Can Smart Cards Reduce Payments Fraud and Identity Theft?

Presentation to the

Payment Council Summit

Smart Card Alliance

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Agenda

- Payment authorization and smart cards
  - Information-intensive payment authorization
  - The UK EMV rollout
- The economics of adopting of payment smart cards
  - The "business case"
  - Network technology and coordination
  - Standards development

Card payment authorization in the United States

- Major tool used to fight payment fraud
- Information intensive
  - Card number, transaction information
  - Transaction analysis
    - Brick-and-mortar transactions: POS location, transaction patterns, customer zip code
    - Online transactions: customer address, transaction history at retailer, CVN, IP address, computer profile
- Card with PIN more secure
  - Two factor authentication
  - Often supplemented with transaction analysis

Payment smart cards

- Embedded computer chip allows encryption to aid authorization
- EMV standard ("Chip and PIN")
  - Most commonly used and becoming the de facto standard
- Worldwide adoption
  - UK, Euro area, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Japan, and many other countries

UK Rollout

- Reduced fraud at domestic ATMs and POS terminals
- Fraud migrated to areas of security weakness
  - MOTO, internet, foreign ATMs and POS
- Fraud on UK cards in other countries rose by 124% (2007 over 2004)
  - The U.S. was the number 1 target for this fraud in 2007

EMV security issues

- Range of encryption options
  - SDA, DDA, or CDA
- Support for magnetic stripe
- Protection of PIN (and card data)
- Card-not-present transactions

One sentence summary: Payment smart cards are helpful but do not solve all security issues

Challenges to adopting payment smart cards in the U.S.

- The “business case” is difficult to make
  - Private cost/benefit not favorable to issuers and networks
- Industry consensus: current fraud control methods are adequate
  - No one likes the losses but most trends do not suggest an increasing problem

Number of Publicly Reported Data Breaches

U.S., Monthly, April 2005-January 2009



Sources: Privacy Rights Clearinghouse website and author calculations. Note: twenty-one states implemented breach notification laws through May 2006, and 24 additional states implemented notification laws from June 2006 to July 2008. ; (See Perkins Cole law firm web site.)

Trends in ID Fraud



Source: Javelin Research

Other challenges to payment smart cards adoption

- Network structure of retail payments
  - Race to establish market share reduces priority of security development
  - Security standards require coordination across of network participants
- Market
  - Mismatch of costs and benefits across banks, merchants, consumers, and government

Could the U.S. develop a new standard for payment smart cards?

- X9.59
  - Requires simple computer chips, little authorization overhead, adaptable to non-card payments
  - Does not rely on personally identifiable information
- Standards setting
  - Centralized or decentralized

Success of SSOs

- Carefully design governance and scope
- Participation
  - Open with broad representation
  - Include key industry members
- Decision process fosters consensus
- Standard is well-defined, complete, and flexible
- Follow-up to maintain the standard

One sentence summary:
Business needs and coordination issues complicate development and adoption of upgraded payment security standards

Summary

- The cost of payment fraud is manageable for now
- Payment smart cards can reduce some payment fraud but fraud is shifting towards security weaknesses
- The U.S. is not adopting these cards and will be an attractive target for fraud
- New standard could be developed but it would require leadership

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