Latest Research from the Risk and Policy Analysis Unit

Knightian Uncertainty and Interbank Lending
Matthew Pritsker

The bursting of the housing price bubble during 2007 and 2008 was accompanied by high interbank spreads, and a partial breakdown of interbank lending. This paper theoretically models how Knightian uncertainty over banks risk exposures may have contributed to the breakdown. The paper shows: 1) the two-tier structure of the U.S. Fed Funds market makes it robust to uncertainty, but the market may nevertheless collapse — and private incentives to restart it may be insufficient. 2) In some circumstances government bank audits and information releases about exposures that resemble a stress test can restart markets and improve welfare by internalizing an externality associated with economy-wide uncertainty reduction. 3) Collapses due to uncertainty are less likely ex-ante and less costly to fix ex-post when there is better publicly available information on core banks aggregate risk exposures. Based on 2) and 3), ex-ante and ex-post “transparency initiatives” are proposed. Their success depends on the financial architecture of bank interlinkages.

 

The Stability of Prime Money Market Mutual Funds: Sponsor Support from 2007 to 2011 by Steffanie A. Brady, Ken E. Anadu, and Nathaniel R. Cooper

It is commonly noted that in the history of the Money Market Mutual Fund (MMMF) industry only two MMMFs have “broken the buck,” or had the net asset value per share (NAV) at which they transact fall below $1. While this statement is true, it is useful to consider the role that non-contractual support has played in the maintenance of this strong track record. Such support, which has served to obscure the credit risk taken by these funds, has been a common occurrence over the history of MMMFs. This paper presents a detailed view of the non-contractual support provided to MMMFs by their sponsors during the recent financial crisis based on an in depth review of public MMMF annual SEC financial statement filings (form N-CSR) with fiscal year-end dates falling between 2007 and 2011. According to our conservative interpretation of this data, we find that at least 21 prime MMMFs would have broken the buck absent a single identified support instance during the most recent financial crisis. Further, we identify repeat instances of support (or significant outflows) for some MMMFs during this period such that a total of at least 31 prime MMMFs would have broken the buck when considering the entirety of support activity over the full period.

 

Bank Diversification, Market Structure and Bank Risk Taking: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Commercial Banks
by Martin Goetz

This paper studies how a bank’s diversification affects its own risk taking behavior and the risk taking of competing, nondiversified banks. By combin- ing theories of bank organization, market structure and risk taking, I show that greater geographic diversification of banks changes a bank’s lending be- havior and market interest rates, which also has ramifications for nondiversi- fied competitors due to interactions in the banking market. Empirical results obtained from the U.S. commercial banking sector support this relationship as they indicate that a bank’s risk taking is lower when its competitors have a more diversified branch network. By utilizing the state-specific timing of a removal of intrastate branching restrictions in two identification strategies, I further pin down a causal relationship between the diversification of competi- tors and a bank’s risk taking behavior. These findings indicate that a bank’s diversification also impacts the risk taking of competitors, even if these banks are not diversifying their activities.

Evaluating the Impact of Fair Value Accounting on Financial Institutions: Implications for Accounting Standards Setting and Bank Supervision
by Sanders Shaffer

Recent standard-setting activity related to fair value accounting has injected new life into questions of whether fair value provides information useful for decision-making, and whether there might be unintended consequences on financial stability. This discussion paper provides insight into these questions by performing a holistic evaluation of fair value accounting’s usefulness, the potential impacts it may have on financial institutions and any broader macroeconomic effects. Materials reviewed as part of this analysis include public bank regulatory filings, financial statements, and fair value research. The bank supervisory rating approach referred to as CAMELS is used as an organizing principle for the paper. CAMELS serves as a convenient way to both categorize potential impacts of fair value on financial institutions, as well as provide a bank supervisory perspective alongside the more traditional investor’s views on decision usefulness.

 

Branching of Banks and Union Decline
by Alexey Levkov

This paper proposes a novel explanation for the decline in unions in the United States since the late 1970s: state-by-state removal of geographical restrictions on branching of banks. Bank branch deregulation reduces union membership in the non-banking sectors by intensifying entry of new firms, especially in sectors with high dependence on external finance. New firm entry, in turn, is associated with a reduction in union wage premium, and subsequently leads to adverse union voting. I provide empirical evidence for these channels using repeated cross-sectional and panel data of U.S. workers and union representation election outcomes.

 

Financing Constraints and Unemployment: Evidence from the Great Recession
by Burcu Duygan-Bump, Alexey Levkov, and Judit Montoriol-Garriga

This paper exploits the differential financing needs across industrial sectors and provides strong empirical evidence that financing constraints of small businesses are important in explaining the unemployment dynamics around the Great Recession. In particular, we show that workers in small firms are more likely to become unemployed during the 2007-2009 financial crisis if they work in industries with high external financing needs. According to our estimates, eliminating financial constraints of small firms could add up to 850,000 jobs to the economy. We suggest that policies aimed at making credit available to small businesses would significantly help stabilize the labor markets and economic activity in the U.S.

 

How Effective Were the Federal Reserve Emergency Liquidity Facilities? Evidence from the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility
by Burcu Duygan-Bump, Patrick M. Parkinson, Eric S. Rosengren, Gustavo A. Suarez, and Paul S. Willen

Following the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, short-term credit markets were severely disrupted. In response, the Federal Reserve implemented new and unconventional facilities to help restore liquidity. Many existing analyses of these interventions are confounded by identification problems because they rely on aggregate data. Two unique micro datasets allow us to exploit both time series and cross-sectional variation to evaluate one of the most unusual of these facilities—the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF). The AMLF extended collateralized loans to depository institutions that purchased asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) from money market funds, helping these funds meet the heavy redemptions that followed Lehman’s bankruptcy. The program, which lent $150 billion in its first 10 days of operation, was wound down with no credit losses to the Federal Reserve. Our findings indicate that the facility was effective as measured against its dual objectives: it helped stabilize asset outflows from money market mutual funds, and it improved liquidity in the ABCP market. Using a differences-in-differences approach we show that after the facility was implemented, money market fund outflows decreased more for those funds that held more eligible collateral. Similarly, we show that yields on AMLF-eligible ABCP decreased significantly relative to those on otherwise comparable AMLF-ineligible commercial paper.

 

How Effective Were the Federal Reserve Emergency Liquidity Facilities? Evidence from the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility
by Burcu Duygan-Bump, Patrick M. Parkinson, Eric S. Rosengren, Gustavo A. Suarez, and Paul S. Willen

Following the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, short-term credit markets were severely disrupted. In response, the Federal Reserve implemented new and unconventional facilities to help restore liquidity. Many existing analyses of these interventions are confounded by identification problems because they rely on aggregate data. Two unique micro datasets allow us to exploit both time series and cross-sectional variation to evaluate one of the most unusual of these facilities—the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF). The AMLF extended collateralized loans to depository institutions that purchased asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) from money market funds, helping these funds meet the heavy redemptions that followed Lehman’s bankruptcy. The program, which lent $150 billion in its first 10 days of operation, was wound down with no credit losses to the Federal Reserve. Our findings indicate that the facility was effective as measured against its dual objectives: it helped stabilize asset outflows from money market mutual funds, and it improved liquidity in the ABCP market. Using a differences-in-differences approach we show that after the facility was implemented, money market fund outflows decreased more for those funds that held more eligible collateral. Similarly, we show that yields on AMLF-eligible ABCP decreased significantly relative to those on otherwise comparable AMLF-ineligible commercial paper.

 

Optimal Portfolio Choice with Predictability in House Prices and Transaction Costs
by Stefano Corradin, José L. Fillat, and Carles Vergara-Alert

We study a model of portfolio choice, in which housing prices are predictable and adjustment costs must be paid when there is a housing transaction. We show that two state variables affect the agent’s decisions: (i) his wealth-house ratio; and (ii) the time-varying expected growth rate of housing prices. The agent buys (sells) his housing assets only when the wealth-house ratio reaches an optimal upper (lower) boundary. These boundaries are time-varying and depend on the expected growth rate of housing prices. Finally, we use household level data from the PSID and SIPP surveys to test and support the main implications of the model, as well as portfolio rules and holdings of housing asset.

 

Fair Value Accounting: Villain or Innocent Victim?
Exploring the Links Between Fair Value Accounting, Bank Regulatory Capital, and the Recent Financial Crisis

by Sanders Shaffer

There is a popular belief that the confluence of bank capital rules and fair value accounting helped trigger the recent financial crisis. The claim is that questionable valuations of long term investments based on prices obtained from illiquid markets created a pro-cyclical effect whereby mark to market adjustments reduced regulatory capital forcing banks to sell off investments which further depressed prices. This ultimately led to bank instability and the credit effects that reached a peak late in 2008. This paper analyzes a sample of large banks to attempt to measure the strength of the link between fair value accounting, regulatory capital rules, pro-cyclicality and financial contagion. The focus is on large banks because they value a significant portion of their balance sheets using fair value. They also hold investment portfolios that contain illiquid assets in large enough volumes to possibly affect the market in a pro-cyclical fashion. The analysis is based on a review of recent historical financial data. The analysis does not reveal a clear link for most banks in the sample, but rather suggests that there may have been other more significant factors putting stress on bank regulatory capital.

 

Your House or Your Credit Card, Which Would You Choose? Personal Delinquency Tradeoffs and Precautionary Liquidity Motives
by Ethan Cohen-Cole and Jonathan Morse

This paper presents evidence that precautionary liquidity concerns lead many individuals to pay credit card bills even at the cost of mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures. While the popular press and some recent literature have suggested that this choice may emerge from steep declines in housing prices, we find evidence that individual-level liquidity concerns are more important in this decision. That is, choosing credit cards over housing suggests a precautionary liquidity preference.

By linking the mortgage delinquency decisions to individual-level credit conditions, we are able to assess the compound impact of reductions in housing prices and retrenchment in the credit markets. Indeed, we find the availability of cash-equivalent credit to be a key component of the delinquency decision. We find that a one standard deviation reduction in available credit elicits a change in the predicted probability of mortgage delinquency that is similar in both direction and nearly double in magnitude to a one standard deviation reduction in housing price changes (the values are -25% and -13% respectively). Our findings are consistent with consumer finance literature that finds individuals have a preference for preserving liquidity-even at significant cost.

This paper replaces QAU09-5.