
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# Independent Final Evaluation of Combating Child Labor Through Education in Morocco (Project Dima-Adros)

Management Systems International Cooperative Agreement Number: IL-16568-07-75-K






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## 2010




#### **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

This report describes in detail the final evaluation, conducted during October 2010, of the Combating Child Labor through Education in Morocco (*Dima-Adros*) project. The report was prepared by ICF Macro, according to agreements specified in its contract with the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) Office of Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking (OCFT). The evaluation of the *Dima-Adros* project in Morocco was conducted and documented by Monique Bidaoui-Nooren, an independent evaluator in collaboration with USDOL/OCFT staff, the *Dima-Adros* project team, and stakeholders in Morocco. ICF Macro would like to express sincere thanks to all parties involved in this evaluation: the independent evaluator, Management Systems International and its partners, and U.S. Department of Labor.






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#### LIST OF FOREIGN TERMS AND ACRONYMS

Adros (Project) "I Study"—Project administered by MSI (2003–2007)

ALEF (Project) Advancing Learning and Employability for a Better Future

Animateurs/trices Facilitators/Teachers

CLU Child Labor Unit

CPU Child Protection Unit

CSEC Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children

CSO Civil Society Organizations

Dar Taleb Dormitory

Dima-Adros (Project) "Always Study"—Project administered by MSI (2007–2010)

Douar Village within Rural Commune

DT Direction du Travail, du Ministère de l'Emploi et de la Formation

Professionnelle (Directorate of Labor)

EN Entraide Nationale (National Mutual Aid)

GOM Government of Morocco

ILO-IPEC International Labour Organization's International Programme on the

Elimination of Child Labour

INDH Initiative Nationale du Développement Humain

(National Initiative for Human Development)

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MCC Millennium Challenge Corporation

MDSFS Ministère de Développement Social, la Famille et la Solidarité

(Ministry of Social Development, Family and Solidarity)

MNE Ministry of National Education

MoA Ministry of Agriculture

MSI Management Systems International

NFE Nonformal Education

NGO Nongovernmental Organization

OCFT Office of Child Labor, Forced Labor and Human Trafficking

ONDE Observatoire National des Droits de l'Enfant

(National Observatory for the Rights of Children)

Partner Associations Local implementing partner organizations working on the project

TPR Technical Progress Report

Independent Final Evaluation of Combating Child Labor Through Education in Morocco (Project Dima-Adros)

UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USDOL United States Department of Labor

USG United States Government

WFCL Worst Forms of Child Labor

#### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

#### INTRODUCTION

This final evaluation report is for the Combating Child Labor Through Education in Morocco (*Dima-Adros*) project, which was implemented by Management Systems International (MSI) (a subsidiary of Coffey International Ltd.) and was funded by the United States Department of Labor (USDOL) under the Education Initiative cooperative agreement IL-16568-07-75-K. The project had a total budget amount of US\$3 million and was implemented from September 30, 2007 to October 30, 2010.

The goal of *Dima-Adros* was to reduce the incidence of exploitive child labor in Morocco by withdrawing or preventing 8,000 children from engaging in exploitive child labor and providing them with educational opportunities. The project also aimed to (1) strengthen child labor policies and institutional capacity, (2) raise awareness among parents and mobilize them and others to assume a sustainable role in addressing child labor and improving the quality of education, (3) collect baseline and other data on child labor, (4) sustain piloted interventions with government assistance, and (5) create supportive alliances among civil society organizations. Geographically, the project targeted six rural and seven urban areas, mostly in the northern region of Morocco (Chefchaouen and Taza Provinces) and in the region of Marrakech.

#### **EVALUATION OBJECTIVES**

- 1. Assess the relevance of the project in the cultural, economic, and political context in Morocco, as well as the extent to which it is suited to the priorities and policies of the host country government and USDOL (**Relevance**).
- 2. Assess whether the project has met its objectives and identify the challenges it encountered in doing so (**Effectiveness/Efficiency**).
- 3. Assess the intended and unintended outcomes and impacts of the project (**Impact**).
- 4. Assess whether project activities can be deemed sustainable at the local and national levels and among implementing organizations (**Sustainability**).
- 5. Provide lessons learned from the project design and experiences in implementation that could be applied to current or future child labor projects in the country and to projects designed under similar conditions or in similar target sectors.

#### **METHODOLOGY**

The final evaluation took place in October 2010 and was conducted by an independent consultant. The methodology used included a document review; preparation of data collection tools; interviews in Rabat with project staff, relevant government representatives, and the U.S. Embassy labor attaché; field visits to 10 selected sites from the 13 areas targeted by the project; and a presentation and discussion of preliminary evaluation findings with project stakeholders during a

meeting In Rabat. The site visits included extensive interviews and focus group discussions with children (direct beneficiaries of project interventions), parents (indirect beneficiaries), partner associations, *animateurs/trices* (facilitators/teachers), caseworkers, local elected and appointed officials, and provincial government representatives, among other stakeholders.

#### MAIN FINDINGS

#### General

Dima-Adros successfully met its goals at the community level. Direct and indirect beneficiaries, as well as other members of the respective communities and neighborhoods, spoke very highly of the project. They understood the need to combat child labor, believed in the Dima-Adros objectives, and spoke very highly of the MSI team. In a number of rural areas, Dima-Adros was the very first project that showed interest in the respective douars (villages within rural communes) and actually the implemented interventions it had proposed. The vast majority of children interviewed during the field visits were school dropouts, thus implying that the poor quality of education, the cost of education, and the traveling distance to attend school are among the causes of child labor, at least in the areas targeted by the project.

Contrary to its predecessor, Project *Adros*, *Dima-Adros* appears to have been operating somewhat in isolation. It was not as present on the national scene and did not coordinate as actively with relevant counterpart ministries and other organizations. According to one of the stakeholders, the International Labour Organization's International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour, this may have been because of the "new" and additional focus on the rural areas, which required concentrated attention.

#### Relevance

The project design fully supported the five USDOL goals for eliminating child labor. *Dima-Adros* was relevant to Morocco's cultural, economic, and political context in terms of the educational services it provided, its implementation approach of using local partner associations, and the rural and urban areas it targeted. The project was less relevant in terms of its duration, which many of the project's direct and indirect beneficiaries considered too short. Finally, the project design appears to have been slightly overoptimistic as far as gauging interventions that were achievable at the national level.

The targeted research topics—namely the baseline study, the study of the project's tutoring program, and the preliminary study of commercial sexual exploitation of children (CSEC), in lieu of the initially planned study of child labor in the artisan sector—were all relevant to, and advanced, the overall understanding of some child labor issues, barriers, and possible solutions.

Given the delay in the CSEC study and the project's completion date of October 30, 2010, the *Dima-Adros* team will not be able to provide formal technical assistance to the local network that will be carrying out the recommendations from the preliminary study and leading the subsequent study among CSEC victims (conditional upon availability of funds).

#### **Effectiveness**

The project achieved most—and exceeded some—of its targets for withdrawal and prevention at the rural and urban sites. It successfully raised awareness and mobilized direct and indirect beneficiaries, as well as other stakeholders. It achieved its total targets, reaching out to almost an equal numbers of girls and boys overall, though boys were more "difficult" to withdraw than girls. The project was perceived as somewhat less successful and effective in achieving its targets for two national-level outputs: (1) strengthening policies and institutional capacity, and (2) maintaining sustainability.

The tutoring and nonformal education (NFE) programs were very effective and well-delivered. These programs were monitored by the 23 partner associations and their respective *animateurs/trices*. The use of parent-teacher associations (PTAs) as partner associations to implement the tutoring program seems a particularly interesting option for the Ministry of National Education to explore further.

The project has made tremendous efforts in improving the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system to appropriately track the work status of project beneficiaries, though this remained somewhat of a challenge.

#### **Efficiency**

The project's work with partner associations and caseworkers in the rural areas was extremely efficient and effective. However, the partner associations would have benefitted from additional training to build their capacity beyond the scope of the immediate project interventions for the potential continuation of some programs.

The project's budget did not include an M&E budget line item, which seems warranted, given the intensive M&E requirements, including training and in-country travel. Key project documents—such as the logical framework, sustainability matrix, implementation timeline, and Section III.A of the technical progress report (TPR)—should be regularly reviewed for consistency and accuracy to improve project monitoring, management, and reporting.

#### **Impact**

The project's overall impact was extremely positive on both the direct and indirect beneficiaries, and this impact is palpable in the field. Girls and boys who benefited from the different programs—tutoring, NFE, school transportation, and project-assisted dormitories (*dar taleb*)—were very appreciative of these programs, which allowed them to do better in school, mainstream back into the formal system, or continue their education at a middle school away from their village—thanks to the transportation (bus and bike) or the board and lodging in the *dar taleb*. Attitudes toward child labor have changed among parents, who are very proud of their children's accomplishments; many parents have made sacrifices to allow their children to have an education that they themselves never had.

#### SUSTAINABILITY

The project's progress toward sustainability and scaling-up of successful interventions could have benefitted from closer coordination with relevant national entities in the Government of Morocco (GOM). A formal partnership would most likely have provided a framework to guide identification of potential models and negotiation of how to capitalize on the *Dima-Adros* experience. Stronger collaboration with the GOM at the national level would not necessarily have led to more successful implementation at the selected sites, but it would have enabled joint progress assessments for possible adoption of project interventions. The accomplishments at the project sites during the life of the project have been extraordinary. It is the evaluator's strong opinion that the positive changes in attitudes about child labor and education brought about by *Dima-Adros* will not easily be reversed.

Unfortunately, the partner associations have no funds to carry on any of the project interventions on their own, and the partners will probably not be able to successfully lobby for new funding. The project provided them with adequate training to carry out the tasks specified in the partnership document, but it was unable to provide sufficient training on more general topics, such as human resources, financial management, lobbying, and proposal writing.

#### **MAIN LESSONS LEARNED**

**Duration of the Project.** The 3-year duration of child labor elimination projects, especially those aimed at combating child labor in the most disadvantaged, remote, and isolated areas, is usually too short. Such projects should plan for an extra year to assist the local groups in building leadership for identifying sustainable solutions to continue the work they introduced.

**Team Work.** Strong collaboration in the field between local partner associations, caseworkers, elected local officials, parents, and other relevant groups is the key to successful implementation, especially in remote rural areas. The locally elected caseworkers, who are trusted and respected by the populations, are an important element of the team and serve as leaders.

**School Transportation.** Donors perceive investment in school buses as unsustainable because of potential breakdowns or a lack of funds to purchase gas. However, *Dima-Adros* has been able to demonstrate that modest cost-sharing to purchase a school bus can be justified if the management of the bus is in capable and responsible hands. As the experience of the co-financed school buses is still recent, it is presented as a lesson learned and not quite yet as a best practice.

Monitoring and Evaluation. Future similar projects should include a budget for M&E, including funds for transportation and training for M&E. Future projects should also consider tracking project progress and performance using a TPR format that will allow tracking performance from one TPR to the next, as well as for more accuracy overall. The current TPR format does not include a section for "actions/interventions planned for the next 6 months," which could be considered a means to improve reporting. Budgets should include line items specifically for transportation and M&E training.

**Awareness Raising.** Well-targeted, small-scale, and appropriately and repeatedly delivered awareness raising mobilizes people, solidifies messages, and changes attitudes in the long run. Project *Dima-Adros's* direct beneficiaries—and their parents, siblings, neighbors, teachers, school principals, bus drivers, and local elected and appointed officials—all understand the dangers of child labor and the need for children to be educated.

**Coordination with the GOM.** Regarding sustainability and scaling-up potential, the project would have benefitted from a formal partnership or other similar arrangement with one or more relevant GOM entities, probably the Ministry of National Education or the *Direction du Travail* (Directorate of Labor). Project *Adros*, predecessor to Project *Dima-Adros*, was reportedly part of a tripartite partnership with these two departments, which seems to be perceived by the director of the child labor unit as a strong basis for collaboration toward achieving joint objectives, including national-level objectives.

#### **GOOD PRACTICES**

**Baseline Study.** The holistic concept of the baseline study—as designed and conducted at the outset of Project *Dima-Adros*—produced an excellent tool that served multiple purposes, including data collection. Once analyzed, these data were used for "show and tell," mobilization, awareness raising, and planning and reporting. The process appears to be replicable and adaptable to other similar projects.

The project's **afterhours tutoring program** approach, delivered by associations, PTAs in particular, has proven its effectiveness through the beneficiaries' improved scholastic performance, preventing them from early school dropout, and their potential engagement in exploitive labor. The program should be adaptable nationwide, conditional on the project's submission of the results of the tutoring evaluation study.

#### **KEY RECOMMENDATIONS**

- 1. Three-year child labor projects should be required to include a local-level sustainability plan and strategy or they should also plan for an extra year, which would be dedicated to anchoring interventions with relevant partners and counterparts at the local level. Because projects in extreme rural areas need to start from scratch, the extra year is probably more realistic, since it may not be feasible to jointly plan after-project solutions at the initial project stage, when local populations have not had the benefit of experiencing project inputs and potential impact.
- 2. The holistic baseline study concept—as designed and implemented by the *Dima-Adros* team—should be considered as a future reference for similar future projects in Morocco, and possibly elsewhere. Beyond data collection, the baseline study can be used for mobilization, "show and tell," and planning and reporting. The study has proven its effectiveness in mobilizing local populations and changing behaviors toward child labor.

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- 3. Raising awareness of the dangers of child labor and the importance of education appears to be most efficient and effective when carried out on a small scale, such as in small groups or during workshops, when participants are in a situation where they can discuss and digest the information. Functional literacy classes currently offered for farmers, rural women, fishermen, and artisans under the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)-funded Kifayate activity—managed by MSI—seem to offer an appropriate context for extending awareness raising of child labor within these sectors. MSI is encouraged to recommend to MCC and the *Agence du Partenariat pour le Progress* (Millennium Challenge Account, Morocco) that they consider including some of the child labor awareness-raising messages and concepts from *Dima-Adros* in the literacy training materials.
- 4. Because of the delays in conducting the CSEC study, the evaluator recommends that MSI leverage supplemental funds to provide technical assistance to the Moroccan network of associations combating CSEC, to carry out the recommendations of the preliminary study and to fund the core study among victims.

#### EVALUATION OBJECTIVE AND METHODOLOGY

#### 1.1 EVALUATION OBJECTIVE

The Office of Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking (OCFT) is an office within the Bureau of International Labor Affairs, an agency of the United States Department of Labor (USDOL). OCFT-funded projects are subject to midterm and final evaluations. The 3-year Combating Child Labor Through Education in Morocco (*Dima-Adros*) project (September 2007 to October 2010) underwent a midterm evaluation in 2009 and was due for its final evaluation in 2010. In-country field visits for the final evaluation were conducted from October 11 to 22, 2010.

This final evaluation includes a review and assessment of all activities carried out under the USDOL cooperative agreement with Management Systems International (MSI), from project launch through the time of evaluation fieldwork, including the project's progress toward reaching its targets and objectives as outlined in the cooperative agreement and project document. This evaluation assesses the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of the project design, implementation, and management, as well as its impact on the target population (to the extent possible).

The final evaluation seeks to achieve the following goals:

- 1. Assess the relevance of the project in the cultural, economic, and political context in Morocco, as well as the extent to which it is suited to the priorities and policies of the host country government and USDOL.
- 2. Assess whether the project has met its objectives and the challenges it encountered in doing so.
- 3. Assess the intended and unintended outcomes and impacts of the project.
- 4. Provide lessons learned from the project design and experiences in implementation that could be applied to current or future child labor projects in the country and to projects designed under similar conditions or target sectors.
- 5. Assess whether project activities can be deemed sustainable at the local and national levels and among implementing organizations.

#### 1.2 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

#### 1.2.1 Approach

The evaluation approach was primarily qualitative in terms of the data collection methods used. Quantitative data was drawn from project reports to the extent available and was incorporated into the analysis. The evaluation approach was independent. Project staff and implementing partners were only present in meetings with stakeholders, communities, and beneficiaries to provide introductions. The external evaluator was responsible for developing the methodology in

consultation with ICF Macro, USDOL, and the project staff; conducting interviews and facilitating other data collection processes; analyzing the evaluation material gathered; presenting feedback on the initial findings of the evaluation at the national stakeholders' meeting; and preparing the evaluation report. During the field visits and when informants did not speak French, other local stakeholders were generally able to provide informal Arabic–French interpretation. If this was not an option, the *Dima-Adros* driver provided translation assistance.

#### 1.2.2 Data Collection Methodology

**Document Review**. Before the field visits, the evaluator read the project documents, including the cooperative agreement, project document, logical framework and performance monitoring plan, work implementation timeline, technical progress reports (TPRs) and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) reports, correspondence related to TPRs, the baseline survey PowerPoint presentation, the midterm evaluation report, and the tutoring study. These documents were verified during the field visits and information from these documents was used for triangulating the findings of the evaluation. (See Annex A for a complete list of the documents reviewed.)

**Data Collection Tools.** USDOL and other stakeholders developed a list of key evaluation questions. These evaluation questions were incorporated into a question matrix, which the evaluator used to develop data collection instruments to guide the individual and group interviews conducted with project stakeholders in French or Arabic (the latter using interpretation services). The evaluation questions can be found in the Terms of Reference (Annex B).


**Field Visits.** In Rabat, the evaluator met with the three MSI *Dima-Adros* professional project staff (the chief of party, the education specialist and the M&E specialist) and some government officials. The evaluator then visited five of the six rural project sites (Aït Adel, Ain Aouda, Aït Saghrouchen, Skhour Lhadra, and Tassift) and five of the seven urban sites (Chefchaouen, Kalaa, Marrakech, Rabat, and Sale). In each site, the evaluator met with local and/or government officials, and with members of the project's partner associations who had been involved in the delivery of direct educational services. The evaluator visited Ministry of National Education (MNE) primary schools, vocational training centers, and dormitories, to talk to former beneficiaries of the direct educational services provided by the project. While at the primary schools, the evaluator was also able to talk to some parents and to the principal.

Depending on the circumstances, individual or group interviews were held, the latter mostly with ex-beneficiaries and with parents. In Rabat, the evaluator also met with the labor attaché and the country director from the International Labour Organization's International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (ILO-IPEC). (See Annex C for a full list of interviewees).

**Stakeholder Meeting.** Following the field visits, the evaluator conducted a stakeholder meeting that brought together government officials, partners associations, the U.S. Embassy labor attaché, the complete *Dima-Adros* staff, and other invitees. The objective of the meeting was to present major preliminary findings and emerging issues, solicit recommendations, and obtain clarification or additional information from stakeholders, including those not interviewed earlier. (See Annex D for a full list of attendees).

#### 1.2.3 Limitations

The evaluation field visits did not include class observations because the *Dima-Adros* education programs had been completed at the end of the 2009-2010 school year (June 2010). Also, the evaluator was unable to interview the representative from the *Ministère de Développement Social, la Famille et la Solidarité* (Ministry of Social Development, Family and Solidarity, or MDSFS), who remained unavailable after several attempts to schedule a meeting.



#### II CHILD LABOR IN MOROCCO

In Morocco, children work on family and commercial farms in rural areas. In urban areas, children work as artisans and in manufacturing; some boys work in construction and as "apprentices" for mechanics. There are 50,000 children, mostly girls, working in domestic service in Morocco; these children are subject to abuse and to nonpayment or underpayment of wages. There are also 15,000 street children in the major cities of Morocco; they sell cigarettes and plastic bags, wash cars, and beg, among other activities. These children are also particularly vulnerable to selling drugs and commercial sexual exploitation. Moreover, ILO, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the World Bank have received reports of child prostitution in Morocco's major cities. Children are also trafficked internally for domestic labor and commercial sexual exploitation, both of which are illegal.<sup>1</sup>

#### 2.1 USDOL'S Previous Child Labor Experience in Morocco

USDOL has provided US\$8,351,069 to combat exploitive child labor in Morocco.<sup>2</sup> Previous projects include Project *Adros*, which was implemented by MSI from 2003 to 2007 and received US\$3.1 million in funding. This project withdrew or prevented 11,882 children from exploitive labor, mostly in the domestic service sector. USDOL also funded a 4.5-year US\$2.25 million ILO-IPEC-implemented project to combat rural child labor in Morocco. By the project's conclusion in June 2008, it had withdrawn 3,994 children and prevented 7,868 children from the worst forms of child labor (WFCL).<sup>3</sup>

## 2.2 GOVERNMENT OF MOROCCO CHILD LABOR AND EDUCATION POLICIES

The Government of Morocco (GOM) has ratified ILO Conventions 138 and 182, and is an ILO-IPEC participant country. The minimum age of employment is 15, but this restriction only applies to registered businesses with more than five employees; so operations such as family farms, artisan workshops, and other informal work are not covered. The law does provide restrictions on the number of hours and times of day children under age 16 may work, and prohibits hazardous work for children under age 18.

The Ministry of Employment and Vocational Training is responsible for implementing and enforcing child labor laws through its network of labor inspectors; it fines employers who recruit and employ children under age 15. Regardless of these measures, the U.S. Department of State reports that the informal sector is not closely monitored.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> United States Department of Labor. U.S. Department of Labor's 2008 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor—Morocco Country Report. p. 253–254.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> United States Department of Labor. *Project Status—Europe, Middle East, and North Africa*. Retrieved from http://www.dol.gov/ilab/projects/europe\_mena/project-europe.htm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> United States Department of Labor. U.S. Department of Labor's 2008 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor—Morocco Country Report. p. 255.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Ibid. p. 254.

The GOM has a National Action Plan to Eliminate Child Labor (2006–2015), which includes improving implementation and raising awareness of child labor laws, and improving the basic education of children. Sectors such as agriculture (which includes herding), the industrial sector (carpets and stitching), metal and auto work, construction, and hospitality and food production are especially targeted, as are street children and the commercial sexual exploitation of children (CSEC). In March 2008, the GOM committed US\$2.6 million to improve the income-generating capacity of poor families at risk of sending their children to work as domestic laborers. In addition to the USDOL-funded projects, the GOM participated in two ILO-IPEC projects, including a regional project to combat child labor in Francophone Africa (2006–2009, funded by the French Government) and a project empowering boys and girls to combat gender-based violence (2008–2011, funded by the United Nations Development Programme—Spain Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund).<sup>5</sup>

## 2.3 DONOR ACTIVITIES IN CHILD LABOR AND RELATED PROGRAMS IN MOROCCO

Aside from the above projects, there are no other donor-funded projects whose primary objective is that to combat child labor. However, Morocco has a long track record of donor-funded education projects that assist MNE in increasing access to and improving the quality of education. Donors include the Government of France, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Canadian International Development Agency, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency, the European Union, and the World Bank. MNE is currently implementing a conditional cash transfer program funded by the World Bank, which provides small amounts of money to the most disadvantaged families in rural Morocco, thus enabling them to send their children to school. This program was piloted last year in a restricted number of rural areas from among those targeted by the *Initiative Nationale du Développement Humain* (National Initiative for Human Development, or INDH), some of which were also targeted by *Dima-Adros*. The program was expanded to other areas this school year. One of the conditions to qualify for this financial aid is that a child must be receiving formal education; those receiving nonformal education (NFE) are not yet considered.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Ibid.

## 3.1 COMBATING CHILD LABOR THROUGH EDUCATION IN MOROCCO (PROJECT *DIMA-ADROS*)

On September 30, 2007, MSI was awarded a 3-year, US\$3 million cooperative agreement by USDOL to implement the Combating Child Labor Through Education in Morocco Project (Project *Dima-Adros*) from September 30, 2007 to October 31, 2010. Launched on the heels of its successful predecessor, Project *Adros*, *Dima-Adros* aimed at withdrawing and preventing children from exploitive child labor by expanding access to and improving the quality of basic education, and by supporting the five USDOL goals for eliminating WFCL, as defined by ILO Convention 182.

As stipulated in the cooperative agreement and the subsequent project document, *Dima-Adros* targets 4,000 children for withdrawal and 4,000 children for prevention from exploitive labor. The targeted sectors, as stated in the project document, are family and commercial agriculture, domestic labor, artisan workshops, mechanic and auto repair shops, and street work, including CSEC. Geographically, the project targets the rural communes of Aït Adel, Aït Saghrouchen, Sidi Issa Regragui, Skoura Lhadra, Tassift, and Timezgadiouine (replaced by Ain Aouda), <sup>6</sup> as well as the urban areas of Bejaad, Chefchaouen, Kalaa, Marrakech, Rabat, Sale, and Temara.

The goal of the project is to reduce the incidence of exploitive child labor in Morocco. The project's intermediate objectives are to (1) withdraw or prevent children from engaging in exploitive child labor and provide them with educational opportunities (through direct educational services); (2) strengthen child labor policies and institutional capacity; (3) raise awareness among parents and mobilize them and their communities at a grassroots level to assume a sustainable role in addressing child labor and improving the quality of education; (4) conduct research and collect data on child labor; (6) ensure sustainability and scale up piloted models of intervention with government assistance; and (7) create supportive alliances among civil society organizations (CSOs).

The project's approaches and strategies for direct interventions, awareness raising, and capacity building include the following actions:

- Establish NFE and vocational programs for withdrawn children.
- Support shelters for victims of CSEC.
- Establish dropout prevention and formal education support programs for at-risk children.
- Create dormitories for middle school girls in rural areas.
- Improve the legal environment for child labor through training and advocacy.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> This rural commune was not maintained as a target area because of internal commune problems beyond the control of the project. The rural area of Ain Aouda (near Rabat) was selected in lieu of Timezgadiouine.

- Provide M&E support to the government's child labor unit (CLU).
- Create school watchdog/dropout prevention committees in communities.
- Organize anti-WFCL communication campaigns and activism workshops.
- Conduct research on children involved in CSEC and the handicraft industry.

#### 3.2 MIDTERM EVALUATION

A midterm evaluation was conducted in February and March 2009 and consisted of document review; individual and group interviews with project staff, beneficiaries, and other stakeholders; site visits (observation); and a stakeholder workshop. The visited sites included five of the six targeted rural communes (Aït Adel, Kalâa, Sidi Issa Regragui, Skoura Lhadra, and Tassift) and two of the five urban areas (Marrakech and Rabat).

The midterm evaluation found that the project was on track to meet its withdrawal and prevention targets. Parents, students, teachers, and local officials expressed high satisfaction with classes, and attendance in project-supported classes was high (95%). The midterm evaluator found that the project had also positively impacted the capacity building of its implementing partner associations, most of which were newly formed, small groups. The network approach of the project's 23 partners was found to be key to the project's success by midterm. The evaluator found that the project still needed to deepen capacities among implementing associations, and scale up and sustain interventions through civil society partner institutions, since the GOM seemed ill-equipped to take on responsibility for sustainability.

Key recommendations from the midterm evaluation included the following:

- The U.S. Embassy should take the initiative to coordinate USDOL and USAID with the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) investments in primary and workforce education. USDOL should assume an aggressive role in collaborating with other international donor organizations, especially to link contractors, such as MSI, with ILO-IPEC operations.
- MSI should provide technical and material assistance to partner associations.
- While coordination with the government has been advanced, MSI should intensify national awareness of school dropout and the ongoing crisis stemming from neglecting both education and child protection.
- The project should expand the quality of educational programs for children beyond the current offerings.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> No research was conducted on children involved in the handicraft sector because ILO-IPEC was already engaged in a study that included this sector. As of October 8, 2010, the results of this study are not yet available.

## IV FINDINGS, LESSONS LEARNED, AND GOOD PRACTICES

This chapter examines how the project addressed the child labor situation in Morocco, the strategies the project developed, and the activities it implemented. The findings, lessons learned, and good practices are grouped according to the five evaluation categories—(1) relevance, (2) effectiveness, (3) efficiency, (4) impact, and (5) sustainability—and address the specific questions listed in the Terms of Reference (Annex B).

The section on relevance assesses the project's fit in the cultural, economic, and political context of Morocco, as well as the extent to which it fits in the priorities and policies of GOM and USDOL. The section on effectiveness assesses whether the project has reached its objectives and how effective project activities have been in contributing toward these objectives. The section on efficiency provides an analysis of the strategies the project employed in terms of the resources used (inputs) compared with the qualitative and quantitative impacts (outputs). The section on impact assesses the positive and negative changes produced by the project—intended and unintended, direct and indirect—as well as any changes in the social and economic environment in Morocco as reported by interviewees. The section on sustainability assesses whether the project has taken steps to ensure the continuation of project activities after the project's completion, including sources of funding and partnerships with other organizations and/or the GOM, and identifies areas where sustainability may be strengthened.

#### 4.1 RELEVANCE

#### 4.1.1 Appropriateness of Project Design Toward USDOL's Goals

The goal of the "Combating Child Labor Through Education in Morocco (*Dima-Adros*)" Project is to reduce the incidence of exploitive child labor in Morocco. Its purpose is to withdraw or prevent children from engaging in exploitive child labor and provide them with educational opportunities. The evaluator found that the project design supports the five USDOL goals, as illustrated by the following table:

Table 1: Project *Dima-Adros's* Objectives, Strategies, and Outputs as Designed in Response to the USDOL Goals

USDOL Goals	Project Objectives/Strategies/Outputs
Withdrawing or preventing children from involvement in exploitive child labor	Withdrawal and prevention via direct educational services:
through the provision of direct educational services	Provide NFE and vocational programs to children withdrawn from exploitive child labor (estimated at 4,000)
	<ul> <li>Provide school tutoring programs (dropout prevention) for at-risk children in the formal system (estimated 4,000)</li> </ul>
	Support shelters for child victims of CSEC exploitation
	Create dormitories for girls in rural areas to allow girls access to middle school

USDOL Goals	Project Objectives/Strategies/Outputs			
Strengthening policies on child labor and education, the capacity of national institutions to combat child labor, and formal and transitional education systems that encourage children engaged in or at risk of engaging in exploitive labor to attend school	Strengthening policies and institutional capacity:  Improve the Moroccan legal environment through training and advocacy  Create school watchdog committees for dropout prevention  Support/strengthen CLU			
Raising awareness of the importance of education for all children and mobilizing a wide array of actors to improve and expand education infrastructures	<ul> <li>Awareness and mobilization:</li> <li>Organize awareness-raising campaigns</li> <li>Involve parents in the education of their children</li> <li>Train implementing associations in raising awareness of the dangers of child labor and the need to enroll and retain children in school</li> </ul>			
Supporting research and the collection of reliable data on child labor	Research and studies:     Conduct a baseline study on project beneficiaries     Conduct a study on the project's tutoring program     Conduct a study on children working in the handicrafts sector			
Ensure the long-term sustainability of these efforts	<ul> <li>Ensuring long-term sustainability:</li> <li>Develop regional models of school watchdog committees</li> <li>Develop an action plan to help create networks to combat child labor in targeted areas</li> <li>Create alliances among CSOs</li> </ul>			

An assessment of the extent to which the project was able to implement the activities, as designed, is included in Section 4.2.1 below.

#### 4.1.2 Relevance of Project Assumptions

The logical framework for *Dima-Adros*<sup>8</sup> lists four critical assumptions at the project-purpose level, related to the GOM's role and commitment to the project at the national level. There are seven critical assumptions for Output 1, *Direct Educational Services*, five of which are directly related to the project's partners and implementers in the targeted areas, while two are of a general nature, related to Morocco's poverty situation and to the GOM's capacity to better coordinate child labor interventions at the national and local levels.

Based on discussions with project staff and government officials, the evaluator concluded that the assumptions were accurate at the time of the project document's development. In retrospect, however, some are less accurate, such as "the GOM honoring its commitment to work with the project" and "school dropout watchdog committees hold regular meetings to which [parent-teacher associations or] PTAs are invited." In case of the former, MDSFS, one of the most committed government partners to the predecessor, Project *Adros*, and equally committed to *Dima-Adros* at the project document development stage, did not honor its commitment after the change in

<sup>8</sup> Management Systems International. *Project Document Under USDOL and MSI Cooperative Agreement*, p. 42.

leadership in October 2007 following elections. A similar situation occurred with the school watchdog committees. MNE new leadership launched the new Emergency Plan, which did not maintain the watchdog committee model as a strategic priority in combating school dropout.

#### 4.1.3 Criteria for Defining Exploitive, Withdrawn, and Prevented

Per the project document, interventions were to target children engaged in *exploitive* labor, defined as labor that prevents children from obtaining an education (for children age 15 and younger) and exposes them to risks to their health and/or physical and psychological development. The sectors that were targeted by the project included agriculture/farming (exposure to pesticides, heavy loads, proximity to dangerous machinery, and long hours), handicrafts (long hours, toxic fumes and chemicals, and flammable substances), mechanic shops (long hours, machinery, and dangerous products), construction sites (carrying heavy loads and risks of falling), girls' domestic labor (long hours and physical/verbal abuse), street children (sexual abuse and physical violence), and prostitution (sexual exploitation).

The project defined a *withdrawn* child as a child engaged in any type of labor (including children who were also attending formal school), who was provided with project-funded direct educational services, and as a result, is no longer working. The project defined a child as *prevented* when that child had been identified as being at risk of engaging in child labor (because of poor background, siblings who work, or poor grades, among other characteristics), was provided with project services (tutoring, NFE, dormitories, or transportation to and from school), and as a result, the child continued in the formal system.

From interviews with parents and former beneficiaries, the evaluator found the above criteria to be in line with the USDOL criteria, in that the children targeted were engaged in labor that prevented them from obtaining an education or impeded them in learning (ILO Convention 138), and that they were no longer working, or were no longer at risk of engaging in work, as a result of project direct educational services.

#### 4.1.4 Project Strategies and Rationale

The main project strategies, which were designed to meet the objectives in withdrawing and preventing children from WFCL, were the following:

- Establish NFE and vocational programs for withdrawn children.
- Establish dropout prevention and formal education support programs for at-risk children.
- Create dormitories for middle school girls in rural areas.
- Support shelters for victims of CSEC.
- Improve the legal environment for child labor through training and advocacy.
- Provide monitoring and evaluation support to the government's CLU.
- Create school watchdog/dropout prevention committees in communities.

- Organize anti-WFCL communication campaigns and activism workshops.
- Conduct research on children involved in CSEC and the handicraft industry.

The general rationale behind these strategies involved the Moroccan public school system, which is underperforming in terms of access and quality. The schools' holding power is weak, which leads to early school dropout, and in turn puts children at high risk of engaging in labor, paid or unpaid. While Morocco is aware of its child labor challenge and has made strides to combat it, much remains to be done. International donor projects are well-placed to assist in improving the legal environment, as well as in direct withdrawal and prevention of children from exploitive labor. The rationale behind the strategies in support of CSEC is to help understand the breadth and depth of this serious issue to determine how to address CSEC in the most appropriate and efficient way.

#### 4.1.5 Obstacles or Barriers to Addressing Child Labor in Morocco

The project identified several barriers to effectively addressing child labor in Morocco, which were all confirmed by the various interviewees during the field trip and by the government officials. The most important obstacles were poverty, the cost of education, the poor quality of education (poor teaching, teacher absenteeism, and poor physical infrastructure), and the distance of schools from children (particularly in rural areas). Parents and children have negative attitudes toward the formal education system, and parents are unaware of the role they can play to change the school environment. This is especially true in poorer urban and rural areas. Another important barrier is that parents are not aware of child labor hazards.

Addressing child labor in agriculture presents other barriers in addition to poverty. It is difficult to change entrenched cultural attitudes regarding the appropriateness of children helping on the farm and to convince parents to let their school-aged children go to school or to limit the hours and types of work they assign to their children age 16 to 18. Another challenge is persuading parents in rural areas to allow children to attend middle school in urban or semi-urban centers, and that the sacrifices necessary to overcome transportation barriers will be worth the education gained.

A final, but not less important barrier is the difficult identification of children engaged in certain types of exploitive child labor—particularly *petites bonnes* (house domestic girls), street children, and CSEC—who tend to be invisible.

The evaluator was not able to determine how the project addressed the identification of children engaged in those types of exploitive labor. However, the project has been successful in addressing most of these barriers by providing quality education programs, such as the NFE program (including school supplies), the tutoring program, transportation to and from school, and dormitory fees for young girls whose parents cannot afford them. Awareness campaigns on the dangers of child labor and the importance of education have helped change the attitudes of many parents, including those in the most remote and rural areas.

### 4.1.6 Appropriateness of Project Design for Cultural, Economic, and Political Context

The project design was appropriate for the Moroccan cultural, economic, and political context. Morocco is committed to combating child labor, as demonstrated by its ratification of ILO Conventions 138 and 182. The GOM has made progress and there is political will, but much remains to be done. Projects like *Dima-Adros* help to advance the agenda and provide additional tools to the GOM. The project fits well in Morocco's socioeconomic development agenda, as it contributes to the country's efforts in respecting the rights of the child, combating child labor, improving the quality of education, reducing early school dropout, and improving skills development among youth. As for the cultural context, interviewees at the different project sites confirmed that the project design was very appropriate. Very few cultural barriers remain that prevent children from going to school. The only project component that was politically sensitive was the CSEC component, as demonstrated by the local government, which did not allow the project to interview CSEC victims as part of the CSEC study in Marrakech. According to the director of the CLU, the GOM leader in combating child labor, the issue is no longer taboo and there is general awareness of the atrocities and the urgent need to provide prevention and protection strategies.

All interviewees agreed that the country has made great strides in education but much was left to be done before each and every child would enter and complete at least the basic education program, let alone continue on to middle and high school. Given the extremely difficult economic circumstances at the project sites, the local officials and the populations in general were grateful for the educational and other direct services. All expressed regret about the project's October 31, 2010 completion date, as they would like the children to continue the highly valued education programs. For many communities, *Dima-Adros* was the very first assistance initiative in their respective regions.

#### 4.1.7 Project Fit Within Existing Similar (GOM) Programs

There are several GOM initiatives to combat child labor. The most significant was created by the Ministry of Employment and Vocational Training and the ILO—the Child Labor Unit, which has office space, its own staff, and a budget. The CLU, attached to the *Direction du Travail* (Directorate of Labor, or DT) has been "built, equipped and trained" by ILO-IPEC and UNICEF; it has in turn trained 350 labor inspectors and provincial focal points in identification, protection, and withdrawal of children engaged in exploitive labor. The CLU runs a grants program in which nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can compete for annual grants to implement programs in support of reducing the incidence of child labor. The grantees' programs must result in fully withdrawing children under age 15 from work and improve the work status of those between age 15 and 18 who are engaged in hazardous work. NGOs that are successful can have their grants renewed for a subsequent year. From information gathered, it appears that these programs mainly take place in urban areas and do not concern the agricultural sector, where incidence of child labor is the highest. As for collaboration between the CLU and the project, the project advocated for strengthening the CLU's management and coordination capacity through training in M&E, financial management, and communication. It developed a training plan that was submitted to the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Survey findings. GOM Moroccan High Commission for Planning. June 2010.

Ministry for approval, but has remained without follow-up. While the project did provide limited training in project monitoring, the director of the CLU did not perceive this training as relevant. During the interview with the evaluator, the director claimed that there had been very little direct collaboration between the project and the CLU, but did say that both parties are familiar with each others' work, share the same objectives, are part of the same network, and are both members of the National Committee for Child Labor.

In 2007, MDSFS established the Child Protection Unit (CPU) in Marrakech. Currently there are four CPUs in Morocco (Casablanca, Marrakech, Meknes, and Tangier), and one (Essaouira) is being established. These government entities have been created by law to combat violence against children, including CSEC, and are responsible for coordination between the focal points designated within the various departments, such as labor, justice, police, education, and health, to intervene in cases of violence against children. Since its creation, the CPU in Marrakech has been in dire straits, awaiting enactment of the law. In the meantime, it is operating as an NGO under the supervision of the city hall, but staff members, including the treasurer, have left over the past months; this has blocked access to funding. In 2007, UNICEF provided staff training, and in 2008, *Dima-Adros* provided technical assistance for strategic planning and the development of an action plan, which, with the exception of some awareness- raising messages that were aired over the regional radio, has not yet been implemented because of the lack of funds.

Finally, the GOM has an Education Emergency Plan 2009-2015, implemented by MNE, to increase access to education, improve its quality, and decrease grade repetition and dropout. While this GOM initiative does not combat child labor directly, it contributes to the creation of an environment conducive to reducing the incidence of child labor. The project has worked in support of the Emergency Plan's objectives to reduce school dropout and improve quality, through its educational interventions in the rural and urban target areas. The tutoring program helped the GOM in its efforts to reduce school dropout and improve quality, while the NFE program supported access to education for out-of-school children of school age.

#### 4.1.8 Adjustments Following the Midterm Evaluation Recommendations

As stated in Section III, the midterm evaluation (February to March 2009) resulted in four key recommendations. Based on the document review and interviews with project staff and the labor attaché, the evaluator concluded that the project did not make any formal implementation adjustments based on these recommendations, but considered as follows:

1. Future projects should be better coordinated with other United States Government (USG) activities in the country to increase project leverage and resources and have a more collaborative approach in order to achieve better impact.

**Action:** Considered not relevant. USG partners did not consider it their role to coordinate with other USG projects and international donors, respectively, on behalf of the project. MSI was a subcontractor to the USAID/Advancing Learning and Employability for a Better Future (ALEF) project completed in August 2009, and as such, was able to apply relevant ALEF experience to *Dima-Adros*. The MCC compact does not include primary education, but has a functional literacy and vocational training activity, which targets farmers, fishermen, artisans for functional literacy, and artisans and artisans-to-be for

vocational training. MSI won the management contract for the Kifayate (competencies) activity in March 2010.

2. MSI should provide technical and material assistance to partner associations.

**Action:** The project has continued, as planned, to provide technical and training assistance to its partner associations during the remainder of the project, strengthening their capacity to deliver their respective educational services successfully.

3. While coordination with the government has been advanced, MSI should intensify national awareness of school dropout and the ongoing crisis stemming from negligence of education and child protection.

**Action:** The project has continued to implement awareness-related interventions, as planned.

4. The project should expand the quality of educational programs for children beyond current offerings.

**Action:** The project has continued to closely monitor the educational programs, paying particular attention to the needs of the beneficiaries and the process of mainstreaming children into the formal system, as planned.

#### 4.1.9 Relevance of Targeted Research Topics

The project document listed three topics for action research/studies: (1) the baseline study, (2) the tutoring study, and (3) a study of children working in the handicraft industry. The baseline study collected in-depth data on the six rural communes identified for project assistance, which served as the basis for the development of communal actions plans with the stakeholders of the six communes, as well as for the performance monitoring plan.

The study on tutoring was completed in the third year of the project (2010). It was extremely relevant for the project to evaluate its tutoring approach, which had been implemented since Project *Adros* and which MNE had authorized for use in the project-assisted schools. During implementation, *Dima-Adros* staff members were able to observe classes occasionally, and partner associations fulfilled the project's reporting requirements, but there had not been an independent evaluation, which was considered desirable and timely. The findings demonstrate that the project's tutoring approach is relevant and efficient. The consultant submitted a copy of the study to the NFE department of MNE. The project itself, however, was unable to present the results officially at a seminar, as initially planned, because of the lack of time.

The study on the handicraft sector was not carried out because ILO-IPEC, in collaboration with UNICEF (the funder), had already engaged in a broader study addressing child labor in several sectors, including the artisan sector. <sup>10</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> As of November 8, 2010, the study is not yet available.

As a third study, the project conducted a study on CSEC in Marrakech, which was relevant in terms of the magnitude of the problem and for addressing the issue of the "invisible" victims and abusers. Some local GOM officials appear to have perceived the project as nonrelevant, as they did not grant the project authorization to interview CSEC victims.<sup>11</sup>

### 4.1.10 Other Issues Related to the Design and/or Implementation of the Project

**Duration of the Project.** Many of the project's partner associations, *animateurs/trices* (facilitators/teachers), parents, and other stakeholders who were interviewed during the field visits expressed great regret about the project's October 31, 2010 end date. For these stakeholders, particularly those from the rural communes, the actual project interventions only started in the second year and covered 2 years, which in their perspective is hardly sufficient time to sustain the changes that the project has started to bring about. The project team members assured the evaluator that they had informed the various groups from the first encounter of the limited duration of the project and the need to think about the "after project." Regardless of the initial warning, all parties expressed a need for continued project assistance to help plan next steps and negotiate with relevant local government entities and other parties.

**Project Documents.** The various key project documents that were developed at the design stage, such as the logical framework, the implementation timeline, and the sustainability matrix, have not been subject to subsequent reviews to confirm their continued relevance to the implementation environment and accuracy for reporting. The midterm evaluation did not raise the need for revision. It appears to the evaluator, however, that project implementation and reporting would have benefitted from timely reviews and updates.

#### 4.1.11 Lessons Learned and Good Practices

#### Lessons Learned

**Duration of the Project.** Three-year child labor elimination projects, especially those that aim to combat child labor in the most disadvantaged, remote, and isolated areas, seem too short. Such projects should plan for an extra year to assist the local groups in building leadership for identifying sustainable solutions to continue the work introduced by the project and include action items on sustainability in their implementation process.

**Project Design Documents.** The use of outdated indicator tables and other key project documents hinders accurate reporting of project progress and performance.

**Accuracy of Assumptions.** Similar projects should be sensitive to the fact that their assumptions may not hold true and should therefore undergo midcourse reviews and corrections to keep governments engaged.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> During the presentation of the preliminary results of the study, the project was informed that the barrier to conducting a study involving the victims had been removed.

**Collaboration with the CLU.** The project should have taken advantage of the CLU's annual grants program to find additional resources to sustain its activities. Additionally, the project should have collaborated more closely with the CLU to determine how to best assist the unit through useful trainings or other coordination.

#### **Good Practices**

**Baseline Study.** The holistic concept of the baseline study, as designed and conducted at the outset of *Dima-Adros*, resulted in an excellent tool that served multiple purposes, including first and foremost the collection of data. The project then organized group sessions to present the findings of the data collection as a basis for participatory and joint action plan development. This "show and tell" for mobilization, awareness raising, planning, and reporting was eye-opening to remote populations, according to the project staff. The process appears to be replicable and adaptable to other similar projects.

#### 4.2 EFFECTIVENESS

#### 4.2.1 Project Targets and Objectives, and Factors of Success

The following section assesses the degree to which the project has achieved its targets and objectives/strategies, as stated in the project document (objectives/strategies) and the TPR's performance information and assessment (targets).

#### Objective/Strategy 1. Withdrawal and prevention via direct educational services

The project aimed to withdraw 4,000 children and prevent 4,000 children, for a total of 8,000 children, equally divided between girls and boys.

The Project has *exceeded* these targets for total children withdrawn and prevented, as well as for total number of girl beneficiaries, as illustrated in Table 2.

Table 2: End-of-Project Status of Direct Beneficiaries 12

		Preve		ented Withdrawn		TOTAL		
Cohort	Program	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	тот
1	Tutoring	123	102	0	0	123	102	225
	NFE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	Tutoring	903	897	95	106	998	1,003	2,001
	NFE	11	15	1,205	706	1,216	721	1,937
3	Tutoring	759	804	488	504	1,247	1,308	2,555
	NFE	337	108	696	415	1,033	523	1,556
Grand Total (8,274) Prevented: 4,059 Withdrawn: 4,215		2,133	1,926	2,484	1,731	4,617	3,657	8,274

Source: Dima-Adros M&E Specialist, October 18, 2010

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Exclusive of CSEC (33) and Trafficked children (196). Source: *Dima-Adros* M&E.

The table presents interesting data that can be summarized as follows:

- 56% of all beneficiaries were girls; 44% were boys.
- 58% (2,484) of the total 4,215 *withdrawn* children were girls; 42% (1,731) were boys.
- 23.4% (583) of the *withdrawn* girls and 35% (610) of the *withdrawn* boys were withdrawn from work while attending school and were reported as beneficiaries of the tutoring program.
- 76.6% (1,901) of the *withdrawn* girls and 65% (1,121) of the *withdrawn* boys were withdrawn from work while out of school and were reported as beneficiaries of NFE.
- 64% (2,249) of the total 3,493 NFE beneficiaries were girls; 36% (1,244) were boys.
- 52.5% (2,133) of the total 4,059 *prevented* children were girls; 47.5% (1,926) were boys.
- 49.8% (1,785) of the total *prevented* girls and 50.2% (1,803) of the total *prevented* boys were prevented from engaging in child labor while attending formal primary school and were therefore reported as beneficiaries of the tutoring program.
- 8.6% (348) of the total *prevented* children (4,059) were girls who were prevented from engaging in child labor while out of school and were therefore reported as NFE beneficiaries; 3% (123) were boys.
- 49.5% (2,368) of the total beneficiaries of the tutoring program (4,781) were girls; 50.5% (2,413) were boys.

The following project data, <sup>13</sup> not included in the above, provides the breakdown between urban and rural beneficiaries:

- 63% (38% girls, 25% boys) were withdrawn or prevented in urban areas.
- 37% (18% girls, 19% boys) were withdrawn or prevented in rural areas.

These few statistics indicate that more girls than boys benefitted from the project overall; in the NFE program, girls outnumbered boys in the *withdrawn* category, and as beneficiaries in urban areas. The tutoring program had equal enrollment among boys and girls, and boys and girls equally benefitted from the project in rural areas. While no analysis has been conducted to understand the reason for the higher number of girls in the specific categories and overall, the evaluator concluded that boys were more difficult to convince to go back to school because they were most likely engaged in paid work, while girls tended to stay home and help their mothers with no pay.

One factor that contributed to the overall success in achieving these targets was that the parents of children in the rural areas were mobilized from the beginning, project staff and partners listened to them, which is not very customary in Morocco when dealing with disadvantaged communities.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Source: *Dima-Adros* end-of-project table: Project enrollees by geographic area. October 18, 2010.

They were included in the baseline study and later in the workshop where the baseline results were presented, discussed, and translated into communal action plans. The partner associations, elected officials, local government officials, and other stakeholders were also included in the baseline study and workshops. Parents understood the dangers of child labor and the need for their children to be educated. The prospect of accessible vocational training was, for many, one of the driving factors in sending their children back to school. Another factor of success was the selection, according to interviewees, of the project's "on-the-ground caseworkers," who coordinated interventions among several parties and brought issues or problems to the attention of the project or resolved them directly with local government or other entities, as needed. Strong commitment to the job at hand, as well as the support of the caseworkers, local government, and elected officials, all contributed to the ability of four rural communes and their respective douars (villages within rural communes) to successfully implement 80% of their respective actions plans. 14 Two communes had problems: (1) Timezgadiouine faced internal power struggles that forced termination; and (2) Skoura Lhadra, where the project did not reach the target of "at least 50% of the action plan implemented".

As for the urban areas, where the project was able to build off previous experience from Project Adros, the continued coaching of partner associations along with training of the animateurs/trices were the main factors contributing to the project's success in reaching beneficiary targets. During field visits to some of the project's urban and peri-urban schools, the evaluator was impressed to hear the regular school teachers talk about their experiences with the tutoring program. The teachers spoke about how they were able to assist in the identification of at-risk children and how pleased they were with the academic performance and overall positive attitudes of the children who had benefitted from the program. The evaluator was also impressed by how much these teachers, as well as the partner associations and the animateurs/trices, knew about the individual children's family issues.

The project also exceeded its target for mainstreaming NFE beneficiaries into formal education (10% for girls and 5% for boys). Of the total 3,493 NFE beneficiaries, 505 (14.5%)<sup>15</sup> were mainstreamed into formal primary/middle schools or formal vocational training centers (Office de Formation Professionelle et de la Promotion du Travail [Office of Vocational Training and the Promotion of Labor], Agriculture, Entraide Nationale [National Mutual Aid, or EN]). These results were higher than the national average which was reported as 10%.

As part of the direct educational services, the project planned the creation of six dormitories for girls in rural areas to allow them to attend middle school, one in each rural site targeted for project assistance. This target was not achieved. During the participatory development of the community action plans, only three of the six communities expressed interest in the dormitory option to further the education of their female children; others preferred the school transportation arrangements. Also, there were existing dormitory structures (dar taleb) in each of the three communities. Therefore, the project was able to build off of existing dar taleb in lieu of creating new structures. The project paid dormitory fees for over 120 girls from poor families (US\$12 per

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Status as of February 2009 (TPR September 2010) is four communes implemented at least 50% of their action plans. It is assumed that the end of project status would be 80% (tbc).

15 Source: *Dima-Adros* records as of October 31, 2010. Boy-girl breakdown not (yet) available, confirmation of

additional insertions is expected.

girl per month), in addition to modest infrastructure improvement, bedding, and library books, among other services.

Table 2 does not include children withdrawn from CSEC and trafficking. The evaluator learned from the project staff that the project had not prevented or *withdrawn* any CSEC or trafficking victims, or provided them with project-funded direct educational services, because the CPU's confidentiality policy regarding victims' personal information did not permit access to them. In Section III.B of the project's most recent TPR at the time of the evaluation: *Performance Information and Assessment*, in particular Sections III.B2 and III.B3, the project reported 196 children victims of trafficking as withdrawn and 33 CSEC victims as *withdrawn*. This reflects the number of victims recorded by the CPU who were subsequently referred to shelters or returned to their respective families. The rationale for reporting these numbers is that the project provided technical assistance to the CPU for the development of its action plan and its tracking system.

#### Objective/Strategy 2. Strengthening Policies and Institutional Capacity

The project was quite ambitious and optimistic in its targets for this objective, as illustrated by the fact that some of the targets were not met. One example is the target for the law on domestic child labor, which was expected to be passed and implemented, or at least presented to parliament; this target was not met. The project also expected the Ministry of Justice to issue a memorandum criminalizing intermediaries in domestic child labor recruitment, which also did not happen. In the evaluator's view these were unrealistic targets/indicators, because the project could not expect to control the process or pretend to seriously influence it. In an effort to achieve these targets, however, the project put more emphasis on awareness raising about domestic child labor and held meetings with the Ministry of Justice. The project was able to lobby for the inclusion of anti-child labor considerations in the operational strategies of the INDH, which is an important achievement given INDH's widespread presence throughout the entire country, particularly in disadvantaged rural areas. In early October 2010, Morocco did approve the revised list of hazardous labor categories, also one of the project's targets, <sup>16</sup> which was the result of considerable work on the part of all entities involved in combating child labor. According to the ILO-IPEC country director, the revised list is a major improvement over the earlier version of 2004. The country director also made a point that the project had not played a role in the final process.

As for institutional capacity building, the project provided limited M&E training to two staff members of the CLU. ILO-IPEC and UNICEF had been active in building the CLU's capacity. The training successfully built the capacity of local rural communities to develop and implement their respective action plans; strengthened the capacity of partner associations, enabling them to withdraw important numbers of children from exploitive labor and deliver direct educational services; and also built the capacity of participating schools to identify at-risk children and prevent dropout.

The project did not provide support for the school watchdog committees, which were initially seen as key instruments for dropout prevention. The change in MNE leadership following the fall 2007 elections and the subsequent launch of the MNE Emergency Plan for increased access to and improved quality of education, discontinued the earlier MNE commitment to the watchdog

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Source: The ILO-IPEC country director.

committees, which were meant to be a regional/local approach for the prevention of dropout, also addressing child labor and overall promotion of education. However, as mentioned above it appears that the tutoring programs delivered by schools were actively preventing dropout at their own initiative and did not seem to need a watchdog committee.

#### Objective/Strategy 3. Awareness and Mobilization

The project used many opportunities to raise community awareness of the dangers of child labor and the importance of education, starting with the survey and data collection for the baseline study. Next, the project mobilized community members around the development of their respective action plans, which presented another platform to renew awareness and discuss the dangers of child labor, particularly regarding agriculture, as most children in the rural areas were known to help their families on the land. This informal effort was referred to as the "healthy farm work campaign." From discussions and interviews in the field, the evaluator learned that parents, children, and all others involved in the project, directly or indirectly, were aware of the dangers of child labor and the importance of schooling. Parents also showed an interest in their children's schooling, as demonstrated by their occasional school visits. The project's partner associations played an important role in awareness raising when negotiating with parents to withdraw their children from work and/or let the children go back to school.

At the national level, the project participated with ILO-IPEC and UNICEF in the third awareness-raising campaign on the dangers of domestic labor for girls. According to the director of the CLU, today the people of Morocco know that exploitive domestic labor by underaged girls is unacceptable, yet it still occurs, <sup>17</sup> in some cases with very tragic results. Public awareness raising regarding the dangers of CSEC has been limited.

### Objective/Strategy 4. Research and Studies

The project planned to conduct three studies, which it did. The baseline study and the study/evaluation of the project's tutoring program were carried out according to plan. As mentioned above, the study on child labor in the artisan sector was not carried out, but a preliminary study on CSEC was conducted in its place.

#### Objective/Strategy 5. Ensuring Sustainability

According to the project document, sustainability is a key part of MSI's strategy and an integral part of the MSI scaling-up framework. The sustainability matrix included in the project document lists nine components that were identified at the beginning of the project as having the potential to be taken over, funded, or scaled up by the GOM and other partners. The TPR's *Performance Information and Assessment* refers to a target of three "Project Best Practices Adopted," and lists one achieved—*Dima-Adros* tutoring program approach. It also includes "Budget amounts earmarked by the GOM for anti–child labor activities" as an indicator for measuring sustainability. The budget amount was exceeded by US\$100,000 (US\$200,000 target; US\$300,000 actual).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> In a recent study on domestic child labor, employers and parents reported to know that it is illegal for a child under age 15 to work, but they still recruit (employers) and supply (parents) such children. Source: National Radio, November 5, 2010.

The TPRs did not comment on these budgets, and the evaluator could not successfully obtain illustrative examples.

## 4.2.2 Effectiveness of Direct Action (Direct Educational Services)

The NFE and afterschool tutoring programs, the dormitories for middle school girls in rural areas, and the provision of school transportation for children in rural areas were all effective, as demonstrated by the numbers of children withdrawn and prevented and by their completion rates (65% and 85%, respectively). For the tutoring program, the percentage of children who were promoted to a higher grade was over 90%, which is a key indicator for its success. It is tempting to measure the NFE program's effectiveness by the number of children mainstreamed into the formal system, but this would not be entirely fair. There were a number of circumstances beyond the project's control that inhibited children from accessing vocational training centers—for instance, the centers were too far away from the children's homes or there was no available dormitory space.

During the field visits, it was evident to the evaluator that girls in rural areas would not have been able to attend middle school if they had not had the option of living in a *dar taleb* or using safe transportation (such as a bus or bicycle).

Contrary to the indicator language included in Section III of the TPR, the project's direct educational services did not include literacy or education programs in shelters for CSEC victims. According to the project, the withdrawn children in both age groups—9 to 15 years and 16 to 18 years—were provided with NFE. Normally in Morocco, the latter group would qualify for literacy training, but according to the project, the project beneficiaries age 16 to 18 preferred the NFE program to the literacy training. As for the CSEC victims, there was a strategy change, though it was never recorded in Section III of the TPR, because the project was not allowed to create shelters or to provide educational services to the victims. Therefore, the project changed its strategy to providing technical assistance to the CPU in Marrakech and conducting the CSEC study. However, the reported results in the TPR, which reflect services provided to CSEC victims, are incorrect. Technical assistance to the CPU should not have been counted as direct service provision to beneficiaries. The entrepreneurship training, which was initially planned to be offered as part of the NFE program, was used as part of the training for the *animateurs/trices* to expose them to an instructional method that links school to real life and is interactive and participatory.

# 4.2.3 Effectiveness in Meeting the Needs of Target Populations

The baseline study collected extensive data on six targeted rural sites and populations (the urban sites were not *studied* because the previous project [*Adros*] had worked with them). The baseline study included data related to children's work status, conditions of education, and perceived barriers and obstacles to education, as well as perceptions of the value of education, among other areas. Once these data were analyzed, the project presented the results to the respective project sites during a 2-day workshop to translate the findings into action plans with the active participation of all concerned. Based on this approach and the implementation experience from Project *Adros* in the urban areas, the project was able to design and deliver direct educational services that responded to the needs of the targeted populations. During the evaluator's visits at some of the project sites, parents confirmed that both the NFE and tutoring programs met the needs of their children. The children themselves said they liked the smaller groups in the tutoring classes,

the attention from the *animateurs/trices*, and the interaction in class. Some of the *animateurs/trices* interviewed mentioned that 60 hours of tutoring were insufficient to bring the weakest of the children to the required levels. The mother of one of the beneficiaries said that she had given up on her son's ability to continue school until he was selected for the tutoring program, which offered the right context for him and made him a studious boy—she was very proud.

Beneficiaries of the NFE program also spoke highly about the classes. They liked the Arabic, math, and French classes, the work in small groups, and the attention from the *animateurs/trices*. Some of the girls interviewed had completed their 6th grade program and had passed the primary school certificate program. They were eagerly awaiting the start of a garment-making vocational training program that was to be set up in the *douar* by EN. Some of the boys who attended the NFE program were doing well in the higher grades of primary school.

Many more of the NFE beneficiaries would have liked to have been able to join formal vocational training to learn a skill. Insertion into the formal primary education system requires that they pass a simple test. For insertion into middle school, children must pass the national primary school certificate exam, which is much more than a simple test and which they also need for admission into the lowest level of vocational training or apprenticeship vocational training. Admission decisions for primary or middle schools are granted by the provincial MNE authorities, usually at the beginning of the school year. As for vocational training, which for the NFE beneficiaries is usually short term, children are admitted either in October or February, but a lack of dormitory space or high transportation costs often prevent qualified children from joining.

As part of their jobs, partner associations and their respective *animateurs/trices* are expected to insert high-performing program beneficiaries into the formal system, and they complete the paperwork required to accomplish the process for those who qualify. Once the partnership between MSI and the partner associations ended, at the end of the 2009-2010 school year (June/July)—and in the cases where the insertion process has not been completed—the partner associations were strongly encouraged to complete the insertion process and were compensated in the form of a small bonus (US\$24 per beneficiary inserted), to be divided equally between the association and the relevant *animateur/trice*. The evaluator was not able to determine whether the associations might have intentionally delayed the mainstreaming process to receive additional payment. As mentioned in Section 4.2.1, the project exceeded its modest target (10% average) for mainstreaming, which could have been higher. As mentioned in Section 4.2.2, beneficiaries who were admitted into vocational training had not systematically been able to attend because of distance and lack of dormitory space at the training centers. The project tried to lobby for additional space in existing dormitories, but slots were limited and demand was high.

The school transportation and the *dar taleb* met the needs of the middle school-level beneficiaries, without exception. Female beneficiaries told the evaluator that their parents would not have allowed them to go to middle school if it were not for the safe transportation or for the boarding. For the boys riding the bus, the case was a bit different. They claim they would have had to walk or tried to hitchhike to go to school, which girls could never consider.

## 4.2.4 Effectiveness of the Project's Specific Models

The project's model for creating community ownership has been effective, as demonstrated by the fact that the majority of the communes and *douars* have implemented their respective action plans, as initially planned, leading to reduced child labor and school dropout. Bringing the local stakeholders together around the issues of child labor and education in their immediate environment, and from the very beginning, has been successful. The community members have trusted the *Dima-Adros* project and team, and they believe in the great value of the accomplishments. Some have expressed interest in donating land to build classrooms. Using local caseworkers who were elected by the stakeholders to coordinate project implementation on the ground has constituted another effective project model. Finally, in terms of educational services, the tutoring model and the NFE model were both effective in strengthening children's scholastic aptitudes, school performance, self-esteem, and confidence, among other traits.

As for the training programs for the *animateurs/trices* who were not teachers by training, the entrepreneurship model was highly appreciated and effective, as were the models on multigrade teaching and general pedagogical skills.

## 4.2.5 Accurate Identification of the Children Targeted by the Project

Based on information received from the beneficiaries during the interviews and focus groups, the majority of the *withdrawn* rural girls reported that they helped their mothers in the family home before joining the NFE program—a few reported having worked in the field with their fathers. The majority of girls in urban areas also reported helping their mothers, except a few who said that they worked for someone else away from home. Almost all had dropped out of primary school, but surprisingly, quite a few had made it to the 6th grade.

All the boys interviewed in rural sites, without exception, reported that they helped their fathers in the field. In urban areas, boys reported working in carpentry, mechanics, street vending, or as shop assistants. As with the girls, almost all the boys had dropped out of primary school.

Partner associations worked with primary schools to obtain the schools' dropout records, which they used to locate potential beneficiaries. They would make house calls and attempt to convince parents to let their children stop working and continue their education through NFE. According to the associations, this was easier for girls than for boys, primarily because girls were considered to be "doing nothing," and additional education was perceived as being more beneficial, in particular with the perspective of NFE leading to vocational education. A few remarkably successful girls are now pursuing "formal" vocational training leading to a diploma.

The children who were identified as being at risk of engaging in exploitive labor and who were prevented through enrollment in the tutoring program, were selected based on their poor grades, the poverty of their families, and whether their siblings worked. School teachers and the project's partner associations worked together in the identification process, leading to excellent results. When asked why they thought they had been selected for the tutoring program, the boys would be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> A term that the girls themselves used too; when asked what they used to do before their enrollment in class, they would use the Moroccan term for "nothing; just sit at home."

up front and say they had bad grades, while the girls would be more shy and say first that their parents did not have the means to give them extra lessons at home.

## 4.2.6 Effectiveness of the Project's Awareness-Raising Strategy

The project's awareness-raising strategy was an ongoing effort, from the very first contacts at target sites during baseline data collection, through the communal action plan development process during the workshops, and at any subsequent occasions when partner associations, caseworkers, and *anitmateurs/trices* would further explain or elaborate, as needed. Often, the initial messages aimed to inform the various groups of the basics regarding child labor: (1) it is against the law for children younger than age 15 to work; (2) there are restrictions on the work that children age 15 to 18 can perform; (3) helping parents in the field, shop, garage, or other outside venue, or at home is considered work, even though children are not paid; and (4) school is compulsory for children up to age 16, which parents generally knew, but had always brushed aside because school is too far or of poor quality. After that, the specific dangers of working would be explained, particularly those pertaining to the agricultural sector in rural areas, which provides the most predominant source of family income. The messages would also explain that preventing children from education is taking away a basic human right.

From the field visits and interviews with parents, children, associations, *animateurs/trices*, caseworkers, and others, the evaluator concluded that the target populations in the various rural and urban project sites were well aware of the dangers of child labor, the importance of education, and the need for children to be in school. Many parents told the evaluator that they themselves had worked their entire lives and had never been to school, but they wanted a better future for their children. Even the poorest families, whose children had been withdrawn from work, said that they were very pleased that their children had a chance to receive an education; they had seen their children change into eager learners.

It is true that, in Morocco, it does not seem that child labor in rural agriculture is on the national radar, one of the reasons being that the sector falls outside the jurisdiction of the labor inspectors, who focus on labor issues in the formal and industrial sectors and would most likely not even travel to remote rural areas for inspection. During an interview, the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) chief of technical and vocational training mentioned that the ministry does not have an awareness-raising strategy to combat child labor in that sector. However, child labor is an issue in agriculture. Usually, the entire family works on the family farm, and at best, parents send some children to school but keep others at the farm. MoA runs an apprenticeship program, designed as a means of combating child labor, which provides young future farmers who have a very basic education background with formal skills and competencies in a number of areas. The ministry has 45 vocational training centers offering the apprenticeship and other programs; it may create more as needs arise. *Dima-Adros* and MoA have collaborated to mainstream 90 project beneficiaries, which although modest in numbers was still successful. Only 10% of the *Dima-Adros* students dropped out, compared with 30 to 40% of regular students. MoA attributes this to the excellent follow-up provided by the project's partner associations.

As for awareness raising of CSEC, the CPU action plan, developed with technical assistance from the project, included the development and distribution—by CPU's partner NGOs—of information that aimed to prevent CSEC in schools, at market places, and tourist gathering places, all in

Marrakech, and via local radio spots. Given the current lack of funding, all interventions except the local radio spots have been kept on hold.

Last but not least, the effectiveness of the three national awareness-raising campaigns on the risks that domestic labor poses for young girls (*petites bonnes*) is evident in the large network of Moroccan NGOs spread out over the entire country actively engaged in lobbying for the cause. Domestic labor for young girls has not yet been eradicated, but clearly the work started by the major child labor donor advocates—UNICEF, ILO-IPEC, *Adros*, and *Dima-Adros*, along with GOM counterparts—is being continued with full Moroccan force.

#### 4.2.7 Effectiveness/Usefulness of Research

The baseline study was extremely useful. It collected and analyzed baseline data in the six rural communes initially targeted, surveying over 8,000 children and 4,000 parents. The results from these data served as the basis for development, in coordination with the local populations, of the six communal action plans to combat child labor through education in over 100 *douars*. Informing the local groups of the perceptions of the child labor incidence, causes, and potential solutions—and asking them to participate in formulating the action plans—was a very effective start to their awareness and ownership. Without the research data, this exercise might not have been so successful. A consultant conducted the baseline study assisted by local surveyors, mostly members of local associations.

The tutoring study was conducted by an independent consultant who assessed the performance of the *Dima-Adros* partner associations and their respective *animateurs/trices*, administered tests to some 2,000 beneficiaries of the 2008-2009 school year, and interviewed parents, school principals, teachers, and other school stakeholders. Major findings included the following:

- The associations implemented the tutoring program according to their scope of work.
- The *animateurs/trices* delivered quality education and occasionally increased the tutoring hours based on the needs of the beneficiaries.
- The academic performance of the beneficiaries improved, as demonstrated by the majority obtaining grades of 5/10 or higher on the tests.
- Parents were extremely pleased with their children's improved school performance and reported a positive change in their children's attitude toward school and homework.

The study on CSEC turned out to be a challenge, because the project was not allowed to interview victims of CSEC as part of the study. As a result, the project, along with the research team at the Marrakech University Hospital and Medical School, changed the initial research methodology from interviewing CSEC victims, as initially intended, to collecting data from sources such as the *Observatoire National des Droits de l'Enfant* (National Organization for Children's Rights, or ONDE), hospital records, and relevant associations, among others, which still allowed the project to collect information that contributed to understanding the breadth and depth of the issue and to identify relevant actions to combat the problem, such as protection, prevention, and shelters. Findings of this study were presented during a half-day workshop in Marrakech, which the

evaluator was able to attend, along with some 25 stakeholders, including police, gendarmerie, medical doctors, pediatricians, social workers, the director of the Marrakech CPU, local/regional representatives from MNE, the Ministry of Health, EN, and associations and child protection advocacy groups.

Major findings included the following:

- CSEC is perceived as increasing, but only few cases are known.
- Different parties are assisting each other informally, but efforts must be more formally coordinated, and there is a need for leadership.
- The creation of the CPU is a good initiative, but is not sufficiently responding to the needs of the victims.
- Individuals concerned have no confidence in the judicial system.
- NGOs should be more specialized and focused.

The workshop's final recommendation was to create a network of relevant parties to ensure the systemic prevention of CSEC, protection of its victims, and legal action against abusers. There was a long debate over whether to create a parallel structure to the CPU or to wait for the CPU to be fully operational and build the network off of the CPU. The debate concluded with the decision to draft a letter to the relevant GOM authorities to present the results of the study, request that the CPU/Marrakech be made fully operational, and express the intention to create a network of relevant parties in support of CSEC prevention and child protection.

# 4.2.8 Effectiveness of the Monitoring System for Tracking the Work Status of Children

The lack of a written monitoring process for tracking the work status of beneficiaries of the NFE and tutoring programs was identified as an issue by the project audit in May 2009. Following this finding, the M&E specialist developed supplemental questionnaires to collect the missing data from children already enrolled and revised the existing intake forms to include the required additional information for future enrollees. In addition, the project trained partner associations, animateurs/trices, and caseworkers on how to fill out the supplemental questionnaires and revised forms. Under the supervision and leadership of the M&E specialist, these individuals closely monitor what children do after school hours and during vacations, and report the information on the respective forms.

While the tracking systems are in place, fully grasping of the beneficiaries' afterschool occupations and drawing a "fine line" between what is acceptable and what is not remains a challenge. As mentioned in Section 4.2.5, many girls who enrolled in the NFE program were reported to be "helping [their] mothers at home" before enrollment. It will be hard to determine to what extent

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> This would be the preferred option because the creation of the CPU by the GOM is the result of many years of lobbying by the NGOs. Ideally, the CPU has the authority and a budget, and should be able to assume leadership in the struggle against CSEC.

these girls continue to help their mothers during and after the program, more so because they are generally perceived (including by themselves) as "doing nothing."

## 4.2.9 Effectiveness of Project Management

The project was implemented by a team of qualified Moroccan professionals, who were very dedicated to the cause. All of them, including the chief of party, had also worked on the Project *Adros* team in their same respective positions. In addition to the chief of party, the team consisted of an education specialist, an M&E specialist and assistant, a financial manager, a secretary, two drivers and a cleaning lady.

While the tasks and responsibilities of each team member were clear, the strength of the team was their holistic approach to the work at hand, particularly regarding the needs in the field. All the members assisted each other when and where needed and if feasible, often going well beyond the call of duty in terms of tasks and hours. Working long hours was the norm rather than the exception when on site visits to remote, difficult-to-access project areas.

During field visits to the urban and rural project sites, the evaluator was impressed by the uniform appreciation of the *Dima-Adros* team's work and their high profile. The team was reported to be available when needed, to listen, to give prompt and good advice, and to find solutions to problems when they arose. In the most remote *douars*, people knew the first names of all members of the entire team and said that different team members had come to visit the project site on different occasions.

As mentioned earlier, the evaluator learned from interviews with GOM officials that it is the GOM officials' perception that project management could have been more effective if it coordinated more closely with key counterparts, particularly to build GOM ownership of some of the educational models and programs.

In addition to the excellent *Dima-Adros* core team, the local caseworkers effectively managed the project's interventions on the ground. As mentioned earlier, the men—all were men, although this was by no means the project's intention—were elected during the action plan development workshops based on their positions in the community, their perceived fairness, their network within and outside the community, and their ability to be the spokesperson for the community to the project. The caseworkers maintained excellent work relations with the associations and vice-versa.

#### 4.2.10 Lessons Learned and Good Practices

#### Lessons Learned

**Team Work.** Strong collaboration in the field between local partner associations, caseworkers, elected local officials, parents, and other relevant groups was key to the successful implementation, particularly in remote rural areas. The locally elected caseworkers, who were trusted and respected by the communities, were an important element of the team and served as local leaders.

**School Transportation.** *Dima-Adros* has been able to demonstrate that modest cost-sharing in the purchase of a school bus can be justified if the management of such a bus is in capable and responsible hands. As the experience of the co-financed school buses is still recent, it is presented as a lesson learned and not quite yet a *best practice*.

**Mainstreaming.** One of the driving factors for parents to withdraw their children (boys in particular) from work was the prospect of the child being able to learn a skill through access to a vocational training center. However, because of distance and a lack of dormitory space, access to these centers was not a given. Future similar projects should seek to negotiate solutions with relevant training centers to avoid situations in which children qualify for admission but are not able to enroll and obtain skills.

#### **Good Practice**

The project's **afterhours tutoring program** approach, which was delivered by associations, PTAs in particular, has proven its effectiveness through beneficiaries' improved scholastic performance and the prevention of early school dropout/potential engagement in exploitive labor. The program should be adaptable nationwide as a valid alternative to the MNE's approach.

#### 4.3 EFFICIENCY

## 4.3.1 Project Cost-Efficiency

The project's total original budget was US\$3 million, which was appropriate for the scale of the project, which included interventions in a variety of rural and urban locations, interventions in support of policy strengthening and institutional capacity building, and awareness raising, as well as considerable research and studies, and actions in support of project sustainability. A closer look at the budget breakdown by labor, equipment, other direct costs, program activities, and overhead, reveals that a relatively small percentage of the budget was allocated to program activities, as illustrated by the budget breakdown in Table 3.

Table 3: Dima-Adros Project Budget

Budget Line Item	% of Overall Estimated Budget	
Direct Labor	31%	
Equipment and Supplies	0.96%	
Project Office Support Costs (of which US\$270K for social benefits)	15%	
Subtotal Management Costs	(47%)	
Output 1: Withdrawal and Prevention	27%	
Output 2: Strengthening Policies and Institutional Capacity	1.3%	
Output 3: Raising Awareness	1.3%	
Output 4: Research and Studies	3.9%	
Output 5: Sustainability	0.6%	
Subtotal Program Activities	(34%)	

Budget Line Item	% of Overall Estimated Budget
General and Administrative, and Overhead	18%
Grand Total	100%
Additional Money for Modest Refurbishing and Equipment <sup>20</sup>	n/a
(Revised Final Total)	n/a

Source: Dima-Adros

The most striking observation in the above breakdown is the low percentage (27%) of project funds allocated to the project's immediate objective (project purpose)—targeting 8,000 children for withdrawal or prevention from engaging in exploitive child labor in 13 different rural and urban areas. The other equally striking conclusion is the high percentage of funds (47%) dedicated to the project's overall management costs, of which only a very small part (5%) went to equipment, supplies, rent and utilities, communications, and other such needs. The remaining 42% covers direct labor, social benefits, and drivers' salaries (not included in direct labor). The total management/backstop costs rose to over 60% when overhead and General and Administrative were added. The budget percentages for other project outputs seem high, while they were relatively high for Output 4. One item was notably absent from the above budget: M&E. The project has done enormous work to track beneficiaries and to train partner associations and caseworkers in complying with the tracking and reporting requirements, but the costs of this important project component were hidden.

The evaluator assumes and anticipates that the above does not represent the actual budget breakdown as of the end of the project, and that the final project expense reports will draw a significantly different and more realistic picture. It is unlikely, however, that the final expense reports will include data on the project's M&E costs. Based on the information available at the time of this writing, however, the evaluator can only conclude that the above does not reflect that the budget of *Dima-Adros* is cost-effective.

# 4.3.2 Project Strategies—Financial and Human Resources

MSI's decision to assign the implementation of *Dima-Adros* to a Moroccan team was excellent and efficient. The team was composed of extremely highly qualified professionals, who had longstanding work experience in socioeconomic development in Morocco, including work with MSI and Project *Adros*. This team was able to smoothly and quickly phase into Project *Dima-Adros* and fully committed their time and effort to the project. MSI makes very efficient use of the staff dedicated to the various projects managed for USDOL, USAID, and MCC in Morocco, which led the evaluator to wonder whether *Dima-Adros* (the smallest of the lot) had not suffered a bit from part-time "brain-drain," (i.e., some staff's attention going to other projects and to general oversight of the overall MSI portfolio in Morocco).

The strategy to work on the ground with local associations with whom the project contracted was also very efficient, as was the strategy of using caseworkers to ensure coordination among all parties on the ground as well as a direct link to the project team.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Source: *Dima-Adros'* financial and administrative specialist.

As for financial and payment strategies, the project contracted 23 local associations to implement direct project services on the ground. The associations were paid according to their respective contracts, and they, in turn, paid the *animateurs/trices* they had recruited for the delivery of tutoring and NFE classes. The project directly paid the nine caseworkers a monthly stipend. As for the project's financial support to school transportation and *dar taleb*, the evaluator learned from the education specialist that the project had contributed to the purchase of transportation (buses) based on the annual estimated school transportation costs per child needing transportation. A similar formula was applied for supporting the *dar taleb*; at the beginning of the school year, the project paid the amount representing the monthly fee (US\$12 per girl per month) for the number of girls who needed financial assistance during the school year, as identified and confirmed by the association in charge of managing the dormitory. The project also assumed the costs of tuition fees and supplies for the children who were mainstreamed into vocational education, either at the *Office de Formation Professionelle et de la Promotion du Travail* or at the agricultural training centers.

## 4.3.3 Efficiency of the Monitoring System

The project implemented a rather complex M&E system to create a complete picture of each withdrawn and prevented beneficiary, including providing data on current/previous work status, level of schooling, parents' occupation, number of siblings and their respective work status, and the beneficiaries' current work status, as applicable for NFE and tutoring beneficiaries. Intake forms and personal cards were designed by the project's M&E specialist; these items improved over the life of the project, including after the auditors' visit. Because of the complexity of the system, associations, animateurs/trices, and caseworkers were trained in the project's reporting requirements. They submitted the initial personal cards at the beginning of the respective programs. The cards were then completed with subsequent data and attendance lists, grades, promotion status to next grade, indication of whether the beneficiary had passed the test required for insertion into the formal system, program completion data, and other such information. Associations running school transportation programs and dar taleb were also required to submit similar data.

During field interviews, the evaluator learned that the partner associations, *animateurs/trices*, and caseworkers found the reporting requirements cumbersome and very time-consuming. However, these parties also admitted that they had learned a lot from the process, such as accuracy and the need to pay attention to detail, and that they found the reporting useful.

The M&E specialist regrets that the initial M&E system, as developed by the project, was considered incomplete during the audit visit. She mentioned that the project's biggest challenge in M&E was to obtain timely, complete, and accurate data from the project sites. Processing the various forms was very tedious and time-consuming, and there was not always sufficient staff time to complete that task. Also, the M&E specialist mentioned that the local groups needed occasional assistance, and that the project did not have the funds to allow for sufficient M&E field visits.

As for the efficiency of the semiannual TPRs, in particular Annex G, Section III: *Performance Information and Assessment*, the evaluator believes that the indicators that were reported for measuring project progress at the design stage had not been subject to review and/or adjustment during the life of project to reflect the changes in project implementation or context, and to ensure accurate tracking. While the indicators for measuring the immediate objective (project purpose)

were excellent, a review of Section III at some point during the project would most likely have determined the need to adjust or change some of the project's output indicators. For example, the three indicators related to the dormitories, while measuring the project target as initially designed, do not appropriately measure/report actual implementation. As for the other project output indicators, the evaluator found that some of the indicators were beyond the control of the project (Output 2) and that some did not capture the core of the output's objective (Output 3).

Along these same lines, it also appears that the TPRs did not capture a complete track record of the implementation progress over the life of the project. In the TPRs that the evaluator reviewed, specifically those for 2009-2010, Section II.A: Overall Progress of the Project, while providing relevant information on project progress, does not make the connection to the achievements reported in Section III and Section II.B: Progress Towards Strategic Goals and Operational Objectives and Indicators, and tends to repeat certain information from the previous sections. The evaluator also observed that the information provided in Section I: Implementing Environment, is more detailed and better structured than the information in Sections II.A and II.B.

In light of the above, it seems that the project's M&E focus was on the complex task of ensuring accurate monitoring of project beneficiaries and its subsequent quantitative reporting (for Section III of the TPR), leaving little quality time for the other qualitative/narrative sections.

#### 4.3.4 Lessons Learned and Good Practices

#### Lessons Learned

**Human Resources.** Project *Dima-Adros* demonstrated that child labor projects of similar scope and scale could be successfully implemented by teams of host country professionals. An emerging lesson might also be that national firms or NGOs might be able to assume full responsibility for similar projects, provided they meet the USDOL/USG criteria for such arrangements and have strong English communication skills for effective liaison with USDOL. This would presumably reduce management and overhead costs in favor of program costs.

**Monitoring and Evaluation.** Future similar projects should include a budget for M&E and would be well-served to track project progress and performance using a format that allows tracking performance from one TPR to the next, as well as for more accuracy overall. The current TPR format does not include a section for "actions/interventions planned for the next 6 months," which could be considered a means to improve reporting.

#### **Good Practice**

The project-designed personal **intake card** for child registration and subsequent monitoring could be a useful basic tool for MNE and the CPUs to adapt to their respective needs for tracking children in their programs.

### 4.4 IMPACT

## 4.4.1 Impact on Beneficiaries

The project has made an important impact on the 8,274 direct beneficiaries, as well as on their parents and the *animateurs/trices*. As for the children, the impact entails their motivation to learn and study, improved school results and self-esteem, and—for those who managed to mainstream into formal education or vocational training—the extra self-esteem, confidence, and motivation because of the ability "to have made it." In addition, their attitudes toward working and going to school have changed. Field interviews and focus groups with children clearly confirmed all of the above results and more: there is a general sense of pride and a certain glow. Interviews with parents revealed that they perceived their children as having changed and blossomed, as being interested in learning, and as becoming more mature. Even the parents were proud of their children. Their attitudes changed as well, as they reported that from then on, all their children would be enrolled in school—provided there is a school—and that they would be involved in the school and the teachers.

The impact on the beneficiaries of the project's assistance to school transportation and the three *dar taleb* was evident in that the girls would not have been able to attend middle school without obtaining a seat on the bus, or without room and board.

## 4.4.2 Impact of Awareness Raising

The impact of awareness raising was very noticeable at the local level, as partner association members, local officials, parents, children, and other random but interested people from the *douars* now knew the dangers of child labor and the need for children to be in school and educated. While it was evident that the communities' attitudes toward the dangers of child labor as they pertained to their immediate environment had changed, the evaluator was not able to get a sense of whether there was general knowledge of other broader dangers.

# 4.4.3 Impact on Education Quality

During field visits to some schools, the evaluator was told by one of the principals that dropout had been reduced considerably and that, in the case of a prolonged absence of a child, efforts were being made to find out the cause and bring the child back. In one of the schools where the PTA was the partner association responsible for the tutoring program, the results in terms of spillover toward the regular program were reported to be considerable. One of the examples cited was that the school's regular teachers were keeping an eye on the "graduates" of the tutoring program to ensure that they would not slip back into old habits, the teachers were also on the outlook for children displaying unusual behavior and tried to find ways to help the children who seemed troubled.

In some schools, project-funded modest infrastructure improvements were in progress to address the most deplorable conditions of a number of classrooms (and the three *dar taleb* assisted by the project) that were no longer in use but were badly needed. Once these classrooms were completed, they had a very positive impact on the quality of education and learning. The improvements at the *dar taleb* mostly consisted of painting and making kitchen improvements.

## 4.4.4 Impact on Project Partners/Organizations

**Partner Associations.** Some of the project's partner associations had worked on Project *Adros* and were able to gain additional experience and to mature during the 3 years of *Dima-Adros*' implementation. The project impacted these partners by building stronger capacity to deliver similar programs and monitor them on the ground. A few now have the potential to lobby for outside resources to implement their own modest projects. The majority of the *Dima-Adros* partner associations, however, are still rather "nascent," ranging from those that were just created to work with the project to those that had some experience before the project, but with less demanding reporting requirements.

The impact of the project on the transportation associations that managed the school buses was quite remarkable. During interviews with the members of these associations, the evaluator learned that based on increasing demand for transportation by children and parents, the associations were already lobbying for funds for the purchase of additional buses. The drivers were already doubling the number of trips to meet the transportation needs of all the children and neighboring *douars* who wanted to participate. Some *douars* were seeking advice on how to purchase a bus.

**Partner Schools.** The most striking impact on the partner primary schools was the reduced rate of school dropout because of the tutoring program and the delivery of NFE classes. Now, when children are absent for a certain time, the schools inquire about their whereabouts, and teachers or classmates make an effort to bring them back, which demonstrates that the schools are quite capable of managing retention. Impact on one of the middle schools was evident in the number of bicycles parked on the school grounds labeled, "a gift from *Dima-Adros* and *l'Heure Joyeuse*" or "*Dima-Adros* and the Rotary Club." At another middle school, the presence of the school bus represented a major impact on the school and its environment. Finally, there was the impact of the improved infrastructure and the availability of computers and other equipment that made the various classrooms and/or *dar taleb* more appealing and conducive to learning.

## 4.4.5 Impact on Government and Policy Structures

The project's impact on government and policy structures, in terms of systemwide change, remains limited. As mentioned in Section 4.1.7, the initially planned institutional strengthening of the CLU and CPU was not carried out. The project was able to work in synergy with UNICEF and ILO-IPEC to launch the third campaign to raise awareness against domestic labor by underaged girls. The greatest impact of Project *Dima-Adros*, however, was among the populations in the target areas and neighborhoods, where it left footprints that will not be easily erased.

#### 4.4.6 Lessons Learned and Good Practices

#### Lessons Learned

**Awareness Raising.** Well-targeted, small-scale, and appropriately and repeatedly delivered awareness raising mobilizes people, drives messages home, and changes attitudes for the long run. The project's direct beneficiaries and their parents, brothers and sisters, neighbors, teachers, school principals, bus drivers, and local elected and appointed officials all understand the dangers of child labor and the need for children to be educated.

**Avoid Negative Impact.** Providing educational services to extremely remote areas that offered no formal schooling system was great as long as the funds were available to maintain the services. However, this could have a negative impact once the project is over. No solutions have been found in the meantime to ensure that education is continued uninterrupted, without losing momentum.

## 4.5 SUSTAINABILITY

## 4.5.1 Exit Strategy

As most development projects, *Dima-Adros* includes an exit strategy and a sustainability matrix, which lists nine "project components" (i.e., services and systems that the project anticipated it would either provide, create, or develop). The rationale was that at the project document development stage, these components appeared to have potential for adoption or scaling-up by the respective entities/stakeholders, who had pledged, albeit informally, to collaborate to this effect. MNE had pledged to take over and possibly scale-up the school watchdog committee model, the tutoring program, and the celebration of World Day Against Child Labor (June 12). MDSFS had shown initial interest in sustaining and scaling-up the community-directed, CSO-managed funds for social and pedagogical support, the CSO network against child labor, and the dormitories for rural middle school girls. EN had pledged to take over the vocational training programs created by the project in underserved areas. The CLU had expressed interest in the child labor monitoring model, and the CSOs would adopt the CSO alliance model.

As briefly discussed in Section 4.1.10, the sustainability matrix was never reviewed or updated to ensure continued relevance and effectiveness. In addition, there was limited information on how the project was going to implement the matrix and on overall progress. The TPRs did not seem to contain systematic updates on progress toward the sustainability objectives included in the matrix and the indicators listed for Output 5: *Sustainability*, in Section III.A, do not directly connect to the matrix. Based on this, along with the feedback obtained during interviews with project staff and respective GOM entities (except MDSFS), the evaluator concluded that the sustainability matrix, as designed at the start of the project, was not effective.

That said, the project's strengths were the tremendous efforts in the most remote and disadvantaged rural and urban areas, where the project has left footprints that will not easily be erased, and where people's attitudes toward child labor have changed.

# 4.5.2 Leveraging Non-Project Resources

The project document included an initial cost-sharing estimate of US\$500,000, mainly in-kind contributions. The bicycles mentioned in Section 4.4.4 represent an in-kind contribution by the Rotary Club and by the Moroccan NGO, *l'Heure Joyeuse*, well-known for its massive annual distribution of school backpacks filled with books and supplies. The evaluator did not find any other examples of resources leveraged during the life of the project. An example of in-kind, host-country cost-sharing was the provision of books for the NFE program beneficiaries by MNE, and the collaboration of the NFE inspectors.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> MSI. *Project Document*, p. 78.

## 4.5.3 Partnership Challenges and Successes

Beside the partnerships with local associations, Project *Dima-Adros* did not enter into formal partnerships with other parties. The project kept an extensive network of the different professionals, groups, and entities that were actively combating child labor in Morocco. One of the platforms for maintaining contacts in the child labor community was the National Committee for Child Labor, operating under the leadership of DT. *Dima-Adros* was a member of this committee—as were the relevant government entities, NGOs, UNICEF, ILO-IPEC, ONDE, and labor unions, among others—and presented its project strategy and communal action plans to the committee for approval, which was granted. The project would most likely have benefitted from a more active role on the committee, as it offered a platform for coordination and information sharing, and might have facilitated project interventions at the national level.

As mentioned earlier, *Dima-Adros* was engaged in a partnership with UNICEF, ILO-IPEC, and MDSFS for the campaigns to raise awareness against the dangers of exploitive domestic labor by girls.

### 4.5.4 Coordination with the Government

The project mainly coordinated interventions with the respective government counterparts at the local, provincial and regional levels, in particular with MNE. The project's caseworkers were well-placed and tasked to ensure that all relevant government parties were consulted, informed, or involved in relevant interventions. Along these lines, provincial MNE inspectors who had visited the project sites and MNE's provincial *délégués* (delegates) were fully aware of the project's progress and potential problems. For example, during the phone interview, the MNE *délégué* of Chefchaouen informed the evaluator that his office was going to send a teacher to one of the project's *douars*, once the community identified proper classroom space, and was planning to adopt the project's tutoring and NFE approaches in the schools in his province. He was convinced of the respective effectiveness of these tactics.

The national government entities interviewed during the final evaluation agreed that the project made extremely valuable contributions to combat child labor in Morocco, particularly in the most disadvantaged remote rural areas. There was, however, a general sense of lack of coordination at the national level. During their respective interviews, the officials of the MNE directorate for NFE and DT, as well as the director of the CLU, each expressed regret that the project had not kept them systematically and sufficiently informed of interventions, partner associations, progress, achievements, and other information. They both claimed that, beside Dima-Adros' initial presentation of the project strategies and communal action plans at the regional level during a meeting of the National Committee for Child Labor, and subsequent annual statistics on beneficiaries, they had not been informed or invited to give advice or to participate in field visits. During the stakeholders' meeting, however, the director of the CLU had made a public announcement stating that, based on the presentation of the preliminary evaluation findings and the subsequent comments, observations, and remarks made by the stakeholders from the field, she could only conclude that the project had made outstanding contributions to the overall advancement of the struggle against child labor in Morocco. Given her key role and position on the subject, this was an extremely meaningful and important statement. However, she also expressed

regret that none of the project's partner associations had been able to compete for the CLU's grants that had just been awarded, since the CLU did not know about the associations.

#### 4.5.5 Coordination with ILO-IPEC

The ILO-IPEC country director spoke highly of the project's work, particularly in the rural areas and on CSEC. As for CSEC, she strongly encouraged continued efforts by the project, if it were extended, but only with the full involvement of the relevant GOM parties, as one must be very vigilant not to rush unbaked solutions, as they might cause more harm than good.

As for ILO-IPEC/Morocco's current and future strategies, the ILO-IPEC country director said that Morocco was no longer an ILO-IPEC priority country from an international perspective, and that ILO-IPEC/Morocco was closing projects with French and Belgian financial assistance at the end of 2010. ILO-IPEC and *Dima-Adros* did not proactively coordinate their respective projects but both contributed to the same cause in a positive way. Contrary to its predecessor, *Dima-Adros* was more present in the field, mobilizing communities around the dangers of child labor and the importance of education, and was, therefore, less present on the national scene.

## 4.5.6 Challenges and Opportunities in Working with Other Organizations

Contrary to its predecessor, Project *Dima-Adros* did not have much direct interaction with international or multinational organizations, or with national NGOs, as illustrated by the absence of such stakeholders from the list of persons interviewed by the evaluator and the list of invitees to the stakeholders' meeting.

As mentioned earlier, the project collaborated with UNICEF on the third national campaign to raise awareness against domestic labor by underaged girls, and worked indirectly with ONDE on the CSEC study, for which it was one of the major sources of information and data collection. The evaluator speculated that the bulk of the project team's attention was focused on its rural and urban sites, where no other large organizations or donors were present.

# 4.5.7 Sustainability of Committees/Groups and Systems Created by the Project

The project did not create any committees or groups, per se, but rather assisted and strengthened its partner associations and the *animateurs/trices* recruited by the associations for the NFE and tutoring programs. Some of the more "mature" associations will be actively pursuing other sources of funding to carry out similar programs, possibly using the same *animateurs/trices*. However, these individuals will also actively pursue other employment options, as a considerable number of them were unemployed university graduates when they joined the project.

In terms of the project's beneficiary monitoring system, based on feedback from the associations during the field visits, they believed in the usefulness of a tracking system. It is very likely that they will apply some of the tools to future similar projects.

The sustainability related to the *dar taleb* was not so much an issue of whether the structure would remain, but rather whether the girls who were able to stay in the *dar taleb* because of project

funding would be able to stay on through the completion of middle school (3 years). The *dar taleb* managing associations were aware of the risk of potential dropout and were looking for solutions, such as charging a slightly higher fee to girls whose parents are "better off." In the evaluator's opinion, however, girls from a certain minimal economic background should not have to pay for board and lodging in a government structure.

## 4.5.8 Sustainability of Buses

During the site visits, the evaluator was able to observe the buses in operation. There were two buses: one regular coach-size bus in Tassift, which started its service in the project's second year; and one mini-bus in Aït Adel, which started in the third year. Both buses transported children from the *douars* to the closest middle schools and back, making several trips because of the high demand. The buses were successfully managed by local associations. The parents paid a monthly bus fee of US\$12 per child, and each child carried a bus subscription card that was stamped each month once the fees were paid. According to the associations, the fees covered expenses for gas, maintenance, and repair, as well as the salaries of the bus drivers. Both associations were already looking for outside funding to help with potential major repairs and to eventually purchase a second bus at each site because of reported ever-increasing demands at both sites. The association in Tassift was able to lobby for US\$3,000 from different sources; it also organized occasional day trips for a modest fee to raise funds. Children were involved in collecting bus fees and in keeping the buses orderly and clean.

#### 4.5.9 Lessons Learned and Good Practices

#### Lessons Learned

**Sustainability Matrix.** The sustainability matrix, as developed at the design stage of a project, should undergo a review at least once during the lifetime of the 3-year project, or preferably on a yearly basis, to ensure that it is realistic and achievable. Also, the sustainability matrix should be accompanied by a strategy that goes beyond the matrix to describe the "how-to" process, including a simple risk analysis and brief description of remedial action to ensure that the objective is achieved.

**Coordination with the GOM.** In terms of sustainability and scaling-up potential, the project would have benefitted from a formal partnership or other similar arrangement with one or more relevant GOM entities, probably MNE and DT. Project *Adros* was reported to have been part of a tripartite partnership with these departments, which the director of the CLU seemed to have perceived as a strong basis for collaboration toward joint objectives, including those at the national level.

**Dormitory Fees.** Payment of dormitory fees for middle school girls' board and lodging should be guaranteed for the full 3 years, unless alternative solutions are identified during the life of the project to assume the costs of these fees.

## 5.1 CONCLUSIONS

#### General

- Project *Dima-Adros* was successful at the community level. Direct and indirect beneficiaries, as well as other members of the respective communities and neighborhoods, spoke very highly of the project. They knew its purpose, believed in its objectives, and spoke very highly of the MSI team.
- In a number of rural areas, Project *Dima-Adros* was the very first project that showed interest in the respective *douars* and actually brought assistance.
- The vast majority of children interviewed during the field visits were school dropouts, which confirmed that the poor quality of education, the cost of education, and traveling distance to attend school were the major causes of child labor, at least in the areas targeted by the project.
- Project *Dima-Adros*, contrary to Project *Adros*, seems have been operating somewhat in isolation. It was not as present on the national scene and was not as actively coordinating with relevant counterpart ministries and with ILO-IPEC, perhaps because of the "new" and additional focus on the rural areas.
- Given the delay in the CSEC study and the project's completion date—October 30, 2010, the *Dima-Adros* team will not be able to provide formal technical assistance to the local network that will be carrying out the recommendations of the preliminary study, nor will it lead the subsequent study among CSEC victims (conditional upon the availability of funds).

#### Relevance

- The project design fully supported the five USDOL goals for eliminating child labor.
- The project design was appropriate for the Moroccan context in terms of content, but was too short and somewhat over-ambitious (or over-optimistic) in terms of what could be achieved at the national level.
- No project adjustments were made in response to the key recommendations generated by the midterm evaluation. This raised the question of the project's relevance in terms of execution, quality, timing, and/or appropriateness of the TOR for the midterm evaluation.

#### **Effectiveness**

- The project exceeded its targets for withdrawal and prevention of girls at the respective rural and urban project sites. It successfully raised awareness and mobilized populations at the same sites, and achieved its targets for research and studies.
- The project achieved its total girl—boy targets, by reaching out to almost equal numbers of each overall, though boys proved more "difficult" to withdraw.
- *Dima-Adros* was less successful and effective in achieving the targets for the two national-level outputs: (1) strengthening policies and institutional capacity, and (2) maintaining sustainability.
- The tutoring and NFE programs were very effective and well-delivered; they were monitored by the 23 partner associations and their respective *animateurs/trices*. The use of the PTA as a partner association for the implementation of the tutoring program seems a particularly interesting option for MNE to explore further.
- The project made great efforts to improve the M&E system to appropriately track the work status of project beneficiaries, but this remained a challenge. It seems very difficult to track the work status, for example, of the girls who had benefitted from the NFE program (64% of the total), the majority of whom, before joining the program, had been helping their mothers at home, or as most people, including themselves, used to say, "[they had been] just sitting at home."
- Though there was no evidence to suggest this was intentional, the caseworkers for the project were all male. Similar projects should actively encourage a gender balance among the community members selected by the respective communities to represent them for project coordination and implementation.
- The project did not participate in efforts to approve the hazardous labor list, which illustrated its absence from national efforts on this issue. At time of the evaluation, it was unknown whether the list had been made public and was officially enacted.

## **Efficiency**

- The project's work with the partner associations and the caseworkers in the rural areas was extremely efficient and effective.
- Partner associations would have benefitted from additional training to build their capacity beyond the scope of their immediate project interventions.
- The project's budget did not include an M&E budget line item, which seems warranted, given the intensive M&E requirements, including training and in-country travel.

• Key project documents, such as the logical framework, sustainability matrix, implementation timeline, and Section III.A of the TPR, were not regularly updated to ensure accurate project reporting.

## **Impact**

- The project's overall impact on the direct and indirect beneficiaries was very palpable in the field.
- One temporary negative impact was that in one of the villages where children were still waiting for NFE to start up again under the auspices of MNE. This could have been avoided by earlier notification by the *animateur/trice*, the partner association, and the caseworker to the project and other parties concerned.

## Sustainability


- The project's progress toward sustainability and potential scaling-up of successful interventions would have benefitted from closer coordination with relevant GOM entities. A formal partnership would probably have provided the necessary framework to enhance the prospects of sustainability.
- Stronger collaboration with the GOM at the national level would not have caused more successful implementation at the selected sites, but would have enabled joint progress assessments for possible adoption of project interventions.
- Partner associations have no funds to carry on any of the project interventions on their own, and there is little chance that they will be successful in lobbying for new funding. The project provided them with adequate training to carry out the tasks specified in their partnership document, but was unable to expand the training to more general topics, such as management, financial management, lobbying, and proposal writing.


## 5.2 KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

- Future similar projects in Morocco should be very selective about setting objectives that are within the manageable interest of the project and should take advantage of existing child labor support mechanisms, such as the National Committee for Child Labor, particularly for defining and achieving project interventions aimed at strengthening child labor policies. The rationale for this recommendation is that a committee, representing a number of official stakeholders, is assumed to have stronger lobbying power for pushing legislation and other similar actions than does an individual donor.
- Three-year child labor projects should include a local-level sustainability plan and strategy, or projects should plan for an extra year to be dedicated to anchoring interventions at the local levels with relevant partners and counterparts. Based on the need for projects in extreme rural areas to start from scratch, the second option (an extra year) is probably more realistic, since it may not be feasible to jointly

plan "after-project solutions" at the initial project stage, when local populations have not had the benefit of experiencing project inputs and potential impact.

- The holistic baseline study concept, as designed and implemented by the *Dima-Adros* team, should be considered as future reference for similar projects in Morocco and possibly elsewhere. Its use beyond data collection, namely for mobilization, "show and tell," awareness raising, planning, and reporting, has proven its effectiveness in mobilizing local populations and changing behaviors toward child labor.
- Project *Dima-Adros* is encouraged to share project implementation experience, along the lines of what they are planning with regard to the findings of the tutoring study, with its relevant host country counterparts in the form of simple one-pagers that explain the highlights of the experience for future reference. The project is also encouraged (although the completion date has passed) to work with the various partner associations and write up success stories on the beneficiaries with the most striking achievements.
- Raising awareness of the dangers of child labor and the importance of education seem most efficient and effective when carried out on a small scale, such as in small groups, during workshops, and in situations when people can discuss and "digest" the information. Functional literacy classes currently offered for farmers, rural women, fishermen, and artisans under the MCC-funded Kifayate activity managed by MSI seem to offer an appropriate context for extending awareness raising of child labor within these sectors. MSI is encouraged to recommend to MCC and the *Agence du Partenariat pour le Progress* (MCA-Morocco) to consider including some of the child labor awareness-raising messages and concepts from *Dima-Adros* in the literacy training materials.
- Along these same lines, USDOL might consider lobbying USG agencies who fund literacy projects in developing countries to include basic concepts of exploitive child labor in literacy content, in addition to other relevant content matter, which will vary from country to country.
- Because of the delays in conducting the CSEC study, it is recommended that MSI leverage additional funding to provide technical assistance to the Moroccan network of associations combating CSEC, to carry out the recommendations of the preliminary study and fund the core study among victims.
- USDOL should consider a review and possible revision of the format of the TPR to allow projects to do a better job at reporting implementation progress and performance. For USDOL to obtain a more holistic picture from the sequence of TPRs, it is recommended that it includes a section entitled "Actions planned for the next 6-month period," against which the projects would report.






## ANNEX A: LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

## **MIDTERM EVALUATION DOCUMENTS**

- Cooperative Agreement Morocco FY07
- Dima-Adros—USDOL Comments Responses—September 30, 2008
- *Dima-Adros*—Annex A—Logframe (submitted—May 2008)
- *Dima-Adros*—Etude de base principaux résultats—September 30, 2008
- *Dima-Adros*—Organizational Chart (submitted—May 2008)
- Dima-Adros—PMP Data Tracking Table (Annex E)—December 19, 2008
- Dima-Adros—Project Document—December 19, 2008
- *Dima-Adros*—Sustainability Matrix (submitted—May 2008)
- Dima-Adros TPR—Annex E—Work Plan—September 30, 2008
- Dima-Adros TPR—Annex F—PMP Worksheet—September 30, 2008
- Dima-Adros TPR—March 31 2008—Submit
- Dima-Adros TPR—September 30, 2008
- Morocco—Combating the Worst Forms of Child Labor in Morocco FY07, Dec. 2008
- Morocco *Dima-Adros* March 08 TPR—USDOL Comments
- Morocco *Dima-Adros* Sept. 08 TPR—USDOL Comments

#### FINAL EVALUATION DOCUMENTS

- *Dima-Adros* PMP Worksheet (March 31, 2009)
- Dima-Adros TPR September 2010
- Dima-Adros TPR March 2009 (revised)
- *Dima-Adros* TPR March 2010 response
- Dima-Adros TPR March 2010
- *Dima-Adros* TPR September 2009 (revised)
- *Dima-Adros* TPR September 2009 response
- Dima-Adros Work Plan (March 31, 2009)
- Morocco Midterm Evaluation Report
- Dima-Adros Tutoring Study (March 2010)



## ANNEX B: TERMS OF REFERENCE

# Terms of Reference for the Independent Final Evaluation of Combating Child Labor through Education in Morocco (*Dima-Adros*)

Cooperative Agreement Number:	IL-16568-07-75-K	
Financing Agency:	United States Department of Labor	
Grantee Organization:	Management Systems International	
Dates of Project Implementation:	September 30, 2007–October 30, 2010	
Type of Evaluation:	Independent Final Evaluation	
Evaluation Fieldwork Dates:	September 15–30, 2010	
Preparation Date of TOR:	July 20, 2010	
Total Project Funds from USDOL Based on Cooperative Agreement:	US\$3,000,000 Matching funds: US\$500,000	
Vendor for Evaluation Contract:	ICF Macro, Headquarters 11785 Beltsville Drive Calverton, MD 20705 Tel: (301) 572-0200 Fax: (301) 572-0999	

## I BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATION

The Office of Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking (OCFT) is an office within the Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB), an agency of the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL). OCFT activities include research on international child labor; supporting U.S. government policy on international child labor; administering and overseeing cooperative agreements with organizations working to eliminate child labor around the world; and raising awareness about child labor issues.

Since 1995, the U.S. Congress has appropriated over US\$780 million to USDOL for efforts to combat exploitive child labor internationally. This funding has been used to support technical cooperation projects to combat exploitive child labor in more than 80 countries around the world. Technical cooperation projects funded by USDOL range from targeted action programs in specific sectors of work to more comprehensive programs that support national efforts to eliminate the worst forms of child labor as defined by ILO Convention 182. USDOL-funded child labor elimination projects generally seek to achieve five major goals:

- 1. Withdrawing or preventing children from involvement in exploitive child labor through the provision of direct educational services;
- 2. Strengthening policies on child labor and education, the capacity of national institutions to combat child labor, and formal and transitional education systems that encourage children engaged in or at risk of engaging in exploitive labor to attend school;

- 3. Raising awareness of the importance of education for all children and mobilizing a wide array of actors to improve and expand education infrastructures;
- 4. Supporting research and the collection of reliable data on child labor; and
- 5. Ensure the long-term sustainability of these efforts.

The approach of USDOL child labor elimination projects—decreasing the prevalence of exploitive child labor through increased access to education—is intended to nurture the development, health, safety, and enhanced future employability of children engaged in or at-risk of entering exploitive labor.

USDOL reports annually to Congress on the performance of its program. As these programs have developed, an increasing emphasis has been placed on ensuring that the data collected by grantees are accurate, relevant, complete, reliable, timely, valid and verifiable.

In the appropriations to USDOL for international child labor technical cooperation, the U.S. Congress directed the majority of the funds to support the two following programs:<sup>22</sup>

# 1. International Labour Organization's International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labor (ILO-IPEC)

Since 1995, the U.S. Congress has appropriated some US\$450 million to support the International Labor Organization's International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor (ILO-IPEC), making the U.S. Government the leading donor to the program. USDOL-funded ILO-IPEC projects to combat child labor generally fall into one of several categories: comprehensive, national Timebound Programs (TBP) to eliminate the worst forms of child labor in a set time frame; less comprehensive Country Programs; sector-specific projects; data collection and research projects; and international projects. In general, most projects include "direct action" components that are interventions to remove or prevent children from involvement in exploitative and hazardous work. One of the major strategies used by ILO-IPEC projects is to increase children's access to and participation in formal and non-formal education. Most ILO-IPEC projects also have a capacity-building component to assists in building a strong enabling environment for the long-term elimination of exploitive child labor.

#### 2. Child Labor Education Initiative

Since 2001, the U.S. Congress has provided some US\$269 million to USDOL to support the Child Labor Education Initiative (EI), which focuses on the elimination of the worst forms of child labor through the provision of education opportunities. These projects are being implemented by a wide range of international and non-governmental organizations as well as for-profit firms. USDOL typically awards EI cooperative agreements through a competitive bid process.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> In 2007, the U.S. Congress did not direct USDOL's appropriations for child labor elimination projects to either of these two programs. That year, USDOL allocated \$60 million for child labor elimination projects through a competitive process.

EI projects are designed to ensure that children in areas with a high incidence of child labor are withdrawn and integrated into educational settings, and that they persist in their education once enrolled. In parallel, the program seeks to avert at-risk children from leaving school and entering child labor. The EI is based on the notion that the elimination of exploitative child labor depends, to a large extent, on improving access to, quality of, and relevance of education. Without improving educational quality and relevance, children withdrawn/prevented from child labor may not have viable alternatives and could resort to other forms of hazardous work. EI projects may focus on providing educational services to children removed from specific sectors of work and/or a specific region(s) or support a national Timebound Program that aims to eliminate the worst forms of child labor in multiple sectors of work specific to a given country.

#### Other Initiatives

Finally, USDOL has supported US\$2.5 million for awareness-raising and research activities not associated with the ILO-IPEC program or the EI.

## **Project Context**

In Morocco, children work on family and commercial farms in rural areas. In urban areas, children work as artisans and in manufacturing, and some boys conduct forced labor as "apprentices" for mechanics and in construction work. There are 50,000 children, mostly girls, working in domestic service in Morocco, who are subject to abuse and nonpayment of wages. There are also 15,000 street children in the major cities of Morocco, who perform work such as sell cigarettes, wash cars, and beg. These children are also particularly vulnerable to selling drugs and commercial sexual exploitation. The World Bank, ILO-IPEC, and UNICEF have received reports of child prostitution in Morocco's major cities; children are also internally trafficked within the country for the purpose of domestic labor and CSEC.<sup>23</sup>

USDOL has provided US\$8,351,069 to combat exploitive child labor in Morocco. Previous projects funded by USDOL in Morocco include the Adros project, which was implemented by Management Systems International from 2003 to 2008, and funded at US\$3.1 million. This project withdrew or prevented 11,882 children from exploitive labor, mostly targeted children in the domestic service sector. USDOL also funded a 4.5-year US\$2.25 million ILO-IPEC implemented project to combat rural child labor in Morocco. By the project's conclusion in June 2008, it had withdrawn 3,994 and prevented 7,868 children from the worst forms of child labor.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> USDOL. U.S. Department of Labor's 2008 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor—Morocco country report, p. 253–254.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> USDOL. *Project Status—Europe, Middle East, and North Africa,* http://www.dol.gov/ilab/projects/europe mena/project-europe.htm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> USDOL. U.S. Department of Labor's 2008 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor—Morocco country report, p. 255.

Years	Grantee	Project	Amount (in US\$)
2003–2008	ILO-IPEC	Combating Child Labor in Morocco by Creating an Enabling National Environment and Developing Direct Action Against Worst Forms of Child Labor in Rural Areas	\$2,251,069
2003–2008	MSI	Adros: Combating Child Labor Through Education in Morocco	\$3,100,000
2007–2010	MSI	Combating Child Labor Through Education in Morocco (Dima-Adros)	\$3,000,000
<b>Total Moroc</b>	СО		\$8,351,069

The Government of Morocco (GOM) has ratified ILO Conventions 138 and 182, and is an ILO-IPEC participant country. The minimum age of employment is 15, but this restriction only applies to registered businesses with more than five employees, so operations such as family farms, artisan workshops, and other informal work, is not covered. The law does provide restrictions on the hours and times of day during which children under 16 may work. The law also prohibits hazardous work for children under 18.

The Ministry of Employment is responsible for implementing and enforcing child labor laws, and provides fines for employers who actively recruit children under age 15 to work. However, the U.S. Department of State reports that the informal sector is not closely monitored. Forced labor, child prostitution and trafficking of children are all illegal.<sup>27</sup>

The GOM has a National Action Plan to Eliminate Child Labor (2005–2015), which includes improving implementation and raising awareness of child labor laws and improving basic education of children. Sectors such as agriculture and herding, the industrial sector (carpets and stitching), metal and auto work, construction, and hospitality and food production are especially targeted, as are street children and CSEC. In March 2008, the GOM committed US\$2.6 million to improve the income-generating capacity of poor families at risk of sending their children to work as domestic laborers. In addition to the project funded by USDOL, the GOM participated in two ILO-IPEC implemented projects, including a regional project to combat child labor in Francophone Africa (2006–2009, funded by the French Government) and a project empowering boys and girls to combat gender based violence, funded by the United Nations Development Programme—Spain Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund (2008–2011). 28

# Combating Child Labor through Education in Morocco (Dima-Adros)

On September 30, 2007, Management Systems International received a 3-year Cooperative Agreement worth \$US3 million from USDOL to implement an EI project in Morocco, aimed at withdrawing and preventing children from exploitative child labor by expanding access to and improving the quality of basic education and supporting the five goals of the USDOL project as

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> USDOL. U.S. Department of Labor's 2008 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor—Morocco country report, p. 254.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Ibid, p. 255.

outlined above. Management Systems International was awarded the project through a competitive bid process.

As stipulated in the Cooperative Agreement, the *Dima-Adros* project targets 4,000 children for withdrawal, and 4,000 children for prevention from exploitive labor. The targeted sectors are family and commercial agriculture, domestic labor, artisan workshops, mechanic and auto repair shops, street work, and commercial sexual exploitation. Geographically, the project targets the rural communes of Timezgadiwine, Sidi Issa Regragui, Aït Adel, Skoura Lhadra, Rbaâ, and Tassift, as well as the urban areas of Marrakech, Casablanca, Skhirat Temara, Mohamedia, and Rabat/Sale. The goal of the project is to reduce the incidence of exploitive child labor in Morocco, and the project's intermediate objectives are to: withdraw or prevent children from engaging in exploitive child labor and provide them with educational opportunities; strengthen child labor policies and institutional capacity; mobilize parents and communities at a grassroots level to assume a sustainable role in addressing child labor and improving the quality of education; provide anti-child labor activists and the government with access to reliable information, allowing for knowledgeable decisions regarding child labor and education to be made; and scale up piloted models of intervention with government assistance and create supportive alliances among civil society organizations.

The project's approaches and strategies for direct interventions, awareness raising and capacity building include the following:

- Establish vocational and literacy programs for withdrawn children.
- Support shelters for victims of CSEC.
- Establish dropout prevention and formal education support programs for at-risk children.
- Create boarding centers for girls in rural areas.
- Improve the legal environment with regard to child labor through training and advocacy.
- Provide monitoring and evaluation support to the government's Child Labor Unit.
- Create school watchdog/dropout prevention committees in communities.
- Organize anti-WFCL communication campaigns and activism workshops.
- Conduct research on children involved in commercial sexual exploitation and the handicraft industry.

#### Midterm Evaluation

A midterm evaluation was conducted from February 16 to March 3, 2009, by Charles Tesar, an independent international consultant. The evaluation consisted of document review; individual and group interviews with project staff, beneficiaries, and other stakeholders; site visits (observation) in Rabat, Aït Adel, Kalâa, Marrakech, Skoura Lhadra, Sidi Issa Regragui, and Tassift; and a stakeholder workshop.

The midterm evaluation found that the project was on track for meeting its withdrawal and prevention targets. Parents, students, teachers, and local officials expressed high satisfaction with classes, and attendance in project-supported classes nears 95%. The evaluator found that the project had also had a positive impact on its implementing partners, most of which were newly formed and small groups, with regard to capacity building. The network-approach of the project's 23 partners was found to be key to the project's success by midterm. The evaluator found that the project still needed to deepen capacities among implementing associations, and scale up and sustain interventions through civil society partner institutions, since the GOM seemed ill-equipped to take on responsibility for sustainability.

Key recommendations from the midterm evaluation include the following:

- The U.S. Embassy should take the initiative to coordinate USDOL and USAID with the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) investments in primary and workforce education. USDOL should assume an aggressive role in collaborating with other international donor organizations, especially to link contractors such as MSI with International Labour Organization/International Programme for Elimination of Child Labour operations.
- MSI should provide technical and material assistance to partner associations.
- While coordination with the government has been advanced, MSI should intensify
  national awareness of school dropout and the ongoing crisis stemming from negligence of
  education and child protection.
- The project should deepen and expand the quality of educational programs for children beyond current offerings.

#### II PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF EVALUATION

OCFT-funded projects are subject to midterm and final evaluations. The fieldwork for final evaluations is generally scheduled 3 months before the end of the project. Project *Dima-Adros* in Morocco went into implementation in September 2007 and is due for final evaluation in 2010.

# **Scope of Evaluation**

The scope of the evaluation includes a review and assessment of all activities carried out under the USDOL Cooperative Agreement with Management Systems International. All activities that have been implemented from project launch through time of evaluation fieldwork should be considered. The evaluation should assess the achievements of the project in reaching its targets and objectives as outlined in the cooperative agreement and project document.

The evaluation should address issues of project design, implementation, management, lessons learned, replicability and provide recommendations for current and future projects. The questions to be addressed in the evaluation (provided below) are organized to provide an assessment of the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and (to the extent possible) impact on the target population.

## **Final Evaluation Purpose**

The purpose of the final evaluation is to—

- 1. Assess whether the project has met its objectives and identify the challenges encountered in doing so;
- 2. Assess the relevance of the project in the cultural, economic, and political context in the country, as well as the extent to which it is suited to the priorities and policies of the host country government and USDOL;
- 3. Assess the intended and unintended outcomes and impacts of the project;
- 4. Provide lessons learned from the project design and experiences in implementation that can be applied in current or future child labor projects in the country and in projects designed under similar conditions or target sectors; and
- 5. Assess whether project activities can be deemed sustainable at the local and national level and among implementing organizations.

The evaluation should also provide documented lessons learned, good practices, and models of intervention that will serve to inform future child labor projects and policies in Morocco and elsewhere, as appropriate. It will also serve as an important accountability function for USDOL and Management Systems International. Recommendations should focus around lessons learned and good practices from which future projects can glean when developing their strategies toward combating exploitive child labor.

#### **Intended Users**

This final evaluation should provide USDOL, Management Systems International, other project specific stakeholders, and stakeholders working to combat child labor more broadly, an assessment of the project's experience in implementation and its impact on project beneficiaries. Lessons learned and good practices should be used by stakeholders in the design and implementation of subsequent phases or future child labor projects in the country and elsewhere as appropriate. The final report will be published on the USDOL website, so the report should be written as a standalone document, providing the necessary background information for readers who are unfamiliar with the details of the project.

#### **Evaluation Questions**

Specific questions that the evaluation should seek to answer are found below, according to five categories of issue. Evaluators may add, remove, or shift evaluation questions, but the final list will be subject to approval by USDOL and ICF Macro.

#### Relevance

The evaluation should consider the relevance of the project to the cultural, economic, and political context in the country, as well as the extent to which it is suited to the priorities and policies of the host country government and USDOL. Specifically, it should address the following questions:

- 1. Does the project design seem to be adequately supporting the five USDOL goals, as specified above? (Please pay particular attention to goal #1: Withdrawing or preventing children from involvement in exploitive child labor through the provision of direct educational services—please note that withdrawal and prevention is NOT THE SAME as enrollment in an educational program. Both must occur for a child to be counted towards USDOL GPRA common indicators). If not, which ones are not being supported and why not?
- 2. Have the project assumptions been accurate?
- 3. What criteria were used to define "exploitive" when targeting children as direct service beneficiaries? Was this criterion in line with USDOL definitions?
- 4. What criteria was used to define a child as either "withdrawn" or "prevented" from exploitive child labor for USDOL reporting purposes? Was this criterion in line with USDOL definitions?
- 5. What are the main project strategies/activities designed toward meeting objectives in withdrawing/preventing children from WFCL? What is the rationale behind using these strategies?
- 6. What are the main obstacles or barriers that the project has identified as important to addressing child labor in this country? (i.e., poverty, lack of educational infrastructure, lack of demand for education, etc.) Has the project been successful in addressing these obstacles?
- 7. Is the project design appropriate for the cultural, economic, and political context in which it works?
- 8. How has the project fit within existing programs to combat child labor and trafficking, especially government initiatives?
- 9. Did the project adjust implementation and/or strategy based on the findings and recommendations of the midterm evaluation?
- 10. Were the areas that were defined for research relevant to the overall country context and implementing environment (see Section 3.1.4. of Project Document, as well as the study on Commercial Sexual Exploitation (CSEC) victims)?
- 11. What other major design and/or implementation issues should be brought to the attention of the grantee and USDOL?

#### **Effectiveness**

The evaluation should assess whether the project has reached its objectives, and the effectiveness of project activities in contributing toward those objectives. Specifically, the evaluation should address:

- 1. Has the project achieved its targets and objectives as stated in the project document? What factors contributed to the success and/or underachievement of each of the objectives? (Please pay particular attention to the CSEC component.)
- 2. Assess the effectiveness of the "direct action" interventions, including the education interventions provided to children (i.e. vocational and literacy programs, nonformal education in shelters, pre-employment entrepreneurship modules, tutoring, and boarding schools). Did the provision of these services results in children being withdrawn/prevented from exploitive child labor/trafficking and ensure that they were involved in relevant educational programs?
- 3. Assess the effectiveness of the services in meeting the needs of the target population identified in the project document including children *prevented* and *withdrawn* from labor/trafficking.
- 4. Assess the effectiveness of the specific models (instructional technology, participatory learning methodology, tutoring) on increasing educational opportunities, creating community ownership, increasing the capacity of communities, and increasing awareness/understanding of the dangers of child labor.
- 5. How has the project contributed to raising awareness of exploitive child labor in family and commercial agriculture and in CSEC? What were the project's messages and were they communicated effectively in all relevant project sites?
- 6. Given that Moroccan laws are in some ways complicit to child labor in agriculture, has the project done anything to bring this issue to the forefront or identify it is problematic?
- 7. Has the project accurately identified and targeted children engaged in, or at risk of working in, the target sectors identified in the project strategy (family and commercial agriculture, domestic labor, artisan workshops, mechanic and auto repair shops, street work, and commercial sexual exploitation)? In a larger sense, did they accurately identify the worst forms of child labor in the country?
- 8. Were the research/study components carried out effectively and were the results used for the purposes stated in the project document?
- 9. Are there any sector specific lessons learned regarding the types and effectiveness of the services provided?
- 10. What monitoring systems does the project use for tracking the work status of children? Were they feasible and effective? Why or why not?
- 11. What are the management strengths, including technical and financial, of this project?

## Efficiency

The evaluation should provide analysis as to whether the strategies employed by the project were efficient in terms of the resources used (inputs) as compared to its qualitative and quantitative impact (outputs). Specifically, the evaluation should address:

- 1. Is the project cost-efficient?
- 2. Were the project strategies efficient in terms of the financial and human resources used, as compared to its outputs? What alternatives are there?
- 3. Was the monitoring system designed efficiently to meet the needs and requirements of the project?

#### **Impact**

The evaluation should assess the positive and negative changes produced by the project—intended and unintended, direct and indirect, as well as any changes in the social and economic environment in the country—as reported by respondents. Specifically, it should address:

- 1. What appears to be the project's impact, if any, on individual beneficiaries (children, parents, teachers, etc.)?
- 2. Please assess the impact, to the extent possible, of raising awareness on the hazards of exploitive child labor in each of the sectors targeted by the project (paying particular attention to the "Healthy Farm Work" campaign and the CSEC awareness-raising campaign).
- 3. Assess the impact, to the extent possible, of project activities/strategies on education quality (both formal and nonformal interventions). How has the education quality improvement component been received by the government and the communities?
- 4. What appears to be the project's impact, if any, on partners or other organizations working on child labor in the country (NGOs, community groups, schools, national child labor committee, etc.)?
- 5. What appears to be the project's impact, if any, on government and policy structures in terms of system-wide change on education and child labor issues?

### Sustainability

The evaluation should assess whether the project has taken steps to ensure the continuation of project activities after the completion of the program, including sources of funding and partnerships with other organizations and/or the government, and identify areas where this may be strengthened. Specifically, it should address:

1. Were the exit strategy and sustainability plan integrated into the project design? Will it likely be effective?

- 2. How successful has the project been in leveraging non-project resources? Are there prospects for sustainable funding?
- 3. What have been the major challenges and successes in maintaining partnerships in support of the project, including with other USDOL-funded projects?
- 4. What have been the major challenges and opportunities, if any, of maintaining coordination with the host country government, particularly the National Initiative for Human Development; the Ministry of Social Development, Family and Solidarity; the Ministry of National Education and Youth; the Ministry of Agriculture; and the Ministry of Employment, as well as other government agencies active in addressing related children's issues?
- 5. What have been the major challenges and opportunities, if any, of implementing coordination with the ILO-IPEC?
- 6. What have been some of the challenges and opportunities in working with international and/or multilateral organizations?
- 7. What have been some of the challenges and opportunities in working with other national NGOs and/or community-based organizations present in the country?
- 8. Will the *dar taleb* (boarding schools), *animateurs* (community teachers/monitors), classes, monitoring systems, and other committees/groups and systems created by the project be sustainable?
- 9. Will the buses purchased by the program and run by the community be a long-term sustainable method for transporting rural children to school?
- 10. What lessons can be learned of the project's accomplishments and weaknesses in terms of sustainability of interventions?

#### III EVALUATION METHODOLOGY AND TIMEFRAME

The evaluation methodology will consist of the following activities and approaches:

# A Approach

The evaluation approach will be primarily qualitative in terms of the data collection methods used as the timeframe does not allow for quantitative surveys to be conducted. Quantitative data will be drawn from project reports to the extent that it is available and incorporated in the analysis. The evaluation approach will be independent in terms of the membership of the evaluation team. Project staff and implementing partners will generally only be present in meetings with stakeholders, communities and beneficiaries to provide introductions. The following additional principles will be applied during the evaluation process:

1. Methods of data collection and stakeholder perspectives will be triangulated for as many as possible of the evaluation questions.

- 2. Efforts will be made to include parents' and children's voices and beneficiary participation generally, using child-sensitive approaches to interviewing children following the ILO-IPEC guidelines on research with children on the worst forms of child labor (http://www.ilo.org/ipecinfo/product/viewProduct.do?productId=3026) and UNICEF Principles for Ethical Reporting on Children (http://www.unicef.org/media/media\_tools\_ guidelines.html).
- 3. Gender and cultural sensitivity will be integrated in the evaluation approach.
- 4. Consultations will incorporate a degree of flexibility to maintain a sense of ownership of the stakeholders and beneficiaries, allowing additional questions to be posed that are not included in the TOR, whilst ensuring that key information requirements are met.
- 5. As far as possible, a consistent approach will be followed in each project site, with adjustments to the made for the different actors involved and activities conducted and the progress of implementation in each locality.

### B Final Evaluation Team

The evaluation team will consist of—

- 1. The international evaluator
- 2. An interpreter fluent in Moroccan Arabic and English who will travel with the evaluator

One member of the project staff may travel with the team to make introductions. This person is not involved in the evaluation process.

The international evaluator is Monique Bidaoui-Nooren. She will be responsible for developing the methodology in consultation with ICF Macro and the project staff; assigning the tasks of the interpreter for the fieldwork; directly conducting interviews and facilitating other data collection processes; analysis of the evaluation material gathered; presenting feedback on the initial findings of the evaluation to the national stakeholder meeting and preparing the evaluation report.

The responsibility of the interpreter/s in each provincial locality is to ensure that the evaluation team is understood by the stakeholders as far as possible, and that the information gathered is relayed accurately to the evaluator.

# C Data Collection Methodology

#### 1 Document Review

- Pre-field visit preparation includes extensive review of relevant documents
- During fieldwork, documentation will be verified and additional documents may be collected
- Documents may include—
  - Project Document and revisions

- Cooperative Agreement
- Technical Progress and Status Reports
- Project Logical Frameworks and Monitoring Plans
- Work plans
- Correspondence related to Technical Progress Reports
- Management Procedures and Guidelines
- Research or other reports undertaken (baseline studies, etc.)
- Project files (including school records) as appropriate.

#### 2 Question Matrix

Before beginning fieldwork, the evaluator will create a question matrix, which outlines the source of data from where the evaluator plans to collect information for each TOR question. This will help the evaluator make decisions as to how they are going to allocate their time in the field. It will also help the evaluator to ensure that they are exploring all possible avenues for data triangulation and to clearly note where their evaluation findings are coming from.

#### 3 Interviews with Stakeholders

Informational interviews will be held with as many project stakeholders as possible. Depending on the circumstances, these meetings will be one-on-one or group interviews. Technically, stakeholders are all those who have an interest in a project, for example, as implementers, direct and indirect beneficiaries, community leaders, donors, and government officials. Thus, it is anticipated that meetings will be held with—

- ILAB/OCFT Staff
- Headquarters, Country Director, Project Managers, and Field Staff of Grantee and Partner Organizations
- Government Ministry Officials and Local Government Officials
- Community leaders, members, and volunteers
- School teachers, assistants, school directors, education personnel
- Project beneficiaries (children withdrawn and prevented and their parents)
- International organizations, NGOs and multilateral agencies working in the area
- Other child protection and/or education organizations, committees and experts in the area
- Labor Reporting Officer at U.S. Embassy and USAID representative

#### 4 Field Visits

The evaluator will visit a selection of project sites. The final selection of field sites to be visited will be made by the evaluator. Every effort should be made to include some sites where the project experienced successes and others that encountered challenges, as well as a good cross-section of sites across targeted CL sectors. During the visits the evaluator will observe the activities and outputs developed by the project. Focus groups with children and parents will be held, and interviews will be conducted with representatives from local governments, NGOs, community leaders and teachers.

## D Ethical Considerations and Confidentiality

The evaluation mission will observe utmost confidentiality related to sensitive information and feedback elicited during the individual and group interviews. To mitigate bias during the data collection process and ensure a maximum freedom of expression of the implementing partners, stakeholders, communities, and beneficiaries, implementing partner staff will generally not be present during interviews. However, implementing partner staff may accompany the evaluator to make introductions whenever necessary, to facilitate the evaluation process, make respondents feel comfortable, and to allow the evaluator to observe the interaction between the implementing partner staff and the interviewees.

## E Stakeholder Meeting

Following the field visits, a stakeholders' meeting will be conducted by the evaluator that brings together a wide range of stakeholders, including the implementing partners and other interested parties. The list of participants to be invited will be drafted prior to the evaluator's visit and confirmed in consultation with project staff during fieldwork.

The meeting will be used to present the major preliminary finding and emerging issues, solicit recommendations, and obtain clarification or additional information from stakeholders, including those not interviewed earlier. The agenda of the meeting will be determined by the evaluator in consultation with project staff. Some specific questions for stakeholders will be prepared to guide the discussion and possibly a brief written feedback.

The agenda is expected to include some of the following items:

- 1. Presentation by the evaluator of the preliminary main findings
- 2. Feedback and questions from stakeholders on the findings
- 3. Opportunity for implementing partners not met to present their views on progress and challenges in their locality
- 4. Possible SWOT exercise on the project's performance
- 5. Discussion of recommendations (to improve the implementation and ensure sustainability. Consideration will be given to the value of distributing a feedback form for participants to nominate their "action priorities" for the remainder of the project.)

## F Limitations

Fieldwork for the evaluation will last two weeks, on average, and the evaluator will not have enough time to visit all project sites. As a result, the evaluator will not be able to take all sites into consideration when formulating their findings. All efforts will be made to ensure that the evaluator is visiting a representative sample of sites, including some that have performed well and some that have experienced challenges.

This is not a formal impact assessment. Findings for the evaluation will be based on information collected from background documents and in interviews with stakeholders, project staff, and beneficiaries. The accuracy of the evaluation findings will be determined by the integrity of information provided to the evaluator from these sources.

Furthermore, the ability of the evaluator to determine efficiency will be limited by the amount of financial data available. A cost-efficiency analysis is not included because it would require impact data which is not available.

## G Timetable and Work Plan

The tentative timetable is as follows. Actual dates may be adjusted as needs arise.

Activity	Responsible Party	Proposed Date(s)	
Phone interview with USDOL and Grantee Staff/Headquarters	ICF Macro, USDOL, Grantee, Evaluator	September	
Desk Review	Evaluator	September	
Question Matrix and Instruments due to ICF Macro/USDOL	Evaluator	September 17	
Finalize TOR and submit to Grantee and USDOL	USDOL/ICF Macro/Evaluator	August 16	
Introductory Meetings with Project Staff and National Stakeholders	Evaluator	October 8	
Field Site Visits	Evaluator	October 11–21	
National Stakeholder Meeting		October 25	
Post-evaluation debrief call with USDOL		November 1	
Draft report to ICF Macro for QC review	Evaluator	November 8	
Draft report to USDOL & Grantee for 48 hour review	ICF Macro	November 10	
Draft report released to stakeholders	ICF Macro	November 17	
Comments due to ICF Macro	USDOL/Grantee & Stakeholders	December 1	
Report revised and sent to ICF Macro	Evaluator	December 8	
Revised report sent to USDOL	ICF Macro	December 9	
Final approval of report	USDOL	December 23	
Finalization and distribution of report	ICF Macro	January 13, 2011	

## IV EXPECTED OUTPUTS/DELIVERABLES

Ten working days following the evaluator's return from fieldwork, a first draft evaluation report will be submitted to ICF Macro. The report should have the following structure and content:

- I. Table of Contents
- II. List of Acronyms
- III. Executive Summary (providing an overview of the evaluation, summary of main findings/lessons learned/good practices, and three key recommendations)
- IV. Evaluation Objectives and Methodology
- V. Project Description
- VI. Relevance
  - A. Findings—answering the TOR questions
  - B. Lessons Learned/Good Practices
- VII. Effectiveness
  - A. Findings—answering the TOR questions
  - B. Lessons Learned/Good Practices

#### VIII. Efficiency

- A. Findings—answering the TOR questions
- B. Lessons Learned/Good Practices
- IX. Impact
  - A. Findings—answering the TOR questions
  - B. Lessons Learned/Good Practices
- X. Sustainability
  - A. Findings—answering the TOR questions
  - B. Lessons Learned/Good Practices
- XI. Recommendations and Conclusions
  - A. Key Recommendations—critical for successfully meeting project objectives
  - B. Other Recommendations—as needed
    - 1. Relevance
    - 2. Effectiveness
    - 3. Efficiency
    - 4. Impact
    - 5. Sustainability

XII. Annexes—including list of documents reviewed; interviews/meetings/site visits; stakeholder workshop agenda and participants; TOR; etc.

The total length of the report should be a minimum of 30 pages and a maximum of 45 pages for the main report, excluding the executive summary and annexes.

The first draft of the report will be circulated to OCFT and key stakeholders individually for their review. Comments from stakeholders will be consolidated and incorporated into the final reports as appropriate, and the evaluator will provide a response to OCFT, in the form of a comment matrix, as to why any comments might not have been incorporated.

While the substantive content of the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the report shall be determined by the evaluator, the report is subject to final approval by ILAB/OCFT in terms of whether or not the report meets the conditions of the TOR.

After returning from fieldwork, the first draft evaluation report is due to ICF Macro on November 8, 2010, as indicated in the above timetable. A final draft is due one week after receipt of comments from ILAB/OCFT and stakeholders and is anticipated to be due on December 8, 2010, as indicated in the above timetable. All reports including drafts will be written in English.

## V EVALUATION MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT

ICF Macro has contracted with Monique Bidaoui-Nooren to conduct this evaluation. Ms. Bidaoui-Nooren has been an international education consultant since October 2007. Prior to that, she was the Team Leader for Education and Workforce Development of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Rabat Morocco. She has also served as Human Resources (Training) Division Chief and Training Officer, both also with USAID/Morocco. The contractor/evaluator will work with OCFT, ICF Macro, and relevant Management Systems International staff to evaluate this project.

ICF Macro will provide all logistical and administrative support for their staff and subcontractors, including travel arrangements (e.g., plane and hotel reservations, purchasing plane tickets, providing per diem) and all materials needed to provide all deliverables. ICF Macro will also be responsible for providing the management and technical oversight necessary to ensure consistency of methods and technical standards.

