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# EDITORIAL

by Martin Howard, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Operations



## Challenges for Civil Emergency Planning

Although new to the post of NATO Assistant Secretary General, I am fortunate in not being new to the business of operations nor the concept of civil-military cooperation and its importance. As ASG for Operations, my immediate priority is to provide political and strategic support to the Secretary General and the NAC for NATO's current operations and to ensure efficient situational awareness about the current security environment. I hope to help improve the organisation's responsiveness to ongoing and new crises and my responsibilities also include enhancing the civil-military interface, of which Civil Emergency Planning is a key enabler.

Recently, NATO has been discussing the Comprehensive Approach in which a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments are required to address the complex security environment in which operations are currently conducted. While this concept is yet to be agreed, I am eager to promote the Comprehensive Approach's practical implementation between actors in the field. After all, this is what matters regardless of whether agreement is reached on paper or not. My predecessor, Adam Kobieracki pointed out that the Comprehensive Approach is not new but that the trick is to make it happen and I endorse this view too. The Comprehensive Approach is already part of current NATO operations in Afghanistan or Kosovo. For example, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams provide concrete examples of civil, military and international actors cooperating in a theatre of operations. However, the concept goes beyond that.

### CEP QUOTE

*"Tomorrow's threat may – I suggest will include the use of chemicals, biological agents, radioactive materials and even nuclear technology"*

Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, former Head MI5, UK

At HQ level, contingency planning and preparation are key elements to a successful translation of the Comprehensive Approach into practice in the field. Civil Emergency Planning plays an important role by serving as an interface between a variety of ministries (as diverse as health, agriculture, transport) and military planning. In addition to a vast network of civil experts across the EAPC, the Planning Boards and Committees provide inter-agency support to NATO's military bodies. As military troops will be called upon increasingly to begin the early phases of post conflict reconstruction during that narrow window before the environment is permissive to NGOs and other more appropriate actors, military planning will need to exploit much of CEPs civilian expertise in areas such as critical infrastructure, food, water, agriculture, health and industry.

This issue of perCEPtions is devoted to the theme of CBRN preparedness. The most devastating threat which we face today is that of a CBRN terrorist attack. Many security analysts, including the former Head of MI5, reckon that sooner or later an attack is inevitable. NATO has acknowledged that a purely military response is not sufficient to defend against such threats. Close civil-military cooperation is essential to ensuring the correct mix of capabilities in support of civil populations. NATO provides such a forum by supporting nations in their planning and preparedness measures for such eventualities. NATO CEP activities bring added value by assisting nations in the development and exercising of consequence management mechanisms. For example, the EADRCC's yearly exercises test procedures for responses to CBRN incidents and improve nations interoperability in civil protection. I invite you to read the articles and features that touch on some of the topical questions in this area.

As ASG for Operations, I am looking forward to furthering NATO CEP activities, both in the CBRN area and also in bringing added value to current and future NATO operations.

## DID YOU KNOW ?



Swedish Ambassador Veronika Wand-Danielsson signs the MoU with ASG for Operations Martin Howard, 10 October 2007.

To date, 12 nations have subscribed to the MoU on the Facilitation of Vital Cross Border transport : Albania, Armenia, Finland, Germany, Moldova, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\* and the UK. This MoU improves the speed and efficiency of bringing assistance to victims of humanitarian crises and disasters, including those triggered by a Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) event within the EAPC area.

\* Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.



# The Role of CEP in the defence against CBRN terrorism



Bombs explode in a European capital, the result of terrorist attacks involving chemical and biological agents which spread through the environment. One attack is carried out near a nuclear power plant. There are immediate effects, the damage is enormous. National authorities are overwhelmed.

Does this sound like an action film scenario or is it something that could be a real event one day?

Although many analysts point out that a coordinated terrorist attack involving chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear agents is not a likely occurrence due to the difficult and complex processes required to develop and use such weapons, this possibility cannot be excluded. There have already been attempts to use CBRN agents by terrorists, we recall the 1995 sarin gas attack of the Aum Shinrikyo sect in the Tokyo subway.

If such a nightmare scenario were to happen, would NATO be involved? Would the Alliance's civil emergency planning resources be used? Do we have enough capabilities to prevent and to respond to such events collectively?

It is true that preparedness and response is first and foremost a national responsibility. However, preparing comprehensively for CBRN emergencies requires considerable resources and specialized capabilities which might be difficult to develop and finance for many nations individually. Therefore, from a national perspective there is very clear added value in international cooperation, including in the framework of NATO and the EAPC. For smaller nations, this might even be a matter of utmost necessity.

Civil emergency planning (CEP) at NATO has already developed tools and capabilities that can provide valuable support to national authorities both in their preparedness activities and in the case of a CBRN emergency. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) has unique experience in coordinating disaster assistance. Tools such as the Inventory of National Capabilities maintained by the EADRCC have great potential in expediting targeted first responses through the identification of available capabilities. The CEP Planning Boards and Committees can provide valuable CBRN related expertise to stricken nations. A

large scale WMD attack would likely imply the activation of combined military and civil capabilities. Therefore, it is of importance to enhance civil-military interaction early in the planning process.

Relevant CEP



capabilities and instruments (such as the Rapid Reaction Team and other forms of civil expertise, the Inventory, the EADRCC) should be considered both at the national level and by the NATO Military Authorities when preparing for such incidents. Moreover, they should be strengthened and further developed. Lessons from previous experiences, such as the EADRCC's annual exercises, the support provided to the Olympic Games in Athens in 2004 and the Riga Summit in 2006 are of great value as such events help identify gaps and shortfalls not only in our own capabilities but also in our interactions with other relevant players, including the EU.

Nations should be aware of what CEP can offer to them in assisting their preparedness and response activities. Several steps have been taken to raise awareness of CEP capabilities but more needs to be done. At national level, we must do our best to identify our requirements and expectations towards CEP, thereby making work at NATO-level even more tailored to national needs.

It is often said that resources are scarce. Given that only few nations (if any) can afford all the necessary capabilities to protect their population and critical infrastructures from all possible threats, there is no alternative to international cooperation and complementary use of resources. We must work together so that we can be prepared if the unthinkable happens; we definitely cannot afford to waste making good use of the opportunities we have now.

# The Russian-Hungarian Initiative as a form of NATO-Russia Emergency Humanitarian Cooperation



For more than ten years, NATO-Russia cooperation on civil emergency planning has been developing in accordance with the NATO-Russia 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security. It is noteworthy that the first document setting out the professional aspects of such cooperation was the


Memorandum of Understanding on civil emergency planning and disaster preparedness, signed a year earlier by Minister S. K. Shoigu and Secretary General J. Solana on behalf of the Russian EMERCOM and NATO. The Rome Declaration in 2002 and the creation of the NATO-Russia Council gave new impetus to this area of cooperation.

In this short but eventful time, not only have we been able to make plans for the future, but also to identify patterns as they emerge. With the new threats to society posed by international terrorism, developing systems of protection in the event of an emergency takes on greater significance. Such emergencies may be the result of terrorist attacks using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons. The Russian-Hungarian initiative aimed at designing an international response mechanism in the event of a CBRN disaster could be developed and implemented as part of this important area of NATO-Russia Council work.

A number of questions arise: Why do we need such a mechanism? Why is it so crucial that the first response should be international? Are national rescue forces sufficient?

We need such mechanisms to ensure a rapid first response to a CBRN emergency and actually, national rescue forces are often not sufficient. Lessons learnt from major disasters such as Chernobyl, Spitak, Bhopal and Katrina demonstrate the need for an international division of rescue labour. The Russian-Hungarian initiative

provides for various national response contributions under a unified plan, in accordance with national capacities. Russia, is prepared to allocate a team of rescuers and CBRN defence experts with search equipment, an Il-76 aircraft and a light helicopter; Hungary - a chemical reconnaissance team with an express laboratory aboard a minibus; and Italy - rescuers with chemical expertise and additional aircraft. Germany's contribution to the initiative will consist of two units: one for search and rescue, the other to provide drinking water. Other countries are also ready to make contributions. The basic elements of field cooperation in the framework of this initiative were successfully rehearsed in October 2006 at the NATO-Russia international exercise «Lazio 2006».



How can we ensure that the international response is not slow compared with a national or bilateral response? We are all acutely aware that the faster help comes, the more victims will be saved. This brings us to the crucial point. The beauty of the Russian-Hungarian initiative lies precisely in the fact that it will reduce the time needed for an international disaster response to the same as that needed for a national response.

So far, bilateral assistance following a major disaster has always been faster than multilateral. The reasons are simple. For example, a certain country decides to offer emergency assistance. If its president or government gives appropriate instructions, the necessary funds are allocated or guaranteed, each country having already allocated such funds to a reserve budget for emergencies. Air crews find a way of delivering rescue teams and humanitarian aid to the crisis area; reserve aeroplanes and helicopters are also available for such an eventuality. The entire operation is carried out by national authorities and services, following an agreed schedule.

In the Russian Federation, for example, each phase of disaster response abroad is guided by prior government decisions and departmental policy. The procedure is simple and reasonably quick.

At international level there is no president or prime minister, nor any common finance ministry. However, there is still a need for a comprehensive response. Therefore, we need a coordinated procedure for all NATO-Russia Council (NRC) members in the event of a disaster, and the Russian-Hungarian initiative puts forward just such a procedure. It covers all phases of CBRN disaster response and, in our opinion, could also apply to a wider range of disasters. As the concept is further improved it should include an international funding procedure via a special fund or bank account (a kind of international ministry of finance).



*The Hungarian CBRN Mobile Laboratory transported by EMERCOM'S Ilyshin 76*

It goes without saying that the mechanism cannot work efficiently until an advance decision is made on the financial arrangements for the first rescue flight. We know that the funds needed for the flight cannot be found and allocated within the three hours given to rescue teams to prepare for departure. A special international fund must be set up in advance to finance the deployment of rapid response capabilities, with clear procedures for its use and for topping it up.

If the financial issues are properly resolved, we will have at our disposal an international response mechanism, the

practical significance of which can hardly be overstated. First of all, it would play an essential role in the performance of crucial tasks to deliver emergency humanitarian aid, including those set out in the recommendations of the NRC at the level of Foreign Ministers in Sofia in April 2006. In other words, the Russian-Hungarian initiative represents the shortest route to implementation of the Sofia political directives. The initiative also chimes with the Memorandum of Understanding on the Facilitation of Vital Civil Cross Border Transport developed by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. As a result, the anticipated results of the Russian-Hungarian initiative could be even more significant than we thought in 2003, when it was first planned. Brought to its logical completion, this initiative will be a real contribution to the theory and practice of international disaster response.

We have already said that the initiative is based on principles of a universal nature and is thus not limited to CBRN disasters. Incidentally, are we justified in arbitrarily restricting our work to countering hypothetical radiological, chemical and biological threats? Experience of recent years shows that natural disasters are still the greatest danger to human health and safety. Let us recall Katrina, Pakistan, the tsunami in South East Asia, floods and forest fires in Europe. This aspect must not be neglected.

It is time we gave some thought to other areas of cooperation too - for example, the problem of preventing and dealing with emergencies and protecting critical infrastructure, including in the context of large-scale international actions. The

summer of 2007 demonstrated the need for close international cooperation in fighting forest fires. As global warming has become an established fact, it is likely that the risk of large-scale forest fires will increase in the coming years. Effective international measures should be taken now well in time for the next season of fire risk.

Cooperation on protecting populations from disasters and on post-crisis recovery are the areas of international activity which least depend on the political situation. This is what makes our joint work with partners unique - work which aims at attaining new results.

## Partners in the Humanitarian Aid Network: An internationally active operational organisation



Technisches Hilfswerk (THW) is the volunteer-based operational civil protection organisation of the Federal Republic of Germany. With specialised units and approximately 80,000 volunteer members, it is a reliable partner when it comes to civil protection interventions in Germany or internationally.

As a federal agency, THW has been delivering rapid and reliable emergency assistance at home and abroad since its foundation in 1950. Its spectrum of services ranges from acute emergency aid through to long-term partnerships for civil reconstruction. With its "Rapid Deployment Units" the THW can act rapidly when time is critical - for example, in the wake of earthquakes or other

natural catastrophes. As a governmental agency, THW offers the security of reliable and competent cooperation to its international partners, who include the United Nations, the European Union, NATO and other national governments.

### **NATO AND THW - A PROVEN PARTNERSHIP**

There has been a close partnership between NATO and THW within the international humanitarian assistance network for almost a decade. The scope of this partnership includes the European Atlantic Disaster Relief Coordination Centre (EADRCC), to which the THW secondes relevant experts, and Partnership for Peace (PfP), as well during humanitarian crisis interventions, eg. The 2004 tsunami, hurricane Katrina in 2005 and after the earthquake that struck Pakistan in 2005. Furthermore THW activities include being an operational partner in exercises, training experts, and staging seminars. Additionally, NATO and THW are working together in the field of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC).

### **FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS**

It is planned to intensify cooperation between the THW and NATO, particularly in the fields of crisis management and preparation for relief interventions. The THW will continue to be an important operational partner during NATO exercises and NATO's civil-military networks will be expanded with THW help.



**DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SENIOR CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING COMMITTEE**

**SCEPC Plenary in Romania**

On 28-29 November, the biannual SCEPC Plenary session will take place in Poiana Brasov (Romania). This event will bring together 120 participants: senior representatives from national civil emergency planning authorities, SCEPC permanent representatives, Chairs of the Planning Boards and Committees (PB&Cs), representatives from NATO’s Military Authorities (NMAs) and CEP staff to discuss topical issues in Civil Emergency Planning.

Traditionally, the plenary serves to review the status of the various activities and policy initiatives undertaken by SCEPC as well as the Planning Boards and Committees (PB&Cs). Emphasis is also placed on the exchange of experience in the areas of training and exercises. National presentations complement the activities undertaken in the context of the CEP Training and Exercise Programme. Following an update on the 2005 CEP Action Plan, the status of the revised 2007 CEP Action Plan will be examined. The CEP Action Plan was launched for the first time in 2001 for the protection of populations against the effects of CBRN incidents. While the CBRN dimension clearly remains an important focus for CEP, a discussion will examine how better to support national authorities in the case of natural disasters. Recent national experience underlines the challenge in preparing for and dealing with natural disasters. In the context of support to national authorities, developments in Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), including cyber defence, will be shared. Finally, under the overall heading of efficiency and effectiveness, the Chairs of the PB&Cs will provide an overview of the work in their respective PB&C. A presentation on the work of the Civil Aviation Planning Committee (CAPC) on aeromedical evacuation will provide an insight into one of many practical activities undertaken by the PB&Cs.

**SCEPC**  
**Currently on the table**

- CEP Action Plan on CBRN Preparedness
- Advisory Support Team (Project on Minimum Standards and Non-binding Guidelines for First Responders in CBRN incidents)

**LOOKING AHEAD**

**SCEPC Calendar**

- 27 November PB&C Chairs meeting ..... Romania
- 28-29 November SCEPC Plenary ..... Romania
- 10 December Last SCEPC(EAPC) before Christmas Break ..... NATO HQ

**DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PLANNING BOARDS AND COMMITTEES (PB&CS)?**

NATO’s eight Planning Boards and Committees bring together national government experts, industry experts and military representatives to provide for coordinated planning across various areas of civil activity. These bodies advise SCEPC on crisis-related matters and assist NATO Military Authorities and nations in effective use of civil resources. The section below provides a brief overview of current issues across the PB&Cs.

**Transport**



The Planning Board for Ocean Shipping (PBOS) prepared comprehensive studies on the availability of ships on the commercial market to support military sealift requirements. This study covers projections over the next 5 years and includes the different types of militarily useful ships (RO/ROs, containerships, tweendeckers, etc) that would normally be used by the military to deploy and sustain forces in a NATO operation. Discussed at the PBOS Plenary meeting on 26-27 September, this study is considered extremely useful by the NATO Military Authorities and nations.

The Planning Board for Inland Surface Transport (PBIST) has surveyed the Height and Width limitations on highways in the EAPC area. PBIST has begun cooperation with the newly formed

Multimodal Movement Coordination Centre Europe in Eindhoven by providing information on seaports and Inland Surface Transport capabilities in some African Countries of interest. On request from Allied Command Transformation (ACT), PBIST has launched a study on Sea Ports of Embarkation (SPOE) to be completed by the end of 2008.

At the request of the NATO International Military Staff, PBOS and PBIST are conducting a study on new security initiatives in the maritime domain and their implications on the use of commercial shipping by the military, in particular implications for military cargo movements through commercial surface transportation systems.

The Civil Aviation Planning Committee (CAPC), at the request of the Allied Command Operations Medical Advisor, is evaluating the capability within the commercial aviation industry to fill a perceived gap in strategic aeromedical evacuation lift. The SCEPC authorised the initial call up of civil experts for this task with several operations and aeromedical civil experts conducting their first meeting in Munich on 10 October. The next joint civil and military expert meeting will be held in the margins of the 3-4 December meeting of the Civil Aviation Working Group. The planned completion date for a proposed aeromedical evacuation policy using commercial air assets is December 2008.

In September 2007, seven civil aviation experts met at NATO HQ to amend the annual Civil Aviation Availability Assessment report. This report is intended for NATO Military Authorities and nations and predicts current and future trends in the civilian aviation market that could have an impact on NATO operations. The report is expected to be released in November 2007.

The 2007 NATO Transportation seminar was conducted in Munich from 8-10 October and brought together 125 participants including 55 civilian experts from the three transport PB&Cs, 20 NATO and national military authorities. The focus of the seminar was future trends in the transportation industries and included presentations on future ship building,

pandemic flu implications and customs processing in a paperless environment. The final report of the seminar is expected to be issued in November and will be used as a basis for the Transport Committees' work in the coming years

**Civil Protection**

The Civil Protection Committee (CPC) is developing information exchange tools in the areas of Critical Infrastructure Protection and the Minimum Standards and Non-Binding Guidelines for First Responders to CBRN incidents. These information exchange tools include increasing awareness of national training opportunities and events. Special emphasis is given to highlighting joint civil-military training and exercise opportunities.

The Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Working Group is updating its road map (last revised in 2003) which accompanies the CIP Concept Paper. The aim of this update will be to sharpen the focus of CIP activities, ensure consistency across the PB&Cs, and review timelines.


**Communications**

Cyber Defence has become a highly visible issue for NATO this year. Although a relatively new area of interest for many in the Alliance, Civil Emergency Planning has in fact been addressing crucial cyber defence aspects for years. Specifically, the Civil Communications Planning



Committee (CCPC) is responsible for developing and co-ordinating the arrangements necessary to ensure continued availability of civil communications, including civilian information systems and related infrastructure. Furthermore, the Committee maintains a group of experts prepared to respond to requests for assistance prior to or during a cyber-related crisis. The CCPC accomplishes these responsibilities by providing advice and support to nations as well as to other NATO and international communications bodies. In accordance with its Work Programme, the Committee has produced several documents that analyse specific issues of interest to the nations, providing them with clear recommendations for establishing and/or improving their respective cyber defence capabilities.

**Food and Agriculture**



The Food and Agricultural Planning Committee (FAPC) will launch a number of important initiatives in the area of CBRN preparedness. A virtual library of national best practices will be created. To begin with, this library will house best practices in the areas of food chain security and vector borne diseases (such as avian influenza).

One of the spin offs of this increased exchange of national experience is to promote bilateral projects and initiatives.

The FAPC plans to organise an expert workshop in cooperation with the Science for Peace and Security Programme on the



theme of “Threats to Food and Water Chains: National Security or Collective defence? “. This workshop is tentatively scheduled for end 2008.

**Medical**



The Joint Medical Committee (JMC) has been addressing how NATO can better implement the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) International Health Regulations in particular for potential bio attacks on troops in theatre. This problem has raised

questions as to which authority would be responsible for reporting such an attack to the WHO especially in crisis zones where a recognised government authority may be lacking. Currently, no formal procedure exists for NATO Military Commanders to report directly to the WHO.

The CBRN working groups will review medical treatment protocols and set up a compendium. All three working groups will include representatives from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), WHO and OPCW thus ensuring maximum coordination and cooperation between all actors involved.

**Industrial Production and Supply**

The Industrial Planning Committee (IPC) has always placed particular emphasis on ensuring an effective contribution to the fight against terrorism and protection from weapons of mass destruction. It has addressed major issues such as technological developments in equipment to manage CBRN incidents. A paper has been prepared by civilian experts which will be discussed at the upcoming IPC Plenary meeting in Bucharest in November. One of the IPC’s new responsibilities which has already been discussed concerns protection of critical infrastructure in the energy sector.

The CBRN database is under development. It contains information about 400 eligible companies or institutions manufacturing specific products, or providing services, to prepare against and respond to potential attacks using CBRN agents. It significantly enhances nations’ preparedness to counter possible incidents.

The IPC continued to cooperate with the JMC on industrial capacity and surge production capability requirements for medical and civil/military protection in the new threat environment. Additionally, the IPC began addressing export licensing for equipment and technologies used to counter CBRN threats.



**LOOKING AHEAD**

**PB&Cs Calendar**

- 6-7 November 2007      IPC Seminar ..... Bucharest, Romania
- 8-9 November 2007      IPC Plenary ..... Bucharest, Romania
- 22-23 November 2007    FAPC Plenary ..... NATO HQ, Brussels
- 28-29 February 2008    CPC Plenary ..... NATO HQ, Brussels
- 11-12 March 2008      CAPC Plenary ..... NATO HQ, Brussels
- 9 April 2008              CCPC Plenary ..... NATO HQ, Brussels



## NATO Weapons of Mass Destruction Centre

### CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF WMD DEFENCE AND PREPAREDNESS



One of the most dangerous combinations of potential security threats is the case of terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction. This is why NATO needs to develop the capability to deal with Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) hazards, including the ability to defend deployed forces and protect the Alliance's populations, territory, and critical infrastructure. This means, among other things, that we need to enhance our civil-military cooperation, so that we can improve the overall preparedness of CBRN defence

forces to support consequence management activities, ensuring rapid response to national requests for assistance in dealing with the consequences of terrorist attacks.

The requirement to improve CBRN defence of our forces and civil preparedness for possible terrorist attacks with WMD was identified after terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001, and the practical collaboration between the military and the civil side of NATO has been accelerated since then.



The growing role of civil support to the military has been confirmed over the last several years, beginning with NATO's involvement in the Balkans. Military support to consequence management operations plays an increasing role in our planning, as has been demonstrated at the Olympic Games in Athens and the NATO Summit in Riga.

The need to avoid duplication and create synergy by improving information exchange and cooperation has been recently reiterated within the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP) Programme of Work and within the Ministerial Guidance for Civil Emergency Planning 2007–2008. Indeed, effective cooperation in the areas of CBRN defence and civil preparedness plays a growing role for the DGP (the Group dealing with military preparedness) and SCEPC (the Committee dealing with civil emergency planning), and for the staffs that support these Groups.

Since 2001, the information exchange between the DGP and SCEPC has been enhanced, and both sides now benefit from greater cooperation:

- joint organization of various workshops and meetings;
- involvement of DGP and SCEPC staffs in the preparation of consequence management exercises;
- involvement of military preparedness officers in the annual training of CEP experts,
- increasingly, joint provision of CBRN expertise and advice to Partners (e.g. recent series of radiological protection workshops with the ICI countries – workshops that were co-sponsored by the WMD Centre and CEPD);
- increasing (and very welcome) participation of CEPD staff in the preparation of the annual NAC WMD Seminar - an excellent opportunity for NATO Ambassadors to explore some of the issues related to both military and civil emergency aspects of the WMD challenge.

I believe that there are other areas of cooperation that should be explored:

- more open cooperation in the development of joint planning documents;
- improvements in the use of civil expert advice – particularly in the important area of ‘reach back’ to capitals for CBRN expertise;
- closer cooperation with Partners in the enhancement of their CBRN capabilities – where it would be useful to have a combined approach of civil emergency and military preparedness experts;
- more joint use of Crisis Management exercises, to ensure that military preparedness and civil emergency challenges are addressed in a holistic manner;
- greater use of the NATO Science programme (which is open to Partners) so that both the DGP and SCEPC communities understand more fully emerging CBRN research and development elements, so that greater use can be made of progress registered in this area.

There is no doubt that the ‘military’ and ‘civil emergency’ CBRN planning communities are working together more effectively than was the case prior to 9/11. It has been amply demonstrated that both communities have gained a great deal from this synergy. In simple terms, this is a success story in the making, and we need more of it. I remain confident that this trend will continue, and that both NATO and individual NATO members will benefit from this close cooperation.

## Civil Expert Focus

**DR WILLI MARZI,  
ASSISTANT HEAD OF DIVISION, GERMAN FEDERAL INTERIOR MINISTRY**



The backbone of Civil Emergency Planning at NATO is a network of over 350 civil experts drawn from industry, business, government and other public administrations. Experts such as Dr. Marzi provide advice to NATO's Military Authorities on the effective use of civilian resources during the planning and execution phases of a NATO operation. They can also provide advice to national authorities, in the event of a crisis, on issues including CBRN and consequence management.

Dr. Marzi is an expert in the field of Chemical Protection for the NATO Civil Protection Committee. He is currently Assistant Head of Division in the German Interior Ministry, a post he has held since September 2007. His main responsibilities include strategic planning and protection of the population, CBRN Protection, disaster medicine and civil defence research.

A chemistry graduate from the University of Bonn, Dr. Marzi began his career in 1978 at the Federal Office for Civil Defence where he worked in the areas of chemical protection, personal protective equipment, detection and decontamination. In 2000, he moved to the Interior Ministry where he was responsible for warning, research, interministerial coordination and development of a civil protection concept.

From 2003, he was Head of Centre at the Federal Ministry for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief (BBK) in the field of CBRN Protection, civil defence research, disaster medicine and medical CBRN-protection.

Dr. Marzi has been an expert for the Civil Protection Committee since 2004. Recently, at the request of SHAPE, he provided advice to the ISAF Force Commander on the handling of toxic chemicals. This was the first time expertise of this kind was provided by a CEP civil expert and the experience was considered a great success. It significantly improved force protection and capacity building in Afghanistan.

In addition to his work with NATO, Dr. Marzi has led research projects in the field of CBRN protective equipment and is a member of the Office for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Protection Network.

Dr. Marzi's expertise, along with other experts across the functional areas of the Planning Boards and Committees, constitutes a valuable civilian tool and illustrates how CEP provides cost effective added value to NATO operations and national authorities.

## LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE NATO RIGA SUMMIT IN THE FIELD OF CBRN DEFENCE



The NATO summit in Riga on 28-29 November 2006 presented a serious challenge for the planners and experts responsible for the security arrangements at this event. With hindsight, many elements of the security operation which were not apparent when the planning process began in April 2006 now seem obvious. Therefore, it has been useful to derive the main lessons learned from the summit security operation in which CBRN defense played an important part.

The task was to ensure the security of the Heads of State and Government as well as other participants at the event. Given that Latvia's national capabilities for such a large scale event were not sufficient, a coordinated approach was required. This involved many actors: Latvian civil authorities, Latvian National Armed Forces, elements of the multinational CBRN Battalion (lead by Germany) and civil authorities of NATO nations coordinated by the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee.

Coordination during both the planning process and executive phase of the operation presented the main challenge. There were many obstacles to overcome from the outset such as differences in civil and military procedures and experience which made it difficult to establish common ground for a joint operation. A particularly complex problem to resolve was the setting up of a single, integrated command and control structure for all civil, military, national and multinational elements of the CBRN operation. This also required clarification of practical and legal aspects of cooperation among the different players, as well as the need to establish compatible communication and information systems.



We are convinced that permanent joint training between civil and military agencies involved in CBRN defence is essential to enable an efficient and coherent response in case of a CBRN incident. Lack of unified procedures and joint experience could lead to mismanagement and uncoordinated action.



We were very grateful for the support provided by Allied nations and NATO structures during the summit. It was a truly multinational operation and Latvia, as host nation, learnt considerably from it. First, we noted that NATO Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) Crisis Management Arrangements in such situations did not provide enough flexibility to assist during the early phases of planning and many arrangements were developed on an ad hoc basis. Second, NATO CEP should have been involved in the early planning stages together with NATO military planners to ensure that available resources were planned and coordinated more efficiently. Third, as host nation, we recognised that it was easier to deal with military forces than with civil emergency services. On the military side, the legal basis and procedures for force deployment were already in place and there was no requirement to deal with border crossing, customs or financial issues.

A NATO summit is undoubtedly an exceptional event requiring special arrangements and deployed capabilities given that security must be guaranteed even if unexpected threats occur. We have translated the lessons learned from the Riga summit into preparedness measures within our emergency services to react to accidents involving CBRN agents. We have concluded that the main capabilities should be developed nationally, enabling a quick and efficient first response to such an incident. International assistance could be useful in a subsequent phase, if the crisis so requires, but is not considered an efficient contribution to first response given the time delays.

## CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: EVERYONE IS CONCERNED



Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, NATO launched a Programme of Work (PoW) for Defence against Terrorism (DAT) within its Defence Investment Division and under the auspices of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD). This programme aims at equipping armed forces with new or adapted technologies to detect, disrupt and defeat terrorists. To lead and coordinate the PoW DAT efforts, NATO appointed a Counter-terrorism Technology Unit within its Defence Investment Division at NATO HQ.

At present, the PoW DAT comprises 10 initiatives. Each of them is led by a NATO Nation. The 10th initiative which deals with the protection of critical infrastructure was added to the PoW DAT list in early 2006 and is led by Belgium. The objective of this initiative is to improve the protection of fixed critical infrastructure (e.g. harbours, airports, energy supply installations, such as nuclear plants) on the Alliance's territory using NATO nations' military capabilities. As a first step, the initiative seeks technological solutions to improve the protection of military critical infrastructure in expeditionary operations (eg. Seaports, airports, encampments, headquarters, ....) against terrorist attacks. In order to avoid overlap with other initiatives, it focuses on two specific domains. First, the initiative identifies new technologies to tackle surface, nearby surface and sub surface threats to military critical infrastructures. Second, it aims at developing technologies for new and existing infrastructure to better withstand the effects of terrorist attacks.

A table-top exercise will be held in Brussels in December 2007 to explore the specific military needs. In addition, a NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) Study Group will present findings in mid 2008 and will address the technological gaps in the two domains. Thereafter, the initiative will aim to match the needs by promoting the rapid fielding of emerging technologies. In the meantime, the working group is working on the creation of a toolbox containing relevant documents, existing commercial products and technologies.

In the framework of Civil Emergency Planning, this toolbox and subsequently developed technologies will be very valuable for civilian operators in the protection of critical infrastructure in Allied and Partner nations. Moreover, if civilian operators express a specific requirement to improve protection of critical infrastructure, then this need can be taken up by the initiative and an appropriate synergy can be sought. Finally, new capabilities that will be acquired by national Armed Forces in these domains can also be made available for the protection of civilian critical infrastructure on national territory in accordance with national legislation.

# The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre EADRCC

## THE EAPC INVENTORY OF NATIONAL CAPABILITIES IN CBRN CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

At the Washington Summit in 1999, NATO Heads of State and Government agreed to launch a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Initiative to enhance the possibilities for Allies to assist one another in the protection of their civil populations against WMD risks. The aim was to build a capability within the Alliance for nations to co-operate and assist each other in planning for, and dealing with the consequences of, a CBRN attack and in providing assistance to other Allies, if needed. As a part of the WMD Initiative, the SCEPC was directed to develop and maintain an inventory of national capabilities for protecting civil populations against WMD risks.

The Inventory contains key capabilities which would be critically required for immediate response needs in case of a CBRN attack against civilian populations. eg. Decontamination teams, detection teams, mobile hospitals laboratories. It is important to note that both Allies and Partner nations provide inputs to the Inventory. To date, inputs from 38 nations have been received.

The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) serves as the repository for the Inventory. Nations responding to a terrorist attack or an event involving CBRN agents can request the EADRCC to assist in co-coordinating the response to such events. The EADRCC would use the Inventory to identify the resources requested by the stricken nation and act as a clearinghouse for assistance in case of CBRN incidents in the same manner as it does for natural and technological disasters.

The Inventory has proven useful in real life situations and during exercises. Examples include preparation for high visibility events, such as the Olympic Games and NATO Summit meetings, and consequence management exercises organised by the EADRCC.

Key features of the Inventory are:

- All information is provided by nations on a voluntary basis.
- A submission of information to the Inventory on potentially available national capabilities does not constitute a commitment to provide that capability.
- Funding for any use of the inventoried resources are consistent with the well established NATO understanding that unless otherwise specified, the cost of providing the requested capability are borne by the contributing nation. Any other arrangements are co-ordinated directly between the requesting and providing nation.

So far the Inventory comprises information on national capabilities in ten categories (eg response teams, equipment, medical capabilities). The 2007 Questionnaire now adds five transport categories (such as aero medical evacuation, inland surface transport, air transport). This questionnaire also takes into account comments received from nations based on experience with the previous version and from experience using the Inventory in the EADRCC. The tool includes state-of-the-art security features and is NATO certified.

For more information, visit the EADRCC Web Site [www.nato.int/eadrcc/2007](http://www.nato.int/eadrcc/2007)



## SENIOR NATO OFFICIALS OBSERVE MAJOR US ANTITERRORISM EXERCISE.

Amb. Maurits Jochems, DASG for Operations (Planning) accompanied by the Head of the EADRCC, Gunther Bretschneider observed exercise TOPOFF 4 from 15-19 October, the largest ever congress-mandated anti-terrorism exercise in the United States. TOPOFF 4 was designed to test and strengthen the US capacity to prevent, protect against, respond to and recover from terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass destruction. The scenario involved a simulated attack using a radiological dispersion device. TOPOFF 4 involved over 15,000 participants from federal, state and local government administrations as well as private sector entities and observers from international organisations.

## CEP IN OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

### THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY'S (IAEA) INCIDENT AND EMERGENCY CENTRE (IEC)

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the world's centre for cooperation in the nuclear field. The IAEA works with its partners worldwide to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies.



The IAEA's Secretariat fulfils functions in relation to radiation emergencies, including the fostering of international cooperation in the area of emergency preparedness and response. The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (often called the Emergency Conventions) place specific legal obligations on the IAEA with regard to emergency preparedness and response.

As the global focal point for international preparedness, communication and response to nuclear and radiological incidents or emergencies irrespective of their cause, the IEC stands at the centre of coordinating effective and efficient activities worldwide. While emergency response capabilities have existed within the IAEA since the conclusion of the Emergency Conventions, in the 1980s, the decision to create an integrated Centre within the IAEA became more pressing with the increase in the use of nuclear applications as well as heightened concern over the malicious use of nuclear or radioactive materials.

Today, the IEC provides around-the-clock assistance to States in dealing with nuclear and radiological events. Under the Emergency Conventions, the IEC coordinates the actions of global experts and efforts within the IAEA. In case of a nuclear or radiological emergency it also helps to coordinate, under the Joint Radiation Emergency Management Plan of the International Organizations, the responses of 15 international organizations, such as the WHO (World Health Organization), FAO (Food and Agricultural IAEA) or WMO (World Meteorological Organization). NATO currently has observer status on the Inter Agency Committee on the Response to Nuclear Accidents.

Response to incidents and emergencies can involve exchange of information, provision of advice and/or coordination of field response. The IEC ensures that the IAEA's incident and emergency arrangements are fully operational, efficient and effective. This includes training a broad range of IAEA staff to respond to emergencies as well as training external experts.

In order to coordinate a global response, the IEC hosts a Response Assistance Network (RANET) under which IAEA Member States, Parties to the Emergency Conventions, and relevant international organizations are able to register their response capabilities. This network aims to facilitate assistance in case of a nuclear or radiological incident or emergency in a timely and effective manner.

Effective national and global response capabilities are essential to minimize the impacts from nuclear incidents and radiological emergencies and to build public trust in the safety and security of nuclear energy. The increased use of nuclear energy and more acute security concerns require a proportionate increase in national, regional and international capabilities to respond to an accident or incident. In this context, the IEC will continue serving as the world's focal point for incident and emergency preparedness and response.

# CEP IN OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

As NATO's Civil Emergency Planning activities do not take place in a vacuum, this table provides an overview of useful links to other organisations also active in the field of Civil Emergency Planning.

ORGANISATION	WEB SITE
European Commission	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/environment/civil">http://ec.europa.eu/environment/civil</a>
	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/justice_home/terrorism/dg_terrorism_en.htm">http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/justice_home/terrorism/dg_terrorism_en.htm</a>
EU Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC)	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/environment/civil/prote/mic.htm">http://ec.europa.eu/environment/civil/prote/mic.htm</a>
EU Commission Human Aid Office (ECHO)	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/echo/index_en.htm">http://ec.europa.eu/echo/index_en.htm</a>
United Nations Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA)	<a href="http://ochaonline.un.org">http://ochaonline.un.org</a>
The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE)	<a href="http://osce.org">http://osce.org</a>
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	<a href="http://iaea.org">http://iaea.org</a>
IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC)	<a href="http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/emergency/incident-emergency-centre.htm">http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/emergency/incident-emergency-centre.htm</a>
IAEA Guidance for First Responders to Radiological Emergencies	<a href="http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/emergency/emergency-response-actions.asp">http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/emergency/emergency-response-actions.asp</a>
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)	<a href="http://www.opcw.org">http://www.opcw.org</a>

## CEP EVENTS

Below is a list of upcoming events in other international organisations:

ORGANISATION	EVENT	DATE	PLACE
<b>NATO School</b>	NATO Civil Emergency Planning Course	Oct 29-Nov 2	Oberammergau, Germany
<b>IAEA</b>	JAEA-IAEA Workshop on Advanced Safeguards Technology for the Future Nuclear Fuel Cycle	Nov 13-16	Ibaraki, Japan
<b>Finnish Defence Forces International Centre</b>	NATO/PfP/MD Course on Civil-Military Cooperation	Nov 26-30	Niinisalo, Finland
<b>OPCW</b>	Swiss Emergency-Field-Laboratory Training Course	Nov 3-7	Spiez, Switzerland
<b>IAEA</b>	International Conference on Illicit Nuclear Trafficking: Collective Experience and the Way Forward	Nov 19-22	Edinburgh, UK
<b>European Commission</b>	Civil protection forum	Nov 22-23	Brussels, Belgium
<b>Swedish National Defence Centre</b>	Senior Course on Civil Emergency Planning	Dec 3-7	Stockholm, Sweden
<b>INSARAG</b>	INSARAG (International Search and Rescue Advisory Group) Africa/Middle East Awareness Training Course	Dec 9-11	Tunisia
<b>Army Engineering School and Training Centre</b>	Course on Human Relief Operations in Disasters	10-15 March 2008	Izmir, Turkey
<b>Joint Force Command HQ, Naples</b>	Seminar on Civil Military Cooperation in Operations : tactical and operational levels	March 2008	Naples

Further information is available on e-Prime, the Partnership Real-time Information Management and Exchange System.

If you would like to contribute to "perCEPtions", the CEP newsletter, please contact **Clare Roberts, CEP, NATO HQ** [cepd@hq.nato.int](mailto:cepd@hq.nato.int)