Smooth...

Lotion is designed to keep you smooth, but apparently not smooth enough to fool our Millimeter Wave (MMW) machines. Recently, a passenger concealed a 4 oz. bottle of lotion on their person for the sole reason that it was expensive and they didn’t want to lose it.

Of course, many of you are saying, “Thank the heavens for the TSA. Without them, a harmless bottle of lotion would have made it onto an airplane. “

While the sarcasm is expected, what you don’t know is our intelligence has shown us that terrorists with dry flaky skin are unable to fulfill their missions. So it’s vital to keep all lotions off of airplanes.

I kid, I kid, but on a serious note, what if it wasn’t lotion? What if it was liquid explosives, or a block of plastic explosives?

The success story here is not that we kept a bottle of lotion off of a plane, but we found an intentionally hidden item on a passenger. We found a hidden item and knew exactly where it was without having the passenger undergo a hand-wanding or patdown.

Blogger Bob

EoS Blog Team

A Day In The Life Of: Transportation Security Inspectors (TSI)

In an effort to explain the many different positions we have in the field, I've asked a Transportation Security Inspector (TSI) from Cincinnati to talk a little about his position.

Jim is from the Aviation side of Inspections, so keep in mind that TSA has a cadre of inspectors in the field. We’ll highlight their jobs in the future as well.

Now, the next time you see the folks in the fancy "TSA Inspector" jackets, you'll know what they do. ~ Bob

When most people think about TSA, the dedicated men and women performing the duties of the Transportation Security Officer (TSO) come to mind; and why not? It is by far the most visible public component of TSA and usually the first thing we see as we approach the checkpoint. Much like the many layers that make up TSA’s security “system of systems”, other components of TSA are tasked with duties not so visible to the traveling public, but are just as fundamental to securing our nation’s transport systems. Today I will discuss one of those components...TSA’s Transportation Security Inspectors, or TSIs.

As with most things governmental, regulations abound! Especially with respect to airline operations, airport operations and the wide variety of security programs that these entities adopt and implement. That’s where the TSI comes in. I’m an aviation inspector, so I’ll refrain from commentary on the cargo inspection program or the surface (rail and mass transit) inspection program. The duties and responsibilities of a TSI are quite varied due in no small part to an industry that can be complex, market driven, evolving and critical to our nation’s economy. Bear with me as I reach deep into my mind-numbing facts hat and reference the actual regulations that drive what TSIs actually inspect. Our beloved Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) has many titles and parts, but for the aviation TSI, it’s all about 49 CFR part 1500 and the relevant subchapters. Within that body of work, those who find themselves regulated by TSA will know what is expected of them as well as what can be expected from us. If you find yourself unable to sleep on a given night, look them up on the web at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/ under the executive resources portion.

So, what does it all mean? TSIs in the field conduct comprehensive inspections, assessments and investigations of regulated entities to determine how well they comply with the regulations as well as identifying areas of weakness that need to be fixed. Exactly how is it done? Well, TSIs will use a variety of methods to determine compliance which may include surveillance, interview, document review and/or testing. But it doesn’t end there. Those findings are archived so we can get a snapshot of trouble areas that are common and adjust our security priorities to meet those needs.

In addition to our normal inspection workload, TSIs conduct investigations into alleged violations of security regulations at the screening checkpoint. Normally this would be the result of a person attempting to bring something prohibited through the screening checkpoint – things like guns, explosives and incendiaries. On occasion, and it doesn’t happen all too often, someone will cause a fracas at the checkpoint that rises to level of interference with the screening process. When that happens, the TSI will investigate the circumstances surrounding the alleged violation and determine what enforcement action is appropriate. An enforcement action may be administrative in nature (warning notice), or result in a monetary fine (civil penalty). However, if the investigation demonstrates that no violation occurred, the matter will be closed with no action and a letter advising the person of that determination will be mailed out. I could go on and on regarding enforcement actions because those can be thorny and it doesn’t simply end with a fine because the TSI recommends it. There is a process and I will defer to our legal team regarding the steps that it entails.

Lastly, TSIs conduct outreach activity with our industry partners and local/Federal agencies in order to foster that open relationship and share information critical to our mutual success. There is more to a TSI’s job than what I have written about today, but my post is getting long so I’ll wrap it up. Perhaps I can post another time with some more riveting TSI tidings. Until then, travel safe and thanks for checking out our blog!

Guest Blogger

Jim

Frozen Monkey Heads & Other Fun Stuff

I saw this story today and thought it would be a fun link to share with our readers. Among the usual pocket knives, lotions and bottles of water, our officers often find some, well… not so usual things.

Check out this Daily News article on the weird and wacky stuff that’s found during searches by TSA and Customs at JFK.

I encourage any of our officers that are reading to chime in and talk about some of the out of the ordinary things you’ve found.

Blogger Bob

EoS Blog Team

3 oz or 3.4 oz? What gives???

Short answer: 3.4 oz. For more details, read on…

OK, here’s the scoop. If the U.S. would have switched to the metrics system in the 70s, this wouldn’t be an issue. How many of you out there had to learn the metric system in school only to never use it…

When TSA lifted the total liquid ban and implemented the 3-1-1 program, the permissible amount of liquids, aerosols and gels was 3oz. Press releases went out, WebPages were updated, and signs were printed and shipped out nationwide to 457 airports.

When TSA rolled out 3-1-1, the European Union was not on board yet. When the EU decided to lift the ban and allow liquids to travel, the amount permitted was 100ml. Well, as those of you who like me had to learn metric conversion in grade school, youmight remember that 100ml = 3.4oz. not 3 oz. In order to align with the EU, we decided to allow liquids in containers up to 3.4oz. We also decided to keep our signage the same to maintain consistency. (Besides, 3.4-1-1 just doesn’t have the same ring to it.)

From a marketing perspective, 3 ounces was easier to remember than 3.4. For the European Union, 100 milliliters was easier to remember than 89. So, behind the scenes, we’ve been allowing up to 3.4 ounces, but it hasn’t been reflected on the web or in signage.

We’ve read your concerns here on the blog, so from now on, we’ll use 3.4 on the blog when talking about liquid limits, and also make changes (as soon as possible) to the TSA web site. I worked with Lynn on this and she has crafted a new response for the contact center to use when communicating with the public. We are also going to send a message to the workforce as a reminder.

Some people have asked why we don’t convert the net weight of the toothpaste to volume since they are different. Good question. The 3.4 container/volume rule was created to make it simple and streamlined for both passengers and our officers. As you could imagine, taking weight into consideration would be a wrench in the spokes. I’m sure the public doesn’t want our officers using scales or conversion charts, etc.

I hope this has helped you better understand the 3.0/3.4 oz. conundrum.

Thanks,

Bob

EoS Blog Team

Pilot Program Tests Millimeter Wave for Primary Passenger Screening

This week, TSA began testing MMW technology in the place of a metal detector at Tulsa International Airport to assess passenger throughput and acceptance.

Currently, 18 airports have millimeter wave equipment installed at checkpoints in a “secondary” screening configuration, which means that metal detectors are still the primary method of screening passengers. At these airports, randomly selected passengers and those requiring secondary screening can be screened by millimeter wave technology as a non-invasive alternative to a pat-down from an officer.

In Tulsa, instead of walking through the metal detector, passengers will go directly through the millimeter wave machine. A passenger can opt not to go through the unit, but will go through the metal detector and get a pat-down instead. Signage at the checkpoint informs travelers about the technology and lets them know that using it is voluntary. We’ve included one of the signs below.


So far the pilot seems to be going well, as noted in an article in USA Today. In the first three days of primary MMW at Tulsa, 3,780 passengers have been screened using the technology and only 8 people have opted for the metal detector and a pat-down.

In addition to the security benefit of whole body imaging – it can detect metallic and non-metallic threat items – the technology also reduces the need to pat-down passengers with hip replacements, prosthetics and other surgical implants. At airports without Whole Body Image machines, when passengers alarm the metal detector, the alarm must be resolved through a hand-held metal detector and a pat down. This often takes two to four minutes as opposed to about 15 seconds with millimeter wave.

For every person who is hesitant to go through the millimeter wave portal for whatever reason, there are 100 people with metallic surgical implants that are rejoicing. Here is a quote from Thomas Frank’s USA Today Article:

“For passengers with metallic hips or knees, the scanners were a relief from metal detectors, which invariably sound alarms that lead to pat-downs. ‘I walked through, raised my arms and was done,’ said a beaming Larry Brenden, 43, of Albuquerque. ‘I was like, what, no pat-down?"

And yes, whenever we talk about whole body imaging we get lots of comments and questions about privacy. We suggest checking out 60 Minutes correspondent Leslie Stahl’s commentary on millimeter wave or this article by the producer of Ms. Stahl’s segment. For anyone just hearing about millimeter wave and wanting to know more, please read Blogger Bob’s two previous MMW posts: [link 1] [link 2]. The short version: the technology is completely safe, WBI images are never transmitted, printed or stored, the officer at the machine cannot see the image and the officer viewing the image cannot see the passenger.

In the next two months, the pilot program will expand to San Francisco, Las Vegas, Miami, Albuquerque, and Salt Lake City.

If you have the chance to go through a millimeter wave machine – in primary or secondary – please share your thoughts here on the blog.

- Poster Paul

EoS Blog Team

**Update:

TSA’s partnership with European civil aviation authorities has also had a significant impact on TSA’s decision to begin the Primary MMW pilot. A Primary MMW trial at Schiphol airport in the Netherlands has been underway since late 2006. Prior to TSA’s pilot program, TSA technology experts met with Dutch civil aviation authorities and technology experts to discuss the process and recent results.

***Addendum:

Including the above, three signs will be on display at the security checkpoint for airports participating in the Primary MMW pilot. See the other two below. All three are currently on display at Tulsa.

Why We Do What We Do: Shift Briefs

Lynn’s husband asked a question similar to this after a recent trip, and we also get this question from people on the blog:

“When I’m going past the checkpoint, I see a group of officers standing over to the side. What are they doing? “

Maybe it’s happened to you, too: you’re in the line waiting go to through the checkpoint and you see a large group of officers near the checkpoint standing around and talking. Your first thought is probably “why in the heck don’t they use these officers to open more lanes?”

Are they trying to figure out how many officers it takes to change a light bulb? Are they getting ready to make a human pyramid? Nope…

The most likely reason is that it’s time for a shift change. Officers receive an in-brief and out-brief at the beginning and end of their shifts. During the course of a day, officers on the same shift are routinely assigned different tasks and are never in the same place at the same time. These two occasions are opportune times to get the entire shift together and disseminate important information and assign tasks for the day etc. This is a time when officers can communicate with their supervisors and managers and bring things to light. This is when critical intelligence is shared or information relating to an FBI BOLO or Amber Alert is distributed.

Sometimes these briefings take place in rooms outside of the public view and other times there just isn’t any space at a particular airport and briefings have to be conducted in a public area.

There can also be other reasons for smaller groups of officers to convene at the checkpoint.

Officers are sent to breaks and lunches in groups and before they return to duty, they usually meet near the checkpoint to wait for a lead or supervisor to give them their next assignment.

We also have teams of officers sent to various locations to randomly screen airport employees. Even if nobody is being screened, officers need to stay at this location for a specific period of time.

Officers also frequently use cell phones to communicate in larger airports where radios might not reach everywhere. So while it may look like an officer is making a personal call, they are in fact doing their job. Use of personal cell phones while on duty is not permitted.

We understand it’s human nature to assume folks are just doing nothing, but in a public job like this one, our officers are like the gold fish in the bowl swimming around for everyone to see. Everything they do is open to a different interpretation by each passenger. I just wanted to give you a few explanations to clear things up.

Bob

EoS Blog Team

Why We Do What We Do: Screening People in Wheelchairs

On February 4 at Los Angeles International Airport (better known as LAX), TSA officers found two 6x6x2 packages taped to the abdomen of a passenger.

The passenger arrived at the checkpoint in a wheelchair and was given the option of walking through the metal detector or being patted down in his wheelchair. He chose to walk through the metal detector. Because he was wearing bulky clothing, he also received additional screening - in this case a pat down.

That's when an officer found the two packages. The packages were tested and initial results were positive for explosive content. A TSA Bomb Appraisal Officer eventually cleared the packages through additional tests at the checkpoint and LAX police determined that the packages contained cocaine. The passenger was arrested, and federal charges are pending.

Now we know what some of you are thinking - TSA’s mission is not to find drugs, and that’s true. But finding drugs isn’t the success story here – the success story is that the officers found suspicious items intentionally concealed on a person’s body and that person was someone who would appear to pose no threat. We know that people who want to sneak something through a checkpoint – like improvised explosives devices and their components – often look to the techniques of drug and money smugglers and other criminals. In this case, it was drugs (which are admittedly not a threat to a plane), but when an officer finds these kinds of items, they don’t know what the contents are until the package is tested.

And because it’s a hot topic, it bears repeating that because transportation security officers are federal officers, if they find drugs, they must report it to law enforcement. Often on the blog we get questions like: “how is granny a threat?,” “what can a person in a wheelchair do on a plane,” etc. To us, this story is about the importance of screening everyone, and not giving anyone an exemption that a terrorist could use to their advantage.

Case in point: in 2005 in Colombia, a man in a wheelchair was allowed to bypass the metal detectors to board his flight. He and his son then tried to hijack the plane with two hand grenades they got through security. According to the media reporting:

“Duque said the older hijacker boarded the plane in a wheelchair. It may have helped him smuggle the grenades aboard. The wheelchair was too large to pass through an airport metal detector, and the man was not patted down by security agents, Luis Octavio Rojas, director of the Florencia airport, told The Associated Press.

“But they did give him and the chair a visual inspection,” Rojas added.”

______

- Lynn

EoS Blog Team

Welcoming the New Secretary

Former Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano is now officially on board as the new Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security.

Earlier this week, she published her first post on the DHS Leadership Journal titled “Getting to Work.” I suggest you follow the link and give it a read.

Also, TSA was happy to welcome Secretary Napolitano to its headquarters earlier this week for her first visit.



The Secretary was given three brief presentations on Security Operations, Technology, and Public Engagement. I was lucky enough to be able to present the latter, and the Secretary seems to be very interested in social media and wants to look into various ways the blog can be used. She has also stated that she plans to be a regular poster at the DHS Leadership Journal.



I look forward to seeing what new challenges we can all tackle together.

Vlogging With Blogger Bob

Vlog. No, it's not an Eastern European surname, (Vlog the Vlogger) it's short for Video Log. Vlogging is basically blogging with a video. We're not switching to a Vlog format, but we are going to start vlogging occasionally.

In this vlog, we show you some footage of the inauguration. As history was being made, more than 300 of our Transportation Security Officers were there partnering with the US Secret Service to help keep the record breaking crowd safe.



For the snarks out there, we were funded by the United States Secret Service. TSA along with the its other DHS components worked with federal, state, and local authorities at the inauguration helping to keep nearly 2 million people safe. The inauguration was designated a National Special Security Event by DHS.

Check out our web page to see what part TSA played in this mammoth security undertaking. TSA.GOV

Bob
EoS Blog Team

Administrator Kip Hawley's Final TSA Blog Post

TSA opened up this web dialogue about a year ago to get feedback from the public and engage with them on the issues that they presented. We have learned a great deal from those of you who have posted and I am grateful for your engagement with us. While some of the individual comments are painful to read and/or based on something that is factually wrong, taken as an aggregate there are undeniable, unavoidable themes.

One of those themes is that TSA's security is intellect-free. The broad categories seem to be about doubting the reality of the current threat, perceived vulnerabilities, and experiences that defy common sense.

With this post, I would like to touch on threat and vulnerabilities and focus on how TSA is introducing more 'smart' security at the airport.

Threat information comes in many forms, virtually all of it coming to us with restrictions on how we can use it. The good news is that we get it -- and use it -- to craft our security activities, and we literally do that every day. The bad news is that a condition of getting the really detailed and actionable information is that we cannot fully explain to the public the 'why' behind what we do. Ellen Howe's previous post discusses how we have tried to get out as much as we can on the 'why,' most recently, with the Ad Council.

The point on vulnerabilities is that since there are vulnerabilities in every system, what's important is to identify them and then compensate for those vulnerabilities with other measures. TSA is involved in risk-management - understanding our vulnerabilities, looking at what terrorists may be planning, and devoting our main efforts to reduce the risk of attacks with catastrophic consequences.

You might look at it like mapping out a spectrum of attacks causing catastrophic consequences, then overlaying it with vulnerabilities, and then circling in red the vulnerabilities associated with high-consequence attack scenarios where we know terrorists are plotting. We look for compensating measures across the spectrum to protect against vulnerabilities or plotting of which we are unaware. But first of all, we take action to close down any vulnerabilities circled in red. When we see an intersection of threat, vulnerability and consequence, TSA takes action as we have with liquids and shoes even though we know that they will not be popular. We are more likely to consider convenience issues in other areas of the spectrum and devote considerable effort in working with our airport and airline colleagues to make things work with the least possible inconvenience. There are technology answers -- but we have to close the gap until the technology answer works and is deployed.

Part of the problem with the 'common sense' theme is that our rhetoric of smarter, flexible, unpredictable, stay-ahead-of-the-terrorist strategy can clash with your personal experience. Some measures are in place now and others rolling out that will sharply reduce that disconnect. I will mention a few examples in each of our key areas: people, technology, and process.

First off with our people, TSA is about two-thirds of the way through retraining our entire airport workforce, from Federal Security Director to front-line Officer. (Headquarters elements are also included.) This training is worthy of its own post but it is two full days in length and covers the gamut from human factors to updated information on terrorist weapons and tactics. It is all about being smart about how we do our security job and how to think in terms of identifying real - and sophisticated - threats and less about running through a checklist.

Secondly, we are also about two-thirds through a major deployment of much more sophisticated carry-on bag scanners, AT-X-ray. About 600 of the new, smarter AT's are deployed already with another 300 more in the next few months. These are the machines that will be able to detect threat liquids (or powders, gels, etc.) automatically and will allow TSA to change the baggie requirement and clear up many of the head-scratching moments you now endure. (Probably about a year away.)

Finally, I have spoken about wanting to break up the rigidity of checkpoint screening and mentioned a goal of changing it up, spreading it out, and calming it down. With a re-trained workforce that has better technology, we can make the existing process calmer. There are opportunities also to make process changes that will make things smoother. For instance, where we have rigid and predictable criteria for extra screening (like last minute travel changes and one-way tickets), we can get more security value by using less obvious criteria like randomness or behavior and make things less congested at the checkpoint.

While this forum will continue to hear from our vigorous critics, I hope that in addition to the words of the indefatigable Blogger Bob and his colleagues, you will see that TSA has backed them up with actions in the year that the EoS Blog has been in business.

Our on-line presence is much clearer, deeper, and more accessible - and improvements will continue. Black Diamond, laptop bags, clearer signage, better explanations of the “why”, are all examples of actions taken by TSA that were helped by this blog discussion. You've helped us prioritize your pain points and we do, in fact, work to reduce those.

The security needs in aviation (and surface transportation) are significant and on-going. Real security risk mitigation can only happen when all parties - including the public - are active, positive participants. The men and women of TSA are amazing in their commitment to protect you and it has been an honor to serve with them. I hope that, going forward, your personal experience with our people, bolstered by better technology and process, will bring us together in support of our common objective - untroubled transportation to our chosen destination and a safe, smooth return home.

Thank you for your interest and participation,

Kip