



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION

Current as of 5 December 2008

J-5
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CJCSI 2320.01C
6 November 2006

GUIDANCE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VIENNA DOCUMENT 1999 AND ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS

References:

- a. Vienna Document 1999 of the Negotiations on the Confidence and Security Building Measures adopted at the 269th Plenary Meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) at Istanbul on 16 November 1999
- b. DOD Directive 2060.1, 9 January 2001, "Implementation of, and Compliance with, Arms Control Agreements"
- c. USD(AT&L) memorandum, 20 June 1991, "Guidance for Department of Defense Compliance with the Vienna Document 1990"
- d. Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 19 November 1990

1. Purpose. Consistent with references a through c, this instruction provides updated guidance and military policy for the implementation of the Vienna Document 1999 (VDOC 99) (reference a) as agreed to by the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and subscribed to by the US government (USG) at Istanbul on 16 November 1999.

2. Cancellation. CJCSI 2320.01B, 15 December 2003, is canceled.

3. Applicability. This instruction applies to US Central Command (USCENTCOM), US European Command (USEUCOM), other combatant commands that deploy forces into the ZoA as defined in Annex I of reference a, the Services, US Delegation to the Military Committee, NATO (USDELMEC), the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Joint Staff, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Representative to the OSCE.

4. Policy

a. Implementation policy for confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) is developed within the National Security Council (NSC) interagency coordination process. This process includes the participation of the NSC Staff, the Department of State (DOS), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Director of Central Intelligence Staff, and the Joint Staff. DTRA and DIA support OSD and the Joint Staff in the interagency process. DOD representatives ensure operational security and force protection are factored into policy decisions regarding the applicability of VDOC 99 in times of crisis, conflict, or post-hostilities.

b. DOD level policy for compliance with reference a is delineated in references b and c. To comply with the provisions of reference a, all military activities associated with VDOC 99 should reflect openness and transparency, keeping in mind operations security measures to protect classified and sensitive information or material as well as force protection. Detailed implementation and compliance policies are in Appendixes A through K of Enclosure C of this document.

5. Definitions. Enclosure B of this document contains detailed interpretation of VDOC 99 provisions. Acronyms and abbreviations are in the Glossary.

6. Responsibilities

a. DOS is responsible for implementation of, and compliance with, certain VDOC 99 CSBMs, specifically: Chapter III, "Risk Reduction;" Chapter X, "Regional Measures;" Chapter XI, "Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting;" and Chapter XII, "Final Provisions."

b. DOD component responsibilities for implementation of and compliance with reference a are broadly specified in references b and c.

(1) OUSD (AT&L) is responsible for DOD oversight for implementation of and compliance with all arms control agreements including VDOC 99 and the DOD Arms Control Information and Notification (ACIN) Program.

(2) OUSD (Policy) is responsible for developing DOD policy in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ("the Chairman") and for VDOC 99 Chapter II, "Defence Planning."

(3) DTRA is responsible for planning and oversight of efforts to ensure sufficient personnel are trained to fulfill DOD linguist requirements to support VDOC 99.

(4) The Chairman is responsible for promulgation of coordinated DOD policy guidance to applicable military organizations and for overseeing the following specific VDOC 99 CSBMs: Chapter I, “Annual Exchanges of Military Information;” Chapter IV, “Military Contacts;” Chapter V, “Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities;” Chapter VI, “Observation of Certain Military Activities;” Chapter VII, “Annual Calendars;” Chapter VIII, “Constraining Provisions;” and Chapter IX, “Compliance and Verification.”

(5) DTRA is responsible for VDOC 99 Chapter IX, “Compliance and Verification.” This includes: carrying out active inspections and evaluations; serving as the US representative and providing escorts for passive inspections and evaluations; and establishing liaison with host countries during inspections that might include US forces. DTRA also is responsible for augmenting, when requested, the theater escort team for activities under Chapter IV, “Contacts”: specifically, US airbase visits; military formation and military facilities visits; observations visits; and demonstrations of new types of major weapon and equipment systems.

(6) The International Negotiations Division, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5), is the Joint Staff office of primary responsibility for all matters involving implementation of, and compliance with, VDOC 99.

(7) Detailed responsibilities are in Appendixes A-K of Enclosure C.

7. Summary of Changes. This revision updates CJCSI 2320.01. It further:

a. Deletes information related to the Defense Data Management and Notification System and its component, the Compliance Monitoring and Tracking System, and adds information pertinent to the new DOD ACIN program and its web-based component, the Arms Control Enterprise System (ACES).

b. Incorporates DOD policy regarding the provision of voluntary briefings during VDOC 99 passive inspections.

c. Establishes DOD policy regarding the new FSC decision to advocate, on a voluntary basis, a below threshold notification of a participating state’s largest military activity.

d. Changes responsibility from USEUCOM to Service Headquarters for the submission of photographs and technical information on new types of major weapon and equipment systems deployed into the VDOC zone of application (ZoA) and clarifies several other responsibilities for implementation of VDOC 99.

e. Adds a matrix on AEMI and notification responsibilities (Enclosure D).

8. Releasability. This instruction is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. DOD components (to include the combatant commands), other federal agencies, and the public may obtain copies of this instruction through the Internet from the CJCS Directives Home Page--
http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives. Copies are also available through the Government Printing Office on the Joint Electronic Library CD-ROM.

9. Effective Date. This instruction is effective upon receipt.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



WALTER L. SHARP
Lieutenant General, USA
Director, Joint Staff

Enclosures:

- A - List of Participating States of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
- B - Interpretation of the Vienna Document 1999
- C - Policy, Procedures, and Responsibilities for Implementation of, and Compliance with, Vienna Document 1999
- GL - Glossary

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ENCLOSURE A

LIST OF PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY
AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (OSCE)

Albania	Andorra
Armenia	Austria
Azerbaijan	Belarus
Belgium	Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bulgaria	Canada
Croatia	Cyprus
Czech Republic	Denmark
Estonia	Finland
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)	France
Georgia	Germany
Greece	Holy See
Hungary	Iceland
Ireland	Italy
Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan
Latvia	Liechtenstein
Lithuania	Luxembourg
Malta	Moldova
Monaco	Montenegro
Netherlands	Norway
Poland	Portugal
Romania	Russian Federation
San Marino	Slovak Republic
Serbia	Slovenia
Spain	Sweden
Switzerland	Tajikistan
Turkey	Turkmenistan
Ukraine	United Kingdom
United States of America	Uzbekistan

NOTE: All of the above subscribe to the Vienna Document 1999

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ENCLOSURE B

INTERPRETATION OF THE VIENNA DOCUMENT 1999

1. General. Explanations are addressed in sequence by Chapter (I-XII) of VDOC 99. The paragraph numbering system is identical to the system used within the text of VDOC 99.

2. Explanation by Paragraph

a. Chapter I, "Annual Exchange of Military Information," information on military forces.

(1) Paragraph 9. An annual exchange of information is required for military forces "in the zone of application." This exchange of information is on the military forces, which are permanently assigned in the ZoA.¹

(2) Paragraph 10. The information exchange will be conducted NLT 15 December of each year and will be valid as of 1 January of the following year.

(3) Subparagraph 10.1. The term equivalents (with due consideration of VDOC 99 footnotes * and **) are defined as:

(a) Land -- army, corps, division, brigade, and regiment

(b) Air -- major command, numbered air force, and wing

(4) Subparagraph 10.1.1. Requires the provision of the number of units (as defined in paragraph 10.1) listed in Chart I of the information exchange. The resultant annual evaluation quota is one evaluation visit per calendar year for every 60 units, but not to exceed more than 15 evaluation visits annually.

(5) Subparagraph 10.2. Combat units are infantry, armored, mechanized, motorized rifle, artillery, combat engineer, army aviation, airmobile, and airborne. Information will indicate the following:

(6) Subparagraph 10.2.1. Designation equates to unit title, and subordination to its immediate higher headquarters.

¹ The ZoA for these confidence and security building measures covers the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area and air space of the 56 OSCE participating states. See Annex I of VDOC 99 for a further explanation.

(7) Subparagraph 10.2.2. Active or non-active (based on whether a unit is above or below 15 percent of authorized combat strength). Authorized combat strength (cited in VDOC 99 footnote ****) is a unit's wartime authorized personnel strength.

(8) Subparagraph 10.2.3. Exact normal location of the headquarters during peacetime in geographic terms and/or coordinates.

(9) Subparagraph 10.2.4. Peacetime authorized personnel strength is a unit's authorized strength.

(10) Subparagraphs 10.2.5, 10.2.5.1-10.2.5.4, 10.2.5.6, 10.2.5.7. Major organic weapon and equipment systems of units and formations identified in paragraph 10.1 will be reported consistent with Article II and the Protocol on Existing Types of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (reference d). These land systems are battle tanks; helicopters; armored combat vehicles (ACVs), which include armored personnel carriers (APCs), armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs), and heavy armament combat vehicles; APC and AIFV look-alike vehicles; artillery pieces, which include self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars, and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm caliber and above); and armored vehicle launched bridges. Formations will report their total holdings of reportable equipment, not just weapon and equipment systems held by subordinate units. Museum pieces, static displays, and range targets are not reportable since they are not organic weapon and equipment systems of units or formations.

(11) Subparagraph 10.2.5.5. Antitank guided missile (ATGM) launchers are limited to vehicles not reported as ACVs, such as the US M901, improved T.O.W. vehicle or the Stryker M1134 ATGM vehicle. However, the M901 is no longer in the inventory of US forces assigned in the zone of application. Museum pieces, static displays, and range targets are not reportable since they are not organic weapon and equipment systems of units or formations.

(12) Subparagraph 10.3. Increases in active units of 1,000 troops and formations of 3,000 troops must be over the peacetime authorized personnel strength as listed in the information exchange. The increase must be for more than 21 days. The threshold of 3,000 personnel does not include subordinate formations and units reporting separately. A corps would count only increases in its directly subordinate combat support and service support units and not its divisions, corps artillery brigade, or cavalry regiment, which are subject to their own reporting requirements.

(13) Subparagraph 10.3.1. Nonactive formations and nonactive combat units are considered active when more than 2,000 troops are present for more than 21 days.

(14) Subparagraphs 10.3.2, 10.3.2.1-10.3.2.6. This information will be provided in the annual exchange of military information for units and formations that are reportable under subparagraphs 10.3 and 10.3.1.

(15) Subparagraph 10.3.3. The goal is to report increases or temporary activations of formations and units in the annual calendar. If activations occur after submission of the annual calendar, notification will be made 42 days in advance of the increase or activation. In the case of no advance notice of an increase in personnel, the notification, at the latest, will be at the time of increase or activation.

(16) Subparagraph 10.4. Amphibious formations and amphibious combat units permanently located in the zone of application are subject to the same reporting requirements as directed in paragraphs 10.3.2 - 10.3.2.6.

(17) Subparagraph 10.5. Land-based naval air (LBNA) means combat aircraft as defined in Article II of the CFE Treaty that are subordinate to naval forces, but are not based aboard ship. Airborne early warning and control aircraft, airborne ground surveillance and battle management aircraft, and airborne electronic warfare aircraft subordinate to naval forces are not combat aircraft; thus, even if not based aboard ship, they are excluded.

(18) Subparagraphs 10.5.1-10.5.3, 10.5.3.1, 10.5.3.2, 10.5.4, 10.5.5, 10.5.5.1, 10.5.5.2. Information is required for each air formation and air combat unit, air defense, aviation, and LBNA. An air defense aviation units peacetime authorized personnel strength is excepted and need not be provided. An air unit's normal peacetime location airbase or military airfield may be the same location and should be reported as such.

b. Data Relating to Major Weapon and Equipment Systems

(1) Paragraph 11. Data exchanged as specified in the provisions on the information on military forces pertain only to major weapon and equipment systems permanently assigned with forces in the zone of application.

(2) Subparagraph 11.1. Updated data on a CD-ROM including digital photos were provided to all participating states on 15 December 2002 and for eight Stryker vehicles on 12 September 2006.

(3) Subparagraph 11.2. The decision on whether a major weapon or equipment system constitutes a new type or version is the sovereign right of each participating state. For the United States, a new type or version of a major organic weapon and equipment system introduced into the zone of application is designated as such if it is consistent with Article II of the CFE Treaty Protocol on Existing Types (POET) and is either in the POET of the CFE

Treaty or notified for inclusion in the POET. A new type or version introduced by another participating state is not a new type or version for the United States unless it meets those same criteria. When a new type or version is deployed for the first time in the zone of application, all data are required. If any other state has provided data prior to the United States, the United States can, if applicable, certify that the data provided by the first state is correct for the US major weapons and equipment system. Note that the national nomenclature must be provided if different from the introducing state's nomenclature.

(4) Subparagraph 11.3. States will inform each other when a type or version is removed from service.

(5) Paragraph 12. Annex III provides the format required for reporting major weapons and equipment.

c. Information on Plans for the Deployment of Major Weapons and Equipment Systems

(1) Paragraph 13. Report systems specified in subparagraph 10.2.5 that the United States plans to deploy within the ZoA the following year.

(2) Subparagraphs 14-14.4. The information is to be provided NLT 15 December of each year.

d. Chapter II, "Defence Planning," Exchange of Information

(1) Paragraph 15. The information requested in this chapter will be used by other participating states to determine the mid- to long-term intent of the US military. The information relating to defense planning is not limited to the ZoA. This information will be distributed on an annual basis NLT 3 months after the defense budget has been approved. The date of the forthcoming fiscal year's military budget and the identification of the competent authorities that approved the budget will also be provided. Information on US military budgets will be provided annually to all other participating states NLT 3 months after the budget has been approved. OUSD(P), in coordination with OUSD(AT&L) and OUSD(Comptroller), plans and prepares the annual exchange of military budgets. The Joint Staff and Services will support as required.

(2) Subparagraphs 15.1-15.1.3. Defense policy and doctrine changes (down to and including Joint and Service level changes) will be provided in a written statement to participating states.

(3) Subparagraphs 15.2 - 15.2.7. A general description of force planning will be provided to participating states. The use of illustrative charts and maps to facilitate understanding is encouraged. Paragraph 15.2.2 is a new information requirement that requests information on "the deployment of their

armed forces and the envisaged changes thereto,” where deployment means military forces permanently assigned within the ZoA.

(4) Subparagraph 15.3. Report defense expenditures from the most recent fiscal year. A new requirement in VDOC 99 is that the information must be provided in relation to the gross national product as a percentage.

(5) Subparagraph 15.4 - 15.4.4.2. Required information on defense budgets will consist of relevant and releasable (not classified) facts, figures, and/or estimates under consideration for defense planning. If inflation is factored in for outyears, then clarification regarding the figures used must be provided.

e. Clarification Review and Dialogue

(1) Subparagraph 15.5. Requests for clarification should be submitted within a period of 2 months following receipt of a participating state’s information.

(2) Subparagraph 15.6. The Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM) can be used for discussions on matters relating to defense planning.

(3) Subparagraph 15.7, 15.8. The OSCE will conduct military doctrine seminars and arrange study visits of individuals from appropriate bodies involved in defense planning.

f. Possible Additional Information. Subparagraphs 15.9, 15.10. Participating states are encouraged to provide unclassified information on defense planning to the OSCE Conflict Prevention Center (CPC).

g. Chapter III, “Risk Reduction,” Mechanism for Consultations and Cooperation as Regards Unusual Military Activities

(1) Paragraph 16. Information will be provided to host states about any unusual and unscheduled activities involving US forces outside normal peacetime locations, but within the ZoA, that are militarily significant and are a concern to a participating state.

(2) Subparagraphs 16.1-16.1.4. A participating state that has concerns about military activities may ask for an explanation from a state where the activity is taking place. An explanation of the activity in question will be transmitted within not more than 48 hours. This requires US forces to provide information that enables host states to respond to such requests.

(3) Subparagraphs 16.2-16.2.1.5. The requesting state may ask for a meeting with the responding state. This meeting will be convened within not more than 48 hours and may include other interested participating states.

(4) Subparagraphs 16.3-16.3.1.2. The requesting or responding state may ask for a meeting of all participating states. The Permanent Council and the FSC will jointly assess the situation and may recommend appropriate stabilizing measures.

h. Cooperation as Regards Hazardous Incidents of a Military Nature. Paragraphs 17 - 17.4. Participating states will report hazardous incidents of a military nature within the ZoA to prevent misunderstandings and mitigate effects on another participating state. USCENTCOM and USEUCOM will provide an in-theater military point of contact for all hazardous incidents of a military nature and report any hazardous incidents of a military nature to the Joint Staff NMCC with amplifying information as needed.

i. Voluntary Hosting of Visits to Dispel Concerns about Military Activities. Paragraphs 18 - 18.2. In order to dispel concerns about military activities in the ZoA, states are encouraged to invite other participating states to visit areas on the territory of the host state in which there may be cause for concern. When US forces are a subject of concern, the responsible geographic combatant command (GCC) will ensure the host nation is supported with a liaison team commensurate with the scale of US involvement. When the United States participates in an observation of another participating state's military activity, representatives will generally be military personnel drawn from the appropriate US embassy or GCC.

j. Chapter IV, "Contacts," Visits to Air Bases

(1) Paragraph 19. An airbase visit is not linked to any air activity. The purpose of the visit is to observe the normal activity of an airbase and permit visitors to gain an impression of the approximate number of sorties and types of missions flown.

(2) Paragraph 20. The United States will host a visit to an air base in the ZoA at least once in the 5-year periods identified by the OSCE CPC. The current 5-year period for air base visits is 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2006. The next 5-year period begins 1 January 2007.

(3) Paragraphs 21, 23, 24. Up to two visitors from each participating state may attend the airbase visit. Annex IV outlines modalities for visits to airbases.

(4) Paragraph 22. Negative replies to invitations should be provided (if applicable) to hosting participating states.

(5) Paragraph 25. When selecting individuals to represent the United States on visits to other nations' airbases, consideration should be given to selecting personnel with a military aviation background. The following information must be provided on all personnel selected to participate in an airbase visit: name, rank, date of birth, place of birth, passport number, place of issue and expiration date, and travel arrangements, including flight number and arrival place and time. Information on travel arrangements is not required in the initial message and may be provided outside the 21-day response time. The remainder of the data on personnel selected must be submitted promptly to meet the 21-day response time.

(6) Paragraphs 26, 27. The briefings provided during the airbase visit (which last for a minimum of 24 hours) will be unclassified and confined to questions that are applicable to the airbase, including appropriate information on the air force structure and operations. The specific role and subordination of the air base will be explained.

(7) Paragraph 28. Visitors to airbases will have the opportunity to speak with troops from various units and view aircraft located at the base.

(8) Paragraph 29. The opportunity for an out brief should be provided for the visitors to discuss the visit.

k. Program of Military Contacts and Cooperation, Military Contacts. Paragraphs 30.1 - 30.1.9. An important aspect of confidence building is the voluntary exchange of personnel and visits that fosters an open exchange of views. Military contacts are an important component of these measures. Voluntary contacts are encouraged and may consist of contacts between personnel from military institutions, naval vessels, air force units, and military education facilities and will include cultural events and seminars.

1. Military Cooperation. Paragraphs 30.2 - 30.16. Participating states, on a voluntary basis, may conduct joint military exercises and training, provide experts to consult on defense and security, participate in OSCE-organized seminars on military cooperation, and exchange information on agreements on military contacts and cooperation. In any 5-year period, participating states will make every effort to arrange for a visit to a military facility or a military formation, or for observation of certain military activities. Modalities for these visit will be as described for airbase visits. The United States, in coordination with a territorial host, will make every effort to arrange for one such visit in any 5-year period. On a voluntary basis, host states can also arrange for additional observation visits. The OSCE Programme of Military Contact and Cooperation is open to all OSCE participating states.

m. Demonstration of New Types of Major Weapon and Equipment Systems

(1) Paragraphs 31 - 34. Demonstrations are required for new types of major weapon or equipment systems within 1 year of deployment into the ZoA. The demonstrations may be done in isolation or in conjunction with another CSBM activity such as a visit to an airbase, observation, or exercise. The demonstration may also be done outside a CSBM event, such as during an air or trade show. There is no requirement for a demonstration if another participating state has already given a demonstration of the same weapon system.

(2) Paragraph 35. All invitations require a response. Information from Annex IV should be provided for personnel attending the demonstration. Individuals should be selected based on their expertise and knowledge of the particular or similar weapon systems.

n. Provision of Information on Contacts. Paragraphs 36, 37. Information on multinational contact events will be provided annually NLT 15 November to the OSCE CPC.

o. Chapter V, "Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities"

(1) Paragraph 38. Participating states will give notification of notifiable military activities 42 days or more in advance of the start of the activity.

(2) Paragraph 39. Although the United States does not have territory in the ZoA, notification by the United States is required if US involvement in a planned military activity reaches the notifiable level. Thus two notifications may be required for the same event; one from the United States and one from the host state. If US involvement is below the thresholds, yet the combined exercise exceeds the thresholds, the United States will provide military activity details directly to the host state arms control verification center.

(3) Paragraph 40. The focus for all notifications is on land forces in the field. This notification excludes, among other things, independent naval and air maneuvers and land force activity that takes place in garrison, but includes amphibious landings, airmobile, or parachute assaults in the ZoA.

(a) The phrase "in the field" is synonymous with the phrase "out of garrison." Only activities occurring outside of garrisons are notifiable. This requirement protects USG capability to use its bases in Europe as a staging area in responding to other worldwide contingencies. A civilian airfield or seaport used temporarily by the military is considered to be in the field.

(b) There are three categories of military activities that require notification. They are: engagement of formations in the same field exercises

under a single operational command, either independent of or in combination with air or naval components; engagement in an amphibious assault landing or an airmobile or parachute assault; and arrival or concentration of formations resulting from a transfer of troops, either from outside the ZoA to arrival points inside the zone or from inside the zone to points of concentration in the zone, to participate in a notifiable activity or to be concentrated.² Forces of other participating states participating in a military activity will count toward the thresholds of the military activity.

(4) Subparagraph 40.1. A single activity refers to a self-contained military activity. Individual exercises within a series may be notifiable if they breach the thresholds outlined in this paragraph. A single operational command must also control land forces participating in a single activity. This single operational command refers to the controlling headquarters for the activity that has the authority to assign operational missions to the forces in the field. This single operational command headquarters is not required to be located in the field, but troops who are controlled by this headquarters located in the field will be counted toward notifiable thresholds.

(5) Subparagraph 40.1.1. The structural threshold of a division or two or more brigades or regiments, not necessarily subordinate to the same division, must be met prior to applying the numerical thresholds. Structure exists if the command post is in the field. Elements of the division or brigades or regiments represent that unit in determining structure; i.e., the brigade command post in the field represents that brigade. Once the structural threshold is met, a count is conducted in the field of troops, tanks, ACVs, or artillery participating in the single activity that respond to the same operational commander. The thresholds of 9,000 troops, 250 tanks, 500 ACVs, or 250 artillery pieces 100 mm caliber or above include those assigned to the military activity and also include support units. When determining if an activity meets the threshold for notification, personnel from units and units deployed in the field conducting combat support or combat service support functions within the same military activity and responding to the same single operational command are counted with the brigades or regiments. Troops, tanks, ACVs, and artillery that are permanently assigned to the ZoA and engaged in the activity from a garrison location are not counted toward the threshold determination.

(6) Subparagraph 40.1.2. Aircraft sorties (excluding helicopters) are those conducted in support of the notified ground force activity described in Subparagraph 40.1. Independent air operations will not be reported. For air operations supporting more than one activity, report the number of sorties

² Land force exercises are normally divided into three phases: preparation/deployment, exercise, and redeployment/recovery.

flown in support of the notifiable activity. Naval air sorties flown from outside the ZoA will not be counted toward the 200-sortie total.

(7) Subparagraph 40.2. A notification is also required if 3,000 troops conduct an amphibious landing, heliborne landing, or parachute assault in the ZoA. Notification is required without regard to structure.

(8) Subparagraph 40.2.1. US cumulative troop strength is used in determining if the activity is notified by the United States. In determining troop strength for an amphibious landing, include only those troops that come ashore in the ZoA. If the exercise is notifiable, personnel pre-positioned ashore who are or will be involved in the amphibious landing as support or safety personnel will be included in the cumulative troop strength. If at any time during the amphibious landing or parachute drop the cumulative strength reaches the threshold of 3,000 troops, the activity is notifiable. The start date and time of the notifiable activity is the date the first troops land ashore or in the drop zone. At the conclusion of the amphibious landing or parachute drop, the activity becomes a traditional land force activity subject to the notification thresholds of 9,000 troops, 250 tanks, 500 ACVs, or 250 artillery pieces 100 mm caliber or above.

(9) Subparagraphs 40.3, 40.3.1. Transfers or movements from outside the ZoA to the ZoA are not notifiable or observable. However, the military activity becomes notifiable if it meets the following criteria when transferred forces meet at points of concentration: it (1) is located within the ZoA; (2) is located at a field location; e.g., at a civil arrival point (civilian airfield or seaport) or outside a military garrison; and (3) meets the notifiable threshold, structure, and single activity criteria at any time.

(10) Subparagraph 40.3.2. Arrivals at military airbases or military seaports are not subject to notification; however, should the troops involved in the transfer leave the military base at the notifiable level and conduct an otherwise notifiable activity (exercise, concentration), that activity is notifiable. Once the forces are in the CSBM ZoA, their subsequent military transfers are treated as movements within the ZoA. When US forces depart their military arrival points in the ZoA (which are not notifiable) or civil arrival points (which may be if the criteria in paragraph 40.3.2 are met) to concentrate in the field to train, prepare for future military activities, or for any purpose, then that concentration is notifiable if it satisfies the notification criteria (paragraph 40 of reference a).

(11) Paragraphs 41, 41.1. Alerts (when troops have no advance notification of the activity) are an exception to the 42-day notification. Alerts will not be forecasted in the annual calendar, even if higher headquarters preplans them. Notification will be given at the time the military activity begins. The notification thresholds for notification and observation of a

military activity apply. However, the duration of the alert must exceed 72 hours for it to be observable. Even then, only that portion of the alert extending beyond 72 hours is observable. Invitation to observe an alert activity must be sent concurrently with the notification of that activity.

(12) Paragraph 42. Written notification of notifiable military activities is required. The appropriate GCC will generate notifications via the ACES.

(13) Paragraphs 43-43.2. Information identified in subparagraph 43.1 - 43.5 is included in notifications of military activities.

(14) Subparagraph 43.3. In reporting multinational exercise activities, the host state will gather information from all participating states, number of troops by state, designation, subordination, number and type of formations and units by state, and the total number of tanks, ACVs, or artillery pieces 100 mm caliber and above disaggregated by state. Participating states have agreed to notify military activities when they contribute forces above threshold level or when they serve as host state for an activity. Germany will always notify a notifiable US activity that takes place in Germany, whether or not Germany contributes forces, because it is hosting the US military activity.

(15) Subparagraph 43.4. Use the generic level of command; e.g., brigade/regiment, division, corps, or army.

(16) Subparagraph 43.5. For land force exercises, the 42-day prior notification is counted from the first day of the activity's first phase, regardless of whether the troop strength has breached the notification thresholds on that day. This is typically the first day of the activity's deployment phase. The end date will be the last day of the redeployment or recovery phase. These dates must be coordinated with the exercise participants. For amphibious landings and parachute drops, the 42-day prior notification is counted from the first day of the activity's entry into the CSBM ZoA, regardless of whether the troop strength has breached the notification thresholds of 3,000 troops on that day. The end date for an independent amphibious landing or parachute drop exercise is the completion of the redeployment or recovery. For an amphibious landing or parachute drop exercise that becomes part of a land force exercise, the end date is the date the land force exercise begins. For concentrations, the 42-day prior notification is counted from the first day that the notification threshold is breached. There is not a concentration or an arrival by definition until the thresholds are breached.

(17) Paragraphs 44 - 44.1.2. Include all personnel pre-positioned ashore in the amphibious landing area. This requirement should include troops pre-positioned ashore as well as support and safety personnel ashore supporting the amphibious landing. For example, if 3,500 troops came across the beach in the amphibious landing and another 3,000 were pre-positioned

ashore in the amphibious landing area to participate in or support the landing, a total of 6,500 troops would be reported. However, in subparagraph 44.2.1, 3,500 would be reported because that is the number involved in the amphibious landing.

(18) Subparagraphs 44.1.3 - 44.1.6. The total number of tanks, ACVs, ATGMs mounted on armored vehicles, artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm caliber and above), helicopters (by category) and number, purpose, and missions of aircraft sorties (excluding helicopters) by each participating state will be notified in writing.

(19) Subparagraph 44.1.7. Sorties by aircraft (if notifiable) include sorties by naval aircraft in support of the notifiable ground activity. Helicopters are not included in this category (reported in subparagraph 44.1.6).

(20) Subparagraph 44.1.8. Use generic purposes for air missions (e.g., close air support or reconnaissance). The class or air mission termed as "battlefield air interdiction" will not be listed as such. The term "air to ground" will be used instead.

(21) Subparagraph 44.1.9. Use generic categories of aircraft (e.g., bomber, reconnaissance, or fighter).

(22) Subparagraph 44.1.10. Use the generic level of command; e.g., squadron, wing, or allied tactical air force.

(23) Subparagraph 44.1.11. Any naval ship-to-shore gunfire should be so noted. A yes or no response indicates this notation. There is no requirement to notify simulated ship-to-shore gunfire.

(24) Subparagraph 44.1.12. A yes or no response is all that is required to indicate naval ship-to-shore support.

(25) Subparagraph 44.1.13. Use the generic level of command (e.g., fleet, flotilla, and squadron). There is no requirement to provide the numbered fleet (e.g., 2d fleet) or a more precise level of command (e.g., Commander, Naval Forces Atlantic).

(26) Subparagraph 44.2. Parachute assaults, heliborne landings, and amphibious landings have lower notification thresholds due to their offensive potential. Once the landing and/or assault is complete, the threshold reverts to that for a normal military activity. The troops that arrived via assault and/or landing would be then included into the totals for any activity in which they are subsequently engaged.

(27) Subparagraph 44.2.1. Applies only to the troops who actually participate in a ground force activity resulting from an amphibious landing or a parachute assault (only those troops that ultimately become land forces once they land on the beach or drop zone). Aviation sections that come ashore will be included in troop totals. Air sections that do not come ashore and sea components of these activities are not notifiable.

(28) Subparagraph 44.2.2. Points of embarkation refer only to those start points in the CSBM ZoA. Do not report embarkation points outside the CSBM ZoA.

(29) Subparagraphs 44.3 - 44.3.4. Apply only to military activities notifiable under paragraph 40.3.

(30) Subparagraph 44.3. Normally the United States will not notify an arrival of troops from the continental United States because arrival points are usually military garrisons. The United States will notify subsequent concentrations or activities if it breaches thresholds and meets notification criteria for military activities.

(31) Subparagraph 44.3.1. Troops that are not present in the CSBM ZoA are excluded from the reporting requirement.

(32) Subparagraph 44.3.2. Use generic types of divisions (e.g., one mechanized division).

(33) Subparagraphs 44.3.3 - 44.3.5. The United States provides this information to the host state that is responsible for providing the notification.

(34) Subparagraph 44.3.6. Unless classified, include the geographic coordinates of anticipated arrival points, concentration area(s), and Combat Equipment Group Europe sites being used.

(35) Paragraphs 45, 45.1. A box delimited by geographic coordinates (with names of corresponding towns) that will cover the activity's area, as appropriate.

(36) Subparagraphs 45.2 - 45.4. Pertains to all types of notifications and require the activity to be subdivided into principal phases of the activity, including a brief description of the activity and its corresponding dates.

(37) Paragraphs 46 - 46.2. Refers to other information in addition to that described in subparagraphs 45.2 - 45.4 and changes to the information provided in the annual calendar regarding the activity.

p. Chapter VI, "Observation of Certain Military Activities"

(1) Paragraph 47. This provision has two parts, active and passive observations. In the case of passive observations, coordination is required in the event of simultaneous passive observations and inspections of the same notifiable military activity.

(2) Subparagraphs 47.1 - 47.3. In addition to field exercises, concentrations with 13,000 or more troops or 300 or more battle tanks are observable (only during the period that the 13,000 troops or 300-tank threshold is breached). Arrivals are not normally notified or observed because the arrival points are usually at military garrisons or airfields, which are not in the field. When these forces depart their garrisons and concentrate in the field or participate in an otherwise observable activity, an observation invitation is required.

(3) Subparagraph 47.4. If a transfer of troops into or within the CSBM ZoA equals or exceeds 13,000 troops, 300 battle tanks, 500 ACVs, or 250 artillery pieces 100 mm and above, or 3,500 troops are involved in an amphibious landing, heliborne landing, or parachute assault, it becomes an observable activity. If practicable, an observation program covering all phases of an exercise being conducted within the ZoA may be conducted.

(4) Paragraph 48. The United States, having no territory in the CSBM ZoA, will coordinate closely with host states on whose territory notifiable military activities will take place.

(5) Paragraph 49. In most cases, the United States will coordinate closely with the allies in allocating responsibilities for a joint observation program. Should matters needing interpretation arise, the host state will decide the matter.

(6) Paragraph 50. Ideally, observers sent to view a military activity will have a high level of knowledge associated with the military activity taking place.

(7) Paragraph 51. Annex IV outlines modalities for personnel selected to observe military activities.

(8) Paragraph 52. The observation of the military activities will take place during the time the thresholds equal or exceed 13,000 troops, 300 battle tanks, 500 ACVs, 250 pieces of artillery, or 3,500 troops engaged in an amphibious landing, heliborne landing, or parachute assault (paragraph 47.4) and will terminate when the thresholds fall below the accountable numbers reflected above.

(9) Paragraphs 54 - 55. Observers will be granted diplomatic status. Participating states will ensure that official personnel and troops taking part in an observed military activity, as well as other armed personnel located in the area of military activity, are informed of their presence and status as observers.

(10) Paragraph 56. There is no requirement to permit observation of restricted locations, installations, or defense sites. In accordance with (IAW) USG policy on access to such facilities, requests for access will be denied.

(11) Paragraphs 57 - 57.9. Observers will be provided a preliminary information briefing (which will allow them to confirm that the notifiable activity is non-threatening) followed by daily briefings on all forces involved in the military activity. Observers will be provided with maps and observation equipment. An aerial survey, preferably by helicopter, is encouraged when feasible.

(12) Paragraph 58. There is no need to invite observers unless activities that are not previously notified exceed notifiable thresholds for a period of more than 72 hours.

(13) Paragraphs 59, 59.1. Media representation during observations of notifiable military activities is encouraged.

(14) Paragraph 60. The host or delegated state will provide suitable transportation for observers for the duration of the observation.

q. Chapter VII, "Annual Calendars"

(1) Paragraph 61. Participating states will provide by 15 November an annual calendar of its military activities subject to prior notification for forces in the ZoA for the subsequent calendar year.

(2) Paragraph 62. If no military activities subject to prior notification are scheduled, this information will be transmitted to participating states.

(3) Paragraphs 63 - 63.2.11. These paragraphs outline the specific information requirements to be provided regarding military activities subject to prior notification, which are provided in annual calendars.

(4) Paragraph 64. Changes to planned activities should be provided IAW the notification requirements for the military activity subject to prior notification.

(5) Paragraph 65. A cancellation of a military activity subject to prior notification or reduction of the exercise below notifiable thresholds will be reported as soon as possible.

(6) Paragraph 66. Additional information on a military activity subject to prior notification will be provided IAW the model provided in the annual calendar.

r. Chapter VIII, "Constraining Provisions"

(1) Paragraphs 67, 67.1. Only one military activity subject to prior notification involving more than 40,000 troops, 900 battle tanks, 2,000 ACVs, or 900 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars, and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm caliber and above) can be carried out every 3 years by each state.

(2) Subparagraphs 67.2, 67.2.1. Each participating state is allowed up to six military activities subject to prior notification per calendar year with more than 13,000 troops, 300 battle tanks, 500 ACVs, or 300 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars, and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm caliber and above). Of these six military activities subject to prior notification, only three may be carried out each calendar year in excess of 25,000 troops or more than 400 battle tanks, 800 ACVs, or 400 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars, and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm caliber and above). There is no numerical restriction on military activities subject to prior notification below 13,000 troops or involving fewer than 300 tanks.

(3) Subparagraph 67.3. No participating state may have more than three military activities subject to prior notification going on at the same time if they each involve more than 13,000 troops, 300 battle tanks, 500 ACVs, or 300 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars, and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm caliber and above).

(4) Paragraphs 68 - 69. Military activities subject to prior notification involving over 40,000 troops, 900 battle tanks, 2,000 ACVs, or 900 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars, and rocket launchers (100 mm caliber and above) will be communicated to other participating states by 15 November, more than a year in advance of the activity planned in the second subsequent calendar year. If a state does not schedule this type of exercise, it should inform other participating states. No unnotified exercises should take place.

(5) Paragraph 70. Military activities subject to prior notification involving over 40,000 troops, 900 battle tanks, 2,000 ACVs, or 900 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars, and rocket launchers (100 mm caliber and above) will not be conducted unless they have been communicated and placed on the annual calendar.

(6) Paragraph 71. Attempts should be made to limit military activities subject to prior notification that have not been notified on the annual calendar.

s. Chapter IX, "Compliance and Verification." Paragraphs 72, 73. Specific modalities on forms of verification for confidence and security building measures are amplified in this chapter.

t. Inspection

(1) Paragraph 74. Inviting inspectors from other participating states is voluntary. The inspecting state will determine whether or not inspectors from other participating states should be invited to participate in an inspection and, if so, which states are to be invited to be part of the multinational team.

(2) Paragraphs 75 - 77. USG policy is to cite "Paragraph 75 of the Vienna Document 1999" as the reason for requesting an inspection. No state is required to accept more than three inspections per calendar year on its territory or more than one from the same participating state. Participating states will inform other participating states when three inspections have been accepted.

(3) Paragraph 78. The term "force majeure" relates to causes that are outside the control of the receiving state and could not be avoided by exercise of due care. They are normally synonymous with natural disaster (e.g., earthquake, flood), extreme weather (e.g., hurricane), or manmade disaster (e.g., Chernobyl nuclear accident). Any decision involving force majeure during an onsite inspection of US troops will be made in consultation with the Joint Staff. In declaring force majeure, the receiving state will, without delay, provide a full explanation through diplomatic or official channels.

(4) Paragraph 79. The participating state receiving the request for inspection is obligated to affirmatively respond within the agreed timeframe, subject to limitations of paragraphs 76 and 77.

(5) Paragraphs 80 - 84. The participating state requesting the inspection will designate a specified area. This area will comprise terrain where notifiable military activities are conducted or where it is believed that a notifiable military activity is taking place. The purpose of a specified area inspection is to confirm or deny the presence of notifiable military activities. Military installations, naval vessels, military vehicles, and aircraft are excluded from inspection, access, or entry. Restricted areas may be designated, but in no case will the restricted areas be areas where notifiable military activities can take place (except for identified permanent or temporary military installations). Commanders of US units and formations located inside the specified area and outside of their permanent or temporary garrison location will provide a briefing and permit access to the activities of their units to the inspecting state,

if requested. Although not required under paragraphs 80 or 81, to promote good will and transparency and if requested during a specified area inspection, commanders of units and formations that are listed in the most recent VDOC 99 Annual Exchange of Military Information (or designated representatives) will provide an unclassified command briefing to the inspecting state at an appropriate location, either on or off garrison. If the inspection team requests access to more information on the unit or formation, the DTRA escort team representative should deny access and explain that US policy and practice is to only present the information just briefed.

(6) Paragraphs 85 - 85.11. The host state (receiving the inspection) may request that the United States provide two operational helicopters and two ground vehicles for the inspection team during the time that US troops are being inspected. Since the United States cannot be a host state for an inspection, it is not obligated to provide such equipment. However, if the inspection team requests a briefing for a unit in garrison, overflight may be granted solely for the purpose of transporting the inspection team to a site on a military installation to receive such briefing. The host state should be informed of the US position before the inspection team arrives at the POE.

(7) Paragraphs 86 - 87. A reply must be provided not more than 24 hours after receiving the request for inspection.

(8) Paragraph 91. If another participating state has been invited, the number of inspectors from that state cannot exceed the number from the inviting or inspecting state. Up to three participating states may be represented on the inspection team.

(9) Paragraph 95 and 96. Providing a map of the specified area is voluntary. Equipment should not be taken from the inspectors for examination out of their sight or dismantled in any way. Should an objection be raised regarding a particular device, the inspectors should agree not to employ it during the inspection, on the understanding that the incident would likely be pursued through diplomatic channels. The use of additional inspection equipment, such as digital still or digital video cameras, cellular phones, and global positioning systems, must be requested and is subject to the specific consent of the receiving state. If US military units and formations are in the specified area and subject to inspection, prior to the inspection, US representatives will inform the receiving state that the United States only permits the use of equipment identified in paragraph 95.

(10) Paragraph 98. A briefing is not intended to be used to delay the inspection. Inspectors are only required to take into consideration host country suggestions as to the advisability of a pre-inspection briefing. However, there is no requirement on inspectors to receive a briefing, even when offered, if that is not their wish. If requested, commanders of US units and

formations conducting military activities within the specified area but outside of their permanent or temporary garrison (or their representatives) will provide unclassified briefings on the out of garrison activity taking place.

(11) Paragraph 106. Responsibility for travel expenses to and from the point of entry does not mean the United States must pay for the invited guests. Prior agreement with the invited state might be required.

u. Evaluation

(1) Paragraph 109. Actual quotas for the following year will not be known until after the information exchange on 15 December, valid as of 1 January. Paragraph 10.1.1 requires each state to include a statement indicating the total number of units contained in the information exchange and the resultant annual evaluation quota.

(2) Paragraph 111. Annual evaluations of US forces generated by current force levels could be conducted in any country in the zone where there are US combat forces; i.e., not just in Germany. Nonacceptance of an evaluation visit means that the unit is in its normal peacetime location, but the host state (or stationing state through the host state) has elected to use one of its entitlements to not accept the visit.

(3) Paragraphs 112 - 119 Describe the nature of the request. Unlike inspections, no reason for the evaluation request is required. If a unit is out of garrison during the period of a proposed evaluation, the requesting state may still insist and be granted a visit to the empty normal peacetime location of the requested formation or unit, or the requested state may grant a visit to the unit in the field. Non acceptance (paragraph 118) ultimately is an option to postpone. In the case of US forces stationed in the ZoA, a nonacceptance decision would be communicated through diplomatic channels to the host state during consultations before the reply. Participating states are entitled to invoke this provision five times for an aggregate of no more than 30 days per calendar year.

(4) Paragraph 121. "Place of assembly of the team" in the discussion of points of entry provides the possibility of using an in-country attaché or embassy officer dealing with military matters as an evaluator.

(5) Paragraph 122. It is important that coordination and consultation between the host and stationing states precede the issuance of the reply. Subject to agreements with states in which US forces are stationed, the United States will be in charge during the actual evaluation visit to US forces. The host state has responsibility for the evaluation team before the start of the evaluation and immediately following the conclusion of the evaluation visit.

(6) Paragraph 127. The visit begins with the briefing, not with the arrival of the team in country. This procedure allows the option of a team arriving on one day and conducting the evaluation on the next. Auxiliary personnel should always be identified as interpreters on the request message. The only requirement on a receiving state during the evaluation of a formation is to provide a briefing. Beyond that, the receiving state may provide the possibility to see (and by implication, evaluators may ask to see) any of the formation's immediate subordinate elements that were not reported separately (e.g., noncombatant units and other subordinate elements).

(7) Subparagraphs 127.2, 128, 132. With the exception of sensitive points and sub-elements that are not in their normal peacetime locations, personnel, weapons, and equipment should be available for evaluation. Commanders are not required to disrupt training or stage special training exercises for the evaluators.

(8) Paragraph 128. Participating states have a right to restrict access to sensitive points, facilities, and equipment. However, participating states are under an obligation to keep the number to a minimum.

v. Chapter XI, "Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting." Paragraphs 148 - 150.4. The FSC is the OSCE forum for exchanging information on VDOC 99 activities conducted by participating states. Particular attention is given to issues about inspections, evaluation visits, airbase visits, visits to military facilities and military formations, demonstrations of new types of major weapon and equipment systems, and observations of specific military activities. The AIAM is a forum to discuss these issues. The meeting is conducted annually at OSCE. Representatives from the Joint Staff, OUSD(AT&L), and USEUCOM will attend.

w. Chapter XII, "Final Provisions"

(1) OSCE Communications Network. Paragraphs 151, 152. The CSBM communications network establishes direct communications between participating states' capitols. This network complements existing diplomatic channels and is used for all CSBM-related matters. OUSD(AT&L), in cooperation with the Joint Staff and DTRA, have developed the ACES data management system to accomplish required notification and accounting.

(2) Implementation. Paragraphs 155 - 158. The CPC will be the repository for all CSBM notifications and exchanged information. VDOC 99 is a politically binding document and entered into force on 1 January 2000.

ENCLOSURE C

POLICY, PROCEDURES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF,
AND COMPLIANCE WITH, VIENNA DOCUMENT 1999

1. Joint Staff. Unless otherwise indicated in this instruction, Joint Staff/J-5, International Negotiations Division (IND), is the office of primary responsibility for all matters pertaining to the implementation of, and compliance with, reference a. Joint Staff/J-5 will:

a. Represent the US military in the US National Security Council interagency national security coordination process on all matters pertaining to reference a and additional CSBMs that may be approved and promulgated by the FSC of the OSCE.

b. Provide military advice and assistance to the Departments of Defense and State on all matters pertaining to reference a and additional CSBMs that may be approved and promulgated by the FSC.

c. Coordinate with the Services, USCENTCOM, and USEUCOM to establish US military policy and procedures for implementation of, and compliance with, the provisions of reference a and additional CSBMs that may be approved and promulgated by the FSC.

d. Provide military policy guidance pertaining to reference a and additional CSBMs that may be approved and promulgated by the FSC to USCENTCOM and USEUCOM as required.

e. Exercise oversight of US military implementation of, and compliance with, the provisions of reference a based on the Joint Staff interpretation of these provisions contained in Enclosure B. Specific policy, procedures, and responsibilities concerning implementation of, and compliance with, VDOC 99 are contained in the Appendices to this Enclosure as follows:

(1) Appendix A, "Policy, Procedures, and Responsibilities Concerning Vienna Document 1999, Chapter I, 'Annual Exchange of Military Information.' "

(2) Appendix D, "Policy, Procedures, and Responsibilities Concerning Vienna Document 1999, Chapter IV, 'Contacts.' "

(3) Appendix E, "Policy, Procedures, and Responsibilities Concerning Vienna Document 1999, Chapter V, 'Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities.' "

(4) Appendix F, “Policy, Procedures, and Responsibilities Concerning Vienna Document 1999, Chapter VI, ‘Observation of Certain Military Activities.’ ”

(5) Appendix G, “Policy, Procedures, and Responsibilities Concerning Vienna Document 1999, Chapter VII, ‘Annual Calendars,’ and Chapter VIII, ‘Constraining Provisions.’ ”

(6) Appendix H, “Policy, Procedures, and Responsibilities Concerning Vienna Document 1999, Chapter IX, ‘Compliance and Verification.’ ”

f. Coordinate with and assist OUSD(P) in implementation of, and compliance with, the provisions contained in Appendix B, “Policy, Procedures, and Responsibilities Concerning Vienna Document 1999, Chapter II, ‘Defence Planning.’ ”

g. Coordinate with and assist DOS in implementation of, and compliance with, the provisions contained in the following appendices:

(1) Appendix C, “Policy, Procedures, and Responsibilities Concerning Vienna Document 1999, Chapter III, ‘Risk Reduction.’ ”

(2) Appendix I, “Policy, Procedures, and Responsibilities Concerning Vienna Document 1999, Chapter X, ‘Regional Measures.’ ”

(3) Appendix J, “Policy, Procedures, and Responsibilities Concerning Vienna Document 1999, Chapter XI, ‘Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting.’ ”

(4) Appendix K, “Policy, Procedures, and Responsibilities Concerning Vienna Document 1999, Chapter XII, ‘Final Provisions.’ ”

h. Participate as permanent member of the DOD Compliance Review Group (CRG).

i. Raise to the CRG for resolution any US military compliance issue not covered by existing policy or any ambiguity related to the provisions of reference a or other CSBMs that may be approved and promulgated by the FSC.

j. Process CSBM notifications generated by USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, or the Services and generate notifications using the ACES.

2. USCENTCOM and USEUCOM

a. For their respective commands, coordinate and establish policy and procedures for implementation of, and compliance with, reference a and additional CSBMs that may be approved and promulgated by the FSC. Ensure implementation procedures are coordinated for consistency across the ZoA.

b. Coordinate with DTRA (lead) for the development of any memorandums of understanding (MOUs) necessary to implement the guidance in this CJCSI on the provisions of Chapter IX of reference a.

c. Monitor the ACES to access, generate, and transmit notifications, invitations, and other messages required by reference a.

d. USEUCOM compiles and verifies, with input from USCENTCOM, data and information on equipment, troops, and activities in the VDOC 99 ZoA as required by Chapters I, IV, V, VI, and VII of reference a (see Appendices A, D, E, F, and G to this Enclosure), taking into account the provisions of Chapter VIII (see Appendix G to this Enclosure).

e. Coordinate with the Joint Staff and theater Service components for all planning and other activities associated with implementation of, and compliance with, obligations of airbase visits, visit to military installations, visits to military facilities, formation, and observation of certain military activities, and demonstrations of major weapons and equipment systems of Chapter IV.

f. Provide advisors to support the Joint Staff and OUSD(P) as requested or required in CRG, FSC, and NATO Verification Coordination Committee (VCC) meetings, sessions, or conferences.

3. DIA. Provide support to the Joint Staff, OUSD(P), and OUSD(AT&L) as required on all matters related to reference a and additional CSBMs that may be approved and promulgated by the FSC.

4. USDELMC NATO

a. Facilitate coordination of all reference a information and additional CSBMs that may be approved and promulgated by the FSC between the USG and its allies as directed.

b. Ensure all information provided by other NATO participating states to the International Military Staff regarding reference a, and additional CSBMs that may be approved and promulgated by the FSC, is distributed to the Joint Staff, USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, the JCS Representative to the OSCE in Vienna, Austria, and DTRA, as appropriate.

5. JCS Representative to the OSCE in Vienna, Austria

a. Facilitate coordination of all reference a information and additional CSBMs that may be negotiated, approved, and promulgated by the FSC between the USG and its allies, as directed.

b. Represent the Joint Staff on the US OSCE Mission Staff and attend all meetings and sessions of the FSC and its related working groups regarding reference a and additional CSBMs that may be negotiated, approved, and promulgated by the FSC.

c. Maintain formal coordination with the Joint Staff, and routinely coordinate with USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, USDELMT NATO, DTRA, and other DOD OSCE mission representatives, to ensure currency in all matters relating to reference a and additional CSBMs that may be negotiated, approved, and promulgated by the FSC.

d. Ensure all information provided by other participating states to the US OSCE delegation regarding reference a and additional CSBMs that may be negotiated, approved, and promulgated by the FSC is distributed to the Joint Staff, USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, USDELMT NATO, and DTRA, as appropriate.

6. DTRA

a. Conduct active inspections, active evaluations, escort and liaison provisions, and functions contained in or derived from Chapter IX of reference a (see Appendix H).

b. Develop and maintain the ACIN program directed by OUSD (AT&L), to include development, integration, and operation of the web-based ACES.

c. Coordinate with the Joint Staff, USCENTCOM, and USEUCOM for all planning and other activities associated with implementation of, and compliance with, the passive obligations of Chapter IX of reference a.

d. Coordinate with USCENTCOM and USEUCOM for the development of any MOUs necessary to implement the guidance in this CJCSI or the provisions of Chapter IX of reference a.

e. In coordination with USCENTCOM and USEUCOM, develop and maintain current an operations plan for implementation of the passive obligations of Chapter IX of reference a, applying the guidance contained in this instruction.

f. Provide advisors to support the Joint Staff, OUSD(P), and OUSD(AT&L) as requested or required in interagency, CRG, FSC, and VCC meetings, sessions, or conferences. These advisors should possess expertise in the areas of inspections, evaluations, escorting, and liaison functions or other matters regarding reference a and any additional CSBMs that may be promulgated by the FSC.

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APPENDIX A TO ENCLOSURE C

POLICY, PROCEDURES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING VIENNA
DOCUMENT 1999, CHAPTER I, "ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF MILITARY
INFORMATION"

1. Policy

a. Annual Exchange of Military Information (AEMI). The annual exchange of information on military forces must be provided to all other participating states NLT 15 December of each year, valid as of 1 January of the following year. The DOD-validated AEMI must be presented to DOS for interagency review NLT 5 working days prior to 15 December of each year.

b. Data and Information on Major Weapon or Equipment Systems. VDOC 99 permits the exchange of data on new types or versions of major weapon or equipment systems coincident with the first deployment of such systems in the ZoA or coincident with the AEMI.

2. Procedures

a. Providing Information on Military Forces. The US AEMI is distributed by the USG in paperback book form in mid-December to all participating states at an OSCE FSC plenary session held for that purpose in Vienna. USEUCOM, with input from USCENTCOM, prepares and transmits the required data IAW the requirements of Chapter 1 of VDOC 99 to the Joint Staff electronically via ACES. The Joint Staff, in coordination with the Services, OUSD(P), and OUSD(AT&L), validates the accuracy and completeness of the data and presents it to the Interagency. The data is then finalized and sent to Vienna for distribution to OSCE participating states.

b. Providing Data on Major Weapon and Equipment Systems and Information on Plans for the Deployment of Such Systems. US data on existing major weapon and equipment systems deployed in the ZoA that was provided prior to the adoption of VDOC 99 remain valid. Information on the plans for deployment of a major weapon and equipment system not previously deployed in the ZoA should be provided to all participating states coincident with the AEMI for the forthcoming year but NLT coincident with deployment. The responsible Service, in coordination with USEUCOM, provides the data and information to the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff, in coordination with the Services and OSD, validates and approves the data and information package and forwards it to DOS for presentation to all OSCE participating states.

3. Responsibilities

a. Joint Staff

(1) Notify USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, the Services, OUSD(P), and OUSD(AT&L) on or about 15 September (90 days prior to 15 December) of the specific timelines for the collection and coordination of the data required for submitting the AEMI.

(2) Ensure that the US VDOC 99 AEMI uses the same database and correlates with CFE Treaty data.

(3) Ensure that the definitions contained in the CFE Treaty and the equipment listed in the POET of Conventional Armaments and Equipment of the CFE Treaty are used in the AEMI.

(4) Coordinate and schedule in the first week of December a DOD Data Validation Conference to review the AEMI.

(5) Circulate a Joint Staff action package for formal coordination and approval of the validated data to other elements of the Joint Staff, USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, the Services, OUSD(P), DTRA, and OUSD(AT&L).

(6) Present the DOD-approved AEMI NLT 5 working days prior to 15 December for interagency review. DOS provides the US AEMI to all OSCE participating states NLT 15 December or on the agreed exchange date.

(7) Ensure distribution of official copies of the US AEMI and data and information packages for deployment of major weapon and equipment systems to USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, the Services, OUSD(P), OUSD(AT&L), DTRA, DIA, USDELMC NATO, and the JCS OSCE representative.

(8) Validate plans for deployment with USEUCOM, the Services, OUSD(P), and OUSD (AT&L) of a major weapon and equipment system submitted by the responsible Service and forward the appropriate data package to DOS for presentation to OSCE participating states. When possible, this should occur NLT 15 December for planned deployments during the next calendar year.

b. USEUCOM

(1) Initiate annual coordination with USCENTCOM as required by the timelines contained in the Joint Staff notification issued IAW paragraph 3.a (1) of this appendix.

(2) Use general CFE Treaty equipment definitions and the equipment listed and specified in the POET of Conventional Armaments and Equipment in order to compile the AEMI.

(3) Collect and validate the AEMI and submit to the Joint Staff via the ACES NLT 2 working days before the start of the DOD Data Validation Conference, the date of which will be announced in the Joint Staff notification (see paragraph 3.a (1) of this Appendix). The cut-off date for data collection will be no earlier than 15 November to ensure appropriate confidence in the actual and projected data in the AEMI. Any changes to projections will be notified in an F-41 format at the beginning of the calendar year.

(4) Provide representation at the DOD Data Validation Conference. Review and approve the Joint Staff action package for final DOD coordination of the AEMI.

c. USCENTCOM

(1) Provide USEUCOM the required data for the AEMI.

(2) Provide representative, if requested by USEUCOM, to attend the annual DOD Data Validation Conference.

(3) Coordinate with and assist USEUCOM in meeting the Joint Staff timeline requirements for compiling and submitting the AEMI required by VDOC 99, Chapter I.

d. Services

(1) Provide a representative to participate in the annual DOD Data Validation Conference and provide formal clearance to the Joint Staff action package for final coordination and approval of the AEMI.

(2) Compile data and information pertaining to the planned deployment of a major weapon and equipment system not previously deployed in the ZoA and provide to the Joint Staff NLT the annual DOD Data Validation Conference. If such data is not available for inclusion in the AEMI as Chart 4, it must be compiled and submitted coincident with deployment of the major weapon or equipment system into the ZoA via the CSBM F41. Such packets should contain the information required by VDOC 99 Chapter I, paragraph 14, and technical data, information, and photographs as defined in Annex III and similar to those required by the POET of Conventional Armaments and Equipment of the CFE Treaty.

(3) Maintain resources for tracking force and equipment deployments into and out of the ZoA as necessary to provide requisite data and information to the Joint Staff, facilitate the AEMI, and provide information necessary to develop a data package as set forth in paragraph 3.a.(8) of this appendix.

e. USDELMC NATO

(1) Represent the Joint Staff at NATO Military Committee meetings concerning the AEMI.

(2) Facilitate the flow of information between the Joint Staff and the NATO International Military Staff on matters concerning the deployment of a major organic weapon and equipment system not previously deployed in the ZoA and other matters pertaining to VDOC 99 or other CSBM.

APPENDIX B TO ENCLOSURE C

POLICY, PROCEDURES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING VIENNA
DOCUMENT 1999, CHAPTER II, "DEFENCE PLANNING"

1. Policy

a. Exchange of Information. Participating states annually exchange defense planning information on defense policy and doctrine, force planning, previous-year military expenditures, and the military budget for the year being considered. Defense planning information is exchanged annually NLT 3 months after the competent national authority approves the military budget for the forthcoming fiscal year.

b. Clarification, Review and Dialogue, and Possible Additional Information. The United States will respond to requests for clarification of defense planning information, participate in annual discussions on information and clarification provided under this provision, participate in OSCE military doctrine seminars and study visits, and provide additional information as deemed appropriate.

2. Procedures

a. Exchange of Information. The DOD budget approval cycle usually occurs in February or March, and the requisite defense planning information is exchanged on or about 1 June. The Department of Defense uses the SecDef Annual Report, with military budget information appended thereto, to satisfy Chapter II, reference a policy, doctrine, force planning, and military budget information. The Department provides annual defense planning information to DOS for distribution to all participating states.

b. Clarification, Review and Dialogue, and Possible Additional Information. The Department of Defense provides information to DOS (interagency) to support requests for clarification; participates as appropriate in annual discussions, seminars, and study visits; and provides additional documentary information as deemed appropriate, taking cognizance of the respective US GCC operational security and force protection requirements.

c. Possible Additional Information. The Department of Defense routinely provides to DOS (interagency) other factual and documentary information pertaining to US defense planning.

3. Responsibilities

a. Exchange of Information

(1) In accordance with reference e, OUSD(AT&L) -- in coordination with OUSD(P), OUSD(Comptroller), and the Joint Staff -- prepares and coordinates the defense planning information required by paragraphs 15-15.4, Chapter II, of reference a. OUSD(P) provides the information to DOS (interagency) for distribution to all participating states.

(2) Mandatory defense planning information includes defense policy and doctrine, force planning, and budget projections.

(a) OUSD(P) will annually prepare a written statement that addresses US defense policy, including national military strategy and doctrine, national procedures for defense planning, and current personnel policy. OUSD(P) additionally provides information on the planned procurement of major equipment and major military construction programs based on the categories used in the United Nations' "Instrument for Standardized International Reporting of Military Expenditures." The previous fiscal year's defense expenditures will also be provided IAW the UN Instrument.

(b) OUSD(AT&L), in coordination with OUSD(Comptroller), plans and prepares information and data for the annual exchange of military budgets for the forthcoming fiscal year; where possible, on the two fiscal years following the forthcoming fiscal year; and on previous expenditures.

(c) The Joint Staff provides an annual statement on behalf of the Chairman regarding force planning that includes size, structure, deployment of major weapon and equipment systems, force deployment, training, and future changes and/or trends.

b. Clarification, Review and Dialogue, and Possible Additional Information

(1) The Joint Staff, the responsible US GCC, and the Services -- in coordination with OUSD(P), OUSD(AT&L), and OUSD (Comptroller) -- provide information to DOS (interagency) to support requests for clarification to increase transparency of activities that cause a participating state to request clarification, taking cognizance of US GCC operational security and force protection requirements.

(2) The Joint Staff, the respective US GCC, and the Services -- in coordination with OUSD(P), OUSD(AT&L), and OUSD (Comptroller) -- participate in annual discussions, seminars, and study visits resulting from

requests for additional review and dialogue of activities, taking cognizance of US GCC operational security and force protection requirements.

(3) The Joint Staff, the responsible US GCC, and the Services -- in coordination with OUSD(P), OUSD(AT&L), and OUSD (Comptroller) -- provide additional documentary information to DOS to satisfy requests for increased transparency of activities that cause a participating state to request clarification, taking cognizance of the US GCC operational security and force protection requirements.

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APPENDIX C TO ENCLOSURE C

POLICY, PROCEDURES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING VIENNA
DOCUMENT 1999, CHAPTER III, "RISK REDUCTION"

1. Policy

a. Mechanism for Consultation and Cooperation as Regards Military Activities. DOS implements and complies with the mechanism for consultation and cooperation with regard to unusual military activities. The Joint Staff, respective US GCC, and Services, in coordination with OSD, provide information and support to DOS regarding these activities.

b. Cooperation as Regards Hazardous Incidents of a Military Nature. The DOS notifies participating states of hazardous incidents involving US forces in the ZoA. The Joint Staff, respective US GCC, and Services, in coordination with OSD, provide information and support to DOS regarding these activities.

c. Voluntary Hosting of Visits to Dispel Concerns About Military Activities. DOS coordinates the USG decision on whether to host voluntary visits to dispel concerns about unusual military activities. The Joint Staff, OSD, and DOS participate in the decision on hosting voluntary visits and, if approved, the Joint Staff, respective US GCC, and Services will provide the necessary support to host these visits. The United States only executes visits that involve the area of its military installations and training areas within the ZoA. Host states for US forces stationed in the ZoA have responsibility for all other host state territory.

2. Procedures

a. Mechanism for Consultation and Cooperation as Regards Unusual Military Activities

(1) The Interagency considers all requests from a participating state for an explanation regarding unusual military activities that US forces are conducting or participating in and prepares and coordinates the US response. The Joint Staff, respective US GCC, and Services, in coordination with OSD, provide support to DOS for interagency consideration regarding these activities. This support is expected to be in the form of information and data concerning the military activity.

(2) If the participating state, after considering the explanation, requests a meeting, the DOS (interagency) considers the request and subsequent invitation to the participating state and others. The Joint Staff, in coordination

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with the respective US GCC, Services, and OSD, provides military advice to DOS. The Joint Staff provides a representative on the US delegation for all such meetings.

(3) DOS represents the USG at meetings held under the auspices of OSCE to address unusual military activities. The Joint Staff provides a representative on the US delegation for all such meetings.

b. Cooperation Regarding Hazardous Incidents of a Military Nature. The US force causing or involved in hazardous incidents of a military nature notifies, through channels and systems specified in its standard operating procedures, the US NMCC and the US Embassy located in the host country. The US Embassy and the NMCC, in turn, notify DOS. The final decision as to what constitutes a hazardous incident of a military nature will be made by the Interagency. DOS consults with the host government as required. The Joint Staff, respective US GCC, and Services, in coordination with OSD, provide clarifying information and military advice as required.

c. Voluntary Hosting of Visits to Dispel Concerns About Military Activities

(1) To help alleviate possible concerns about a US military activity in the ZoA, the United States, in coordination with the host state, may invite other participating states to visit the area or activity in which the concern may exist. States hosting such a visit will decide which participating states to invite, but it is understood that any participating state that has a concern will receive an invitation. While the arrangements and conduct of such visits are at the discretion of DOS, it was envisaged by the participating states that the Defense Attaché or a similar accredited military person would be invited to participate in such visits. If the Defense Attaché is not available, the Joint Staff, in coordination with the respective US GCC and OSD, will recommend an alternate military representative.

(2) The Joint Staff, in coordination with the respective US GCC, the Services, and OSD, will provide information and advice to DOS and the Interagency to dispel concerns about a military activity being conducted by or involving US forces. DOS will transmit US information through diplomatic channels or the OSCE communications net as appropriate.

3. Responsibilities

a. Joint Staff

- (1) Coordinate the collection of information and data concerning unusual military activities for which a participating state has requested an explanation.
- (2) Prepare and validate the information and data package to explain the unusual military activity; circulate it as a Joint Staff action package; coordinate it with the respective US GCC, the Services, and OUSD(P); and provide the approved information and data package to DOS for interagency consideration.
- (3) Take cognizance of the operational security and force protection requirements of the GCC responsible for the unusual military activity and ensure such requirements are vetted in interagency deliberations.
- (4) Represent the US military in the interagency deliberation process when evaluating and formulating a US report on a hazardous incident involving US forces in the ZoA.
- (5) Assist the Interagency in determining whether the United States will execute a visit to dispel concerns about a US military activity and, if so, determine the modalities for such a visit. Coordinate with the respective US GCC, the Services, and OUSD(P) on all aspects of such visits.

b. USCENTCOM and USEUCOM

- (1) Provide information and data to the Joint Staff on which to base a response to a participating state's request for an explanation of an unusual military activity occurring in the respective area of responsibility. Ensure operational security and force protection requirements are clearly articulated.
- (2) Promptly report hazardous military incidents involving US forces that occur in the respective areas of responsibility, provide in-theater points of contact, and provide clarification of incidents to the Joint Staff as required.
- (3) During the conduct of visits to dispel concerns about military activities, the responsible US GCC serves as the official US representative for interpretation of the VDOC 99 IAW this instruction and other guidance from the Joint Staff; plans and executes the visit; coordinates with the country on whose territory the visit will take place (host state); and ensures the safety and security of the visitors. These visits should explain the nature and purpose of the military activity and alleviate concerns or unresolved issues surrounding the activity, being cognizant of operational security and force protection requirements.

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APPENDIX D TO ENCLOSURE C

POLICY, PROCEDURES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING VIENNA
DOCUMENT 1999, CHAPTER IV, "CONTACTS"

1. Policy

a. Visits to Airbases. Participating states with air combat units reported in their annual exchange of information are obligated to arrange at least one visit in each 5-year period to an airbase located in the ZoA. The United States will never be the host state for an airbase visit in Europe. The host state, in coordination with the United States, is responsible for extending airbase visit invitations to the other participating states. The United States, in coordination with the participating state on whose territory the US airbase is located (host state), will arrange a visit at least once each 5-year period. For visits to airbases of other participating states, the United States will always attempt to send two visitors, the maximum allowable number, to each notified airbase visit.

b. Program of Military Contacts and Cooperation. The Secretary of Defense and Chairman encourage military contacts and cooperation to enhance confidence and security building as well as security cooperation. Among these should be exchange visits of naval vessels and air combat units; joint exercises of land forces; and a full spectrum of military schooling, training, seminar, symposia, and expert visits and exchanges. The Joint Staff, in coordination with respective GCCs, the Services, and OUSD(P), plan for and conduct a full and versatile worldwide program. This program supports OSCE and VDOC 99 goals and objectives, but is a distinct entity based on separate bilateral agreements or understandings between the United States and individual nations and, in some cases, with groups of allies. As a matter of policy, the United States will not sponsor any OSCE-wide military contact or cooperation activity on its territory.

c. Demonstration of New Types of Major Weapon and Equipment Systems. New types of major weapon and equipment systems are required to be the subject of a demonstration by the first participating state to deploy such systems. The first US GCC or Service to deploy a new type of major weapon or equipment system in the ZoA will conduct such demonstrations as soon as practical but NLT 1 year after deployment.

d. Provision of Information on Contacts. Information on plans for US military-to-military contacts for which all participating states will be invited will be provided to all other participating states annually, NLT 15 November. In this regard, the United States does not conduct additional visits to which

observers from other participating states are invited, except for the once-every-5-years requirement for a visit to a US airbase, military facility, formation or activity, or a demonstration of a new type of major weapon or equipment system.

2. Procedures

a. Visits to Airbases

(1) The Joint Staff will task a GCC to arrange for a visit to a US airbase (passive visit) in the ZoA at least once every 5 years. DOS, based on information provided by the Joint Staff and originated by the appropriate GCC, transmits information pertaining to a visit to a US airbase to other participating states via the OSCE communications network and conducts detailed planning.

(2) For a visit to an airbase of another participating state (active visit), the appropriate GCC will identify two US observers and provide the required information to the Joint Staff via ACES. If practicable, the US Defense Attaché Office (USDAO) in the host state should provide one observer, and the other observer should be a representative of the responsible GCC. Observers should have the requisite expertise associated with the type of equipment to be observed.

b. Program of Military Contacts and Cooperation. The Joint Staff, in coordination with the respective GCC, the Services, and OUSD(P), plans for a full range of military contacts and cooperation to strengthen the process of confidence and security building among military forces worldwide. This comprehensive US military contacts program includes all the types of contacts and cooperative measures set forth in paragraph 30, Chapter IV, of VDOC 99. While it is not conducted under the auspices of the OSCE, it more than fulfills the spirit and intent of this CSBM.

c. Demonstration of New Types of Major Weapon and Equipment Systems

(1) The Joint Staff, in coordination with the respective GCC, the Services, OUSD(P), and OUSD(AT&L), determine the date, location, program content, and modalities of a US demonstration of a new type of major weapon or equipment system that will be deployed in the ZoA (passive demonstration).

(2) Because the demonstration will be held on the territory of another participating state, the host state will send the invitation to the event to all other participating states. USEUCOM will provide all requisite information for the invitation to the host state.

(3) In this regard, only new types of major weapon and equipment systems required to be included in the AEMI (see Annex III to reference a) will be considered as requiring a demonstration. Any plans for development and deployment of a new type of weapon or equipment system based on new technology that may replace or be employed to achieve the same results as any of the types of weapon or equipment systems listed in Annex III to reference a should be reported to the Joint Staff by the responsible Service for consideration by the DOD CRG.

d. Provision of Information on Contacts. The Joint Staff -- in coordination with the GCCs, the Services, and OUSD(P) -- annually provides to DOS via the ACES 3 working days prior to 15 November information on plans for visits to airbases, military facilities, formations, or activities; observation visits; or demonstrations of new types of major weapon or equipment systems. The Joint Staff will use the F45 notification format. USEUCOM in coordination with USCENTCOM, will provide this information via the ACES to the Joint Staff NLT 10 working days prior to 15 November. The United States does not conduct additional visits to which observers from other participating states are invited, except for the once-every-5-years requirement for a visit to a US airbase and a military facility, formation, or activity, or a demonstration of a new type of major weapon or equipment system. Negative (nil) reports are required.

3. Responsibilities

a. Visits to Airbases

(1) Joint Staff

(a) Annually, on or about 15 October, receive recommendations from the appropriate GCCs on the timeframe and airbase to be visited when the United States fulfills its obligation to arrange a VDOC 99 visit within each 5-year period.

(b) Ensure that the appropriate GCC coordinates with the participating state on whose territory the US airbase is located to reach agreement on delegation of responsibilities for hosting modalities.

(c) Ensure that the appropriate GCC, in coordination with the participating state on whose territory the US airbase is located, generates the invitation to the visit. The host state transmits the invitation to all participating states NLT 42 days prior to the date of the visit.

(d) For all visits to other participating states' airbases (active visits), coordinate with the appropriate GCC to provide notification, via the ACES, on the names of the US observers who will participate in the visit and other required information NLT 23 days prior to the start date of the activity. DOS must respond NLT 21 days before the date of the visit via the OSCE communications network.

(2) Responsible GCC

(a) Visit to participating states' airbases (active visits)

1. Act on behalf of the Joint Staff in organizing, planning, and conducting visits to other participating states' airbases.

2. Designate the airbase visit team, in response to an invitation to visit an airbase of another participating state, and provides, on a workday, the required notification through ACES NLT 24 days before the event.

3. Ensure that the visit team possesses the requisite language, country skills, and military expertise to successfully carry out the airbase visit. For a visit to an airbase of another participating state (active visit), identify two US observers and provide the required information to the Joint Staff via ACES. If practicable, the USDAO in the host state should provide one observer and the other observer should be a representative of the GCC. Observers should have the requisite expertise associated with the type of equipment to be observed.

4. Coordinate the link up of visiting team members before arrival at the program rendezvous point and provide instructions and briefings as appropriate.

5. Obtain, as required, clearance for use of US military aircraft for transporting the US airbase visit team to the host state. Use of commercial air transportation is preferred.

6. Coordinate the preparation of a written airbase visit report and transmit via DMS message to the Joint Staff, DOS(EUR), DOS(AC), OUSD(P), OUSD (AT&L), the Services, DTRA(OS), USDELNC NATO, US Mission Vienna, and DIA NLT 10 working days after completing the airbase visit.

(b) Visit to US airbases (passive visits)

1. Serve as the official US representative for interpretation of VDOC 99, IAW this instruction and other guidance from the Joint Staff, during visits to US airbases.
 2. Act on behalf of the Joint Staff in coordinating with the host state for receiving observers.
 3. Coordinate with the host state on host responsibilities delegated to the United States and ensure the responsibilities are specified in the invitation and met.
 4. Coordinate the program for the visit and visitor access with the host state.
 5. Coordinate with the host state on issuance of required notifications.
 6. Ensure the visiting observers are provided the opportunity to meet at the close of the visit with state officials and senior airbase personnel to discuss the course of the visit.
 7. Ensure the program includes a briefing on the purpose and functions of the airbase and on current activity at the airbase.
 8. As needed, ensure liaison officers are provided to host state escort teams.
 9. Ensure that visitors will have the opportunity to communicate with commanders and troops, including support and logistics personnel, and that visitors will be able to view all types of aircraft located at the base. Ensure visitors are given the opportunity to view airbase activities, including preparations to carry out base functions, to gain an impression of the approximate number of sorties and types of missions flown.
- (3) DTRA. Provide assistance and augmentation to GCCs concerning escort activities for visits to US airbases (passive visits) and provide expert advice on interpretation of VDOC 99 measures.
- (4) USDELMC NATO. Facilitate the sharing of reports on visits to other participating states airbases (active visits).
- (5) JCS Representative to the OSCE in Vienna, Austria. Facilitate the sharing of information pertaining to visits to US airbases (passive visits) with the military representatives of other OSCE participating states, as required.

b. Program of Military Contacts and Cooperation (MCC). On a voluntary basis and in coordination with a territorial host state, GCCs may arrange one visit to a military facility, military formation, or observation of certain military activities in any 5-year period. Modalities will be as described for airbase visits. Other voluntary military contact and cooperation activities are at the discretion of the GCC as deemed appropriate.

(1) Joint Staff

(a) Coordinate with USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, the Services, and DOD agencies to initiate the collection of data required for the timely submission of information regarding new agreements on MCC established in the past calendar year. Data will be provided to Joint Staff/J-5 IND NLT 15 October each year. Since the US military-to-military contact program is not conducted under the auspices of the OSCE or VDOC 99, nil reports are the norm but nonetheless are required.

(b) Coordinate with USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, and DOS on the timely response to invitations to participate in visits to military formations and facilities or observations.

(2) USCENTCOM and USEUCOM

(a) Execute the US military-to-military contact program within respective areas of responsibility as a separate entity from VDOC 99 but with cognizance of the MCC measure.

(b) Provide Joint Staff/J-5 IND with necessary data or nil reports NLT 15 October annually to comply with the provisions of the MCC measure.

c. Demonstration of New Types of Major Weapon and Equipment Systems

(1) Joint Staff

(a) Coordinate with DOS, the respective US GCC, the respective Service, and the participating state on whose territory the demonstration will be conducted (host state) in determining the date, location, program content, and modalities when the United States conducts a demonstration of a new type of major weapon or equipment system.

(b) Coordinate, through USDELMC NATO, with the International Military Staff and US representative to OSCE to verify that no other state has already demonstrated the major weapon or equipment system.

(c) Ensure a valid requirement exists for conducting a demonstration.

(d) Coordinate with combatant command to determine if the demonstration will be executed as a separate event or conducted in conjunction with another activity or CSBM event.

(e) Provide information to DOS for use in preparing invitations to US-hosted demonstrations.

(f) Coordinate with the respective US GCC and the Services on all matters pertaining to demonstrations.

(g) Coordinate and direct, through the respective US GCC, the military effort in planning, organizing, and executing the demonstration of new types of major weapon or equipment systems.

(h) Assist the respective US GCC as required in coordinating US participation in a multi-state demonstration (air show or trade show).

(2) USCENTCOM and USEUCOM

(a) Demonstrations by Other Participating States. GCCs are responsible for:

1. Organizing and executing US attendance at demonstrations by other participating states.

2. Providing the demonstration visit team as directed by the Joint Staff in response to an invitation to attend a demonstration. The combatant commands will identify two US observers and provide the required information to the Joint Staff via ACES. If practicable, the USDAO in the host state should provide one observer, and the other observer should be a representative of the GCC. Observers should have the requisite expertise associated with the type of equipment being demonstrated. On an exceptional basis, the Joint Staff may elect to fill one of the two observer positions.

3. Submitting the names via ACES of the visiting team members to the Joint Staff NLT 14 days after issue of the invitation to the demonstration. For protocol reasons, one individual should be an O-5 or above if possible. In providing the team members' names, include their rank, date of birth, place of birth, passport number, place of issue, and expiration date.

4. Ensuring that the visiting team possesses the requisite language, country skills, and military expertise to successfully observe the demonstration.

5. Coordinating with USDAO and the Joint Staff to ensure link-up of visiting team members before arrival at the demonstration place of assembly.

6. Obtaining, as required, clearance for use of US military aircraft in transporting the US demonstration visiting team to the host state.

7. Assisting the team in preparing its written after-action report on the demonstration. Transmit, via DMS message, the report to the Joint Staff, DOS(EUR), DOS(VI/AC), OUSD(P), OUSD(AT&L), the Services, DTRA(OS), USDELMC NATO, US Mission Vienna, and DIA NLT 10 working days after returning from the demonstration.

(b) Demonstrations by the United States. The responsible GCC will:

1. Serve as the official USG representative for interpretation of VDOC 99, IAW this instruction and other guidance from the Joint Staff, during demonstrations by the United States.

2. Plan, organize, and execute demonstrations.

3. Coordinate with the country on whose territory the US demonstration will take place:

a. To ensure that there are no conflicts or restrictions on conducting the demonstration.

b. To receive and host representatives of other participating states.

c. To develop a demonstration program consistent with the laws and regulations of the country on whose territory the demonstration will take place.

4. Arrange for appropriate transportation of observers during the conduct of the demonstration. Transportation support should begin and conclude at a place of assembly specified in the invitation to the demonstration. The United States is responsible for travel expenses to and from the place of assembly for the demonstration and costs for accommodations during the visit.

5. Ensure observers have the opportunity to meet at the close of the demonstration and discuss the event with the senior officials responsible for the demonstration. It may also be appropriate to have selected technical experts on the system available to talk with observers.

6. Provide a briefing on the purpose and agenda of the demonstration.

7. Provide qualified escorts to facilitate the conduct of the demonstration and to serve as moderators during the demonstration. There may be a requirement to include a liaison officer from the country on whose territory the demonstration is taking place.

8. Ensure escorts and liaison officers are familiar with sensitive points and restricted locations not accessible to observers.

9. Establish a demonstration program that includes the following:

a. A demonstration of the new weapon or equipment system. An operational demonstration is permissible, but is not required for a demonstration.

b. An opportunity for observers to physically view the weapon or equipment system. An unclassified viewing of its internal configuration is acceptable.

c. An opportunity to meet and speak with qualified equipment crewmembers.

d. Appropriate safety briefing and gear for observers.

e. Transportation to and from demonstration sites and appropriate viewing facilities and devices (i.e., binoculars).

10. In the event of a multi-state demonstration, air show, or trade show event, coordinate and delineate responsibilities among the participants for the conduct of the equipment demonstrations. This coordination may include:

a. An agreed order or agenda for the demonstration.

b. Transportation requirements (if applicable).

- c. Briefing and host responsibilities.
- d. Timing and location.
- e. Invitations.

(3) DTRA. Provide assistance, expertise, and augmentation to the appropriate GCC concerning escort and liaison activities for demonstrations by the United States.

(4) USDELMC NATO. Facilitate the sharing of demonstration information and reports between the United States and its allies.

(5) JCS Representative to OSCE in Vienna, Austria. Coordinate and share information with allied OSCE military representatives of participating states as required. Interface and share information with the OSCE military representatives of all participating states as directed.

APPENDIX E TO ENCLOSURE C

POLICY, PROCEDURES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING VIENNA
DOCUMENT 1999, CHAPTER V, "PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN
MILITARY ACTIVITIES"

1. Policy

a. Prior notification of certain military activities (see Chapter V of reference a and Enclosure B to this instruction) is required 42 days in advance of the start of the notifiable military activity. Notification is given by the participating state on whose territory the activity is planned to take place (host state). The United States also must notify all activities that meet the requirements of a notifiable military activity, whether participating in an activity with other participating states or acting alone. This requirement is in addition to the notification requirements of the host state.

b. NATO members are required to coordinate draft notifications 60 days in advance of the start of the notifiable military activity with other NATO members.

c. Alerts are exceptions to the requirement for notification of certain military activities 42 days in advance. Notification of an alert that will exceed a notifiable threshold is coincident with the start of the alert activity.

2. Procedures. All inputs required for prior notification of certain military activities and alerts are transmitted by DOS via the OSCE communications network based on information provided by the Joint Staff. GCCs, coordinating as appropriate, provide the Joint Staff the required information and data for individual activity notifications via the ACES. The Joint Staff validates the accuracy and completeness of the input by coordinating with the NATO International Military Staff, the Services, OUSD(P), OUSD(AT&L), and DTRA.

3. Responsibilities

a. Individual Activity Notifications

(1) Joint Staff

(a) Conduct preliminary coordination with USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, and the Joint Staff/J-7 90 days before the start of a notifiable

activity to facilitate accurate and complete input to DOS on individual activity notifications.

(b) For multinational activities, coordinate with the appropriate allies as necessary to facilitate accurate and complete information.

(c) Obtain USEUCOM or USCENTCOM input to the draft activity notification NLT 70 days before the start of the activity.

(d) Coordinate the US draft activity notification with USDELMC NATO approximately 60 days in advance of the start of the activity.

(e) Obtain USDELMC NATO comments or concurrence approximately 50 days in advance of the activity's commencement and incorporate it in the notification as appropriate.

(f) Generate and provide DOS the activity notification via ACES approximately 49 days in advance of the start of the notifiable activity. DOS (interagency) reviews and approves the notification before transmitting the official notification to all participating states via the OSCE communications network approximately 45 days before the start of the activity.

(g) Ensure that USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, USDELMC NATO, DTRA, and the Joint Staff receive the official notification.

(2) USCENTCOM and USEUCOM

(a) Collect and validate data concerning individual activity notifications.

(b) Provide the Joint Staff with individual activity notifications NLT 70 days before the start of the activity.

(c) Provide the Joint Staff comprehensive notification information regarding exercise-related activities 80 days in advance of the start date. Include air and sea arrival and/or redeployment points and, if applicable, military storage sites to be used.

(d) Provide the Joint Staff a draft copy of the host state notification of exercise-related activities in advance of the start date.

(e) Coordinate with the host state Ministry of Defense as required on notifiable activities. Coordination will not involve policy matters.

(3) USDELMC NATO

(a) Obtain US draft activity notifications NLT 60 days before the start of the notifiable activity and coordinate the US draft notification within NATO for concurrence or comment.

(b) Provide comments and/or concurrence on activity notifications to the Joint Staff NLT 50 days before the start of the activity.

(c) Provide the Joint Staff with draft allied activity notifications NLT 55 days before the start of the activity.

(d) Obtain Joint Staff comments and/or concurrence on allied draft activity notifications NLT 50 days before the start of the activity.

b. Activities With No Prior Notification (Alerts). Activities conducted without prior notification to the troops involved (i.e., alerts) are exempt from the 42-day prior notification provision of reference a. Notification will be given at the time the troops involved commence such activities. USEUCOM or USCENTCOM, as appropriate, will be required to coordinate with the host state, draft the notification, and provide it to the Joint Staff via ACES. Upon approval, the Joint Staff will forward the notification via ACES to DOS for transmission via the OSCE communication network to all other participating states.

(1) USEUCOM or USCENTCOM, as appropriate, will notify the Joint Staff/J-5 IND as soon as a notifiable alert activity is planned (a minimum of 7 days before the start of the activity).

(2) All coordination required for individual activity notifications will apply to alerts, but the timeline will be accelerated to “as soon as possible” so that the activity can be notified simultaneously with the start of the alert.

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APPENDIX F TO ENCLOSURE C

POLICY, PROCEDURES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING VIENNA
DOCUMENT 1999, CHAPTER VI, "OBSERVATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY
ACTIVITIES"

1. Policy. Participating states are required to invite observers from all other participating states to observe certain military activities of their land forces above established thresholds (see Chapter VI of reference a and Enclosure B to this document). In this regard, the term "land forces" includes amphibious, airmobile, heliborne, and airborne forces.
2. Procedures. Invitations to observe US military activities in the ZoA are transmitted by DOS via the OSCE communications network based on information provided by the Joint Staff. USEUCOM or USCENTCOM, as appropriate, provides the Joint Staff with the required information and data for individual observations via the ACES.
3. Responsibilities
 - a. Joint Staff
 - (1) Coordinate the military effort in planning, organizing, and executing the US observation program.
 - (2) Assess all participating states' annual calendars for potential observable exercises and provide assessments to USCENTCOM and USEUCOM.
 - (3) Coordinate with USCENTCOM or USEUCOM, as appropriate, the organization, training, and conduct of the US observation effort.
 - (4) Coordinate with USCENTCOM or USEUCOM, as appropriate, to obtain via the ACES the names of the two members of the observation team and forward this information via the ACES to DOS NLT 23 days before the activity start date specified in the invitation. DOS must respond to the host state NLT 21 days prior to the start date of the activity.
 - b. USCENTCOM and USEUCOM
 - (1) Active Observation Program
 - (a) Act on behalf of the Joint Staff in organizing, planning, and conducting the observation program.

(b) Coordinate the selection of the observation team, as directed by the Joint Staff, for observable military activities when the United States is invited by another participating state.

(c) Coordinate with the USDAO in the host state to obtain the name of its representative. If the USDAO declines to provide an observer, USCENTCOM or USEUCOM, as appropriate and in coordination with the Joint Staff, will fill the USDAO allocation with a suitable representative.

(d) Provide names of two observers via the ACES to the Joint Staff 30 days before the start date specified in the invitation or as directed by the Joint Staff.

(e) Ensure that the observation team possesses the requisite language, country skills, and military expertise to successfully carry out the observation.

(f) Ensure that potential observers remain current in their training and preparation and that each member possesses a current passport.

(g) Coordinate with USDAO to ensure link-up of observers before arrival at the observer program rendezvous point.

(h) Arrange a briefing of the observation team before its departure for observer duty, if possible.

(i) Obtain, as required, clearance for the use of US military aircraft in transporting the US observation team to the host state.

(j) Arrange a debriefing of the observation team upon completion of the observation, if possible.

(k) Assist the team in preparing a written observation report for transmission via DMS message to DOS(EUR), DOS(AC), the Joint Staff, OUSD(P), OUSD(AT&L), USCENTCOM or USEUCOM as appropriate, DTRA, USDELMEC NATO, US Mission Vienna, and DIA NLT 10 working days after completing the observation program.

(2) Passive Observation Program. The United States will never be the host state for an observable activity in Europe under VDOC 99. The host state is responsible for extending invitations for activities conducted on its territory. USCENTCOM and USEUCOM:

(a) Act on behalf of the Joint Staff in coordinating with the host state for the conduct of the observation program.

(b) Provide to the Joint Staff a draft of all observation programs 70 days in advance of each program's start date.

(c) Provide information on any observable US activity announced in the annual calendar that is to be reduced below the required threshold or canceled.

(d) Ensure that the observation program clearly establishes the nonthreatening nature of the activity and satisfies the reasonable requests of the observers.

(e) Ensure that personnel and troops taking part in the observed exercise are adequately informed as to the presence, status, and functions of the observers.

(f) Coordinate with the host state when US troops are involved to ensure that observer transportation, a commencement briefing, and observation equipment are provided.

(g) Provide qualified escorts and liaison officers to the host state's escort team when US troops are involved. Escort and liaison officers should provide the interface between the US forces and the host state's escorts.

(h) Ensure escorts and liaison officers assigned to assist the host state escorts are familiar with restricted locations, installations, and defense sites (not accessible to observers).

(i) Provide escort teams during exercises as delegated by the host state.

c. USDELMC NATO. Facilitate the sharing of observation visit reports between the United States and its allies.

d. JCS Representative for European Security Issues (OSCE in Vienna, Austria). Share information with, and facilitate response to questions from, military OSCE representatives concerning US observation reports and activities.

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APPENDIX G TO ENCLOSURE C

POLICY, PROCEDURES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING VIENNA DOCUMENT 1999, CHAPTER VII, "ANNUAL CALENDARS," AND CHAPTER VIII, "CONSTRAINING PROVISIONS"

1. Policy

a. Annual calendars of military activities subject to prior notification and to constraining provisions must be compiled and validated by the Department of Defense and submitted to DOS (interagency) to meet the VDOC 99 requirement to exchange such information and data with all other participating states annually by 15 November.

b. The FSC also decided in 2006 that participating states may, on a voluntary basis, notify their respective largest military activity below thresholds. The United States will not provide voluntary notifications under this decision for any of its exercises. The provision of information on US forces taking part in another participating state's below threshold exercise that the participating state wishes to voluntarily notify will be considered on a bilateral case-by-case basis.

2. Procedures. USCENTCOM and USEUCOM provide the Joint Staff via the ACES with the information and data required in Chapter VII of VDOC 99, subject to the constraining provisions in Chapter VIII of VDOC 99. The Joint Staff validates the accuracy and completeness of the input by coordinating with USDELMC NATO, the Services, OUSD (P), OUSD (AT&L), and appropriate DOD agencies. The Joint Staff transmits the annual calendar to DOS (interagency) via ACES for review and transmission over the OSCE Communications Network to the other OSCE participating states.

3. Responsibilities

a. Joint Staff

(1) Conduct preliminary coordination with Joint Staff/J-7 (Joint Exercise Division), USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, the Services, OUSD(P), OUSD(AT&L), and USDELMC NATO during September of each year to facilitate compilation of the required information and data for the annual calendar for the upcoming year.

(2) Coordinate with and obtain USCENTCOM and USEUCOM draft annual calendars NLT 1 October of each year.

(3) Submit NLT 15 October of each year the draft annual calendar and constraining provisions to USDELMC NATO for review by the International Military Staff.

(4) Obtain draft allied annual calendars from USDELMC NATO NLT 15 October of each year and provide comments or concurrence on these calendars NLT 31 October of each year.

(5) Identify any voluntary below threshold notification on allied calendars and ensure the appropriate combatant command has consulted regarding information on US forces participation.

(6) Obtain NATO International Military Staff comments or concurrence on the US draft annual calendar from USDELMC NATO NLT 31 October of each year.

(7) Provide DOS the annual calendar via ACES NLT 1 November of each year. DOS transmits the annual calendar via the OSCE Communications Network to other participating states on or before 15 November of each year.

(8) Ensure the following are provided to DOS for transmission to the other participating states:

(a) Information on activities forecast in the annual calendar and subsequently canceled or reduced below notifiable thresholds.

(b) Information on military activities subject to prior notification not included in the annual calendar.

(9) Ensure that DOS is informed if no military activity subject to prior notification is forecast for the calendar year and that a nil message is initiated by USEUCOM via the ACES.

(10) Ensure that USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, USDELMC NATO, the Services, DTRA, and the Joint Staff (NMCC and J-7) receive official US calendars as well as changes and/or cancellations to calendar items.

b. USCENTCOM and USEUCOM

(1) Collect, validate, and compile the information and data required for the annual calendar, subject to constraining provisions, from the appropriate sources.

(2) Provide the Joint Staff via the ACES their respective draft annual calendar NLT 1 October of each year.

(3) Ensure the following information on activities reported in the annual calendar is provided to the Joint Staff in a timely manner:

(a) Activities canceled or reduced below notifiable thresholds.

(b) Information on military activities subject to prior notification not included in the annual calendar.

(c) Information on any intent by an ally or partner to make a voluntary, below threshold notification of a military activity in which US forces will be involved and report of any consultations on the intended notification.

(4) Ensure that the Joint Staff is informed if no military activity subject to prior notification is forecasted for the calendar year.

c. USDELMC NATO

(1) Coordinate the US draft annual calendar (to be received by 15 October) with the NATO International Military Staff and provide comments or concurrence to the Joint Staff NLT 31 October of each year.

(2) Provide the Joint Staff with draft allied annual calendars NLT 15 October of each year so that the Joint Staff can provide comments or concurrence NLT 1 November of each year.

(3) Facilitate the flow of information between the Joint Staff and NATO International Military Staff.

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APPENDIX H TO ENCLOSURE C

POLICY, PROCEDURES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING VIENNA
DOCUMENT 1999, CHAPTER IX, "COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION"

1. Policy

a. Inspections. VDOC 99 inspections are designed to produce increased transparency and confidence regarding the nature and intent of military activities of participating states. VDOC 99 inspections are directed against a geographic area referred to as a "specified area" and defined as "...terrain where notifiable military activities are conducted or where another participating state believes a notifiable military activity is taking place." Within the specified area for inspection, sensitive areas or points, military installations, naval vessels, military vehicles, and aircraft located within the specified area are not subject to inspection. If requested during a specified area inspection, US units and formations that are located inside the specified area and outside of their permanent or temporary garrisons will provide a briefing and permit access to the activities of the unit or formation to the inspection team. If requested commanders or their designated representatives (to include DTRA or other non-unit representatives) of US units listed in the most recent AEMI that are located inside garrisons or other restricted locations exempt from access, will provide an unclassified "command" briefing to the inspection team at an appropriate location either on or off garrison. Such briefings are not required under paragraphs 81 or 98 of reference a, but are done to promote good will and to provide transparency. If the inspection team requests access to, or more information on, the unit or formation, US representatives should deny access and explain that US policy and practice is to only present the information just briefed.

b. Evaluations. Access will be provided to evaluated units by evaluators of other participating states in the most open, forthright, and unrestricted way possible, with due consideration given to US force protection, operations security, and safety of the evaluators. The declaration of sensitive areas and points should be kept to a minimum, subject to US force protection and operations security requirements. The US intent is to provide a positive impression of US forces and our way of life to representatives from other participating states, particularly those from Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR.

2. Procedures

a. Inspections

(1) The purpose of a VDOC 99 inspection is to determine whether a notifiable military activity is taking place in a specified area. US territory is not in the VDOC 99 ZoA. Accordingly, US territory is not subject to inspection and the United States does not act as the host state (receiving state) to inspections conducted under the provisions of Chapter IX of VDOC 99. The US role during a passive inspection of US military activities in a specified area under the provisions of Chapter IX of reference a is defined and delineated in separate bilateral agreements with respective host states on whose territory US forces are either temporarily or permanently located. In general terms, the US role is to advise US forces inside the inspection area and assist the host state.

(2) DTRA, with policy guidance from the Chairman and OUSD(P), is responsible for the conduct of active inspections of other participating states' military activities. As necessary, DTRA and the responsible GCC will develop MOUs to implement the guidance in this CJCSI (see paragraphs 2.b. and 6.d, Enclosure C to this instruction).

(3) USCENTCOM and USEUCOM, with policy guidance from the Chairman and OUSD(P), are responsible for the receipt of passive inspections of US military activity in the VDOC 99 ZoA and for balancing transparency with force protection and operations security requirements.

b. Evaluations

(1) Although generally clear in their requirements, the provisions for evaluations in Chapter IX of reference a do not articulate well the concept under which the evaluation provisions were negotiated and agreed. The concept is to give participating states an opportunity to gain an impression of the general validity of the information and data provided by other participating states.

(2) Chapter IX provisions for evaluations are intended as a vehicle for openness and transparency and not, as in the case of CFE inspections, a program of strict accounting. Evaluation visits should contribute to the process of openness and transparency while simultaneously limiting the rigor of the accounting required under CFE.

(3) Evaluation visits last up to 12 hours and are not permitted to interfere with the normal activities of the unit or formation visited. Based on current US force structure deployed in the VDOC 99 ZoA, the United States is liable to receive only one evaluation visit per year.

(4) DTRA, with policy guidance from the Chairman and OUSD(P), conducts active evaluations. As necessary, DTRA and the responsible GCC will

develop MOUs to implement the guidance in this CJCSI (see paragraphs 2.b. and 6.d, Enclosure C to this instruction) for the receipt of passive evaluations.

(5) USCENTCOM and USEUCOM, with policy guidance from the Chairman and OUSD(P), are responsible for receiving passive evaluations and balancing transparency with force protection and operations security requirements.

3. Responsibilities

a. Inspections

(1) Joint Staff

(a) Coordinate with USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, OUSD (P), the Services, and DTRA on all matters pertaining to inspections.

(b) Coordinate with USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, and DIA on the US draft plan delineating selection of other participating states for the conduct of US active inspections. Participate in all interagency activities that lead to guidance for US participation in NATO VCC activities related to inspections.

(2) USCENTCOM and USEUCOM (Passive Inspection Program)

(a) Coordinate planning with DTRA to ensure compliance with the inspection provisions of reference a.

(b) Ensure commanders of units and formations present within the specified area are kept fully advised of all information pertaining to a requested inspection and that appropriate measures are taken with respect to force protection and operations security.

(c) Inform DTRA and the Joint Staff of all military activities, operations, and exercises within the area specified in an inspection request.

(d) Provide requested data on US forces participating in activities within the specified area of the inspection to DTRA and the host state point of contact.

(e) Ensure commanders retain overall responsibility for compliance with the requirements of reference a.

(f) Provide the DTRA team chief information on areas or sensitive points to which access is normally denied or restricted during inspections and enforce all appropriate force protection and operations security measures.

(g) Provide DTRA with liaison officer(s) from the appropriate exercise-directing headquarters for any exercise occurring within the specified area to interface among the escort officers of DTRA, US forces, and the host state.

(h) Ensure US liaison officer(s) are knowledgeable of the nature and scope of the activities taking place within the specified area.

(i) For out-of-garrison US units and formations participating in a military activity in the specified area, ensure appropriate representatives, such as the commander or the deputy commander of the US contingent in the exercise and/or activity, are prepared and available to brief the inspectors on the nature and scope of US participation in the activity.

(j) Ensure appropriate representatives are prepared to provide information briefings, if requested, for units and formations listed in the most recent annual exchange of information that are located in garrison within the specified area. USG policy is that these briefings, which are not required by VDOC 99, are provided to promote good will and to provide transparency. Requests for additional information on, or access to, the in-garrison units and formations should be denied.

(k) Ensure the liaison team size is kept to the absolute minimum required. Higher headquarters should have no more than one member per agency.

(l) Ensure, in coordination with DTRA and the host state, that no actions are taken that could endanger the inspection team. Commanders must ensure their personnel are briefed on the upcoming inspection, particularly the presence, status, and functions of the inspection team.

(m) Forward inspection after-action reports and lessons learned to DTRA and the Joint Staff when appropriate.

(n) Provide, in coordination with DTRA and the host state, theater public affairs guidance concerning inspection visits.

(3) DTRA

(a) Formulate, train, and lead inspection teams for conducting active inspections on the territory of other participating states.

(b) Develop plans and, in close coordination with USCENTCOM and USEUCOM, prepare to assist the host state in the escort of inspectors from other participating states.

(c) Formulate, train, and lead the escort and liaison teams for passive inspections.

(d) Direct and supervise US escorts and perform liaison functions with host state representatives.

(e) Serve as the senior USG representative during passive inspections.

(f) Provide official US interpretation for reference a issues during the course of the inspection and resolve all document-related issues between site personnel, inspection teams, and the host-state representatives.

(g) Provide advice and assistance to US commanders as requested and ensure its presence during all contacts between US forces and inspectors.

(h) Notify inspectors of sensitive points and restricted areas as necessary.

(i) Notify the NMCC, USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, and Service Operations Centers of requested inspections. Pass host-state information to the respective GCC center at the earliest possible moment.

(j) Ensure the Joint Staff and the responsible GCC are furnished with DTRA inspection reports that mention US forces.

b. Evaluations

(1) Joint Staff

(a) Ensure requests for evaluation visits to US forces by other participating states have been received by DTRA, USEUCOM, and USCENTCOM as applicable.

(b) Coordinate with USEUCOM and USCENTCOM, the Services, OUSD(P), OUSD(AT&L), and DTRA on all matters pertaining to requests for evaluation visits, to include obtaining the responsible GCC's recommendation and coordinating a DOD position on whether to accept or refuse the request.

(c) Forward the DOD-recommended response to an evaluation request to DOS (interagency) for formulating the US response to the evaluation request (accept or refuse).

(2) USCENTCOM and USEUCOM

(a) Coordinate planning with DTRA and ensure compliance with reference a.

(b) Develop plans for implementation of the evaluation provisions of reference a.

(c) Inform DTRA of all military activities, operations, and scheduled exercises that may have an impact on the requested evaluation visit.

(d) Provide, in coordination with DTRA and the host state, public affairs guidance concerning evaluation visits.

(e) Ensure the commander (or deputy commander if the commander is not available) of the evaluated formation or unit provides a briefing on personnel and the major weapon and equipment systems of the formation or unit reported in the AEMI. The evaluation begins with a briefing that includes:

1. Information provided in the last AEMI and the current status of that information, with an explanation of differences, if any.

2. Information on the schedule for the evaluation.

3. Information on the location of unit facilities, including flight lines and vehicle parks.

4. Information on the units missions, location, activities, and training.

(f) Ensure outside participants of the briefing, especially individuals from higher headquarters, refrain from providing information during the briefing. This does not preclude questions being answered by members of the formation or unit.

(g) Ensure commanders of evaluated formations or units:

1. Recommend to the evaluation team a route that provides the best opportunity to see formation or unit personnel and equipment. The evaluation team is not obligated to accept the recommendation and may dictate its own route.

2. Retain overall responsibility for compliance by the formation or unit with the requirements of reference a.

3. Provide information on sensitive points, facilities, and equipment to the DTRA escort team chief.

4. Provide ready access for the duration of the evaluation to facilities, buildings, and areas where personnel or major weapon and equipment systems of the evaluated formation or unit are located.

5. For unit evaluations, provide the evaluators the possibility to observe and talk with unit personnel and observe equipment reported in the AEMI (a visit to the unit's areas, barracks, mess halls, a drive-through of the on-base housing areas, and the motor pool area or flight line is appropriate).

6. For formation evaluations, provide a briefing. This briefing is all that is required. However, to further openness and transparency, the commander should make every effort to provide the opportunity to observe and talk to personnel and observe some of the major weapon systems reported for the formation.

NOTE: Commanders may show any of the formation's subordinate units that were not reported separately in the AEMI. Units that have been reported separately in the AEMI will not be shown.

(h) Encourage commanders to allow evaluators to observe ongoing unit training on the facility or nearby training areas (not to include locations that require the unit to depart the local training area). However, commanders are not required to disrupt training or stage special training exercises for the evaluators' benefit.

(i) Commanders may informally arrange to take photographs for publicity and goodwill purposes. Ensure teams use only the type of equipment specified in paragraph 131, Chapter IX, of VDOC 99.

(j) Ensure the liaison team size is kept to the absolute minimum required. Higher headquarters should have no more than one member per agency. Personnel above this guideline will be coordinated and agreed between DTRA and the combatant command before the evaluation visit. The commander of the evaluated formation or unit may choose an appropriate number from his or her staff.

(k) Ensure no actions are taken that could endanger the evaluation team. Commanders must ensure their personnel are briefed on the upcoming

evaluation, particularly the presence, status, and functions of the evaluation team.

(3) DTRA

(a) Formulate, train, and lead evaluation teams to conduct active evaluations on the territory of other participating states.

(b) Formulate, train, and lead the escort teams for passive evaluations of US units or formations. Provide, under normal circumstances, one escort for every evaluator. Personnel above the limit of one escort for every evaluator will be coordinated between DTRA and the commander of the evaluated unit before the evaluation visit.

(c) Perform US escort and liaison functions in the reception of passive evaluation visits.

(d) Notify the NMCC and Service Operations Centers of notifications of evaluation requests by other participating states.

(e) Develop plans and, in close coordination with USEUCOM and USCENTCOM as applicable, escort the evaluation team at evaluations of US units and formations.

(f) Control US escorts and perform liaison functions with the host state representatives.

(g) Serve as the senior US representative during passive evaluations.

(h) Provide official US on-site interpretation of reference a to commanders during passive evaluations and resolve all document-related issues among site personnel, evaluation teams, and host state representatives.

(i) Ensure evaluation teams use only the type of equipment specified in paragraph 131, Chapter IX, of VDOC 99 (maps and charts, photo and video cameras, personal binoculars, and Dictaphones).

(j) Declare sensitive points, equipment, and facilities (provided by the formation or unit commander) to the evaluation team when necessary.

APPENDIX I TO ENCLOSURE C

POLICY, PROCEDURES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING VIENNA
DOCUMENT 1999, CHAPTER X, "REGIONAL MEASURES"

1. Policy. The United States supports the concept of regional measures to complement OSCE-wide CSBMs and other cooperative measures on a voluntary basis. Under the current environment in the OSCE ZoA, the United States does not foresee the need for direct involvement in regional measures.
2. Procedures. The US OSCE delegation monitors and provides reports to DOS on activities of the FSC associated with regional measures and seeks guidance as appropriate. DOS leads interagency review and evaluation of the reported activities as appropriate.
3. Responsibilities
 - a. Joint Staff. In coordination with USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, the Services, OUSD(P), and OUSD(AT&L), provide military advice to the interagency in all matters pertaining to regional measures.
 - b. USCENTCOM and USEUCOM
 - (1) Monitor activities associated with regional measures in respective areas of responsibility and report to the Joint Staff as appropriate.
 - (2) Provide command assessments and host-state military perspectives on matters related to regional measures as requested.
 - c. USDELMC NATO. Provide information and Allies' views in matters pertaining to regional measures being considered by other NATO members.
 - d. JCS Representative to the OSCE in Vienna, Austria
 - (1) Monitor OSCE and FSC activities associated with regional measures and report to the Joint Staff as appropriate.
 - (2) Provide assessments and military perspective of OSCE participating states' military representatives who may be considering regional measures.

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APPENDIX J TO ENCLOSURE C

POLICY, PROCEDURES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING VIENNA DOCUMENT 1999, CHAPTER XI, "ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT MEETING"

1. Policy. The United States participates fully in all AIAM and other reviews and responds, as appropriate, to all surveys, agenda items, or other AIAM papers promulgated by the FSC.
2. Procedure. The FSC conducts the AIAM to clarify questions arising from implementation, the operation of agreed measures, and the implications of information gained from implementation of VDOC 99. DOS (interagency) coordinates and formulates US positions on all matters pertaining to the AIAM.
3. Responsibilities
 - a. Joint Staff. In coordination with USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, the Services, OUSD(P), and OUSD(AT&L), provide military advice to the Interagency in all matters pertaining to AIAMs.
 - b. USCENTCOM and USEUCOM
 - (1) Review and provide comments and/or concurrence in AIAM agenda items, surveys, or other papers as requested by the Joint Staff.
 - (2) Report and make recommendations to the Joint Staff concerning the clarification of questions, operation, and implications that may arise from the implementation of VDOC 99, as appropriate.
 - c. USDELMC NATO
 - (1) Facilitate the exchange of information with NATO allies on all matters pertaining to AIAM agenda items, surveys, or other papers as requested by the Joint Staff.
 - (2) Provide allies' perspectives on matters pertaining to AIAM initiatives related to the clarification of questions, operation, and implications that may arise from the implementation of VDOC 99.
 - d. JCS Representative to the OSCE in Vienna Austria
 - (1) Monitor OSCE and FSC activities associated with the AIAM and report to the Joint Staff as appropriate.

(2) Provide assessments and US military perspective to OSCE participating states' military representatives who may be considering AIAM issues or initiatives related to the clarification of questions, operation, and implications that may arise from the implementation of VDOC 99.

APPENDIX K TO ENCLOSURE C

POLICY, PROCEDURES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING VIENNA
DOCUMENT 1999, CHAPTER XII, "FINAL PROVISIONS"

1. Policy

a. OSCE Communications Network. DOS operates the US communications node in the OSCE Communications Network and transmits official US notifications required by VDOC 99. Within the Department of Defense, VDOC 99 information and data requirements are incorporated and applied to the extent possible to the ACIN program and its Web-based component, the ACES. USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, DTRA, and the Joint Staff implement all provisions pertaining to the preparation and coordination of notifications requiring military information and data using the ACES.

b. Implementation. The United States subscribes to VDOC 99, recognizing the measures adopted therein as politically binding. By this endorsement, the United States commits to full implementation and compliance with all provisions contained in VDOC 99, which entered into force on 1 January 2000.

2. Procedure

a. OSCE Communications Network. VDOC 99 notifications requiring military information and data are generated and transmitted to DOS via the ACES. OUSD(AT&L), the Joint Staff, USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, and DTRA maintain accounts for, and operate in, the ACES to interface with DOS. Specific responsibilities for generating, approving, and routing notifications are contained in Enclosure D.

b. Implementation. The United States implements the provisions of VDOC 99 for the mutual benefit of all participating states and with the common goals of promoting security cooperation and reducing the risk of military conflict.

3. Responsibilities

a. OSCE Communications Network

(1) Joint Staff

(a) Establish and operate an ACES account.

(b) Review, approve, and forward to DOS all notification messages generated and transmitted by USCENTCOM and USEUCOM.

(2) USCENTCOM and USEUCOM

(a) Establish an account for and operate in the ACES URL network.

(b) Collect, generate, and transmit, via the ACES, notifications containing military information and data related to active and passive inspections, evaluations, observations, visits, risk reduction measures, certain military activities, and annual calendars required by VDOC 99.

(3) DTRA

(a) Develop, operate, and maintain the ACES URL network.

(b) Generate and transmit to DOS all notifications required by VDOC 99 relating to the conduct of active inspections and evaluations.

(c) Maintain the capability to communicate with the Joint Staff, OUSD(AT&L), the NMCC, USCENTCOM, and USEUCOM to pass information and data related to the conduct of active and receipt of passive inspections and evaluations.

(d) Relay participating state notifications of their intent to conduct a unit evaluation to the USEUCOM command center and coordinate with USEUCOM for the decision to deploy DTRA liaison teams.

b. Implementation. OUSD(P) is responsible for overall coordination of policy for DOD involvement in the OSCE process. Each DOD Service component and agency ensures compliance with the provisions of VDOC 99 within their organization and implements these provisions IAW references b and c to this instruction and other guidance provided by the Joint Staff.

ENCLOSURE D

VIENNA DOCUMENT MILITARY INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND NOTIFICATION RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

Format	Originate	Review	Info Copy	Review	Release	Transmit
F01 - AEMI Chart 1 Command Organization of Military Forces	USAREUR USAFE NAVEUR USCENTCOM (Annually 3rd Thurs in Nov)	USEUCOM	HQ DA, USMC & USAF, & CNO	JS	Interagency Clearance	Distributed in Vienna
F02 AEMI Chart 2 Formations & Combat Units Land Forces; Amphibious Formations & Amphibious Combat Units	USAREUR USAFE NAVEUR USCENTCOM	USEUCOM	HQ DA, USMC & USAF, & CNO	JS	Interagency Clearance	Distributed in Vienna
F03 – AEMI Chart 3 Air Formations & Air Combat Units of Air Forces; Air Defense Aviation & Permanently Land Based Naval Aviation	USAREUR USAFE NAVEUR USCENTCOM	USEUCOM	HQ DA, USMC & USAF, & CNO	JS	Interagency Clearance	Distributed in Vienna
F04 – AEMI Chart 4 Info on Plans for Deployment of Major Weapon & Equipment Systems	USAREUR USAFE NAVEUR USCENTCOM	USEUCOM	HQ DA, USMC & USAF, & CNO	JS	Interagency Clearance	Distributed in Vienna
F06 Notification Information on Temporary Activation of Reserve & National Guard Formation & Units	USAREUR USAFE NAVEUR USCENTCOM	USEUCOM	HQ DA, USMC & USAF, & CNO	JS	DOS	NRRC via OSCE Network
F07, F08 & F09 Notifications Not Used/Deleted During Format Negotiation						
F10 Notification Request for Explanation of	DOS		JS USEUCOM		Interagency Clearance	NRRC via OSCE Network

Format	Originate	Review	Info Copy	Review	Release	Transmit
Unusual Military Activities			USCENTCOM			
F11 Notification Reply to Explanation of Unusual Military Activities	DOS		JS USEUCOM USCENTCOM		Interagency Clearance	NRRC via OSCE Network
F12 Notification Request for Meeting with Responsible State on Unusual Military Activities	DOS		JS USEUCOM USCENTCOM		Interagency Clearance	NRRC via OSCE Network
F13 Notification Reply From Responsible State on Meeting on Unusual Military Activities	DOS		JS USEUCOM USCENTCOM		Interagency Clearance	NRRC via OSCE Network
F14 Notification Report of Meeting on Unusual Military Activities	DOS		JS USEUCOM USCENTCOM		Interagency Clearance	NRRC via OSCE Network
F15 Notification Request for Meeting of All Participating States	DOS		JS USEUCOM USCENTCOM		Interagency Clearance	NRRC via OSCE Network
F16 Notification Hazardous Incidents Report	USAREUR USAFE NAVEUR USCENTCOM	USEUCOM	HQ DA, USMC & USAF, & CNO	JS	DOS	NRRC via OSCE Network
F17 & F18 Notifications Not Used/Deleted During Format Negotiations						
F19 Notification Invitation for Voluntary Hosting of Visit (Only Applies to States With Territory in ZoA)						
F20 Notification Reply to Invitation for Voluntary Hosting of Visit	USEUCOM USCENTCOM		HQ DA, USMC & USAF, & CNO	JS	DOS	NRRC via OSCE Network
F21 Notification Comments on Visit for Voluntary Hosting	USEUCOM USCENTCOM		HQ DA, USMC & USAF, & CNO	JS	DOS	NRRC via OSCE Network

Format	Originate	Review	Info Copy	Review	Release	Transmit
F22 Notification Invitation to Event (Only Applies to States With Territory in ZoA)	Host State on Behalf of United States					
F23 Notification Reply to Invitation to Event	USEUCOM USCENTCOM (32 days prior to event)		HQ DA, USMC & USAF, & CNO	JS	DOS	NRRC via OSCE Network
F24 Notification Military Contacts and Cooperation	USEUCOM USCENTCOM		HQ DA, USMC & USAF, & CNO	JS	DOS	NRRC via OSCE Network
F25 Notification Prior Notification of Military Land Exercise Activities	USAREUR USCENTCOM	USEUCOM	HQ DA, USMC & USAF, & CNO	JS	DOS	NRRC via OSCE Network
F26 Notification Prior Notification of Amphibious Landing	USAREUR NAVEUR USCENTCOM	USEUCOM	HQ DA, USMC & USAF, & CNO	JS	DOS	NRRC via OSCE Network
F27 Notification Prior Notification of Parachute Assault	USAREUR USCENTCOM	USEUCOM	HQ DA, USMC & USAF, & CNO	JS	DOS	NRRC via OSCE Network
F28 Notification Prior Notification of Heliborne Landing	USAREUR NAVEUR USAFE USCENTCOM	USEUCOM	HQ DA, USMC & USAF, & CNO	JS	DOS	NRRC via OSCE Network
F29 Notification Prior Notification of Land Forces in a Transfer and/or Concentration	USAREUR NAVEUR USCENTCOM	USEUCOM	HQ DA, USMC & USAF, & CNO	JS	DOS	NRRC via OSCE Network
F30 Notification Annual Calendar	USAREUR NAVEUR USAFE USCENTCOM (15 Oct)	USEUCOM	HQ DA, USMC & USAF, & CNO	JS	DOS	NRRC via OSCE Network

Format	Originate	Review	Info Copy	Review	Release	Transmit
F31 Notification Changes, Cancellations, and/or Reductions to Annual Calendar	USAREUR NAVEUR USAFE USCENTCOM	USEUCOM	HQ DA, USMC & USAF, & CNO	JS	DOS	NRRC via OSCE Network
F32 Notification Constraining Provisions	USAREUR NAVEUR USAFE USCENTCOM	USEUCOM	HQ DA, USMC & USAF, & CNO	JS	DOS	NRRC via OSCE Network
F34 Notification Reply to Request to Inspect (Only Applies to States With Territory in ZoA)						
F35 Notification Inspection Report	DTRA-OSE	DTRA-OS			DOS	NRRC via OSCE Network
F36 Notification Request for Evaluation Visit	DTRA-OSE	DTRA-OS			DOS	NRRC via OSCE Network
F37 Notification Reply to Request for Evaluation Visit (Only Applies to States With Territory in ZoA)						
F38 Notification Evaluation Visit Report	DTRA-OSE	DTRA-OS			DOS	NRRC via OSCE Network
F39 Notification Request for Clarification	All DOD ACES Accounts	USEUCOM	All DOD ACES Accounts	JS	DOS	NRRC via OSCE Network
F40 Notification Not Used/Deleted During Format Negotiations						
F41 Notification Miscellaneous	All DOD ACES Accounts	USEUCOM	All DOD ACES Accounts	JS	DOS	NRRC via OSCE Network
F42 Notification Quarterly Summary of Notifications	NRRC			JS, USEUCO M, DTRA, DOS		NRRC via OSCE Network

Format	Originate	Review	Info Copy	Review	Release	Transmit
F43 Notification Information on Major Weapon and Equipment Systems No Longer in Service in the ZoA	USAREUR NAVEUR USAFE USCENTCOM	USEUCOM	HQ DA, USMC & USAF, & CNO	JS	DOS	NRRC via OSCE Network
F44 Notification Reply to Request for Clarification	DOS		JS USEUCOM USCENTCOM		Interagency Clearance	NRRC via OSCE Network
F45 Notification Information on Events	USAREUR NAVEUR USAFE USCENTCOM	USEUCOM	HQ DA, USMC & USAF, & CNO	JS	DOS	NRRC via OSCE Network
F46 Notification Exhaustion of Inspection Quota (Only Applies to States With Territory in ZoA)						
F47 Notification Announcement of Evaluation Quota	USEUCOM		HQ DA, USMC & USAF, & CNO	JS	DOS	NRRC via OSCE Network
F48 Notification Exhaustion of Evaluation Quota	USEUCOM		HQ DA, USMC & USAF, & CNO	JS	DOS	NRRC via OSCE Network
F49 Notification Nil Report	DOS		JS USEUCOM USCENTCOM		Interagency Clearance	NRRC via OSCE Network
F50 Notification List of Replies to Invitation to Event (Only Applies to States With Territory in the ZoA)						
F101-107 Notifications Regional Measures						

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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACES	arms control enterprise system
ACIN	Arms Control Information and Notification Program
ACV	armored combat vehicle
AEMI	Annual Exchange of Military Information
AIAM	Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting
AIFV	armored infantry fighting vehicle
APC	armored personnel carrier
ATGM	antitank guided missile
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CPC	Conflict Prevention Center (OSCE)
CRG	Compliance Review Group (DOD)
CSBM	confidence and security building measure
DA	Department of the Army
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DOS	Department of State
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
DTRA-OS	Defense Threat Reduction Agency, On Site Inspection Directorate
DTRA-OSE	Defense Threat Reduction Agency, On Site Inspection Directorate, Europe
FSC	Forum for Security Cooperation (OSCE)
GCC	geographic combatant command
HQ	headquarters
IAW	in accordance with
J-5	Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, Joint Staff
J-5 IND	International Negotiations Division, J-5
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
LBNA	land based naval air
MCC	military contacts and cooperation
MOU	memorandum of understanding

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVEUR	Naval Forces, Europe
nil	negative
NLT	not later than
NMCC	National Military Command Center
NRRC	Nuclear Risk Reduction Center
NSC	National Security Council
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OUSD (P)	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
OUSD (AT&L)	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
POET	Protocol on Existing Types
USAF	US Air Force
USAFE	US Air Forces in Europe
USAREUR	US Army Europe
USCENTCOM	US Central Command
USDAO	US Defense Attaché Office
USDELMC	US Delegation, Military Committee, NATO
USEUCOM	US European Command
USG	US government
USMC	US Marine Corps
VCC	Verification Coordination Committee (NATO)
VDOC 99	Vienna Document 1999
ZoA	zone of application (as defined in Annex I to reference a)