



NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE

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DIVISION OF EDUCATION PROGRAMS

Narrative Section of a Successful Application

The attached document contains the grant narrative and selected portions of a previously funded grant application. It is not intended to serve as a model, but to give you a sense of how a successful application may be crafted. Every successful application is different, and each applicant is urged to prepare a proposal that reflects its unique project and aspirations. Prospective applicants should consult the Education Programs application guidelines at <http://www.neh.gov/grants/guidelines/seminars.html> for instructions. Applicants are also strongly encouraged to consult with the NEH Division of Education Programs staff well before a grant deadline.

Note: The attachment only contains the grant narrative and selected portions, not the entire funded application. In addition, certain portions may have been redacted to protect the privacy interests of an individual and/or to protect confidential commercial and financial information and/or to protect copyrighted materials.

Project Title: Liberty, Equality, and Justice: Philosophical Problems in Domestic and Global Contexts

Institution: Washington University

Project Director: Christopher Wellman

Grant Program: Summer Seminars and Institutes for College and University Teachers

Seminar for College and University Teachers

**Liberty, Equality, and Justice in National and International Contexts: Philosophical
Issues and Arguments**

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Project Narrativep. 2

 Intellectual Rationalep. 2

 Content and Structurep. 3

 Project Faculty and Staff.....p. 16

 Selection of Participantsp. 19

 Institutional Context.....p. 20

Project Budget and Justificationp. 21

Referees: Evaluations from previous seminar.....p. 23

Appendices

 Appendix A: Bibliography.....p. 34

 Appendix B: Curricula Vitaep. 37

 Andrew Altman, Co-Directorp. 37

 Christopher H. Wellman, Co-Director.....p. 39

 Elizabeth S. Anderson, Consultantp. 41

 Michael I. Blake, Consultantp. 43

 Allen Edward Buchanan, Consultant.....p. 45

 Samuel R. Freeman, Consultant.....p. 47

 Appendix C: Detailed Schedule of Meetings.....p. 49

 Appendix D: Letters of Commitmentp. 51

“LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND JUSTICE IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
CONTEXTS: PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS”

PROJECT NARRATIVE

Part A: Intellectual Rationale

A1. OVERVIEW. Liberal democracies such as the United States aspire to treat their members as free and equal citizens. Determining precisely what this means in today’s world, however, is a difficult matter. Even if one agrees that political regimes must, as a matter of justice, organize themselves in a liberal democratic fashion (and not everyone does, of course), it remains controversial when someone is free, what equality requires, and how conflicts between these two core values should be adjudicated. What is more, as interesting and important as these issues are, some of the most pressing and difficult questions in today’s geo-political context concern not how liberal democracies should treat their own citizens, but how they should interact with foreigners and their states. To pose this question in the most general terms, should liberal democracies try to "export" their values, and, if so, what is the best way to do so? Additionally, one of the central principles of any form of democracy, the principle of collective self-government, appears to be seriously undermined by globalization and the shrinking scope of effective choices within the power of a domestic government to make. Is the idea of democracy a meaningful one in the context of 21st century global society?

This seminar will attempt to understand and critically assess liberal democratic conceptions of justice not only in terms of how states should treat their own citizens but also in terms of how they should interact with other states and how meaningful self-government is possible in a globalized world.

A1a. PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND AND CONTENT.

This proposal is informed by three previous NEH projects which the co-directors have directed in the past: the 2005 Summer Seminar for University and College Professors, “Political Obligation, Democratic Legitimacy and Human Rights: Theoretical and Applied Issues,” the 2007 Seminar, “Philosophical Perspectives on Democracy, Law and Human Rights,” and the 2010 Seminar, “Philosophical Perspectives on Liberal Democracy and the Global Order.” The current proposal is most similar to our 2010 seminar. We have updated the readings to include important new work in the field and have revised some of the material covered to reflect our experience of what worked best in that seminar. In particular, a greater emphasis is now placed on the concept of justice and its varying interpretations in national and international contexts. The participant evaluations from 2010 summer seminar are included in this application.

The co-directors are well aware that many of the topics covered by the seminar involve vigorous disagreement among scholars, political figures, and laypersons. We have no philosophical or political axes to grind in conducting the seminar. Our unwavering conviction is that disagreement and dialogue among persons of varying views is indispensable to the process by which reasoned conclusions are reached. Our aim is to foster such dialogue and to encourage the seminar participants to develop and defend their own positions, whether or not those positions conform to the ones that we happen to hold. Indeed, the co-directors themselves are far from being of one mind on the issues to be examined.

In order to give the seminar sufficient intellectual focus and coherence, our readings and discussions will address three main issues pertaining to the values of liberty,

equality, and justice. These values are central to the modern Western liberal tradition, and the seminar is an extended examination of the meaning and implications of those values and their relation to liberal democratic institutions. At the same time, the values -- at least as they have been understood in the liberal tradition -- have not gone unchallenged, so the seminar will also devote a significant portion of its time to an examination of major philosophical criticisms of liberal conceptions of liberty, equality, and justice.

The first issue to be addressed by the seminar is ‘Does justice demand liberal democracy?’ Many philosophers and political thinkers suppose that political regimes cannot be just unless they are liberal democratic because only liberal democracies (including Western European-style social democracies) treat their constituents as free and equal. To understand this line of thinking, notice how and why some might object to either a democratic but illiberal or a liberal but undemocratic regime. For a stark example of how a democratic but illiberal government might fail its citizens, imagine an apartheid regime in which the whites were in the majority and democratically enacted racist laws that oppressed the black minority. The fact that these laws had a democratic pedigree would not seem to provide sufficient grounds for a duty to obey them. At the opposite end of the spectrum, imagine an enlightened monarch who imposed laws which provided all of her subjects with an ample and equal scope of personal freedom. This undemocratic arrangement would still seem to be morally problematic, notwithstanding its treatment of every subject as free and equal. The problem stems from the fact that the subjects have no political power, unlike the citizens of a democracy in which each is, ideally, to have an equal share of political power.

The foregoing hypothetical examples suggest that it is not enough for a government to be merely democratic or liberal; government is just only if it is both liberal and democratic. Nonetheless, the moral intuitions elicited by such cases have proved remarkably difficult to elaborate into a consistent and cogent account of the moral basis of liberal democracy. The principle of free and equal citizenship is at the heart of the moral justification of liberal democracy, but defenders of liberal democracy disagree over the meaning of the principle and its precise relation to liberal democratic institutions. For example, many thinkers contend that liberal freedoms and democratic authority can come into conflict and need to be adjusted to one another on the basis of some principle that demarcates the rightful jurisdiction of each. Other thinkers contend that equality is more fundamental than liberty, so that any apparent conflict between the two values can be readily resolved by adverting to the requirements of equality, while still other theorists take the reverse position that liberty is more fundamental than equality. These are only a few of the kinds of positions taken by liberal democratic theorists in presenting the moral grounds of liberal democracy, but they illustrate the centrality of the twin values of personal freedom and equality to the defense of liberal democracy.

Traditionally, theorists of liberal democracy have sought to formulate principles of justice that are meant to guide the construction of domestic political and legal institutions. In recent years, however, many liberal thinkers have begun to turn to international affairs and to examine aspects of the second main issue which the seminar will address: ‘What role should the values of liberty, equality, and justice play in shaping the world order of the 21st century?’ This broad question has many aspects, but there are four on which the seminar will focus: (1) efforts to “export” liberal democratic values,

including the use of forcible methods; (2) challenges to the practice of self-government that arise from globalization and world-wide problems such as climate change and nuclear proliferation; (3) the scope of a liberal state's control over its borders and its membership; and (4) the scope of the obligation that wealthy liberal democratic states have to mitigate extreme poverty in the world's poorest States.

On the matter of exporting liberal democratic institutions by forcible methods, theorists of liberal democracy are split. Some argue that such policies are justifiable in principle, even if in many cases the policies should be foregone due to practical considerations: if persons are to be treated as free and equal, it might sometimes be necessary to exert coercive pressures, perhaps to the point of military action, against regimes which egregiously oppress their constituents. Other liberal theorists respond that it is fundamentally illiberal to force other societies to become liberal democracies and that the liberal principle of toleration, applied to the international realm, requires acceptance of illiberal and undemocratic regimes.

The forces of globalization in combination with problems such as climate change and the regulation of international business and finance confront liberal democratic states with the profound problem of how liberal democracy can survive in a world that seems to demand strong institutions of supra-national governance. Is self-government desirable or even possible under conditions in which every state seems to be losing effective control over its own future? What should democracy look like in the 21st century? Over the past two decades, political theorists of all stripes have discussed and debated these questions, addressing the problem of how the values of liberty, equality, and justice can be adapted to and realized in an international context very different from

the ones in which the existing institutions of liberal democracy were created and developed.

The matter of citizenship and immigration policy begins with a conundrum for liberal democrats: May liberal democratic states treat only their own constituents as free and equal, or must they treat everyone in the world as such? If the former, then what justifies their lesser regard for human beings living on the other side of their borders? If the latter, then does the freedom of foreigners imply that liberal democratic states may not permissibly deny immigration or even citizenship to anyone (just as they may not deny any of their own citizens the right to emigrate)? Liberal democratic theorists have only recently begun to address this conundrum, some of them defending restrictive immigration policies and others arguing for open borders.

The topic of aid to the impoverished states and people of the world raises much the same conundrum as does the issue of immigration. If liberal democracies need only treat their own citizens as free and equal, what justifies the lesser regard for human beings on the other side of their borders? How much less regard is justifiable? If each human being must be treated as free and equal, then are not wealthy liberal democracies morally obligated to work toward a major reconstruction of the global economic and political system? These kinds of questions are increasingly addressed by liberal thinkers in an effort to forge an understanding of justice that is relevant for some of the most urgent issues of the globalized world of the 21st century.

No philosophical examination of liberal values would be satisfactory without serious and sustained attention to the third main issue of the seminar: What do the critics of liberal conceptions of liberty, equality, and justice say? The critics are many, and they

have voiced powerful arguments over the past two centuries. Among their claims have been: the liberal conceptions of liberty and equality are irreconcilable with one another; liberal conceptions of justice invariably and unjustifiably elevate the right of private property and its accumulation over the collective needs of the people; liberal conceptions of justice ignore the egregious wrongs of oppression and exploitation; liberal values prevent liberal democracies from providing their citizens with sufficiently strong attachment to their political institutions and their fellow citizens; liberal values are excessively individualistic and leave no room for the crucial idea of a common good; liberal values help to perpetuate sexism and racism; liberal values and institutions might be appropriate for some societies and cultures but are not suitable for others; and liberal values break down into implausibility and incoherence when one tries to apply them to the main global issues of the 21st century.

The seminar will focus on communitarian critics (liberal values are too individualistic, have no room for the common good, and/or are not suitable for certain cultures and societies); Marxist/critical theory critics (liberal justice elevates private property and ignores oppression and exploitation; liberty and equality are irreconcilable); feminist critics (liberal values help to perpetuate sexism and racism); conservative critics (liberal democracy destroys traditions); and certain cosmopolitan critics (liberal values break down in the global world of the 21st century). Each line of criticism will serve to test the adequacy of liberal understandings of liberty, equality, and justice, and to help the seminar participants reflect more fully on the overriding question of the seminar: ‘Can liberal values provide liberal democratic states and their citizens with sound moral guidance in the world of the 21st century?’

A1b. Readings and Guest Speakers.

The readings for the seminar will come mainly from contemporary sources in philosophy, political theory, and jurisprudence. However, some classic sources will be included in order to provide historical depth and background for the contemporary readings.

The week-by-week list of readings to be found below represents just a small sample of the philosophical work that has been done on liberal democratic values. The co-directors have been ruthlessly selective. This is due, in part, to unavoidable time-constraints. However, it is also due to the nature of philosophical inquiry. The critical assessment of philosophical argumentation calls for a slow and close reading of the text. Philosophical thinkers thus find it more profitable to focus their reading on fewer pieces rather than to range more broadly but not as deeply. The experience of the co-directors during their previous seminars has confirmed this point.

The co-directors intend to respond to the specific interests of the participants by asking them to suggest readings to supplement the week-by-week list. This was done during previous seminars, and it was found to be very effective at linking the readings planned by the co-directors to the participants' research and teaching projects. Indeed, in many cases the participants led the seminar sessions in which their suggested readings were discussed.

During each week of the seminar, we will have as a guest speaker a theorist of international stature whose scholarship is on the topic for the week. The talks by guests were very successful in the previous seminar conducted by the co-directors. While some of the featured visitors did a better job than others of engaging the interests of the

participants, overall participants found it extremely helpful to be able to engage directly (in both formal and informal settings) with thinkers whose views and arguments are central to the current state of the scholarship.

A2. The Intended Audience.

College and university teachers who teach and research in the areas of political philosophy, legal philosophy, and political theory would be among those in the main target audience. The seminar is intended to encourage participating faculty to pursue scholarly research in one of the areas covered and to integrate material from the seminar into their courses. By bringing in at the end of each week leading thinkers who are central to the current state of the argument, we will be giving the participants a valuable opportunity to develop and refine their scholarly research and to bring to their students the best of current thinking. The material covered during the four weeks should prove useful to a broad array of courses, from introductory level classes in philosophy and political theory to more advanced courses in legal and political philosophy and ethics.

Those holding terminal degrees in philosophy, political science and law would be the prime audience, but, as with our previous seminars, we would expect to get competitive applications from theorists in a variety of other disciplines. We would choose applicants with an eye to ensuring a diversity of intellectual perspectives.

Part B. Content and Structure of the Project

The seminar will meet three days a week for each of the four weeks of its duration. We will hold sessions on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday, 10-12:30. Additional sessions will be scheduled as required, especially if (as in previous seminars) the participants are keen to get extensive feedback on their own projects from the group

as a whole. This schedule reflects that of the previous seminars conducted by the co-directors and worked very well.

During the first week, individual appointments with the participants will be scheduled to discuss each of the participant's research and/or teaching plan. Additional individual appointments will be encouraged throughout the seminar's duration. The co-directors found that this approach to guiding and mentoring the participants worked well and was appreciated by the participants. In addition, each participant will present her/his work to the group for comments and feedback.

PROPOSED PLAN OF STUDY

Week 1: Justice and Liberal Democracy (Guest Speaker: Elizabeth Anderson) Readings will include: Anderson, "What is the Point of Equality?"; Christiano, The Constitution of Equality; Cohen selections from, Philosophy, Politics, Democracy; Dworkin, selections from Justice for Hedgehogs; Estlund, selections from Democratic Authority; Habermas, "On Legitimation through Human Rights" and selections from Between Facts and Norms; Locke, Second Treatise of Government; Mill, On Liberty and selections from Considerations on Representative Government; Rawls, selections from A Theory of Justice and from Political Liberalism.

It is widely presumed that justice requires that a state have liberal democratic institutions. Is this belief justified, and, if so, are there other types of political organizations which are equally just? In particular, could an undemocratic liberal regime, an illiberal democracy, or even an undemocratic illiberal regime also qualify as just? If not, what is so special about liberalism and democracy, and how must a government treat

its constituents in order to be a genuine liberal democracy? Is the United States currently a liberal democracy? If so, has it been so since its creation?

The readings from Locke and Mill present some of the classic philosophical arguments in favor of liberal and democratic principles. These arguments confront a series of problems, including the difficulty of resolving the tensions between liberty and equality. Various ways of resolving the tensions have been proposed in recent years by Rawls, Cohen, Christiano, Habermas, Dworkin, and Estlund. Anderson's work criticizes much of the recent liberal theorizing about equality and argues for an alternative conception of equality and its relation to justice and democracy.

Week 2: Liberal Democracy and Its Discontents (Guest Speaker: Allen Buchanan). Readings will include: Buchanan, "Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism" and selections from Marx and Justice; Gutmann, "Communitarian Critics of Liberalism"; MacIntyre, selections from After Virtue and Whose Justice? Which Rationality? MacKinnon, selections from Feminism Unmodified; Marx, "On the Jewish Question"; Nussbaum, "The Feminist Critique of Liberalism"; Okin, selections from Justice, Gender and the Family; Sandel, selections from Liberalism and the Limits of Justice; Schmitt, Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy; Walzer, "The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism" and selections from Spheres of Justice; Young, selections from Justice and the Politics of Difference.

Many have worried that, insofar as liberal democracy places such an emphasis upon the individual and the inviolability of her moral rights, it serves as an effective tool for those who seek to defend the status quo against the reforms of various social justice movements. There are important questions, in other words, as to whether promoting

liberal democratic values promotes or impedes the realization of justice. Consider, for instance, the following questions: Do liberal rights of privacy and association protect sexist practices and attitudes, thereby helping to render women second class citizens? Do liberal freedoms extend to personal property so that each of us has a right to dispose of our possessions entirely as we see fit? If so, are liberal values incompatible with forced redistribution either among compatriots or from the world's wealthy to the world's poor? Is liberal democracy's preoccupation with the individual and her rights incompatible with healthy cultures, especially minority cultures? Do liberal values leave sufficient room to extend special group rights to minority cultures such as American Indians? Can liberal democrats consistently endorse special language and/or territorial rights for national minorities, for instance?

The readings from Marx and Schmitt present classic socialist and conservative arguments, respectively, against liberal democracy, while MacKinnon and Okin present some of the most powerful feminist criticisms of liberalism. Nussbaum seeks to show how liberal principles, properly understood, are compatible with much of the criticism. MacIntyre criticizes liberal democracy as a destroyer of tradition. Young contends that the focus of liberal thought on the correction of injustice leads it to ignore oppression and domination, and she argues for a form of democracy that is more egalitarian and participatory than current forms. Sandel argues against liberal values on the basis of a form of communitarianism, while Walzer develops a less aggressive communitarian criticism, calling for a "communitarian corrective" to liberal democracy. The readings from Buchanan and Gutman, in turn, defend liberal democratic principles against radical, conservative, and communitarian criticism.

Week 3: Liberal Democracy in Global Society (Guest Speaker: Michael Blake). Readings will include: Applbaum, “Forcing a People to Be Free”; Beitz, “Rawls’ Law of Peoples” and selections from Political Theory and International Relations; Blake, “Reciprocity, Stability, Intervention”; Buchanan, “Justice, Legitimacy, and Human Rights” and selections from Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination; Gould, selections from Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights; Held, “Principles of a Cosmopolitan Order” and Global Covenant; Miller, “Respectable Oppressors, Hypocritical Liberators”; Wenar, “Why Rawls is not a Cosmopolitan Egalitarian.”

Liberal democracies are major players on the current international scene. Accordingly, they are faced with a number of key issues. How should they interact with illiberal or undemocratic States? Do they have any right to try to reform the latter so as to make them more liberal or more democratic? If so, may they ever use coercive measures such as economic sanctions to do so? More importantly, may liberal democracies ever permissibly use their military might to force foreigners to be more liberal or democratic?

Additionally, globalization and other forces have made the world of the 21st century very different from the way it was when the values and institutions of existing liberal democracies first took shape. How can liberal democratic values be understood and implemented in this altered global context? Is self-government desirable or even possible under the conditions that we can reasonably expect to reign during this century?

The reading from Rawls develops principles to guide the foreign policies of liberal democratic states. Wenar defends those principles, while Beitz and Buchanan criticize them. Applbaum, Blake, and Miller address from widely differing perspectives the

question of whether and when liberal democracies are morally permitted to use coercion for purposes of promoting democracy and protecting human rights in other states. The writings of Gould, Held, and Benhabib seek to understand how democracy can adapt to, and survive in, the globalized world of the 21st century.

Week 4: Global Justice (Guest Speaker: Samuel Freeman). Readings will include: Altman and Wellman, selections from A Liberal Theory of International Justice; Carens, “Aliens and Citizens”; Freeman, “The Law of Peoples, Social Cooperation, Human Rights, and Distributive Justice” and selections from Justice and the Social Contract; Jaggar, “‘Saving Amina’: Global Justice for Women and Intercultural Dialogue”; MacKinnon, selections from Are Women Human?; Miller, Globalizing Justice; Moellendorf, selections from Cosmopolitan Justice; Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice”; Pogge, “An Egalitarian Law of Peoples,” and World Poverty and Human Rights; Rawls, The Law of Peoples; Risse, “Do We Owe the Global Poor Assistance or Rectification?”; Walzer, selections from Spheres of Justice; Wellman, “Immigration and Freedom of Association.”

Among the most striking aspects of the current global order is the contrast between the poverty experienced by so many in the developing states and the relative affluence of the members of other, more developed countries, especially liberal democratic ones. Given these inequalities, do the more developed countries have responsibilities to assist the world’s poor? May the wealthy states exercise control over their territorial borders, or do they have an obligation to allow open immigration? Must the world’s rich, as a matter of justice, transfer some of their wealth to those around the world suffering in poverty? Does the concept of justice apply to relations between

different states and their citizens? If justice demands that affluent folks help the world's poor, is this as rectification for past injustices like colonization, for present injustices involved in the current global economic order, or merely because all humans are entitled to something far closer to an equal share of the world's assets? If the developed countries seek to help the world's poor, is there a way to give aid which will have a lasting positive impact?

The reading from Rawls sets up the question of whether obligations of distributive justice hold only among compatriots or whether such obligations extend across borders. Nagel and Freeman defend the view that distributive justice is strictly a matter of relations among compatriots, while Mollendorf and Miller argue that justice imposes distributive demands that extend across borders. Pogge and Risse disagree over the nature and extent of the obligations owed by the wealthy of the earth to its poorest, while Altman and Wellman develop an alternative to both Pogge and Risse. Carens, Walzer, and Wellman disagree over what justice requires in the way of the immigration policies of wealthy countries. MacKinnon and Jaggar provide feminist critiques of the existing legal and political norms on questions of global poverty and human rights.

Part C: Project Faculty and Staff

ANDREW ALTMAN is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Jean Beer Blumenfeld Center for Ethics at the Georgia State University. He holds his Ph.D. in Philosophy from Columbia University (1977) and received a Liberal Arts Fellowship in Law and Philosophy from Harvard Law School (1984-5). Professor Altman is the author of Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique (Princeton, 1990), Arguing About Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy (2nd ed. 2001), and, with Christopher Heath Wellman, A

Liberal Theory of International Justice (Oxford, 2009). He has published more than two dozen articles on topics in legal and political philosophy, including freedom of speech, democratic legitimacy, and voting rights. His articles have appeared in prominent scholarly journals in the areas of political, legal and ethical philosophy, including Ethics and Philosophy and Public Affairs, and several of his pieces have been widely reprinted in anthologies in legal philosophy and contemporary social issues.

Professor Altman will serve as one of the co-directors of the seminar. Along with Professor Wellman, he co-directed an NEH Summer Seminar in 2005, “Political Obligation, Democratic Legitimacy, and Human Rights: Theoretical and Applied Issues,” a 2007 Summer Seminar, “Philosophical Perspectives on Democracy, Law, and Human Rights,” and a 2010 Summer Seminar, “Philosophical Perspectives on Liberal Democracy and the Global Order.”

CHRISTOPHER HEATH WELLMAN is Professor of Philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis. He holds his Ph.D. from University of Arizona (1994). Professor Wellman is author of A Theory of Secession: The Case for Political Self-Determination (Cambridge, 2005), with John Simmons, Is There a Duty to Obey the Law? (Cambridge, 2005), with Andrew Altman, A Liberal Theory of International Justice (Oxford, 2009, and, with Phillip Cole, Debating the Ethics of Immigration: Is There a Right to Exclude? (Oxford, 2011). He has published widely-discussed articles on matters of political legitimacy and obligation in prominent journals in the field, including Ethics and Philosophy and Public Affairs. Professor Wellman was awarded an NEH fellowship for 2004-5 to conduct a study on the foundations of political obligation.

Professor Wellman will serve as one of the co-directors of the seminar. Just as with their previous seminars, his areas of expertise complement those of Professor Altman in a way that makes it possible to tie the seminar topics together so as to form a well-integrated and in-depth course of study.

ELIZABETH ANDERSON is Arthur F. Thurnau Professor and John Rawls Collegiate Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies at the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor. She is the author of The Imperative of Integration (Princeton University Press, 2010) and Values in Ethics and Economics (Harvard University Press, 1993). Her articles appear in the leading venues in the field, including Philosophy and Public Affairs, Ethics, and Hypatia, and many of her pieces have been widely reprinted. She is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

MICHAEL BLAKE is Associate Professor in Philosophy at the University of Washington, with a joint appointment in the School of Public Affairs. Previously, he was Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Philosophy at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government and held positions in the University's Center for Ethics and the Professions and Carr Center for Human Rights. He was a Laurance S. Rockefeller Fellow at Princeton University's Center for Human Values from 2001-02. His articles have appeared in the leading journals in the field, including Philosophy and Public Affairs.

ALLEN BUCHANAN is James B. Duke Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Duke University. He is the author of eleven books, including Human Rights, Legitimacy, and the Use of Force (Oxford University Press, 2010) and Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination (Oxford University Press, 2004). He has published over 100 scholarly articles, many of them in the leading journals in the field, such as

Philosophy and Public Affairs and Ethics. Professor Buchanan has been a Senior Fellow at the National Humanities Center and has served as Staff Philosophy on the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and as Consultant to the President's Council on Bioethics.

SAMUEL FREEMAN is Avalon Professor in the Humanities and Professor of Philosophy and Law at the University of Pennsylvania. He authored Justice and the Social Contract (Oxford University Press, 2006) and Rawls (Routledge, 2007) and has edited the Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge University Press, 2002), as well as John Rawls's Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy (Harvard University Press, 2007) and Rawls's Collected Papers (Harvard University Press, 1999). Professor Freeman's numerous articles in legal and political philosophy have appeared in such leading journals as Philosophy and Public Affairs and Politics, Philosophy, and Economics.

Part D. Selection of Participants

The participants will be selected by a committee consisting of the two co-directors and two additional persons who will not otherwise be connected to the seminar. The principal criterion will be academic excellence. We expect that participants will be involved in an active research project that promises to produce articles or a monograph helping to advance the current literature. We also expect the participants to have a strong commitment to integrating their studies in the seminar into their course materials. The committee will seek a diverse group of participants who will complement one another in terms of their areas of interest and fields of expertise.

Part E: Institutional Context

As a major research university which has very few students in residence during the summers, Washington University in St. Louis is an ideal place to host a Summer Seminar. Participants would be extended faculty-level access to University resources and events, including the computer labs, libraries, recreational sports facilities, the Metro bus and rail service, as well as the various campus activities. They would also have accounts on the Washington University network for access to on-line resources such as email. The Philosophy Department recently moved into beautiful new facilities (with a great seminar room), and the department is willing to provide significant financial support which will allow the co-directors to host weekly dinners for the participants and their families.

There is ample affordable housing within walking distance of campus, but the participants would be strongly encouraged to live together at Village East Apartments on campus. These apartments have full kitchens, network connections, a computer lab, laundry facilities, parking, and an outdoor swimming pool. Each person would have a private bedroom and bath, and those participants who bring partners or other family members would be able to have their own apartments. Because developing a sense of community is so important to the seminar, the participants would be housed in contiguous units, insulated from other residents. The cost is approximately \$27 per day, per person, plus \$50 for parking, so the total cost for the four week seminar would be \$756 (or \$806 with a car).

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