each COA will constitute a theater strategic or operational concept and should outline the following per JP 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning,* 26 Dec 2006.

   a.   Major strategic and operational tasks to be accomplished in the order in which they are to be accomplished.

   b.   Capabilities required.

   c.   Task organization and related communications systems support concept.

   d.   Sustainment concept.

   e.   Deployment concept.

   f.   Estimate of time required to reach mission success criteria or termination criteria.

   g.   Concept for maintaining a theater reserve.

6.   **Tentative Courses of Action TTP's.**  Below is listed a logical flow of TTP's that will help focus the staff while conceptualizing Tentative COA's:

a. **Review information** contained in the mission analysis and CDRs' guidance. The staff should review once again the mission statement it developed and the CDR approved during mission analysis. All staff members should understand the mission and the tasks that must be accomplished to achieve mission success. Following this review or upon the receipt of new information or tasking(s) from higher headquarters, if the mission statement appears inadequate or outdated then the staff should recommend appropriate changes. The CDR has also given the staff his planning guidance. This guidance is directly linked to the CDR's operational design, how he visualizes the operation unfolding.

b. **Determine the COA development technique.** A critical first decision in COA development is whether to conduct simultaneous or sequential development of the COAs. Each approach has distinct advantages and disadvantages. The advantage of simultaneous development of COAs is potential time savings. Separate groups are simultaneously working on different COAs. The disadvantage of this approach is that the synergy of the JPG may be disrupted by breaking up the team. The approach is manpower intensive and requires component and directorate representation in each COA group, and there is an increased likelihood that the COAs will not be distinctive. While there is potential time to be saved, experience has demonstrated that it is not an automatic result. The simultaneous COA development approach can work, but its inherent disadvantages must be addressed and some risk accepted up front. The recommended approach if time and resources allows is the sequential method.

c. Planning cells with land, maritime, air, space and special operations planners as well as Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) reps (and others as necessary) should initially **develop ways to accomplish the essential tasks.**

(1) Regardless of the eventual COA, the staff should plan to accomplish the higher CDR's intent by understanding its essential task(s) and purpose and the intended contribution to the higher CDR's mission success. The staff must ensure that all the COAs developed will fulfill the command mission and the purpose of the operation by conducting a review of all essential tasks developed during mission analysis.

They should then consider ways to accomplish the other tasks.  A technique is for these planners to "think two levels down" (e.g., how could the MARFOR's component commands, MEF, or appropriate subordinate, accomplish the assigned tasks).

d.   Once the staff has begun to visualize a *tentative* COA, it should see how it can best synchronize (arrange in terms of time, space, and purpose) the actions of all the elements of the force.  The staff should estimate the anticipated duration of the operation.  One method of synchronizing actions is the use of phasing as discussed earlier.  Phasing assists the CDR and staff to visualize and think through the entire operation or campaign and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose.  Planners should then **integrate and synchronize** these ideas (which will essentially be Service perspectives) by using the joint architecture of maneuver, firepower, protection, support, and command and control (see the taxonomy used in the Universal Joint Task List).  **See the questions below:**

(1) **Land Operations.**  What are ways land forces can integrate/synchronize maneuver, firepower, protection, support, and command and control with other forces to accomplish their assigned tasks?  Compare friendly against enemy forces to see if there are sufficient land forces to accomplish the tasks.

(2) **Air Operations.**  What are ways air forces can integrate/synchronize maneuver, firepower, protection, support, and command and control with other forces to accomplish their assigned tasks?  Compare friendly against enemy forces to see if there are sufficient air forces to accomplish the tasks.

(3) **Maritime.**  What are ways maritime forces can integrate/synchronize maneuver, firepower, protection, support, and command and control with other forces to accomplish their assigned tasks?  Compare friendly against enemy forces to see if there are sufficient maritime forces to accomplish the tasks.

(4) **Special Operations.**  What are ways special operations forces can integrate/synchronize maneuver, firepower, protection, support, and command and control with other forces to accomplish their assigned tasks?  Compare friendly against enemy forces to see if there are sufficient special operations forces to accomplish the tasks.

(5) **Space Operations.**  What are the major ways that space operations can support maneuver, firepower, protection, support and establishment of command and control?

(6) **Information Operations (IO).**  What are the ways joint forces can integrate the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.

e.   The *tentative* COAs should focus on where **Center(s) of Gravity (COGs) and decisive points** (or vulnerabilities, e.g., "keys to achieving desired effect on centers of gravity") may occur.  The CDR and the staff review and refine their COG analysis begun during mission analysis based on updated intelligence, JIPOE products and initial staff estimates.  The refined enemy and friendly COGs and critical vulnerabilities are used in the development of the initial COAs.  The COG analysis helps the CDR orient on the enemy and compare his strengths and weakness to those of the enemy.  The staff takes the CDR's operational design, reviews it, and focuses on the friendly and enemy COGs and critical vulnerabilities.

By looking at friendly COG's and vulnerabilities, the staff understands the capabilities of their own force and those critical vulnerabilities that will require protection.  Protection resource limitations will probably mean that the staff cannot plan to protect each asset individually, but rather look at developing overlapping protection techniques.  The strength of one asset or capability may provide protection from the weakness of another.

f.   **Identify the sequencing** (simultaneous/sequential/or combination) of the operation for each COA.  This is not required for each COA, but may be included.

g.   **Identify main and supporting efforts**, by phase, the purposes of these efforts, and key supporting/supported relationships within phases.

h.   **Identify component level mission/tasks** (who, what and where) that will accomplish the stated purposes of main and supporting efforts.  Think of component tasks from the perspective of movement and maneuver, firepower, protection, support and C2.  Display them with graphic control measures as much as possible.  The Line of Operation that you completed earlier will help identify these tasks.

i.   **Recognize MILDEC (military deception) planning.**  Results of deception operations may influence any COA. The CCDR has a resident MILDEC planner on staff charged with developing the CDR's Deception Plan. Access to this plan will be as required and as directed by CDR only. Recognize that by design MILDEC planning is just behind operational planning. (see JP 3-13.4 Military Deception, 13 July 2006)

j.   **Task-Organization.**  The staff should develop a detailed task-organization (two-levels down) to execute the COA.  The CDR and staff determine appropriate command relationships to include operational mission assignments and support relationships.

k.   **Logistics.**  No COA is complete without a plan to sustain it properly. The logistic concept is more than just gathering information on various logistic functions. It entails the organization of capabilities and resources into an overall theater campaign or operation sustainment concept.  It concentrates forces and material resources strategically so that the right force is available at the designated times and places to conduct decisive operations.  Think through a cohesive sustainment for joint, single service and supporting forces relationships, in conjunction with multinational, interagency, non-governmental, or international organizations.

l. **Develop initial COA sketches and statements.**  Answer the questions:

(1) WHO (type of forces) will execute the tasks?

(2) WHAT is the task?

(3) WHERE will the tasks occur? (Start adding graphic control measures, e.g., areas of operation, amphibious objective areas).

(4) WHEN will the tasks begin?

(5) HOW (but do not usurp the components' prerogatives), the CCDR should provide "operational direction," so the components can accomplish "tactical actions."

(6) WHY (for what purpose) will each force conduct its part of the operation?

m. **Test the validity of each *tentative* COA**

(1) **Tests for suitability**

(a) Does it accomplish the mission?

(b) Does it meet the CCDRs intent?

(c) Does it accomplish all the essential tasks?

(d) Does it meet the conditions for the end state?

(e) Does it take into consideration the enemy and friendly centers of gravity?

(2) **Preliminary test for feasibility**

(a) Does the CCDR have the force structure and lift assets (means) to carry it out?  The COA is feasible if it can be carried out with the forces, support, and technology available, within the constraints of the physical environment and against expected enemy opposition.

(b) Although this process occurs during COA analysis and the test at this time is preliminary, it may be possible to declare a COA infeasible (for example, resources are obviously insufficient).  However, it may be possible to fill shortfalls by requesting support from the CCDR or other means.

(3) **Preliminary test for acceptability**

(a) Does it contain unacceptable risks? (Is it worth the possible cost?) A COA is considered acceptable if the estimated results justify the risks.  The basis of this test consists of an estimation of friendly losses in forces, time, position, and opportunity.

(b) Does it take into account the limitations placed on the CCDR (must do, cannot do, other physical limitations)?

(c) Acceptability is considered from the perspective of the CCDR by reviewing the strategic objectives.

(d) COAs are reconciled with external constraints, particularly ROE.

(e) Requires visualization of execution of the COA against each enemy capability.  Although this process occurs during COA analysis and the test at this time is

preliminary, it may be possible to declare a COA unacceptable if it violates the CCDRs definition of acceptable risk.

(4) **Test for variety**.  Is it fundamentally different from other COAs? They can be different when considering:

(a)  The focus or direction of main effort.

(b)  The scheme of maneuver (land, air, maritime, and special operation).

(c)  Sequential vs. simultaneous maneuvers.

(d)  The primary mechanism for mission accomplishment.

(e)  Task organization.

(f)  The use of reserves.

(5) **Test for completeness**.  Does it answer the all of the questions WHO, WHAT, WHERE, WHEN, HOW and WHY?

n.  **Determine command relationships and organizational options.** (See Appendix F)

(1) **Joint Force Organization and Command relationships**.  Organizations and relationships are based on the campaign design, complexity of the campaign, and degree of control required.  Establishing **command relationships** includes determining the types of subordinate commands and the degree of authority to be delegated to each.  Clear definition of command relationships further clarifies the intent of the CCDR and contributes to decentralized execution and unity of effort.  The CCDR has the authority to determine the types of subordinate commands from several doctrinal options, including Service components, functional components, and subordinate joint commands.  The options for delegating authority emanate from COCOM and range from command to support relationships.  **Regardless of the Command or Support relationships selected, it is the Combatant (or JFC) CDR's responsibility to ensure that these relationships are understood and clear to all subordinate, adjacent and supporting HQs.**  The following are considerations for establishing Joint Force Organizations:

(a)  CCDRs will normally designate JFACCs and organize special operations forces into a functional component.

(b)  Joint Forces will normally be organized with a combination of Service and functional components with operational responsibilities.

(c)  Functional component staffs should be joint with Service representation in approximate proportion to the mix of subordinate forces. These staffs will be required to be organized and trained prior to employment in order to be efficient and effective, which will require advanced planning.

(d)  CCDRs may establish supporting/supported relationships between components to facilitate operations.

(e) CCDRs define the authority and responsibilities of functional component CDRs based on the strategic concept of operations and may alter their authority and responsibility during the course of an operation.

(f) CCDRs must balance the need for centralized direction with decentralized execution.

(g) Major changes in the Joint Force organization are normally conducted at phase changes.

(2) **Operational Objectives and Subordinate Tasks**

(a) The theater and supporting **operational objectives** assigned to subordinates are critical elements of the theater-strategic design of the campaign. They establish the conditions necessary to reach the desired end state and achieve the national strategic objectives. The CCDR carefully defines the objectives to ensure clarity of theater and operational intent, and identify specific tasks required to achieve those objectives. Tasks are shaped by the concept of operations—intended sequencing and integration of air, land, sea, special operations, and space forces. Tasks are prioritized in order of criticality while considering the enemy's objectives and the need to gain advantage.

(b) One of the fundamental purposes of a campaign plan is to synchronize employment of all available military (land, sea, air, and special operations, as well as space, information and protection) forces and capabilities. This overwhelming application of military capabilities can be achieved by assigning the appropriate tasks to components for each phase, though supporting CDRs will also contribute with their own capabilities. These tasks can be derived from an understanding of how component and supporting forces interrelate, not only among themselves, but also with respect to the enemy.

o. **Refine the theater design/operational area and initial battlespace architecture** (e.g., control measures). The Theater Design is normally a legally/politically binding document which will initiate planning and negotiations throughout the COCOM, interagency and internationally. It will provide flexibility/options and/or limitations to the CCDR. The theater design must be <u>precise</u>. Specifics are required to negotiate basing and overflight. DOS will be the lead agency here. Theater design is also **resource sensitive**. Limited infrastructure resources must be optimized, i.e., APOE/DS/SPOE/DS, and when utilizing a host nation's resources, negotiations for sharing those resources is common.

(1) **Operational area** is an overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms for geographic areas in which military operations are conducted. Operational areas include, but are not limited to, such descriptors as AOR, theater of war, theater of operations, JOA, amphibious objective area (AOA), joint special operations area (JSOA), and area of operations (AO). Except for AOR, which is normally assigned in the *UCP*, the geographic CCDR (GCC) and other JFCs designate smaller operational areas on a temporary basis. Operational areas have physical dimensions comprised of some combination of air, land, and maritime domains. JFCs define these areas with

geographical boundaries, which facilitate the coordination, integration, and deconfliction of joint operations among joint force components and supporting commands.  The size of these operational areas and the types of forces employed within them depend on the scope and nature of the crisis and the projected duration of operations.

(2) **Combatant Command-Level Areas.**  GCCs conduct operations in their assigned AORs across the range of military operations.  When warranted, the President, SecDef, or GCCs may designate a theater of war and/or theater of operations for each operation.  GCCs can elect to control operations directly in these operational areas, or may establish subordinate joint forces for that purpose, allowing themselves to remain focused on the broader AOR.[1]

(a) **Area of Responsibility.**  An AOR is an area established by the President and SecDef on an enduring basis that defines geographic responsibilities for a GCC.  A GCC has authority to plan for operations within the AOR and conduct those operations approved by the President or SecDef.

(b) **Theater of War.**  A theater of war is a geographical area comprised of some combination of air, land, and maritime domains established for the conduct of major operations and campaigns involving combat.  A theater of war is established primarily when there is a formal declaration of war or it is necessary to encompass more than one theater of operations (or a JOA and a separate theater of operations) within a single boundary for the purposes of C2, logistics, protection, or mutual support.  A theater of war does not normally encompass a GCC's entire AOR, but may cross the boundaries of two or more AORs.

(c) **Theater of Operations.**  A theater of operations is a geographical area comprised of some combination of air, land, and maritime domains established for the conduct of joint operations.  A theater of operations is established primarily when the scope of the operation in time, space, purpose, and/or employed forces exceeds what can normally be accommodated by a JOA.  One or more theaters of operations may be designated.  Different theaters of operations will normally be geographically separate and focused on different missions.  A theater of operations typically is smaller than a theater of war, but is large enough to allow for operations in depth and over extended periods of time.  Theaters of operations are normally associated with major operations and campaigns.

(d) **Combat Zones and Communications Zones (COMMZs).**  Geographic CCDRs also may establish combat zones and COMMZs.  The combat zone is an area required by forces to conduct combat operations.  It normally extends forward from the land force rear boundary.  The COMMZ contains those theater organizations, LOCs, and other agencies required to support and sustain combat forces.  The COMMZ usually includes the rear portions of the theaters of operations and theater of war (if designated) and reaches back to the CONUS base or perhaps to a supporting CCDR's AOR.  The COMMZ includes airports and seaports that support the flow of forces and

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[1]JP 3-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, 17 Sept 2006.

logistics into the operational area.  It usually is contiguous to the combat zone but may be separate — connected only by thin LOCs — in very fluid, dynamic situations.[2]

p.   Prepare the COA concept of operations statement (or tasks), sketch, and task organization.

(1) COA concept of operations statements (or tasks) answer WHO, WHAT, WHERE, WHEN, HOW, and WHY.

(2) Finalize COA sketches.

(3) Finalize the task organization.

q.   **Conduct COA Development Brief to CCDR.**  Figure XVIII-2 is a suggested sequence:

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**Recommended Briefing Sequence**

- **J3**:
    - Context/Background- i.e. road to war
    - Initiation- review guidance for initiation in general
    - Strategic guidance-planning tasks assigned to supported CDR, forces/resources apportioned, planning guidance, updates, defense agreements, USG Security Cooperation Plan, Theater Security Plan, JSCP
    - Forces Apportioned/Assigned
- **J2**:  Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE)
    - ECOA- Most dangerous, Most likely; strengths and weaknesses
- **J3**:
    - Update Facts and Assumptions
    - Mission Statement
    - Commanders Intent (purpose, method, endstate)
    - Endstate: political/military
        - Termination criteria
    - Center of Gravity Analysis results: Critical Factors Strategic/Operational
    - JOA/Theater of Ops/COMMZ sketch
    - Phase 0 Shaping Activities recommended (for current theater security plan)
    - FDO's with desired effect (DIME)
    - COA Sketch and Statement by phase (3 COA's minimum)
        - Task organization
        - Component tasking
        - Timeline (I+5=W Day/MEU(SOC) in Gulf, etc.)
        - Recommended C2 by phase
        - Operational Design (LOO)
        - COA Risks
    - COA summarized distinctions (COA 1, 2, and 3)
    - COA Priority for Wargaming
- **Commanders Guidance**

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**Figure XVIII-2.  Recommended Briefing Sequence**

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[2]JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operation*, 17 Sept 2006.

r.  **CCDR provides guidance on COAs**

(1) Review and approve COAs for further analysis.

(2) Direct revisions to COAs, combinations of COAs, or development of additional COA(s).

(3) Directs priority for which enemy COA will be used during wargaming of friendly COA(s).

s.  **Continue the staff estimate process.**  The staff must continue to conduct their staff estimates of supportability for each COA.

t.  **Conduct vertical and horizontal parallel planning.**

(1) Discuss the planning status of staff counterparts with both CCDR's and JFC components' staffs.

(2) Coordinate planning with staff counterparts from other functional areas.

(3) Permit adjustments in planning as additional details are learned from higher and adjacent echelons, and permit lower echelons to begin planning efforts and generate questions (e.g., Requests for Information/Intelligence).[3]

7.  There are several planning techniques available to you during COA development. The step-by-step approach below utilizes the <u>backwards planning technique</u> (reverse planning):

**Step 1.**  Determine how much force will be needed in the theater at the end of the campaign, what those forces will be doing, and how those forces will be postured geographically.  Use troop to task analysis.  Draw a sketch to help you visualize the forces and their location.

**Step 2.**  Looking at your sketch and working backwards, determine the best way to get the forces you just postured in step 1 from their ultimate locations at the end of the campaign to a base in friendly territory.  This will help you formulate your desired basing plan.

**Step 3.**  Using your mission statement as a guide, determine the tasks the force must accomplish enroute to their ultimate positions at the end of the campaign.  Draw a sketch of the maneuver plan.  Make sure your force does everything the SecDef has directed the CCDR to do (refer to specified tasks from the mission analysis steps).

**Step 4.**  Determine the basing required to posture the force in friendly territory, and the tasks the force must accomplish to get to these bases.  Sketch this as part of a deployment plan.

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[3]CJCSM 3500.05A, *JTFHQ Master Training Guide*, 1 September 2003.

**Step 5.** Determine if the force you just considered is enough to accomplish all the tasks the SecDef has given you. Adjust the force strength to fit the tasks. You should now be able to answer the first question.

**Step 6.** Given the tasks to be performed, determine in what order you want the force to be deployed into theater. Consider force categories such as *combat, C4ISR, protection, sustainment, theater enablers, and theater opening*. You can now answer the second question.

**Step 7.** You now have all the information necessary to answer the rest of the questions regarding force employment, major tasks and their sequencing, sustainment and command relationships.[4]

8. **Planning Directive Published.** The Planning Directive identifies planning responsibilities for developing COCOM plans. It provides guidance and requirements to the HQ staff and subordinate commands concerning coordinated planning actions for plan development. The CCDR normally communicates initial planning guidance to the staff, subordinate CDRs, and supporting CDRs by publishing a planning directive to ensure that everyone understands the CDR's intent and to achieve unity of effort. Generally, the J-5 coordinates staff action for deliberate planning. The J-5 staff receives the CCDR's initial guidance and combines it with the information gained from the initial staff assessments. The CCDR, through the J-5, may convene a preliminary planning conference for members of the JPEC who will be involved with the plan. This is the opportunity for representatives to meet face-to-face. At the conference, the CCDR and selected members of the staff brief the attendees on important aspects of the plan and may solicit their initial reactions. Many potential conflicts can be avoided by this early exchange of information.[5]

9. **Staff Estimates.** "**Continuous**" staff estimates are the foundation for the CCDR's selection of a COA. Up until this point our COA's have been developed from initial impression based on limited knowledge. Staff estimates determine whether the mission can be accomplished and also determine which COA can best be supported. The staff divisions analyze and refine each COA to determine its supportability. These estimates can form the cornerstone for staff annexes to orders and plans.

a. Staff estimates must be comprehensive and continuous and must visualize the future, but at the same time they must optimize the limited time available and not become overly time-consuming. *Comprehensive* estimates consider both the quantifiable and the intangible aspects of military operations. They translate friendly and enemy strengths, weapons systems, training, morale, and leadership into combat capabilities. The estimate process requires a clear understanding of weather and terrain effects and, more important, the ability to visualize the battle or crisis situations requiring military forces. Estimates

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[4]Army War College, Campaign Planning Primer, Final Working Draft, AY 2008.

[5]CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: Planning, Policies, and Procedures, Enclosure T, Appendix A, contains sample formats for the Planning Directive.

must provide a timely, accurate evaluation of the unit, the enemy, and the unit's area of operations at a given time.

b.   Estimates must be as thorough as time and circumstances permit.  The CDR and staff must constantly collect, process, and evaluate information.  They update their estimates:

> • When the CDR and staff recognize new facts.
>
> • When they replace assumptions with facts or find their assumptions invalid.
>
> • When they receive changes to the mission or when changes are indicated.

c.   Estimates for the current operation can often provide a basis for estimates for future missions as well as changes to current operations.  Technological advances and near-real-time information estimates ensure that estimates can be continuously updated. Estimates must *visualize the future* and support the CDR's battlefield visualization.  They are the link between current operations and future plans. The CDR's vision directs the end state. Each subordinate unit CDR must also possess the ability to envision the organization's end state.  Estimates contribute to this vision. Failure to make staff estimates can lead to errors and omissions when developing, analyzing, and comparing COA's.

d.   Not every situation will allow or require an extensive and lengthy planning effort. It is conceivable that a CDR could review the assigned task, receive oral briefings, make a quick decision, and direct writing of the plan to commence.  This would complete the process and might be suitable if the task were simple and straightforward.

e.   Most CDRs, however, are more likely to demand a thorough, well-coordinated plan that requires a complex staff estimate process.  Written staff estimates are carefully prepared, coordinated, and fully documented.

f.   Again, the purpose of the staff estimates is to determine whether the mission can be accomplished and to determine which COA can best be supported.  This, together with the supporting discussion, gives the CDR the best possible information to select a COA. Each staff division:

> —reviews the mission and situation from its own staff functional perspective;
>
> — examines the factors and assumptions for which it is the responsible staff;
>
> — analyzes each COA from its staff functional perspective; and
>
> — concludes whether the mission can be supported and which COA can be best supported from its particular staff functional perspective.

g.   Because of the unique talents of each joint staff division, involvement of all is vital.  Each staff estimate takes on a different focus that identifies certain assumptions, detailed aspects of the COAs, and potential deficiencies that are simply not known at any other level, but nevertheless must be considered.  Such a detailed study of the COAs involves the corresponding staffs of subordinate and supporting commands.

h.   The form and the number of COAs under consideration may change during this step.  These changes result in refined COAs.

i.   The product of this step is the sum total of the individual efforts of the staff divisions.  Complete, fully documented staff estimates are extremely useful to the J-5 staff, which extracts information from them for the CDR's estimate.  The estimates are also valuable to planners in subordinate and supporting commands as they prepare supporting plans.  Although documenting the staff estimates can be delayed until after the preparation of the CDR's estimate, they should be sent to subordinate and supporting CDRs in time to help them prepare annexes for their supporting plans.

j.   The principal elements of the staff estimates normally include **mission**, **situation and considerations**, **analysis of opposing COAs, comparison of friendly COAs**, **and conclusions**.  The coordinating staff and each staff principle develop facts, assessments, and information that relate to their functional field.  Types of estimates generally include, but are not limited to, operations, personnel, intelligence, logistics, civil-military operations, special staff, etc.  The details in each basic category vary with the staff performing the analysis.  The principal staff divisions have a similar perspective — they focus on friendly COAs and their supportability.  However, the Intelligence Directorate (J-2) estimates on intelligence (provided at the beginning of the process) concentrate on the adversary: adversary situation, including strengths and weaknesses, adversary capabilities and an analysis of those capabilities, and conclusions drawn from that analysis.  The analysis of adversary capabilities includes an analysis of the various COAs available to the adversary according to its capabilities, which include attacking, withdrawing, defending, delaying, etc.  The J-2's conclusion will indicate the adversary's most likely COA and identify adversary COGs.[6]

k.   In many cases the steps in the concept development phase are not separate and distinct, as the evolution of the refined COA illustrates.  During planning guidance and early in the staff estimates, the initial COAs may have been developed from initial impressions and based on limited staff support.  But as concept development progresses, COAs are refined and evolve to include many of the following considerations:

— What military operations are considered?

— Where they will be performed?

— Who will conduct the operation?

— When is the operation planned to occur?

— How will the operation be conducted?

l.   *An iterative process of modifying, adding to, and deleting from the original tentative list is used to develop these refined COAs.*  The staff continually evaluates the situation as the planning process continues (XVIII-3).  Early staff estimates are frequently given as oral briefings to the rest of the staff.  In the beginning, they tend to

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[6]CJCSM 3122.01A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System* Vol. I: Planning, Policies, and Procedures, Enclosure S contains sample formats for staff estimates.

emphasize information collection more than analysis.  It is only in the later stages of the process that the staff estimates are expected to indicate which COAs can be best supported.

## Staff Estimate

### COMMANDER

1. HHQ Guidance
2. JIPOE
3. Mission Analysis

**Staff Estimates Influence Commander**

### STAFF ESTIMATES

**J-1**

1. Mission
2. The situation and considerations
3. Analysis
4. Comparison
5. Conclusions

**PERSONNEL**

**J-2**

1. Mission
2. Enemy situation
3. Enemy capabilities
4. Analysis or enemy capabilities

**INTELLIGENCE**

**J-3**

1. Mission
2. The situation and courses of action
3. Recommendation

**OPERATIONS**

**J-4**

1. Mission
2. The situation and considerations
3. Analysis
4. Comparison
5. Conclusions

**LOGISTICS**

**J-6**

1. Mission
2. The situation and considerations
3. Analysis
4. Comparison
5. Conclusions

**C4**

**Figure XVIII-3.  Staff Estimates**

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# CHAPTER XVIX

# COA ANALYSIS and WARGAMING



1.  **Step 4 — COA Analysis and Wargaming.**   COA wargaming allows the CDR, his staff and subordinate CDRs and their staffs to gain a common understanding of friendly and threat COAs.  This common understanding allows them to determine the advantages and disadvantages of each COA and forms the basis for the CDR's comparison (Step 5) and approval (Step 6).  COA Wargaming involves a detailed assessment of each COA as it pertains to the enemy and the operational environment. Each friendly COA is wargamed against selected threat COAs.  The CDR will select the COAs he wants wargamed and provide wargaming guidance along with **governing factors.**

> **Wargaming Process**
> 1. Assemble the necessary tools and information
> 2. Establish specific analysis rules to follow
> 3. Wargame the COAs
> 4. Record vital wargaming activities
> 5. Identify advantages/disadvantages
> 6. Refine each COA based on wargaming results

While time consuming, this procedure reveals strengths and weaknesses of each friendly course of action, anticipates battlefield events, synchronizes warfighting functions, determines task organization for combat, identifies decision points, informs potential branches and sequels, and identifies cross-service or component support requirements. Wargaming should also answer these questions:

- Does the COA achieve the purpose of the mission?
- Is the COA supportable?
- What if?

2.  The heart of the commander's estimate process is the *analysis of opposing courses of action*. Analysis is nothing more than wargaming—either manual or computer assisted. In the previous steps of the estimate, ECOAs and COAs were examined relative to their basic concepts. ECOAs were developed based on enemy capabilities, objectives, and our estimate of the enemy's intent, and COAs developed based on friendly mission and capabilities. In this step we conduct an analysis of the probable effect **each ECOA has on the chances of success of each friendly COA**. The aim is to develop a sound basis for determining the *feasibility* and *acceptability* of the COAs. Analysis also provides the planning staff with a greatly improved understanding of their COAs and the relationship between them. The COA analysis identifies which COA best accomplishes the mission while best positioning the force for future operations. It helps the commander and staff to:

- Determine how to maximize combat power against the enemy while protecting the friendly forces and minimizing collateral damage.
- Have as near an identical visualization of the operation as possible.
- Anticipate events in the operational environment and potential reaction options.
- Determine conditions and resources required for success.
- Determine when and where to apply the force's capabilities.
- Focus intelligence collection requirements.
- Determine the most flexible COA.

3.  COA analysis is conducted using wargaming. The wargame is a disciplined process, with rules and steps that attempt to visualize the flow of the operation. The process considers friendly dispositions, strengths, and weaknesses; enemy assets and probable COAs; and characteristics of the physical environment. It relies heavily on joint doctrinal

foundation, tactical judgment, and operational experience. It focuses the staff's attention on each phase of the operation in a logical sequence. It is an iterative process of action, reaction, and counteraction. Wargaming stimulates ideas and provides insights that might not otherwise be discovered. It highlights critical tasks and provides familiarity with operational possibilities otherwise difficult to achieve. Wargaming is a critical portion of the planning process and should be allocated more time than any other step. **Each retained COA should, at a minimum, be war gamed against both the most likely and most dangerous ECOAs.**

4.  During the wargame, the staff takes a COA statement and begins to add more detail to the concept, while determining the strengths or weaknesses of each COA. Wargaming tests a COA and can provide insights that can be used to improve upon a developed COA. The commander and his staff (and subordinate commanders and staffs if the war game is conducted collaboratively) may change an existing COA or develop a new COA after identifying unforeseen critical events, tasks, requirements, or problems.

5.  For the wargame to be effective, the CDR should indicate what aspects of the COA he desires to be examined and tested. Wargaming guidance may include a list of friendly COAs to be wargamed against specific threat COAs (e.g., COA 1 against the enemy's most likely, most dangerous), the timeline for the phase or stage of the operations, a list of critical events and level of detail (i.e., two levels down).

    a.  Analysis of the proposed COAs should reveal a number of factors including:

- Potential decision points
- Task organization adjustment
- Identification of plan branches and sequels
- Identification of high-value targets
- Risk assessment
- COA advantages and disadvantages
- Recommended CCIR

    b.  **COA Analysis Considerations.** Before we move to making key decisions for wargaming, we need to collate and review a few important items. A few are listed below:

- Governing factors
- Friendly and enemy forces
- RFI's
- Assumptions
- Known critical events

    c.  In the context of COA Analysis, we will look at governing factors and critical events.

    (1) **Governing Factors** (Figure XVIX-1). Determining the governing factors or better said, the evaluation criteria, to be used is a critical requirement that begins with

wargaming.  The CDR and staff choose the evaluation criteria during wargaming that will be used to select the COA that will become the CONOPS.  CDRs establish evaluation criteria based on judgment, personal experience, METT-T and those criteria the staff uses to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of one COA relative to other COAs following the war game.  These evaluation criteria help focus the wargaming effort and provide the framework for data collection by the staff.  They are those aspects of the situation (or externally imposed factors) that the commander deems *critical* to the accomplishment of his mission.  Potential influencing factors include elements of the Commander's Guidance and/or Commander's Intent, selected principles of war, external constraints, and even anticipated future operations for involved forces or against the same objective.  Governing Factors change from mission to mission.  Though these factors will be applied in the next step when the COAs are compared, it will be helpful during this wargaming step for all participants to be familiar with the factors so that any insights into a given COA which influence a factor are recorded for later comparison.  The criteria may include anything the commander desires. If not received directly from the commander, they are often derived from his intent statement.

The factors should look at both what will create success and what will cause failure.  They may be used to determine the criteria of success for comparing the COAs in STEP 5.



**Figure XVIX-1. Possible Commander's Governing Criteria**

(2) **Developing Governing Factors.**  Governing factors do not stand alone.  Each must have a clearly defined definition.  Defining the criteria in precise terms reduces subjectivity and ensures the interpretation of each remains constant.  The following list provides a good starting point for developing a COA comparison criteria list.  See Appendix H for more examples of evaluation criteria.

(a) Some possible sources for determining criteria are:

- The Commander's Guidance and Commander's Intent.
- Mission accomplishment at an acceptable cost.

- The principles of war-Joint operations/SSTR (MOOSEMUSS).
- Doctrinal fundamentals for the type of operation(s) being conducted.
- The level of residual risk in the COA.
- Implicit significant factors relating to the operation (e.g., need for speed, security).
- Each staff member may identify factors relating to that staff function.
- Elements of Operational Art**.**
- Other factors to consider: political constraints, risk, financial costs, flexibility, simplicity, surprise, speed, mass, sustainability, C2, infrastructure survivability, etc**.**

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**OPERATIONAL DESIGN ELEMENTS**

-Termination   -Simultaneity and Depth   -End State and Objectives
-Timing and Tempo    -Effects    -Forces and Functions
-Center of Gravity    -Leverage  -Decisive Points
-Balance        -Direct versus Indirect       -Anticipation
-Lines of Operations   -Synergy  -Operational Reach
-Arranging Operation        -Culmination

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(3) **List known Critical Events**.  These are essential tasks, or a series of critical tasks, conducted over a period of time that require detailed analysis (e.g., the series of component tasks to be performed on D-Day).  This may be expanded to review component tasks over a phase(s) of an operation (e.g., lodgment phase) or over a period of time (C-Day through D-Day).  The planning staff may wish at this point to also identify Decision Points (those decisions in time and space that the commander must make to ensure timely execution and synchronization of resources). These decision points are most likely linked to a critical event (e.g., commitment of the JTF Reserve force).

6.  **There are two key decisions to make before COA analysis begins**.  The *first* decision is to decide *what type of wargame will be used*.  This decision should be based on CDR's guidance, time and resources available, staff expertise, and availability of simulation models.  Note that at this point in the planning process, there may be no phases developed for the COA; Pre-hostilities, Hostilities, and Post-hostilities may be your only considerations at this point.  Phasing comes later when the planner begins to flesh out the selected COA into a strategic concept.  Some considerations are:

o  Information Review: Mission Analysis, CDR's intent, planning guidance, CCDR's orders.

o  Gather tools, materials, personnel and data:

▪  Friendly courses of action to be analyzed

▪  Enemy courses of action against which you will evaluate the friendly COAs

▪  Representations of the operational area such as maps, overlays, etc.

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- Representations of friendly and enemy force dispositions and capabilities
- Subject matter experts (INTEL, SJA, POLAD, Log, IW, C4, PAO, etc.)
- Red cell
- Scribe/recorder

- o Keep discussions elevated to the theater level.
- o Balance between stifling creativity and making progress.

The *second* decision is to prioritize the enemy COAs the wargame is to be analyzed against. In time-constrained situations, it may not be possible to wargame against all courses of action.

7. **Wargaming**. Wargaming provides a means for the CDR and participants to analyze a tentative COA and obtain insights that otherwise might not have occurred. An objective, comprehensive analysis of tentative COAs is difficult even without time constraints. Based upon time available, the CDR should wargame each tentative COA against the most probable and the most dangerous adversary COAs (or most difficult objectives in non-combat operations) identified through the JIPOE process. Some considerations are:

- Refine wargaming methodology
- Pre-conditions or start points and endstate for each phase
- Advantages/disadvantages of the COA
- Unresolved issues
- COA modifications or refinements
- Estimated duration of critical events/phases
- Major tasks for components
- Identify critical events and decision points
- Identify branches and sequels
- Identify risks
- Recommended EEIs and supporting collections plan priorities
- Highlight ROE requirements

a. Wargaming is a conscious attempt to visualize the flow of the operation, given joint force strengths and dispositions, adversary capabilities and possible COAs, the operational area (OA), and other aspects of the operational environment. Each critical event within a proposed COA should be wargamed based upon time available using the action, reaction, counteraction method of friendly and/or opposition force interaction. Here, the friendly force will make two moves because this activity is intended to validate and refine the friendly forces COA, not the adversaries. The basic wargaming method (modified to fit the specific mission and environment) can apply to noncombat as well as combat operations.

b.   Wargaming stimulates thought about the operation so the staff will obtain ideas and insights that otherwise might not have occurred.  This process highlights tasks that appear to be particularly important to the operation and provides a degree of familiarity with operational-level possibilities that might otherwise be difficult to achieve.

c.   The wargaming process can be as simple as a detailed narrative effort that describes the action, probable reaction, counteraction, assets, and time used.  A more comprehensive version is the "sketch-note" technique, which adds operational sketches and notes to the narrative process in order to gain a clearer picture.  The most sophisticated form of wargaming is modern, computer-aided modeling and simulation.  Figure XVIX-2 provides a list of key inputs and outputs for wargaming.



**Figure XVIX-2.  Course of Action Analysis and Wargaming**

d.   Where to begin. Wargaming Steps:

   **Step 1** - Prepare for the Wargame
   **Step 2** - Conduct the Wargame and assess the results
   **Step 3** - Output of Wargame

   **(1) Step 1-Prepare for the Wargame**

   o   Gather tools
   o   List and review friendly forces
   o   List and review enemy forces
   o   List known critical events
   o   Determine participants
   o   Determine enemy course of action to oppose
   o   Select wargame method
      ▪   Manual

- Computer
  - o Select method to record and display wargaming results
    - Narrative
    - Sketch and notes
    - Wargame worksheets
    - Synchronization matrix

**(2) Step 2 - Conduct the Wargame and assess the results**

- o Purpose of the Wargame
  - Identify gaps, visualization, etc.
- o Basic methodology
  - Action
  - Reaction
  - Counteraction
- o Type of method to be used: Based on CDR's guidance

(a) Manual Wargaming:

<u>1</u> **Deliberate Timeline Analysis**- Consider actions day by day or in other discrete blocks of time.  This is the most thorough method when time permits for detailed analysis.

<u>2</u> **Operational Phasing**- Used as a framework for COA analysis. Identify significant actions and requirements by functional area and/or JTF component.

<u>3</u> **Critical Events/Sequence of Essential Tasks**- The sequence of essential tasks, also known as the critical events method, highlights the initial shaping actions necessary to establish a sustainment capability and to engage enemy units in the deep battle area.  At the same time, it enables the planners to adapt if the enemy executes a reaction that necessitates the reordering of the essential tasks.  This technique also allows wargamers to concurrently analyze the essential tasks required to execute the CONOPS.

Focus on specific critical events that encompass the essence of the COA.  If time is particularly limited, focus only on the principal defeat mechanism.  It is important to identify a measure of effectiveness that attempts to quantify the achievement of that defeat mechanism.  This measure of effectiveness should enable a consistent comparison of each COA against each enemy COA for each specific critical event.  If necessary, different measures of effectiveness should be developed for assessing different types of critical events (e.g., destruction, blockade, air control, neutralization, ensure defense).  As with the focus on operational phasing, the critical events discussion identifies significant actions and requirements by functional area and/or by JTF component.

<u>4</u> Computer assisted.  There are many forms of computer-assisted wargames.  Most wargames require a significant spin-up time to load scenarios and then to train users.  However, the potential to utilize the computer model for multiple scenarios or blended scenarios makes it valuable.

**(3) Step 3-Output of Wargame**

- o Results of the Wargame Brief:
    - ▪ Potential decision points
    - ▪ Governing factors (those factors that the CDR deems critical to mission accomplishment)
    - ▪ Potential branches and sequels

- o Revised staff estimates
- o Refined COAs
- o Feedback through the COA Decision Brief

e. **Preparing for the Wargame**

   (1)   Room Organization.  Contemplate how to organize the players in a logical manner.  Below (Figure XVIV-3) is an *example* of a manual wargame room organization. Note that along one wall are blown-up slides for CCIRs, Facts and Assumptions, Friendly Forces, Enemy COA.  On the screens in the front of the wargame table are the working Synchronization Matrix and Decision Support Template.  There is no limit to the information you can display around the room for quick reference.  However, it's important to limit those items displayed to essential items that facilitate the Wargame, not distract from it.



**Figure XVIV-3.  Example Wargame Room Organization**

   (2) Briefing Sequence.  The following briefing sequence is an example of how the Blue Team/facilitator choreographs their Wargame:

- • Blue Team/Facilitator: reviews conditions and timing for particular COA (includes current ***Friendly*** Intel picture)

- Red Cell Orientation
- COCOM / CFC Planner
- CJSOTF Planner
- AFFOR Planner
- NAVFOR Planner
- MARFOR Planner
- ARFOR Planner
- Coalition Planner
- Force Ratio Assessment
- Issues from Recorder
- Facilitator: highlights issues and concludes game turn

(3) Rules of the Road

- Facilitator has final say…
- Facilitator is the only one who brings problems to arbitrators
- Don't argue with Red Cell
- Come prepared…try not to ad lib
- Keep pace and pay attention
- Take notes
  - Submit appropriate info to Recorder

Name: *Major Pain*
Component: *ARFOR*
COA #: *1*
Critical Event: *Commence CATK*
Topic Item: *ARFOR commences CATK from lodgment in Tunis with 85% strength in personnel due to planned force flow…need 40 sorties of strike aircraft…*

Decision Point: *CFC-T will launch ARFOR CATK simultaneously with MARFOR once ARFOR has at least 85% strength in combat forces and sustainment capability for 30 DOS in Classes I, III & V.*

Assumption: *Once CATK has been launched, there will be no interruption of planned force flow from N+30 – N+45*

**Figure XVIX-4.  Submission Cards to Recorder**

f.  Wargame Process

- Begins with time or event
  - *Could be an enemy attack*
- Next is friendly action, then threat reaction, then friendly counteraction
  - If necessary, may continue beyond three moves
- Continually assess feasibility

(1) The facilitator and the red cell commander get together to agree on the rules of the war game. The wargame begins with an event designated by the facilitator. It could be an enemy offensive/defensive action or it could be a friendly offensive/defensive action. They decide where (in the AO) and when (H-Hour or L-Hour) it will begin. They review the initial array of forces. Of note, they must come to an agreement on the effectiveness of intelligence collection and shaping actions by both sides prior to the war game. The facilitator must ensure that all members of the wargame know what critical events will be wargamed and what techniques will be used. This coordination within the friendly cell and between the friendly and the red cell must be done well in advance.

(a) Within each wargaming method the war game normally has three total moves. If necessary, that portion of the wargame may be extended beyond the three moves. The facilitator decides how many moves are made in the wargame.

(b) During the war game the players must continually assess the COA's feasibility. Can it be supported? Can we do this? Do we need more combat power, more intelligence assets, more battlespace, more time, do we have the necessary logistics and communications? Has the threat successfully countered a certain phase or stage of a friendly COA? If we find that many of the aforementioned questions were answered, "yes," then we may have to make major revisions to our friendly COA. We don't make major revisions to a COA in the midst of a wargame. Instead, we stop the wargame, make the revisions, and start over at the beginning.

(2) The war game is for comparing and contrasting friendly COAs with the threat COAs. We compare and contrast friendly COAs with each other in the fifth step of the JOPP, comparison/decision. Avoid becoming emotionally attached to a friendly COA; this will lead to the overlooking of the COA shortcomings and weaknesses.

- Avoid comparing one friendly COA with another friendly COA during the war game

- Must remain unbiased

- Do not violate timelines

(a) A wargame for one COA at the JTF level may take six-eight hours. The facilitator must allocate enough time to ensure the war game will thoroughly test a COA.

(b) The wargame considers friendly dispositions, strengths, and weaknesses; threat assets and probable COAs; and characteristics of the area of operations. Through a logical sequence it focuses the players on essential tasks to be accomplished.

(c) When the wargame is complete and the worksheet and sync matrix are filled out, there should be enough detail to "flesh out" the bones of the COA and begin orders development (once the COA has been selected by the commander in comparison/decision).

(d) Additionally, the wargame will produce a refined event template and the initial decision support template which we call "decision support tools." These are similar to a football coach's game plan. The tools can help predict what the threat will do. The tools also provide the commander options for employing his forces to counter a threat action. The tools will prepare the commander (coach) and the staff (team) for a wide spectrum of possibilities and a choice of immediate solutions.

(e) The wargame relies heavily on doctrinal foundation, tactical judgment, and experience. It stimulates new ideas and provides insights that might have been overlooked. The dynamics of the war game require the red cell commander and the red cell members to be aggressive, but realistic, in the execution of threat activities.

- Records advantages and disadvantages of each COA as they become evident.

- Creates decision support tools (a game plan) (Figures XVIX-12-15).

- Focuses OPT on the threat *and* commander's evaluation criteria.

g. **Wargaming Products.** We seek certain things to come out of the wargame in addition to wargamed COAs. We enter the wargame with a "rough" event template and must complete the wargame with a "refined," more accurate event template. Remember, the event template with its NAIs and TPLs will help the J-2 focus the intelligence collection effort. An event matrix can be used as a "script" for the intelligence rep during the wargame. It can also tell us if we are relying too much on one or two collection platforms and if we have overextended these assets.

(1) A first draft of a decision support template (DST) and decision support matrix (DSM) should also come out of the COA wargame. The first time we see decision points (DP) and target areas of interest (TAI) should be on the first draft DST as developed in the wargame. As more information about friendly forces and threat forces becomes available, the DST and DSM may change.

(2) Below the products in RED (italics) are produced by the intelligence section. Products in BLUE (underlined) are produced by the friendly or the operations section.

- Refines existing *named areas of interest (NAI)* and *time phase lines (TPL)* and identifies new *NAIs*. Identifies likely target areas of interest (TAI) and decision points (DP)

- Refines the J-2's *situation and event templates* and creates first draft decision support template and matrix

- *High value targets (HVT)* from J-2 source the OPT's high payoff targets (HPT)

h. **Wargaming Outputs.** There are inputs to the COA war game. Similarly, there are outputs from the COA war game. We must have the modified COAs, both sketch and narrative, ready to present to the Commander at the COA war game back brief.

(1) The critical events are associated with the essential tasks which we identified in mission analysis. The decision points are tied to points in time and space when and where the commander must make a critical decision. Decision points will be tied to the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR). Remember, CCIRs generate three types of information requirements: PIRs, FFIRs, and EEFIs. The commander approves CCIR's. From a threat perspective, PIRs tied to a decision point will require an intelligence collection asset to gather information about the threat. In IPB we tie PIRs to NAIs which are linked to threat COAs. The sync matrix is a tool which will help us determine if we have adequate resources.

- Wargamed COAs with graphic and narrative. Branches and sequels identified
- Information on Commander's Evaluation Criteria
- Initial task organization
- Critical events and decision points
- *New* resource shortfalls
- *Refined/new* CCIRs and event template/matrix
- *Initial* decision support template/matrix
- "Fleshed out" synchronization matrix
- *Refined* staff estimates

(2) The outputs of the COA war game will be used in the comparison/decision step, orders development, and transition. The outputs on the slide are "products." The results of the wargame are the strengths and weaknesses of each friendly COA, the core of the back brief to the CDR.

i. **Red Team**. Once the enemy COA has been selected, it's time to build your Red Team.

(1) One of the most critical elements of your wargaming will be the synchronization of the Red TEAM. Without an aggressive and forward-leaning Red Team, the plan as a whole will be lesser for it. The most important element of wargaming is not the tool used, but the people who participate. Staff members who participate in wargaming should be the individuals who were deeply involved in the development of COAs. **A robust cell that can aggressively pursue the adversary's point of view when considering adversary counteraction is essential.** This **"red cell"** role-plays the adversary CDR and staff. The red cell develops critical decision points relative to the friendly COAs, projects adversary reactions to friendly actions, and estimates adversary losses for each friendly COA. By trying to accurately portray the capabilities of the enemy, the red cell helps the staff fully address friendly responses for each adversary COA.

(a) The primary purpose of the Red Team is to provide additional operational analysis on the adversary.  The Red Team process normally is a peer review of the selected COA against adversary most dangerous (MD) or most likely (ML) COA.  The Red Team will fight MD and/or ML COA, goal is not to see if the Red Team can come up with a plan to defeat Blue's COA.  The most important piece here is for the Red team to have enough time to develop a Red CONOPS prior to the wargame itself.  The Red Team leader and team should be extremely knowledgeable of the Blue plan and should have been in on the development of that plan.  The Red Team will, among other duties:

- Project adversary reactions to friendly actions
- Attempt to accurately portray the capabilities of the adversary
- Develop critical decision points relative to the friendly COAs
- Analyze friendly critical vulnerabilities
- ID adversary HVTs' key terrain, avenues of approach, doctrine and tactics, unconventional threats, reconnaissance and surveillance plans, etc.
- Depict adversary NAIs, TAIs, and DPs and in refining situation templates (threat COAs).

(b) If subordinate functional and Service components establish similar cells that mirror their adversary counterparts, this Red Cell network can collaborate to effectively wargame the adversary's full range of capabilities against the joint force.  In addition to supporting the wargaming effort during planning, the Red Cell can continue to view friendly joint operations from the adversary's perspective during execution.  The Red Cell process can be applied to noncombat operations to help determine unforeseen or most likely obstacles to, as well as the potential results of planned operations.

j.  **White Team**.  A small team of arbitrators normally composed of senior individuals familiar with the plan is a smart investment to ensure that the wargame does not get bogged down in unnecessary disagreement or arguing.  The White Team will provide overall oversight to the wargame and any adjudication required between participants.  The White Team may also include the facilitator and/or senior mentors as required.

**RED TEAM**

*Continually Ask the Critical Questions*

| QUESTIONS | RESULTS IN |
|---|---|

| | |
|---|---|
| **What if (tied to assumption or wildcard, etc)? (pre-mortem analysis)** | **Alternative Analysis** |
| **What are the objectives of….?** | **Consideration of Others** |
| **What about…..?** | **Identification of Gaps,** |
| **What are we missing….?** | **Seams, Vulnerabilities and Opportunities** |
| **What happens next….?** | **Branches and Sequels Proactive Plans/Actions** |
| **What should we assess….?** | **Measures of** |
| **How should we assess…..?** | **Effectiveness** |

**Figure XVIX-5.  Red Team Critical Questions**

k.  **What a Wargame Provides.**

- COA Wargame helps the commander determine how to best apply friendly strengths against threat critical vulnerabilities (CV) while *protecting* friendly CVs.

- COA Wargame provides decision support tools which facilitate the *transition* to *current operations* and subsequent execution.

- The red cell and the war game test our COAs against a thinking adversary.  The wargame ensures we bring viable COAs to the commander for his decision. The results of COA analysis are better COAs.

- The wargame confirms:

  – paths to threat critical vulnerabilities
  – mission analysis

l.  A **synchronization matrix** is a decision-making tool and a method of recording the results of wargaming.  Key results that should be recorded include decision points, potential governing factors, CCIR, COA adjustments, branches, and sequels. Using a synchronization matrix helps the staff visually synchronize the COA across time and space in relation to the adversary's possible COAs.  The wargame and synchronization matrix efforts will be particularly useful in identifying cross-component support resource requirements.  Figures XVIX-6 through XVIX-9 are examples of synchronization matrix frameworks and Figure XVIX-10 through XVIX-11 are examples of a time line matrix and matrix by phase.

| CRITICAL EVENT/PHASE/TIME: | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sequence Number | Action | Reaction | Counter-action | Assets | Time | Decision Point | PIR | Procedural & Positive Controls | Remarks |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

**Figure XVIX-6.  Example of Synchronization Matrix Framework**

These synchronization matrices might be combined into one that, for example, reflects the contributions that each component would provide, within each joint functional area, over time.  The staff can adapt the synchronization matrix to fit the needs of the analysis.  It should incorporate other operations, functions, and units that it wants to highlight.

**Figure XVIX-7. Example Wargame Synchronization Matrix**

SKETCH

MEU

Red City

Red Airbase

X
Airborne Brigade

Friendly COA

Enemy ECOA

Friendly Response

| COA# 1 | Critical Event: Seize Red Airbase | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sequence Number | Action | Reaction | Counter Action | Time | Forces/ Assets | Remarks |
| 1 | Abn Bde conducts forced entry onto airfield | Garrison from Red City launches counter attack against Abn force at the Airfield | MEU establishes Blocking Psn on Main Road; Air Interdicts Red force | H+1 | -Abn Bde -MEU AI | Requires early commitment of afloat reserve (MEU); PSYOP Focus |
| 2 | | | | | | |

Friendly COA # _____ Short Name

Enemy COA - (Most Likely / Most Dangerous)

Time / Phase / Critical Event _____

## COA

*Overall Situation:*

| | Areas | Action | Reaction | Counteraction |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **C O M P O N E N T S** | ARFOR / Land Component | | | |
| | MARFOR / Land Component | | | |
| | NAVFOR / Maritime Component | | | |
| | AFFOR | | | |
| | JFACC | | | |
| | JSOTF | | | |
| | Others (e.g. USCG & Interagency) | | | |
| **J O I N T   F U N C T I O N A L   A R E A S** | Movement & Maneuver | | | |
| | Intelligence | | | |
| | Firepower | | | |
| | Support | | | |
| | Command & Control | | | |
| | Protection | | | |
| **O T H E R S** | Decision Pts | | | |
| | CCIR | | | |
| | Branches | | | |
| | Risks | | | |
| | Issues | | | |

**Figure XVIX-8.  Example of Synchronization Matrix Framework**

**Friendly COA # 1 Short Name** Simultaneous NEO

**Enemy COA** — (Most Likely)(Most Dangerous)

**Time / Phase** (Critical Event) Evacuations

**Situation:**

The host country government cannot guarantee the safety of Americans & third country nationals (TCN). The environment for a NEO is "uncertain." Rebel factions are becoming more violent.

Start: JTF 780 positioned for NEO
End: Successful NEO and forces return to safe havens

| | Areas | Action | Enemy Reaction | Counteraction |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **C O M P O N E N T S** | ARFOR / Land Component | - Preparing to secure evac. site at # 3<br>- Located with NAVFOR (afloat) | Rebel forces declare all AMCITs "enemies of the revolution" & US military presence as evidence of plans to invade their country. Several TCNs killed in grenade atk near Site 2. | - Launches & secures evac. site # 2<br>- Evac AMCITs/TCN onto C-130 for evac |
| | MARFOR / Land Component | - Preparing to secure evac. site at # 3<br>- Located with NAVFOR (afloat) | | - Launches & secures evac. site # 3<br>- Evac AMCITs/TCN onto NAVFOR ships |
| | NAVFOR / Maritime Component | - Spting MARFOR<br>- Spting JFACC<br>- Spting ARFOR (ISB TR) | | - Spting MARFOR<br>- Spting JFACC<br>- Spting ARFOR (ISB TR) |
| | AFFOR | - Spting JFACC<br>- Preparing evac. control center at site A | | - Spting JFACC<br>- Operates evac. control center at site A |
| | JFACC | - Preparing to gain air superiority<br>- Preparing to provide CAS - Coord airspace | | - Gains/maintains air superiority<br>- Provides CAS - Coordinates airspace |
| | JSOTF | - Preparing to secure evac. site at # 1<br>- Located at ISB B | | - Launches & secures evac. site # 1<br>- Evac AMCITs/TCN to ISB B |
| | Others (e.g., USCG & Interagency) | DOS - Preparing to implement emergency evacuation plan<br>President/SECDEF - Prepares EXORD | | DOS - Implements emergency evac plan<br>President/SECDEF - Releases EXORD |
| **J O I N T   F U N C T I O N A L   A R E A S** | Movement & Maneuver | - JTF must be in position NLT ____<br>- JTF must be prepared to execute EXORD +4 hr | | - NAVFOR & JFACC insures freedom of sea & air movements |
| | Intelligence | - NAIs - Sites 1,2 & 3<br>- PIR - Threat against AMCITs; rebels troop mov; rebels attacks; etc. | | - Collects info at NAIs<br>- Collects & processes PIR |
| | Firepower | - Targeting efforts continue | | - AC-130 spt ARFOR/MARFOR/JSOTF (OPCON to JSOTF, TACON others) |
| | Support | - HN spt being provided from Countries Y & Z | | - HN spt being provided from Cty Y & Z |
| | Command & Control | - IO/TW -PSYOP spt to each ARFOR, MARFOR & JSOTF<br>- JTF HQ located on USS MTW | | - NAVFOR provides direct spt to MARFOR & ARFOR<br>- ROE changes |
| | Protection | - Weapons status ____<br>- Deception theme ____ | | - Weapons status ____<br>- Deception theme ____ |
| **O T H E R S** | Decision Pts | - Recommendation for evacuation EXORD | | - When to declare "end state" and mission accomplishment |
| | CCIR | - Taking of any AMCIT as a hostage<br>- Violence directed at AMCITs or TCN | | - #'s of AMCITs & TCNs evacuated<br>- Any interference with the evacuation |
| | Branches | - Site # 1 is unusable       - Site # 3 is unusable<br>- Site # 2 is unusable       - Hostages are taken | | - Implement branch plans |
| | Risks | - Military presence will provoke rebels | | - Significant casualties<br>- Unable to locate all AMCITs |
| | Issues | - Army helicopter on carriers<br>- Approval for use of evac site/ISB in Cty Y & Z | | - Policy for evacuation of unidentified personnel requesting help |

**Figure XVIX-9. Example of Synchronization Matrix Framework**

Friendly COA # 1  Short Name  Simultaneous NEO

Enemy COA - (Most Likely) (Most Dangerous)

Time / Phase / Critical Event _____ Evacuations

Situation:

The host country government cannot guarantee the safety of Americans & third country nationals (TCN). The environment for a NEO is "uncertain." Rebel factions are becoming more violent.

Start: JTF 780 positioned for NEO
End: Successful NEO and forces return to safe havens

| | Areas | Day D-2 | D-Day |
|---|---|---|---|
| **C O M P O N E N T S** | ARFOR/Land Component | - Preparing to secure evac. site at # 3<br>- Located with NAVFOR (afloat) | - Launches & secures evac. site # 2<br>- Evac AMCITs/TCN onto C-130 for evac |
| | MARFOR/Land Component | - Preparing to secure evac. site at # 3<br>- Located with NAVFOR (afloat) | - Launches & secures evac. site # 3<br>- Evac AMCITs/TCN onto NAVFOR ships |
| | NAVFOR/Maritime Component | - Spting MARFOR<br>- Spting JFACC<br>- Spting ARFOR (ISB TR) | - Spting MARFOR<br>- Spting JFACC<br>- Spting ARFOR (ISB TR) |
| | AFFOR | - Spting JFACC<br>- Preparing evac. control center at site A | - Spting JFACC<br>- Operates evac. control center at site A |
| | JFACC | - Preparing to gain air superiority<br>- Preparing to provide CAS    - Coordinates airspace | - Gains/maintains air superiority<br>- Provides CAS    - Coordinates airspace |
| | JSOTF | - Preparing to secure evac. site at # 1<br>- Located at ISB B | - Launches & secures evac. site # 1<br>- Evac AMCITs/TCN to ISB B |
| | Others (e.g., USCG & Interagency) | DOS - Preparing to implement emergency evacuation plan<br>Pres/SECDEF - Prepares EXORD | DOS - Implements emergency evac plan<br>Pres/SECDEF- Releases EXORD |
| **J O I N T   F U N C T I O N A L   A R E A S** | Movement & Maneuver | - JTF must be in position NLT _____<br>- JTF must be prepared to execute EXORD +4 hr | - NAVFOR & JFACC insures freedom of sea & air movements |
| | Intelligence | - NAIs - Sites 1,2 & 3<br>- PIR - Threat against AMCITs; rebels troop mov; rebels attacks; etc. | - Collects info at NAIs<br>- Collects & processes PIR |
| | Firepower | - Targeting efforts continue | - AC-130 spt ARFOR/MARFOR/JSOTF (OPCON to JSOTF, TACON others) |
| | Support | - HN spt being provided from Countries Y & Z | - HN spt being provided from Cty Y & Z |
| | Command & Control | - IO/IW - PSYOP spt to each ARFOR, MARFOR & JSOTF<br>- JTF HQ located on USS MTW | - NAVFOR provides direct spt to MARFOR & ARFOR<br>- Continue IW/C2W spt<br>- ROE changes |
| | Protection | - Weapons status _____<br>- Deception theme _____ | - Weapons status _____<br>- Deception theme _____ |
| **O T H E R S** | Decision Pts | - Recommendation for evacuation EXORD | - When to declare "end state" and mission accomplishment |
| | CCIR | - Taking of any AMCIT as a hostage<br>- Violence directed at AMCITs or TCNs | - #'s of AMCITs & TCNs evacuated<br>- Any interference with the evacuation |
| | Branches | - Site # 1 is unusable    - Site # 3 is unusable<br>- Site # 2 is unusable    - Hostages are taken | - Implement branch plans |
| | Risks | - Military presence will provoke rebels | - Significant casualties<br>- Unable to locate all AMCITs |
| | Issues | - Army helicopter on carriers<br>- Approval for use of evac site/ISB in Cty Y & Z | - Policy for evacuation of unidentified personnel requesting help |

**Figure XVIX-10.  Sample Time Line Matrix for a JTF Operation**

# SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX

Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time (Joint Pub 1-02)

| TIME/PHASE INCLUDE: WM, M, C, D DAYS | SHAPING | DETERRENCE | SEIZE INITIATIVE | DOMINANCE | STABILIZATION | ENABLE CA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| THREAT ENEMY ACTION / REACTION CCIR | COMPONENT TASKS | | | | | |
| OPERATIONAL INTEL, SURV RECON OPN'L ENVIRONMENT AWARENESS | AIR / NAV / AF / MAR / SOF / SPACE | | | | | |
| OPERATIONAL MOVEMENT & MANEUVER FORCE APPLICATION | AIR / NAV / AF / MAR / SOF | | | | | |
| OPERATIONAL FIREPOWER | AIR / NAV / AF / MAR / SOF | | | | | |
| OPERATIONAL PROTECTION ANTITERRORISM TMD WMD DAMAGE CONTROL NBC DEFENSE CBRNE | AIR / NAV / AF / MAR / SOF | | | | | |
| OPERATIONAL LOG & SPT FOCUSED LOGISTICS | AIR / NAV / AF / MAR / SOF / HOST NATION SPT | | | | | |
| OPERATIONAL CMD & CONTROL ROE | STAFF / COMM/C3I / MULTINATIONAL / INTERAGENCY | | | | | |
| INFO OPS JPOTF / IW | | | | | | |
| INTERAGENCY | | | | | | |
| MULTINATIONAL | | | | | | |
| ROE | | | | | | |
| DECISION POINTS (Link to CCIR) ☆ | | | | | | |
| RISK | | | | | | |
| ANNOTATE BRANCHES AND SEQUELS: | | | | | | |

FUNCTIONAL JJTL OPERATIONAL LEVEL TASKS

OTHERS / ENABLERS

NOTE: ARMAR MAY BE JFLCC / NAV MAY BE JFMCC / AF MAY BE JFACC

PROTECTION

SYNCHRO /WARGAME MATRIX SAMPLE/JFSC JAWS

**XVIX-11. Sample Matrix by Phase**

**Figure XVIX-12.  Sample Event Tem**plate

# Event Matrix

| NAI | Event | NET/ NLT | DP & TAI | Tasked Collection Assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3, 2 | Orange WOG first echelon vic Mezzouna displaces from defensive positions | H + 6 H + 12 | DP 3 | RC-135, TR-1, F/A-18D, Predator Track 3 |
| 19, 20 | Red SEC moving east across border toward Kasserine Pass | H +12 H +24 | DP 1 | National IMINT, National SIGINT U-2R, RC-135, |
| 1 | Orange 205th mech BDE moves north out of Gafsa to link up with lead BDE | H +6 H + 48 | DP 1 | National SIGINT, RC-135, Predator Track 6 |
| 8 | LY 2d echelon forces move north to establish strongpoint defense vic Gabes | H Hour H + 60 | DP 2 | National SIGINT, Theater IMINT, RC-135, VMU Track 2 |
| 2, 5 | Orange first echelon attacks Sfax | 21 July / 26 July | DP 4 | FA-18/FAC/FLIR National IMINT and SIGINT |
| 10 | Orange fire SCUDs at Blue ports and airfields | Phase 1 & 2 | DP 5 | National / Theater IMINT National / Theater SIGINT |
| 7 | Orange establish CSSC-3 seersucker battery vic Jerba Island | Phase 1 & 2 | DP 6 | JSTARS,     Predator Track 1 |

**Figure XVIX-13.  Sample Event Matrix**

**Decision Support Template**

Figure XVIX-14. Sample Decision Support Template

**DECISION SUPPORT MATRIX**

| DP | EVENTS & INDICATORS | NET/NLT | CDR'S OPTIONS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Whether or not enemy 1st echelon units are fixed; (NAI 1 - 3) | H+24/H+36 | 1 AD continues turning mvmnt or executes branch plan for envelopment of 1st echelon |
| 2 | 1st echelon enemy forces withdrawing into/through Gabes; 103d Armor Bde covering withdrawal and as possible counterattk force; 204th, 201st, and 104th preparing for BHO vic Gabes; refugees being forced North;  (NAI 4-5) | H+96/H+120 | Bypass, isolate or clear Gabes; force options:  2d MarDiv or LF6F |
| 3 | Enemy delays 2dMarDiv and reorients on mountain passes IOT hold 1 AD and allow forces to withdraw to border;   (NAI 9) | H+144/H+168 | Options: defeat 2d echelon via encirclement; defeat 2d echelon by annihilation (1AD/2MAW) or allow enemy to withdraw |

Figure XVIX-15. Sample Decision Support Matrix

8.  **Interpret the results of analysis and wargaming**.  Comparisons of advantages and disadvantages of each COA will be conducted during the next step of COA Determination.  However, if the *suitability, feasibility*, or *acceptability* of any COA becomes questionable during the analysis, the CDR should *modify or discard* it and concentrate on other COAs.  The need to create additional combinations of COAs may also be required (Figure XVIX-16).

"There were no decisions reached about how to exploit a victory in Sicily. It was an egregious error to leave the future unresolved."
*-General Omar Bradley on Operation Husky*

**Figure XVIX-16.  Results of Analysis and Wargaming**

9.  **Flexible Plans.**  We have several techniques to help us develop adaptability.  One of these is to make flexible plans.  Flexible plans can enhance adaptability by establishing a course of action that provides for multiple options.  We can increase our flexibility by providing *branches* to deal with changing conditions on the battlefield that may affect the plan (e.g., changing dispositions, orientation, strength, movement) or by providing *sequels* for current and future operations.  Sequels are courses of action to follow probable battle or engagement outcomes; victory, defeat, or stalemate.

a.  **Branches and Sequels.**  Many operation plans require adjustment beyond the initial stages of the operation.  Consequently, CDRs build flexibility into their plans by developing branches and sequels to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing conditions.  An effective plan places a premium on flexibility because operations never seem to proceed exactly as planned.

b.  During the wargaming sequence we will identify operational branches and sequels giving our plans that flexibility and help focus our future planning efforts.  Visualizing and planning branches and sequels are important because they involve transitions—changes in mission, type of operations, and often forces required for execution.  Unless planned, prepared for, and executed efficiently, transitions can reduce the tempo of the operation, slow its momentum, and surrender the initiative to the adversary.  Both branches and sequels should have execution criteria, carefully reviewed before their implementation and updated based on assessment of current operations.  Both branches and sequels directly relate to the concept of phasing.

(1) **Branches are options built into the basic plan** and provides a framework for flexibility in execution.  Branches may include shifting priorities, changing mission, unit organization and command relationships, or changing the very nature of the joint operation itself.  Branches add flexibility to plans by <u>anticipating</u> situations that could alter the basic plan.  Such situations could be a result of lingering planning assumptions not proven to be facts, anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions, availability of friendly capabilities or resources, or even a change in the weather or season within the operational area.  Commanders anticipate and devise counters to enemy actions to mitigate risk.  Although anticipating every possible threat action is impossible, branches anticipate the most likely ones. Commanders execute branches to rapidly respond to changing conditions.



(2) **Sequels are subsequent operations** based on the possible outcomes of the current operation — victory, defeat, or stalemate.  Sequel planning allows the CDR and staff to keep pace with a constantly evolving situation while staying focused on mission accomplishment.  They are future operations that anticipate the possible outcomes—success, failure, or stalemate—of the current operations.  A counteroffensive, for example, is a logical sequel to a defense; exploitation and pursuit follow successful attacks.  Executing a sequel normally begins another phase of an operation, if not a new operation. In joint operations, phases can be viewed as the sequels to the basic plan.  CDRs consider sequels early and revisit them throughout an operation.  Without such planning, current operations leave forces poorly positioned for future opportunities, and leaders are unprepared to retain the initiative.

PH I    PH II    PH III    PH IV

OPERATIONS

END STATE

TIME

Identified through Campaign

Sequel plans are developed during execution based on the assessment of current operations for adjustments to future operations

c.   The value of *branches and sequels* is that they prepare us for several different actions. *We should keep the number of branches and sequels to a relative few.*  We should not try to develop so many branches and sequels that we cannot adequately plan, train, or prepare for any of them.  The skillful, well-thought-out use of branches and sequels becomes an important means of anticipating future courses of action.  This anticipation helps accelerate the decision cycle and therefore increases tempo and flexibility.

d.   Flexible plans avoid unnecessary detail that not only consumes time in their development, but has a tendency to restrict subordinates' latitude.  Instead, flexible plans lay out what needs to be accomplished, but leave the manner of accomplishment to subordinates.  This allows the subordinates the flexibility to deal with a broader range of circumstances.

e.   Flexible plans are plans that can be easily changed.  Plans that require coordination are said to be "coupled."  If all the parts of a plan are too tightly coupled, the plan is harder to change because changing any one part of the plan means changing all the other parts. Instead, we should try to develop modular, loosely coupled plans.  Then if we change or modify any one part of the plan, it does not directly affect all the other parts.

f.   Finally, flexible plans should be simple plans.  Simple plans are easier to adapt to the rapidly changing, complex, and fluid situations that we experience in combat.

# CHAPTER XX

# COA COMPARISON



1.  **Step 5 — COA Comparison:** Course of action comparison is a <u>subjective</u> process whereby COAs are considered independently of each other and evaluated/compared against a set of criteria that are established by the staff and CDR. The goal is to identify and recommend the course of action that has the highest probability of success against the enemy course of action that is of the most concern to the CDR, so take some time and energy with this step. COA comparison facilitates the CDR's decision-making process by balancing the **ends, means, ways and risk** of each COA (Figure XX-1). The end product of this task is a briefing to the CDR on a COA recommendation and a decision by the CDR.

**Figure XX-1.  COA Comparison**

- **Determine comparison criteria**
- **Define and determine the standard for each criteria**
- **Assign weight or priority to comparison criteria**
- **Construct comparison method and record**
- **Conduct and record the comparison**
  **Recommend COA**

a.   In COA comparison the CDR and staff evaluate all friendly COAs – against established criteria-governing factors (discussed in previous chapter), and select the COA which best accomplishes the mission.  The CDR reviews the criteria list and adds or deletes as they see fit.  The number of governing factors will vary, but there should be enough to differentiate COAs. Consequently, COAs are not compared to each other, but rather they are individually evaluated against the criteria that are established by the staff and CDR.

(1) COA comparison helps the CDR answer the following questions:

- What are the differences between each COA?

- What are the advantages and disadvantages?

- What are the risks?

**Identify and select the COA that best accomplishes the mission.**

b.   Staff officers may each use their own matrix to compare COAs with respect to their functional areas.  Matrices use the evaluation criteria developed before the wargame.  Decision matrices alone cannot provide decision solutions.  Their greatest

value is providing a method to compare COAs against criteria that, when met, produce mission success. They are analytical tools that staff officers use to prepare recommendations. CDRs provide the solution by applying their judgment to staff recommendations and making a decision.

## Staff Estimate Matrix (Intel Estimate)

| Evaluation Criteria | Frontal COA 1 | Envelopment COA 2 |
|---|---|---|
| Effects of Terrain | | ✔ |
| Effects of Weather | ✔ | |
| Utilizes Surpise | | ✔ |
| Attacks Critical Vulnerabilities | | ✔ |
| Collection Support | | ✔ |
| Counterintelligence | ✔ | |
| Totals | 2 | 4 |

c. The staff helps the CDR identify and select the COA that best accomplishes the mission. The staff supports the CDR's decision-making process by clearly portraying his options and recording the results of the process. The staff compares feasible COAs to identify the one with the highest probability of success against the most likely enemy COA and the most dangerous enemy COA.

### COA Comparison
1. Determine evaluation criteria
2. Develop a construct for making comparison
3. Perform COA comparison
4. Decide on COA and prepare to recommend to CDR

2. **Prepare for course of action comparison.** The CDR and staff develop and evaluate a list of important criteria. Using the governing factors/evaluation criteria discussed during COA analysis and wargaming, the staff outlines each COA, highlighting advantages and disadvantages. Comparing the strengths and weaknesses of the COAs identifies their advantages and disadvantages relative to each other.

a. Determine/define comparison criteria or governing factors. As discussed earlier, criteria are based on the particular circumstances and should be relative to the situation. There is no standard list of criteria, although the CDR may prescribe several core criteria that all staff directors will use (see Appendix H for examples). Individual staff sections, based on their estimate process, select the remainder of the criteria.

(1) Criteria are based on the particular circumstances and should be relative to the situation.

(2) Review CDRs guidance for relevant criteria.

(3) Identify implicit significant factors relating to the operation.

(4) Each staff identifies criteria relating to that staff function.

(5) Other criteria might include:

(a) Political, social, and safety constraints; requirements for coordination with Embassy/Interagency personnel

(b) Fundamentals of Joint Warfare/SSTR

(c) Elements of Operational Art

(d) Mission accomplishment

(e) Risks

(f) Costs

b.  Define and determine the standard for each criterion.

(1) Establish standard definitions for each governing factor.  Define the criteria in precise terms to reduce subjectivity and ensure the interpretation of each governing factor remains constant between the various COAs.

(2) Establish definition prior to commencing COA comparison to avoid compromising the outcome.

(3) Apply standard for each criterion to each COA.

c.  The staff evaluates feasible COAs using those governing factors most important to the CDR to identify the one COA with the highest probability of success.  The selected COA should also:

(1) Mitigate risk to the force and mission to an acceptable level.

(2) Place the force in the best posture for future operations.

(3) Provide maximum latitude for initiative by subordinates.

(4) Provide the most flexibility to meet unexpected threats and opportunities.

3.  **Determine the comparison method and record.**  Actual comparison of COAs is critical.  The staff may use any technique that facilitates reaching the best recommendation and the CDR making the best decision.  There are a number of techniques for comparing COAs.  The most common technique is the decision matrix, which uses evaluation criteria to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of each COA.  Here are examples of several decision matrices:

a.  **Weighted Numerical Comparison Technique**.  The example below provides a numerical aid for differentiating COAs.  Values reflect the relative advantages or disadvantages of each COA for each of the criterion selected.  Certain criteria have been weighted to reflect greater value (Figure XX-2 and XX-3 on the following page).

---

b.   Determine the weight of each criterion based on its relative importance and the CDR's guidance.  The CDR may give guidance that result in weighting certain criteria.  The staff member responsible for a functional area scores each COA using those criteria.  Multiplying the score by the weight yields the criterion's value.  The staff member then totals all values.  However, he must be careful not to portray subjective conclusions as the results of quantifiable analysis.  Comparing COAs by category is more accurate than comparing total scores.

(1) Criteria are those selected through the process described earlier.

(2) The criteria can be rated (or weighted).  The most important criteria are rated with the highest numbers.  Lesser criteria are weighted with progressively lower numbers.

(3) The highest number is best.  The best criterion and the most advantageous COA ratings are with the highest number.  Values reflect the relative strengths and weaknesses of each COA.

**Courses of Action**

| Criteria | Weight | COA 1 Rating | COA 1 Product | COA 2 Rating | COA 2 Product | COA 3 Rating | COA 3 Product |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Exploits Maneuver | 2 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 2 |
| Attacks COGs | 3 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 3 |
| Integrates Maneuver and Interdiction | 2 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 6 | 1 | 2 |
| Exploits Deception | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 6 |
| Provide flexibility | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 4 |
| CSS (best use of transportation) | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| etc. | | | | | | | |
| Total | | 12 | | 15 | | 9 | |
| Weighted total | | | 23 | | 31 | | 18 |

Figure 207-1
Example Numerical Comparison

- The CJTF's intent explained that the most important criteria was "attacking the enemy's centers of gravity."
   *therefore*-----> Assign a value of 3 for that criteria and lower numbers for other criteria that the staff devises (this is weighting the criteria).
- For "attacking enemy COGs," COA 2 was rated the best (with a number of "3")
   *therefore*----> COA 2 = 9,  COA 1 = 6,  and COA 3 = 3
- After multiplying the relative COA rating by the weight given to each criteria, and adding the product columns, COA 2 (with a score of 31) is rated the most appropriate according to the criteria used to evaluate it.

**Figure XX-2.  Example Numerical Comparison**

(4) Each staff section does this separately, perhaps using different criteria on which to base the COA comparison.  The staff then assembles and arrives at a consensus for the criterion and weights.  The Chief of Staff/DCJTF should approve the staff's recommendations concerning the criteria and weights to ensure completeness and consistency throughout the staff sections.

| EXAMPLE #2  COA COMPARISON MATRIX FORMAT | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GOVERNING FACTOR | WEIGHT | COA #1 | | COA #2 | | COA #3 | |
| | | SCORE | WEIGHTED | SCORE | WEIGHTED | SCORE | WEIGHTED |
| SURPRISE | 2 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 4 |
| RISK | 2 | 3 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| FLEXIBILITY | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| RETAILIATION | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| DAMAGE TO ALLIANCE | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| LEGAL BASIS | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| EXTERNAL SUPPORT | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| FORCE PROTECTION | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| OPSEC | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| | | | | | | | |
| TOTAL | | 27 | | 18 | | 16 | |

**Figure XX-3.  Comparison Matrix Format**

c.  **Non-Weighted Numerical Comparison Technique.**  The same as the previous method except the criteria are not weighted.  Again, the highest number is best for each of the criteria.

d.  **Narrative or bulletized descriptive comparison of strengths and weaknesses.** Review criteria and describe each COA's strengths and weaknesses.  See the example below, Figure XX-4.

| Course of Action | Strengths | Weaknesses |
|---|---|---|
| COA 1 | Narrative or bulletized discussion of strengths using the criteria | Narrative or bulletized discussion of weaknesses using the criteria |
| COA 2 | Same | Same |
| COA 3 | Same | Same |

**Figure XX-4.  Criteria for Strengths and Weaknesses**

e.  **Plus/Minus/Neutral comparison.**  Base this comparison on the broad degree to which selected criteria support or are reflected in the COA.  This is typically organized as a table showing (+) for a positive influence, (0) for a neutral influence, and (-) for a negative influence.  Figure XX-5 is an example:

| Criteria | COA 1 | COA 2 |
|---|---|---|
| Casualty estimate | + | - |
| Casualty evacuation routes | - | + |
| Suitable medical facilities | 0 | 0 |
| Flexibility | + | - |

**Figure XX-5.  Plus/Minus/Neutral Comparison**

f.  **Stop Light comparison**.  Criteria are judged to be acceptable or unacceptable with varying levels in between.  Ensure you define each color in the stop light on a key along with corrective methods to elevate mid colors to green.

| COA Criteria | COA-1 | COA-2 | COA-3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Speed | Red | Green | Yellow |
| Surprise | Red | Orange | Green |
| Risk | Orange | Yellow | Green |
| TOTAL | Red | Orange | Green |

**Figure XX-6.  Stop Light Comparison**

g.  **Descriptive comparison.**  Simply a description of advantages and disadvantages of each COA.

| COA | ADVANTAGES | DISADVANTAGES |
|---|---|---|
| COA 1 | • Rapid Delivery<br>• Meets critical needs | • Rough integration of forces<br>• Rough transition<br>• Complex organization<br>• Not flexible at all<br>• Adequate force protection |
| COA 2 | • Rapid Delivery<br>• Meets critical needs<br>• Smooth integration<br>• Smooth transition | • Complex organization<br>• Less flexible<br>• Adequate force protection |
| COA 3 | • Smooth integration<br>• Smooth transition<br>• Simplest organization<br>• Adequate force protection<br>• Best force protection | • Less rapid delivery<br>• Does not meet all critical needs |

4.  COA comparison remains a subjective process and should not be turned into a mathematical equation.  Using +,-, 0 or 1, 2, 3 are as appropriate as any other methods. The key element in this process is the ability to articulate to the CDR why one COA is preferred over another.

5.  Figure XX-7 depicts inputs and outputs for course-of-action comparison.  Other products not graphically shown in the chart include updated JIPOE products, updated CCIR's, staff estimates, CDR's identification of branches for further planning and a Warning Order as appropriate.

# Input: Staff Estimates

— Reviews the mission and situation from its own staff functional perspective;
— Examines the factors and assumptions for which it is the responsible staff;
— Analyzes each COA from its staff functional perspective; and
— Concludes whether the mission can be supported and which COA can be best supported from its particular staff functional perspective.

|  | Decisive Air<br>COA 1 | Sequential Build<br>COA 2 |
|---|---|---|
| J2 |  | √ |
| J3 |  |  |
| J4 | √ |  |
| MARFOR |  |  |
| ARFOR |  |  |
| AFFOR | √ | √ |
| NAVFOR |  |  |
| JFACC |  |  |
| JFLCC |  | √ |
| JFMCC |  |  |
| TOTALS: | 2 | 3 |
| The Staff and Components recommend COA 2 | | |

**Figure XX-7. Course of Action Comparison**

6. The staff ensures the selected COA is faithfully captured as the concept of operations (CONOPS). The CONOPS – along with the joint functions (movement and maneuver, intelligence, firepower, support, C2, protection) – forms the basis for the operation plan (OPLAN) or order (OPORD).

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# Chapter XXI

# COA SELECTION and APPROVAL



| Step #1 | PLANNING INITIATION |
| Step #2 | MISSION ANALYSIS |
| Step #3 | COA DEVELOPMENT |
| Step #4 | COA ANALYSIS/WARGAMING |
| Step #5 | COA COMPARISON |
| Step #6 | COA APPROVAL |
| Step #7 | PLAN OR ORDER DEVELOPMENT |

COA Determination

1. **Step 6 — COA Approval**

   a. **COA Recommendation.**  Throughout the COA development process, the CCDR conducts an independent analysis of the mission, possible courses of action, and relative merits and risks associated with each COA.  The CDR, upon receiving the staff's recommendation, combines his analysis with the staff recommendation resulting in a selected COA.  The forum for presenting the results of COA comparison is the *CDR's Decision Brief*.  Typically this briefing provides the CCDR with an update of the current situation, an overview of the COAs considered, and a discussion of the results of COA comparison.  Figure XXI-1, on the following page, depicts the COA approval inputs and outputs.

**Figure XXI-1.  Course of Action Approval**

b.  **Prepare the COA decision briefing**.  This briefing often takes the form of a CDR's Estimate.  This information could include the current status of the joint force; the current JIPOE; and assumptions used in COA development.  The CDR selects a COA based upon the staff recommendations and the CDR's personal estimate, experience, and judgment.  The JPG should prepare a briefing to provide the following to the CCDR:

(1) The purpose of the briefing.

(2) Enemy situation.

(a) **Strength.**  A review of enemy forces, both committed/available for reinforcement.

(b) **Composition.**  Order of battle, major weapons systems, and operational characteristics.

(c) **Location and disposition.**  Ground combat and fire support forces, air, naval, missile forces, logistic forces and nodes, command and control (C2) facilities, and other combat power.

(d) **Reinforcements.**  Land; air; naval; missile; nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC), other advanced weapons systems; capacity for movement of these forces.

(e) **Logistics.**  A summary of the enemy's ability to support combat operations.

(f) **Time and space factors**.  The capability to move to and reinforce initial positions.

(g) **Combat efficiency**.  The state of training, readiness, battle experience, physical condition, morale, leadership, motivation, tactical doctrine, discipline, and significant strengths and weaknesses.

c.  Friendly situation.

d.  Mission statements.

e.  CDR's intent statement.

f.  Operational concepts and COAs developed.

(1) Any changes from the mission analysis briefing in the following areas:

(a) Assumptions.

(b) Limitations.

(c) Enemy and friendly centers of gravity.

(d) Phasing of the operation (if phased).

(2) Present courses of action. As a minimum, discuss:

(a) COA # ___. (Short name, e.g., "Simultaneous Assault")

1  COA statement (brief concept of operations).

2  COA sketch.

3  COA architecture:

a  Task organization.

b  Command relationships.

c  Organization of the operational area.

(b) Major differences between each COA.

(c) Summaries of COAs.

g.  COA analysis.

(1) Review of JPG's wargaming efforts.

(2) Add considerations from own experience.

h. COA comparisons.

(1) Description of comparison criteria (e.g., governing factors) and comparison methodology.

(2) Weigh strengths/weaknesses with respect to comparison criteria.

i. COA recommendations:

(1) Staff.

(2) Components.

3. **Present the COA decision briefing.** The staff briefs the CDR on the COA comparison and the analysis and wargaming results, including a review of important supporting information. All principal staff directors and the component CDR's should attend this briefing (physically present or linked by VTC).



4. **CDR selects/modified COA**. COA approval/selection is the end result of the COA comparison process. It gives the staff a concise statement of how the CDR intends to accomplish the mission, and provides the necessary focus for execution planning and OPLAN/OPORD development.

a. Review staff recommendations.

b. Apply results of own COA analysis and comparison.

c. Consider any separate recommendations from supporting and subordinate CDRs.

d. Review guidance from the higher headquarters/strategic guidance.

e. The CDR may:

    (1)    Concur with staff/component recommendations, as presented.

    (2)    Concur with staff/component recommended COAs, but with modifications.

    (3)    Select a different COA from the staff/component recommendations.

    (4)    Direct the use of a COA not formally considered.

    (5)    Defer the decision and consult with selected staff/CDRs prior to making a final decision.

5. **Refine Selected COA.** Once the CDR selects a COA, the staff will begin the refinement process of that COA into a clear decision statement to be used in the CDR's Estimate. At the same time, the staff will apply a final "acceptability" check.

a. Staff refines CDR's COA selection into clear decision statement.

    (1) Develop a brief statement that **clearly and concisely** sets forth the COA selected and provides only whatever information is necessary to develop a plan for the operation (no defined format).

    (2) Describe what the force is to do as a whole, and as much of the elements of when, where, and how as may be appropriate.

    (3) Express decision in terms of what is to be accomplished, if possible.

    (4) Use simple language so the meaning is unmistakable.

    (5) Include statement of what is acceptable risk.

b. Apply final "acceptability" check.

    (1) Apply experience and an understanding of situation.

    (2) Consider factors of acceptable risk versus desired outcome consistent with higher CDR's intent and concept. Determine if gains are worth expenditures.

> **Note:** The nature of a potential contingency could make it difficult to determine a specific end state until the crisis actually occurs. In these cases, the CCDR may choose to present two or more valid COAs for approval by higher authority. A single COA can then be approved when the crisis occurs and specific circumstances become clear.

6. **Prepare the CDR's Estimate**

   a. Once the CCDR has made a decision on a selected COA, provides guidance, and updates his intent, the staff completes the CDR's Estimate. The CDR's Estimate provides a **concise narrative statement** of how the CCDR intends to accomplish the mission, and provides the necessary focus for campaign planning and OPLAN/OPORD development. Further, it responds to the establishing authority's requirement to develop a plan for execution. The CDR's Estimate[1] provides a continuously updated source of information from the perspective of the CCDR. CDRs at various levels use estimates during JOPP to support all aspects of COA determination and plan or order development. Outside of formal JOPES requirements, a CDR may or may not use a CDR's Estimate as the situation dictates. The CDR's initial intent statement and planning guidance to the staff can provide sufficient information to guide the planning process. Although the CCDR will tailor the content of the CDR's Estimate based on the situation, a typical format for an estimate that a CCDR submits per *JOPES VOL I* procedures is shown at Figure XXI-2.

   (1) Precise contents may vary widely, depending on the nature of the crisis, time available to respond, and the applicability of prior planning. In a rapidly developing situation, the formal CDR's Estimate may be initially impractical, and the entire estimate process may be reduced to a CDRs' conference.

   (2) In practice, with appropriate horizontal and vertical coordination, the CCDR's COA selection could already have been briefed to and approved by the CJCS and SecDef. In the current global environment, where major military operations are both politically and strategically significant, even a CCDR's selected COA is normally briefed to and approved by the President or SecDef. The CDR's Estimate then becomes a matter of formal record keeping and guidance for component and supporting forces.

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[1] Annex J of JOPES Volume I (CJCSI 3122.01) provides the format for a CDR's Estimate. See also Appendix C of this document.

**Figure XXI-2. Commander's Estimate**

b.  The supported CDR may use simulation and analysis tools in the collaborative environment to assess a variety of options, and may also choose to convene a concept development conference involving representatives of subordinate and supporting commands, the Services, Joint Staff, and other interested parties.  Review of the resulting CCDR's Estimate (also referred to as the strategic concept) requires maximum collaboration and coordination among all planning participants.  The supported CDR may highlight issues for future interagency consultation, review or resolution to be presented to Secretary of Defense during the IPR.[2]

c.  **CJCS Estimate Review.**  The Estimate Review determines whether the scope and concept of planned operations satisfy the tasking and will accomplish the mission; whether the assigned tasks can be accomplished using available resources in the time frames contemplated by the plan; and ensures the plan is proportional and worth the expected costs.  Once approved for further planning by the Secretary of Defense during the Concept Development IPR, the CCDR's Estimate becomes the CONOPS for the plan. A detailed description of the CONOPS will be included in Annex C of the plan.[3]

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[2]JOPES Vol I, 29 Sept 2006
[3]Ibid

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# CHAPTER XXII

# PLAN DEVELOPMENT – Function III

| Step #1 | PLANNING INITIATION |
| Step #2 | MISSION ANALYSIS |
| Step #3 | COA DEVELOPMENT |
| Step #4 | COA ANALYSIS/WARGAMING |
| Step #5 | COA COMPARISON |
| Step #6 | COA APPROVAL |
| Step #7 | PLAN/ORDER DEVELOPMENT |

1.  **Function III — Plan Development**

2.  **Step 7 — Plan or Order Development:**

   a.   After completing Steps 1-6, we now have a document that's been well staffed which will aid us in developing our plan.

   b.   During Plan or Order development, the CDR and staff, in collaboration with subordinate and supporting components and organizations, expand the approved COA into a detailed OPLAN or OPORD utilizing the CONPLAN, which is the centerpiece of the operation plan or order.

3.  **Format of Military Plans and Orders.**  Plans and orders can come in many varieties from the very detailed Campaign Plans and Operations Plans to simple verbal orders. They also include Operation Orders, Warning Orders, Planning Orders, Alert Orders, Execute Orders, and Fragmentary Orders.  The more complex directives will contain much of the amplifying information in appropriate annexes and appendices.  However,

the directive should always contain the essential information in the main body. The form may depend on the time available, the complexity of the operation, and the levels of command involved. However, in most cases, the directive will be standardized in the five-paragraph format that was introduced back in step one. Following is a brief description of each of these paragraphs.

- **Paragraph 1 – Situation.** The commander's summary of the general situation that ensures subordinates understand the background of the planned operations. Paragraph 1 will often contain sub paragraphs describing the higher Commander's Intent, friendly forces, and enemy forces.

- **Paragraph 2 – Mission.** The commander inserts his restated mission (containing essential tasks) developed during the mission analysis.

- **Paragraph 3 – Execution.** This paragraph contains Commander's Intent, which will enable commanders two levels down to exercise initiative while keeping their actions aligned with the overall purpose of the mission. It also specifies objectives, tasks, and assignments for subordinates (by phase, as applicable—with clear criteria denoting phase completion).

- **Paragraph 4 – Administration and Logistics.** This paragraph describes the concept of support, logistics, personnel, public affairs, civil affairs, and medical services.

- **Paragraph 5 – Command and Control.** This paragraph specifies the command relationships, succession of command, and overall plan for communications.

4. **Plan or Order Development**

a.   For plans and orders developed per *CJCSM 3122.01* (*JOPES*), the CJCS, in coordination with the supported and supporting CDRs and other members of the JCS, monitors planning activities, resolves shortfalls when required, and reviews the supported CDR's OPLAN for *adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, completeness, and compliance with Joint Doctrine*. The supported CDR will conduct Final Plan Approval-in-progress reviews (IPR-F) with the SecDef to confirm the plan's strategic guidance and receive approval of assumptions, the mission statement, the concept, the plan, and any further guidance required for plan refinement. At IPR-F, the CJCS and USD(P) will include issues arising from, or resolved during, plan review (e.g., key risks, decision points). The intended result of IPR-F is SecDef approval of the basic plan and required annexes, the resolution of any remaining key issues, and approval to proceed with plan assessment (as applicable) with any amplifying guidance or direction.

If the President or SecDef decides to execute the plan, all three joint operation planning elements — *situational awareness, planning, and execution* — continue in a complementary and iterative process.

b.   The CCDR guides plan development by issuing a PLANORD or similar planning directive to coordinate the activities of the commands and agencies involved.  A number of activities are associated with plan development, as Figure XXII-1 shows.



**Figure XXII-1.  Plan Development Activities**

These planning activities typically will be accomplished in a parallel, collaborative, and iterative fashion rather than sequentially, depending largely on the planning time available. The same flexibility displayed in COA development is seen here again, as planners discover and eliminate shortfalls.

c.   The *CJCSI 3122* series (JOPES) provides specific guidance on these activities for organizations required to prepare a plan per JOPES procedures.  However, these are typical types of activities that other organizations also will accomplish as they plan for joint operations.  For example, a COCOM which is preparing a crisis-related OPLAN at the President's direction will follow specific procedures and milestones in force planning, TPFDD development, and shortfall identification.  If required, a joint task force (JTF) subordinate to the CCDR will support this effort even as the CCDR and staff are planning for their specific mission and tasks.

(1) **Application of Forces and Capabilities**

(a) When planning the application of forces and capabilities, **the CCDR should not be completely constrained by the strategic plan's force apportionment** if additional resources are justifiable and no other course of action within the allocation reasonably exists.  The additional capability requirements will be coordinated with the joint staff through the development process.  Risk assessments will include results using both allocated capabilities and additional capabilities.  Operation planning is inherently an iterative process, with forces being requested and approved for certain early phases, while other forces may be needed or withdrawn for the later phases.  This process is particularly complex when planning a campaign because of the potential magnitude of committed forces and length of the commitment.  Finally, when making this determination the CCDR should also consider withholding some capability as an **operational reserve**.

(b) When developing an OPLAN, the supported CCDR should designate the main effort and supporting efforts as soon as possible. This action is necessary for economy of effort and for allocating disparate forces, to include multinational forces. The main effort is based on the supported CCDR's prioritized objectives. It identifies where the supported CCDR will concentrate capabilities to achieve specific objectives. Designation of the main effort can be addressed in geographical (area) or functional terms. Area tasks and responsibilities focus on a specific area to control or conduct operations. Functional tasks and responsibilities focus on the performance of continuing efforts that involve the forces of two or more Military Departments operating in the same domain — air, land, sea, or space — or where there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. In either case, designating the main effort will establish where or how a major portion of available friendly forces and assets are employed, often to attain the primary objective of a major operation or campaign.

(c) Designating a main effort facilitates the synchronized and integrated employment of the joint force while preserving the initiative of subordinate CDRs. After the main effort is identified, joint force and component planners determine those tasks essential to accomplishing objectives. The supported CCDR assigns these tasks to subordinate CDRs along with the capabilities and support necessary to achieve them. As such, the CONOPS must clearly specify the nature of the main effort.

(d) The main effort can change during the course of the operation based on numerous factors, including changes in the operational environment and how the adversary reacts to friendly operations. When the main effort changes, support priorities must change to ensure success. Both horizontal and vertical coordination within the joint force and with multinational and interagency partners is essential when shifting the main effort. Secondary efforts are important, but are ancillary to the main effort. They normally are designed to complement or enhance the success of the main effort (for example, by diverting enemy resources). Only necessary secondary efforts, whose potential value offsets or exceeds the resources required, should be undertaken, because these efforts divert resources from the main effort. Secondary efforts normally lack the operational depth of the main effort and have fewer forces and capabilities, smaller reserves, and more limited objectives.[1]

(2) **Force Planning**

(a) The primary purposes of force planning are to **(1)** influence COA development and selection based on force allocations, availability, and readiness **(2)** identify all forces needed to accomplish the supported component CDRs' CONOPS with some rigor and **(3)** *effectively phase the forces into the OE.* Force planning consists of determining the force requirements by operation phase, mission, mission priority, mission sequence, and operating area. It includes force allocation review, major force phasing; integration planning; force list structure development (TPFDD); followed by force list development. Force planning is the responsibility of the CCDR, supported by component

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[1] JP 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, 26 Dec 2006.

CDRs in coordination with global force management (GFM) and USJFCOM force providers. Force planning begins early during CONOPS development and focuses on adaptability. The CDR determines force requirements; develops a letter of instruction or time phasing and force planning; and designs force modules to align and time-phase the forces in accordance with the CONOPS. Major forces and elements are selected from those apportioned or allocated for planning and included in the supported CDR's CONOPS by operation phase, mission and mission priority. Service components then collaboratively make tentative assessments of the specific sustainment capabilities required in accordance with the CONOPS. After the actual forces are identified (sourced), the CCDR refines the force plan to ensure it supports the CONOPS, provides force visibility, and enables flexibility. The CDR identifies and resolves or reports shortfalls with a risk assessment.

(b) In CAP, force planning focuses on the actual units designated to participate in the planned operation and their readiness for deployment. The supported CDR identifies force requirements as operational capabilities in the form of force packages to facilitate sourcing by the Services USJFCOM, USSOCOM, and other force providers' supporting commands. A force package is a list (group of force capabilities) of the various forces (force requirements) that the supported CDR requires to conduct the operation described in the CONOPS. The supported CDR typically describes required force requirements in the form of broad capability descriptions or unit type codes, depending on the circumstances. The supported CDR submits the required force packages through the Joint Staff to the force providers for sourcing. Force providers review the readiness and deployability posture of their available units before deciding which units to allocate to the supported CDR's force requirements. Services and their component commands also determine mobilization requirements and plan for the provision of non-unit sustainment. The supported CDR will review the sourcing recommendations through the GFM process to ensure compatibility with capability requirements and concept of operations. [2]

(3) **Support Planning.** The purpose of support planning is to determine the sequence of the personnel, logistic, and other support required to provide distribution; maintenance; civil engineering, medical, and sustainment in accordance with the concept of operation. Support planning is conducted in parallel with other planning, and encompasses such essential factors as executive agent identification; assignment of responsibility for base operating support; airfield operations; management of non-unit replacements; health service support; personnel management; financial management; handling of prisoners of war and detainees; theater civil engineering policy; logistic-related environmental considerations; support of noncombatant evacuation operations and other retrograde operations; and nation assistance. Support planning is primarily the responsibility of the Service component CDRs and begins during CONOPS development. Service component CDRs identify and update support requirements in coordination with the Services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and USTRANSCOM. They initiate the procurement of critical and low-density inventory items; determine host nation support

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[2]JP 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, 26 Dec 2006.

(HNS) availability; develop plans for total asset visibility; and establish phased delivery plans for sustainment in line with the phases and priorities of the CONOPS. They develop and train for battle damage repair; develop reparable retrograde plans; develop container management plans; develop force and line of communications protection plans; develop supporting phased transportation and support plans aligned to the CONOPS and report movement support requirements. Service component CDRs continue to refine their sustainment and transportation requirements as the force providers identify and source force requirements. During distribution planning, the supported CCDR and USTRANSCOM resolve gross distribution feasibility questions impacting inter-theater and intra-theater movement and sustainment delivery. USTRANSCOM and other transportation providers identify air, land, and sea transportation resources to support the approved CONOPS. These resources may include apportioned inter-theater transportation, GCC-controlled theater transportation, and transportation organic to the subordinate commands. USTRANSCOM and other transportation providers develop transportation schedules for movement requirements identified by the supported CDR. A transportation schedule does not necessarily mean that the supported CDR's CONOPS is transportation feasible; rather, the schedules provide the most effective and realistic use of available transportation resources in relation to the phased CONOPS.[3]

(a) **Support refinement** is conducted to confirm the sourcing of logistic requirements in accordance with strategic guidance and to assess the adequacy of resources provided through support planning. This refinement ensures support is phased in accordance with the CONOPS; refines support C2 planning; and integrates support plans across the supporting commands, Service components, and agencies. It ensures an effective but minimum logistics foot-print for each phase of the CONOPS.

(b) **Transportation refinement** simulates the planned movement of resources that require lift support to ensure that the plan is transportation feasible. The supported CDR evaluates and adjusts the concept of operation to achieve end-to-end transportation feasibility if possible, or requests additional resources if the level of risk is unacceptable. Transportation plans must be consistent and deconflicted with plans and timelines required by providers of Service-unique combat and support aircraft to the supported CCDR. Planning also must consider requirements of international law; commonly understood customs and practices; and agreements or arrangements with foreign nations with which the U.S. requires permission for overflight, access, and diplomatic clearance. If significant changes are made to the CONOPS, it should be assessed for feasibility and refined to ensure it is acceptable.

(4) **Nuclear strike.** CDRs must assess the military as well as political impact a nuclear strike would have on their operations. Nuclear planning guidance issued at the CCDR level is based on national-level political considerations and is influenced by the military mission. Although USSTRATCOM conducts nuclear planning in coordination with the supported GCC and certain allied CDRs, the supported CDR does not effectively control the decision to use nuclear weapons.

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[3]JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operation*, 17 Sept 2006.

(5) **Deployment Planning.**  Deployment planning is conducted on a continuous basis for all approved contingency plans and as required for specific crisis-action plans. In all cases, mission requirements of a specific operation define the scope, duration, and scale of both deployment and redeployment operation planning.  Unity of effort is paramount, since both deployment and redeployment operations involve numerous commands, agencies, and functional processes.  Because the ability to adapt to unforeseen conditions is essential, supported CCDRs must ensure their deployment plans for each contingency or crisis-action plan support global force visibility requirements.

(a) **Operational Environment**.  For a given plan, deployment planning decisions are based on the anticipated operational environment, which may be permissive, uncertain, or hostile.  The anticipated operational environment dictates the type of entry operations, deployment concept, mobility options, predeployment training, and force integration requirements.  Normally, supported CCDRs, their subordinate CDRs, and their Service components are responsible for providing detailed situation information; mission statements by operation phase; theater support parameters; strategic and operational lift allocations by phase (for both force movements and sustainment); HNS information and environmental standards; and prepositioned equipment planning guidance.

(b) **Deployment Concept**.  Supported CCDRs must develop a deployment concept and identify specific predeployment standards necessary to meet mission requirements.  Supporting CCDRs provide trained and mission-ready forces to the supported COCOM deployment concept and predeployment standard.  Services recruit, organize, train, and equip interoperable forces.  The Services' predeployment planning and coordination with the supporting COCOM must ensure that predeployment standards specified by the supported CCDR are achieved, supporting personnel and forces arrive in the supported theater fully prepared to perform their mission, and deployment delays caused by duplication of predeployment efforts are eliminated.  The Services and supporting CCDRs must ensure unit OPLANs are prepared; forces are tailored and echeloned; personnel and equipment movement plans are complete and accurate; command relationship and integration requirements are identified; mission-essential tasks are rehearsed; mission-specific training is conducted; force protection is planned and resourced; and sustainment requirements are identified.  Careful and detailed planning ensures that only required personnel, equipment, and materiel deploy; unit training is exacting; missions are fully understood; deployment changes are minimized during execution; and the flow of personnel, equipment; and movement of materiel into theater aligns with the concept of operation.

(c) **Movement Planning**.  Movement planning integrates the activities and requirements of units with partial or complete self-deployment capability, activities of units that require lift support, and the transportation of sustainment and retrogrades. Movement planning is highly collaborative and is enhanced by coordinated use of simulation and analysis tools.

<u>1</u>   The supported command is responsible for movement control, including sequence of arrival, and exercises this authority through the TPFDD and the JOPES validation process.  The supported CDR will use the organic lift and non-organic,

common-user, strategic lift resources made available for planning by the CJCS. Competing requirements for limited strategic lift resources, support facilities, and intra-theater transportation assets will be assessed in terms of impact on mission accomplishment. If additional resources are required, the supported command will identify the requirements and provide rationale for those requirements. The supported CDR's operational priorities and any movement constraints (e.g., assumptions concerning the potential use of WMD) are used to prepare a movement plan. The plan will consider enroute staging locations to support the scheduled activity. This information, together with an estimate of required site augmentation, will be communicated to appropriate supporting CDRs. The global force manager and USTRANSCOM use the Joint Flow Analysis and Sustainment for Transportation model to assess transportation feasibility and develop recommendations on final port of embarkation selections for those units without organic lift capability. Movement feasibility requires current analysis and assessment of movement C2 structures and systems; available organic, strategic and theater lift assets; transportation infrastructure; and competing demands and restrictions.

2    After coordinated review of the movement analysis by USTRANSCOM, the supported command, and the global force provider may adjust the concept of operation to improve movement feasibility where operational requirements remain satisfied. CDR USTRANSCOM should adjust or reprioritize transportation assets to meet the supported CDR's operational requirements (fort to foxhole). If this is not an option due to requirements from other CDRs, then the supported CDR adjusts TPFDD requirements or is provided additional strategic and theater lift capabilities using (but not limited to) Civil Reserve Air Fleet and/or Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement capabilities as necessary to achieve end-to-end transportation feasibility.

3    Operational requirements may cause the supported CDR and/or subordinate CDRs to alter their plans, potentially impacting the deployment priorities or TPFDD requirements. Planners must understand and anticipate the impact of change. There is a high potential for a sequential pattern of disruption when changes are made to the TPFDD. A unit displaced by a change might not simply move on the next available lift, but may require reprogramming for movement at a later time. This may not only disrupt the flow, but may also interrupt the operation. Time is also a factor in TPFDD changes. Airlift can respond to short-notice changes, but at a cost in efficiency. Sealift, on the other hand, requires longer lead times, and cannot respond to change in a short period. These plan changes and the resulting modifications to the TPFDDs must be handled during the planning cycles.

(d) **Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration Planning.** JRSOI planning is conducted to ensure an integrated joint force arrives and becomes operational in the OA as scheduled. Effective integration of the force into the joint operation is the primary objective of the deployment phase.

(e) **TPFDD Letter of Instruction (LOI).** The supported CDR publishes supplemental instructions for time phasing force deployment data development in the TPFDD LOI. The LOI provides operation specific guidance for utilizing the JOPES processes and systems to provide force visibility and tracking; force mobility; and operational agility through the TPFDD and the validation process. It provides procedures

for the deployment, redeployment, and rotations of the operation's forces. The LOI provides instructions on force planning sourcing, reporting, and validation. It defines planning and execution milestones and details movement control procedures and lift allocations to the CDR's components, supporting CDRs, and other members of the JPEC. A TPFDD must ensure force visibility, be tailored to the phases of the concept of operation, and be execution feasible.

(f) **Deployment and JRSOI Refinement**. Deployment and JRSOI refinement is conducted by the supported command in coordination with Joint Staff, USJFCOM, USTRANSCOM, the Services, and supporting commands. The purpose of the deployment and JRSOI refinement is to ensure the force deployment plan maintains force mobility throughout any movements, provides for force visibility and tracking at all times, provides for effective force preparation, and fully integrates forces into a joint operation while enabling unity of effort. This refinement conference examines planned missions, the priority of the missions within the operation phases and the forces assigned to those missions. By mission, the refinement conference examines force capabilities, force size, support requirements, mission preparation, force positioning/basing, weapon systems, major equipment, force protection and sustainment requirements. It should assess the feasibility of force closure by the CDR's required delivery date and the feasibility of successful mission execution within the timeframe established by the CDR under the deployment concept. This refinement conference should assess potential success of all force integration requirements. Transition criteria for all phases should be evaluated for force redeployment or rotation requirements.

(g) For lesser-priority plans that may be executed simultaneously with higher-priority plans or on-going operations, COCOM and USTRANSCOM planners may develop several different deployment scenarios to provide the CCDR with a range of possible transportation conditions under which the plan may have to be executed based on risk to this plan and the other ongoing operations. This will help both the supported and supporting CCDRs identify risk associated with having to execute multiple operations in a transportation-constrained environment.

(6) **Shortfall Identification.** Along with hazard and threat analysis, shortfall identification is performed throughout the plan development process. The supported CDR continuously identifies limiting factors and capabilities shortfalls and associated risks as plan development progresses. Where possible, the supported CDR resolves the shortfalls and required controls and countermeasures through planning adjustments and coordination with supporting and subordinate CDRs. If the shortfalls and necessary controls and countermeasures cannot be reconciled or the resources provided are inadequate to perform the assigned task, the supported CDR reports these limiting factors and assessment of the associated risk to the CJCS. The CJCS and the Service Chiefs consider shortfalls and limiting factors reported by the supported CDR and coordinate resolution. However, the completion of assigned plans is not delayed pending the resolution of shortfalls. If shortfalls cannot be resolved within the JSCP timeframe, the completed plan will include a consolidated summary and impact assessment of unresolved shortfalls and associated risks.

(7) **Feasibility Analysis.** This Step in plan or order development is similar to determining the feasibility of a course of action, except that it typically does not involve simulation-based wargaming. The focus in this Step is on ensuring the assigned mission can be accomplished using available resources within the time contemplated by the plan. The results of force planning, support planning, deployment planning, and shortfall identification will affect OPLAN or OPORD feasibility. The primary factors considered are whether the apportioned or allocated resources can be deployed to the joint operations area (JOA) when required, sustained throughout the operation, and employed effectively, or whether the scope of the plan exceeds the apportioned resources and supporting capabilities. Measures to enhance feasibility include adjusting the CONOPS, ensuring sufficiency of resources and capabilities, and maintaining options and reserves.

(8) **Refinement.** During Contingency Planning, plan refinement typically is an orderly process that follows plan development and is associated with plan assessment (Figure XXII-2). Refinement then continues on a regular basis as circumstances related to the potential contingency change. In CAP, refinement is almost continuous throughout OPLAN or OPORD development. Planners frequently adjust the plan or order based on results of force planning, support planning, deployment planning, shortfall identification, revised JIPOE, and changes to strategic guidance. Refinement continues even after execution begins, with changes typically transmitted in the form of FRAGORDs rather than revised copies of the plan or order.[4]



**Figure XXII-2. Joint Operations Planning Activities, Functions, and Products**

(9) **Documentation.** When the TPFDD is complete and end-to-end transportation feasibility has been achieved and is acceptable to the CDR, the supported CDR completes the documentation of the final, transportation-feasible OPLAN or OPORD and coordinates distribution of the TPFDD within the JOPES network as appropriate.

(10) **Plan Review and Approval.** When the final OPLAN or OPORD is complete, the supported CDR then submits it with the associated TPFDD file to the CJCS and SecDef for review, approval, or modification. The JPEC reviews the supported CDR's OPLAN or OPORD and provides the results of the review to the CJCS. The CJCS reviews and recommends approval or disapproval of the OPLAN or OPORD to the SecDef. After the CJCS's review, the SecDef or President will review, approve, or modify the plan. The SecDef may delegate the approval of contingency plans to the CJCS. The President is the final approval authority for OPORDs. Plan review criteria are common to Contingency Planning and CAP, as shown in Figure XXII-3.



## PLAN REVIEW CRITERIA

### Adequacy
■ *The scope and concept of planned operations can accomplish the assigned mission and comply with the planning guidance provided.* Are the assumptions valid and do they comply with strategic guidance. Planning assumptions must be reasonable and consistent with planning guidance.

### Feasibility
■ *The assigned mission can be accomplished using available resources within the time contemplated by the plan.* Can the apportioned or allocated resources be used effectively or does the scope of the plan exceed available resources? Measures to enhance feasibility include crafting effective employment schemes, ensuring sufficiency of resources and capabilities, and maintaining options and reserves.

### Acceptability
■ *The plan is proportional and worth the expected costs.* Used with the criterion of feasibility to ensure that the mission can be accomplished with available resources. Can the plan be accomplished without incurring excessive losses in personnel, equipment, materiel, time, or position? *Risk management* procedures can identify, assess, and control hazards and threats associated with possible accidental losses.

### Completeness
■ *The plan incorporates all tasks to be accomplished.* It includes forces required, deployment concept, employment concept, sustainment concept, time estimates for achieving objectives, mission success criteria, and military end state.

### Compliance with Joint Doctrine
■ *The plan complies with joint doctrine to the maximum extent possible.* Approved joint doctrine provides a baseline that facilitates both planning and execution. The exception to this requirement is the development of multinational plans, which are the product of bilateral or multinational negotiations. These plans should adhere to applicable joint doctrine as closely as possible, but other nations and multinational organizations are not bound by US joint doctrine.

**Figure XXII-3. Plan Review Criteria**

(11) **Supporting Plan Development**

(a) Supporting CDRs prepare plans that encompass their role in the joint operation. Employment planning is normally accomplished by the JFC (CCDR or subordinate JFC) who will direct the forces if the plan is executed. Detailed employment planning may be delayed when the politico-military situation cannot be clearly forecast, or it may be excluded from supporting plans if employment is to be planned and executed within a multinational framework.

(b) The supported CDR normally reviews and approves supporting plans. However, the CJCS may be asked to resolve critical issues that arise during the review of supporting plans, and the Joint Staff may coordinate the review of any supporting plans should circumstances so warrant. Contingency Planning does not conclude when the supported CDR approves the supporting plans. Planning refinement and maintenance continues until the operation terminates or the planning requirement is cancelled or superseded.

5. **Transition**. Transition is critical to the overall planning process. It is an orderly turnover of a plan or order as it is passed to those tasked with execution of the operation. It provides information, direction and guidance relative to the plan or order that will help to facilitate situational awareness. Additionally, it provides an understanding of the rationale for key decisions necessary to ensure there is a coherent shift from planning to execution. These factors coupled together are intended to maintain the intent of the concept of operations, promote unity of effort and generate tempo. Successful transition ensures that those charged with executing an order have a full understanding of the plan. Regardless of the level of command, such a transition ensures that those who execute the order understand the CDR's intent and concept of operations. Transition may be internal or external in the form of briefs or drills. Internally, transition occurs between future plans and future/current operations. Externally, transition occurs between the CDR and subordinate commands.

(1) **Transition Brief**. At higher levels of command, transition may include a formal transition brief to subordinate or adjacent CDRs and to the staff supervising execution of the order. At lower levels, it might be less formal. The transition brief provides an overview of the mission, CDR's intent, task organization, and enemy and friendly situation. It is given to ensure all actions necessary to implement the order are known and understood by those executing the order. The brief should include items from the order or plan such as: higher headquarters mission (tasks and intent), mission, CDR's intent, CCIRs, task organization, situation (enemy and friendly), concept of operations, execution (including branches and sequels), and planning support tools (synchronization matrix, JIPOE products, etc.). The brief may include items from the order or plan such as:

- Higher headquarters mission (tasks and intent).
- Mission.
- Commander's Intent.
- CCIRs.
- Task organization.
- Situation (friendly and enemy).
- Concept of operations.
- Execution (including branches and potential sequels).
- Planning support tools (such as synchronization matrix, JIPOE products, etc.).

(2) **Confirmation Brief**. A confirmation brief is given by a subordinate CDR after receiving the order or plan. Subordinate CDRs brief the higher CDR on their understanding of CDR's intent, their specific tasks and purpose, and the relationship between their unit's missions and the other units in the operation. The confirmation brief allows the higher CDR to identify potential gaps in the plan, as well as discrepancies with

subordinate plans.  It also gives the CDR insights into how subordinate CDRs intend to accomplish their missions.

(3) **Transition Drills**.  Transition drills increase the situational awareness of subordinate CDRs and the staff and instill confidence and familiarity with the plan.  Sand tables, map exercises, rehearsals of concept (ROC) and rehearsals are examples of transition drills.

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# CHAPTER XXIII

# EXECUTION

1. **Execution**

a. **Execution begins when the President decides to use a military option to resolve a crisis**. Only the President or SecDef can authorize the CJCS to issue an EXORD. The EXORD directs the supported CDR to initiate military operations, defines the time to initiate operations, and conveys guidance not provided earlier. The CJCS monitors the deployment and employment of forces, acts to resolve shortfalls, and directs action needed to ensure successful completion of military operations. Execution continues until the operation is terminated or the mission is accomplished or revised. The CAP process may be repeated continuously as circumstances and missions change.

During execution of a plan, accomplishment of the plan's tasks will be monitored and measured for how successfully each objective was completed, along with the input of new data and information as it is obtained to allow selection of branches or sequels, if applicable, or the plan to be modified as necessary. During execution, planning will continue for future operations within the plan to include branches and sequels. The number and detail of IPRs required will be determined by the President and SecDef in discussions with the CCDR. The four planning functions will continue to be the basis for planning, although planners may reenter the planning process at any of the earlier functions.

b. During execution, changes to the original plan may be necessary because of tactical, intelligence, and environmental considerations, force and non-unit cargo availability, availability of strategic lift assets, and port capabilities. Therefore, ongoing refinement and adjustment of deployment requirements and schedules and close coordination and monitoring of deployment activities are required. The JOPES deployment database contains the following information, at a minimum, at the time of OPORD execution:

(1) Sourced combat and sustainment capability requirements for assigned forces.

(2) Integrated critical resupply requirements identified by supply category, port of debarkation, and latest arrival date (LAD) at port of debarkation.

(3) Integrated non-unit personnel filler and casualty replacements by numbers and day.

c. The CJCS publishes the EXORD that defines D-day and H-hour and directs execution of the OPORD. The **CJCS's EXORD** is a record communication that authorizes execution of the COA approved by the President and SecDef and detailed in the supported CDR's OPORD. It may include further guidance, instructions, or amplifying orders. In a fast-developing crisis the EXORD may be the first record communication generated by the CJCS. The record communication may be preceded by

a voice announcement.  **The issuance of the EXORD is time-sensitive**.  The format may differ depending on the amount of previous record correspondence and applicability of prior guidance.  *CJCSM 3122.01* (*JOPES Vol I*) contains the format for the EXORD.  Information already communicated in previous orders should not be repeated unless previous orders were not made available to all concerned.  The EXORD need only contain the authority to execute the operation and any additional essential guidance, such as D-day and H-hour.

d.  Throughout execution, the Joint Staff monitors movements, assesses achievement of tasks, and resolves shortfalls as necessary.  The CJCS should monitor the situation for potential changes in the applicability of current termination criteria and communicate them to all concerned parties.

e.  The supported CDR issues an EXORD to subordinate and supporting CDRs upon receipt of the CJCS's EXORD.  It may give the detailed planning guidance resulting from updated or amplifying orders, instructions, or guidance that the CJCS's EXORD does not cover.  The supported CDR also monitors, assesses, and reports achievement of objectives; ensures that data are updated in the JOPES database; and re-plans, re-deploys, or terminates operations as necessary, in compliance with termination criteria directed by the President or SecDef.

f.  Subordinate and supporting CDRs execute their OPORDs, revalidate the sourcing and scheduling of units, report movement of organic lift, and report deployment movements on the JOPES database.  These CDRs conduct the operation as directed and fulfill their responsibilities to sustain their Service forces in the OA.

g.  USTRANSCOM components validate transportation movement planned for the first increment, adjust deployment flow and reschedule as required, and continue to develop transportation schedules for subsequent increments.  Both statuses of movements and future movement schedules are entered in the JOPES database.

h.  **Planning during Execution.**  Planning continues during execution, with an initial emphasis on refining the existing plan and producing the OPORD.  As the operation progresses, planning generally occurs in three distinct but overlapping timeframes: *future plans, future operations,* and *current operations* as Figure XXI-1 depicts.

(1) The joint force J-5's effort focuses on *future plans*. The timeframe of focus for this effort varies according to the level of command, type of operation, JFC's desires, and other factors.  Typically the emphasis of the *future plans* effort is on planning the next phase of operations or **sequels** to the current operation.  In a campaign, this could be planning the next major operation (the next phase of the campaign).

(2) Planning also occurs for **branches** to current operations (*future operations* **planning**).  The timeframe of focus for *future operations* planning varies according to the factors listed for *future plans*, but the period typically is more near-term than the *future plans* timeframe.  *Future planning* could occur in the J-5 or JPG, while *future operations* planning could occur in the joint operations center or J-3.

(3) Finally, *current operations* planning addresses the immediate or very near-term planning issues associated with ongoing operations.  This occurs in the JOC or J-3.



**Figure XXIII-1.  Planning During Execution**

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# CHAPTER XXIV

# PLAN ASSESSMENT – FUNCTION IV

1.  **Function IV – Plan Assessment:**  During plan assessment, the CCDR extends and refines planning while supporting and subordinate CDRs complete their plans for review and approval.  The CCDR continues to develop branch plans and other options for the SecDef and the President as required or directed.  When required by the supported CCDR, supporting commands and agencies submit supporting plans within 60 days after SecDef approval of the base plan. Service component supporting plans should be reviewed by the respective Military Department(s) for an assessment of Service Title 10 requirements. The CCDR and the Joint Staff continue to evaluate the situation for any changes that would "trigger" plan refinement, adaptation, termination, or execution. During the Plan Assessment stage, if the plan requires refinement or adaptation and depending on the amount of change required, the CCDR may direct his planning staff to reenter the planning process at any of the earlier stages.

a.   Under a fully mature JOPP process, "triggers" will alert the planning community to reassess and revise, if necessary, contingency plans, thereby keeping them in a "living" state.  These triggers include, but are not limited to, changes associated with:

(1) Implied or stated plan assumptions

(2) Force or enemy military structure and/or capabilities

(3) Readiness levels and availability of forces

(4) COA timelines/concept/phases

(5) Strategic guidance

(6) Intentions (U.S. and enemy)

(7) Alliances

(8) Key planning factors

> Assessment is the <u>continuous appraisal</u> of military operations
> to determine progress toward established goals.
> *MAGTF Staff Training Program Pam 6-9, Assessment*

b.   During assessment the CCDR will conduct as many IPRs as required with the SecDef to maintain plans in a living state.  Top-priority plans and CPG-directed plans unique to specific CDRs are required to be reviewed every six months at a minimum. Further, these plans require a review if there are significant changes in the following; strategy, risk and/or tolerance of risk, assumptions, U.S. capabilities, enemy and/or adversary intent or capabilities, resources, or alliances.

Plan assessment encompasses four distinct evaluations of a plan; refinement (R), adaptation (A), termination (T), or execution (E) (Figure XXIV-1).

   c.   Depending on the nature or significance of triggers, plans may only require refinement.  Refining a plan to keep it in a living state does not require an additional IPR. However, an IPR is required if the plan requires a more complex adaptation, is recommended for termination, or is required for execution.  The CCDR may conduct one or more IPR(s) with the SecDef during Plan Refinement. These IPR(s) would likely focus on branches and sequels, updated intelligence, and changes in assumptions or the situation that require major reassessment or significant plan modification. This meeting may include a variety of other pertinent issues (e.g., information operations, special access programs (SAP), sensitive targets, nuclear escalation mitigation, and Annex V considerations).

   d.   As part of Plan Assessment, and with approval of the SecDef, the CCDR may present the plan's Annex V (Interagency Coordination) to the OSD/Joint Staff Annex V working group (Joint Staff/OSD working group will prep plans for IA collaboration) for transmittal to the NSC and/or the HSC, if the plan impacts US Territory, with the intent of obtaining managed interagency staffing and plan development. In advance of authorization for formal transmittal of Annex V to the NSC, the CCDR may request interagency consultation on approved Annex V elements by the JS/OSD working group. During this step, the CCDR may present his plan for multinational involvement.[1]



**Figure XXIV-1. Planning Functions**

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[1]*Adaptive Planning Roadmap* II, JS, March 2008.

2. **Measuring Progress.**

a. General. Assessment is a process that measures progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment. CDRs continuously assess the operational environment and the progress of operations, and compare them to their initial vision and intent. CDRs adjust operations based on their assessment to ensure objectives are met and the military end state is achieved.

(1) **The assessment process is continuous and directly tied to the CDR's decisions** throughout planning, preparation, and execution of operations. Staffs help the CDR by monitoring the numerous aspects that can influence the outcome of operations and provide the CDR timely information needed for decisions. The CCIR process is linked to the assessment process by the CDR's need for timely information and recommendations to make decisions. The assessment process helps staffs by identifying key aspects of the operation that the CDR is interested in closely monitoring and where the commander wants to make decisions. Examples of commander's critical decisions include when to transition to another phase of a campaign, what the priority of effort should be, or how to adjust command relationships between component CDRs.

(2) The assessment process begins during mission analysis when the CDR and staff consider what to measure and how to measure it to determine progress toward accomplishing a **task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective**. During planning and preparation for an operation, for example, the staff assesses the joint force's ability to execute the plan based on available resources and changing conditions in the operational environment. However, the discussion in this chapter focuses on assessment for the purpose of determining the progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment (Figure XXIV-2).

(3) CDRs and their staffs **determine relevant assessment actions and measures during planning.** They consider assessment measures as early as mission analysis, and include assessment measures and related guidance in CDR and staff estimates. They use assessment considerations to help guide operational design because these considerations can affect the sequence and type of actions along LOOs. During execution, they continually monitor progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating effects, and achieving objectives. Assessment actions and measures help CDRs adjust operations and resources as required, determine when to execute branches and sequels, and make other critical decisions to ensure current and future operations remain aligned with the mission and end state. Normally, the joint force J-3, assisted by the J-2, is responsible for coordinating assessment activities. For subordinate CDRs' staffs, this may be accomplished by equivalent elements within joint functional and/or Service components. The chief of staff facilitates the assessment process and determination of CCIRs by incorporating them into the headquarters' battle rhythm. Various elements of the JFC's staff use assessment results to adjust both current operations and future planning.

# Assessment Process – An Overview

| Task Assessment |
| :---: |
| *Are we doing things right?* |

| Effects Assessment |
| :---: |
| *Are we doing the right things?* |

| Campaign Assessment |
| :---: |
| *Are we accomplishing the mission?* |

**Assess:**

- What happened? (Analysis)
- So What? (Assessment)
- What do we need to do?
  - Continue
  - Reprioritize
  - Redirect

*Interagency / Component actively involved in all Phases*

**CDR's Assessment**

- Guidance / Intent

**Planning**

- Drawn from effects
- Synchronized through CONOPS
- Resourcing: appropriate to the desired effect

**Components / Outside Actors**

- Orders vs requests
- Supporting / Supported relationship

*Key Points:*
- *Should answer three key questions:*
  - *Are we doing things right or task assessment? Speaks to standards of execution.*
  - *Are we doing the right things or effects assessment? Did the environment's behavior change as we expected or do we need to do something different?*
  - *Are we accomplishing the mission? Looking to determine if the plan is on the right path to achieving our desired end state.*
- *Staff makes recommendations on changes to the plan.*
- *Assessment may be quantitative or qualitative depending on the environment.*
- *Commander uses his experience and applies the art of command to the assessment to provide Planning Guidance to the staff and Commander's initial intent to subordinates and key stakeholders.*

(Effects Based Approach to Operations, Joint Training Group, JWFC)

**Figure XXIV-2. Assessment Process -- An Overview**

(4) Friendly, adversary, and neutral diplomatic, informational, and economic actions applied in the operational environment can impact military actions and objectives. When relevant to the mission, the CDR also must plan for using assessment to evaluate the results of these actions. This typically requires collaboration with other agencies and multinational partners — preferably within a common, accepted process — in the interest of unified action. For example, failure to coordinate overflight and access agreements with foreign governments in advance or to adhere to international law regarding sovereignty of foreign airspace could result in mission delay, failure to meet U.S. objectives, and/or an international incident. Many of these organizations may be outside the CCDR's authority. Accordingly, the CCDR should grant some joint force organizations authority for direct coordination with key outside organizations — such as USG interagency elements from DOS or the Department of Homeland Security, national intelligence agencies, intelligence sources in other nations, and other COCOMs — to the extent necessary to ensure timely and accurate assessments.

> **Assessment provides the CDR with:**
> - **A report card on how well the command is doing in accomplishing its desired effects.**
> - **A "tool" to speed his decision-making process.**
> - **Recommendations on future activities based on past actions and performance.**

b. **Levels of War and Assessment**

(1) Assessment occurs at all levels and across the entire range of military operations. Even in operations that do not include combat, assessment of progress is just as important and can be more complex than traditional combat assessment. **As a general rule, the level at which a specific operation, task, or action is directed should be the level at which such activity is assessed**. To do this, CCDRs and their staffs consider assessment ways, means, and measures during planning, preparation, and execution. This properly focuses assessment and collection at each level, reduces redundancy, and enhances the efficiency of the overall assessment process (Figure XXIV-3).

**Figure XXIV-3. Assessment Levels and Measurements**

(2) Assessment at the operational and strategic levels typically is broader than at the tactical level (e.g., combat assessment) and uses MOEs that support strategic and operational mission accomplishment. Strategic- and operational-level assessment efforts concentrate on broader tasks, effects, objectives, and progress toward the end state. Continuous assessment helps the CCDR and joint force component CDRs determine if the joint force is "doing the right things" to achieve objectives, not just "doing things right." The CCDR also can use MOEs to determine progress toward success in those operations for which tactical-level combat assessment ways, means, and measures do not apply.

(3) Tactical-level assessment typically uses MOPs to evaluate **task accomplishment.** The results of tactical tasks are often physical in nature, but also can reflect the impact on specific functions and systems. Tactical-level assessment may include assessing progress by phase lines; neutralization of enemy forces; control of key terrain or resources; and security, relief, or reconstruction tasks. Assessment of results at the tactical level helps CDRs determine operational and strategic progress, so CCDRs must have a comprehensive, integrated assessment plan that links assessment activities and measures at all levels.

(4) **Combat assessment** is an example of a tactical-level assessment and is a term that can encompass many tactical-level assessment actions. Combat assessment typically focuses on determining the results of weapons engagement (with both lethal and nonlethal capabilities), and thus is an important component of joint fires and the joint targeting process (see *JP 3-60, Joint Targeting*). **Combat assessment is composed of**

**three related elements: battle damage assessment, munitions effectiveness assessment, and future targeting or reattack recommendations**. However, combat assessment methodology also can be applied by joint force functional and Service components to other tactical tasks not associated with joint fires (e.g., disaster relief delivery assessment, relief effectiveness assessment, and future relief recommendations).

c. **Assessment Process and Measures**

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**KEY TERMS**

**Measure of performance** – A criterion used to assess friendly actions that are tied to measuring task accomplishment.

**Measure of effectiveness** – A criterion used to access changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect.

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(1) Both MOPs and MOEs can be quantitative or qualitative in nature, but meaningful quantitative measures are preferred because they are less susceptible to subjective interpretation. MOEs are based on observable and measurable indicators. Indicators provide evidence that a certain condition exists or certain results have or have not been attained, and enable decision makers to assess progress towards the achievement of the objective. Several indicators may make up an MOE, just like several MOEs may assist in measuring progress toward achievement of an objective.

(a) **MOEs assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment**. They measure the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect; they do not measure task performance. These measures typically are more subjective than MOPs, and can be crafted as either qualitative or quantitative. MOEs can be based on quantitative measures to reflect a trend and show progress toward measurable threshold.

(b) **MOPs measure task performance.** They are generally quantitative, but also can apply qualitative attributes to task accomplishment. MOPs are used in most aspects of combat assessment, since it typically seeks specific, quantitative data or a direct observation of an event to determine accomplishment of tactical tasks. But MOPs have relevance for non-combat operations as well (e.g., tons of relief supplies delivered or noncombatants evacuated). MOPs also can be used to measure operational and strategic tasks, but the type of measurement may not be as precise or as easy to observe.

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| Caimpaign Assessment | Desired "Effects" Assessment |
|---|---|
| • Tracks the desired effects **(MOE/MOP) outlined in the** Campaign Plan<br><br>• Identifies achievement of Campaign Plan objectives and recommends adjustments (if required)<br><br>• Collaborative effort with Staff | • Tracks the desired effects outlined in the OPORD<br>• Based on MOE / MOP<br>• Analyzes:<br>  • Trends & Patterns<br>  • Largely drawn from subjective analysis<br>  • Addresses applicable Warfighting functions<br>• Supports commanders decision-making & planning priorities |

(LtCol Mike Brown, JAWS AY07-08)

(2) The **assessment process and related measures should be relevant, measurable, responsive, and resourced** so there is no false impression of accomplishment.  Quantitative measures can be helpful in this regard.

(a) **Relevant.**  MOPs and MOEs should be relevant to the task, effect, operation, the operational environment, the end state, and the CDR decisions.  This criterion helps avoid collecting and analyzing information that is of no value to a specific operation.  It also helps ensure efficiency by eliminating redundant efforts.

(b) **Measurable**.  Assessment measures should have qualitative or quantitative standards they can be measured against.  To effectively measure change, a baseline measurement should be established prior to execution to facilitate accurate assessment throughout the operation.  Both MOPs and MOEs can be quantitative or qualitative in nature, but meaningful quantitative measures are preferred because they are less susceptible to subjective interpretation.

(c) **Responsive**.  Assessment processes should detect situation changes quickly enough to enable effective response by the staff and timely decisions by the CDR.  The CCDR and staff should consider the time required for an action or actions to produce desired results within the operational environment and develop indicators that can respond accordingly.  Many actions directed by the CCDR require time to implement and may take even longer to produce a measurable result.

(d) **Resourced**.  To be effective, assessment must be adequately resourced.  Staffs should ensure resource requirements for data collection efforts and analysis are built into plans and monitored.  Effective assessment can help avoid both duplication of tasks and unnecessary actions, which in turn can help preserve combat power.

(3) CDRs and staffs derive relevant assessment measures during the planning process and reevaluate them continuously throughout preparation and execution. They consider assessment measures during mission analysis, refine these measures in the CCDR's initial planning guidance and in CDR's and staff's estimates, wargame the measures during COA development, and include MOEs and MOPs in the approved plan or order. An integrated data collection management plan is critical to the success of the assessment process, and should encompass all available tactical, theater, and national intelligence sources.

(4) Just as tactical tasks relate to operational- and strategic-level tasks, effects, and objectives, there is a relationship between assessment measures. By monitoring available information and using MOEs and MOPs as assessment tools during planning, preparation, and execution, CDRs and staffs determine progress toward creating desired effects, achieving objectives, and attaining the military end state, and modify the plan as required. Well-devised MOPs and MOEs, supported by effective information management, help the CDRs and staffs understand the linkage between specific tasks, the desired effects, and the CCDR's objectives and end state.[2]

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[2]JP 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, 26 Dec 2006, JP 3-0, *Operations* 17 Sep 06.

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# SUMMARY

The dawn of the 21st Century presents multiple, diverse and difficult strategic challenges for the United States. A national level effort involving extensive interagency (and in most cases, alliance and coalition partners) integration and coordination is required not only to win the current fight but to ensure a government capable of "defending the people" and our vital national interests abroad utilizing a "whole of government" approach to achieve enduring ends.

> **"Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact."**
>
> *President Dwight D. Eisenhower*
> *Special Message to the Congress on Reorganization*
> *of the Defense Establishment, 3 April 1958*

This document, the *Joint Operation Planning Primer,* has outlined an approach to planning utilizing the construct of the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP). As this document has presented, the JOPP is <u>key</u> to making logical, sequential and learned decisions. It is a standardized planning process that is conceptually easy to understand and capable of being applied in contingency or crisis action environments. CDRs today operate in an environment of potentially overwhelming information. Our job as planners, through the JOPP, is to present that information in a logical flow to the CDR. Remember, the plan you're working on is probably not the CDR's only plan, nor concern. The CDR's time is valuable and your job is to get the point across in a relevant, well thought out, manner. **Give the CDR solutions, not problems, or lacking solutions, give the CDR options - well massaged, learned and vetted.**

In today's Global Operating Environment, we, as joint planners, must adjust our view of the adversary and the environment writ large. As the figure below visualizes, today's adversary is a dynamic, adaptive foe who operates within a complex, interconnected operational environment that we need to fully understand and penetrate. A logical way of gaining that increased understanding is to break out the OE into its major parts, examine these parts individually, and then study the relationships and interaction between them to comprehend not only what is occurring, but why.

# *Expanding Our Perception*

**Today's** adversary is a *dynamic, adaptive* foe who operates within a *complex, interconnected* operational environment



**Systems Understanding**

PMESII Environment

**Time - Space**

*Multi-dimensional situational understanding*

**The Challenge: Assisting the conceptual leap from two dimensional awareness to multi-dimensional understanding**

General Luck (Ret) in his paper titled *"Insights on Joint Operations: The Art and Science,"* September 2005, says the challenge for us then is how to understand and visualize this new adversary so that we can effectively defend our national interests. The traditional military-centric single center of gravity [focus] approach that worked so well in the cold war doesn't allow us to accurately analyze, describe, and visualize today's emerging networked, adaptable, asymmetric adversary. This adversary has no single identifiable 'source of all power.' Rather, because of globalization, the information revolution, and, in some cases, the non-state characteristic of our adversary, this form of adversary can only be described (and holistically attacked) as a system of systems.

> **"We will counter the terrorist ideology most effectively by using the strongest weapon in our arsenal - the power of freedom."**
>
> *President G.W. Bush*

# APPENDIX A

# PLANNING TIMES and DATES

**Times — (C-, D-, M-days** end at 2400 hours Universal Time (Zulu time) and are assumed to be 24 hours long for planning.)  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff normally coordinates the proposed date with the CDRs of the appropriate unified and specified commands, as well as any recommended changes to C-day.  **L-hour** will be established per plan, crisis, or theater of operations and will apply to both air and surface movements.  Normally, L hour will be established to allow C-day to be a 24-hour day.

a.  **C-day.**  The unnamed day on which a deployment operation commences or is to commence.  The deployment may be movement of troops, cargo, weapon systems, or a combination of these elements using any or all types of transport.  The letter "C" will be the only one used to denote the above.  The highest command or headquarters responsible for coordinating the planning will specify the exact meaning of C-day within the aforementioned definition.  The command or headquarters directly responsible for the execution of the operation, if other than the one coordinating the planning, will do so in light of the meaning specified by the highest command or headquarters coordinating the planning.

b.  **D-day.**  The unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence.

c.  **F-hour.**  The effective time of announcement by the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments of a decision to mobilize Reserve units.

d.  **H-hour.**  The specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation commences.

e.  **H-hour (amphibious operations).**  For amphibious operations, the time the first assault elements are scheduled to touch down on the beach, or a landing zone, and in some cases the commencement of countermine breaching operations.

f.  **I-day.**  (CJCSM 3110.01A/JSCP).  The day on which the Intelligence Community determines that within a potential crisis situation, a development occurs that may signal a heightened threat to U.S. interests. Although the scope and direction of the threat is ambiguous, the Intelligence Community responds by focusing collection and other resources to monitor and report on the situation as it evolves.

g.  **L-hour.**  The specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence.

h.  **L-hour (amphibious operations).**  In amphibious operations, the time at which the first helicopter of the helicopter-borne assault wave touches down in the landing zone.

---

i.  **M-day.**  The term used to designate the unnamed day on which full mobilization commences or is due to commence.

    j.  **N-day.**  The unnamed day an active duty unit is notified for deployment or redeployment.

    k.  **R-day.**  Redeployment day.  The day on which redeployment of major combat, combat support, and combat service support forces begins in an operation.

    l.  **S-day.**  The day the President authorizes Selective Reserve call-up (not more than 200,000).

    m.  **T-day.**  The effective day coincident with Presidential declaration of national emergency and authorization of partial mobilization (not more than 1,000,000 personnel exclusive of the 200,000 call-up).

    n.  **W-day.**  Declared by the President, W-day is associated with an adversary decision to prepare for war (unambiguous strategic warning).

**Indications and warning —** Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time sensitive intelligence on foreign developments that could involve a threat to the United States or allied and/or coalition military, political, or economic interests or to U.S. citizens abroad.  It includes forewarning of enemy actions or intentions; the imminence of hostilities; insurgency; nuclear/non-nuclear attack on the United States, its overseas forces, or allied and/or coalition nations; hostile reactions to U.S. reconnaissance activities; terrorists' attacks; and other similar events.  Also called **I&W.**  See also **information; intelligence** in JP 2-01, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.

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# APPENDIX C

# COMMANDERS' ESTIMATE

1. <u>Purpose</u>

    a.   The commander's estimate, submitted by the supported commander in response to a CJCS Warning Order, provides the Chairman with time-sensitive information for consideration by the NCA in meeting a crisis situation.  Essentially, it reflects the supported commander's analysis of the various COAs that may be used to accomplish the assigned mission and contains recommendations as to the best COA (recommended COAs submitted for NCA approval may be contained in current OPLANs or CONPLANs or may be developed to meet situations not addressed by current plans.  Regardless of origin, these courses of actions will be specifically identified when they involve military operations against a potential enemy).  Although the estimative process at the supported commander's level may involve a complete, detailed estimate by the supported commander, the estimate submitted to the Chairman will normally be a greatly abbreviated version providing only that information essential to the NCA and the Chairman for arriving at a decision to meet a crisis.

    b.   Supporting commanders normally will not submit a commander's estimate to the Chairman; however, they may be requested to do so by the supported commander.  They may also be requested to provide other information that could assist the supported commander in formulating and evaluating the various COAs.

2. <u>When Submitted</u>

    a.   The commander's estimate will be submitted as soon as possible after receipt of the CJCS Warning Order, but no later than the deadline established by the Chairman in the Warning Order.  Although submission time is normally 72 hours, extremely time-sensitive situations may require that the supported commander respond in 4 to 8 hours.

    b.   Follow-on information or revisions to the commander's estimate should be submitted as necessary to complete, update, or refine information included in the initial estimate.

    c.   The supported commander may submit a commander's estimate at the commander's own discretion, without a CJCS Warning Order, to advise the NCA and Chairman of the commander's evaluation of a potential crisis situation within the AOR.  This situation may be handled by a SITREP instead of a commander's estimate.

3. <u>How Submitted</u>.  The commander's estimate is submitted by record communication, normally with a precedence of IMMEDIATE or FLASH, as appropriate.  GCCS Newsgroup should be used initially to pass the commander's estimate but must be followed by immediate record communication to keep all crisis participants informed.

4.  Addressees.  The message is sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with information copies to the Services, components, supporting commands and combat support agencies, USTRANSCOM, TCCs, and other appropriate commands and agencies.

5.  Contents

    a.  The commander's estimate will follow the major headings of a commander's estimate of the situation as outlined in Appendix A to Enclosure J but will normally be substantially abbreviated in content.  As with the Warning Order, the precise contents may vary widely, depending on the nature of the crisis, time available to respond, and the applicability of prior planning.  In a rapidly developing situation, a formal commander's estimate may be initially impractical, and the entire estimative process may be reduced to a commander's conference, with corresponding brevity reflected in the estimate when submitted by record communications to the Chairman.  Also, the existence of an applicable OPLAN may already reflect most of the necessary analysis.

    b.  The essential requirement of the commander's estimate submitted to the Chairman is to provide the NCA, in a timely manner, with viable military COAs to meet a crisis. Normally, these will center on military capabilities in terms of forces available, response time, and significant logistic considerations. In the estimate, one COA will be recommended.  If the supported commander desires to submit alternative COAs, an order of priority will be established.  All COAs in the Warning Order will be addressed.

    c.  The estimate of the supported commander will include specific information to the extent applicable.  The following estimate format is desirable but not mandatory and may be abbreviated where appropriate.

    (1) Mission. State the assigned or deduced mission and purpose.  List any intermediate tasks, prescribed or deduced, that the supported commander considers necessary to accomplish the mission.

    (2) Situation and Courses of Action (COA).  This paragraph is the foundation of the estimate and may encompass considerable detail.  Because the CJCS is concerned primarily with the results of the estimate rather than the analysis, for purposes of the estimate submitted, include only the minimum information necessary to support the recommendation.

    (a) Considerations Affecting the Possible Courses of Action.  Include only a brief summary, if applicable, of the major factors pertaining to the characteristics of the area and relative combat power that have a significant impact on the alternative COAs.

    (b) Enemy Capability.  Highlight, if applicable, the enemy capabilities and psychological vulnerabilities that can seriously affect the accomplishment of the mission, giving information that would be useful to the President, SecDef, and the CJCS in evaluating various COAs.

(c) <u>Terrorist Threat</u>.  Describe potential terrorist threat capabilities to include force protection requirements (prior, during, and post mission) that can affect the accomplishment of the mission.

(d) <u>Own Courses of Action</u>.  List COAs that offer suitable, feasible, and acceptable means of accomplishing the mission.  If specific COAs were prescribed in the WARNORD, they must be included.  For each COA, the following specific information should be addressed:

<u>1</u>.  Combat forces required; e.g., 2 FS, 1 airborne brigade.  List actual units if known.

<u>2</u>.  Force provider.

<u>3</u>.  Destination.

<u>4</u>.  Required delivery dates.

<u>5</u>.  Coordinated deployment estimate.

<u>6</u>.  Employment estimate.

<u>7</u>.  Strategic lift requirements, if appropriate.

(3)    <u>Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action</u>.  Highlight enemy capabilities that may have significant impact on US COAs.

(4)    <u>Comparison of Own Courses of Action</u>.  For the submission to the CJCS, include only the final statement of conclusions and provide a brief rationale for the favored COA.  Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the alternative COAs, if significant, in assisting the President, SecDef, and the CJCS in arriving at a decision.

(5)    Recommended Course of Action.  State the supported commander's recommended COA. (Recommended COA should include any recommended changes to the ROE in effect at that time) (CJCSM 3122.01A, 1 September 2005).

# SAMPLE COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE

IMMEDIATE (OR FLASH AS APPROPRIATE)
FROM:    COMUSCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
TO:    CJCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO: CSA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
        CMC WASHINGTON DC
        COMUSELEMNORAD PETERSON AFB CO
        COMUSJFCOM NORFOLK VA
        COMUSEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
        HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//

        COMUSPACOM HONOLULU HI
        COMUSNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO
        COMUSSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
        DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD


DISTR:  COMBATANT
COMMANDER/DCOM/CCJ1/CCJ2/CCJ3/CCJ4/7/CCJ5/CCJ6
DRAFTER:  LTC CHUCK SWANSON, USA CCJ7, EXT 53046
        COMUSSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE
        COMUSSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE
        COMUSSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
        COMUSTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL
        DISA WASHINGTON DC
        DIA WASHINGTON DC
        DLA FT BELVOIR VA
        DIRECTOR DTRA FAIRFAX VA
        CIA WASHINGTON DC
        NGA HQ BETHESDA MD
        COMSDDC FALLS CHURCH VA
        COMSC WASHINGTON DC
        COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-OPF/G-OPD//
        COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA
        USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//CC//
        COMUSNAVCENT
        COMLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
        CORMARFORLANT
        COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
        COMPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
        CORMARFORPAC
        COMUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
C L A S S I F I C A T I O N

OPER/BLUENOSE//
MSGID/COMESTIMATE/COMUSCENTCOM//
REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV ____ /___/NOTAL//
AMPN/CJCS Warning Order//
REF/B/DOC/USCENTCOM OPLAN XXXX//
AMPN/USCENTCOM OPLAN FOR CONTINGENCY OFPERATIONS
XXXX.//GENTEXT/MISSION/
1. ( ) MISSION. WHEN DIRECTED BY THE SECDEF, USCENTCOM
COMMANDER WILL CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BLUELAND (GOB) TO PROTECT AND
DEFEND BLUELAND STRONG POINTS AND LINES OF
COMMUNICATION (LOCS).//
GENTEXT/SITUATION/

2. ( ) SITUATION

   A. ( ) THE INTERNAL STABILITY AND SECURITY OF BLUELAND
AND ORANGELAND HAVE DETERIORATED BECAUSE OF
CONTINUED YELLOWLAND SUPPORT OF THE REBEL FORCES
SEEKING THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT. TENSIONS
BETWEEN YELLOWLAND, BLUELAND, AND ORANGELAND HAVE
BEEN HIGH BECAUSE OF OVERT YELLOWLAND SUPPORT OF THE
COUP ATTEMPT, YELLOWLAND ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE
REBELS, AND A RECENT ALLIANCE OF HERETOFORE
ANTAGONISTIC REBEL FORCES. ALL OF THESE ACTIONS AGAINST
BLUELAND AND ORANGELAND BY YELLOWLAND REQUIRE
PRUDENT CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATION OF
USCENTCOM OPLAN XXXX.

   B. ( ) ASSIGNED AND SUPPORTING FORCES ARE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT USCENTCOM OPLAN XXXX.//

GENTEXT/ENEMY CAPABILITIES/
3. <statement on enemy capabilities>//

GENTEXT/OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS/
4. <list operational constraints>

GENTEXT/CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS/
5. <summary of concept of operations>

HEADING/COURSES OF ACTION/
GENTEXT/OWN COURSES OF ACTION/

6. ( ) USCENTCOM COMMANDER HAS DEVELOPED THE FOLLOWING COURSES OF ACTIONS (COAs):

   A. ( ) COA 1. DEPLOY AND EMPLOY FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCENTCOM OPLAN XXXX TPFDD. TACTICAL FIGHTER AND RECONNAISSANCE WING TO USE BABA AFB AS MAIN OPERATING BASE. I MEF TO DEPLOY VIA STRATEGIC AIR TO JOIN WITH MPS EQUIPMENT. CVBG TO OPERATE MODLOC VIA SOUTHEASTERN SEA. TWO ARMY BDES DEPLOY TO PORT WASI VIA STRATEGIC AIR TO JOIN WITH EQUIPMENT SHIPPED BY SEA. SUBSEQUENT MILITARY ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED AS REQUESTED BY GOB TO INCLUDE, BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO, *NON*COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEO), SHOW OF FORCE, AND PROTECTION AND DEFENSE OF BLUELAND STRONG POINTS AND LOCS.

   B. ( ) COA 2. DEPLOY AND EMPLOY AIR FORCE AND NAVAL FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCENTCOM OPLAN XXXX. HOLD MEF AND ARMY BDES ON CALL. SUBSEQUENT MILITARY OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED AS REQUESTED BY GOB. GENTEXT/OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION/

7. ( ) ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COA. ENEMY CAPABILITIES CANNOT SIGNIFICANTLY DELAY SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION OF US MILITARY OPERATIONS UNDER EITHER COA. UNDER COA 2, HOWEVER, THERE IS AN INCREASED POSSIBILITY OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE AGAINST ISOLATED AMERICANS IN RETALIATION FOR US FORCE ARRIVAL. ARRIVAL OF SMALL AIR FORCE AND NAVAL FORCE PACKAGES FOR SHOW OF FORCE RESTRICTS COMMANDERS POTENTIAL TO CONDUCT NEOS OR DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS WITHOUT GROUND FORCES.

GENTEXT/COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION/
8. ( ) COMPARISON OF OWN COAs

   A. ( ) COA 1 PROVIDES FOR SIMULTANEOUS EMPLOYMENT OF THE ENTIRE TASK FORCE AND IS THE MOST DESIRABLE FOR TACTICAL EXECUTION. THE INITIAL PRESENCE OF AIR FORCE AND NAVAL FORCES COUPLED WITH THE ARRIVAL OF THE CG, I MEF (FORWARD) AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT ABOARD MPS, PROVIDES CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY FOR RAPID INSERTION OF SECURITY FORCES AS REQUIRED BY GOB. THIS COA REQUIRES THE LONGEST RESPONSE TIME (__ DAYS AIRLIFT AND __ DAYS SEALIFT (DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATE) FOR CLOSURE OF THE ENTIRE TASK FORCE. EMPLOYMENT COULD BEGIN IMMEDIATELY.

B.  ( )  COA 2 HAS ADVANTAGE OF MOST RAPID RESPONSE (
____ DAYS AIRLIFT AND ____ DAYS SEALIFT (DEPLOYMENT
ESTIMATE)) FOR AIR FORCE AND NAVAL FORCES.  IT PROVIDES
FOR A REPRESENTATIVE FORCE TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO
GOB AND DEMONSTRATE US RESOLVE IN AREA.  ITS PRIMARY
DISADVANTAGE IS THAT ALL GROUND FORCES ARE ON CALL.
HOWEVER, RESPONSE TIME FOR MEF AND ARMY BDES COULD
BE MINIMAL AS MPS AND MSC SHIPS COULD BE IN MODLOC
POSITION OFF COAST OF PORT WASI PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT OF
PERSONNEL.
COAIDENT/

9.  ( )  DECISION.  RECOMMEND COA 1.

10.  ( )  GENTEXT/OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE/
GENTEXT/ADDITIONAL INFORMATION/  FORCE, LOGISTIC, AND
TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENT DETAILS HAVE BEEN LOADED
INTO THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM
(JOPES) AND ARE AVAILABLE UNDER PLAN IDENTIFICATION
NUMBER (PID) XXXXT (COA 1) AND PID XXXXU (COA 2).//

DECL/<source for classification>/<reason for
classification>/<downgrade instructions or date>/<downgrading or
declassification exemption code>//

(CJCSM 3122.01A, JOPES Volume I, Enclosure J, 1 September 2005)

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# APPENDIX D

# GLOSSARY

# ACRONYMS and ABBREVIATIONS

**A**

| | |
|---|---|
| AA | Attack Assessment |
| AADC | Area Air Defense Commander |
| AAGS | Army Air-ground System |
| AAR | After-Action Report/Review |
| AAW | Antiair Warfare |
| ABCCC | Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center |
| AC | Active Component |
| ACA | Airspace Control Authority |
| ACINT | Acoustic Intelligence |
| ACO | Airspace Control Order |
| ACP | Airspace Control Plan |
| ACR | Armored Calvary Regiment |
| ACT | Advanced Civilian Teams |
| ADA | Air Defense Artillery |
| ADC | Air Defense Commander, Area Damage Control |
| ADMIN | Administration |
| ADVON | Advanced Echelon |
| ADP | Automated Data Processing |
| ADW | Air Defense Warning |
| AEEB | Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States |
| AFIS | Armed Forces Information Service |
| AFFOR | Air Force Forces |
| AFM | Air Force Manual |
| AFSATCOM | Air Force Satellite Communications |
| AFSC | Armed Forces Staff College |
| AFRTS | Armed Forces Radio and Television Service |
| AGR | Active Guard/Reserve |
| AI | Air Interdiction |
| AJMRO | Area Joint Medical Regulating Office |
| ALCC | Airlift Control Center |
| ALCON | All Concerned |
| ALERTORD | Alert Order |
| ALSP | Aggregate Level Simulations Protocol |
| AMC | Air Mobility Command; Army Materiel Command |
| AMCIT | American Citizen |
| AMEMB | American Embassy |
| AMHS | Automated Message Handling System |
| AMPE | Automated Message Processing Exchange |
| ANGLICO | Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company |

| | |
|---|---|
| AO | Area of Operations |
| AOA | Amphibious Objective Area |
| AOC | Air Operations Center (USAF) |
| AOR | Area of Responsibility |
| AP | Adaptive Planning |
| APMT | Automated Planning and Management Tools |
| APOD | Aerial Port of Debarkation |
| APOE | Aerial Port of Embarkation |
| ARFOR | Army Forces |
| ARNGUS | Army National Guard of the United States |
| ARM | Anti-Radiation Missiles |
| ASBPO | Armed Services Blood Program Office |
| ASD | Assistant Secretary of Defense |
| ASD (PA) | Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) |
| ASLT | Assault |
| ASOC | Air Support Operations Center |
| ASUW | Anti-surface Warfare |
| ASW | Antisubmarine Warfare |
| ATACMS | Army Tactical Missile System |
| ATC | Air traffic Control |
| ATDS | Airborne Tactical Data System |
| ATO | Air Tasking Order |
| AUTODIN | Automatic Digital Network |
| AUTOSEVOCOM | Automatic Secure Voice Communications Network |
| AWACS | Airborne Warning and Control System |
| AWSIM | Air Warfare Simulation |

**B**

| | |
|---|---|
| BBG | Broadcast Board of Governors |
| BCC | Battlefield Circulation Control |
| BCE | Battlefield Coordination Element |
| BDA | Bomb or Battle Damage Assessment |
| BDE | Brigade |
| BMD | Ballistic Missile Defense |
| BSA | Beach Support Area |

**C**

| | |
|---|---|
| C2 | Command and Control |
| C2W | Command and Control Warfare |
| C2WC | Command and Control Warfare Commander |
| C3 | Command, Control, and Communications |
| C3I | Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence |
| C3IC | Coalition, Coordination, Communications, and Integration Center |
| C4 | Command, Control, Communications, and Computers |
| C4I | Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence |
| C4S | Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems |

| | |
|---|---|
| C-day | Unnamed day on which a deployment operation begins |
| CA | Civil Affairs |
| CAP | Crisis Action Planning; Combat Air Patrol |
| CAS | Close Air Support |
| CAT | Crisis Action Team |
| CATF | Commander Amphibious Task Force |
| CAX | Computer-Assisted Exercise |
| CB | Chemical-Biological |
| CBS | Corps Battle Simulation |
| CCDR | Combatant Commander |
| CCIR | Commander's Critical Information Requirements |
| CC | Critical Capabilities |
| CCO | Complex Contingency Operation |
| CD | Campaign Design |
| CDR | Commander |
| C-E | Communications-Electronics |
| CE | Communications-Electronics; Command Element (MAGTF) |
| CED | Captured Enemy Documents |
| CEE | Captured Enemy Equipment |
| CEOI | Communications-Electronics Operating Instructions |
| CESP | Civil Engineer Support Plan |
| CF | Critical Factors |
| CFL | Coordinated Fire Line; Contingency Planning Facilities List |
| CGFOR | Coast Guard Forces |
| CHAP | Chaplain |
| CI | Counterintelligence; Civilian Internees |
| CIA | Central Intelligence Agency |
| CIAP | Command Intelligence Architecture Plan |
| CID | Criminal Investigation Division |
| CIDC | Criminal Investigation Division Command |
| CISO | Counterintelligence Support Staff Officer |
| CJCS | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| CJCSI | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction |
| CJCSM | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual |
| CJTF | Commander Joint Task Force |
| CJTMP | CJCS Joint Training Master Plan |
| CL | Class (of supply) |
| CLF | Commander Landing Forces; Combat Logistics Force |
| CLIPS | Communications Link Interface Planning System |
| CMBT | Combatant |
| CMCS | Civil Military Coordination Section |
| CMCoord | Civil Military Coordination, UN Humanitarian |
| CMD | Command |
| CMDT | Commandant |
| CMO | Civil-Military Operations |
| CMOC | Civil-Military Operations Center |
| CMST | Collection Management Support Tools |
| CNA | Computer Network Attack |

| | |
|---|---|
| CNO | Computer Network Operations |
| COA | Course of Action |
| COCOM | Combatant Command (Command Authority) |
| COE | Common Operating Environment |
| COG | Center of Gravity |
| COIN | Counterinsurgency |
| COINS | Community On-Line Intelligence System |
| COLISEUM | Community On-line Intelligence System for End Users Managers |
| COLT | Combat Observation and Lasing Team |
| COM | Chief of Mission |
| COMARFOR | Commander of Army Forces |
| COMCAM | Combat Camera |
| COMDT | Commandant |
| COMINT | Communications Intelligence |
| COMMARFOR | Commander of Marine Forces |
| COMMZ | Communication Zone |
| COMP | Component |
| COMPT | Comptroller |
| COMPUSEC | Computer Security |
| COMSEC | Communications Security |
| COMPT/CMPT | Comptroller |
| CONCAP | Navy Contract Augmentation Program |
| CONOPS | Concept of Operations |
| CONPLAN | Operation Plan in Concept Format |
| CONUS | Continental United States |
| COORD | Coordination |
| COS | Critical Occupational Specialty; Chief of Staff |
| CPG | Contingency Planning Guidance |
| CPX | Command Post Exercise |
| CR | Critical Requirements |
| CSAR | Combat Search and Rescue |
| CS | Civil Support, Combat Support; Call Sign; |
| CSS | Combat Service Support |
| CSSA | Combat Service Support Area |
| CSSE | Combat Service Support Element (MAGTF) |
| CSSTSS | Combat Service Support Training Simulation System |
| CT | Counter Terrorism |
| CTAPS | Contingency Theater Automated Planning System |
| CV | Critical Vulnerabilities |
| CWC | Composite Warfare Commander |

**D**

| | |
|---|---|
| D-day | Unnamed day on which operations commence or are scheduled to commence |
| D3A | Decide, Detect, Deliver and Assess |
| DA | Development Assistance; Direct Action |
| DARS | Daily Aerial Reconnaissance Syndicate |

| | |
|---|---|
| DASC | Direct Air Support Center |
| DC | Displaced Civilian |
| DCA | Defensive Counterair |
| DCM | Deputy Chief of Mission |
| DCJTF | Deputy Commander JTF |
| DCS | Defense Communications System |
| DCTN | Defense Commercial Telecommunication Network |
| DD | Defense Department (administrative form designator) |
| DDN | Defense Data Network |
| DE | Directed Energy; Delay Equalizer |
| DEA | Drug Enforcement Administration |
| DEFCON | Defense Readiness Condition |
| DEP | Deputy |
| DEPMEDS | Deployable Medical Systems |
| DEPORD | Deployment Order |
| DFSC | Defense Fuel Supply Center |
| DHL | Dalsey, Hillblom and Lynn |
| DHS | Department of Homeland Security |
| DIA | Defense Intelligence Agency |
| DIME | Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic |
| D-IO | Defensive Information Operations |
| DIR | Director |
| DIRLAUTH | Direct Liaison Authorized |
| DIRMOBFOR | Director of Mobility Forces |
| DISA | Defense Information Systems Agency |
| DISN | Defense Information Systems Network |
| DISUM | Defense Intelligence Summary; Daily Intelligence Summary |
| DJIOC | Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Center |
| DJ-3 | Joint Staff Director of Operations |
| DJ-7 | Joint Staff Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development |
| DLA | Defense Logistics Agency |
| DMRT | Defense Medical Regulating Teams |
| DMS | Defense Message System |
| DNSO | Defense Network Systems Organization |
| DOD | Department of Defense |
| DODD | Department of Defense Directive |
| DODIIS | Department of Defense Intelligence Information System |
| DODI | Department of Defense Instruction |
| DOJ | Department of Justice |
| DOS | Department of State; Day of Supply |
| DOT | Department of Transportation |
| DPG | Defense Planning Guidance |
| DSB | Defense Science Board |
| DSCS | Defense Satellite Communications System |
| DSN | Defense Switched Network |
| DTRA | Defense Threat Reduction Agency |

| | |
|---|---|
| DV | Distinguished Visitor |
| DZ | Drop Zone |

**E**

| | |
|---|---|
| EA | Electronic Attack |
| EAP | Emergency Action Procedures |
| EC | Electronic Combat |
| ECC | Evacuation Control Center |
| ECOA | Enemy Course of Action |
| EED | Electro-Explosive Device |
| EEFI | Essential Elements of Friendly Information |
| EEI | Essential Elements of Information |
| EG | Economic Growth |
| ELECTRO-OPTINT | Electro-Optical Intelligence |
| ELD | Emitter Locating Data |
| ELINT | Electronics Intelligence |
| EMC | Electromagnetic Compatibility |
| EMI | Electromagnetic Interface |
| EMP | Electromagnetic Pulse |
| EMPINT | Electromagnetic Pulse Intelligence |
| EMS | Electromagnetic Spectrum |
| ENDEX | Exercise Termination |
| ENGR | Engineer |
| ENWGS | Enhanced Naval Warfare Gaming System |
| EO | Electro-Optical; Eyes Only |
| EOD | Explosive Ordnance Disposal |
| EP | Electronic Protection; Execution Planning |
| EPW | Enemy Prisoner of War |
| ES | Electronic Warfare Support |
| ESF | Economic Support Fund |
| EW | Electronic Warfare |
| EWO | Electronic Warfare Officer |
| EXORD | Execute Order |
| EZ | Extraction Zone |

**F**

| | |
|---|---|
| F-hour | Effective time of announcement by the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments of a decision to mobilize Reserve units |
| FA | Field Artillery; Feasibility Assessment |
| FAA | Federal Aviation Administration; Foreign Assistance Act |
| FAD | Force Activity Designator; Feasible Arrival Date |
| FASCAM | Family of Scatterable Mines |
| FDO | Flexible Deterrent Option |
| FEMA | Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| FEO | Forcible Entry Operations |
| FER | Final Exercise Report |
| FFA | Free Fire Area |
| FFIR | Friendly Force Information Requirements |

| | |
|---|---|
| FHA | Foreign Humanitarian Assistance |
| FID | Foreign Internal Defense |
| FISINT | Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence |
| FLTSAT | Fleet Satellite |
| FLTSATCOM | Fleet Satellite Communications |
| FM | Frequency Modulation; Field Manual |
| FMFM | Fleet Marine Force Manual |
| FMO | Frequency Management Office |
| FOB | Forward Operations Base |
| FRAG | Fragmentation Code |
| FSA | Fire Support Area; Forward Support Area; Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union |
| FSCL | Fire Support Coordination Line |
| FSCOORD | Fire Support Coordinator |
| FSE | Fire Support Element |
| FSN | Foreign Service National |
| FSSG | Force Service Support Group (Marine Air-Ground Task Force) |
| FTS | Federal Telecommunications System; Federal Telephone System; File Transfer Service |
| FTX | Field Training Exercise |

**G**

| | |
|---|---|
| GAO | General Accounting Office |
| GAT | Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting Cell |
| GCE | Ground Combat Element (MAGTF) |
| GCI | Ground Control Intercept |
| GCS | Ground Control Station |
| GCC | Geographic Combatant Commander |
| GCCS | Global Command and Control System |
| GCSS | Global Combat Support System |
| GDP | Global Defense Posture |
| GDSS | Global Decision Support System |
| GEF | Guidance for Employment of the Force |
| GEOINT | Geospatial Intelligence |
| GENSER | General Service (message) |
| GENTEXT | General Text |
| GFM | Global Force Management |
| GIRH | Generic Intelligence Requirements Handbook (USMC) |
| GI&S | Geospatial Information and Services |
| GJD | Governing Justly and Democratically |
| GMD | Global Missile Defense |
| GMF | Ground Mobile Forces |
| GMFSCS | Ground Mobile Forces Satellite Communications System |
| GMI | General Military Intelligence |
| GP | Group |
| GPALS | Global Protection against Limited Strikes |
| GPMRC | Global Patient Movement Requirements Center |

| | |
|---|---|
| GRREG | Graves Registration |
| GSM | Ground Station Module |
| GTN | Global Transportation Network |
| GWOT | Global War on Terrorism |

**H**

| | |
|---|---|
| H-hour | Specific time an operation or exercise begins; seaborne assault landing hour |
| HA | Humanitarian Assistance |
| HARM | High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile |
| HCA | Humanitarian and Civic Assistance |
| HF | High Frequency |
| HIV | Human Immunodeficiency Virus |
| HLZ | Helicopter Landing Zone |
| HN | Host Nation |
| HNG | Host-Nation Government |
| HNS | Host-Nation Support |
| HOC | Humanitarian Operations Center |
| HOIS | Hostile Intelligence Service |
| HPT | High-Priority/Payoff Target(s) |
| HQ | Headquarters |
| HQ COMDT | Headquarters Commandant |
| HSS | Health Service Support |
| HUMINT | Human Intelligence |
| HVT | High-Value Target(s) |

**I**

| | |
|---|---|
| I&W | Indication and Warning |
| IA | Information Assurance |
| IAW | In Accordance With |
| ICAO | International Civil Aviation Organization |
| ICN | Interface Control Network |
| ICO | Interface Control Officer |
| ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| IDAD | Internal Defense and Development |
| IDB | Integrated Data Base |
| IDHS | Intelligence Data Handling System |
| IED | Improved Explosives Devices |
| IES | Imagery Exploitation System |
| IEW | Intelligence and Electronic Warfare |
| IFF | Identification, Friend or Foe |
| IGO | Intergovernmental Organization |
| IGPS | Global Positioning System |
| IIP | Investing in People |
| IMINT | Imagery Intelligence |
| IMS | Interagency Management System |
| INFOSEC | Information Security |
| ING | Inactive National Guard |

| | |
|---|---|
| IRR | Individual Ready Reserve |
| INSCOM | United States Army Intelligence and Security Command |
| INTACS | Integrated Tactical Communications System |
| INTELSITSUM | Daily Intelligence Summary |
| INTREP | Intelligence Seaport |
| INTSUM | Intelligence Summary |
| IO | Information Operations, International Organization |
| IOM | Installation, Operation, and Maintenance |
| IPB | Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace |
| IPDS | Inland Petroleum Distribution System; Imagery Processing and Dissemination System |
| IPG | Initial Planning Guidance |
| IPIE | Intelligence Preparation of the Information Environment |
| IPL | Integrated Priority List |
| IPR | In-Progress Review |
| IPW | Interrogation Prisoners of War |
| IR | Information Requirements |
| IRINT | Infrared Intelligence |
| ISA | Inter-Service Agreement |
| ISB | Intermediate Staging Base |
| ISR | Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance |
| ISSA | Inter-Service Support Agreement |
| ITEM | Integrated Tactical Engagement Model |
| ITW | Integrated Tactical Warning |
| IW | Irregular Warfare |
| I&W | Indications and Warnings |

**J**

| | |
|---|---|
| J-1 | Manpower and Personnel Directorate of a Joint Staff |
| J-2 | Intelligence Directorate of a Joint Staff |
| J-3 | Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff |
| J-4 | Logistics Directorate of a Joint Staff |
| J-5 | Plans Directorate of a Joint Staff |
| J-6 | Command, Control, Communications, and Computer System Directorate of a Joint Staff |
| J/CLIPS | Joint/Communications Link Interface Planning System |
| J-SEAD | Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses |
| J-STARS | Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System |
| JAAT | Joint Air Attack Team |
| JACC/CP | Joint Airborne Communications Center/Command Post |
| JAG | Judge Advocate General |
| JAO | Joint Area of Operations |
| JAOC | Joint Air Operations Center |
| JAPO | Joint Area Petroleum Office |
| JATF | Joint Amphibious Task Force |
| JAWS | Joint Advanced Warfighting School |
| JBP | Joint Blood Program |
| JBPO | Joint Blood Program Office, Joint Blood Program Officer |

| | |
|---|---|
| JC2WC | Joint Command and Control Warfare Center |
| JCAT | Joint Crisis Action Team |
| JCATF | Joint Civil Affairs Task Force |
| JCCC | Joint Communications Control Center; Combat Camera Center |
| JCCMT | Joint Combat Camera Management Team |
| JCCP | Joint Casualty Collection Point |
| JCEOI | Joint Communications-Electronics Operating Instructions |
| JCEWS | Joint Force Commander's Electronic Warfare Staff |
| JCGRO | Joint Central Graves Registration Office |
| JCIOC | Joint Counterintelligence Operations Center |
| J/CIPS | Joint/Combined Interoperability Planning System |
| JCM | Joint Conflict Model |
| JCMEB | Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board |
| JCMEC | Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center |
| JCMOTF | Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force |
| JCMT | Joint Collection Management Tools |
| JCN | Joint Communications Network |
| JCS | Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| JCSAR | Joint Combat Search and Rescue |
| JCSC | Joint Communications Satellite Center |
| JCSE | Joint Communications Support Element |
| JDB | Joint Deployment Board |
| JDEC | Joint Document Exploitation Center |
| JDG | Joint Deployment Group |
| JDISS | Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System |
| JDS | Joint Deployment System |
| JDSS | Joint Decision Support System |
| JECEWSI | Joint Electronic Combat Electronic Warfare Simulation |
| JECG | Joint Exercise Control Group |
| JFACC | Joint Force Air Component Commander |
| JFAST | Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation |
| JFC | Joint Force Commander |
| JFCA | Joint Force Contingency Account |
| JFCC-ISR | Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (USSTRATCOM) |
| JFLCC | Joint Force Land Component Commander |
| JFMCC | Joint Force Maritime Component Commander |
| JFSOCC | Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander |
| JFUB | Joint Facilities Utilization Board |
| JIACG | Joint Interagency Coordination Group |
| JIB | Joint Information Bureau |
| JIC | Joint Intelligence Center |
| JICG | Joint Information Coordination Group |
| JIDC | Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Operations Center |
| JIEO | Joint Interoperability Engineering Organization |
| JIF | Joint Interrogation Facility |
| JILE | Joint Intelligence Liaison Element (CIA) |

| | |
|---|---|
| JINTACCS | Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems |
| JIOC | Joint Intelligence Operations Center |
| JIOP | Joint Interface Operational Procedures |
| JIPB | Joint Imagery Processing Board, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace |
| JIPC | Joint Imagery Production Complex |
| JIPOE | Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment |
| JIPTL | Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List |
| JISE | Joint Intelligence Support Element |
| JLOTS | Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore |
| JLPSB | Joint Logistics Procurement Support Board |
| JLRC | Joint Logistics Readiness Center |
| JMAO | Joint Mortuary Affairs Office or Officer |
| JMB | Joint Munitions Board |
| JMC | Joint Movement Center; Joint Military Command |
| JMCIS | Joint Maritime Command Information System |
| JMET | Joint Mission Essential Task |
| JMETL | Joint Mission Essential Task List |
| JMFU | Joint Force Meteorological and Oceanographic Forecast Unit |
| JMMO | Joint Materiel Management Office |
| JMO | Joint Maritime Operations/Joint Meteorological Officer |
| JMO (AIR) | Joint Maritime Operations (Air) |
| JMPA | Joint Military Police Agency |
| JMPAB | Joint Material Priorities and Allocation Board |
| JMRO | Joint Medical Regulating Office |
| JOA | Joint Operations Area |
| JOC | Joint Operations Center |
| JOPES | Joint Operation Planning and Execution System |
| JOPP | Joint Operation Planning Process |
| JOTS, JOTS-1, JOTS-2 | Joint Operational Tactical System |
| JOWPD | Joint Operational War Plans Division (JS-7) |
| JP | Joint Pub |
| JPB | Joint Blood Program |
| JPEC | Joint Planning and Execution Community |
| JPG | Joint Planning Group |
| JPMRC | Joint Patient Movement Requirements Center |
| JPO | Joint Petroleum Office |
| JPOTF | Joint Psychological Operations Task Force |
| JPOTG | Joint Psychological Operations Task Group |
| JPRC | Joint Personnel Reception Center |
| JRA | Joint Rear Area |
| JRAC | Joint Rear Area Coordinator |
| JRACO | Joint Rear Area Communications Officer |
| JRC | Joint Reconnaissance Center |
| JRFL | Joint Restricted Frequency List |

| | |
|---|---|
| JRC | Joint Reconnaissance Center |
| JRD | Joint Reporting Structure |
| JROC | Joint Rear Area Operations Center |
| JRSOI | Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration |
| JRTOC | Joint Rear Tactical Operations Center JS Joint Staff |
| JS | Joint Staff |
| JSAR | Joint Search and Rescue |
| JSC | Joint Spectrum Center |
| JSCP | Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan |
| JSE | Joint Support Elements |
| JSIR | Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution |
| JSOA | Joint Special Operations Area |
| JSOTF | Joint Special Operations Task Force |
| JSPS | Joint Strategic Planning System |
| JSRC | Joint Search and Rescue Center |
| JSST | Joint Space Support Team |
| JSTARS | Joint Surveillance, Target Attack Radar System |
| JTAGS | Joint Tactical Air Ground System |
| JTAO | Joint Tactical Air Operations |
| JTASC | Joint Training, Analysis and Simulations Center |
| JTB | Joint Transportation Board |
| JTCB | Joint Targeting Coordination Board |
| JTF | Joint Task Force |
| JTFEODO | Joint Task Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal Office(r) |
| JTF HQ | Joint Task Force Headquarters |
| JTIDS | Joint Tactical Information Distribution System |
| JTL | Joint Target List |
| JTLS | Joint Theater Level Simulation |
| JTMD | Joint Theater Missile Defense |
| JTTP | Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures |
| JULLS | Joint Universal Lessons Learned System |
| JVB | Joint Visitors Bureau |
| JVIDS | Joint Visual Integrated Display System |
| JWFC | Joint Warfighting Center (USJFCOM) |
| JWICS | Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System |

**K**

| | |
|---|---|
| KAL | Key Asset List |
| KC-130 | Stratotanker |
| Km | Kilometer |

**L**

| | |
|---|---|
| L-hour | Specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence |
| LAD | Latest Arrival Date |
| LAN | Local Area Network |
| LASINT | Laser Intelligence |

| | |
|---|---|
| LDR (S) | Leader(s) |
| LEA | Law Enforcement Agencies |
| LFA | Lead Federal Agency |
| LIMDIS | Limited Distribution |
| LLO | Logical Lines of Operation |
| LNO | Liaison Officer |
| LOAC | Law of Armed Conflict |
| LOC | Lines of Communications |
| LOI | Letter of Instruction; Loss-of-Input |
| LOO | Lines of Operation |
| LOTS | Logistics Over-the-Shore |
| LPI/D | Low Probability of Intercept / Detection |
| LRC | Logistics Readiness Center |
| LTIOV | Latest Time Information is of Value |
| LZ | Landing Zone |

**M**

| | |
|---|---|
| M-day | Unnamed day on which full mobilization of forces commences or is to commence |
| MAAG | Military Assistance Advisory Group |
| MACCS | Marine Air Command and Control System |
| MACG | Marine Air Control Group |
| MAG | Marine Aircraft Group |
| MAGTF | Marine Air-Ground Task Force |
| MAP | Military Assistance Program |
| MARFOR | Marine Corps Forces |
| MASINT | Measurement and Signature Intelligence |
| MCA | Military Civic Action; Mission Concept Approval |
| MC | Military Community / Multi-Channel |
| MCC | Millennium Challenge Corporation; Movement Control Center |
| MCEB | Military Communications-Electronics Board |
| MCIA | Marine Corps Intelligence Activity |
| MCM | Mine Countermeasures / Military Classification Manual |
| MCOO | Modified Combined Operations Overlay |
| MCS | Maneuver Control System |
| MCT | Movement Control Team(s) |
| MEDEVAC | Medical Evacuation |
| MEDINT | Medical Intelligence |
| MEF | Marine Expeditionary Force |
| METOC | Meteorological and Oceanographic |
| METT-TC | Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time Available and Civilian |
| MFC | Meteorological Forecast Centers |
| MFO | Multinational Force and Observers |
| MIA | Missing in Action |
| MIDB | Modernized Integrated Database |
| MIIDS | Military Intelligence Integrated Data System |

| | |
|---|---|
| MIIDS/IDB | Military Intelligence Integrated Database System / Integrated Database |
| MILCON | Military Construction |
| MILDEC | Military Deception |
| MILGP | Military Group (assigned to American Embassy in host nation) |
| MIO | Maritime Intercept Operations |
| MIW | Mine Warfare |
| MLRS | Multiple Launch Rocket System |
| MMC | Materiel Management Center |
| MNC-I | Multi-national Corps-Iraq |
| MNF | Multi-national Force |
| MODLOC | Miscellaneous Operational Details, Local Operations |
| MOE | Measure of Effectiveness |
| MOG | Maximum (aircraft) on the Ground |
| MOOTW | Military Operations Other Than War |
| MOP | Measure of Performance |
| MOPP | Mission Oriented Protective Posture |
| MOU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| MP | Military Police |
| MPF | Maritime Pre-Positioning Force |
| MPO | Military Police Operations |
| MPS | Maritime Prepositioning Ships |
| MRE | Meal, Ready to Eat |
| MSC | Military Sealift Command |
| MSE | Mobile Subscriber Equipment |
| MSEL | Master Scenario Events List |
| MSR | Mission Support Request; Main Supply Route |
| MTF | Message Text Formats; Medical Treatment Facility |
| MTG | Master Training Guide |
| MTMC | Military Traffic Management Command |
| MTT | Mobile Training Team |
| MTWS | Marine Tactical Warfare System |
| MWR | Morale, Welfare, and Recreation |

**N**

| | |
|---|---|
| NAI | Named Area of Interest |
| NAVAIDS | Navigational Aids |
| NAVFOR | Navy Forces |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NAVATAC | Navy Antiterrorism Analysis Center |
| NBC | Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical |
| NCO | Noncommissioned Officer |
| NCS | National Communications System; Net Control Station |
| NCSC | National Computer Security Center |
| NCWC | Naval Coastal Warfare Commander |
| NCWEP | Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons |
| NDCS | National Drug Control Strategy |

| | |
|---|---|
| NDS | National Defense Strategy |
| NEC | National Economic Council |
| NEO | Noncombatant Evacuation Operation |
| NFA | No-Fire Area |
| NGA | National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency |
| NGB | National Guard Bureau |
| NGFS | Naval Gunfire Support |
| NGO | Nongovernmental Organization |
| NIMA | National Imagery and Mapping Agency |
| NIST | National Intelligence Support Team |
| NLT | Not Later Than |
| NMD | National Missile Defense |
| NMIST | National Military Intelligence Support Team (DIA) |
| NMS | National Military Strategy |
| NOAA | National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration |
| NOPLAN | No Operation Plan Available or Prepared |
| NRO | National Reconnaissance Office |
| NSA | National Security Agency |
| NSC | National Security Council |
| NSC | National Security Council/Deputies Committee |
| NSC/PC | National Security Council/Principals Committee |
| NSC/PCC | National Security Council/Policy Coordination Committee |
| NSCS | National Security Council System |
| NSFS | Naval Surface Fire Support |
| NSPD | National Security Presidential Directive |
| NSS | National Security Strategy |
| NSTL | No-Strike Target List |
| NTACS | Navy Tactical Air Control System |
| NTCS-A | Naval Tactical Command System - Afloat |
| NTDS | Naval Tactical Data System |
| NTS | Naval Telecommunications System |
| NUCINT | Nuclear Intelligence |
| NWP | Naval Warfare Publication |
| NWS | National Weather Service |

**O**

| | |
|---|---|
| OA | Operational Area |
| OB | Order of Battle |
| OCA | Offensive Counterair |
| OCOKA | Observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach |
| OCONUS | Outside the Continental United States |
| OCJCS | Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| OE | Operating Environment |
| OEF | Operation Enduring Freedom |
| OEG | Operational Exposure Guide |
| OFDA | Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance |
| OGA | Other Governmental Agency |

| | |
|---|---|
| OIC | Officer In Charge |
| OIF | Operation Iraqi Freedom |
| O-IO | Offensive Information Operations |
| OIR | Other Intelligence Requirements; Operational Intelligence Requirements |
| O/O | On Order |
| OOB | Order of Battle |
| OOTW | Operations Other Than War |
| ONA | Operational Net Assessment |
| OP | Operational (level task) |
| OPCON | Operational Control |
| OPDEC | Operational Deception |
| OPDS | Offshore Petroleum Discharge System |
| OPFOR | Opposing Forces |
| OPG | Operations Planning Group |
| OPLAN | Operation Plan |
| OPLAW | Operational Law |
| OPORD | Operation Order |
| OPREP | Operational Report |
| OPSEC | Operations Security |
| OPTASKLINK | Operational Tasking Data Link |
| OPTINT | Optical Intelligence |
| OSAD (PA) | Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) |
| OSCE | Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe |
| OSD | Office of the Secretary of Defense |
| OSINT | Open-Source Intelligence |
| OT, O/T | Observer/Trainer |
| OTCIXS | Tactical Command Exchange System |
| OUSD (P) | Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy |

**P**

| | |
|---|---|
| P&S | Peace and Security |
| PA | Public Affairs; Probability of Arrival |
| PAG | Public Affairs Guidance |
| PAO | Public Affairs Office; Public Affairs Officer |
| PAT | Public Affairs Team |
| PB | Peace Building |
| PD | Presidential Directive |
| PDD | Presidential Decision Directive |
| PEL | Priority Effects List |
| PEO | Peace Enforcement Operations |
| PERMREP | U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations |
| PGM | Precision-Guided Munitions |
| PHIBGRU | Amphibious Group |
| PHIBRON | Amphibious Squadron |
| PHOTINT | Photographic Intelligence |
| PHSD | Port Security and Harbor Defense |

| | |
|---|---|
| PIR | Priority Intelligence Requirements |
| PIREP | Pilot Report |
| PKO | Peacekeeping Operations |
| PLANORD | Planning Order |
| PLL/ASL | Prescribed Load List/Authorized Stock Level |
| PLRS | Positioning Location Reporting System |
| PLS | Personnel Locator System |
| PM | Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; Provost Marshal |
| PMESII | Political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure |
| PMIS | Psychological Operations Management Information Subsystem |
| PMO | Provost Marshal Office; Program Management Office |
| PO | Peace Operations |
| POV | Privately Owned Vehicle |
| POADS | Psychological Operations Automated Data System |
| POAS | Psychological Operations Automated System |
| POC | Point of Contact |
| POD | Port of Debarkation |
| POE | Port of Embarkation |
| POL | Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants |
| POLAD | Political Advisor |
| POLMIL | Political-Military |
| POMCUS | Pre-positioning of Material Configured to Unit Sets |
| POTF | Psychological Operations Task Force |
| POTG | Psychological Operations Task Group |
| POW | Prisoner of War |
| PR | Personnel Recovery |
| PRC | Populace and Resources Control |
| PRT | Provincial Reconstruction Team |
| PSA | Port Support Activity |
| PSC | Provisional Support Company |
| PSHD | Port Security and Harbor Defense |
| PSN | Packet Switching Note |
| PSYOP | Psychological Operations |
| PSYWAR | Psychological Warfare |
| PVO | Private Volunteer Organizations |
| PWR | Pre-positioned War Reserves |
| PWRMS | Pre-positioned War Reserve Materiel Stock |
| PWRS | Pre-positioned War Reserve Stocks |
| PZ | Pickup Zone |

**Q**

| | |
|---|---|
| QDR | Quadrennial Defense Review |
| QRE | Quick Reaction Element |
| QTY | Quantity |

**R**

| | |
|---|---|
| R&D | Research and Development |
| RADFO | Radiation Forecast |
| RADINT | Radar Intelligence |
| RAOC | Rear Area Operations Center |
| RATE | Refinement, Adaptation, Termination, or Execution |
| RC | Reserve Component |
| RCA | Riot Control Agents |
| RDA | Requirements Development and Analysis |
| RCC | Rescue Coordination Center |
| RDD | Required Delivery Date (at destination) |
| RECCE | Reconnaissance |
| RECON | Reconnaissance |
| RESA | Research, Evaluation, and Systems Analysis (simulation model) |
| RF | Radio Frequency; Response Force |
| RFA | Restricted Fire Area |
| RFF | Request for Forces |
| RFI | Request for Information |
| RFID | Radio Frequency Identification |
| RFL | Restricted Fire Line |
| RINT | Unintentional Radiation Intelligence |
| RMS | Requirements Management System |
| ROA | Restricted Operations Area |
| ROC | Rehearsal of Concept |
| ROE | Rules of Engagement |
| ROK | Republic of Korea |
| ROWPU | Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit |
| ROZ | Restricted Operations Zone |
| RP | Release Point |
| RPV | Remotely Piloted Vehicle |
| RQMT | Requirement |
| RSSC | Regional Space Support Center; Regional Satellite Support Cell; Regional Signals Intelligence Support Center (NSA) |
| RSTA | Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition |
| RTL | Restricted Target List |
| RZ | Recovery Zone |

**S**

| | |
|---|---|
| SA | Security Assistance; Situational Awareness |
| SAAFR | Standard use Army Aircraft Flight Zone |
| SACC | Supporting Arms Coordination Center |
| SAFE | Selected Area for Evasion |
| SAGRO | Subarea Graves Registration Office |
| SALT | Supporting Arms Liaison Team |
| SAO | Security Assistance Organization |
| SAPO | Subarea Petroleum Office |
| SAR | Search and Rescue |
| SARTF | Search and Rescue Task Force |

| | |
|---|---|
| SAT | Satellite |
| SATCOM | Satellite Communications |
| SC | Strategic Communication |
| SCG | Security Cooperation Guidance |
| SCI | Sensitive Compartmented Information |
| SCIF | Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility |
| S/CRS | Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization |
| SDI | Strategic Defense Initiative |
| SDIO | Strategic Defense Initiative Organization |
| SEAD | Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses |
| SecDef | Secretary of Defense |
| SERE | Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape |
| SEW | Space and Electronic Warfare |
| SF | Special Forces |
| SGS | Strategic Guidance Statements |
| SHF | Super-High Frequency |
| SHFT | Shift |
| SI | Special Intelligence |
| SIF | Selective Identification Feature |
| SIG | Signal |
| SIGINT | Signals Intelligence |
| SIGSEC | Signal Security |
| SINCGARS | Single-channel and Airborne Radio System |
| SIR | Serious Incident Report |
| SITREP | Situation Report |
| SJA | Staff Judge Advocate |
| SJFHQ(CE) | Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Command Element) |
| SLC | Satellite Laser Communications |
| SLOC | Sea Line of Communication |
| SME | Subject Matter Expert |
| SMIO | Search and Rescue (SAR) Mission Information Officer |
| SO | Special Operations |
| SOC | Special Operations Command |
| SOCCE | Special Operations Command and Control Element |
| SOCRATES | Special Operations Command, Research, Analysis, and Threat Evaluation System |
| SOF | Special Operations Forces |
| SOFA | Status of Forces Agreement |
| SOLE | Special Operations Liaison Element |
| SOP | Standing Operating Procedures |
| SOSE | Special Operations Staff Element |
| SP | Security Police |
| SPECAT | Special Category |
| SPECOPS | Special Operations |
| SPG | Strategic Planning Guidance |
| SPOD | Seaport of Debarkation |
| SPOE | Seaport of Embarkation |

| | |
|---|---|
| SPRINTCOM | Special Intelligence Communication Handling System |
| | SPT Support |
| SR | Special Reconnaissance |
| SRC | Standard Requirements Code; Survival Recovery Center |
| SRCC | Service Rescue Coordination Center |
| SSO | Special Security Office(r) |
| SSTR | Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction |
| SST | Space Support Team |
| STW | Strike Warfare |
| SURG | Surgeon |
| SVC | Service(s) |
| SVS | Secure Voice System |
| SWO | Staff Weather Officer |
| SYG | U.N. Secretary General |
| SYS | System |
| SYSCON | Systems Control |

**T**

| | |
|---|---|
| TA | Target Audience |
| T&AO | Training and Assessment Outlines |
| TACAIR | Tactical Air |
| TACC | Tactical Air Command Center (USMC); Tactical Air Control Center (USN); Tanker/Airlift Control Center (USAF) |
| TACINTEL | Tactical Intelligence |
| TACON | Tactical Control |
| TACOPDAT | Tactical Operations Data |
| TACP | Tactical Air Control Party |
| TACS | Tactical Air Control System; Theater Air Control System |
| TACS/AAGS | Theater Air Control System/Army Air-Ground System |
| TACSAT | Tactical Satellite |
| TACSIM | Tactical Simulation |
| TACWAR | Tactical Warfare (simulation model) |
| TAD | Temporary Additional Duty (non-unit related personnel) |
| TADC | Tactical Air Direction Center |
| TADIL | Tactical Digital Information Link |
| TADS | Tactical Air Defense System |
| TAGS | Theater Air-Ground System |
| TAI | Target Area of Interest |
| TALO | Theater Airlift Liaison Officer |
| TAOC | Tactical Air Operations Center (USMC) |
| TAOR | Tactical Area of Responsibility |
| TARPS | Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System |
| TASIP | Tailored Analytic Intelligence Support to Individual Electronic Warfare and Command and Control Warfare Projects TAT Technical Assistance Team |
| TBD | To Be Determined |
| TBM | Tactical Ballistic Missile |
| TBMCS | Theater Battle Management Core System |

| | |
|---|---|
| TBP | To Be Published |
| TCC | Telecommunication Center |
| TCF | Technical Control Facilities/Tactical Combat Force |
| TCN | Third Country National |
| TDC | Track Data Coordinator |
| TDY | Temporary Duty |
| TECH | Technical |
| TECHCON | Technical Control |
| TECHDOC | Technical Documentation |
| TECHINT | Technical Intelligence |
| TELINT | Telemetry Intelligence |
| TELNET | Telecommunications Network |
| TENCAP | Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program |
| TF | Task Force |
| TFCICA | Task Force Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority |
| TLAM | Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile |
| TLCF | Teleconference (WIN) |
| TM | Team Member; Tactical Missile; Technical Manual |
| TMD | Theater Missile Defense |
| TMIS | Theater Medical Information System |
| TNAPS | Tactical Network Analysis and Planning System |
| TNAPS+ | Tactical Network Analysis and Planning System Plus |
| TNG | Training |
| TO | Task Outline |
| TOE | Table of Organization and Equipment |
| TOPINT | Technical Operational Intelligence |
| TPFDD | Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data |
| TPFDL | Time-Phased Force and Deployment List |
| TPMRC | Theater Patient Movement Requirement Center |
| TR | Tactical Reconnaissance |
| TROPO | Tropospheric Scatter; Troposphere |
| TSG | Theater Security Guidance |
| TSN | Track Supervision Network |
| TTP | Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures |
| TW/AA | Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment |
| TWDS | Tactical Water Distribution System |
| | |
| **U** | |
| UAV | Unmanned Aerial Vehicle |
| UCCATS | Urban Combat Computer Assisted Training System |
| UCMJ | Uniform Code of Military Justice |
| UCP | Unified Command Plan |
| UHF | Ultra High Frequency |
| UJT | Universal Joint Task |
| UJTL | Universal Joint Task List |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| ULN | Unit Line Number |
| UN | United Nations |

| | |
|---|---|
| UNAAF | United Action Armed Forces |
| UNDPO | UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commission for Refugees |
| UNITAF | Unified Task Force |
| UNOCHA | UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| US | United States |
| USA | United States Army; United States of America |
| USAR | United States Army Reserve |
| USACIDC | United States Army Criminal Investigations Command |
| USAF | United States Air Force |
| USAFR | United States Air Force Reserve |
| USAFCOM | United States African Command |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| USCENTCOM | United States Central Command |
| USCG | United States Coast Guard |
| USCGR | United States Coast Guard Reserve |
| USDAO | U.S. Defense Attaché's Office |
| USDR | U.S. Defense Representative |
| USEUCOM | United States European Command |
| USFJ | United States Forces Japan |
| USFK | United States Forces Korea |
| USFORAZORES | United States Forces Azores |
| USG | United States Government |
| USIA | United States Information Agency |
| USJFCOM | United States Joint Forces Command |
| USMC | United States Marine Corps |
| USMCR | United States Marine Corps Reserve |
| USMILGP | United States Military Group |
| USMTM | United States Military Training Mission |
| USN | United States Navy |
| USNORTHCOM | United States Northern Command |
| USNR | United States Navy Reserve |
| USPACOM | United States Pacific Command |
| USSOCOM | United States Special Operations Command |
| USSOUTHCOM | United States Southern Command |
| USSS | United States Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) System |
| USSTRATCOM | United States Strategic Command |
| USTRANSCOM | United States Transportation Command |
| UW | Unconventional Warfare |
| UXO | Unexploded Ordnance |

**V**

| | |
|---|---|
| VCJCS | Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| VF | Voice Frequency |
| VHF | Very High Frequency |
| VI | Visual Information |
| VI/COMCAM | Visual Information/Combat Camera |
| VIP | Very Important Person; Visual Information Processor |

| VTC | Video Teleconferencing |
|-----|------------------------|

**W**

| WAN | Wide-Area Network |
|-----|-------------------|
| WARNORD | Warning Order |
| WCS | Weapons Control Status |
| WHNS | Wartime Host-Nation Support |
| WIN | Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) Inter-computer Network |
| WMD | Weapons of Mass Destruction |
| WPS | World Port System |
| WRM | War Reserve Materiel |
| WTCA | Water Terminal Clearance Authority |
| WX | Weather |

**XYZ**

| YR | Year |
|----|------|
| Z | Zulu |
| ZULU | Time Zone Indicator for Universal Time |

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# APPENDIX E

# OPERATIONAL PLAN ANNEXES

A   Task Organization
B   Intelligence
C   Operations
D   Logistics
E   Personnel
F   Public Affairs
G   Civil-Military Affairs
H   Meteorological and Oceanographic Services
J   Command Relationships
K   Communications System Support
L   Environmental Considerations
M   Geospatial Information and Services
N   Space Operations
P   Host Nation Support
Q   Medical Services
R   Reports
S   Special Technical Operations
T   Consequence Management
U   Notional OPLAN Decision Guide
V   Interagency Coordination
X   Execution Checklist
Y   Strategic Communication
Z   Distribution
AA Religious Support


Annexes A-D, K, and Y are required annexes for a CAP OPORD per JOPES.  All others may either be required by the JSCP or deemed necessary by the supported CCDR.

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## APPENDIX F

### Command Relationships[1]

1. **Levels of Authority.** The specific command relationship (combatant command (command authority) (COCOM), operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), and support) will define the level of authority a commander (CDR) has over assigned or attached forces. A CDR can also have authority when coordinating authority, administrative control (ADCON), and direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) relationships have been specified. An overview of command relationships is shown in Figure F-1.



**Figure F-1. Command Relationships**

2. All forces under the jurisdiction of the Secretaries of the Military Departments (except those forces necessary to carry out the functions of the Military Departments) are assigned to combatant commands or commander (CDR), U.S. Element North

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[1] Extracted from JP 1, FM 3-31 and NWC 4111H

American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) (USELEMNORAD) by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) in the "Forces for Unified Commands" memorandum. A force assigned or attached to a combatant command may be transferred from that command to another combatant commander (CCDR) only when directed by the SecDef and under procedures prescribed by the SecDef and approved by the President. The command relationship the gaining CDR will exercise (and the losing CDR will relinquish) will be specified by the SecDef. Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and joint task forces (JTFs) may direct the assignment or attachment of their forces to those subordinate commands and delegate the command relationship as appropriate (see Figure F-2).

## COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS OVERVIEW

- **Forces, not command relationships, are transferred between commands. When forces are transferred, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over those forces must be specified.**

- **When transfer of forces to a joint force will be permanent (or for an unknown but long period of time) the forces should be reassigned. Combatant commanders will exercise combatant command (command authority) and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs), will exercise operational control (OPCON) over reassigned forces.**

- **When transfer of forces to a joint force will be temporary, the forces will be attached to the gaining command and JFCs, normally through the Service component commander, will exercise OPCON over the attached forces.**

- **Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and joint task forces direct the assignment or attachment of their forces to those subordinate commands as appropriate.**

**Figure F-2.  Command Relationships Overview**

3.   The CCDR exercises **combatant command (command authority) (COCOM)** over forces assigned or reassigned by the President or SecDef.  Forces are assigned or reassigned when the transfer of forces will be permanent or for an unknown period of time, or when the broadest level of command and control (C2) is required or desired. Operational control (OPCON) of assigned forces is inherent in COCOM and may be delegated within the combatant command by the CCDR.  Subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) will exercise OPCON over assigned or reassigned forces.

4.   The CCDR normally exercises operational control (OPCON) over forces attached by the SecDef.  Forces are attached when the transfer of forces will be temporary. Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and joint task forces (JTFs)

normally will direct the delegation of OPCON over forces attached to those subordinate commands.

5.  In accordance with the "Forces for Unified Commands" memorandum and the Unified Command Plan (UCP), except as otherwise directed by the President or the SecDef, all forces operating within the geographic area assigned to a specific CCDR shall be assigned or attached to, and under the command of, that CCDR.  Transient forces do not come under the chain of command of the area CDR solely by their movement across operational area boundaries, except when the CCDR is exercising tactical control (TACON) for the purpose of force protection.  Unless otherwise specified by the SecDef, and with the exception of the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), a CCDR has TACON for exercise purposes whenever forces not assigned to that CCDR undertake exercises in that CCDR's AOR.

6.  **Brief Summary of U.S. Command Relationships**

   a.  **COMBATANT COMMAND (COMMAND AUTHORITY)**

   (1) COCOM is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces to include:

   - Organizing and employing commands and forces.
   - Assigning tasks.
   - Designating objectives.
   - Giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training
   - Logistics.

   (2) COCOM should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations.  Normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate JFCs and Service and/or functional component commanders; however, it cannot be delegated to subordinate commanders.  COCOM provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.

   b.  **OPERATIONAL CONTROL (OPCON)**

   (1) OPCON is the command authority exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of COCOM and can be delegated or transferred.

   (2) OPCON is inherent in COCOM and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving:

   - Organizing and employing commands and forces.
   - Assigning tasks.
   - Designating objectives.
   - Giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.

(3) OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. It should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate JFCs and Service and/or functional component commanders. OPCON normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and employ those forces necessary to accomplish assigned missions. It does not include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. The combatant commander delegates these elements. OPCON does include the authority to delineate functional responsibilities and geographic JOAs of subordinate JFCs.

(4) The superior commander gives commanders of subordinate commands and JTFs OPCON of assigned or attached forces.

c. **TACTICAL CONTROL**

(1) TACON is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking. It is limited to the detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks.

(2) TACON may be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of COCOM. TACON is inherent in OPCON.

d. **SUPPORT**

(1) Support is a command authority. A support relationship is established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force.

(2) Support may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of COCOM. This includes the President / SecDef designating a support relationship between combatant commanders as well as within a COCOM. The designation of supporting relationships is important as it conveys priorities to commanders and staffs who are planning or executing joint operations. The support command relationship is a flexible arrangement. The establishing authority is responsible for ensuring that both the supported and supporting commanders understand the degree of authority granted the supported commander.

(3) The supported commander should ensure that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. The supporting commander provides the assistance needed, subject to the supporting commander's existing capabilities and other assigned tasks. When the supporting commander cannot fulfill the needs of the supported commander, the establishing authority is notified by either the supported or supporting commander. The establishing authority is responsible for determining a solution.

(4) An establishing directive is normally issued to specify the purpose of the support relationship, the effect desired, and the action to be taken.

e.  **DIRECT LIAISON AUTHORIZED (DIRLAUTH).**  Direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) is that authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command.  DIRLAUTH is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting DIRLAUTH informed.  DIRLAUTH is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised.

f.  **FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS**

(1) The Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) can be in either a supporting or supported relationship or both.  The JFC's needs for unity of command and unity of effort dictate these relationships.  Support relationships will be established by the JFC in appropriate campaign plans and orders.  Similar relationships can be established among all functional and Service component commanders, such as the coordination of deep operations involving the JFLCC and the joint force air component commander (JFACC).  Close coordination is necessary when the JFLCC provides joint suppression of enemy air defenses in support of JFACC operations.  Examples are attack helicopters or multiple-launched rocket systems in Operation DESERT STORM as well as seizing and holding ports and airbases for friendly air and sea forces (such as in Operation JUST CAUSE).  The JFLCC can also expect support to include airlift, close air support (CAS), and interdiction strikes from the JFACC.

(2) The JFC may task the JFLCC to conduct operations outside of the land AO.  Land-based elements may conduct air and missile defense operations to protect the force and critical assets from air and missile attack and surveillance.  These may include operational maneuver and/or operational fires against enemy ports and airbases outside of the land area of operations (AO).  Similarly, the JFLCC can request from the JFC air support from other components to attack or isolate enemy land forces in the land AO.  Figure F-3 illustrates a simultaneous support relationship scenario between the JFLCC and JFACC.



**Figure F-3.  JFLCC and JFACC Support Relationships**

g. **COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS WITH SERVICE COMPONENTS**

(1) The JFLCC functional component responsibility is normally assigned to a commander already serving as a Service component (e.g., ARFOR, MARFOR) to a JTF or subordinate unified command. Additionally, the JFC may use one of his Service components (e.g., Army Service component or Marine Service component) as the JFLCC reporting to him directly.  The JFLCC retains Service component responsibility for assigned or attached forces but does not assume Service component responsibility for forces made available by other Service components.  TACON is the normal relationship with these Service forces. In those cases in which the JFLC command is not formed from a Service component headquarters, the JFLCC has no Service component responsibilities (see Figure F-4).



**Figure F-4. Service Functions**

(2) Once the JFLC command is established, the operational requirements of the JFLCC subordinate commands are prioritized and presented to the joint force headquarters by the JFLCC.  However, Service component commanders remain responsible for their military department Title 10 responsibilities, such as logistics and personnel support.

**Detailed Description of Command Relationships**

1. **COCOM** is the command authority over assigned forces vested only in the commanders of combatant commands by Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 164 (or as directed by the President in the Unified Command Plan [UCP]) and cannot be delegated or transferred.

a. **Basic Authority**.  COCOM is the authority of a CCDR to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the

missions assigned to the command. COCOM should be exercised through the CDRs of subordinate organizations.  Normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) and Service and/or functional combatant commanders (FCCs) functional component commander.  COCOM provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the CCDR considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.

    b.  Unless otherwise directed by the President or the SecDef, the authority, direction, and control of the CCDR with respect to the command of forces assigned to that command includes the following:

        (1) Exercise or delegate operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), and establish support relationships among subordinate CDRs over assigned or attached forces, and designate coordinating authorities, as described in subparagraphs (8), (9), and (10) below.

        (2) Exercise directive authority for logistic matters (or delegate directive authority for a common support capability).

        (3) Prescribe the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command.

        (4) Employ forces within that command as necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.

        (5) Assign command functions to subordinate CDRs.

        (6) Coordinate and approve those aspects of administration and support, and discipline necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.

        (7) Give authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics.

        (8) Coordinate with other CCDRs, United States Government (USG) agencies, and organizations of other countries regarding matters that cross the boundaries of geographic areas specified in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and inform USG agencies or organizations of other countries in the AOR, as necessary, to prevent both duplication of effort and lack of adequate control of operations in the delineated areas.

        (9) Unless otherwise directed by the SecDef, function as the U.S. military single point of contact and exercise directive authority over all elements of the command in relationships with other combatant commands, DOD elements, U.S. diplomatic missions, other U.S. agencies, and organizations of other countries in the AOR. Whenever a CCDR conducts exercises, operations, or other activities with the military forces of nations in another CCDR's AOR, those exercises, operations, and activities and their attendant command relationships will be mutually agreed to between the CCDRs.

(10)    Determine those matters relating to the exercise of COCOM in which subordinates must communicate with agencies external to the combatant command through the CCDR.

(11)    Establish personnel policies to ensure proper and uniform standards of military conduct.

(12)    Submit recommendations through the CJCS to the SecDef concerning the content of guidance affecting the strategy and/or fielding of joint forces.

(13)    Participate in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process.

(14)    Participate in the Joint Strategic Planning System and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES).

(15)    Concur in the assignment (or recommendation for assignment) of officers as commanders directly subordinate to the CCDR and to positions on the combatant command staff. Suspend from duty and recommend reassignment, when appropriate, of any subordinate officer assigned to the combatant command.

(16)    Convene general courts-martial in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

(17)    In accordance with laws and national and DOD policies, establish plans, policies, programs, priorities, and overall requirements for the command and control (C2), communications system, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities of the command.

c.    **Directive Authority for Logistics.** CCDRs exercise directive authority for logistics and may delegate directive authority for a common support capability. The CCDR may delegate directive authority for as many common support capabilities to a subordinate JFC as required to accomplish the subordinate JFC's assigned mission. For some commodities or support services common to two or more Services, one Service may be given responsibility for management based on Department of Defense (DOD) executive agent (EA) designations or inter-Service support agreements. However, the CCDR must formally delineate this delegated directive authority by function and scope to the subordinate JFC or Service component commander. The exercise of directive authority for logistics by a CCDR includes the authority to issue directives to subordinate CDRs, including peacetime measures necessary to ensure the following: effective execution of approved OPLANs; effectiveness and economy of operation; and prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functions among the Service component commands. CCDRs will coordinate with appropriate Services before exercising directive authority for logistics or delegate authority for subordinate CDRs to exercise common support capabilities to one of their components.

(1) A CCDR's directive authority does not:

(a) Discontinue Service responsibility for logistic support;

(b) Discourage coordination by consultation and agreement; or

(c) Disrupt effective procedures or efficient use of facilities or organizations.

(2) Unless otherwise directed by the SecDef, the Military Departments and Services continue to have responsibility for the logistic support of their forces assigned or attached to joint commands, subject to the following guidance.

(a) Under peacetime conditions, the scope of the logistic authority exercised by the commander of a combatant command will be consistent with the peacetime limitations imposed by legislation, DOD policy or regulations, budgetary considerations, local conditions, and other specific conditions prescribed by the SecDef or the CJCS. Where these factors preclude execution of a CCDR's directive by component CDRs, the comments and recommendations of the CCDR, together with the comments of the component CDR concerned, normally will be referred to the appropriate Military Department for consideration. If the matter is not resolved in a timely manner with the appropriate Military Department, it will be referred by the CCDR, through the CJCS, to the SecDef.

(b) Under crisis action, wartime conditions, or where critical situations make diversion of the normal logistic process necessary, the logistic authority of CCDRs enables them to use all facilities and supplies of all forces assigned to their commands as necessary for the accomplishment of their missions. The President or SecDef may extend this authority to attached forces when transferring those forces for a specific mission and should specify this authority in the establishing directive or order. Joint logistic doctrine and policy developed by the CJCS establishes wartime logistic support guidance to assist the CCDR in conducting successful joint operations.

2. **Operational control (OPCON)** is the command authority that may be exercised by CDRs at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining CDR will exercise (and the losing CDR will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the SecDef.

a. Basic Authority. Operational control (OPCON) is inherent in COCOM and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. It should be exercised through the CDRs of subordinate organizations; normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) and Service and/or functional combatant commanders or functional component commanders. OPCON normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and employ those forces as the commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. It does not include authoritative

direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.  These elements of COCOM must be specifically delegated by the CCDR. OPCON does include the authority to delineate functional responsibilities and operational areas of subordinate JFCs.

 b.  CDRs of subordinate commands, including JTFs, normally will be given OPCON of assigned or attached forces by the superior CDR.

 c.  OPCON conveys the authority for the following:

  (1) Exercise or delegate OPCON and tactical control (TACON), establish support relationships among subordinates, and designate coordinating authorities.

  (2) Give direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training.

  (3) Prescribe the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command.

  (4) Organize subordinate commands and forces within the command as necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.

  (5) Employ forces within the command, as necessary, to carry out missions assigned to the command.

  (6) Assign command functions to subordinate CDRs.

  (7) Plan for, deploy, direct, control, and coordinate the actions of subordinate forces.

  (8) Establish plans, policies, priorities, and overall requirements for the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities of the command.

  (9) Conduct joint training and joint training exercises required to achieve effective employment of the forces of the command, in accordance with joint doctrine established by the CJCS, and establish training policies for joint operations required to accomplish the mission. This authority also applies to forces attached for purposes of joint exercises and training.

  (10) Suspend from duty and recommend reassignment of any officer assigned to the command.

  (11) Assign responsibilities to subordinate CDRs for certain routine operational matters that require coordination of effort of two or more CDRs.

  (12) Establish an adequate system of control for local defense and delineate such operational areas for subordinate CDRs as deemed desirable.

(13) Delineate functional responsibilities and geographic operational areas of subordinate CDRs.

    d.   The SecDef may specify adjustments to accommodate authorities beyond OPCON in an establishing directive when forces are transferred between CCDRs or when members and/or organizations are transferred from the Military Departments to a combatant command. Adjustments will be coordinated with the participating CCDRs.

3.   **Tactical control (TACON)** is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks.

    a.   Basic Authority.  TACON is inherent in OPCON and may be delegated to and exercised by CDRs at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command.  When forces are transferred between CCDRs, the command relationship the gaining CDR will exercise (and the losing CDR will relinquish) over those forces must be specified by the SecDef.

    b.   TACON provides the authority to:

        (1) Give direction for military operations; and

        (2) Control designated forces (e.g., ground forces, aircraft sorties, missile launches, or satellite payload management).

    c.   TACON provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task.  TACON does not provide organizational authority or authoritative direction for administrative and logistic support; the CDR of the parent unit continues to exercise these authorities unless otherwise specified in the establishing directive.

    d.   Functional component CDRs typically exercise TACON over military capability or forces made available to the functional component for tasking.

4.   **Support** is a command authority.  A support relationship is established by a superior CDR between subordinate CDRs when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force.

    a.   Basic Authority.  Support may be exercised by CDRs at any echelon at or below the combatant command level.  This includes the SecDef designating a support relationship between CCDRs as well as within a combatant command. The designation of supporting relationships is important as it conveys priorities to CDRs and staffs that are planning or executing joint operations.  The support command relationship is, by design, a somewhat vague but very flexible arrangement.  The establishing authority (the common superior CDR) is responsible for ensuring that both the supported CDR and supporting CDRs understand the degree of authority that the supported CDR is granted.

b.   The supported CDR should ensure that the supporting CDRs understand the assistance required. The supporting CDRs will then provide the assistance needed, subject to a supporting CDR's existing capabilities and other assigned tasks.  When a supporting CDR cannot fulfill the needs of the supported CDR, the establishing authority will be notified by either the supported CDR or a supporting CDR. The establishing authority is responsible for determining a solution.

c.   An establishing directive normally is issued to specify the purpose of the support relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken.  It also should include:

(1) The forces and resources allocated to the supporting effort;

(2) The time, place, level, and duration of the supporting effort;

(3) The relative priority of the supporting effort;

(4) The authority, if any, of the supporting CDR to modify the supporting effort in the event of exceptional opportunity or an emergency; and

(5) The degree of authority granted to the supported CDR over the supporting effort.

d.   Unless limited by the establishing directive, the supported CDR will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort.  General direction includes the designation and prioritization of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency.

e.   The supporting CDR determines the forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and communications to be employed in providing this support.  The supporting CDR will advise and coordinate with the supported CDR on matters concerning the employment and limitations (e.g., logistics) of such support, assist in planning for the integration of such support into the supported CDR's effort as a whole, and ensure that support requirements are appropriately communicated within the supporting CDR's organization.

f.   The supporting CDR has the responsibility to ascertain the needs of the supported force and take action to fulfill them within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks.

g.   Several categories of support have been defined to better characterize the support that should be given.  For example, land forces that provide fires normally are tasked in a direct support role.

h.   There are four defined categories of support that a CCDR may direct over assigned or attached forces to ensure the appropriate level of support is provided to accomplish mission objectives.  These include general support, mutual support, direct support, and close support.  Figure F-5 summarizes each of the categories of support.

The establishing directive will specify the type and extent of support the specified forces are to provide.



**Figure F-5. Categories of Support**

**Support Relationships between Combatant Commands**

a.   The SecDef establishes support relationships between the CCDRs for the planning and execution of joint operations.  This ensures that the tasked CCDR(s) receives the necessary support.  A supported CCDR requests capabilities, tasks supporting DOD components, coordinates with the appropriate Federal agencies (where agreements have been established), and develops a plan to achieve the common goal.  As part of the team effort, supporting CCDRs provide the requested capabilities, as available, to assist the supported CCDR to accomplish missions requiring additional resources.

b.   The CJCS organizes the joint planning and execution community for joint operation planning to carry out support relationships between the combatant commands. The supported CCDR has primary responsibility for all aspects of an assigned task. Supporting CCDRs provide forces, assistance, or other resources to a supported CCDR. Supporting CCDRs prepare supporting plans as required.  Under some circumstances, a CCDR may be a supporting CCDR for one operation while being a supported CCDR for another.

**Support Relationships between Component Commands**

   a.   The joint force commander (JFC) may establish support relationships between component CDRs to facilitate operations.  Support relationships afford an effective means to prioritize and ensure unity of effort for various operations.  Component CDRs should establish liaison with other component CDRs to facilitate the support relationship and to coordinate the planning and execution of pertinent operations.  Support relationships may change across phases of an operation as directed by the establishing authority.

   b.   When the commander of a Service component is designated as a functional combatant commander (FCC) functional component commander, the associated Service component available by other Service components.  The operational requirements of the functional component CDR's subordinate forces are prioritized and presented to the joint force commander (JFC) by the functional component CDR, relieving the affected Service component CDRs of this responsibility, but the affected Service component CDRs are not relieved of their administrative and support responsibilities.

   c.   In rare situations, a supporting component CDR may be supporting two or more supported CDRs.  In these situations, there must be clear understanding among all parties and a specification in the establishing directive, as to who supports whom, when, and with what prioritization.  When there is a conflict over prioritization between component CDRs, the CCDR having COCOM of the component CDRs will have final adjudication.

5.  **Other authorities outside the command relationships delineated above are described below.**

   a.   **Administrative Control.**  Administrative control (ADCON) is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations with respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.  ADCON is synonymous with administration and support responsibilities identified in Title 10, United States Code (USC).  This is the authority necessary to fulfill Military Department statutory responsibilities for administration and support.  ADCON may be delegated to and exercised by CDRs of Service forces assigned to a CCDR at any echelon at or below the level of Service component command.  ADCON is subject to the command authority of CCDRs.  ADCON may be delegated to and exercised by CDRs of Service commands assigned within Service authorities.  Service CDRs exercising ADCON will not usurp the authorities assigned by a CCDR having COCOM over CDRs of assigned Service forces.

   b**.   Coordinating Authority**.  CDRs or individuals may exercise coordinating authority at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command.  Coordinating authority is the authority delegated to a CDR or individual for coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service (e.g., joint security coordinator exercises coordinating authority for joint security area operations

among the component CDRs). Coordinating authority may be granted and modified through a memorandum of agreement to provide unity of command and unity of effort for operations involving, Reserve Component (RC), and Active Component (AC) forces engaged in interagency activities.  The CDR or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved but does not have the authority to compel agreement.  The common task to be coordinated will be specified in the establishing directive without disturbing the normal organizational relationships in other matters.  Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship between CDRs, not an authority by which command may be exercised.  It is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations.  Coordinating authority is not in any way tied to force assignment.  Assignment of coordinating authority is based on the missions and capabilities of the commands or organizations involved.

c.  **Direct Liaison Authorized**.  Direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) is that authority granted by a CDR (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command.  DIRLAUTH is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the CDR granting DIRLAUTH informed.  DIRLAUTH is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised.

6. **Command of National Guard and Reserve Units**

a.  All National Guard and reserve forces (except those forces specifically exempted) are assigned by the SecDef to the combatant commands under the authority provided in Title 10, United States Code (USC), Sections 162 and 167, as indicated in the "Forces for Unified Commands" memorandum.  However, those forces are available for operational missions only when mobilized for specific periods in accordance with the law, or when ordered to active duty and after being validated for employment by their parent Service.

b.  The authority CCDRs may exercise over assigned Reserve Component (RC) forces when not on active duty or when on active duty for training is training and readiness oversight (TRO). CCDRs normally will exercise TRO over assigned forces through the Service component commanders.  TRO includes the authority to:

(1) Provide guidance to Service component commanders on operational requirements and priorities to be addressed in Military Department training and readiness programs;

(2) Comment on Service component program recommendations and budget requests;

(3) Coordinate and approve participation by assigned Reserve Component (RC) forces in joint exercises and other joint training when on active duty for training or performing inactive duty for training;

(4) Obtain and review readiness and inspection reports on assigned Reserve Component (RC) forces; and

(5) Coordinate and review mobilization plans (including post-mobilization training activities and deployability validation procedures) developed for assigned Reserve Component (RC) forces.

c.  Unless otherwise directed by the SecDef, the following applies.

(1) Assigned Reserve Component (RC) forces on active duty (other than for training) may not be deployed until validated by the parent Service for deployment.

(2) CCDRs may employ Reserve Component (RC) forces assigned to their subordinate component CDRs in contingency operations only when the forces have been mobilized for specific periods in accordance with the law, or when ordered to active duty and after being validated for employment by their parent Service.

(3) Reserve Component (RC) forces on active duty for training or performing inactive-duty training may be employed in connection with contingency operations only as provided by law, and when the primary purpose is for training consistent with their mission or specialty.

d.  CCDRs will communicate with assigned Reserve Component (RC) forces through the Military Departments when the RC forces are not on active duty or when on active duty for training.

e.  CCDRs may inspect assigned Reserve Component (RC) forces in accordance with Department of Defense directive (DODD) 5106.4, *Combatant Command Inspectors Genera,* when such forces are mobilized or ordered to active duty (other than for training).

7.  **U.S. vs. Alliance Command Relationships**

Figure F-6 offers a comparison between U.S. command relationships and the two alliance command relationships of NATO and CFC/USFK.

| Authority | US COCOM | US OPCON | NATO OPCOM | NATO OPCON | CFC/USFK COMBINED OPCON | NATO TACOM | US & NATO TACON |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Most control | | | | | | Least control |
| Direct authority to deal with DOD, US diplomatic missions, agencies | X | | | | | | |
| Coordinate CINC boundary | X | | | | | | |
| Granted to a command | X | | X | | | | |
| Delegated to a command | | X | | X | X | X | X |
| Set chain of command to forces | X | X | | | | | |
| Assign mission/designate objective | X | X | X | | | | |
| Assign tasks | X | X | X | | | X | |
| Direct/employ forces | X | X | X | X | X | | |
| Establish maneuver control measures | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Reassign forces | X | | | | | | |
| Retain OPCON | X | X | X | | | | |
| Delegate OPCON | X | X | X | X with approval | | | |
| Assign TACOM | X | X | | | | | |
| Delegate TACON | X | X | X | X | X | | |
| Retain TACON | X | X | X | X | | | |
| Deploy forces (information/within theater) | X | X | X | X | | | |
| Local direction/control designated forces | X | X | | | | | X |
| Assign separate employment of unit components | X | X | X | | | | |
| Directive authority for logistics | X | | | | | | |
| Direct joint training | X | X | | | | | |
| Exercise command of US forces in MNF | X | X | | | | | |
| Assign/reassign subordinate commanders/officers | X | May suspend or recommend reassignment | | | | | |
| Conduct internal discipline/training | X | | | | | | |

NATO *Full Command* and CFC/USFK *Command less OPCON* are basically equivalent to US COCOM, but only for internal matters

X — has this authority

☐ — denied this authority, or not specifically granted it

LEGEND
COCOM – Combatant command
OPCON – Operational control
OPCOM – Operational command
TACOM – Tactical command
TACON – Tactical control

**Figure F-6.  U.S. vs. Alliance Command Relationships**

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# APPENDIX G

# CHAIN of COMMANDS



Note:
This diagram is only an example. It does not prescribe joint force organization. Service components at lower echelons may only contain service forces.

**LEGEND**
— Chain of Command
- - - Administrative Control
-·- Channel of Communication

The President exercises authority and control of the Armed Forces through a single chain of command with two branches. One branch goes from the Secretary of Defense through combatant commanders to Service component commands and subordinate forces. It is for conducting operations and support. The other branch comes from the Secretary of Defense, through the military departments, to their respective major commands (FM 3-0, for additional details, see JP 0-2).

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# APPENDIX H

# GOVERNING FACTORS / EVALUATION CRITERIA

The following menu provides a good starting point for developing a COA comparison criteria list:

Some possible sources for determining criteria are:

- Combatant Commander's intent statement.
- CJTF's intent statement.
- CJTF's subsequent guidance.
- Implicit significant factors relating to the operation (e.g., need for speed, security).
- Each staff member may identify factors relating to that staff function.
- Other factors such as:
  - ➢ Principles of war. COAs should provide for:
    - Mass.
      - ❖ Masses friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses.
      - ❖ Synchronizes fires, maneuver, protections and support.
      - ❖ Creates combat asymmetries.
      - ❖ Concentrates results (not necessarily forces).
    - Objective.
      - ❖ Directly, quickly, and economically contributes to the purpose of the operation.
      - ❖ Clearly defined, decisive, and attainable.
    - Offensive.
      - ❖ Seizes, retains, exploits the initiative.
      - ❖ Attacks enemy center(s) of gravity.
      - ❖ Maintains freedom of action.
      - ❖ Deters aggression.
      - ❖ Robust and versatile reserves.
    - Simplicity.
      - ❖ Easily integrated with adjacent operations.
      - ❖ Does not require extensive preconditions prior to execution.
      - ❖ Simplified combat identification procedures.
    - Economy of force.
      - ❖ Minimizes forces assigned to secondary efforts.
      - ❖ Minimizes force support and sustainment.
    - Maneuver.
      - ❖ Gains positional advantage over the enemy.

- ❖ Positional advantage usually provides positions to deliver, or threaten to deliver, direct or indirect fires.
- ❖ Keeps the enemy off balance and protects the friendly forces.
- ❖ Preserves freedom of action.
  - ▪ Unity of command.
    - ❖ Command relationships are well defined.
    - ❖ Minimizes requirements for real-time coordination.
    - ❖ Forces and operations are under a single commander with requisite authority.
  - ▪ Security (and force protection).
    - ❖ Accomplishes the mission without provocation.
    - ❖ Reduces friendly vulnerabilities, enhances freedom of action.
    - ❖ Provides for prudent risk management.
  - ▪ Surprise.
    - ❖ Effective IO/IW (especially deception and OPSEC).
    - ❖ Avoids stereotypical operations.
    - ❖ Applies unexpected combat power (lethal or nonlethal).

- ➢ Elements of operational art (JP 3-0). COAs should provide for:
  - ▪ Synergy. Integration and synchronization of operations in a manner that applies force from different dimensions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents.
  - ▪ Simultaneity and depth. Bring forces to bear on the opponent's entire structure in a near simultaneous manner to overwhelm and cripple enemy capabilities and the will to resist.
  - ▪ Anticipation. The unexpected/opportunities to exploit the situation.
  - ▪ Balance. The appropriate mix of forces/capabilities within the JTF, and the nature and timing of operations to disrupt an enemy's balance.
  - ▪ Leverage. COAs gain, maintain, and exploit advantages in combat power across all dimensions.
  - ▪ Timing and tempo. COAs conduct operations at a tempo and point in time that best exploit friendly capabilities and inhibit the enemy.
  - ▪ Operational reach and approach. COAs provide basing, whether from overseas locations, sea-based platforms, or the continental United States, which directly affect operational reach. In particular, advanced bases underwrite the progressive ability of the JTF force to shield its components from enemy action and deliver symmetric and asymmetric blows with increasing power and ferocity.

- Forces and functions. COAs provide campaigns/operations that focus on defeating enemy forces or functions, or combination of both.
- Arranging operations. COAs provide a combination of simultaneous and sequential operations to achieve the desired end state conditions quickly and at the least cost in personnel and other resources.
- Centers of gravity. COAs provide the ability to mass results against the enemy's sources of power in order to destroy or neutralize them.
- Direct versus indirect. COAs, to the extent possible, attack enemy centers of gravity directly. Where direct attack means attacking into an opponent's strength, seek an indirect approach.
- Decisive points. COAs should correctly identify and control decisive points that can gain a marked advantage over the enemy, and greatly influence the outcome of an action.
- Culmination. COAs synchronize logistics with combat operations.
- Termination. COAs account for the end state of the operation.

➢ Other factors, e.g., political constraints, risk, financial costs, flexibility.

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# APPENDIX I

# DEPARTMENT of STATE

The President's FY 2009 International Affairs budget for the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other foreign affairs agencies totals approximately 39.5 billion broken down as follows:

- Foreign Operations and related agencies - $26.1 billion
- Department of State - $11.2 billion
- Other International Affairs - $2.2 billion

These appropriations fund the programs, operations, and infrastructure essential to conduct U.S. diplomatic and consular relations in more than 180 countries. They also support vigorous U.S. engagement abroad through public diplomacy and international organizations. Some highlights follow:

- **Civilian Stabilization Initiative**

The Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI) builds on two years of interagency development, exercises, and pilot efforts. It was developed to answer the President's call in National Security Presidential Directive 44 to significantly improve the ability of the United States to respond to conflict and create a civilian counterpart to the U.S. military, ready and capable to stabilize countries in the transition from war to peace. The Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) manages this initiative.

The FY 2009 request includes $248.6 million to build a coordinated capacity across the fifteen United States Government civilian agencies and the Department of Defense for a "Whole of Government" response to emergent Reconstruction and Stabilization (R&S) crises. This will enable the President and Secretary to react to unanticipated conflict in foreign countries through the Interagency Management System, which produces interagency analysis and planning and puts civilian experts on the ground as they are needed, improving assistance effectiveness and increasing options available to support countries in crisis through a coordinated interagency response. These resources will strengthen civilian capacity to address the threat of failed states, thereby reducing or eliminating the need for military deployments in such crises. This will allow civilian agencies to increase the USG's options for assistance and work to prevent the dangers of conflict and state failure that threaten U.S. interests around the world.

This request supports the recruitment, development and training of a 250-member interagency Active Response Corps (ARC) and a 2,000-member Standby Response Corps (SRC). The ARC and SRC will be situated in and drawn from the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, Treasury, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security and the U.S. Agency for International Development. The request also supports a Civilian Reserve Corps of 2,000 citizens composed of 1,500 new Civilian Reservists in FY 2009 in addition to the 500 Reservists expected to have signed up by the end of FY 2008.

This interagency initiative is extensively coordinated within the USG and receives regular input from major partners with similar capabilities including the United Kingdom, Canada, the European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Interagency Management System has the flexibility to integrate partners, build on coalition support, and otherwise operate as part of a broader international mission. S/CRS and its interagency partners consult regularly with the United Nations, the European Union, NATO and other organizations critical to effective R&S response.

This interagency FY 2009 budget will enable U.S. civilians to respond rapidly in countries in crisis, coordinating with U.S. or international military forces, delivering effective assistance, and deploying R&S teams to support U.S. embassies (where they exist) and to partner with local citizens and international actors on the ground. U.S. civilian readiness comprises four initiatives: building up USG internal rapid response capacity through staffing, training, and pre-positioning of equipment; establishing a trained and equipped U.S. Civilian Reserve Corps to draw on broader American expertise; sustaining rapid responders in the immediate response (first two months); and providing initial funding to protect American civilians on the ground in the build-up of a mission.

The FY 2009 request assumes that, up to 1,100 American permanent staff or reserve responders will be required to respond to reconstruction and stabilization missions in FY 2009. To meet this requirement, the USG must have an overall capacity of 250 Active Responders, 2,000 Standby Responders, and 2,000 Civilian Reservists.

- o USG First Responders: $75,220,000

Funds will be used to fully support USG first responders, including expansion of the Active Response Corps to 250 interagency members, through basic salaries, training, and other support costs. Training will be expanded from the current 500-member Standby Response Corps to a full complement of 2,000 members. Required equipment (armored vehicles, field communication and technology support items) will be acquired and pre-positioned to support immediate deployment in response to crisis.

- o Civilian Response Readiness: $86,768,000

The Civilian Reserve Corps will expand to 2,000 reservists. Funding will support their recruiting, hiring, and training, and will support the acquisition and prepositioning of vehicles and equipment (including for the police training component) required for rapid start up across the spectrum of policing, rule of law, public administration and infrastructure assistance. This level will provide materials for up to 500 deploying reservists per year.

- o Expert Deployment: $12,500,000

The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization will draw from rosters of program-funded agencies including Treasury and Justice for the first two

months of an operation, ensuring that critical staff such as police trainers and advisors can be deployed when they are most needed.

- o Initial Deployment: $28,974,000

Funding will be used to sustain deployed personnel and provide mission-specific logistics: to field and sustain the initial component of rapid response (up to 130 responders) for the first two months of an operation, before regular funding can be arranged; to begin stabilization and conflict mitigation activities; to establish a U.S. field presence if necessary; and to build cooperation with host nations and international partners on the ground.

- o Civilian Force Protection (contingency-specific): $22,155,000

Funding will provide security for the civilian mission in country and for up to three deployed field teams (up to 130 staff) and to sustain this security provision in a semi-permissive environment.

- o Washington Leadership and Management: $23,014,000

Washington area leadership will coordinate, manage, and direct the interagency R&S response, including management of the total response capacity. This includes Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization operations and staff, which were previously funded by the Diplomatic and Consular Programs appropriation.

- **Influence Foreign Opinion through Public Diplomacy**

The request provides $395 million in appropriations for public diplomacy to influence foreign opinion and win support for U.S. foreign policy goals. In addition to advocating U.S. policies, public diplomacy communicates the principles that underpin them and fosters a sense of common values and interests. Objectives of the national public diplomacy strategy include promoting democracy and good governance and marginalizing extremist leaders and organizations. Increased funding will help modernize the communications architecture to provide leadership in the war of ideas and sharpen messaging to counter terrorist propaganda. The funding will also support twenty new public diplomacy positions.

- **Confront Threats to U.S. Security**

The request provides $1.163 billion for Worldwide Security Protection to increase security for diplomatic personnel, property, and information in the face of international terrorism. The funding will extend the program to upgrade security equipment and technical support, information and systems security, perimeter security, and security training. This funding will also support the worldwide local guard force protecting diplomatic missions and residences. Funding increases will help meet new security demands in all regions and implement the Visa and Passport Security Strategic Plan to

safeguard the integrity of U.S. travel documents. Because people continue to be the single most important factor in deterrence and response to terrorist acts, the funding will add 200 security professionals.

- **Secure borders and open doors**

The FY 2009 budget provides 2.124 billion for the Border Security Program.  The Department of State plays a critical role in protecting Americans as they travel or reside abroad and in securing our nation's borders through the proper adjudication of passports and visas.  The Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) is responsible for denying visas to individuals who pose a threat to the United States while facilitating the issuance of visas for legitimate travelers; adjudicating and issuing U.S. passports and providing essential assistance to Americans citizens abroad; researching, developing, and deploying automated systems as part of a broad border security network; and implementing policies, procedures and processes in coordination with other federal agencies in support of homeland security goals.  The State Department's Border Security Program (BSP) encompasses all consular activities and provides funds to all regional bureaus and several other functional bureaus which support consular operations.  The FY 2009 budget reflects program growth to address increased passport demand due to the implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI).  In addition, CA continues to manage policies and programs, many created or revised in response to the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-56), and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-173).

- **Provide Secure Diplomatic Facilities**

The request provides $1.790 billion to continue security-driven construction projects and address the major physical security and maintenance needs of U.S. embassies and consulates.  This total includes $844 million for the Capital Security Construction Program to replace diplomatic facilities at the most vulnerable overseas posts.  FY 2009 projects include new embassy compounds in Santo Domingo, Dakar, Maputo, and Bucharest.  During the fifth year of Capital Security Cost Sharing (CSCS), USG agencies with personnel abroad under Chief of Mission authority will contribute $455 million to CSCS construction.  The request total also includes $105 million to upgrade compound security at high-risk posts and increase protection for soft targets such as schools and recreation facilities.  In addition, the request total includes $841 million for ongoing operations, including major rehabilitations.  These programs are essential to keep USG employees abroad safe and to protect the U.S. investment in real estate assets valued at over $14 billion.

- **Exploit Information Technology**

The request provides $414 million, including revenue from fees, for Central Fund investments in information technology (IT).  The ability of the Department to support transformational diplomacy, information sharing, rightsizing efforts, and E-Government

initiatives depends increasingly on robust, secure IT. Funding increases in FY 2009 will help support the State Messaging and Archive Retrieval Toolset project, diplomacy through collaboration, and IT infrastructure that provides American diplomats with anytime/anywhere computing.

- **Engage and educate through international exchanges**

The FY 2009 request provides $522.44 million for educational and cultural exchanges to increase mutual understanding and engage the leaders of tomorrow.  This is a $21 million dollar increase from FY 2008.  Aligned with other public diplomacy efforts, these people-to-people programs are uniquely able to address complex and difficult issues and lay foundations for international cooperation.  President Bush, in his Address to the Nation on the 5th anniversary of September 11, 2001, clearly stated America's goal – "societies based on freedom and tolerance and personal dignity."  He spoke of "offering a path away from radicalism" and working with men and women in the Middle East and around the world toward the day when nations recognize that their "greatest resource" is "the talent and creativity of their people."  In supporting educational and professional exchange programs that promote mutual understanding between the people of the United States and other countries, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) fulfills the President's goal and advances Secretary Rice's vision for transformational diplomacy.  The Secretary has said of transformational diplomacy, "Working together, we can achieve a peaceful and more prosperous world."  ECA programs foster engagement and encourage dialogue with citizens around the world, particularly with key influencers such as clerics, educators, journalists, women, and youth.

Educational and cultural engagement is premised on the knowledge that mutual understanding, the development of future leaders, and the benefits of education programs influence societies and affect official decision-making almost everywhere in the world today.  ECA programs inform, engage, and influence participants across strategic sectors of society – including young people, women, teachers, clerics, journalists, and other key influencers – increasing the number of individuals who have first-hand experience with Americans and with the values of freedom, representative government, rule of law, economic choice, and individual dignity.

Over 250 current and former heads of state and government are alumni of ECA programs – one reflection of the tremendous opportunity the Department has to reach the leaders of tomorrow and expose them to democratic values.  ECA program evaluations confirm the transformational power of exchanges to open minds and societies to democratic ideals.

- **Lead through Multilateral Diplomacy**

The request provides $1.529 billion to pay U.S. assessed contributions to 47 international organizations, including the United Nations.  The request total includes increases to pay outstanding U.S. arrears to international organizations.  The request

recognizes U.S. international obligations and reflects a commitment to maintain the financial stability and efficiency of those organizations. Membership in international organizations assists in building coalitions and gaining support for U.S. policies and interests. Further, multilateral diplomacy through such organizations serves key U.S. foreign policy goals, including advancing democratic principles and fundamental human rights, promoting economic growth through free trade and investment, settling disputes peacefully, encouraging non-proliferation and arms control, and strengthening international cooperation in environment, agriculture, technology, science, education, and health.

- **Contribute to International Peacekeeping**

The request provides $1.497 billion to pay the U.S. share of costs for UN peacekeeping missions. This funding will help support peacekeeping efforts worldwide, including the activities of ongoing missions in Lebanon, Haiti, Liberia, and the Congo. Funding increases will also pay U.S. assessments for new missions in Darfur and Chad. Such peacekeeping activities further U.S. goals by ending conflicts, restoring peace, and strengthening regional stability. They also leverage U.S. political, military, and financial assets through the authority of the UN Security Council and the participation of other states that provide funds and peacekeepers for conflicts around the world.

# SUMMARY of FUNDS ($ in thousands)

(\$ in thousands)

| Appropriations | FY 2007 Actual | FY 2008 Estimate | FY 2009 Request | Increase/ Decrease |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Administration of Foreign Affairs** | **7,422,106** | **7,526,760** | **8,217,454** | **690,694** |
| State Programs | 5,259,756 | 5,386,262 | 5,435,269 | 49,007 |
| Diplomatic & Consular Programs | 5,201,613 | 5,326,687 | 5,364,269 | 37,582 |
| Ongoing Operations (1) (2) | 4,423,164 | 4,358,149 | 4,201,473 | (156,676) |
| Worldwide Security Protection (3) (4) | 778,449 | 968,538 | 1,162,796 | 194,258 |
| Capital Investment Fund | 58,143 | 59,575 | 71,000 | 11,425 |
| Embassy Security, Construction & Maintenance | 1,490,852 | 1,425,574 | 1,789,734 | 364,160 |
| Ongoing Operations | 592,277 | 755,050 | 841,334 | 86,284 |
| Worldwide Security Upgrades | 898,575 | 670,524 | 948,400 | 277,876 |
| Capital Security Construction | 799,852 | 562,110 | 843,700 | 281,590 |
| Compound Security | 98,723 | 108,414 | 104,700 | (3,714) |
| Civilian Stabilization Initiative | 0 | 0 | 248,631 | 248,631 |
| Office of Inspector General (5) | 31,414 | 33,733 | 35,508 | 1,775 |
| Educational & Cultural Exchange Programs (6) | 465,671 | 501,347 | 522,444 | 21,097 |
| Representation Allowances | 8,175 | 8,109 | 8,175 | 66 |
| Protection of Foreign Missions & Officials | 9,270 | 22,814 | 18,000 | (4,814) |
| Emergencies in the Diplomatic & Consular Service (7) | 13,440 | 8,927 | 19,000 | 10,073 |
| Repatriation Loans Program Account | 1,302 | 1,275 | 1,353 | 78 |
| Payment to the American Institute in Taiwan | 15,826 | 16,219 | 16,840 | 621 |
| Foreign Service Retirement & Disability Fund [Mandatory] | 126,400 | 122,500 | 122,500 | 0 |
| **International Organizations** | **2,619,592** | **3,033,946** | **3,026,400** | **(7,546)** |
| Contributions to International Organizations (8) | 1,201,317 | 1,343,429 | 1,529,400 | 185,971 |
| Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (9) (10) | 1,418,275 | 1,690,517 | 1,497,000 | (193,517) |
| **International Commissions** | **67,255** | **155,056** | **109,955** | **(45,101)** |
| International Boundary & Water Commission - S&E (11) | 28,368 | 30,184 | 32,256 | 2,072 |
| International Boundary & Water Commission - Construction | 5,232 | 87,709 | 44,250 | (43,459) |
| International Fisheries Commissions | 23,693 | 26,312 | 22,000 | (4,312) |
| American Sections | 9,962 | 10,851 | 11,449 | 598 |
| Border Environment Cooperation Commission | 2,094 | 2,202 | 2,120 | (82) |
| International Joint Commission | 6,450 | 7,131 | 7,559 | 428 |
| International Boundary Commission | 1,418 | 1,518 | 1,770 | 252 |
| **Related Appropriations** | **108,461** | **36,452** | **101,750** | **65,298** |
| The Asia Foundation | 13,821 | 15,374 | 10,000 | (5,374) |
| National Endowment for Democracy | 74,042 | 0 | 80,000 | 80,000 |
| East-West Center | 18,994 | 19,342 | 10,000 | (9,342) |
| Center for Middle Eastern-Western Dialogue - Program | 740 | 868 | 875 | 7 |
| Eisenhower Exchange Fellowship Program | 494 | 496 | 500 | 4 |
| Israeli Arab Scholarship Program | 370 | 372 | 375 | 3 |
| **Total, Department of State Appropriations** | **10,217,414** | **10,752,214** | **11,455,559** | **703,345** |

Summary Table Footnotes:

All FY 2008 Estimates reflect the rescission of 0.81% provided by the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161, Division J).
(1) FY 2007 Actual includes $774.158 million provided by the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 110-28) and reflects supplemental funding transfers out of $0.258 million to the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom and $8.5 million to the Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service appropriation. FY 2007 Actual also reflects $0.650 million transferred out to the

International Boundary and Water Commission-Salaries and Expenses and includes $1.85 million transferred in from the Department of Defense for reconstruction and stabilization activities.

(2) FY 2008 Estimate includes $575.0 million in emergency funding provided by the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161, Division J). FY 2008 Estimate also includes $3.968 million transferred in from the Foreign Military Financing account.

(3) FY 2007 Actual includes $96.5 million provided by the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 110-28).

(4) FY 2008 Estimate includes $206.632 million in emergency funding provided by the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161, Division J).

(5) FY 2007 Actual includes $36.5 million provided by the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 110-28) and reflects $35.0 million transferred out to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.

(6) FY 2007 Actual includes $20.0 million provided by the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 110-28).

(7) FY 2007 Actual includes $8.5 million transferred in from D&CP-Ongoing Operations.

(8) FY 2007 Actual includes $50.0 million provided by the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 110-28).

(9) FY 2007 Actual includes $283.0 million provided by the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 110-28).

(10) FY 2008 Estimate includes $468.0 million in emergency funding provided by the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161, Division J).

(11) FY 2007 Actual includes $0.650 million transferred in from D&CP-Ongoing Operations.

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# APPENDIX J

## Millennium Challenge Corporation

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is a United States Government corporation established by the ``Millennium Challenge Act of 2003'' and is defined in section 103 of title 5, United States Code. The Chief Executive Officer shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. It is designed to work with some of the poorest countries in the world. Established in January 2004, MCC is based on the principle that aid is most effective when it reinforces good governance, economic freedom and investments in people. MCC's mission is to reduce global poverty through the promotion of sustainable economic growth. Before a country can become eligible to receive assistance, MCC looks at their performance on 16 independent and transparent policy indicators. MCC selects eligible countries for Compact Assistance.

A Compact is a multi-year agreement between the Millennium Challenge Corporation and an eligible country to fund specific programs targeted at reducing poverty and stimulating economic growth. The average compact size is between $400-$500 million.

These programs must be:

- Developed in consultation with a country's citizens — including women, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector;
- Able to measure both economic growth and poverty reduction;
- Implemented, managed and maintained by the country.

A country then drafts a Compact Proposal outlining the specifics of the programs to reduce poverty and stimulate economic growth. MCC works with the country to ensure the proposed programs are reasonable, measurable, and attainable. Countries with Millennium Challenge Compacts in FY 2008:

- Armenia, Benin, Cape Verde, El Salvador, Georgia, Ghana, Honduras, Madagascar, Mali, Nicaragua, Vanuatu.

Membership. The Board shall consist of:

- the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation, and the United States Trade Representative; and
- four other individuals with relevant international experience who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, of which—
    - ❖ one individual should be appointed from among a list of individuals submitted by the majority leader of the House of Representatives;

- ❖ one individual should be appointed from among a list of individuals submitted by the minority leader of the House of Representatives;
- ❖ one individual should be appointed from among a list of individuals submitted by the majority leader of the Senate; and
- ❖ one individual should be appointed from among a list of individuals submitted by the minority leader of the Senate.

MCC currently has a staff of around 300 personnel to manage the development and implementation of MCC assistance programs.  The Corporation may allocate or transfer to any agency of the United States Government any of the funds available for carrying out the MCC title: (http://www.mcc.gov)

# APPENDIX K

# CHANGE RECOMMENDATION SHEET

    1.  Please note chapter, page number and paragraph when recommending changes/corrections.

    2.  To recommend additions please write out recommendation and include source i.e., JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 17 Sept 2006, Chapter III, Page 26.