

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS



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POLICE



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
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Spring 2012

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|--|--|
| <p>2 Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School</p> <p>5 Regimental Command Sergeant Major</p> <p>6 Regimental Chief Warrant Officer</p> <p>9 The 504th Military Police Battalion Surges Into Full Spectrum Operations in Kandahar City
<i>By Captain John R. Kennedy and First Lieutenant Roger Foley</i></p> <p>17 Community Policing: The Cornerstone for a Secure Kandahar City
<i>By First Lieutenant Danelle R. Gamble</i></p> <p>19 A Return to the Division: Tailoring the Military Police Corps for a New Age of Conflict
<i>By Captain Christopher J. Parker</i></p> <p>23 Civilian Policing Internship
<i>By First Lieutenant Lisa Beum</i></p> <p>25 The 12 February 2011 Battle for the Afghan National Police Provincial Headquarters in Kandahar
<i>By Captain Neal C. Dyson</i></p> <p>30 Working Overtime: Professional Development On and Off the Clock
<i>By Captain Cory J. French</i></p> <p>32 Active-Shooter Awareness: Relevant and On Point
<i>By Mr. James M. Kirkland</i></p> <p>35 Military Police Doctrine 2015
<i>By Lieutenant Colonel Richard Heidorn</i></p> <p>38 Doctrine Update</p> <p>40 Badges? We Don't Need No Stinkin' Badges!
<i>By Colonel David P. Glaser and Major David A. Charbonneau</i></p> | <p>41 MILITARY POLICE Writer's Guide</p> <p>42 eGuardian: Threat and Suspicious-Activity Reporting</p> <p>44 CID Special Agents Carry Out Logistics Security Mission
<i>By Mr. Colby T. Hauser</i></p> <p>46 Military Police Convoy Security—Then and Now
<i>By Mr. Thomas E. Christianson</i></p> <p>50 The Road to Law Enforcement
<i>By First Lieutenant Benjamin Grimes, First Lieutenant John Kile, and Second Lieutenant Shane Houle</i></p> <p>54 Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 716th Military Police Battalion—Lineage and Honors</p> <p>55 U.S. Army Military Police Warfighters' Forum and Military Police Lessons Learned Center Web Site
<i>By Mr. Pascual S. Cartagena, Mrs. Kathleen A. Rich, and Mr. Philip E. Tackett</i></p> <p>58 FM 3-37.2, Antiterrorism: A Doctrinal Guide for Preventing Terrorist Attacks
<i>By Colonel Richard Vanderlinden (Retired) and Lieutenant Colonel Craig Benedict (Retired)</i></p> <p>61 North Dakota Military Police Company Supports Flood Operations
<i>By Captain Kristopher P. Elijah</i></p> <p>64 Penal Institutions in the European Theater of Operations
<i>By Master Sergeant Patrick V. Garland (Retired)</i></p> <p>67 Book Review</p> <p>68 Brigade/Battalion Commands</p> |
|--|--|

Front cover—A military police investigator controls traffic flow at an intersection in Heidelberg, Germany. (U.S. Army photograph)

Back cover—Clockwise from top: Military police conduct a traffic stop at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; military police Soldiers engage in an urban exercise; military police Soldiers practice riot control techniques at Camp McGregor, New Mexico; and a military police Soldier and her canine participate in a training exercise. (U.S. Army photographs)

Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School



Brigadier General Mark S. Inch

A Call to Engage, A Call to Write!

As I write this first article for *Military Police*, the professional bulletin of the Military Police Corps, I am humbled at the opportunity to advocate on your behalf and to discuss topics of significance to the Military Police Regiment and the military police profession. In meetings, at ceremonies, and during office calls, this position provides an important platform to speak about the critical and unique skills that military police bring to the joint force. If given only 10 seconds to speak, I trumpet that “Military police conduct *policing, security, and detention* operations across the range of military operations to support *protection*, to enable *mobility*, and to promote the *rule of law*.” I even put this phrase in my e-mail signature block and on the back of my business card!

Fortunately, we are not limited to sound bites at meetings; we have the opportunity to write and be heard across much broader audiences and over extended periods of time. As Regimental Chief Warrant Officer David Albaugh, Regimental Command Sergeant Major John McNeirney, and I travel and engage with members of the military police profession (representing active duty and reserve component Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen as well as civilians and retirees), I am struck at the potential we have to use this bulletin and other media to broadcast the lessons we have learned, the insights we have gained, and the future service potential generated from our intellectual strength and ingenuity. But if we only “talk” about our experiences and insights, much of the potential learning and impact are lost.

As I prepared my change-of-command speech last September, I wrestled with each word so that I could send a clear message to our Regiment and continue the right course set by my predecessors. But only a segment of our Regiment heard the speech; and perhaps, only one out of 10 who heard it can remember the three main points of the 2-minute-45-second soliloquy. So let me “write” those three main points:

- **We must live our Army Values and Warrior Ethos.** We are warrior police; and through upholding our shared Army Values, we build *trust*. Our competence is learned, but our character is a daily choice.
- **We must focus on our mission and police profession.** Our number one priority is providing trained and ready Soldiers to the current fight. We will build upon former commandant Brigadier General David Phillips’ efforts to put the **P** back in **MP** as our Nation calls upon us to be a decisive force in a range of military operations that clearly include building partner police and corrections capacity within the rule of law. We will actively partner with academic and professional organizations and with law enforcement and corrections agencies to further our development as recognized police professionals.
- **We must maintain our balance and build resiliency.** With leaders who are engaged, empowered, and accountable, we will invest in the physical, intellectual, emotional, and spiritual well-being of our Soldiers. We will proactively strengthen family and social bonds, building fitness and strength.

That is my message to you as commandant of the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) and chief of the Military Police Regiment. What is your message to the Regiment, and how will you get that message to the Regiment? Clearly, *Military Police* is our most visible and enduring medium for professional discourse. Therefore, we will make some minor format adjustments to facilitate this dialogue.

Central Themes

Each issue of *Military Police* will have a central theme, with an extended feature article. The Fall 2012 issue will focus on “military police employment in the first 180 days of decisive action across the range of military operations,” and articles must be received by *Military Police* no later than **1 June 2012**. The feature article for the Fall 2012 issue will be written by the assistant commandant,



Colonel Mack Huey, about his experiences and lessons learned as the first military police battalion commander across the berm in Operation Iraqi Freedom I. The story of the 3d Infantry Division, which is important in shaping the Military Police Corps and the Army of 2020, warns against failing to appropriately resource divisions with enough military police. If you wish to nominate a central theme and write the feature article for a future issue, please contact me directly. As you read through this issue, you will see a preponderance of articles appropriately aligned with the application of our policing skill set, including an article on page 30 by Captain Cory French who is working to build his foundational policing skill set.

Letters to the Editor

We will be adding a Letters to the Editor section to provide a forum for feedback and professional dialogue. This issue includes a strong article by Regimental Chief Warrant Officer Albaugh regarding his position on placing all military police in *red* status when carrying weapons in the performance of installation law enforcement (page 6). It also includes an article by Colonel David Glaser (Deputy Provost Marshal General) and Major David Charbonneau which advocates the return of the military police badge (page 40). Do you agree with these articles? The Fall 2012 issue is your opportunity to respond. In any profession, members should courageously put their views into the public domain and then let those views be argued and refined by other members of the profession.

Book Reviews

A new Book Review section contains announcements of books that are important to the military police profession and a critical analyses of their content. As professionals, we should not only write, but also read from a broad array of books. Self-study is important to professional development. I have recently read *Unbroken: A World War II Story of Survival, Resilience, and Redemption*, by Laura Hillenbrand;¹ *Man's Search for Meaning*, by Viktor E. Frankl;² and *Warrior Police: Rolling With America's Military Police in the World's Trouble Spots*, by [Lieutenant Colonel (Retired)] Gordon Cucullu and Chris Fontana.³ I also recently visited the gift shop at the Military Police Museum and picked up *A Forgotten Soldier: The Life and Times of Major General Harry Hill Bandholtz*, by [Master Sergeant (Retired)] Patrick V. Garland.⁴ I look forward to reading more about the man for whom the USAMPS wing here at the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence was named. If a particular book had a significant impact on you or was such a waste of time that you want others to avoid the pain, write a critical book review and submit it to *Military Police*.

Historical Articles

As in the current and previous issues of *Military Police*, we will feature historical articles. One article will be written by the historian or a member of the Museum staff; and generally, one or two articles will come from contributing authors. Articles for this section should look back at least 10 years and should *not* address the current fight or recent lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom.

Recent Experiences

For important experiences and lessons learned from the last 10 years, we should not use our bulletin to merely recount what happened, but to show how a personal or unit experience should support, modify, or completely change Army doctrine, policy, or other definitive information. Critically reflect on these recent experiences, give us the “so what” of your experience, and tell us why your experience is important to our profession and what we do in the future. I also encourage you to run your draft article through mentors and peers—I certainly did that for this article! I find it very useful to elicit professional advice and refine my thoughts before going public.

Military Police Writer's Guide

If you would like to write an article to be considered for publication in *Military Police*, please see the Writer's Guide on page 41 or the Web site at <http://www.wood.army.mil/mpbulletin/guide.htm> for specific guidelines and submission procedures. I look forward to hearing what you have to say!

Other Organizations and Publications

Do not limit yourself by submitting articles only to *Military Police*. As professionals, we should be members of professional organizations and write for those organizations' professional journals.

The Military Police Regimental Association publishes a quarterly magazine, *The Dragoon*,⁵ which is an excellent venue for historical articles or for telling the story of what your unit has recently done or accomplished. This organization and their magazine clearly support our profession.

An array of military journals and publications (which are sponsored by various headquarters, schools, and proponents) draw from the *M* in *MP*. The U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly referred to as “CID”) publishes *The Shield*⁶ monthly, and the Army Corrections Command publishes *The Vanguard*⁷ quarterly. You can also post articles on the Military Police Warfighters' Forum and Military Police Lessons Learned Center Web site⁸ (see page 55).

If you are attending school (military or civilian), use your required theses, monographs, and other papers to write about topics that are important to our profession. For my Senior Service College Fellowship Program in 2005, I wrote a monograph entitled

Supporting the Restoration of Civil Authority: The Business of Prisons.”⁹ My master of arts thesis from 1992 is a much longer read, entitled “Decision-Making and the Implementation of Security Land Use Policies: A Case Study of Iraq.” The Office of the Provost Marshal General and the USAMPS maintain a consolidated list of potential topics for academic research to support the Army and the military police profession. For a list of topics, please contact Colonel Glaser or Colonel Huey.

We must also engage our civilian counterparts in professional discourse. Drawing from the *P* in *MP*, we should publish articles in civilian police and corrections journals. During the 12 years that I have focused on corrections and detention operations, I have contributed several articles to *Corrections Today*,¹⁰ the professional magazine of the American Correctional Association. In fact, through years of professional collaboration between the Army Corrections Command and the American Correctional Association (and affiliated federal and state corrections professionals), several issues of *Corrections Today* have been dedicated specifically to military corrections. Should we not publish articles in other journals such as *The Police Chief*,¹¹ sponsored by the International Association of Chiefs of Police? Last October, Major General David Quantock (Provost Marshal General), and I attended the International Association of Chiefs of Police annual conference and were impressed at the number of senior government and law enforcement executives who participated in that gathering of police professionals.

Find your niche—whether with the American Correctional Association, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, or another organization such as ASIS International (formerly, American Society for Industrial Security),¹² the National Sheriffs’ Association,¹³ the Federal Criminal Investigators Association,¹⁴ the North American Association of Wardens and Superintendents,¹⁵ or the International Law Enforcement Educators and Trainers Association.¹⁶ We can also engage in numerous “think tanks” (Center for a New American Security,¹⁷ United States Institute of Peace¹⁸) that address and publish on broader strategic issues such as building partner capabilities within the rule of law.

After Action Reports

Finally, use your current duties and responsibilities—whether as commanders, staff officers, interns/fellows, or senior noncommissioned officers—to further our profession. As a part of our official duties, we routinely “publish” to effect change within the Army. Never underestimate the value of a staff action or an after action report to the military police profession.

Our Regiment is still engaged in combat, and our prayers are with our comrades at the tip of the spear. Everything we do—from concepts, to doctrine, to organizational/materiel changes, to training and building training support packages, to resourcing—supports our forces forward *and* the next cohort of Soldiers that will go forward. I remind units and their respective commanders to tell us if we have doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) issues right and to tell us what you learned during deployment that should modify our current approach. Several brigade and battalion after action reports are truly remarkable products, and we are a better Regiment for that final effort of a deployed military police formation.

Assist, Protect, Defend!

Endnotes:

¹Laura Hillenbrand, *Unbroken: A World War II Story of Survival, Resilience, and Redemption*, Random House, Inc., New York, 2010.

²Viktor E. Frankl, *Man’s Search for Meaning*, Beacon Press, Boston, 2006.

³Gordon Cucullu and Chris Fontana, *Warrior Police: Rolling With America’s Military Police in the World’s Trouble Spots*, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 2011.

⁴Patrick V. Garland, *A Forgotten Soldier: The Life and Times of Major General Harry Hill Bandholtz*, Concord, Massachusetts, 2009.

⁵*The Dragoon*, <<http://www.mpraonline.org/mp/magazine/>>, accessed on 22 January 2012.

⁶Submit articles for consideration and send correspondence to U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, Public Affairs Office, Russell Knox Building, 27130 Telegraph Road, Quantico, Virginia 22134, or via e-mail to <theshield@conus.army.mil>.

⁷*The Vanguard*, <<https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/443273>>, accessed on 22 January 2012.

⁸Military Police Warfighters’ Forum and Military Police Lessons Learned Center, <<https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/567564>>, accessed on 22 January 2012. Access to the secure site requires an Army Knowledge Online (AKO) user name and password or a common access card (CAC).

⁹Colonel Mark S. Inch, “Supporting the Restoration of Civil Authority: The Business of Prisons,” <<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA435900>>, accessed on 22 January 2012.

¹⁰*Corrections Today*, <<http://www.aca.org/publications/ctmagazine.asp>>, accessed on 22 January 2012.

¹¹*The Police Chief*, <<http://www.naylornetwork.com/iac-nxt/>>, accessed on 22 January 2012.

¹²ASIS International, <<http://www.asisonline.org/>>, accessed on 22 January 2012.

¹³National Sheriffs’ Association, <<http://www.sheriffs.org/>>, accessed on 22 January 2012.

¹⁴Federal Criminal Investigators Association, <<http://www.fedcia.org/>>, accessed on 22 January 2012.

¹⁵North American Association of Wardens and Superintendents, <<http://naaws.corrections.com/>>, accessed on 22 January 2012.

¹⁶International Law Enforcement Educators and Trainers Association, <<http://www.ileeta.org/>>, accessed on 22 January 2012.

¹⁷Center for a New American Security, <<http://www.cnas.org/>>, accessed on 22 January 2012.

¹⁸United States Institute of Peace, <<http://www.usip.org/>>, accessed on 22 January 2012.

Regimental Command Sergeant Major



Command Sergeant Major John F. McNeirney

I am honored to be entrusted to serve as the 11th Military Police Corps Regimental Command Sergeant Major. I fully understand that the position comes with great responsibilities and authority. I intend to use my position to take advantage of every opportunity to be your advocate. I will share my vision and relate our military police story to all.

My vision is simple: “We are Soldiers who are the Army’s police professionals. The Military Police Regiment is built on a firm foundation of values, professionalism, and balance.” As the Army restructures and we determine the appropriate size of our force, the Military Police Corps will adjust. This will provide us with an opportunity to shape the future of our Regiment. The expectation is simple: Those who continue to serve must have a character based on a solid foundation of Army values. We must be Soldiers and leaders of intellect and presence. We will lead our Regiment through the challenges that lie ahead.

Military police Soldiers must serve as the Army’s police professionals—whether in the area of law enforcement, protection, security, corrections, detention operations, or criminal investigations. At all levels, the Army must unequivocally recognize military police Soldiers as the Army’s subject matter experts in policing functions. We must be capable



of providing commanders with expert advice without significant contractor or civilian augmentations. We can use self-development, formal training, and certifications through nationally accepted venues to develop our technical policing expertise and achieve our goals. We must emphasize the “police” portion of “military police.”

“Military police Soldiers must serve as the Army’s police professionals—whether in the area of law enforcement, protection, security, corrections, detention operations, or criminal investigations.”

To complete my vision, military police Soldiers must develop and sustain resiliency. We must create a balance using available opportunities and self-development tools. We, in partnership with our families, can establish an inner balance that will prepare us to overcome the challenges that await us.

Unlike my vision, our story is complex. For the past 10 years, you have volunteered to serve your Nation during a time of war—knowing that your commitment could result in serious injury or death. Yet you continue to serve. Your spirit, your commitment, and your adherence to the Warrior Ethos inspire me on a daily basis.

While deployed, I often stood in admiration as great military police—from all components and across all three strands of our career management field—worked side by side, prepared for their missions, and took the fight to the enemy. You have proven to be confident, mission-focused, and aggressive. On the battlefield and in garrison, you have demonstrated that you are an innovative, adaptive, and resilient force with a reputation of adding value to every supported organization.

I challenge all of us to build upon our rich heritage and traditions, hone our technical expertise, sustain our tactical competence, and continue to be “Soldiers who are the Army’s police professionals.”

“Assist, Protect, Defend”

“The price of freedom is eternal vigilance.”

—Thomas Jefferson

Regimental Chief Warrant Officer



Chief Warrant Officer Five David Albaugh

Military Police Weapons Posture

As our Regiment works hard to place more emphasis on the *P* in *MP*, I ask you to review the security posture and weapons training of military police Soldiers performing law and order operations. This is a controversial topic, and I would like to share my personal and professional view—a view that is shared by some and opposed by others. This is simply a call to consider, discuss, and assess the proper balance across the Regiment. I think there is no better time to broach this subject than now—during the year of the Army Profession of Arms Campaign.

Media coverage of ever-increasing mass shootings in America has created a cultural belief that frustrated people may gain some level of attention, sympathy, or relief by carrying out similar attacks. Violence has spread within our society in recent decades. In 2000 alone, there were 28,663 firearms-related deaths in the United States; of those, 39 percent were reported as homicides and 58 percent as suicides.¹

Firearms-related homicides are no longer limited to the stereotypical urban muggings or inner city, drive-by shootings. The new millennium has turned places such as schools, malls, business offices, and military installations into live-fire ranges. Some “nontraditional” mass shootings that have taken place throughout the years include²—

- 16 people killed and 31 injured by a gunman at the University of Texas in 1966.
- 11 people killed and 11 wounded in two separate mass shootings in the 1970s.
- 36 people killed in two separate mass shootings in the 1980s.
- 75 people killed and 80 wounded in seven separate shootings in the 1990s
- 112 people killed and 47 injured in 11 separate incidents from January 2000 to April 2009.
- A 20-year-old Alabama man claimed that the video game *Grand Theft Auto* caused him to kill three small-town police officers in 2005.³
- 13 people killed and 32 wounded at Fort Hood, Texas, in November 2009.
- 30 people killed in four separate mass shootings from 2010 to 2011.⁴
- Seven fatal shooting incidents on military installations in 2010.
- Four active-shooter incidents on military installations in recent months. (An additional untold number of threats or planned attacks did not reach fruition.)

Although the cause of the increase in mass shooting incidents can be debated, the increase itself cannot be ignored. Consequently, it is essential to reevaluate the security posture, policies, and procedures of the Military Police Corps Regiment at all levels. The decisions that we make directly affect our ability to provide appropriate, adequate, and immediate protection of U.S. forces personnel, including military police Soldiers, and facilities at home and abroad.

I recently conducted a random survey of 21 U.S. Army installations where military police Soldiers perform law and order operations. At 10 of those installations, military police Soldiers carry their duty weapons in “red” status—with a round in the chamber—while 11 installations require them to carry their duty weapons in “amber” status—with no round chambered. On 5 November 2009, Major Nidal Malik Hasan killed 13 people and wounded 32 others at Fort Hood. The after action review and subsequent Department of Defense (DOD) inquiry of the incident identified the red carry status and earlier active-shooter response training as strengths that contributed to the swift neutralization of the threat and prevented additional casualties.



In 2006, the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted a five-part study entitled “Violent Encounters: A Study of Felonious Assaults on Our Nation’s Law Enforcement Officers.” According to the study, law enforcement officers are at a distinct disadvantage in shooting incidents for several reasons. First, in the vast majority of shootings, the offender fired the first shots without hesitation while law enforcement officers hesitated, verifying their target, ensuring that bystanders were not in harm’s way, and checking for other friendly forces. The second critical finding was that offenders hit their targets far more frequently than did their law enforcement adversaries. In addition, violent offenders carried their weapons more often, practiced more frequently, and were much better than the officers at determining if someone nearby was carrying a concealed firearm. In situations where these disadvantages are compounded by carrying a firearm in amber status, there is a good chance that the officer will not survive the encounter. The most significant training deficiency in the Regiment is a lack of shooting sustainment training.

Military police Soldiers around the world are required to perform duties that include responding to active-shooter situations, domestic assaults, and other dangerous or violent crimes. Although these young military police warriors are first responders, some of them arrive at potentially lethal scenes unprepared, with no round chambered in their weapons. There is likely no law enforcement agency in the Nation—including our sister Services—that requires law enforcement officers to perform their duties without a loaded firearm. However, many military police Soldiers are doing just that, due to local policies and misinformed leadership. If Soldiers were to carry loaded weapons, there would be a risk of an accidental or negligent discharge, but that would be more a failure of leaders to adequately train their Soldiers than a reflection of the Soldiers’ aptitude or maturity level. Instead of properly training military police Soldiers to safely carry a loaded weapon, some leaders choose to put their Soldiers and the general public in harm’s way by removing one risk, only to create another (greater) risk. If the prevailing sentiment is that military police Soldiers lack the maturity necessary to perform their duties as professional law enforcement officers, then perhaps we should reevaluate our recruiting practices.

An aggressive field training officer certification process is needed to supplement the existing annual police law enforcement training and certification program outlined in All Army Activities (ALARACT) Message 025/2010.⁵ The field training officer certification process should consist of a comprehensive and meaningful training program that teaches military police Soldiers to safely carry a loaded firearm and ensures that they are certified to do so. Leaders from the highest levels should underwrite honest mistakes and use them as training opportunities. Soldiers who cause an accidental discharge should be suspended from duty and receive additional training and certification. Once they are retrained and recertified, they should resume policing duties. If a Soldier accidentally discharges a firearm in a clearing barrel, leaders and students should understand that this is why the barrels exist and why we are so well disciplined in using them. There is a justified concern about accidental discharges as our Soldiers become properly armed, but the number of incidents will drop once the process becomes conditioned. According to a U.S. Army Military District of Washington law enforcement spokesman, since the district implemented a policy of carrying weapons in red status in October 2010, there have been no accidental discharges. Officials found that most military police Soldiers returning from overseas assignments were accustomed to loading and unloading their weapons and actually felt more comfortable and confident in their law and order mission when they had a round chambered in their weapons.

Throughout the past several years, there has been an increase in violent and deadly acts committed by members of the military. According to the National Center for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), this violence can be attributed primarily to PTSD caused by exposure to violence in combat operations. Rates of domestic violence tend to be greatest among young adults; and because the average age of Service members is lower than that of the civilian population, those rates are generally higher within the DOD. However, the rates are three times higher among Service members suffering from PTSD than among other Service members. Dr. Casey Taft conducted a DOD PTSD study and reported that “people who are exposed to trauma—and, in particular, those who develop PTSD—are at very high risk for aggressive behavior.”⁶ These facts alone should warrant a substantial modification in the security posture on all installations at all times.

There is no way to predict when Soldiers suffering from PTSD might “snap” and act out violently, nor is there any way to anticipate how severe their actions might be. Another reason this should deeply concern Army leaders is that, unlike civilians with PTSD, Soldiers are trained to kill, are familiar and comfortable with firearms, and generally have ready access to them.

The recent increase in military suicides may also be viewed as a testament to the despondency felt by many Service members who suffer from depression or PTSD. It has long been established that suicidal individuals are also potentially

“The recent increase in military suicides may also be viewed as a testament to the despondency felt by many Service members who suffer from depression or PTSD. It has long been established that suicidal individuals are also potentially homicidal. Suicidal people feel that they have nothing to lose and are likely to act violently toward those they hold responsible for their unhappiness or who attempt to foil their suicidal plans.”

homicidal. Suicidal people feel that they have nothing to lose and are likely to act violently toward those they hold responsible for their unhappiness or who attempt to foil their suicidal plans. According to Dr. Natalie Staats Reiss and Dr. Mark Dombeck, homicidal feelings may intermingle with suicidal feelings if there is a sense that someone has deliberately caused harm.⁷

This article is not meant to address the psychological state of depressed persons; rather, it is designed to help us recognize current threats and to outline areas where our security posture and crisis response protocols should be reevaluated. With the level and severity of PTSD among Soldiers, the nationwide increase in mass shootings, and the targeting of law enforcement personnel by criminals, we have an obligation to protect our communities and the military police Soldiers charged with keeping them safe.

It would be grossly irresponsible for us to wait until more lives are lost when the potential for catastrophe is so readily apparent. As leaders, we must assume risks; however, they should always be the right risks, taken for the right reason. Risking the lives of Soldiers due to a failure to properly train them or to provide them with the tools they need to be safe is clearly the wrong risk, taken for the wrong reason. Most military police Soldiers have experienced numerous deployments where they were entrusted to carry a loaded weapon. We can capitalize on their experience, on active-shooter or active-threat training scenarios, and on law enforcement certification processes.

I understand that the current policy leaves the decision of “amber versus red” firearm carrying status in the hands of installation commanders based on the current threat. I argue that the threat is very real and is always lurking. We owe it to our first responders to allow them to protect themselves against deadly behavior without having to take the extra time to chamber a round. How long would it take an officer to engage the threat of a traffic stop ambush with an unloaded weapon? Too long, when the first few seconds in such a situation are critical. When that time must be used to load a weapon instead of firing, the law enforcement officer loses the valuable time needed to survive. Mr. John V. Lease, chief of the Law Enforcement Plans and Exercise Division and manager of the Special Reaction Team Program at Headquarters, Department of the Army, stated, “Not chambering reduces your first-line responders to sacrificial trip wire. Allowing them to chamber is matching modern-day threats to modern-day tactics.”

As true police professionals, we need to treat our Soldiers as police professionals. As the Army draws down, we need to refocus our attention on our core competencies of law and order, corrections, and high-end investigative efforts. All Soldiers can soldier. Only military police professionals can conduct our core competency mission skill sets with success. It is up to us to ensure that our Soldiers are trained, disciplined, confident, and professional.

Regardless of your stance, please contact me at <david.albaugh@us.army.mil> with your comments or respond to this article with a Letter to the Editor to be considered for publication in a future issue of *Military Police*. Thanks for what you do every day and for your service to our great Nation, the U.S. Army, and the Military Police Corps Regiment. Never forget that our Soldiers are our greatest asset.

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The 504th Military Police Battalion Surges Into Full Spectrum Operations in Kandahar City

By Captain John R. Kennedy and First Lieutenant Roger Foley

The agile, adaptive 504th Military Police Battalion, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, continued to add chapters to its legacy by being ready to accomplish any mission during combat operations associated with Operation Enduring Freedom 10-11. The efforts of the battalion from June 2010 to June 2011 significantly contributed to the downward spiral of Taliban influence in Kandahar City, Afghanistan, thereby paving the way for Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to take the lead in providing security for the local populace. The 504th Military Police Battalion was task-organized with the 170th Military Police Company, Joint Base Lewis-McChord; the 202d Military Police Company, Fort Bliss, Texas; the 372d Military Police Company, Cresap-town, Maryland; the 511th Military Police Company, Fort Drum, New York; and the 552d Military Police Company, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, to form Task Force Dragon Fighter.

Surging Into Kandahar

In June 2010, the Soldiers of the 504th Military Police Battalion had their “boots on the ground” in Afghanistan and were ready to support surge operations in the volatile southern region of Kandahar. The battalion was initially assigned to the Canadian-led Task Force Kandahar, and they conducted successful relief-in-place and transfer-of-authority operations with the 97th Military Police Battalion. Soon after the transfer of authority, the 504th was assigned to the 4th Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, positioning Task Force Dragon Fighter to conduct police mentorship training operations to

enhance the capabilities of the Afghan National Police (ANP), provide security to the population of Kandahar City, and support government leaders in understanding and meeting the needs of the local populace.

The 504th Military Police Battalion entered the theater with a familiar face—the 170th Military Police Company, who had completed a relief-in-place operation with the 293d Military Police Company (at that time, the only military police company in Kandahar City). Just days after the 504th began operations, the 372d Military Police Company joined Task Force Dragon Fighter. In each subsequent month, the 552d Military


Police Company, the 202d Military Police Company, and the 511th Military Police Company transitioned into Task Force Dragon Fighter. During this time, the 504th was under the command of the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division—or the “Raider Brigade.”

Securing Malajat

The 504th Military Police Battalion and ANP expediently executed decisive operations in Kandahar City. The most notable of these operations occurred in August, when efforts were focused on Malajat—which had previously been considered a sanctuary of Taliban support that had allowed for enemy freedom of movement into the city.

Following a largely ineffective ANP clearing operation in July, the 504th worked with ANP to plan and execute Operation Malajat I, incorporating critical lessons learned from the initial operation. In early August, elements of the battalion headquarters, the 170th Military Police Company, the 372d Military Police Company, and the ANP swept through the Taliban-controlled area to disrupt the insurgent activity. This operation led to multiple small arms engagements and improvised explosive device (IED) detonations. By the end of the day, 21 suspected insurgents were detained and two large cache sites were discovered.


With the area confirmed as a Taliban stronghold, planning immediately began for a Raider Brigade level operation to support a deliberate, large-scale ANSF “clear and hold” of Malajat. On 25 August, Operation Malajat II began as the




Soldiers from the 504th Military Police Battalion and the ANP established a cordon in northern Malajat during Operation Malajat II. Three days later, they moved to seal the southern flank behind the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry Regiment, who cleared from the south to the north.

504th Military Police Battalion and ANP established blocking positions to the north, west, and east of Malajat. Task Force Dragon Fighter communications and operations sections established a battalion forward tactical command post at Police Substation (PSS) 6, located inside the Malajat area. With blocking positions set, communications established, and logistical support flowing, the clearing operation began with an Afghan Border Police task force followed by the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry Regiment (partnered with Afghan National Civil Order Police). The Afghan Border Police moved from the Dand District, in the southern part of Malajat, to the northern portion of Malajat, just south of Highway 1 in Kandahar City. For the next 2 weeks, the partnered mission swept through Malajat, successfully eliminating a Taliban foothold in Kandahar City.

The dismantled 504th moved from their blocking positions and into the southern part of Malajat to provide relief-in-place to the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry Regiment, and to hold the southern flank. Relying on airdrop resupply from Chinook helicopters, the battalion held the southern portion of Malajat from hastily established strongpoints for more than 2 weeks, successfully preventing the return of the Taliban. A total of 72 detainees were processed at the National Directorate of Security (NDS) in



504th Military Police Battalion battlespace in central Kandahar City



504th Military Police Battalion task organization

Kandahar City and enrolled in a biometric system. Some of the high-value detainees were transferred to Kabul for further investigation.

The 504th supported the clearing operations in Malajat by reallocating combat power from across the city. The Taliban tried to take advantage of what they perceived to be reduced security outside of Malajat by conducting a complex attack on PSS 8 in the western part of Kandahar City. The Soldiers of the 552d Military Police Company quickly proved that the Taliban was no match for their ability to defend PSSs—nor was the Taliban any match for the 504th’s ability to reinforce areas of the city.

Malajat was no longer a safe haven for the Taliban. The once-prominent, white Taliban flags were removed; and Afghans hoisted official flags of Afghanistan in their place. As part of the hold phase, the 504th Military Police Battalion began the initial construction of PSS 15 in the heart of Malajat.

Supporting Successful Elections

Parliamentary elections were held in Kandahar City on 18 September. The elections were planned and executed by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA). The people of Kandahar had the opportunity to cast their votes at one of 36 polling centers across the city. While the GIROA and ANSF controlled the election, the 504th Military Police Battalion assisted by conducting interdiction operations and disrupting insurgent activity for the 4 days leading up to the election.

The Task Force Dragon Fighter military police companies helped the ANP develop effective security plans by conducting a reconnaissance of all polling stations. Using military police working dogs, Task Force Dragon Fighter assisted the ANP with interdicting IEDs and cache sites that could be used by the enemy on election day. In addition, the 504th supported

ANP traffic control points and conducted joint mounted and dismounted patrols throughout the city on election day.

As a result of these efforts, enemy freedom of movement was limited and the enemy’s ability to conduct a significant attack was refuted during the parliamentary elections. In a vast improvement over the August 2009 presidential elections (when 126 significant activities occurred), only 25 significant activities—and no local national injuries—were reported for the parliamentary elections. The only reported casualties consisted of two insurgents who died trying to emplace an IED.

Fortunately, the voters did not heed earlier Taliban threats and attempts at intimidation; instead, their voice was heard.

Securing the Heart of Kandahar City

During most of the 504th’s deployment time, the battalion was responsible for the battlespace in Subdistricts 1–4 of Kandahar City, which included six ANP PSSs and two area control stations. The subdistricts and the Task Force Dragon Fighter companies providing oversight for them were as follows:

- Subdistrict 1: 202d Military Police Company.
- Subdistrict 2: 170th Military Police Company.
- Subdistrict 3: 511th Military Police Company.
- Subdistrict 4: 552d Military Police Company.
- Subdistrict 5: 372d Military Police Company (under the operational control of the 1st Special Troops Battalion).

These four districts, located in the heart of the city, are home to many key structures, including the governor’s palace, the mayoral compound, the judicial center, the NDS, and the ANP provincial headquarters. Given that the area of operations of Task Force Dragon Fighter was the home of many Taliban targets of interest, the 504th Military Police Battalion was a

prominent aspect of Raider efforts to secure the city. The battalion efforts in the center of Kandahar were a key element in improving the security of the city.

Connecting the People to the GIRoA

Enhancing the reach of the government by supplying essential services and humanitarian assistance is an important element of counterinsurgency. One of the missions of the 504th Military Police Battalion was to ensure that the GIRoA represented the best viable option to the people of Kandahar. To accomplish this, the battalion used Commander's Emergency Response Program funds to provide immediate humanitarian assistance to meet the populace needs. Throughout the course of the deployment, nearly \$2 million in Commander's Emergency Response Program funds were spent in an attempt to connect the people to the government.

A total of 20 schools and a juvenile detention center located in the battalion area of operations were refurbished with items such as furniture, plumbing, wood-burning stoves, windows, educational equipment, tents for additional classrooms, and sports and recreational equipment. Due to the weather, parents historically stopped sending their kids to school during the winter; however, these upgrades allowed tens of thousands of children to continue their education throughout the winter months.

The Teacher's Training Institute, which educates about 100 teachers per year, was the 504th's focus. When the battalion first visited the school, the students lived and studied in buildings without windows or heating. The 504th quickly rallied to provide the students with shoes, coats, and blankets. The school also received windows and wood-burning stoves to keep the living areas and classrooms warm throughout the winter. The assistance provided to these teachers helped shape a positive perception of Americans.

In addition to refurbishing existing schools, the battalion worked with the Afghan Minister of Education to build a new school in a subdistrict where the need was pressing. This school now provides instruction to more than 1,000 children who previously had no access to education.

A 6-kilometer road was also paved using Commander's Emergency Response Program funds. This helped increase economic activity and provided access to health care and other government services for Mir Bazaar residents.

Long-term development of the area was enhanced by efforts to encourage entrepreneurialism across Kandahar Province. The 504th Military Police Battalion worked with the local government to provide families with hens so that they could sell eggs at the market. Working closely with Afghan subdistrict managers, canals were cleared and irrigation ditches were built so that crops could be properly



A military police Soldier and his ANP partner meet with village leaders to discuss the security situation.



Antenna systems are installed to expand radio communications between the Arghandab District and Kandahar City.

hydrated, increasing yields. As a result of this partnered effort, the Kandahar City canal network supplied water from the Arghandab River to more citizens than it had in the past few decades.

Other humanitarian assistance packages were provided to local individuals to help them meet their immediate needs. For example, blankets were presented to widows and female heads of households; agricultural equipment was presented to farmers; shoes and jackets were presented to students; and medical supplies were presented to clinics and families.

Thanks to the 504th's efforts to enhance government services, thousands of kids are now going to school, patients now have access to medical care, and the people of Kandahar are now better connected to their government. Although official numbers are not available, it has been estimated that the population of Kandahar City has increased by as much as 25 percent since 2010, demonstrating a public perception of improved security and faith in the GIRoA.

Embedding with the ANP

As the battalion's cornerstone for improving the ANP, Task Force Dragon Fighter platoons were spread across the 16 Kandahar City PSSs, where they lived and worked each day; Dragon Fighters were embedded at most of these locations 24/7. Working at the PSS level paid tremendous dividends in building a better Kandahar City police force from the bottom up. Along with the many operational improvements, the battalion also contracted a total of \$1.5 million in refurbishments on 10 of the PSSs. They also secured land within their battlespace and initiated contracts to build new PSSs at four critical locations within the city at a total cost of \$6 million.

October marked a big milestone for the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (HHD), 504th Military Police Battalion, as a large staff section embedded at the ANP provincial headquarters (PHQ) in the center of Kandahar City. This move allowed improved functionality between the battalion and headquarters staff, and the establishment of a joint operations center resulted in better battle tracking and incident response in Kandahar City. The PHQ efforts quickly leveraged partnered operational and intelligence capabilities, contributing to an intelligence-driven operations cycle and weekly ANSF-led security working group meetings, where ANSF and International Security Assistance Forces discussed the current operational picture.

By mid-February, Dragon Fighter units embedded at the PHQ received a huge boost in resourcing, which increased mentorship capability to meet needs in the areas of recruiting, personnel, training, communications, and logistics. The broadened focus was supported by the relocation of most of the battalion staff to the PHQ. With more personnel available to help assist ANP senior leaders, the 504th exponentially increased the capability and capacity of the ANP force in Kandahar City.

Supporting the Information Operations Campaign

Early successes of the 504th Military Police Battalion and their Afghan partners helped launch a rigorous Task Force Dragon Fighter Information Operations (IO) Campaign. The IO Campaign was put into place to marginalize the efforts of the insurgency, highlight the security efforts of the ANSF, and further promote the legitimacy of the ANP and GIRoA in Kandahar City. According to the IO Campaign philosophy, because the ANP were to serve as

the lead for all operations and U.S. forces were to serve as mentors and enablers, the ANP and GIRoA should become increasingly trustworthy and capable of handling the issues of Kandahar citizens.

The 504th recognized the need to preempt Taliban propaganda by reporting information first, by highlighting the progress made by the ANP, and by placing the faces of ANP leadership in front of the Afghan people. As a result, the battalion led the effort to establish a weekly press conference at the governor's palace, where the chief of security delivered a message and answered questions from reporters. At the press conferences, the chief of security highlighted the results of recent ANP operations and displayed wanted posters (which were provided by the 504th) to spotlight individuals who had been tied to crimes against the GIRoA and to encourage the public to ostracize them. In addition to the weekly press conferences, the 504th distributed IO messages of ANP support via leaflets, posters, billboards, and radio and television stations.

The IO campaign helped portray the ANP as Afghanistan's "true protectors."

Promoting the Rule of Law

While in Kandahar, the 504th placed significant emphasis on promoting the rule of law process through the ANP and into the judicial system. This effort focused on stopping the "revolving door" of insurgent criminals in Kandahar—eliminating their quick, untried release from detention. To accomplish this mission, the battalion established the Special Investigations Unit—Kandahar City (SIU-KC), which is comprised of U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly referred to as "CID") agents, sister Service staff judge advocates, and military police investigators from within the battalion.

The early emphasis of the SIU-KC was on working closely with the ANP Counterterrorism, Counternarcotics, and Criminal Techniques Offices and with national security prosecutors. The SIU-KC stressed the use of biometrics and forensic exploitation as enablers for Afghan-led investigations. More than 100 cases were initiated at the Joint Expeditionary Forensics Facility, which helped to prosecute individuals in Afghan court. The success of the SIU-KC case building against insurgents—backed by forensic evidence—encouraged the 504th to establish an additional team at the NDS to further the rule of law.

In February, the NDS Engagement Team began working with NDS investigators and national security prosecutors to take the next step in prosecution support. The team worked with the Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell to develop prosecution support packets that detailed forensic reports and linked the insurgents to national security crimes. Together, the prosecution support packets and NDS investigation assistance

packets served as a force multiplier in the counter-IED fight. Multiple national security criminals were quickly identified; five of these were associated with previously unsolved Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell cases.

The combined efforts of the SIU-KC and NDS, coupled with more than 4,000 biometric enrollments from Task Force Dragon Fighter, allowed the 504th to identify criminals linked to forensic evidence and to gain increased visibility of ANSF detainees to ensure their appropriate movement through the judicial system.

Conducting Operations in the Arghandab River Valley

In September, the 504th established the Security Force Assistance Team to support the 1st Battalion, 66th Armor Regiment, by conducting operations in the Arghandab River Valley—one of the most insurgent-saturated areas of Afghanistan. The Security Force Assistance Team quickly established standing operating procedures to assist with the proper inprocessing and tracking of detainees. The ANP have fully embraced these procedures. The Security Force Assistance Team also worked with the district chief of police to help establish mission-essential training programs for the ANP within the district.

In just 9 months, the team assisted with many village clearance operations, built several ANP checkpoints and upgraded several others, and established a fueling station for the ANP.

Creating the Intelligence Coordination Center—Kandahar

During the course of the deployment, it became evident that one critical capability that was lacking among the ANSF partners was the sharing and analysis of intelligence information. This problem often resulted in ANSF agencies withholding intelligence due to the fear of a compromise or the secession of bureaucratic territory if the intelligence were revealed to another ANSF agency. To combat this problem, the 504th created the Intelligence Coordination Center—Kandahar (ICC-K). Backed by a GIRoA mandate for intelligence sharing and by the governor of Kandahar Province (who lent credibility), the ICC-K worked to build cooperation and information sharing across Kandahar City.

Supported by coalition intelligence analysts, Afghan partners embraced the ICC-K motto of "Share until it hurts." As coalition information sharing increased, the sharing of Afghan-led intelligence (which had previously been reserved only for top leaders of ANSF agencies) also increased.

Through the ICC-K, ANSF and coalition agencies actively analyzed the credibility of intelligence together; and together, they gained a much better understanding of potential threats. The ICC-K became a focal point in the joint effort to defeat the Taliban.

Equipping and Educating the ANP Force

In February, major efforts were undertaken to improve ANP logistics systems and equip the ANP force ahead of the approaching spring season, when Kandahar historically experiences a spike in insurgent activity. The 504th helped field more than 2,300 weapons and 50 vehicles throughout 10 subdistricts and the 16 PSSs to further improve the ANP fighting capability.

Along with fielding equipment, the battalion Security Force Assistance Team helped plan and execute a month-long, province-wide Ministry of the Interior weapons inventory to account for more than 12,000 weapons, 450 vehicles, and several hundred thousand rounds of ammunition. Five Ministry of the Interior-led teams conducted on-site inventories of district headquarters, PSSs, police battalions, and checkpoints throughout Kandahar Province. The teams stressed the importance of property accountability with the ANP and helped ensure the future resourcing of weapons and equipment across the province.

In addition to expanding ANP resources and equipment, the 504th also worked to improve the level of education across the ANP force. Working with PSS commanders and Afghan training officers, literacy programs were established at each PSS. Each week, local teachers visited the PSSs, where they conducted basic reading and writing classes. As the program continues to develop, Kandahar City will benefit from a better-educated, more capable police force.

Expanding Communications

February proved to be a strong month for the battalion, as great strides were also made in improving communication systems used by the ANP. To dedicate the maximum effort to the project, the battalion communications team embedded at the PHQ and began planning the layout for a city-wide secure radio communications system that would diminish ANP reliance on unsecure cellular telephones.

The plan was executed in March. The team installed a base station at each of the 16 PSSs. One-kilowatt solar power systems, antennas, a triple-battery backup, and six-bay battery chargers were also installed to supplement the base stations. In addition, the team replaced the PHQ repeater and antenna to improve the range of communications from the main ANP hub. Going a step further, they added an additional base station, installed two repeaters, and distributed 50 handheld radios, enabling very high frequency cross-communication throughout the area of operations for the first time in history.

The communications team also established a 4-day communications class designed to help train ANP on the proper use and maintenance of the radio systems. The intent was to provide each district headquarters and PSS with a well-trained radio telephone operator.

Providing Mentorship for the Camp Nathan Smith Police Training Academy

On 29 March 2011, the Camp Nathan Smith Police Training Academy hosted a transfer-of-authority ceremony in which Canada relinquished control of the facility to Afghanistan. The facility now operates under Afghan leadership, with Afghan instructors backed by U.S. Task Force Dragon Fighter mentorship. This allows the ANP to handle administrative processes and ensures that the proper Kandahar-area ANP receive quality training that is supported by U.S. military police and law enforcement professionals.

April marked the first month that classes were taught by mentors from the 504th Military Police Battalion. Courses were approved by the Ministry of the Interior and included the following classes:

- ANP Officer's Training Course.
- Emergency Response Training.
- Crime Scene Officer's Workshop.
- Basic Criminal Investigations.
- Female Security Awareness.
- ANP Leadership and Management.
- Intelligence-Based Policing.
- Female Ethics and Values Workshop.

The instruction took place at a private compound on Camp Nathan Smith. The facility, which can accommodate up to 150 students, contains seven bedrooms, seven classrooms, ablutions, a dining facility, a laundry facility, and a gym.

The 19 May 2011 graduates of the ANP Officer's Training Course were the first to graduate from an officer academy located outside of Kabul. The graduates were commissioned as new lieutenants in the ANP.

The 504th fully embraced the training academy mission, maintaining military police mentorship as the 385th Military Police Battalion transitioned into Kandahar. The continuation of quality training designed to meet the needs of Kandahar City ANP will result in a better-qualified force for years to come.

Responding to the Sarpoza Prison Situation

In April 2011, Task Force Dragon Fighter was tasked to respond to a massive escape of Taliban prisoners from the Sarpoza Prison in Kandahar City. A total of 488 prisoners had slipped away from the Afghan-run facility via a 1,000-foot-long tunnel that insurgents had spent 5 months digging from a residence outside the prison walls. In the days and weeks that followed, the Raiders relied heavily on the 1,200 detailed biometric enrollments that the 504th Military Police Battalion had gathered on 100 percent of the Sarpoza Prison



A military police Soldier instructs a member of the ANP at the Kandahar City Police Training Academy.

population during Operations Caged Tiger I and II just a few weeks earlier. Through the combined efforts of the Raider Brigade and the 504th Military Police Battalion (who assumed the prominent role of identifying and reprocessing escapees), a portion of the insurgents was recaptured and a positive IO message was provided to lessen the impact of Taliban success.

As missing prisoners were being tracked down, Task Force Dragon Fighter was spearheading efforts to investigate the incident, seal the escape tunnel, and address systemic deficiencies within the prison by emplacing a permanently embedded element at the facility. The battalion push to directly mentor Sarpoza Prison administrators resulted in a major impact in a short period of time and set the conditions for continued strides toward a more effective facility.

Responding to the Opening of Fighting Season


In May 2011, the Taliban launched a series of complex attacks across Kandahar City, signaling the return of the traditional fighting season. In a coordinated effort involving small-arms fire, rocket-propelled grenades, and vehicle-borne IEDs, insurgents attacked several GIRoA buildings, including the governor's palace, PSS 1, the Afghan National Civil Order Police Headquarters, and the NDS. At the governor's palace, two insurgents attacked from a building to the southeast, while PSS 1 sustained fire from an adjacent school. At the NDS, insurgents fired small arms and rocket-propelled grenades from the nearby Kandahar Hotel and prestaged multiple vehicle-borne IEDs to target responding forces. Throughout the following 24 hours, Task Force Dragon Fighter again demonstrated their ability to respond to any threat across the city. The

552d Military Police Company protected the governor's palace by suppressing the attackers, helping prevent a breach of the compound, and supporting a large clearing operation. The 202d Military Police Company and their ANP partners successfully defeated a complex attack at PSS 1. The 170th Military Police Company responded to the NDS attack with direct-fire weapons and multiple air weapons teams over a number of hours, which allowed the ANSF to clear the Kandahar Hotel. The 511th Military Police Company helped limit the insurgents' freedom of movement by locking down the checkpoints in their sub-district. The 504th mentors at the Rule of Law Center and the Sarpoza Prison increased their security posture and initiated a 24-hour inmate lockdown. Throughout the attacks, battalion staff members at the PHQ helped coordinate the ANP response by providing advice on ANP asset positions and helping

organize Class I and Class V combat resupply missions. The result of these efforts was a huge victory for the ANP: A total of 13 insurgents were killed during the assault, and 15 more were detained when they were unable to breach any targets.

Leaving a Legacy

The contributions of the 504th Military Police Battalion during Operation Enduring Freedom 10-11 were significant and will leave a lasting impression on the people of Kandahar. Task Force Dragon Fighter Soldiers put forward their best effort to improve the security of Kandahar City by serving *shannah bah shannah*, or "shoulder to shoulder," with their Afghan counterparts. In the process, the battalion positively contributed to the proud history and growing legacy of the great Task Force Dragon Fighter organization!

Dedication: This article is dedicated to the memory of Sergeant Jason Weaver, Corporal Andrew Wilfarht, and Specialist David Fahey—military police Soldiers who lost their lives while serving our Nation in Kandahar City. 

Captain Kennedy is currently attending the Military Police Captain's Career Course at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He previously served as the executive officer, 511th Military Police Company. Captain Kennedy holds a bachelor's degree in English from Baker University, Baldwin City, Kansas.

First Lieutenant Foley is the executive officer, 66th Military Police Company, 504th Military Police Battalion. He holds a bachelor's degree in finance from Stetson University, DeLand, Florida.

Community Policing: The Cornerstone for a Secure Kandahar City

By First Lieutenant Danelle R. Gamble

Heavy traffic, congested neighborhoods, and crowded retail centers bring to mind thoughts of large cities or growing suburbs in the United States or Western Europe. But add streets lined with debris, nightly gunshots, and a population with little or no sense of the rule of law, and thoughts quickly transition to a city or country in desperate need of change. In the midst of the daily hustle and bustle of Kandahar City, Afghanistan, there is a police force with unlimited potential, a desire for change, and partners who are capable of mentoring them to a level from which they can influence the transition to a stable, self-sustaining society.

Upon arriving in Kandahar City, the 58th Military Police Company, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, assumed the police mentorship mission of training and partnering with Afghan Uniform Police (AUP). Would the AUP grasp the forward-thinking concepts of community policing and female engagements, and would they be willing to progress? After providing 5 months of dedicated police mentorship, the 58th is beginning to see that Afghan eyes are opening, the light is shining through overcast skies, and the horizon is broadening every day.

At first, the Kandahar City AUP consisted of a paramilitary force—using military tactics and consistently posturing themselves as a hardened force—with little positive interaction with the communities they served. However, in a city riddled with insurgent and criminal activity, the relationship between the community and its first line of defense is critical. Initially, the AUP did not understand the need to transition from combat operations to stability operations—and they did not realize that

the local populace would be their most valuable asset in combating the enemy.

The 58th Military Police Company is responsible for two police substations (PSSs) in the subdistrict, and 70 percent of the PSS leaders have military backgrounds as *mujahideen*¹ fighters or leaders in the ranks of the Afghan National Army. In contrast, less than half of the 220 patrolmen in the subdistrict have received formal police training. Bringing these two extremes—hardened military fighters and laymen—together might seem to be a daunting task. But for the 2d Platoon, 58th Military Police Company, it was an opportunity that extended beyond preparing the AUP for the official drawdown of U.S. troops in Afghanistan by 2014; it was an opportunity to tap into the depths of true policing—reaching out to people who desperately needed protection and structure.

The platoon, which was embedded and partnered with one of the PSSs, and the higher headquarters recognized the need for AUP transformation to an approachable and proactive police force. Small changes were tested before a formal plan was established. During dismounted patrols, squad leaders encouraged street level engagements between Soldiers, the AUP, and the local populace. The engagements began with Soldiers (who showed genuine concern and modeled interpersonal skills) and the AUP addressing security concerns and recent enemy activity within the area of operations. Rather than idly waiting for information to be provided, they actively solicited it. While the squads and platoon worked the streets, the company and battalion commanders encouraged the PSS commanders to

“...for the 2d Platoon, 58th Military Police Company... it was an opportunity to tap into the depths of true policing—reaching out to people who desperately needed protection and structure.”



Coalition community policing

attend community policing conferences and then serve as mentors for implementing the information into daily patrols. As the PSS commanders began to understand the importance of an amiable police force, the platoon developed a formal plan to close the gap between the AUP and the people of Kandahar City. The plan consisted of three phases: assessment, training, and execution.

Assessment

To gauge where the AUP stood with the Kandahar City populace, a community assessment operation was developed and executed in the village closest to the PSS where the 2d platoon was embedded. The village was divided into five sections, the teams visited with people from each section, and the information was consolidated to assess the overall opinion of the entire community. Based on the knowledge gained while performing law enforcement duties at home, coupled with the knowledge obtained from earlier street level engagements in Afghanistan, the platoon developed questions designed to promote open dialogue. During the initial street level engagements, a desperate need to engage the female Afghan population was identified. To address this need, the platoon established female engagement teams consisting of female military police officers and a female linguist. During the assessment operations, the AUP and the platoon spoke openly with the people, identified security concerns, and bridged the gap that had been created by an excessively aggressive police force—the same force that now acknowledges the advantages of evolution.

Training

As a result of the assessment phase, a training plan was developed for the AUP. The training phase began by making basic corrections to the overtly forceful actions that the AUP had grown accustomed to using. By learning to handle stressful situations in a nonaggressive way, the AUP established a friendly atmosphere that encouraged community members to interact with them and provide them with information that proved useful in disrupting enemy and criminal activity. In addition to the basic corrections, each squad used brigade-directed initiatives and personal experience to develop a class on community policing. The incorporation of captivating class scenarios provided the AUP with realistic training that prepared them for the tasks ahead. Platoon leaders acknowledged that some AUP might find the task of engaging people to be an intimidating one—much like a military police Soldier's first experience with performing law enforcement duties. This problem was mitigated through scenarios in which role players ignored or became openly disrespectful toward the AUP and the AUP practiced responding in an appropriate, non-violent manner.

Execution

Thus far, the execution phase has been encouraging. The AUP are becoming more approachable, and PSS commanders are planning their own community policing operations. In a subdistrict with blatant insurgent

(Continued on page 31)

A Return to the Division:

Tailoring the Military Police Corps for a New Age of Conflict

By Captain Christopher J. Parker

We have arrived at a critical juncture. As Operation New Dawn comes to a close and we begin to see the end of Operation Enduring Freedom on the horizon, we need to take a look back and a look forward—a look back to capture the hard-learned lessons of the previous 10 years and a look forward so that we can better prepare to meet the unforeseen challenges of the 21st century. At the same time, we are faced with the reality of defense cuts and a shrinking budget. Our problem quickly becomes apparent: How do we, as the Military Police Corps, organize our forces to improve efficiency while also remaining an effective force that is capable of supporting unified land operations?

After much thought and consultation with Regimental and other Army leaders, several potential solutions have been proposed. One of these, in particular, stands out as the most practical and efficient means of restructuring the force to better meet future demands—realigning as division military police battalions with organic, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly referred to as “CID”) assets (Figure 1, page 20). Aligning our military police battalions with divisions would provide maneuver commanders with a flexible combat multiplier that is tailored to suit the modular Army and capable of defeating a hybrid enemy by producing legitimate effects on the battlefield and among the populace. Additionally, aligning in this manner would greatly improve efficiency by eliminating

more than 1,500 unnecessary billets in the form of CID battalions and brigade special troops battalion (BSTB) military police platoons, while simultaneously providing a unity of operations and improving our expeditionary police intelligence; forensic; criminal investigation; and host nation, police-building capabilities. To appreciate the motive behind this concept, we must recognize that the threat often drives changes to the force and we must review the evolution of the military police force structure as well as past, present, and future threat models.

The traditional Military Police Corps was structured to support the fight against a conventional threat defined by the Cold War. Combat during this era was to be characterized by force-on-force battles between nation-states. Military police were task-organized as division military police companies (capable of conducting limited military police operations for their supported division) or as corps military police battalions and brigades (prepared to execute all military police functions in support of a larger rear area). However, after the fall of the Soviet Union, a new threat in the form of nonstate terrorist organizations and insurgent cells soon emerged. These organizations seek to influence public opinion and U.S. policy by targeting the civilian populace.

By the time terrorists attacked the United States on 11 September 2001, the Military Police Corps had restructured and




Figure 1. Proposed division battalion (expeditionary) (CID billets depicted accordingly)

replaced the division military police company with a military police platoon in each BSTB and expanded the traditional military police battalions. Though well intentioned, this model has drawn considerable criticism, as BSTB military police platoons continue to be misused. And although larger than the division military police company forces, they are still too small to produce significant effects in the contemporary operating environment. It is this inability to produce effects that has often caused these units to be relegated to missions that fail to make use of the skill sets of assigned Soldiers and leaders. Tasking these troops with missions such as glorified battlefield taxi services, personal security details, and forward operating base/combattant outpost force protection is a shameful underutilization of valuable Army assets. Experience has demonstrated that this is an ineffective model, and changes must be made. To rectify this situation, we must ensure that the new force structure is better suited to defeat emerging threats.

According to Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, the most likely future security threats are best described as “hybrid threats,” or “the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, criminal elements, or a combination of these forces and elements all unified to achieve mutually benefiting effects.”¹ While we will likely continue to face threats similar to those that we have fought for the past decade in Iraq and Afghanistan, the acknowledgement of the threat to populations and U.S. operations posed by criminal elements means that military police will become a much more critical asset

than they have been in the past. As military police, it is within our purview to neutralize these threats and improve upon the ability of our host nation partners to prevent and negate their influence. Despite a rough start, we have learned a great deal throughout the decade since 9/11 and we have significantly improved our ability to carry out this mission; however, considerable shortcomings remain. We continue to lack the investigative experience and forensic knowledge necessary to conduct proper police intelligence operations, and our training of host nation partners is limited to rudimentary police tasks. Rather than relying on our own CID agents and investigators to assist with this mission, we turned to contractors such as international police advisors and law enforcement professionals to fill the void. Realigning our CID assets within military police battalions would correct this shortcoming by unifying our operations and providing division commanders with a “one stop shop” for all policing functions. Under this new task organization, benefits would not be limited to improved policing. Division commanders would have far greater flexibility through a much more substantive force that could easily be tailored to the contemporary operating environment and would be capable of effecting real changes on the battlefield.

The advantages of the proposed division military police battalion can only be appreciated with an understanding of the task organization and how it would unify and enhance military police operations. The battalion would fall under the division maneuver enhancement brigade or, because these are not yet available in all divisions, the sustainment brigade. The




Figure 2. Division military police battalion organization chart

battalion would consist of four military police companies, a headquarters and headquarters detachment, and a law enforcement detachment (Figure 2). Under this organization, CID special agents and investigators (who now comprise the CID battalion operations and training [S-3] section) would realign within the battalion law enforcement detachment. In garrison, this would properly place CID elements under the provost marshal (the military police battalion commander), thereby streamlining unity of command. However, the true benefits would become evident in an expeditionary environment. When deployed, the military police battalion commander could tailor his staff to augment the intelligence (S-2) section with non-commissioned officers (NCOs) from the CID section of the law enforcement detachment, creating a robust intelligence cell that is capable of performing the police intelligence operations required to defeat complex criminal and terrorist networks. Additional CID NCOs and warrant officers would form a staff criminal investigation and forensic section, dramatically enhancing the unit's police intelligence; forensic; criminal investigation; and host nation, police-building capabilities. This would provide combatant commanders with experienced professionals who could train host nation police on the intricate aspects of modern investigative techniques while simultaneously delivering an improved forensic capacity for missions requiring site exploitation.

Other significant advantages of the division military police battalion would lie in size and flexibility. Division

commanders would have a substantive force that could be easily tailored to any number of missions or theaters. Under the current task organization, brigade combat teams (BCTs) are limited to a mere 42-member military police platoon and, as previously noted, the shortcomings are numerous. However, with the presence of a military police battalion, the division commander could “plug and play” as needed—maneuvering forces where they were best able to produce effects. For example, in today's dynamic contemporary operating environment, one BCT may be engaged in sustained conflict with regular forces (calling for only a platoon of military police). In another, more stable area of operations, a significantly larger military police force may be required to defeat an emerging criminal or terrorist threat and to begin the transition to civil control. Or, in concert with the modular concept, one of the division's deploying BCTs may require a company, rather than a platoon, of military police. With an allotment of four times the current number of military police, the division commander could complement the BCT with the appropriate number of forces per mission, phase of operation, or theater. The enhanced police capacity and flexibility would make the division military police battalion a very valuable asset.

In addition to drastically improving performance, the division military police model would significantly reduce cost and promote efficiency by eliminating the need for BSTB military police platoons and CID battalions. Realigning the battalions under divisions would eliminate the need for BSTB military

“How do we, as the Military Police Corps, organize our forces to improve efficiency while also remaining an effective force that is capable of supporting unified land operations?”

police platoons, thereby reducing each BCT across the Army by about 42 billets. As the Army restructures and reduces the size of divisions, this equates to the elimination of about 1,260 military police billets across the force. Moreover, additional savings would be realized through the elimination of the 10 CID battalions currently incorporated in the task organization.

Although functional and well intentioned, the CID battalion is grossly inefficient and must evolve to remain relevant. To be clear, I do not advocate the dissolution of the CID. The premise of stovepipe reporting to prevent unlawful command influence and to provide a direct line of communication for sensitive criminal cases is understandable. However, can't the same objective be accomplished in a more efficient manner? In these organizations, 11 Soldiers accomplish the lion's share of the mission, while the remaining 29 staff members perform support roles. This translates to an investigator-to-staff ratio of 1:2.6, which is extremely redundant. In an era of fiscal restraint and improved moral leadership, this is a significant misappropriation of resources. These 11 agents and investigators could easily be realigned as a criminal investigation section within the law enforcement detachment, where they would be supported by battalion staff. They would maintain their current reporting channels and their current core mission of investigating serious criminal activity against and among our troops. CID groups would retain oversight and reporting on sensitive investigations within their realm; but just as military police brigades provide training and readiness oversight to military police battalions, CID groups would do the same for criminal investigation sections. This force realignment would further reduce cost and redundancy by eliminating an additional 290 billets across the Regiment.

As the Nation—specifically the military—comes to terms with the prospect of significant budget cuts, we must closely examine our current structure, previous shortcomings, and

emerging threats to ensure that our response is the appropriate one. The current Military Police Corps task organization has been successful in some regards; however, there are obvious shortcomings. The misuse of BSTB military police platoons can be attributed to their inadequate size and their inability to produce effects in the contemporary operating environment. Although functional, CID battalions—with their disproportionate investigator-to-support staff ratio—are demonstrably inefficient. In the face of an emerging hybrid threat, we must realign our forces to better provide maneuver commanders with capable and efficient military police units. We must posture ourselves to properly defeat the threat of complex criminal and terrorist networks operating in and among critical human terrain. The proposed division military police battalion, with its organic CID assets, would unify our operations and provide maneuver commanders with a flexible force that could easily be tailored to address evolving operations and that would be capable of defeating hybrid threats through enhanced police intelligence; forensic; criminal investigation; and host nation, police-building capabilities. It would also significantly cut costs by eliminating more than 1,500 unnecessary billets across the Regiment. These matters must be taken into account as we structure our force to improve efficiency and better defeat emerging threats in the 21st century.

Endnote:

¹ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, 10 October 2011.



At the time this article was written, Captain Parker was a student in the Military Police Captain's Career Course, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He was previously assigned to Fort Riley, Kansas, where he served as the assistant S-3, 97th Military Police Battalion, and as an executive officer and platoon leader, 300th Military Police Company. He holds a bachelor's degree in history from Kansas State University.

“One of the best ways to keep peace is to be prepared for war.”

– General George Washington

CIVILIAN POLICING INTERNSHIP

By First Lieutenant Lisa Beum

In early September 2011, the 385th Military Police Battalion, Fort Stewart, Georgia, began an internship program with the Savannah-Chatham Metropolitan Police Department (SCMPD). Under the program, an Army military police lieutenant is sent to the SCMPD to “shadow” a civilian police lieutenant for 1 month. During that time, the military police lieutenant observes the daily operation and management of a civilian police unit, studies lessons learned and best practices, and gains an enhanced perspective on leadership and development. The final goals are to incorporate best practices into Fort Stewart law enforcement operations and to continue to build the relationships established with the SCMPD.

As an Army military police lieutenant involved in this program, I was introduced to the civilian police world on 12 September 2011, when I met with Lieutenant Kenneth Patton of the SCMPD Central Precinct. Patton, who has lived in Savannah, Georgia, most of his life, has worked for the SCMPD for nearly 20 years, serving as a lieutenant for about 6 years. (Although Army lieutenants typically have only a few years’ experience as police officers, civilian police lieutenants have usually been police officers 10–15 years; consequently, they are generally very knowledgeable policing experts.) Due to the fact that Lieutenant Patton has held several specific jobs as an officer within the SCMPD, he is very familiar with not only the SCMPD, but also the city of Savannah and surrounding areas.

On the civilian side of policing, all officers begin as privates and have the opportunity to move their way through the ranks of sergeant, lieutenant, and captain, to chief. Following a 2-year commitment to patrol duty (to allow time to become proficient in the basics of policing), officers have a chance to apply for a transfer to a different job within the department; other departmental jobs include undercover officer, special weapons and tactics team member, narcotics officer, member of the crime suppression unit, marine patrol officer, and bomb squad member. The ability of officers to rotate from one job to another while they move through the ranks creates a well-rounded group of individuals who are specialists in multiple areas. These diversified officers are, therefore, able to offer more to their precincts.

The Central Precinct, which is located in the inner city of Savannah, is known for its high crime rate—particularly for Part 1 crimes, or crimes such as murder, rape, larceny, and robbery. Therefore, Chief Willie C. Lovett, who is the head of the five SCMPD precincts in Savannah, assembled a focused task force made up of officers—each specializing in a particular area of expertise—from all precincts and sent them to the Central Precinct for what began as a 30-day trial period. The goal of the task force was to work with the Central Precinct to decrease the number of crimes within a 7-square-mile area. The group met daily to review activities that had occurred the day before, establish objectives for that day, and plan for any necessary improvements. Based on these daily discussions, the task force continually adapted their tactics, working together to use all available assets to overcome challenges and reach their goal of lowering the crime rate. For example, the task force initially met at the same time every day and initially concentrated only on designated areas. However, after analyzing the activities of the first week, they realized that they needed to deviate from their set schedule, changing the time they began working the road each day. They also began spreading their forces throughout the precinct, concentrating on different “hot spots” each day—and then adjusting as needed. This rendered their scheduling and tactics unpredictable to anyone who might be trying to plan criminal activity around the task force work rotation.

Each Wednesday, the captains of the five precincts and representatives from each subdepartment come together for a computer statistics meeting. This is an opportunity for participants to synchronize and network across the board. The captains review their precinct statistics from the week before, compare trends from the previous year to the current one, justify their numbers to the department chief, and provide an in-depth explanation of their plans for improvement. During the first half of the initial task force trial period, the crime rate for the Central Precinct was unchanged—in spite of the fact that the task force had been working hard for 3 weeks and continuously changing tactics to rid the area of crime. However, all good things take time. By the fourth week, the crime rate for the Central Precinct had finally dropped, indicating



Officers conduct a guard mount, where they discuss activities of the previous day, trends, and the focus of the current day.

improvement in the area. The decrease in crime numbers led Chief Lovett to retain the task force for an additional month to determine whether it was the task force that was responsible for the drop in the crime rate.

During my first week at the Central Precinct, I worked with the lowest-ranking Soldiers and their sergeant supervisors, riding along with patrolmen and members of the crime suppression unit. I got a firsthand look at the problems and issues out on the streets and the methods the officers used to handle the situations. I saw multiple traffic accidents and crime scenes and witnessed robberies in progress, and I saw how officers took control of situations. Sergeants were capable of managing the police officers and crime scenes in the less significant cases; but for larger incidents, lieutenants were called in to assess the full situation and issue orders for further action.


Each patrol vehicle is equipped with a computer system that monitors the officer's location and activity (much like the Blue Force Tracker, although this military technology had not yet made its way into military police patrol cars). Police officers are in constant communication with each other via radio or the vehicle computer. Lieutenants also have radios with them so that they can keep track of where their officers are at all times and so that they have "real time" information about what is happening on the streets. This allows for shorter decision-making reaction times since leaders continually receive up-to-date information that otherwise might have taken hours or days to relay. In addition, the computer system decreases the amount of time officers must spend typing information into

databases at the end of their shift because they can do that in their cars at the time the incident occurs.

Information flows freely among the ranks, from the lowest levels to the highest and vice versa. Leaders use the information and statistics they receive from the patrol officers to track criminals, "hot spots," and crime patterns. The information regarding people, hot spots, and patterns—which drives the focus of the police department and, ultimately, the patrol distribution plan—is, in turn, passed down to the lowest levels by the lieutenants during the guard mount. The leadership presence during the guard mount serves to impress the importance of the information upon the patrol officers. It also allows the lieutenants an opportunity to observe how the patrol officers are doing and to discuss any additional issues.

Throughout the rest of the month, I observed and worked with the SCMP lieutenants. I noted how they

managed personnel, represented themselves to their superiors, and interacted with the local populace. Officers who adhere to the regulations and conduct themselves in a professional manner build a rapport with the community—a rapport that might be used to obtain information to help solve a case. Locals who feel comfortable talking to the police often become "informants," providing officers with key details about crimes. Therefore, officers strive to maintain a positive image within the community by attending city council meetings, listening to the concerns of the public, and working with community members to reach solutions to their problems.

The internship program is very beneficial in the development of military police lieutenants. It provides them with an opportunity to work with civilian police agencies and allows them to gain a new perspective on the operation of a police unit in a garrison type environment. By talking and interacting with individuals outside the military, lieutenants develop important social skills and foster relationships between individuals and organizations. Due to positive feedback regarding the internship program (from the military participants as well as the SCMPD), lieutenants from the 385th Military Police Battalion continue to be sent to the SCMPD in hopes of professionally developing military personnel and building upon existing military/civilian relationships. 

First Lieutenant Beum is the executive officer, 293d Military Police Company, Fort Stewart. She holds a bachelor's degree in leadership from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York.

The 12 February 2011 Battle for the Afghan National Police Provincial Headquarters in Kandahar

By Captain Neal C. Dyson


The embedded headquarters element of the 504th Military Police Battalion awoke to a cold, rainy day in Kandahar City, Afghanistan. Little did the Dragon Fighters know that, only hours later, they would take part in a 4-hour battle to defend each other and the Afghan National Police (ANP) provincial headquarters (PHQ) in the center of Kandahar City.

Shots Ring Out From a Nearby Hotel

It was just before noon on 12 February 2011, and the ANP PHQ in Kandahar City was a flurry of activity as policemen and local Afghan citizens conducted their daily business among the many offices that make up the PHQ facility. A weekly meeting for Afghan and coalition force commanders had just ended an hour earlier, when a burst of small arms fire began to rain down on the PHQ. The source of the fire was quickly determined to be from the direction of the nearby Zir Negir Hotel. However, before the exact location of the incoming fire could be pinpointed, multiple rocket-propelled grenade rounds were also fired at the police compound, impacting near the entry control point. Two nearby military police squads—the 504th Military Police Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment and the 202d Military Police Company—had heard the initial small arms fire; and within minutes, both squads and eight vehicles had positioned themselves along Route Elizabeth, to the east of the PHQ, to provide suppressive fire against the attack.

After reporting the presence of insurgents engaging from the rooftop and the top two floors of the hotel complex, fire was returned from the PHQ guard towers (which were jointly manned

by the 511th Military Police Company and the ANP) and the entry control point on the east side of the PHQ. There were two military police squads positioned between the PHQ and the hotel. The squad leaders instructed the gunners to obtain positive identification of the insurgent gunmen before firing. Only seconds later, one of the insurgents fired an AK47 assault rifle at the military police squads located in the street below. Gunners immediately responded with a barrage of M2 and M240B machine gun fire toward the insurgent, chewing up the insurgent's position. A second insurgent gunman



Hastily developed U.S. task organization for the PHQ defense



View looking north along Route Elizabeth following the battle

appeared in a fourth-floor hotel window, and a third showed up on the rooftop. All three of the insurgents were disguised in ANP uniforms. The overwhelming suppressive fire from the military police squads and the PHQ guard force pinned down the enemy, eliminated their initiative, fixed them in the hotel, and limited them to a defensive position.

The Attack Takes a Complex Turn

As military police continued to respond to the ongoing threat from the hotel, guard force reports began to come in from the other side of the PHQ compound. Soldiers manning a guard tower on the northwest side of the PHQ had been on the receiving end of a grenade attack. As many as four grenades had been thrown over the exterior wall in the vicinity of the tower, with two detonating at the base of the tower and two more detonating on the outside of the perimeter wall. At the same time, a rocket-propelled grenade that had been fired from the hotel sailed over the guard tower, impacting a nearby residence. All guard towers also reported sporadic, small arms fire from the adjacent Zahir Shahi School to the north.

As military police squads and the PHQ guard force reacted to contact from three sides of the PHQ, the battalion tactical command post at the PHQ began repositioning mounted elements to the west side of the PHQ in response to the new threats. Additional military police squads continued to arrive in support. About 30 minutes after initial contact, an air weapons team (consisting of an OH-58 Kiowa reconnaissance helicopter and an AH-64 Apache attack helicopter) arrived on station. The operations and training officer (S-3) of the 504th Military Police Battalion immediately began to employ the team, which proved to be a valuable asset in identifying targets on the hotel rooftop and in providing military police on the ground with visibility of other maneuvering elements and all incidents that were occurring around the PHQ.

The battalion tactical command post authorized the Apache pilot to fire the M230 chain gun into an empty lot adjacent to the hotel. The noise of the 30-millimeter machine gun prompted the insurgents to take cover, allowing a 30-man, dismounted ANP quick-reaction force (QRF) to safely maneuver its way through one of the first-floor entrances of the building. The QRF element, led by Colonel Fazal Ahmad Shirzad

(the chief of security for Kandahar Province), immediately sealed the four hotel exits and began searching the building for insurgents.


While the ANP cleared the lower floors of the hotel, Soldiers inside the PHQ and responding squads from the 202d, 511th, and 552d Military Police Companies maintained suppressive fire against insurgents near the roof. The battalion commander's protective service detail (PSD) repositioned to Route Rusty, west of the PHQ, and countered ongoing attacks centered on the northwest guard tower. The PSD immediately began searching nearby compounds for the origin of the earlier grenade attack, eventually locating rocket-propelled grenade rounds and detaining two suspects. At that time, the battalion tactical command post and the ANP tactical command post jointly began maneuvering military police squads and Afghan security forces into a tight cordon around the hotel complex and the PHQ—a pivotal move in limiting the effectiveness of vehicle-borne, improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), which could have allowed insurgents to breach the PHQ inner defensive perimeter.

The First VBIED Detonates

At 1230, small arms were continuing to be fired from the hotel and harassing fire and grenades were still being reported from the opposite side of the PHQ. At this point, insurgents added another dynamic by detonating the first VBIED on Route Rusty, southwest of the PHQ. A three-wheeled, rickshaw style vehicle exploded just south of the battalion commander's PSD, which had just moved to respond to the grenade attacks near the northwest guard tower. Smoke and debris from the blast covered the sky along the western side of the compound, obscuring the view for tower guards who were still trying to locate the insurgents throwing grenades.

The Second VBIED Detonates

At 1302, a second VBIED detonated along Route Elizabeth, to the northeast of the PHQ. Another rickshaw style vehicle exploded in the vicinity of several shops and many local citizens just east of the Zahir Shahi School. One Afghan National Army soldier and two local national



Graphic depiction of the attack location

“Just minutes later, at 1310, another rickshaw style vehicle detonated on the southeast side of the hotel complex. This was the third VBIED explosion in a span of 25 minutes, all three involving rickshaw style vehicles packed with explosives.”

civilians were killed in this blast. Several civilians, including children, and a Soldier from the 511th Military Police Company were also injured. The Soldiers of the 511th assisted the ANP in evacuating the casualties.

The Third VBIED Detonates

Just minutes later, at 1310, another rickshaw style vehicle detonated on the southeast side of the hotel complex. This was the third VBIED explosion in a span of 25 minutes, all three involving rickshaw style vehicles packed with explosives. It was the quick response of coalition forces in setting up a security cordon around the hotel complex and the PHQ that resulted in the failure of the rickshaw VBIEDs to get as close to the fight as the insurgents had desired. Thus, the effectiveness of the VBIEDs on security forces was limited. The three VBIED explosions resulted mainly in injuries to local citizens. No coalition force soldiers were seriously wounded, and only a small number of Afghan policemen were injured.

The Fourth VBIED Detonates

Ten minutes later, at 1320 (about 1 hour 30 minutes after the first shots were fired from the hotel), the fourth VBIED exploded from a four-door sedan that was parked alongside the road outside the PHQ. The detonation occurred just to the south of the hotel and only a few feet from a mine-resistant, ambush-protected, all-terrain vehicle that belonged to a squad from the 552d Military Police Company. The vehicle gunner lost consciousness, but sustained only minor injuries. The vehicle itself was disabled, forcing the squad to use chains to quickly tow the vehicle back into the protection of the PHQ.

Suicide Bombers Detonate

While the 504th Military Police Battalion and the ANP worked on the outside to suppress the insurgents, Colonel Shirzad and the ANP QRF continued to search the inside of the hotel. The air weapons team assisted the ANP by providing suppressive fire to help disguise their movement. However, the ANP soon realized that they were facing an even more dangerous threat than AK47 assault rifles or rocket-propelled grenades.

At about 1325, one of the insurgents detonated the explosive vest that he was wearing after hearing the QRF inside the hotel. The blast ripped through the fourth floor of the hotel, destroying a concrete stairwell and most of the northwest corner of the building. Debris rained down on the street below, some striking a 552d Military Police Company Soldier who had been working to move the mine-resistant, ambush-protected, all-terrain vehicle that had been damaged in an earlier VBIED attack. Fortunately, the Soldier suffered only minor injuries to his hands and back.

Although some members suffered minor lacerations from the suicide vest, the ANP QRF continued clearing the hotel room by room, looking for any remaining insurgents. More than an hour after entering the building, the QRF located two insurgents in a wedding hall ballroom on the fifth floor. At the sight of the ANP, one of the insurgents managed to detonate the explosive vest he was wearing; fortunately, no ANP members were killed in this blast. The second suicide bomber was unable to detonate his vest and was killed when the QRF opened fire. All three of the insurgents who were wearing explosive vests were also wearing ANP uniforms; however, it was later confirmed that none of them actually were ANP. Unsure whether there were additional insurgents in the hotel, the QRF continued to clear the rest of the building.

After the hotel had been cleared, Colonel Shirzad directed some QRF members to remain inside while he and his PSD exited the building. The sight of Colonel Shirzad caused the ANP who were serving as part of the cordon to collapse their positions and gather at the front of the hotel. Coalition forces implored their counterparts to maintain an elevated security posture and to avoid the suspicious vehicles in the hotel parking lot. But because more than 2 hours had passed since the last VBIED had been detonated, the ANP assumed that the threat had ended.

The Final VBIED Detonates

The last VBIED was detonated from a tan Toyota Corolla in a crowded parking lot on the west side of the hotel at 1535. The insurgents had staged the vehicle, which was packed with explosives, in front of the hotel earlier that day. The blast was set off as a large group of ANP members, Afghan National Army soldiers, and National Directorate of Security agents stood nearby.

Only minutes before, Colonel Shirzad and some members of the QRF had emerged from the Zir Negir Hotel unscathed, having defeated small arms fire, grenades, and three suicide vests. The area had been reinforced with additional higher-headquarters support from the 1st Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division. Explosive ordnance disposal assets had arrived to assist in dealing with improvised explosive devices and suicide vests. Coalition forces had urged the crowd of Afghan National Security Force onlookers to reestablish the perimeter around the hotel; however, the ANP believed that the fight was over.

The final, devastating VBIED detonation resulted in the deaths of 15 ANP members, three Afghan National Army soldiers, and three National Directorate of Security agents. More than 25 Afghan National Security Force personnel were wounded. Military police from the 504th Military Police Battalion and Soldiers from supporting units scrambled to obtain medical aid for the casualties. Many of the wounded were transported to nearby Camp Nathan Smith, where U.S. medical teams provided lifesaving treatment. Others were taken to local medical centers a short distance away. Three battalion Soldiers received minor injuries in the blast, but were able to quickly return to duty.

The ANP Learns Critical Lessons

Showing discipline and determination throughout the entire attack, the ANP successfully neutralized three suicide bombers and cleared a five-story hotel. It was only during that fifth and final VBIED that Afghan operational discipline broke down. U.S. forces and the Afghans studied this attack and were able to incorporate lessons learned into future training and operations. In addition, significant changes were made to further improve the overall force protection of the PHQ since it remained a high value target for insurgents.

The School Poses a Threat

The details of the insurgents' use of the Zahir Shahi School during the attack are not completely clear. According to multiple guard force reports, the school—which is located immediately to the north of the PHQ—was the source of some small arms and grenade contact. A joint ANP element/202d Military Police Company squad entered the school at 1418 to locate possible insurgents and to defend the compound from further attacks. The team found that some glass in the school windows had been broken, and they discovered shell casings in some of the classrooms.

The Defense Takes the Offensive

Even while the rounds were still flying, the battalion commander and S-3 were busy planning to proactively attack the insurgents with an offensive operation. Not long after the final VBIED had exploded—and while casualties were still being evaluated—the battalion commander called in key leaders and began outlining sectors:

- The 504th Security Force Assistance Team and two additional military police squads were tasked with the area to the west.
- The 202d Military Police Company was instructed to hold its ground at the Zahir Shahi School and the area to the north.
- The 552d Military Police Company commander was assigned the area to the south.
- The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry Regiment (adjacent battlespace owner) assisted the battalion by cordoning the area east of the Zir Negir Hotel.
- The 511th Military Police Company increased the guard force manning at the PHQ.

The battalion commander then outlined the next step, which involved the clearing of the buildings located to the south and west. Soldiers worked throughout the night to successfully search about 200 compounds in the vicinity of the PHQ.

The 504th extended the defensive perimeter around the PHQ an additional 300 meters to the south and west. The elevated security posture continued for another 24 hours as battalion elements gradually returned to their regular battle rhythm and the focus transitioned to fortifying the PHQ for the next attack.

Fortunately, no U.S. Soldiers were killed in the 12 February 2011 attack. The Afghans who were lost that day will forever be remembered by the battalion Soldiers who, side by side, fought so hard with them on a cold, rainy Saturday in Kandahar City.



Captain Dyson served as the officer in charge of the 504th Military Police Battalion staff element and was stationed at the PHQ in Kandahar City from June 2010 to June 2011.





Working Overtime: Professional Development On and Off the Clock

By Captain Cory J. French

After a relatively quiet Friday night, the military police emergency telephone line rings at 0126 on Saturday morning. The desk sergeant answers and quickly takes notes as the caller shouts into the phone. An unidentified individual has just been stabbed at a club that is frequented by Soldiers and local nationals. As I stand at the main gate conducting a presence patrol, my radio suddenly screams, “Patrols 3-A, 3-0, 3-2: Respond to multiple assaults in progress. One confirmed stabbing victim and multiple fights breaking out. Polizei¹ and club security request MP [military police] assistance immediately. Code is authorized.”

For years, I’ve been waiting to finally get started on the **P** portion of my **MP** career. Countless hours of training and preparation would have been extremely beneficial in responding to that radio call. Yet I had no criminal justice degree, I had no real on-the-job experience, and I was working alongside military police Soldiers who—for the most part—were new to the Army and had just recently arrived in Germany. Fortunately, the time I spent shadowing the Lincoln Police Department and the Lancaster County Sheriff’s Department (both in Nebraska) prepared me for the exact scenario that was playing out over the radio. After arriving on the scene, I worked side by side with the *polizei*, directing my Soldiers to control the suspects and aid the victims. Without the knowledge that I had gained by working with civilian police, the situation could have been very different.

I quickly realized that I would never excel in the military police world if I didn’t take time out of my own off-duty schedule to draw road gear and ride alongside the enlisted Soldiers and noncommissioned officers of my company. One particular Soldier took me out and showed me what it was like to patrol a community and how to use the famed “*verbal judo*.”² The term *verbal judo* is frequently mentioned in civilian law enforcement circles; however, until I saw the technique in action, I had no real understanding of how a situation could be deescalated

so that a Soldier could end up returning to the barracks rather than being placed in hand irons.

My mentor had worked in the law enforcement field in Texas for several years before joining the military, and he shared his experiences and the lessons he had learned during our shifts together. At first, I thought that my peers would disapprove of me constantly working the road and learning from—of all people—a private first class. However, after several months, I was taking my peers out to teach them the “rules of the road” and how to properly deal with Soldiers, spouses, and local nationals. Over time, I logged more than 650 hours on patrol at an installation where there was no assigned duty officer and no duty roster requiring officers to work patrol. I was often criticized for working so much and for failing to experience all that Europe had to offer! I countered by listing the countries that I had visited and the professional development that I had received while working closely with the *polizei* and *feldjäger*.³

In October 2011, I had the opportunity to attend the 118th Annual International Association of Chiefs of Police Conference in Chicago, Illinois. There, I was able to interact with some of the finest law enforcement officers from the United States and across the entire world, including small-town department chiefs, U.S. marshals, and members of elite Federal Bureau of Investigation special weapons and tactics teams.

I quickly realized that I could gain worthwhile knowledge by partnering and sharing my own experiences with members of these organizations. Surprisingly, most conversations turned to discussions about how I could possibly train Afghan police units and about the difficulty of interacting with people from a country that is new to the concept of the rule of law and basic military and police tactics. Although my learning curve seemed steep, I saw that other agencies respected military police organizations and that they benefited from information about what military police do on a daily basis in garrison and in a deployed environment.

I still feel that my experience as a police officer is inadequate. But I've learned that the only way to expand my knowledge and skills is to push my pride aside and learn from those who have lived and breathed these duties for years. My experiences in Germany, and later Afghanistan, cemented my love for law enforcement and have created a yearning to continually expand my law enforcement knowledge and technical and tactical skills. I have the rare privilege of waking up and being truly excited about going to work every day—to assist, protect,

and defend the ones with whom I work and the community that I have sworn to serve.

Endnotes:

¹*Polizei* is the German word for “police.”

²Verbal judo refers to the tone and use of words (in conjunction with body language) to prevent, deescalate, or end an attempted assault. This type of conflict management is used to defuse a potentially volatile situation before it becomes physically violent.

³*Feldjägers* are German military police units.



Captain French is the aide de camp to the chief of the Military Police Corps Regiment and commandant of the U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He previously served as a platoon leader with the 630th Military Police Company, Bamberg, Germany, and was deployed to Jalalabad, Afghanistan, where he conducted joint operations with Afghan uniformed police. He holds a bachelor's degree from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York.

(“Community Policing,” continued from page 18)

support zones, the support of the populace is vital; and the PSS commanders are beginning to understand this. In addition, the 58th Military Police Company is now taking advantage of a program that provides positively themed pamphlets and “tip cards.” These materials contain information about U.S. and Afghan avenues for reporting insurgent and criminal activity. Furthermore, the 2d Platoon and partnered AUP plan to increase community policing operations in the more dangerous areas of the subdistrict—thereby maintaining pressure on the insurgents and promoting their own support of the Afghan people as well as their desire to create a safer, more manageable subdistrict.

Although the road ahead is promising, barriers remain. For example, during the initial community policing operation, the local populace voiced concerns about health care, education, and municipalities—areas that are beyond the realm and capabilities of the AUP. However, PSS commanders can act as liaisons between the Afghan people and the subdistrict manager, voicing the concerns of the people they serve. The subdistrict manager—who is mentored by the commander of the 58th Military Police Company and the governance noncommissioned officer—can, in turn, encourage the government of Afghanistan to address the concerns of the populace.

Although the security of Kandahar City is desired, the reality is that insurgents are present within the city boundaries. While this knowledge may be discouraging, it has not hindered the 2d Platoon from moving forward with street level engagements and positive relationship building. To account for this threat, the training phase was slightly modified to teach the AUP to split their patrols into two elements—an engagement element and a security element.

The final identified barrier is the difficulty in reaching the significant female population. The unique composition of military police units allows female Soldiers who have already been trained and prepared for combat to conduct female Afghan engagements without the need for additional unit training or rehearsal time. This significantly increases effectiveness and, ultimately, provides a voice to a large portion of the population who previously had no opportunity to express themselves.

The most encouraging part of the 58th Military Police Company mission is recognizing that people are people. No matter where the company has traveled within Kandahar City, smiles, laughter, and generosity are universal. As Soldiers, we often overlook this concept; but as a leader, I am never more proud of my Soldiers than when they put their training to good use and have a positive interaction with a local national.


As battlespace owners, the 58th Military Police Company is mentoring AUP partners and the subdistrict manager—using community policing as the cornerstone to gain advantageous positions with the local populace.

Endnote:

¹*Mujahideens* are Muslims who are self-proclaimed warriors of their faith.



First Lieutenant Gamble is the platoon leader, 2d Platoon, 58th Military Police Company, and is currently deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. She holds a bachelor's degree in business economics from the University of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky.



ACTIVE-SHOOTER AWARENESS: RELEVANT AND ON POINT

By Mr. James M. Kirkland

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Training (G-3/5/7), U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), hosted the annual TRADOC Force Protection (FP) Workshop at Newport News, Virginia, 29–31 March 2011. This was the sixth TRADOC FP workshop conducted by the Command Provost Marshal Directorate, TRADOC. More than 100 FP professionals from brigade level and above attended the 3-day event.

The theme of the train-the-trainer workshop, which featured an interactive seminar for experts, was “Active-Shooter Awareness: Relevant and On Point.” The training sessions addressed active-shooter¹ awareness—emphasizing the recognition of potential indicators of violent behavior—and workforce response (including the possible prevention of an active-shooter incident). A discussion and practical examples of the best methods for surviving an active-shooter attack were also presented. The objective of the workshop was to equip attendees with the knowledge and resources necessary to return to their units and train the workforce on appropriate considerations regarding active-shooter situations.

Mr. Joe Gallagher, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (G-3/5), TRADOC, opened the workshop by sharing his concerns regarding the number of active-shooter incidents that have taken place in recent years and by emphasizing the urgency of training Soldiers, families, and the workforce in the areas of awareness, prevention, and response. He encouraged attendees to reach out to each other and develop new friendships, as well as professional working relationships, and to

return their units trained and prepared to serve as competent and confident security professionals.

Chief David Ross, chief of police at Fort Hood, Texas, served as the keynote speaker. Chief Ross presented some lessons learned from the tragic shooting incident that took place at Fort Hood on 5 November 2009, when a lone gunman fired more than 100 bullets at Soldiers and civilians, murdering 13 people and injuring another 32. In the past, law enforcement response to a shooting situation consisted of containing the situation, negotiating it to a resolution, and—if all else failed—entering the site with a specialized team such as a special-reaction team or special weapons and tactics team. More recently, though, first responders have been instructed to move directly to the site of the gunfire and to stop the threat as quickly as possible in order to save lives and minimize injuries. While the U.S. Secret Service reports that the average duration of an active-shooter situation is 6 minutes, Chief Ross indicated that a total of 14 minutes 16 seconds elapsed from the time the Fort Hood assailant fired the first shot until he was subdued and the threat was brought under control by responding Department of Defense (DOD) police officers. According to Chief Ross, it was the courage of the Fort Hood police—and the active-shooter response training they had received—that enabled them to move directly toward the gunman, stop the threat, and prevent additional murdered or injured citizens.

On the first day of the workshop, Ms. Sherri Mikkelsen—senior crime/threat analyst with the Command Provost

“The training sessions addressed active-shooter¹ awareness—emphasizing the recognition of potential indicators of violent behavior—and workforce response (including the possible prevention of an active-shooter incident)”

Marshal Directorate—presented a threat briefing. According to Ms. Mikkelsen, TRADOC is considering the best way to address the threat within the larger doctrinal principle of protection as well as the implications of an all-hazards threat approach.

Lieutenant Colonel Donnie Yates, chief of the TRADOC Operations Center, provided an update on reporting procedures outlined in TRADOC Regulation 1-8, *U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Operations Reporting*.² These reporting procedures are consistent with procedures for military police reporting, serious-incident reporting, and the reporting prescribed in the “TRADOC Force Protection Operations Order,”³ which amplifies the reporting requirements (such as Operational Reporting [OPREP]-3)⁴ described in U.S. Army North Operations Order 20080108, *Force Protection*.⁵ The TRADOC Operations Center, which is manned 24 hours per day, disseminates information and reports to Headquarters, Department of the Army (DA), and Army North on behalf of former TRADOC installations where 24-hour, higher-headquarters reporting is not available.

Mr. Eric Dockter, chief of the Threat Analysis Branch, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly referred to as “CID”), and Mr. James Wheadon, criminal intelligence specialist with CID, presented a workshop on eGuardian, which is a Federal Bureau of Investigation reporting system that has been adopted as a DOD-wide law enforcement system for submitting and disseminating information about suspicious activities. The eGuardian system consists of a centralized database where law enforcement personnel may report, query, analyze, and track data to share information regarding suspicious activity, potential terrorist threats, and terrorist events with other agencies. FP experts must establish and sustain proactive working relationships with law enforcement agencies to optimize the current eGuardian system.

Ms. Niki Anderson, founder and president of a privately owned company that deals with antiterrorism (AT) issues, presented a highly energetic, exceptionally informative analysis of the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India, that left 170 dead and more than 300 injured. Her presentation focused on threats and tactics used against “soft” targets such as train stations, hotels, and other densely populated public facilities. The observations and lessons learned provided a list of items to be incorporated into FP plans to deter, detect, and defeat similar multiple, nearly simultaneous attacks.

Mr. Jon Moilanen, a senior military analyst assigned to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA), spoke on the topic of “Active-Shooter Awareness: Understanding the Full Spectrum Threat.” His presentation covered threat indicators for risk management of active-shooting incidents, considerations for immediate or deliberate FP response in crisis, perspectives on lone and group active-shooter vignettes (including historical examples), and training resources available from TRISA.

The second day of the workshop consisted of 8 hours of active-shooter awareness, response, and recovery training, which was conducted by one of the world’s leading providers of customized safety and security training, high-level consultation, and specialized technology solutions. Instructors emphasized that active-shooter incidents are dynamic and unpredictable and that immediate and effective responses can be the difference between survival and death. The company promotes the reactions of *Get out*, *Hide out*, and *Take out*—and combinations thereof. These reactions are similar to the *evacuate*, *lock down*, and *attack the shooter* reactions promoted by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Analyses of historical active-shooter events indicate that personnel who have been trained know how to react immediately; those who have not been trained tend to freeze, making them more susceptible to harm by the shooter. The active-shooter awareness, response, and recovery training was supplemented by an informative workbook, an active-shooter planning guide for training exercises, and information on contingency planning for FP. In addition, attendees received two excellent digital video disc (DVD) training aids (entitled “Shots Fired” and “Flashpoint”).

Mr. Dave Reed, chief of the Law Enforcement Operations Branch, U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), delivered a presentation entitled “Active-Shooter Response: Law Enforcement Training Perspective.” Attendees included law enforcement personnel from installation departments of emergency services. Most of the attendees (who have a wide range of skills and hold a wide variety of jobs) had been assigned the additional duty of serving as AT officers for training brigades and TRADOC schools, and many had also been appointed to serve as physical security officers or operations security officers. An understanding of law enforcement response assists AT officers in training unit personnel to take appropriate action when police arrive on the scene. According to Mr. Reed, an independent review of the Fort Hood shooting incident

indicated that active-shooter response training and procedures should be updated to reflect best practices and the most current training techniques. In an 18 August 2010 memorandum, the Secretary of Defense adopted this recommendation and numerous other specific improvements.⁶ However, USAMPS had already incorporated the changes and improvements into a revised training support package by the time the Secretary of Defense memorandum was released. Mr. Reed concluded his presentation with a very emotional story about Ms. Emily Keyes, a 16-year-old who was held captive and, ultimately, shot and killed by a lone gunman at Platte Canyon High School, Bailey, Colorado, on 27 September 2006. During the time she was held hostage, Emily sent text messages to her parents, stating, "I love u guys." Following the incident, the "I Love U Guys" Foundation was established in an effort to restore and protect the joy of youth through positive actions and educational programs conducted in collaboration with families, schools, organizations, communities, and government entities. The foundation Web site is located at <http://www.iloveugays.org>.

Security considerations for construction projects were of particular interest to workshop participants—especially to AT officers and physical security officers. Mr. Cleo Mackey, a TRADOC physical security officer, and a TRADOC team of engineers consisting of Mr. John Brown, Mr. Dan Sommer, Mr. John Willoughby, and Mr. Ron Hallett spoke about "Security Concerns in MILCON [Military Construction] and Other Construction Projects." The presentation offered a methodology for the consideration of critical security requirements (which should be addressed early in the planning process and monitored closely throughout construction) and any potential changes in security factors. It is much more expensive to add security features late in the process than it is to incorporate security requirements throughout the planning and construction phases.

According to an online survey, one of the most favored and useful presentations was that of Chaplain (Major) William Wehlage, Director of Operations, U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School, who provided a briefing on the after action review, lessons learned, and best practices obtained from a recent unit active-shooter training exercise. Chaplain Wehlage opened by remarking, "As I began to prepare for this [presentation], I referred to my most favorite force protection reference;" and with that, he raised his Bible for all to see. He then read from 1 Peter 5:8, which states, "Be self-controlled and alert. Your enemy, the devil, prowls around like a roaring lion looking for someone to devour."⁷ This scripture selection sums up the current threat and addresses the fundamentals of deterring and preventing an attack. Chaplain Wehlage reminded workshop attendees that there are enemies who seek the capability to defeat U.S. programs and ideals and who have the resolve to do so.

One of the highlights of the workshop was the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers display booth. Participants had the opportunity to visit the display, obtain reference materials and DVDs,

and establish expert points of contact. The Headquarters, DA, AT Awareness Booth was also on display. Attendees could test their understanding of AT by interacting with the computer-based AT Knowledge Challenge. Brochures, references, and other AT awareness products for use at parent installations, activities, and units were also available at the AT Awareness Booth. Units can request the use of the booth for Army or command level conferences, workshops, and meetings by contacting Mr. Dan Herold, AT Branch, Office of the Provost Marshal General, at (703) 697-7257 or daniel.j.herold@conus.army.mil.

All workshop briefing slides are available from the TRADOC AT Community through the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) Web site. Membership and access to this restricted community may be requested at <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/group/98357>.

Endnotes:

¹According to USAMPS, an active-shooter incident occurs when "one or more subjects participate in a shooting spree, random or systematic, with intent to continuously harm others." (Training Support Package 191-AS-001, *Active-Shooter Response*, 19 March 2010.)

²TRADOC Regulation 1-8, *U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Operations Reporting*, 16 November 2010.

³"TRADOC Force Protection Operations Order," 10 February 2009.

⁴An OPREP-3 report is an incident report that should be submitted by the lowest level command that has knowledge of the event.

⁵U.S. Army North Operations Order 20080108, *Force Protection*, 13 February 2008.

⁶"Final Recommendations of the Ft. Hood Follow-on Review," memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, 18 August 2010.

⁷*The Holy Bible*, New International Version, Biblica, 1984.



Mr. Kirkland, a certified protection professional, is the TRADOC AT officer, Command Provost Marshal Directorate, G-34, G-3/5/7, Headquarters, TRADOC, Joint Base Langley/Eustis, Virginia. He retired with 30 years of service in the U.S. Army, last serving as the command sergeant major of the 924th Military Police Battalion, Fort Riley, Kansas.





Military Police Doctrine 2015

By Lieutenant Colonel Richard Heidorn


Doctrine 2015 represents the Army's approach to establishing a foundation for training, educating, and equipping Soldiers through a common professional language. The language of our profession allows the Army to develop Soldiers and defend our Nation. Following a decade of war, the Army now has the unique opportunity to reflect on the past and look toward the future. Doctrine 2015 will significantly change how the Army arranges and develops doctrine to support training, education, and operations. Once complete, Doctrine 2015 will provide the Army with well-defined enduring principles, tactics, and standard procedures. Additionally, through the creative use of technology, the Army will be able to rapidly update techniques due to the changing conditions of the operational environment and the needs of operationally deployed forces.

The transition to Doctrine 2015 requires that all doctrine publications be reviewed and separated into the following categories:

- Army doctrine publications (ADPs).** Fifteen ADPs will contain the fundamental, enduring principles that guide the actions of Army forces and will explain how those principles support national objectives. In very concise language, ADPs will provide the intellectual underpinnings of Army operational doctrine. They will be Department of the Army (DA) publications printed in a small (6- by 9-inch) format and limited to fewer than 15 pages. They will also be available electronically through the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) Web site at <http://www.us.army.mil>.

ADPs (15) <i>Fundamental principles</i>	
ADRs (14; 1 per ADP, except ADP 1) <i>Detailed information on fundamentals</i>	
FMs (50) <i>Tactics and procedures</i>	
ATPs <i>Techniques</i> <i>Authenticated version on RDL and APD</i> <i>Input through milWiki</i>	

Doctrine 2015 template



Military Police Doctrine 2015

- **Army doctrine reference publications (ADRP)s.** Fourteen ADP)s will elaborate on the principles described in corresponding ADPs. They will not discuss specific tactics, techniques, or procedures. For every ADP except ADP 1, there will be a corresponding ADRP of the same title. ADP)s will be printed in the traditional, 8½- by 11-inch format and in electronic format for the Web (AKO) and digital devices. In the traditional format, ADP)s will be no more than 100 pages long.
- **Field manuals (FMs).** Fifty FMs will describe doctrinal tactics and procedures (but not techniques) used by the Army to train for and conduct operations consistent with the principles described in ADPs and ADP)s. Information will be presented using a streamlined approach that focuses on functions and does not repeat information presented in ADP)s. FMs will be printed in the traditional, 8½- by 11-inch format and in electronic format for the Web (AKO) and digital devices. In the traditional format, FMs will be limited to no more than 200 pages. Appendixes will describe procedures, or prescriptive methods of performing tasks. Some existing FMs with content that is no longer considered doctrinal will be republished as technical manuals or training circulars. There will be two Military Police Corps Regiment FMs:
 - FM 3-39, *Military Police Operations*.
 - FM 3-63, *Internment and Resettlement Operations*.
- **Army techniques publications (ATPs).** An undetermined number of ATP)s will discuss doctrinal techniques, or non-descriptive methods of performing tasks, missions, or

functions. ATP)s will be DA publications printed in the traditional 8½- by 11-inch format and in electronic format for the Web (AKO) and digital devices. There will be no length restriction for ATP)s, but they will be concisely written and will not repeat information contained in other manuals. Organizations preparing ATP)s will ensure that the content aligns with and integrates the doctrine contained in ADPs, ADP)s, and FMs and that repetition is avoided. There will be nine Military Police Corps Regiment ATP)s:

- ATP 3-37.2, *Antiterrorism*.
- ATP 3-39.10, *Law and Order*.
- ATP 3-39.11, *Special-Reaction Teams*.
- ATP 3-39.12, *Law Enforcement Investigations*.
- ATP 3-39.20, *Police Intelligence*.
- ATP 3-39.32, *Physical Security*.
- ATP 3-39.33, *Civil Disturbance*.
- ATP 3-39.34, *Military Working Dogs*.
- ATP 3-39.35, *Protective Services*.

For most ATP)s (other than those that are classified), there will be a corresponding draft version posted on a collaborative milWiki Web site at <https://www.milsuite.mil/wiki/Portal:Army_Doctrine>. The milWiki draft will allow for direct and ongoing input from the field and accelerate the transfer of lessons learned into doctrine. The organization responsible for the ATP will monitor contributions to the milWiki site, obtain input, determine which input should be adopted into

OLD SERIES	CURRENT SERIES (2012)	2015	TITLE
	FM 3-39 (Feb 10)	FM 3-39	<i>Military Police Operations</i>
	FM 3-39.40 (Feb 10)	FM 3-63	<i>Internment and Resettlement Operations</i>
	FM 3-37.2 (Feb 11)	ATP 3-37.2	<i>Antiterrorism</i>
	ATTP 3-39.10 (Jun 11)	ATP 3-39.10	<i>Law and Order</i>
FM 3-19.11	Publishing revision (1st Quarter, FY 13)	ATP 3-39.11	<i>Special-Reaction Teams</i>
FM 3-19.15	Publishing revision (4th Quarter, FY 12)	ATP 3-39.12	<i>Law Enforcement Investigations</i>
	ATTP 3-39.20 (Jul 10)	ATP 3-39.20	<i>Police Intelligence</i>
	ATTP 3-39.32 (Aug 10)	ATP 3-39.32	<i>Physical Security</i>
	FM 3.19.15 (1975)	ATP 3-39.33	<i>Civil Disturbance</i>
	ATTP 3-39.34 (May 11)	ATP 3-39.34	<i>Military Working Dogs</i>
FM 3-19.12	Publishing revision (1st Quarter, FY 13)	ATP 3-39.35	<i>Protective Services</i>
	TM 3-39.30 (Feb 12)	TM 3-39.30	<i>Military Police Leaders' Handbook</i>
	TM 3-19.31 (Aug 10)	TM 3-39.31	<i>Armored Security Vehicle</i>
	FM 19-25	Rescinded	<i>Traffic Operations</i>

Note. *Traffic Operations* has been integrated into ATP 3-39.10, and *Traffic Accident Investigations* will be integrated into ATP 3-39.12.

Current status of Military Police Doctrine 2015

doctrine, and rapidly prepare revisions to the authenticated publication. All comments on Military Police Corps Regiment ATPs will be reviewed, vetted, and approved by the commandant of the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) and other senior leaders before being accepted as changes to doctrine. Only approved or authenticated publications that are posted on the General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library (RDL) at <<https://rdl.train.army.mil/soldier-Portal/soldier.portal>> and the Army Publishing Directorate (ADP) at <<http://www.apd.army.mil/default.asp>> should be cited as references.

■ **Technical manuals (TMs).** These are general-subject manuals—two of which will be Military Police Corps Regiment TMs:

- TM 3-39.30, *Military Police Leaders' Handbook*.
- TM 3-39.31, *Armored Security Vehicle*.

These TMs, which will be approved by the USAMPS Commandant, will focus on the tactical employment of military police at the company level and the employment of the armored security vehicle in support of military police operations.

Under Doctrine 2015, military police doctrine will be reorganized into 13 doctrinal manuals (two FMs, nine ATPs, and two TMs). Throughout the past 2 years, nine military

police doctrinal publications have been updated; three more are currently undergoing revision. But all doctrinal publications must be revised to include changes to Army terminology and to align with the new naming and numbering conversion within the next 3 years. The Military Police Doctrine Team needs increased participation to meet this requirement. Military police leaders must ensure that our Soldiers are operating with the most current and relevant information.

All doctrine-related questions should be addressed to <leon.mdottddmpdoc@conus.army.mil>.

(**Note.** The best place to locate all current military police publications is the Maneuver Support Knowledge Network [MSKN]. To access the network, log on to AKO and type <<https://www.us.army.mil/suite/portal.do?%24p=500639>> in the address bar.)



Lieutenant Colonel Heidorn is the chief of Military Police Doctrine; Concepts, Organization, and Doctrine Division; Capabilities Development Integration Division; Maneuver Support Center of Excellence; Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He has a bachelor's degree from South Dakota State University.

DOCTRINE UPDATE

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence Capabilities Development Integration Directorate Concepts, Organization, and Doctrine Development Division			
Publication Number	Title	Date	Description
Current Publications			
ATTP 3-39.10	Law and Order Operations	20 Jun 11	A manual that addresses each element of the military police law and order mission, including planning considerations, police station operations, patrol operations, police engagement, traffic operations, and host nation police capability and capacity. Status: Current.
ATTP 3-39.20	Police Intelligence Operations	29 Jul 10	A manual that addresses police intelligence operations which support the operations process and protection activities by providing exceptional police information and intelligence to support, enhance, and contribute to situational understanding, force protection, the commander's protection program, and homeland security. Status: Current.
ATTP 3-39.32	Physical Security	3 Aug 10	A manual that establishes guidance for all personnel responsible for physical security. It is the basic reference for training security personnel and is intended to be used in conjunction with the Army Regulation (AR) 190 (Military Police) Series, Security Engineering Unified Facilities Criteria publications, Department of Defense directives, and other Department of the Army publications. Status: Current.
ATTP 3-39.34	Military Working Dogs	10 May 11	A manual that provides commanders, staffs, and military working dog (MWD) handlers with an understanding of MWD capabilities, employment considerations, sustainment requirements, and the integration of MWDs in support of full spectrum operations. Status: Current.
TM 3-39.30	Military Police Leaders' Handbook	2 Feb 12	A manual that addresses military police maneuver and mobility support, area security, internment/resettlement (I/R), law and order, and police intelligence operations across the full spectrum of Army operations. It primarily focuses on the principles of platoon operations and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) necessary. Status: Current.
FM 3-19.11 (will be ATTP 3-39.11)	Military Police Special-Reaction Teams	13 May 05	A manual that serves as a guide for commanders, staffs, and trainers who are responsible for training and deploying military police special-reaction teams. Status: Under revision; projected for publication 2d quarter, FY 13.
FM 3-19.12 (will be ATTP 3-39.35)	Protective Services	11 Aug 04	A manual that addresses TTP for special agents of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command and military police assigned to protective services duties. Status: Under revision; projected for publication 2d quarter, FY 13.
FM 3-19.13 (will be ATTP 3-39.12)	Law Enforcement Investigations	10 Jan 05	A manual that serves as a guide for military police, investigators, and U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command special agents operating in tactical and garrison environments. Status: Under revision; to be published 4th quarter, FY 13.

DOCTRINE UPDATE

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence Capabilities Development Integration Directorate Concepts, Organization, and Doctrine Development Division			
Publication Number	Title	Date	Description
Current Publications (continued)			
FM 3-19.15 (will be ATTP 3-39.33)	Civil Disturbance Operations	18 Apr 05	A manual that addresses continental U.S. and outside the continental U.S. civil disturbance operations and domestic unrest, including the military role in providing assistance to civil authorities. Status: Current.
FM 3-37.2	Antiterrorism	18 Feb 11	A manual that establishes Army guidance on integrating and synchronizing antiterrorism across the full spectrum of conflict and into the full range of military operations. It shows how antiterrorism operations nest under full spectrum operations, the protection warfighting function, and the composite risk management process. Status: Current.
FM 3-39	Military Police Operations	16 Feb 10	A keystone manual that describes military police support to Army forces conducting full spectrum operations within the framework of joint operations. It emphasizes the importance of simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations and contains a critical discussion of civil support operations. Status: Under revision; projected for publication 2d quarter, FY 13.
FM 3-39.40	Internment and Resettlement Operations	12 Feb 10	A manual that describes the doctrinal foundation, principles, and processes that military police and other elements employ when dealing with internment and resettlement populations. Status: Current.
FM 3-90.31	Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Operations	26 Feb 09	A manual that provides operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons. It facilitates operations and employment considerations of the maneuver enhancement brigade as it organizes, prepares for, and conducts full spectrum operations. Status: Current.
FM 19-25 (will be ATTP 3-39.13)	Military Police Traffic Operations	30 Sep 77	A manual that addresses traffic operations in garrison and combat environments. Status: Current.
TM 3-39.31	Armored Security Vehicle	20 Aug 10	A manual that provides military police forces with the TTP and related information necessary for the employment of the armored security vehicle. Status: Current.
<p>Note. Current military police publications can be accessed and downloaded in electronic format from the Reimer Digital Library at http://www.actdl.army.mil/ or from the U.S. Army Military Police School Web site at http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/. Comments or questions about military police doctrine can be e-mailed to leon.cdiddcodmpdoc@conus.army.mil.</p>			

Badges? We Don't Need No Stinkin' Badges!



By Colonel David Glaser and Major David Charbonneau

The line “Badges? We Don’t Need No Stinkin’ Badges!” basically originated with a 1927 novel¹ and has since surfaced in various forms in several films—most famously the 1974 Western parody *Blazing Saddles*.² And that statement seems to have been a popular, real-life sentiment of many members of the Military Police Corps a few years ago. However, other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies—including the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force—do not appear to share this view. So do Army military police need badges? Do badges serve a purpose? And, if so, what purpose do they serve?

From discussions with scores of military police leaders and instructors at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, it is evident that the Military Police Corps emphasizes the development of Soldiers and future leaders for their role as *police professionals*.³ Newly designated military police receive months of comprehensive training, where they acquire the police skills necessary to support garrison activities and participate in full spectrum operations. To reinforce professional conduct and provide the Army with capable, competent, and ethical law enforcement practitioners, the Office of the Provost Marshal General requires standardized annual law enforcement validation for Soldiers in operational assignments. Military police receive specialized positional training, and all courses include training in leadership and supervisory police skills. Given that the Military Police Corps is the professional policing branch of the Army—and given the level of emphasis, resources, and time placed on police skill development—why is it that the Army Military Police Corps is the only joint Service police organization in which the badge is not used as a universal symbol to denote and identify its practitioners as certified professionals? Where are our “stinkin’ badges?” (The Military Police Corps uses the badge, but not as a universal symbol of professional law enforcement.)⁴

The Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force issue badges to their active-service patrolmen and civilian police so that they may present themselves as law enforcement agents in the conduct of their duties, enhance their ability to network with outside agencies, and instill discipline and pride in themselves and their profession. Department of the Army (DA) civilian police are also issued badges for ease of identification during the conduct of their official law

enforcement duties. But the use of a separate identifier (the military police brassard) for Army military police Soldiers performing installation law enforcement duties creates the perception among their joint and civilian peers—as well as those they serve—that they are somehow less qualified.

In a recent discussion, a member of the Marine Corps stated, “When working with civilian, federal, and outside agencies, it’s kind of hard to be taken seriously by the fellow police officers when all you have to show is your standard military identification. The flat badges and credentials are designed to substantiate our role as law enforcement officers aboard military installations. On base at a PMO [provost marshal’s office], our [military police] do wear an issued badge . . . when on duty.” The Marine Corps representative added, “The badges exist to further reinforce to our [military police] that they are law enforcement officers. They serve as a constant reminder to our [military police] that their conduct is expected to be a cut above the rest of the Marine Corps because they are charged with enforcing the rules and regulations.”

In a profession with high standards, being viewed as a professional by those you serve and those with whom you serve is critical. As General Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently stated, “You are not a professional just because you say you are a professional.” Rather, professionals earn their credentials through accredited training and years of experience. If we as Army military police truly are police professionals and we want our Soldiers and leaders to carry themselves as such and to be recognized as such, then we as an organization must provide accredited training. Badges and credentials serve as recognition of that training and of the professionalism of those who have earned them.

In April 2010, the Civilian Police Academy, U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), was accredited by the Federal Law Enforcement Training Agency, meaning that it is now recognized as a federal law enforcement institution. If USAMPS would do the same for its institutional program, military police Soldiers could be accredited as outlined in paragraph 5-2g, Army Regulation (AR) 190-56,⁵ resulting in equilibrium under a single standard of accreditation, badging, and credentialing. Our Soldiers would have the opportunity (when actively working in a policing role) to carry the same

badge and credentials that our DA civilian police counterparts carry. The foundation for this proposal already exists in Advanced Individual Training, the Basic Officer Leader Course, Office of the Provost Marshal General-directed annual sustainment and developmental training, and local training at installation PMOs. If properly packaged, all military police Soldiers could be accredited through these existing programs, raising our policing profile and level of recognition as professionals in joint, interagency, and multinational circles.

Isn't it time to bring back the badge—as part of our ongoing efforts to build professionalism within our unique competency, to tie badging to the same minimum-level certification standards to which our DA civilian police counterparts perform installation law enforcement, and to be recognized in the same manner as our similarly experienced joint and local police counterparts? Accredited badging and credentialing are powerful symbols of professionalism in the eyes of our police peers, those we serve and, just as importantly, ourselves—the proud, dedicated warrior police who are expected to perform the job of a military police professional.

Endnotes:

¹B. Traven, *The Treasure of the Sierra Madre*, 1927.

²*Blazing Saddles*, Warner Brothers, 1974.

³The *profession* (collectively) and the *professional* (individually) possess a body of knowledge and a repertoire of skills and behaviors (*professional culture*) necessary for the practice of a vocation; *professionalism* is often recognized by a formal certification for those working in the vocation.

⁴According to AR 190-56 (*The Army Civilian Police and Security Guard Program*, 15 October 2009), the police badge and credentials will be used in the performance of installation law enforcement duties for all certified police personnel.

⁵AR 190-56, 15 October 2009.



Colonel Glaser is the Deputy Provost Marshal General, Headquarters, DA. He is a graduate of the Interviewing and Interrogation Training Program from the Reid Institute, Chicago, Illinois, and the Rule of Law Practitioners Course from the U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C. He is also a member of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the American Correctional Association, and the International Network to Promote the Rule of Law.

Major Charbonneau is a small-group team chief for the Military Police Basic Officer Leader's Course, USAMPS, Fort Leonard Wood. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from Mercyhurst College, Erie, Pennsylvania, and a master's degree in business and organizational security from Webster University, St. Louis, Missouri.

••• MILITARY POLICE Writer's Guide •••

MILITARY POLICE is a professional-development bulletin designed to provide a forum for exchanging information and ideas within the Army law enforcement and investigation community. We include articles by and about officers, enlisted Soldiers, warrant officers, Department of the Army civilian employees, and others. Writers may discuss training, current operations and exercises, doctrine, equipment, history, personal viewpoints, or other areas of general interest to military police. Articles may share good ideas and lessons learned or explore better ways of doing things.

Articles should be concise, straightforward, and in the active voice. If they contain attributable information or quotations not referenced in the text, provide appropriate endnotes. Text length should not exceed 2,000 words (about 8 double-spaced pages). Shorter, after-action-type articles and reviews of books on military police topics are also welcome.

Include photographs (with captions) and/or line diagrams that illustrate information in the article. Please do not insert illustrations or photos in the text; instead, send each of them as a separate file. Do not embed photographs in Microsoft® PowerPoint or Word. If illustrations are in PowerPoint, avoid using excessive color and shading. Save digital images in a TIF or JPG format at a resolution no lower than 200 dpi. Images copied from a Web site must be accompanied by copyright permission.

Provide a short paragraph that summarizes the content of the article. Also include a short biography (full name, rank,

current unit, job title, and education), your mailing address, a fax number, and a commercial daytime telephone number.

Articles submitted to *MILITARY POLICE* must include a statement from your local security office stating that the information contained in the article is unclassified, nonsensitive, and releaseable to the public. *MILITARY POLICE* is distributed to military units worldwide, is offered online at <<http://www.wood.army.mil/mpbulletin>>, and is available for sale by the Government Printing Office. As such, it is readily accessible to nongovernment and foreign individuals and organizations.

We cannot guarantee that we will publish all articles, photographs, or illustrations. They are accepted for publication only after thorough review. If we plan to use your article in an upcoming issue, we will notify you. Therefore, it is important to keep us informed of changes in your e-mail address or telephone number. All articles accepted for publication are subject to grammatical and structural changes as well as editing for style.

MILITARY POLICE is published biannually in March and September, and articles are due by 1 December and 1 June. Send submissions by e-mail to <leon.mdotmppb@conus.army.mil>, or send an electronic copy in Microsoft Word on a compact disk and a double-spaced hard copy of the manuscript to *MILITARY POLICE* Professional Bulletin, 464 MANSCEN Loop, Building 3201, Suite 2661, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8926.

eGuardian: Threat and Suspicious-Activity Reporting

“Whether a plan for a terrorist attack is homegrown or originates overseas, important knowledge that may forewarn of a future attack may be derived from information gathered by state, local, and tribal government personnel in the course of routine law enforcement and other activities.”

—National Strategy for Information Sharing¹


Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 2000.26, *Suspicious Activity Reporting*,² directs the Department of Defense (DOD) to use the eGuardian system as the authorized law enforcement suspicious-activity³ reporting system. eGuardian—developed, owned, and operated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—is a sensitive, unclassified reporting system; and access is restricted to law enforcement personnel and analysts. The system—

- Allows the FBI to collect suspicious-activity threat information that has a potential link to terrorism.
- Migrates threat information to the internal Guardian system, where it is assigned to the appropriate joint terrorism task force for further investigative action.
- Shares threat information with other federal law enforcement agencies as well as state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies.


The FBI created eGuardian in 2008 to report and share potential unclassified terrorist threats, events, and suspicious activity among law enforcement agencies, fusion centers, and terrorism task forces. Information received via eGuardian is reviewed and analyzed at all levels to identify current threats, emerging trends, and future indicators. Although some suspicious-activity reports may not clearly indicate terrorism, the information is retained for 5 years and can be used for pattern and trend analysis. Incidents determined to have “no link to terrorism” are removed from eGuardian within 180 days of the final determination.

To strengthen efforts to counter terrorist threats, those responsible for protecting DOD resources must have timely access to properly acquired threat information. This includes information on terrorists’ plans, capabilities, activities, and intended targets.

eGuardian plays a critical role in the ability to fight terrorists by reporting suspicious activity and assisting criminal intelligence analysts in their efforts to assess and warn the Army community of credible threats. It helps commanders determine the aggregate threat and keeps them informed of threat conditions, which allows them to initiate effective security responses and threat countermeasures. Remember, the ability to detect, report, and deter threats is as important as our ability to respond to them!



eGuardian Information and User’s Guide



eGuardian poster

The management, oversight, and control of eGuardian within most of the Army⁴ rests with the Office of the Provost Marshal General, which delegated program management to the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly referred to as “CID”). The Army’s military intelligence community and Army subordinate commands (down



Law Enforcement Online seal

to installation, unit, and facility level) are responsible for establishing education and reporting procedures that contribute to the timeliness and quality of suspicious-activity reporting. Within the Army Protection Program, threat working groups must work closely with their supporting CID office, provost marshal, or directorate of emergency services to establish a system to receive timely threat information.

Although eGuardian is in the early stages of Army-wide implementation, enhanced education and suspicious-activity awareness have led to an increase in suspicious-activity reporting. And suspicious-activity awareness campaigns and Army leader education will further increase reporting, which will result in greater situational awareness and enhanced analysis.

DOD personnel whose law enforcement responsibilities require access to eGuardian must establish Law Enforcement Online accounts at <<http://www.leo.gov>>. There are four account types approved for use by DOD personnel: user, supervisor, approver, and read-only.

For more information about eGuardian or to download products for local distribution, visit the Office of the Provost Marshal General Antiterrorism Enterprise Portal on Army Knowledge Online at <<https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/605757>>. In the Antiterrorism Awareness ToolKit section, you will find an eGuardian Information and User’s Guide, an information poster, and a suspicious-activity categories pocket card.

Endnotes:

¹National Strategy for Information Sharing, October 2007, <<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/infosharing/sectionIV.html>>, accessed on 26 January 2012.

²DODI 2000.26, *Suspicious Activity Reporting*, 1 November 2011.

³“Suspicious activity,” as defined by the FBI, refers to observed behavior that may be indicative of intelligence gathering or preoperational planning related to terrorism or criminal or other illicit intention. Suspicious activities may include surveillance, cyber attacks, probing of security, and photographing of key infrastructure facilities.

⁴eGuardian within the National Guard is managed by the National Guard Bureau Provost Marshal.



This article was written by staff from the Antiterrorism Branch, Office of the Provost Marshal General; the Law Enforcement Branch, Office of the Provost Marshal General; and CID.



CID Special Agents Carry Out Logistics Security

By Mr. Colby Hauser

As dawn breaks over the Hindu Kush Mountains of Afghanistan, a small group of highly trained law enforcement professionals puts the finishing touches on an operation intended to represent the crescendo of combating corruption at Bagram Airfield. For months, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly referred to as "CID") special agents patiently investigated, planned, and prepared for the operation, which was designed to strike at the very lifeline of the insurgents—their pocket book.

Logistics security—a mission that is sometimes taken for granted and often overlooked during U.S. Department of Defense briefings—has exploded onto the national stage. Commanding the attention of the most senior military leaders, it has undergone a transformation from a routine warfighting task to a complex mission in its own right.

According to Lieutenant Colonel David Heath, commander of the 10th Military Police Battalion (CID) (Airborne), logistics security is a major issue in Afghanistan. A combined strike force of CID special agents, law enforcement professionals, and supporting combat units have taken the fight to the enemy, launching raids on Kabul and Bagram. Lieutenant Colonel Heath stated, "During one of my first briefings to U.S. Forces—Afghanistan, General [David H.] Petraeus stopped me and said, 'Colonel, this mission may be the most important thing you do as a battalion commander in combat.' Now with the success of the Kabul and Bagram raids, perhaps those who would think about trying to steal from us will think twice."

CID special agents are familiar with the logistics security mission. Whether conducting a crime prevention survey, gathering criminal intelligence, or recovering stolen goods, CID is a "one stop" shop for forward-deployed commanders as well as those who remain in garrison.

The situation in Afghanistan is a logistician's worst nightmare. Landlocked—with no transportation infrastructure—and bordered by less-than-cooperative nation-states, the few goods that do make it into the country are instantly transformed

into targets of opportunity. From the most mundane items, such as toilet paper, to highly sensitive military equipment, such as night vision goggles, a litany of stolen goods have been recovered in storefronts, shops, and bazaars throughout Afghanistan. Some seemingly worthless items—such as cheap, two-way radios—can be used to build or detonate improvised explosive devices.

According to the assistant operations and forensic science officer of the 10th Military Police Battalion, the items that are found in some of the raids are "truly amazing." However, he added that ". . . what's more interesting is what we discover afterwards and how we can use that information to prevent this from happening again." These operations have helped uncover security procedure deficiencies, double agents, crooked government officials, and insurgent safe havens.

"We're not combat repo[session] men in tactical gear," said an agent assigned to the Bagram CID office. "After every raid, we get hit, so we know we're causing problems for the Taliban. Besides our property, we also get answers to the important questions: How did they do it, where is the money going, and who is it going to? Piece by piece, we can take those criminal cells apart." The additional intelligence exploited after each successful operation continues to assist the International Security Assistance Force.

The United States and its Afghan partners have successfully shut down some of the insurgent cells. The operations officer for the 10th Military Police Battalion is hopeful that

the problem will begin to subside, since more criminals are being locked away and more corrupt local government officials are being replaced by honest ones.

But combat operations involve calculated risks. For every mission that goes right, there are those that go wrong. The key to an effective operation is the ability to adapt and overcome obstacles as conditions on the battlefield change.

For the Bagram raid, there were initially eight known targets with three other possible targets—resulting in a potential 30- to 45-minute task force exposure to an insurgent attack. Before the onset of the operation, the local commander attended a shura, or council meeting of local Afghan tribal leaders. During that time, there were reports of suicide bombers in the area—and a suicide bomber had detonated his vest at a previous area shura, killing nearly everyone in attendance. Fortunately, in this case, the bombers did not attack. As planned, the commander gave the signal to launch the operation at the conclusion of the meeting and the elements of the task force quickly moved to their respective targets. However, Murphy's Law¹ took effect.

At first, the task force was informed that they would be allowed to hit only stores that were open and that had stolen U.S. government property plainly in sight; but those rules were changed during mission rehearsal. Under the new rules, if the property could be seen through the window or through a crack in the door, the task force could obtain the local magistrate's permission to cut the lock or kick in the door. Based on the new rules, once the mission was underway, the number of targets increased from eight to 18—resulting in an extended task force exposure time.

During the operation, task force members removed truckloads of stolen goods and shopkeepers' tempers flared. Some of the shopkeepers protested what they felt was the unjust theft of their freshly stolen property. Dissidents attempted to rally their fellow merchants, but to no avail. In the end, more than \$250,000 worth of U.S. government property was recovered during the Bagram raid.

According to a CID special agent assigned to the logistics security investigations mission for Afghanistan, getting equipment, supplies, and goods into Afghanistan is difficult; but keeping them is proving to be an even bigger challenge. Due to this trend, CID special agents have been working nonstop to ensure that they find and recover stolen U.S. property.

CID special agents have also recovered stolen items from organizations ranging from special operations forces,



A CID special agent picks the lock of a store believed to be selling stolen U.S. Government property.

to conventional combat units, to the Army and Air Force Exchange Service. Logistics security affects everyone. This is everyone's problem.

For more information on the CID, visit their Web site at <http://www.cid.army.mil/>.

Endnote:

¹Murphy's Law is an observation that if anything can go wrong, it will. 

Mr. Hauser is the community relations officer for Headquarters, CID, Quantico, Virginia.

Military Police Convoy Security— *Then* and **NOW**

By Mr. Tom Christianson

In March 2005—just 26 miles southeast of Baghdad, Iraq, two coalition convoys coincidentally converged and were ambushed by Iraqi insurgents. A military police patrol happened to be tailing one of the convoys, and the patrol reacted to the attack with urgency. During the ensuing counterattack, 27 insurgents were killed and seven were wounded. The immediate and professional actions of the military police saved the convoy. Staff Sergeant Timothy Nein was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, and Sergeant Leigh Ann Hester became the first female Soldier ever to receive the Silver Star for direct combat operations.

Convoy security operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in recent years bear a startling resemblance to operations conducted in Vietnam in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The ingenuity and means that Soldiers used to protect and secure convoys in Vietnam are a part of military police history that can provide lessons for military police today.

During the initial phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom, there was a lack of sufficient military police to provide consistent convoy support—just as there was in Vietnam. Transportation units began to mount an assortment of improvised weapon



A V-100 in a convoy
in Vietnam in 1970

systems on “gun trucks.” A sand-bagged “dog house” was mounted on the back of some trucks to house a squad automatic weapon gunner. And just as in Vietnam, armor plating was welded onto cargo trucks and humvees. By late 2003, enough steel was being welded to trucks to completely encompass the beds. In addition, .50-caliber machine guns, automatic grenade launchers, and an assortment of crew-served weapons were mounted on trucks.¹ Again, this was a repeat of methods that were used in Vietnam.

In Vietnam, the continuous supply operations mission was fraught with danger to convoys. The Vietcong insurgency, and later the regular North Vietnamese army, continually preyed upon U.S. Army and Marine supply convoys traveling along the highways. The mountains, jungles, and agricultural foliage typically present along the routes added to the challenge by providing the cover and concealment that the insurgents needed for a successful ambush. Mines were often embedded in and along the roads. The constant vigilance required from American Soldiers made the movement of supplies difficult. Although military police were responsible for providing convoy support, the hundreds of miles of supply routes taxed their abilities. Therefore, transportation units began arming themselves early in the war. “Gun trucks” were armed with an assortment of weaponry, including a variety of crew-served weapons (M60 and .50-caliber machine guns) and grenade launchers. Because there was no real standing operating procedure for equipping vehicles, trucks were often armed according to the availability of weapons and the imaginations of the crews and local units. This individualism resulted in a variety of names that crews used to refer to their vehicles, including “Kolor Me Killer,” “Iron Butterfly,” “Satan’s Chariot,” and “Assassin.”² But as the U.S. role in Vietnam expanded, the military police responsibility for route security only increased.

Early in the Vietnam War, military police modified jeeps with M60 machine guns. These vehicles were often referred to as “Road Runners” because, much like the cartoon character by the same name, they sped ahead to reconnoiter convoy routes at breakneck speeds. However, the Road Runners lacked armor; consequently, military police were forced to endure unacceptable casualties as a result of mines and small-arms fire. Some members of Road Runner units claimed that they were being used as “bait” to trigger ambushes.³ Eventually, the Army fielded the V-100 Commando—an armored vehicle that protected military police and provided them with a means of augmenting the ad hoc convoy security approach used by transportation units. (In addition to their value in convoy support, the V-100s also proved to be useful in urban




The “Assassin” gun truck

fighting; they were heavily involved in the Tet Offensive in 1968.) Colonel Thomas Guidera, the first commander of the 18th Military Police Brigade, was instrumental in obtaining the new V-100 Commando. Two M37 .30-caliber machine guns were mounted on early official versions of the vehicle; but by 1970, individual units had taken the liberty of adding weapons to their vehicles. Some V-100s sported a .50-caliber and several .30-caliber machine guns (sometimes obtained

“In Vietnam, the continuous supply operations mission was fraught with danger to convoys. The Vietcong insurgency, and later the regular North Vietnamese army, continually preyed upon U.S. Army and Marine supply convoys traveling along the highways.”

from downed helicopters) and grenade launchers. Some crews welded a gun pintle from an M113 armored personnel carrier to the top turret of the V-100 and installed an M2 .50-caliber machine gun or minigun. And like the transportation units, military police troops named their vehicles. They even painted them with “nose art.” The more paint that became available, the more colorful the vehicles became. Higher headquarters, such as the 16th Military Police Group, tried to ban the modifications that lower-level units allowed (and even sanctioned), but their attempts were unsuccessful.⁴



Sergeant Mungle's V-100—The "Proud Mary II"

Although V-100s reached military police units by 1968, they never seemed to be available in sufficient numbers. Vietcong and North Vietnamese "regulars" generally conducted ambushes in a manner that is all too familiar today. The enemy immobilized the lead vehicle in a "kill zone" and then attempted to systematically destroy all vehicles in the convoy. These ambushes were conducted in vegetation that concealed the attackers' whereabouts and in terrain that precluded easy convoy rescue. The difficult terrain also allowed the attackers to withdraw to relative safety at will. Military police generally ran route security details with V-100s, searching for mines and suspicious activity ahead of the convoy. Therefore, V-100s were often near the front of the convoy. Depending on the size of the convoy (ranging from 10 to 300 vehicles), V-100s might also have been present near the rear—though by the end of the war, convoy serials were restricted in numbers due to the difficulty in protecting them. If enough V-100s were available, they were placed throughout the serial.⁵

When a convoy was hit, suppressive fire from military police V-100s was intended to allow the other vehicles to exit the kill zone. Crew members (other than the gunner, who was

providing cover) exited the vehicle to remove Soldiers from disabled vehicles and to collect the wounded. The V-100 then left the kill zone, discharged the wounded for helicopter medevac, and returned to the kill zone to repeat the operation. In addition to evacuating wounded personnel from the kill zone, military police V-100s were used to shuttle ammunition to infantry and other units who were fighting near the ambush site. Therefore, close coordination with supporting helicopter gunships and artillery—as well as infantry units in the area—was essential. The military police mission was to protect convoy personnel and vehicles and to ensure that the convoy reached its designated destination—*not* to attack or kill the North Vietnamese.⁶ Following the ambush, military police provided traffic control around the ambush site and used V-100s to assist in removing disabled vehicles. The military police workload was enormous. For example, on average, the 560th Military Police Company, 93d Military Police Battalion, provided direct support for 12 convoys over a distance of 1,200 miles per day. During the Cambodian Campaign (4 May–28 June 1970), the 560th fought through nine major enemy ambushes, logging more than 287 convoys and 13,670 miles.⁷

The day-to-day military police V-100 mission was described in a 1969 interview with personnel from the 720th Military Police Company, whose convoy support responsibilities included the Quan Loi area. Days typically began around 0500, and trips generally totaled about 200 miles. At about 2300, the vehicles were usually returned to the home station, where they were "topped off" with fuel and weapons were cleaned. If the convoy was attacked or if it ran late due to congestion in the many villages, the military police stayed out overnight. In those cases, they scrounged for food or ate C rations and slept in their vehicles. Too often, they were asked to provide perimeter security; consequently, their sleep was often limited.⁸ However, Soldiers acknowledged that they received some time off—generally 2 or 3 days per month.

In the interview, members of the 720th admitted to some "unauthorized" modifications to their V-100s. They indicated that they had added a minigun to the vehicle's normal armament of two .30-caliber machine guns. And because they might expend their entire basic load within 10 minutes of contact during an intense ambush, they also admitted that—based on their experience that air support was not always readily

available and that firefights always seemed to last longer than expected—they routinely carried more than five times their basic load.⁹ After all, their lives and the lives of the convoy they supported depended on their ability to provide protection. Remarkably, from January 1968 through September 1969, this single military police company sustained more than 88 significant enemy contacts during convoy support operations.¹⁰

On 5 September 1969, while in convoy support, the 720th Military Police Company was hit in a complex ambush. The V-100 commander reported seeing numerous white puffs of smoke on the side of a hill along the roadway. From experience, he knew that the smoke signified rocket-propelled grenades; and he heard the grenades whistling overhead. Two of the convoy lowboys were hit with grenades, but the V-100s were hit only with small-arms fire. The V-100s and military police gun jeeps directed suppressive fire at the white puffs of smoke. While continuing to fire at the ambushers, they sped up and moved through the kill zone—in some cases, noting tracer rounds ricocheting off the V-100s. According to the commander, even after picking up speed for 20–25 minutes, the 720th was still in the ambush kill zone. Cobra and Huey gunships finally put an end to the ambush, but not before the enemy sustained numerous casualties. The commander later explained that just before the ambush, numerous Vietnamese children had appeared in the roadway—probably to purposely slow the vehicles.¹¹ This, again, is a story that is all too familiar to modern-day military police in Iraq and Afghanistan.

On 12 June 1971, a military police V-100 responded to a convoy ambush in the An Khe Pass. While travelling through difficult, mountainous terrain, a combined U.S. transportation unit/Korean supply unit convoy was attacked by a company-size group of North Vietnamese who had ambushed the convoy using B-40 rockets, machine guns, and other small arms. Military police Sergeant Henry Mungle and his unit, including his two-man V-100 crew, responded to the attack as it developed. They fought a continuous, 2-hour battle, helping to repulse the attackers. Sergeant Mungle immediately moved his V-100 armored vehicle into the kill zone to provide convoy protection and to assist the wounded. Under intense fire, Sergeant Mungle exited the vehicle to provide first aid to a critically wounded U.S. Soldier. As he shielded the Soldier with his own body, Mungle called for helicopter medevac support and proceeded to fire his weapon at the attackers. When he ran out of ammunition (following the evacuation), Mungle returned to the V-100 for more. He continued fighting alongside his crew members (one of whom was seriously wounded), moving other vehicles from the kill zone. Sergeant Mungle and his crew eventually evacuated all of the wounded and moved the entire convoy out of the kill zone. They also rescued two Korean Army soldiers, five South Vietnamese soldiers, and three Vietnamese civilians. When the fight finally ended, the military police had expended nearly all of their ammunition, nine North Vietnamese were found dead, and numerous trails

of blood leading into the nearby elephant grass indicated many more casualties. Sergeant Mungle was awarded the Silver Star for his actions and heroism.¹² The Military Police Museum, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, has obtained a V-100, which will be displayed with the name of Sergeant Mungle's vehicle—"Proud Mary II."

The convoys of today face many challenges in moving supplies through the potentially hostile environments of Iraq and Afghanistan. Today's weapon systems mirror the systems deployed in Vietnam. Gun trucks, armored humvees, and the M1117 armored support vehicle are in use, but are vulnerable to mines and ambushes. However, professional military police remain vigilant and dedicated to ensuring that convoys successfully reach their destinations. Today's military police carry on the fine tradition of those who served in Vietnam decades ago.

Endnotes:

¹Richard E. Killbane, "Circle the Wagons: The History of U.S. Army Convoy Security," Global War On Terrorism Occasional Paper (OP) 13, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 2005.

²James Lyles, *The Hard Ride—Vietnam Gun Trucks*, Gallant Warrior Press, Planet Art Publishing, Quezon City, Philippines, 2002.

³Rick Young, *Combat Police: U.S. Army Military Police in Vietnam*, Sendraak's Writings, Farmingdale, New Jersey, 1994.

⁴R. Lathrop and J. Mc Donald, *Cadillac Gage V-100 Commando 1960–71* Osprey, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2002.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Killbane, 2005.

⁷"560th MP Co History," <<http://560mp.tripod.com/560MP/History.htm>>, accessed on 25 January 2012.

⁸"Combat After Action Report: Ambush, Quan Loi Resupply Convoy, 17 July 1969," 46th Military History Detachment interview with Captain Richard Schumann, Company C, 720th Military Police Battalion, 89th Military Police Group, 18th Military Police Brigade, October 1969.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹"Combat After Action Report: Ambush, Quan Loi Resupply Convoy, 17 July 1969," 46th Military History Detachment interview with Staff Sergeant Cal Strong, Company C, 720th Military Police Battalion, 89th Military Police Group, 18th Military Police Brigade, October 1969.

¹²Department of the Army, General Orders No. 56, Silver Star Citation for Henry H. G. Mungle, 31 December 1974.



Mr. Christianson is the U.S. Army Military Police historian.



The Road to Law Enforcement

*By First Lieutenant Benjamin Grimes, First Lieutenant John Kile,
and Second Lieutenant Shane Houle*

In August 2011, the 591st Military Police Company, Fort Bliss, Texas, participated in a month-long training program to prepare for a community law enforcement mission at Fort Bliss. The “Road to Law Enforcement” training program was conducted as a result of lessons learned from a previous community law enforcement mission. The training—which focused on paperwork procedures, crime scene security, drug recognition, officer safety, traffic stops, basic vehicle operations, marksmanship, active-shooter response procedures, responses to domestic disturbances, and hostage situations—was instrumental to the success of the 591st Military Police Company in carrying out their community law enforcement mission at Fort Bliss from September 2011 through the beginning of January 2012.

Fort Bliss consists of 1.1 million acres of land, several access control points, and 170,000 Service members, families, and civilians; therefore, it is an extremely demanding post to police. As a result, the

company approach to law enforcement training was similar to the way in which units conduct “Road to War” training.¹ For their Road to War training, Fort Bliss military police units enter



A Soldier from the 591st Military Police Company conducts a traffic stop during a practical exercise.

a “black cycle” (a predetermined training period) in which they focus on the specific tactics, techniques, and procedures needed for the upcoming mission. Upon completion of the training, Soldiers and units are confident, certified, and qualified to assume their designated mission. The 591st Military Police Company placed that same emphasis on preparing for the community law enforcement mission.



A Soldier from the 591st Military Police Company initiates a traffic stop during a practical exercise.

The 591st Military Police Company law enforcement training covered the scope of the primary daily duties of military police. The 591st coordinated with on-post law enforcement agencies, the Directorate of Emergency Services, Military Police Investigation, and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly referred to as “CID”) and also resourced outside agencies. The company conducted unprecedented joint training with state troopers from the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS).

The 591st Soldiers began their training with Directorate of Emergency Services instruction on the proper procedures for completing paperwork, including Fort Bliss (FB) Form 1303, *Information Worksheet*; Department of Defense (DD) Form 1408, *Armed Forces Traffic Ticket*; and the Central Violations Bureau (CVB) citation, *United States District Court Violation Notice*. FB Form 1303 is an information worksheet used by military police specifically for investigating an incident at Fort Bliss.

The DD Forms 1408 and CVB citations are commonly used across the Army. Military police must be capable of correctly completing these documents to ensure the proper prosecution of offenses. Classroom training was reinforced by scenario-based practical exercises in which the students’ paperwork was used in a mock trial. This further emphasized the importance of following proper procedures and the significance of second- and third-order effects of military police statements.

Military Police Investigation staff conducted training on military police investigation requirements and expectations when dispatched to a scene. The training covered securing a crime scene, sketching a crime scene, and conducting field interviews.

CID representatives presented drug recognition training and described the ever-changing variety of synthetic drugs such as Spice



The 591st Military Police Company and Texas state troopers conduct joint training on high-risk traffic stops.



A Soldier from the 591st Military Police Company is shadowed by a Texas state trooper during a traffic stop practical exercise.

and Bath Salts. The training also included types of packaging and the methods and tactics used to conceal drug paraphernalia and other contraband items.

State troopers from the Texas DPS provided in-depth instruction on basic officer safety. They covered the nine deadly “kill zones” of a motor vehicle, vehicle positions when conducting a traffic stop, the proper approach to and stance at a suspect vehicle, and the process of conducting felony traffic stops. The students of the 591st were then placed in a variety of Directorate of Emergency Services and Texas DPS vehicles and required to conduct multiple traffic stop scenarios ranging from speeding stops to felony traffic stops. During this training, the students were shadowed by Texas state troopers, who provided them with detailed feedback on their performances. Once this stage of training was complete, the class moved on to more complex tasks requiring

partners or teams—the intent being to train and certify individual Soldiers and teams.

Next, the Soldiers of the 591st completed a modified Emergency Vehicle Operations Course led by unit leaders and the



A Soldier from the 591st Military Police Company prepares for his final modified Emergency Vehicle Operations Course practical exercise.



The final week of the Road to Law Enforcement training focused on active-shooter training, which—due to recent events at many military installations—is a priority for the battalion commander and the Fort Bliss Directorate of Emergency Services. Before working the road, military police are required to complete active-shooter training conducted by a certified Active-Shooter Threat Instructor Training Program trainer. The 591st Military Police Company completed

The 591st Military Police Company and Texas state troopers conduct joint driver's training.


Texas DPS. The modified Emergency Vehicle Operations Course consisted of 3 grueling days of intensive driving, focusing on simple, applicable vehicle skills—rather than on conducting high-speed maneuvers such as J-turns. Together, the company and the Texas DPS developed driving courses designed to meet the specific challenges that military police face while performing their duties at Fort Bliss. For example, students were required to perform simple tasks, such as backing a vehicle with the mirrors folded in—which forced the Soldiers to turn around to negotiate the course. To further improve Soldier confidence, the training was conducted on improved and unimproved surfaces. The vehicle training ended with a driving course that tested each of the instructed tasks. The course consisted of more than 400 traffic cones arranged over a distance of 150 yards. Soldiers were expected to maneuver through the course without making contact with more than five cones. Those who were unsuccessful were immediately informed of their deficiencies, provided with remedial training, and required to again attempt to negotiate the course to standard. At the end of the driver training week, the Texas state troopers indicated that they were extremely pleased with the progress of the 591st Soldiers and with their enthusiasm throughout the training. Leaders of the 591st concluded that the driver training was an extremely beneficial composite risk management control measure for the troops as they prepared to assume the lengthy community law enforcement mission. Due to the success of the modified Emergency Vehicle Operations Course, the 93d Military Police Battalion adopted the training for their subordinate units who were preparing to assume community law enforcement missions.

Following driver training, the 591st Military Police Company conducted a week of training on the M4 and M9 weapons systems. Soldiers completed advanced marksmanship training using shoot–don't shoot scenarios.

1 day of classroom training followed by 2 days of intense, active-shooter lanes. The various training scenarios challenged the Soldiers to respond to a domestic disturbance, a barricaded subject, and a hostage situation. During the training scenarios, instructors and role players used airsoft munitions to add realism and provide students with immediate feedback. In addition, instructors continuously critiqued the Soldiers' response tactics.

The Road to Law Enforcement training proved extremely valuable to the 591st Military Police Company. The training greatly enhanced the confidence and competence of the Soldiers and the unit. The 591st now consists of motivated law enforcement professionals who *Assist*, *Protect*, and *Defend*. In addition, the training has also strengthened the partnership between Fort Bliss and the Texas state troopers.

Endnote:

¹Road to War training is a specified training routine conducted by a unit before it is deployed. 

First Lieutenant Grimes is the platoon leader, 2d Platoon, 591st Military Police Company. He holds a bachelor's degree in regional theater from Webster University, St. Louis, Missouri.

First Lieutenant Kile is the platoon leader, 2d Platoon, 978th Military Police Company, Fort Bliss. He previously served as the platoon leader, 1st Platoon, 591st Military Police Company. He also has 13 years of civilian law enforcement experience as a certified police officer for the State of Georgia. First Lieutenant Kile holds a bachelor's degree in justice studies from Georgia Southern University, Statesboro, Georgia.

Second Lieutenant Houle is the platoon leader, 3d Platoon, 591st Military Police Company. He is working toward a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from the American Military University.

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment 716th Military Police Battalion

Lineage and Honors

Constituted 10 January 1942 in the Army of the United States as the 716th Military Police Battalion.

Activated 15 January 1942 at Fort Wadsworth, New York.

Allotted 27 October 1950 to the Regular Army.

Reorganized and redesignated 29 March 1973 as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 716th Military Police Battalion. (Companies A, B, and C concurrently inactivated in Vietnam.)



Campaign Participation Credit

Vietnam

Defense
Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase II
Counteroffensive, Phase III
Tet Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase IV

Counteroffensive, Phase V
Counteroffensive, Phase VI
Tet 1969/Counteroffensive
Summer–Fall 1969
Winter–Spring 1970

Sanctuary Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase VII
Consolidation I
Consolidation II
Cease-Fire

Southwest Asia

Defense of Saudi Arabia
Liberation and Defense of Kuwait
Cease-Fire

War on Terrorism

Afghanistan

Consolidation I

Iraq

Iraqi Surge

Additional campaigns to be determined

Decorations

Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered SAIGON-TET OFFENSIVE

Presidential Unit Citation (Navy), Streamer embroidered IRAQ 2003

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered AMERICAN THEATER

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1966

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1968

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1968–1969

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered SOUTHWEST ASIA 1990–1991

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered IRAQ 2003–2004


Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered AFGHANISTAN 2004–2005

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered IRAQ 2007–2008

Navy Unit Commendation, Streamer embroidered SAIGON

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1965–1968

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1968–1973



U.S. Army Military Police Warfighters' Forum and Military Police Lessons Learned Center Web Site

By Mr. Pascual Cartagena, Mrs. Kathleen Rich, and Mr. Philip Tackett

With the Army heavily engaged throughout the world, the need to rapidly share information is becoming increasingly important. The collection, dissemination, and sharing of observations, insights, lessons, and best practices throughout the operating and generating forces greatly enhance the success of the Army by providing valuable tools to those who need them most. To address this issue, the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) has established a combined, Web-based Military Police Warfighters' Forum (WfF) and Military Police Lessons Learned (LL) Center. This initiative promotes the sharing and collaboration of information and ideas to find solutions to common problems across the Regiment. The new Military Police WfF/LL Center Web site serves as an exclusive "one stop shop," eliminating the need for military police to spend valuable resources searching elsewhere.

The goals of this knowledge-converging crossroad are to improve interface capabilities and provide a seamless mixture of knowledge sharing by coalescing and leveraging current, collaborative-based technology platforms for military police worldwide. This will contribute to a "knowledge enabled" force.

The Military Police WfF/LL Center Web site can be accessed directly at <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/567564> or by clicking on the "MP WFF & MP LL CENTER" button on the USAMPS Web site at <http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/>. Access to the secure site requires an Army Knowledge Online (AKO) user name and password or common access card (CAC) log-in. The Web site contains three primary collaboration resources: Military Police WfF, Military Police LL Center, and Military Police Forums on Protection Net.

Military Police WfF

The Military Police WfF supports the Army WfF Program. It contains several unique and useful tools designed with the user in mind:

■ **DOTMLPF Links Center.** The DOTMLPF Links Center captures and catalogs Web site resources, making it easier to locate relevant information. DOTMLPF Links Center categories include—


- Doctrine.
- Organizations.
- Training.
- Materiel.
- Leadership & Education.
- Personnel.
- Facilities.
- Deployment Prep Packages.
- Library, Collaboration and Resources.
- Military Police Policy.

Efforts to improve the DOTMLPF Links Center are ongoing, and suggestions are welcome. Comments may be submitted by clicking on the "Click" button immediately below the DOTMLPF Links Center menu bar.

■ **Announcements.** The Announcements section conveys major announcements to the Regiment. All documents pertaining to the announcements are also posted. In addition, the Announcements section contains the most recent Military Police Doctrine Update.

■ **Warfighter Video Corner.** Significant conferences and events can be streamed to the Military Police Regiment through the Warfighter Video Corner. Streaming video can also be used to send special messages throughout the Regiment or to deliver professional development materials. The Military Police WfF is one of only a few AKO Web sites with streaming video capability.

■ **USAMPS Courses.** The titles of all USAMPS courses are displayed on buttons in a scrollable section. Each button links directly to the course Web site.



The Military Police WfF/LL Center Web site

Military Police LL Center

The Military Police LL Center provides a platform for posting and sharing valuable information. It is in the process of becoming an interactive center in which organizations sponsor their own folders, which are identified by their own personalized insignia or logo. Designated personnel within the organizations have the exclusive right to administer their organization's particular folder. Two of the first organizations to sponsor LL Center folders are the Army Nonlethal Scalable Effects Center and the Department of the Army Civilian Police Academy. Organizational participation in folder sponsorship helps ensure that the most current information is posted and shared with the rest of the military police community.

The Military Police LL Center also leverages information (obtained during scheduled unit collections) from military police units returning home from deployment. In addition, the LL Center will soon link directly to combat training centers—and other sister Service organizations—to collect military police platoon and company trends following every rotation.

Finally, the LL Center assists the WfF in providing a direct link for Soldiers to submit requests for information (RFIs). RFIs are routed through the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE) and USAMPS and are usually addressed within one business day.

Military Police Forums on Protection Net

Protection Net serves as a coordinating and synchronizing network for Army efforts to integrate the capabilities, activities, and processes required for the protection (prevention and mitigation of adverse effects) of personnel, physical assets, and information. Protection Net is one of the Army's primary tools for facilitating the exchange of knowledge between protection professionals within the operating and generating forces. It uses state-of-the-art, online hardware and software technologies to allow the formation of secure, virtual military communities of practice, which are available to worldwide members on a continuous basis.

Knowledge and experience is transferred on Protection Net through—

- Member-added content, which converts the knowledge and experience of military and Department of Defense civilian personnel into downloadable tools, products, and best practices that are available to *everyone* in the protection profession.
- Direct contact with topic leaders, mentors, subject matter experts, and peers. (In essence, the collective minds of the profession become the subject matter expert.)
- Secure, moderated, peer-to-peer discussions.

The Military Police Forums on Protection Net can be accessed by clicking on the spinning globe, which represents

worldwide collaboration, on the Military Police WfF and LL Center Web site.

The Military Police WfF and LL Center Web site promotes growth in team capabilities through the collaborative collection and exchange of data. It empowers commanders, leaders, staffs, Soldiers, and civilians with knowledge to support the Army mission. Leaders are encouraged to get the word out and to provide feedback so that the site can continue to grow and continue to serve as an effective means of dealing with a very complex and dynamic operational environment.

Endnotes:

¹According to Mr. Brad Mason, chief of the Advanced Concepts Division, U.S. Army Forces Command, "Warfighters' Forums expedite the harvesting, vetting, and implementation of key lessons learned throughout the Army force generation process." (Alexandra Hemmerly-Brown, "Warfighters' Forums: A New Era in Army Collaboration," U.S. Army Forces Command, 13 March 2009, <http://www.army.mil/article/18212/Warfighters__039__Forums__a_new_era_in_Army_collaboration/>, accessed on 17 January 2012.)

²The acronym DOTMLPF refers to "doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities."

³According to Mr. Mason, "Warfighters' Forums are an effective way to deal with a very complex and dynamic operational environment." (Hemmerly-Brown, 13 March 2009.)

The authors of this article are members of the Military Police LL Team, Quality Assurance Office, MSCoE, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

Mr. Cartagena is the Military Police WfF analyst. He is a retired military police sergeant major, and he holds a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University, St. Louis, Missouri.

Mrs. Rich is the Military Police LL Center analyst. She is a former Army captain, and she holds a master's degree in education from Drury University, Springfield, Missouri.

Mr. Tackett is an Army professional forums facilitator for Protection Net. He is a retired chief warrant officer five and former Military Police Regimental Chief Warrant Officer. He holds a bachelor's degree in business management from the University of Maryland.



FM 3-37.2, *Antiterrorism*: A Doctrinal Guide for Preventing Terrorist Attacks

By Colonel Richard Vanderlinden (Retired) and Lieutenant Colonel Craig Benedict (Retired)

Doctrine . . . is a guide to action, not hard and fast rules. . . . Its objective is to foster initiative and creative thinking. . . . It also provides a menu of practical options based on experience from which self-aware and adaptive Army leaders can create their own solutions quickly and effectively.

—Field Manual (FM) 1, The Army¹

What is antiterrorism (AT)? How does it apply to my situation? What actions can be taken to prevent a terrorist attack? If insufficient protection assets are available, can I assume the associated risk? Although there are no precise answers to these questions, the questions are worth contemplating.

Colonel John S. Mosby, Confederate cavalry commander, once opined that “. . . war is not an exact science, and it is necessary to take some chances.”² This statement is just as applicable to preventing a terrorist attack today as it was to defending against Union cavalry during the Civil War. Colonel Mosby’s statement highlights the basic challenges facing virtually all Soldiers in every situation (including terrorist-related incidents): knowing how to act, what to do, and when to do it. Army policy (Army Regulation [AR] 525-13, *Antiterrorism*)³ outlines the *basic fundamentals* of what *must* be done with regard to AT; but it does not account for the endless possibilities driven by available resources, the security environment, and any number of other variables. And until recently, there was no AT doctrine to help “guide” leaders and Soldiers through these considerations. But in February 2011, the Army unveiled FM 3-37.2, *Antiterrorism*—its first-ever AT doctrine.⁴ Now that we are more than a year into the implementation of this doctrinal guidance, let’s reflect on its purpose—to ensure our understanding and to gauge unit success in integrating AT doctrine into Army operations.

Terrorism is a persistent and enduring threat to our Nation and to our Army at home and abroad. As we pursue terrorists

around the world, we must also prevent attacks against our Army community. Units involved in AT (the defensive fight against terrorists) must constantly seek to improve their defensive posture. They must be able to understand the threat; detect terrorist activities; and prevent, warn, and defend against the full range of terrorist tactics. The remedy lies within each organization according to its mission. As early as 1783, American icon Daniel Boone (who was a major in the militia) issued the following instructions to his subordinate commanders: “If [sign] be found, the commander must act as he thinks most prudent—as [he] will be the best judge when on the spot.”⁵ Boone recognized that, because no two situations are ever exactly the same, threat warnings must be addressed according to the situation—rather than by prescribed rules and regulations. Random solutions to unique challenges often lead to chaotic, ineffective solutions; however, Soldiers who are guided by bedrock principles stand a better chance of formulating effective plans. Doctrine, which is a critical element in the formulation of an effective and successful plan, can help guide the way. Within a framework bound by policy and broad principles, Army doctrine encourages resourcefulness and creative solutions that are rooted in history and experience.

AT efforts have undergone significant changes and improvements throughout the past two decades. As President Theodore Roosevelt observed, “We must strike out for ourselves, we must work according to our own ideas, and we must free ourselves from the shackles of conventionality before we can do anything.”⁶ To address the growing and

evolving threat of terrorism, the Army combined the most important elements of AT policy with the practical application and doctrinal wisdom gained from operational forces, installations, and stand-alone facilities. Sound doctrinal principles, tools, and processes have emerged by leveraging extensive AT expertise from across the force; and FM 3-37.2 now provides Soldiers with a blueprint to help build AT plans and programs. It outlines AT principles, integrates AT within the combating terrorism framework and the protection warfighting function, and builds on the Army's effective operations and intelligence processes.


According to FM 3-37.2, the AT principles (which serve as key elements in guiding AT planning, program development, and execution) are⁷—

- Assess.
- Detect.
- Defend.
- Warn.
- Recover.

In addition to describing the characteristics of successful AT programs, these principles support the broader functional concept of protection. They provide operational forces with guidance about how to best protect personnel, units, information, operations, and critical assets from terrorist threats and attacks. Key protection measures include the integration of elements of other programs (physical security, information assurance, military and criminal intelligence, operations security, law enforcement, emergency management), persistent detection, shared understanding, and dissemination of threat information.

FM 3-37.2 assists commanders and units with the integration of AT concepts and principles across the full spectrum of operations, the development of AT awareness programs, and defense against the terrorist threat. It also provides AT officers with an approved doctrinal reference to better guide and support their units.


In an effort to reinforce the new Army AT doctrine, the AT Branch, Headquarters, Department of the Army (DA), established a supporting AT strategic communication theme and products. The goal is to encourage Army forces to embrace the new doctrine, initially focusing on AT principles, planning, exercises, assessments, and supporting AT strategic communication plans. The theme received Army-wide attention during the 4th quarter, fiscal year 2011, and AT



DA doctrine awareness poster

Awareness Month in August 2011. The products and tools that are used to support AT doctrinal manual education include a series of posters advertising the release of FM 3-37; AT principles, planning, exercises, and assessments; and a “how to” primer for developing AT strategic communication plans. These products and other AT information are available on the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) Web site at <<https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/605757>>.

The integration of doctrinal AT principles with constant AT awareness should ensure the safety and security of the Army community while performing the mission. AT Awareness Month and the implementation of an AT strategic communication theme have allowed Army forces to focus on, and dedicate efforts toward, understanding a critical element



DA antiterrorism awareness poster

of doctrine that impacts full spectrum operations. Leaders and units should pause to consider how well they have embraced the new doctrine and what more they can do.

As the Army institutionalizes FM 3-37.2, we must capture lessons learned and best practices to allow for continuous improvement. The legendary basketball coach John Wooden summarized his concept of success in his memoirs, stating, “There is perhaps no stronger steel than well-founded self-belief: the knowledge that your preparation is complete . . .”⁸ By analyzing the peculiarities of a situation, applying AT doctrine, and developing resourceful solutions, the Army can build a “steel foundation” and complete the necessary preparations to prevent future terrorist attacks.

Always ready, always alert—because someone is depending on you.

Endnotes:

¹FM 1, *The Army*, 14 June 2005.

²Charles Wells Russell, ed., *The Memoirs of Colonel John S. Mosby*, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, Massachusetts, 1917.

³AR 525-13, *Antiterrorism*, 11 September 2008.

⁴FM 3-37.2, *Antiterrorism*, 18 February 2011.

⁵John Mack Faragher, *Daniel Boone: The Life and Legend of an American Pioneer*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1992.

⁶Theodore Roosevelt, *Theodore Roosevelt: Letters and Speeches*, Library of America, 7 October 2004.

⁷FM 3-37.2, 18 February 2011.

⁸John Wooden and Steve Jamison, *Wooden on Leadership*, McGraw-Hill, 2005.



Colonel Vanderlinden (Retired) is a principal military analyst with the AT Branch, Office of the Provost Marshal General. He holds a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice from Northern Michigan University and master’s degrees in criminal justice from Michigan State University and strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College. He is also a graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) National Academy.

Lieutenant Colonel Benedict (Retired) is a senior military analyst with the AT Branch, Office of the Provost Marshal General. He holds a bachelor’s degree in history from Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas. He is also a graduate of the Command and General Staff College and Armed Forces Staff College.





NORTH DAKOTA MILITARY POLICE COMPANY SUPPORTS FLOOD OPERATIONS

By Captain Kristopher P. Elijah

During the spring and summer of 2011, vast flooding took place across a large portion of North Dakota. The flooding of four major river systems—comprised of the Red, Sheyenne, Missouri, and Souris Rivers—affected numerous towns and cities, including Bismarck, Fargo, and Minot. The situation required a robust National Guard response. As a result, the 191st Military Police Company, Fargo, North Dakota, conducted several operations in domestic support of civil authorities across the state of North Dakota. This article details the missions conducted and lessons learned during these operations.

Under the standing operating procedure for North Dakota National Guard domestic operations, the state is divided into regional response platforms. A battalion or higher headquarters is responsible for each regional response platform area of operations during an initial response in support of the North Dakota Department of Emergency Services. Once the capabilities of the regional response platform surpass headquarters capabilities, a task force or joint task force is activated and placed in command. The size and scope of the task force depend on the operational mission requirements.

In April 2011, two platoons from the 191st Military Police Company were activated for flood operations. One of the platoons was under the operational control of Joint Task Force—East, and the other was under the operational control of Joint Task Force—West. The company was spread over three counties

and four towns. The platoons conducted traffic control point (TCP), quick-reaction force, and levee patrol missions.

In most cases, communities required a detailed description of military police missions and an explanation of the capabilities and limitations of the military police. However, unit liaison communications with local community members and law enforcement personnel in Lisbon were made quicker and easier since the Ransom County sheriff is a Soldier with the 191st. The fight against the early spring flood in the eastern area of North Dakota was expected, conducted as planned, and concluded in the early part of May 2011.

The 191st Military Police Company was activated for a second time in late May 2011. The spring snow melt in neighboring Montana filled the Missouri River and threatened the cities and counties along its banks, including the metropolitan areas of Bismarck (the state capitol, with a population of more than 100,000) and Mandan. The primary company mission was to conduct TCP operations.

Following an incident on the first night of flood operations in Bismarck, the 191st established major safety upgrades—including extra light sets, improved hand wands, and a new style of road guard vests (adopted from the North Dakota Department of Transportation)—at each TCP. The color of the new road guard vest was neon green, which greatly improved visibility for daytime and nighttime operations. However, reflective neon gloves were not available for operations in

Bismarck. In addition, the company supply and maintenance sergeants purchased detachable light bars and designed mounting brackets for the vehicles at each TCP. The light bars were mounted onto several company humvees, resulting in their visibility for several miles. No major accidents occurred after the TCP upgrades were implemented.

The 191st was designated as “Team Safety” and was responsible for all TCPs in Bismarck and portions of the surrounding Burleigh County. At the peak of operations, this consisted of 28 TCPs. At least two personnel and a humvee were assigned to each TCP. More Soldiers were added at particularly dangerous or busy intersections.

The most vital TCPs were the ones located on the Bismarck Expressway, which is a four-lane highway that divides the city of Bismarck in half. Thirteen TCPs were established along the route to ensure that trucks hauling clay for the construction of emergency levees throughout the city were allowed to freely flow east and west without stopping. Traffic was allowed to pass north and south once a military police Soldier had determined that it was safe for the vehicles to move. Thousands of vehicles passed by the military police, and TCP duty was considered hazardous. However, TCPs were essential for moving thousands of tons of clay so that emergency levees could be built before most of the cities were flooded.

In the early stages of flood operations, senior leaders of the 191st established an effective working relationship with the Bismarck Police Department; this relationship proved vital, as tensions among the civilian population were high at times.

Most citizens in the affected areas treated the Soldiers with high regard, offering them bottles of water, food items, and their heartfelt thanks; however, there were occasional problems. For example, one individual who was driving through a TCP nearly hit a military police Soldier who was attempting to stop the vehicle. The incident was quickly reported to law enforcement officials, who promptly responded and arrested the individual for disorderly conduct.

North Dakota National Guard response during this time frame ensured that most of Bismarck and Mandan were saved from the flooding Missouri River. In early June, the 191st was deactivated and the National Guard Soldiers returned to their civilian employment for about 10 days before receiving their third activation notice in less than 3 months. In the middle of June, the Souris River threatened the city of Minot for the second time in 2011. This time, the flows from Canada were too great to control and the city of Minot and the surrounding communities had to be evacuated.

The 191st Military Police Company advance party arrived in Minot and established relief-in-place operations for five other units. The mission sets included TCPs, quick-reaction forces, levee patrols, presence patrols, and evacuation assistance for four local communities.

A number of National Guard units activated for the Minot flood were unable to bring their senior leaders or operations sections. Because the standard military police company operations section is very robust, the 191st was designated as “Team County” and four other companies were placed under their



A military police Soldier directs traffic at a TCP.



Modified mounting bracket and detachable light bar on a humvee

operational control. Team County was responsible for operations in the towns of Burlington, Minot, and Sawyer (in Ward County) and Velva (in McHenry County).

More than 12,000 Ward County residents were evacuated. Military police worked with the Ward County Sheriff's Department not only to ensure that the evacuations took place as rapidly as possible, but also to ensure the protection of evacuated residences.

Some military police Soldiers were from the local area, so they were designated as sergeant-of-the-guard drivers. These drivers were familiar with the quickest route to the scene and could be on site and responding within minutes. In one instance, the sergeant of the guard was able to rapidly respond to a car accident that occurred near one of the county TCPs.

Due to personal hardships, the 191st was never at full strength during flood operations; Soldiers from other companies were assigned to backfill the gaps. Working within that constraint, one trained military police officer was paired with the newly assigned Soldiers.

As the water receded, the difficult transition from response to recovery began. Homeowners wanted to return to their homes to assess the damage; however, they were not allowed to enter flooded areas until those areas had been cleared by several agencies. The homeowners' frustration resulted in heated exchanges at TCPs that had been established to keep people out of the area for safety reasons. Cool heads and professionalism managed to keep the peace until the areas were cleared. The 191st spent more than 2 weeks in Minot before being deactivated, ending flood operations for 2011.

The major lessons learned by the 191st Military Police Company during the 2011 flood operations are as follows:

- Be prepared to be called early and often for support of domestic operations.
- Establish early coordination with local law enforcement agencies. (This pays dividends later.)
- Use city or county tourist maps. (They work well and are frequently available at local gas stations.)
- Use government cell phones for communication.
- Use neon green road guard vests. (They are more visible than orange vests.)
- Use reflective gloves so that drivers can see hand signals clearly.
- Ensure adequate lighting for nighttime operations. (Personnel can never be too visible.)
- Use local Soldiers as drivers whenever possible.
- Cross-train company Soldiers of other military occupational specialties. (They may be needed at a TCP.)
- Place seasoned military police Soldiers at points where upset citizens are most likely to be encountered.



Captain Elijah is the commander of the 191st Military Police Company. He holds a bachelor's degree in political science from North Dakota State University.

Penal Institutions in the European Theater of Operations

By Master Sergeant Patrick V. Garland (Retired)

During the 1942–1945 U.S. involvement in World War II, a total of 66,993 U.S. Army Soldiers received general courts-martial,¹ thus prompting the need for confinement facilities for those personnel who had violated military laws and regulations or committed crimes against others. The facilities, which were located throughout various theaters of operation, consisted of guardhouses, stockades, military police detention centers, and disciplinary training centers (DTCs). This article describes the DTCs—what they were, where they were located, how they were used, and who operated them.

DTTCs were used to house prisoners who had been sentenced by court-martial to serve more than 4 months' confinement. According to a September 1945 report issued by the provost marshal of the European Theater of Operations, 9,072 general prisoners were confined in DTCs from 1 January 1944 to 31 May 1945; 1,851 of them were eventually restored to duty.²

The 2913th DTC was established at the old Shepton Mallet Prison located in Somerset, England, in 1942. In addition to its use as a confinement facility for individuals who had been sentenced to prison, the 2913th DTC was also used as a training facility for other prisons. Lieutenant Colonel James P. Smith, 707th Military Police Battalion, was named the first commandant of the facility.³ When possible, prisoners of the 2913th DTC were rehabilitated and restored to service. In October 1943, an orthopedic shoe repair program was instituted at the prison. The shoe repair services were beneficial to the Medical Department and were also valuable in the rehabilitation of inmates.⁴ Incurable prisoners were sent back to the United States, and those who were sentenced to death were executed. Eighteen U.S. military Servicemembers were executed at the 2913th DTC in England.

Another DTC was established at the Atlantic Base Section, Casablanca, Morocco, North Africa, on 8 January 1943. The facility was designated as the 6677th (or, alternatively, the North Africa Theater of Operations) DTC, and the first inmates were 179 prisoners transferred from the Atlantic Base Stockade in April. The original staff consisted of 18 officers and 179 others; however, due to the rapid increase in prison population, the staff was soon augmented by troops assigned from the Atlantic Base Stockade guard force and the 2661st Stockade Company (Provisional).⁵ In April 1944, the North Africa Theater of Operations DTC was moved to Oran, Algeria; by January 1945, it had followed the Fifth U.S. Army to Pisa, Italy, where it became known as the Mediterranean Theater of Operations DTC. More than

1,600 prisoners were transported from Algeria to Italy during the move; shortly thereafter, thousands of additional prisoners were received from stockades already existing in Italy. Soldiers of the 342d Military Police Escort Guard Company augmented the Mediterranean Theater of Operations guard force.⁶

One notable prisoner who was confined in the facility at Pisa was the once-admired American poet Ezra Pound, who was indicted for treason by the United States in July 1943.⁷ In the eyes of most Americans, Pound was "guilty of 'giving aid and comfort' to the enemy. . . . And to compound the matter, he continued his broadcasts attacking the United States and its support of 'the coming of Zion' until he was arrested in Genoa [Italy] in 1945 and sent to [the Mediterranean Theater of Operations DTC]."⁸

Annex 1 of the 2913th DTC was established at Bourton-on-the-Hill, Moreton-in-Marsh, Gloucestershire, England, under the provision of General Order 69, Headquarters, Southern Base Section, on 3 November 1943; the facility was to be staffed with four officers and 72 enlisted Soldiers and was to be commanded by Captain James W. Doyle, Corps of Military Police.⁹ The site—which was originally established as a prisoner of war compound, but had not yet been used—was modified to house U.S. military prisoners, and training commenced. From 1 March to 30 June 1944, prisoners produced nearly 30,000 skids, which were used for the handling of cargo during the Normandy Invasion in France. During that same time period, 1,309 prisoners were released from confinement and returned to duty status.¹⁰

On 3 June 1944, Annex 1 of the 2913th DTC was deactivated by General Order 82, Headquarters, Southern Base Section, and Annex 1 of the 2912th DTC was activated at the same location. (It appears that the Shepton Mallet Prison had also been redesignated as the 2912th DTC some time earlier.)



Delta Base DTC, France

It was not long after the invasion of Europe that DTCs were required in the new forward areas. In addition to the Mediterranean Theater of Operations DTC in Italy, there were at least three DTCs established in France—Delta Base DTC (located outside of Marseille), Loire Base DTC (located outside of Le Mans), and Seine Base DTC (located outside of Paris). Security military police from the battle-tested 796th Military Police Battalion were assigned to Delta Base DTC, while other members of the 796th were assigned to the 2913th DTC, where they dealt directly with prisoners inside the facility.

With the exception of the Shepton Mallet Prison, each of the DTC facilities consisted of a “tent city” enclosure. The main compound was designed to enable the segregation of prisoners based on their status, as determined by psychiatric evaluations teams. Prisoners were divided into groups consisting of—

- Those who were considered suitable for rehabilitation.
- Those who were incorrigible.
- Those who warranted solitary confinement.
- Those who were condemned (and, therefore, clad in distinctive black uniforms).

There was also sufficient land available for the rigorous, and often harsh, training that the prisoners would undergo.

Upon their arrival at a DTC, the prisoners received a booklet outlining what was expected of them during their confinement. The booklet that was distributed at the North Africa Theater of Operations DTC contained a welcome statement in which the commandant pointed out that each prisoner had, in effect, deprived his country of two Soldiers—the prisoner himself and someone to guard him. The commandant went on to explain that the prisoner must, therefore, complete the work of two men if he expected to be restored to duty.

Former First Sergeant Fred Waggett, Company B, 796th Military Police Battalion, recalls his days at Delta Base DTC, stating:

Upon arrival at the Center, a man was told exactly what he could do and what he couldn't do—and in this case, it actually meant that he had no choice but to do as he was told, when he was told, and how he was told. Every minute of his time was regulated; and an infraction of a rule, however slight, was punished.

*“Speak only when I speak to you, and you are not to initiate a conversation with any of the staff” [was] an important fact that the prisoner had to abide by. Any violation of this rule would, at least, initiate the “Toes and Nose Rule,” whereby a prisoner would be obliged to stand, facing a wall, in the “at attention position,” for a given period of time, with his nose and toes touching a wall. When he addressed anybody on the staff, regardless of rank, they were to be treated as if they were a commissioned officer, with only the proper “Yes, Sir” or “No, Sir” response, if warranted. In fact, a member of the staff could not be spoken to **unless** that staff person either initiated the conversation (seldom done) and/or was [a] staff [member] able to make any conversation other than to issue an order.*

Picture the entire prisoner population in what is almost a regimental formation on the parade ground, surrounded by a track that was used to punish or to make a man realize that he had to conform to the rules. Several trips around that, without stopping, at “double time,” wearing a full field pack, took the starch out of any would-be problem makers.

The prisoners had no creature comforts of any sort that I recall. Some nights, 4 hours of sleep was a lot. There was a hole in the ground somewhere near the rear that a prisoner might be put in for having committed a

serious violation of [regulations]. It had a steel plate cover like those you see on the roadways today to cover holes. . . .

There was a hospital where you could go if you had a really, really good reason—such as you were at **Death's door**. You did not “ride the sick book” here.

One or more of those buildings where they ate had tables that were approximately chest-high, and the men ate as they walked from the serving end of the table to the other end, where they exited; and their tray had better be empty—or else. The end of the line was overseen by staff, and no excuses for not having finished the food were accepted. You could have a reason, but there was no such thing as an excuse. One man complained bitterly about the rations, so he was given all the **raw ingredients** for that day's chow and [was] dismissed from the mess hall and had to return to his quarters to eat what he now had—raw chow!

The perimeter had a double barbed-wire fence about 20 feet high, with guard towers about every 50 yards or so, and [was] manned by guards with .30 [-caliber machine guns]. In between the fences, there were guard dogs and their handlers. I understand that nobody was ever able to find a way out except through a transfer to [the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks at Fort] Leavenworth [Kansas] or having finished the allotted time.¹¹

“Top” Waggett's recollections are substantiated by a report that was produced by Colonel Julien C. Hyer of the theater judge advocate general's office following an inspection visit to Delta Base DTC. With regard to the prisoners, Colonel Hyer stated, “Their clothing and equipment are uniform, well-preserved, and worn with strict exactness. The retreat and review held each afternoon—rain or shine, 7 days a week—might be equaled at [the U.S. Military Academy at] West Point, but hardly excelled. The food is excellent—definitely above the regular mess level. [The] entire plant is clean and well kept, and there is no atmosphere of a prison about the institution.”¹²

Following the Japanese surrender in September 1945, the War Department announced the inactivation of all rehabilitation centers as soon as possible. A single DTC was established at Wurzburg, Germany, to replace those that had been operating in Italy and France. Prisoners who had not yet completed their rehabilitation programs were allowed to continue their courses and, upon successful completion, were returned to Army service.¹³

By December 1945, prisoners began to be shipped home by the hundreds. They traveled on heavily guarded liberty ships that had been modified for the transport of prisoners of war. According to the 6 January 1946 issue of *The Delta Stage* newspaper, “This past week, the second group of prisoners was sent on its way to U.S. prisons from the Delta Disciplinary Training Center. Some 400 sailed, under heavy guard, on the John Pillsbury liberty [ship].”¹⁴ By the summer of 1946, most prisoners had been shipped home; consequently, the DTCs—with the exception of the Wurzburg facility—were closed.

Acknowledgement: Special thanks to former First Sergeant Waggett for his recollections; to the family of former First Sergeant Glenn Snyder for documents and photographs; and to Mr. Troy Morgan, curator of the U.S. Army Engineer Museum, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, for John R. Patton's article on the “6677th Disciplinary Training Center.”

Endnotes:

¹Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (Pam) 27-100-55, *Military Law Review*, Vol. 55, Winter 1972, p. 40.

²“Statistical Returns of General Prisoners—Office of the Theater Provost Marshal,” *European Theater of Operations*, September 1945.

³“Shepton Mallet (HM Prison),” *Absolute Astronomy*, <http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Shepton_Mallet_%28HM_Prison%29>, accessed on 17 November 2011.

⁴Rex L. Diveley, M.D., and Mather Cleveland, M.D., Sc.D., “Orthopedic Surgery and Rehabilitation,” *Surgery in World War II: Activities of Surgical Consultants*, Vol. II (Chapter 6), Office of the Surgeon General, 1964, p. 467.

⁵John R. Patton, “6677th Disciplinary Training Center,” *Trading Post Magazine*, April–June 2011, pp. 23–27.

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⁷Derek Alger, “Ezra Pound—Traitor/Poet,” *History News Network*, George Mason University, <<http://hnn.us/articles/654.html>>, accessed on 29 November 2011.

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹“History of 2913th Disciplinary Training Center, 15 September–15 December 1943,” National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

¹⁰“History of 2913th Disciplinary Training Center, March–June 1944,” NARA, 1 July 1944.

¹¹Personal communication with former First Sergeant Fred Waggett, date unavailable.

¹²“The Military Offender in the Theater of Operations, Annex 4,” report of the visit of Colonel J.C. Hyer to the Delta Base DTC, Digital Library, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, date unavailable.


¹³A.B. MacCormack and V.H. Evers, “Statistical Study of 24,000 Military Prisoners,” date unavailable.

¹⁴“Redeployment Slows to Crawl,” *The Delta Stage* newspaper, Marseille, France, 6 January 1946, p. 1.



Master Sergeant Garland retired from the U.S. Army in 1974. During his military career, he served in military police units and criminal investigation detachments and laboratories. At the time of his retirement, Master Sergeant Garland was serving as a ballistics evidence specialist at the European Laboratory. He remained in this career field until retiring from civilian law enforcement in 1995.

Book Review



Hidden Wounds: A Soldier's Burden, by Nate Brookshire and Marius Tecoanta, Network 3000, July 2011, 192 pages, ISBN-10: 1934266221 ISBN-13: 978-1934266229, \$19.95 (paperback)



War does for human emotions what a laser does for light particles—gathers and intensifies them to the point that they can be blinding. Throughout the novel *Hidden Wounds: A Soldier's Burden*, we see how the experiences of war can render an individual unable to perceive behavior that is obvious to others. According to a tired cliché, “Time heals all wounds;” but for those who have endured the trauma, the seemingly endless passage of time affords only the dubious opportunity to dwell, relive, question, and regret. The experience becomes an endless movie loop, always playing in the forefront of the mind.

A cruel characteristic of the human mind is its penchant to sow doubt, second-guess and, ultimately,

breed despair. While we acknowledge at the conscious, intellectual level that split-second decisions made in combat cannot bear detailed analysis, our vicious subconscious—that “little voice in our heads”—is always there to undermine our best intentions. Perhaps one of the most oft-repeated questions asked by those who have endured extreme stress is a frustratingly unanswerable one: What could I have done differently?

Hidden Wounds adroitly explores the ramifications of what can happen to an otherwise outstanding American Soldier who, for decades, is plagued to the point of instability by that terrible little voice. In this case, all it took was a single, isolated—but poignant—incident to alter the life of a man and his family. Too often, this is the case with returning combat veterans.

Tragically, much of this Soldier's anguish was self-inflicted. Through his inability to come to terms with the reality of his situation and the feeding of his angst with a secret, constant reminder of “that” day, his self-criticism morphed into a self-destructive quest. The story related in *Hidden Wounds* is not allegorical; the events described happen to Soldiers daily. Struggling to cope with routine civilian activities, troubled by memories that they vainly attempt to alter or erase, and haunted by nightmares, they often stumble through their lives. They “go through the motions,” but fail to slip back into the comfort zone that they enjoyed before heading into combat. To some degree, nearly all returning Soldiers and civilian contractors share that experience.



Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Cucullu (Retired). He and his wife Chris Fontana are co-authors of Warrior Police: Rolling With America's Military Police in the World's Trouble Spots and founders of a project that, by Spring 2012, will provide a working and recreational retreat for post-11 September 2001 combat Soldiers and war zone civilian workers.

MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE LEVEL AND ABOVE COMMANDS

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM	UNIT	LOCATION
David E. Quantock	Thomas J. Seaman	HQ USACIDC	Quantico, VA
Mark S. Inch	John McNeirney	USAMPS	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Zane Jones	Jeffrey N. Plemmons	Army Corrections Cmd	Alexandria, VA
Mandi A. Murray	Daniel G. Lincoln	46th MP Cmd	Lansing, MI
Sanford Holman	Kurtis Timmer	200th MP Cmd	Ft Meade, MD
Latonya D. Lynn	Thomas Sivak	8th MP Bde	Schofield Barracks, HI
Scottie Carpenter	Thomas Legare	11th MP Bde	Los Alamitos, CA
Kevin Vereen	Gerald Stegemeier	14th MP Bde	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Eric R. Belcher	Jonathan O. Godwin	15th MP Bde	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Chad B. McRee	Todd Spradling	16th MP Bde	Ft Bragg, NC
Brian Bisacre	Brenda K. Curfman	18th MP Bde	Sembach AB, Germany
Robert M. Taradash	Dawn Rippelmeyer	42d MP Bde	Ft Lewis, WA
Charles E. Petrarca Jr.	Robert A. Sturdahl	43d MP Bde	Warwick, RI
William Arruda	Joseph Menard	49th MP Bde	Fairfield, CA
Patrick Williams	Peter Ladd	89th MP Bde	Ft Hood, TX
Michael White	Dale V. Clarmont	177th MP Bde	Taylor, MI
Patton Pickens	Dennis Thomas	290th MP Bde	Nashville, TN
Therese M. O'Brien	Edward Simpson	300th MP Bde	Inkster, MI
John E. Cornelius	Andrew Lombardo	800th MP Bde	Uniondale, NY
Jan F. Apo	Andre Proctor	3d MP Gp (CID)	Hunter Army Airfield, GA
Robert K. Burk	Timothy S. Fitzgerald	6th MP Gp (CID)	Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA
Donna W. Martin	Dennis Higgins	202d MP Gp (CID)	Kleber Kaserne, Germany
Timothy J. Chmura	Crystal Wallace	701st MP Gp (CID)	Ft Belvoir, VA
Donnie L. Thomas	Mark E. Porrett	Joint Detention Gp	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

MILITARY POLICE BATTALION LEVEL COMMANDS

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM/1SG	UNIT	LOCATION
John D. Adams	Brian Garon	5th MP Bn (CID)	Kleber Kaserne, Germany
David E. Heath	Vacant	10th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Bragg, NC
Arturo J. Horton	James Sanguins	11th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Hood, TX
Shannon Lucas	Charles Baker	19th MP Bn (CID)	Wheeler Army Airfield, HI
Thomas Russell-Tutty	Clyde Wallace	22d MP Bn (CID)	Ft Lewis, WA
Ronald Bonesz	Jerry D. Clements	33d MP Bn	Bloomington, IL
Erica C. Nelson	Donald Wallace	40th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Stanley R. Oneal	Carrol J. Welch	51st MP Bn	Florence, SC
Guenther Pearson	David Burton	91st MP Bn	Ft Drum, NY
William J. Benner III	Angelia Flournoy	92d MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Vernon F. Lightner	Myron J. Lewis	93d MP Bn	Ft Bliss, TX
Noel C. Smart	Robert Mester	94th MP Bn	Yongsan, Korea
Joseph Decosta	Henry Stearns	95th MP Bn	Sembach, Germany
Elvis Hugee	Eric Mills	96th MP Bn (I/R)	San Diego, CA
Michael Mathews	Patrick Quirk	97th MP Bn	Ft Riley, KS
Arthur E. Zegers IV	Thomas Ciampolillo	102d MP Bn (I/R)	Auburn, NY
David A. Gagnon	Scott C. Smilnich	104th MP Bn	Kingston, NY
Warren R. Wintrode	Alpheus A. Haswell	105th MP Bn (I/R)	Asheville, NC
Clintis S. McCray	James A. Young	112th MP Bn	Canton, MS
Eric C. Brown	Aaron Henderson	115th MP Bn	Salisbury, MD
Barry Crum	Fowler L. Goodowens II	117th MP Bn	Athens, TN
Javier A. Reina	David R. Morgan	118th MP Bn	Warwick, RI
Luis A. Munizmartinez	Armando Estradamiranda	124th MP Bn	Hato Rey, PR
Monica Alpi	Rena Torresestrada	125th MP Bn	Ponce, PR
Calvin B. Jenkins	Ardis Harden	136th MP Bn	Tyler, TX
Teresa James	Lonnie R. Bryson	151st MP Bn	Dunbar, WV
William Allen	John Watts	160th MP Bn (I/R)	Tallahassee, FL
Barry L. Collins	Victor Watson	168th MP Bn	Dyersburg, TN
Wallace Steinbrecher	Donald Madden	170th MP Bn	Decatur, GA
Sharon A. Martin	Edward Stratton	175th MP Bn	Columbia, MO
Clifford W. Carter	James Coltrell	185th MP Bn	Pittsburg, CA

Current as of 6 January 2012

For changes and updates, please e-mail <leon.usampspgo@conus.army.mil>.

MILITARY POLICE BATTALION LEVEL COMMANDS (continued)

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM/1SG	UNIT	LOCATION
Daniel W. Murphy	John S. Carragher	192d MP Bn (I/R)	Niantic, CT
Bren Rogers	Joseph Thill	193d MP Bn (I/R)	Denver, CO
Shontelle C. Adams	Randy Wright	198th MP Bn	Louisville, KY
Michael A. Izzo	Perry Hooper	203d MP Bn	Athens, AL
Rodney Ginter	Jay W. Marsden	205th MP Bn	Poplar Bluff, MO
Scott W. Hiipakka	Jon Sawyer	210th MP Bn	Taylor, MI
Patric B. Conaway	Brian P. Branley	211th MP Bn	Lexington, MA
Steven Garcia	Randy E. Abeyta	226th MP Bn	Farmington, NM
James McGlaughn	Jimmy Patrick	231st MP Bn	Prattville, AL
John Baird	Steven Slee	304th MP Bn (I/R)	Nashville, TN
Jacqueline Gordon	Christopher Whitford	310th MP Bn (I/R)	Uniondale, NY
Richard Giles	Gregory Minor	317th MP Bn	Tampa, FL
Frank Stanley	Louis Ditullio	324th MP Bn (I/R)	Fresno, CA
Dominic Wible	Peter Schimmel	327th MP Bn (I/R)	Arlington Heights, IL
David Heflin	Joseph Plezia	336th MP Bn	Pittsburgh, PA
Jay Pulliam	Keith Magee	340th MP Bn (I/R)	Ashley, PA
Perkins M. Robinson	Juan J. Mitchell	372d MP Bn	Washington, DC
Kevin Keen	Edward Simpson	384th MP Bn (I/R)	Fort Wayne, IN
Eugenia K. Guilmartin	William A. Fath	385th MP Bn	Ft Stewart, GA
Eric Engelmeier	Richard Wieder	391st MP Bn (I/R)	Columbus, OH
Sean Siebert	Allen Freeman	393d MP Bn (CID)	Bell, CA
Kenneth Valcourt	Timothy Eddy	400th MP Bn (I/R)	Fort Meade, MD
John E. Teegerstrom	Lawrence A. Hall	402d MP Bn (I/R)	Omaha, NE
Eric D. Nagy	Jonathan Williams	437th MP Bn	Columbus, OH
Terry M. Nihart	Billy Ray Counts	503d MP Bn	Ft Bragg, NC
Lamar Parsons	Albert Nelson	504th MP Bn	Ft Lewis, WA
Robert Davel	Christopher Muller	508th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Lewis, WA
David Detz	Jonathan Narcisse	519th MP Bn	Ft Polk, LA
Christopher V. Wynder	Daniel F. Borrero	525th MP Bn	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Martin Pennock	Jess Patteson	530th MP Bn (I/R)	Omaha, NE
Marshall Bacote	Norman Garnes	535th MP Bn (I/R)	Cary, NC
John Hafley	Burmiekay Keyt	607th MP Bn	Grand Prairie, TX
Thomas P. Lombardo	Michael Cosper	701st MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Dawn Hilton	Steven Raines	705th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Roger P. Hedgepeth	Timothy J. Lamb	709th MP Bn	Grafenwoehr, Germany
David G. Thompson	Willard Smoot	716th MP Bn	Ft Campbell, KY
Eric D. Brunken	Jon Mathews	720th MP Bn	Ft Hood, TX
Victoria Hudson	Robert Eichler	724th MP Bn (I/R)	Fort Lauderdale, FL
Ross Guieb	Scott Dooley	728th MP Bn	Schofield Barracks, HI
Sydney Wright	Craig Owens	733d MP Bn (CID)	Fort Gillem, GA
Stacy Garrity	Jason Wells	744th MP Bn (I/R)	Bethlehem, PA
Christopher Burns	Larry Orvis	759th MP Bn	Ft Carson, CO
Emma Thyen	Marc Peterson	761st MP Bn	Juneau, AK
Christopher A. Rollins	Jesse S. Perry	773d MP Bn	Pineville, LA
Richard Atchison	Charlotte Randazzo	785th MP Bn (I/R)	Fraser, MI
Randall Thrash	Barry Oakes	787th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Stephen E. Gabavics	Bryan Lynch	793d MP Bn	Ft Richardson, AK
Bryan O'Barr	James Schultz	795th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Matthew D. Stubbs	Paul Ohland	850th MP Bn	Phoenix, AZ
Peter C. Reyman	Anthony Pasqualichio	1000th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Campbell, KY
Edward F. Fears	Christopher Heldt	1001st MP Bn (CID)	Ft Riley, KS
Jason M. Stoddard	Robert L. Code	1002d MP Bn (CID)	Warner Barracks, Germany
Richard Felices	Rhonda Brown	Benning CID Bn	Ft Benning, GA
Andrew P. Sullivan	Marvin Marlow	Washington CID Bn	Ft Myer, VA
Barbi L. Aleandre	Janet Tanner-Booska	Protective Services Bn	Ft Belvoir, VA

Current as of 6 January 2012

For changes and updates, please e-mail <leon.usampspgo@conus.army.mil>.

