



Nonbanks in the Payments System

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The background of the slide is a faded, light gray image of a US five-dollar bill. The bill features the portrait of Abraham Lincoln on the left side, the number '5' in the corners, and the text 'FEDERAL RESERVE NOTE' and 'FIVE DOLLARS'. The serial number 'J726712A' is visible in the upper right area of the bill.

Outline

- Government oversight nonbanks in retail payments
- Where are nonbanks in payments, what are the risks, and how bad are they?
- Risk management in retail payments
- Options for improvement
- Discussion

Scope of government oversight of nonbank payment participants

- Regulation over competition, consumer protection, data security, safety and soundness, and legal requirements
- Nonbanks and banks are not treated equally in terms of safety and soundness, and data security
 - Many nonbank payment providers overseen as money transmitters
 - Retailers subject to oversight by FTC
 - Some payment processors are supervised
 - Most are large processors
 - Many payment processors are not supervised

Supervision of Nonbank Payment Providers

- Nonbank payment providers are one example of technology service providers (TSPs) of financial institutions
- TSP supervision
 - Conducted jointly among federal agencies
 - Two programs: regional and national
 - National program
 - Multi-district Data Processing Servicer (MDPS)
- Primary purpose: service to bank examiners

Business Lines Offered by Supervised Technology Service Providers

Business Line	Bank affiliation status					
	All TSPs		Nonbank		Bank affiliated	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Core processing	68	54.6%	37	44.6%	31	73.8%
Any payments-related business line	87	69.6%	55	66.3%	32	76.2%
Other business line	21	16.0%	19	22.9%	2	4.8%
Total number of TSPs	125		83		42	

Notes: Year-end 2004. Percentages add to more than 100% because a TSP may offer several lines of business


Source: Sullivan, "Risk Management and Nonbank Participation in the U.S. Retail Payments System, FRBKC *Economic Review*, 2nd Quarter 2007.

Retail payment risk metrics

- Most available data concerns fraud
 - Data breaches
 - Identity theft
 - Payments fraud
 - Channel oriented (ACH, credit/debit cards)
 - Industry oriented (AFP, ABA, CyberSource, Dove/Pulse)
- Little or no systematic data on non-fraud related operational risk, illicit use, compliance risk
- Little or no information on sources of risk

Records Compromised in Publicly Reported Data Breaches

U.S., Monthly, April 2005-March 2008




Source: Privacy Rights Clearinghouse website and author calculations.

Number of Publicly Reported Data Breaches

U.S., Monthly, March 2005-March 2008

Number of states implementing breach notification laws:
21 through May 2006, 19 additional June 2006 to March 2008



Sources: Privacy Rights Clearinghouse website; Perkins Cole law firm; author calculations.

5 Industry Sources of Data Breaches 5

U.S., April 2006-March 2008

	Incidents	Records
Banks and Credit Unions	5%	4%
Nonbank payment processors	2%	21%
Insurance and Fin. Services	6%	2%
Education	28%	2%
Retail and Commerce	18%	49%
Medical	11%	1%
Government	24%	19%

Source: Privacy Rights Clearinghouse website and author calculations.




Where are risks and how bad are they?

- Nonbanks are important for many elements of payments
 - How important?
- More risk: operational (disruptions, security, fraud) compliance, illicit use
 - How much?
 - Where?

Payment Activities and Selected Risks (cont.)


Primary Activity		Activity		Type of Risk							
				Liquidity and Credit			Operational			Compliance	Illicit use (AML, terrorist financing)
				Liquidity	Credit	Settlement agent credit risk	Malfunctioning and/or other operational problems	Data security risk associated with fraud or violations of privacy responsibilities	Counterfeit and associated fraud		
During-Transaction Stage 2											
16	Preparation	a	Sorting merchant's sales information by payment instrument/network for clearing				x	x		x	
		b	Submission of sales information to each payment instrument network				x	x		x	
		c	Calculation of each network member's (either financial institution or processor) net position and transmission of net position information to each member				x	x			
		d	Provision of transformation services into other payment instrument formats (such as MICR to ACH)				x	x			
		e	Provision of sorting transactions by destination groups to Fis				x	x			
17	Clearing	a	Transmission of clearing orders (credit transfers, direct debits, cards, cheques) to a financial institution				x	x			
		b	Transmission of clearing orders to ACH operator				x	x			
		c	Distribution of advices showing the amounts and settlement dates				x	x			
		d	Clearing (different from an ACH)				x	x			
18	Settlement	a	Posting credit and debit at each financial institution's central bank account	x	x		x				
		b	Posting credit and debit at each financial institution's commercial bank account	x	x	x	x				
		c	Posting debit (credit in case of a return) to front-end payer account	x	x	x	x				
		d	Posting credit (debit in case of a return) to merchant (payee) account	x	x	x	x				
		e	Check settlement	x	x	x	x				
Post-Transaction											
19	Statement	a	Provide statement preparation/delivery services for front-end customers (payers) (such as mobile credit advice or online bank/card account statements)				x			x	
		b	Provision of statement/payment receipt notification services for merchants (payees)				x			x	
20	Reconciliation, incl. collection and receivable management services	a	Matching invoices and payments				x	x		x	
21	Retrieval	a	Provision of chargeback and dispute processing services				x	x			
22	Reporting and data analysis services	a	to merchants, such as support services for treasury and accounting					x			
		b	to consumers					x			
		c	to financial institutions					x			
23	Ex post Compliance services	a	Compliance with anti-money laundering and terrorist financing regulation, such as reporting to authorities, back-feeding to ex-ante databases					x		x	x

Notes: Yellow shading of table cells indicate activities and components of settlement risk.
 Data security risk is associated with the online environment.
 Counterfeit and associated fraud is limited to physical payment instruments (checks and payment cards) used in an offline environment.

The background of the slide is a faded, light gray image of a US five-dollar bill. The bill is oriented vertically, with the number '5' visible in the corners. The portrait of Abraham Lincoln is on the left side, and the Treasury seal is on the right. The text 'FEDERAL RESERVE NOTE' and 'FIVE DOLLARS' is visible in the background.

Risk management in retail payments

- Pricing, insurance, containment
 - Pricing and insurance weakened by imperfect information and moral hazard
 - Payment industry relies heavily on containment
- Industry self-regulation
- Legal recourse
- Government policy

The background of the slide is a faded, grayscale image of a US five-dollar bill. The number '5' is visible in the corners, and the words 'FIVE DOLLARS' are printed in the center. The bill's serial number 'J126712A' is also visible.

Options for improving risk management in retail payments

- Improve industry ability to manage risk
- Strengthen supervision
- Coordinate risk management across the industry
- Collect and analyze useful information

Questions

- Growth of nonbanks in payments
- Competition: disruption, advantages/disadvantages, level playing field
- Nonbanks and safety of payments
- Adequacy of oversight system in retail payments
 - Potential for industry self-regulation
- Methodology: payment activities, importance/risk of nonbanks, bank/nonbank risk if performing similar activities

Summary and Discussion

- Regulatory safeguards are in some cases designed assuming payments safety depends on banks only, what might be termed “legacy regulatory structures.”
- There is a need for increased coordination and cooperation
 - Among banks and nonbanks within the industry.
 - Among bank and nonbank regulators/authorities
 - Among industry participants and regulators/authorities
 - At the international level.

References and Contact Information

Contact information

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Website

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