


- V.B Justification of the War (11 Vols.)
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UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS
1945 - 1967



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V.B.2.

JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR
- INTERNAL COMMITMENTS -

The Truman Administration, 1945-1952

BOOK II - 1950-1952

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JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR -- INTERNAL COMMITMENTS

The Truman Administration, 1945 - 1952

Foreword

This portion of the study consists of a collection of U.S. Government documents which set forth the rationale of U.S. policy toward Vietnam. The collection represents the internal commitment of the U.S. as expressed in classified documents circulated at the highest levels in the government. The documents are organized chronologically within each Presidential administration. This volume covers the Truman years, 1945 - 1952.

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JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR -- INTERNAL COMMITMENTS

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104. The President approves the conclusions of NSC 48/1 as amended. The basic objectives cited are -- development of stable nations and sufficient military power to prevent communist expansion in Asia, reduction of USSR influence in Asia, and prevention of power relationships which could threaten the U.S. Specifically, in Indochina, the U.S. will use its influence to resolve the colonialist-nationalist conflict. NSC 48/2, 30 December 1949.....	265

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105. The JCS reviews the current Mutual Defense Assistance Program and certain objectives evolve as the basis for future military assistance programs. A specific long range objective is "development of sufficient military power in selected nations of the Far East" to prevent encroachment by communism. JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 26 January 1950.....	273
106. The State Department recommends and President Truman approves recognition of the three legally constituted governments of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Memorandum for the President, 2 February 1950.....	276
107. The U.S. forwards the letters of recognition to the Associated States and requests a reply to the suggestion on exchange of diplomatic representatives. Acheson 59 to Saigon, 4 February 1950.....	278

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108. Asiatic neighbors consider Bao Dai a French puppet, The U.S. should realize that ECA and military aid from the U. S. do not constitute decisive factors in Indochina's problems. Therefore the Griffin Mission should not commit ECA or military aid to French Indochina unless France "gives requisite public undertakings re further steps leading to status similar to Indonesia." Stanton (Bangkok) 160 to Acheson, 17 February 1950.....	280
109. The State Department submits to the NSC a report on "The Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina," which analyzes the problem to determine measures to protect U.S. security in Indochina and prevent communist expansion in the area. NSC No. 64, 27 February 1950.....	282
110. President Truman approves the designation of Mr. Robert A. Griffin as Chief of the Economic Survey Mission to Southeast Asia, with rank of Minister. Five basic objectives of the Mission are outlined: (1) determine needed projects of political significance; (2) prepare for Point 4 programs; (3) advise local officials of methods and extent of participation in Point 4; (4) brief U.S. representatives; and (5) investigate regional aspects of technical assistance. Department of State letter to Griffin, 1 March 1950.....	286
111. The State Department maintains to the Department of Defense that Indochina is subject to immediate danger and is the "most strategically important area of Southeast Asia." Dean Rusk believes that the resources of the U. S. should be deployed to "reserve Indochina from further Communist encroachment." Dean Rusk, Deputy Undersecretary of State to General James H. Burns, Defense Representative to Southeast Asia Aid Committee, 7 March 1950.....	288
112. Acheson instructs Saigon, in light of anticipated Franco-Viet friction on handling U.S. aid, that function of Griffin Mission is "clearly understood to be fact finding." Acheson 136 to Saigon, 9 March 1950.....	289
113. Griffin replies that "I understand that ours is an economic aid mission" and that the budding controversy could jeopardize the economic aid program. The French show no enthusiasm for Point 4. Gullion (Saigon) 176 to Acheson, 13 March 1950.....	290
114. Griffin submits his mission's preliminary conclusions on Indochina with a listing of specific urgent programs totaling \$23.5 million exclusive of military aid and indirect	

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U.S. aid (e.g., through France). Obstacles should not permit indecision to allocate aid money or materials; the "crux of the situation lies in prompt decisive action if desired political effect is to be attained." Griffin file copy of telegram sent to Acheson, 16 March 1950.....	292
115. The U.S. assumes that France is determined to protect Indochina from communist encroachment, that success depends on indigenous support, and that France supports Bao Dai, but that the French position and ultimate intentions are not clear to the rest of the world. The U.S. requests France to make a public statement of the concessions to Indochinese nationalism. Acheson 1363 to Paris, 29 March 1950.....	301
116. Acheson advises Griffin Mission of the implications for U.S. policy in Vietnam: (1) The prospect of U.S. aid indirectly would cause crisis (induce hyper-confidence in Viets); (2) Viets bitter at Huu appointment (and the U.S.) may magnify the U.S. role; (3) it is better for the U.S. if a national union government is set up; and (4) the aid program can more easily be worked out with Huu Government. Acheson 244 to Griffin, 9 April 1950.....	305
117. Department of State requests an assessment of the strategic aspects of Indochina from a military point of view because of the threat of communist domination. The Joint Chiefs of Staff indicate that the "mainland states of Southeast Asia also are at present of critical strategic importance to the United States," because of the requirement to stockpile strategic materials acquired there, as well as the threat to other states on the "line of containment." JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 10 April 1950.....	308
118. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur with the State Department on the importance of Southeast Asia to the U.S. However, the JCS urge a more forceful and positive U.S. position than expressed by State -- "...in order to retrieve the losses resulting from previous mistakes on the part of the British and French, as well as to preclude such mistakes in the future, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it necessary that positive and proper leadership among the Western Powers be assumed by the United States in Southeast Asia matters." JCS Memorandum for SecDef, 2 May 1950.....	315
119. The JCS recommend telling the French that the U.S. is prepared to assist France and the three Associated States and that arrangements for U.S. military aid be made. JCS Memorandum for SecDef, 2 May 1950.....	318

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120. President Truman approves \$10 million for military items to Indochina. Acheson 2049 to London, 3 May 1950.....	321
121. Griffin reconstructs the Indochina situation for Secretary Acheson. Griffin indicates that the present status quo cannot be maintained. "Time is of the essence...." if Bao Dai starts to slip, "it will be impossible to restore him." Given that the French are aware that a military solution is unattainable,"the U.S. must find out what the French expect of Vietnam." Griffin Memorandum to Secretary of State, 4 May 1950.....	322
122. The special survey mission headed by R. Allen Griffin recommends a modest \$60 million economic and technical assistance program for Southeast Asia. State press release 485, 11 May 1950.....	327
123. The Ministers of the U.S., U.K., and France agree that while Southeast Asia is of strategic importance to the U.S., the direct responsibilities of U.K. and France make it of greater concern to them. Extract of Tripartite Ministerial Talks, 13 May 1950.....	328
124. The French affirm responsibility for Indochina, acknowledge "supplementary" U.S. assistance, and assure that 8 March agreements would be "liberally implemented." London - SECTO 256, 14 May 1950.....	330
125. U.S. formally announces intent to establish an economic aid mission to the three Associated States of Indochina. State press release 545, 25 May 1950.....	332
126. On the basis of the Griffin recommendations, the U.S publicly announces the launching of a program of rapid economic aid to Southeast Asia. Secretary of State Dean Acheson letter to R. Allen Griffin, 3 June 1950.....	335
127. North Korea attacks South Korea and President Truman announces U.S. military assistance not only to South Korea but also an "acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States in Indochina and the dispatch of a military mission...." Presidential Statement, 27 June 1950.....	336
128. The U.S. clarifies the principles governing U.S. military aid to Indochina. Essentially, the basic principles are: U.S. aid supplements French assistance to Associated States	

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to achieve internal security; assist army of the French Union against communist aggression; Korean events could cause diversion of aid from Associated States. Acheson 4 to Saigon, 1 July 1950.....	338
129. A summary of existing policy on Indochina reveals the JCS view on NSC 73 that the U.S. give consideration to providing air and naval assistance should the Chinese provide overt support to the Viet Minh. Consultants' Meeting, 25 July 1950.....	341
130. The U.S. feels that French requests for overall assistance (military, economic, and political) are inadequate to "consummate U.S. broad objectives in Indochina" and assistance will have to be increased to resist encroachment of communism. Heath (Saigon) 170 to Acheson, 7 August 1950....	343
131. The U.S. views growing political and military deterioration in Indochina with concern; especially evident are failure of the government to gain support, disinclination of Bao Dai to assume leadership role, and indications of CHICOM-Viet Minh military collaboration. The U.S. seeks to have Vietnam establish a national army and declare a national emergency. Acheson 238 to Saigon, 1 September 1950.....	344
132. The U.S. informs France that the U.S. was prepared to increase assistance to French Union forces but could not furnish money for local use or direct tactical air support. Extract of Summary Minutes of Tripartite, Foreign Ministers Meeting, France, U.K., and U.S., 14 September 1950.....	347
133. The Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee (SEAC) proposes a statement of U.S. policy on Indochina to the NSC for consideration. "The U.S. will not commit any of its armed forces to the defense of Indochina against overt, foreign aggression...." but should assist in the "formation of new national armies of the three Associated States." The U.S. should also "press the French" to carry out the agreements of 8 March 1949 and 30 December 1949. SEAC D-21, 11 October 1950.....	349
134. "The draft statement of U.S. policy in Indochina is weak from the political side....the Defense representatives argued for a strong, hardhitting policy on political and economic concessions. The State Department representatives flatly refused....to consider Indochina in that manner. Consequently, the paper ended with a compromise." K. T. Young, DoD Office of Foreign Military Affairs, letter to General Malony, SEAC, 13 October 1950.....	369

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135. The State Department announces the results of high level conversations with French Ministers and that the U. S. Congress has appropriated one-half billion dollars in military assistance for the Far East. Department of State press release 1066, 17 October 1950.....	371
136. State and Defense recapitulate talks with the French Ministers, analyze Saigon's views on Indochina, and review the proposed NSC policy statement on Indochina: The French had not programmed equipment for 18 battalions in the 1951 budget and further had requested that the U.S. pay for and maintain the National armies when formed. It appears that the French will withdraw from Tonkin and may throw the problem to the U.N. The draft policy statement is considered quite adequate. Memorandum for the Record (Mr. K.T. Young), 17 October 1950.....	373
137. The current situation in Indochina reveals serious weakness in French manpower, leadership, and intelligence. The Viet Minh forces are building up for large-scale offensives to seize complete control of Indochina. The French Union forces of 353,970 are opposed by 92,500 Viet Minh regulars and 130,000 irregulars. U.S. Naval Intelligence Memorandum, 17 October 1950.....	382
138. The U.S. informs Emperor Bao Dai, with emphasis, that it is imperative that he give the Vietnamese people evidence of his determination to personally lead his country into immediate and "energetic opposition" to the communist menace. The U.S. has interpreted his "prolonged holiday" on the Riviera as lack of patriotism. It is tactfully suggested that further displays of procrastination might lead to loss of U.S. support for his government. Acheson 384 to Saigon, 18 October 1950.....	388
139. A Defense view is that it is "most important that the French do not quit cold and leave a political vacuum behind them." The U.S. should give increased military aid but not intervene and stress political steps by the French. Memorandum for Secretary Finletter, 19 October 1950.....	391
140. U.S. desires the immediate political and military advantages sought in the National army plan be found through integration of armed native contingents (Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Catholics, etc.) into an army commanded by Bao Dai. Acheson 436 to Saigon, 25 October 1950.....	393
141. U.S. approves French request to transfer 24 -105 mm howitzers and 6 -155 mm howitzers of MDAP assistance to Indochina. Acheson 2250 to Paris, 27 October 1950.....	394

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142. General Brink, Chief MAAG-Indochina, reports that the French contemplate changing troops from "pacification" dispositions to larger unit regroupment. French military plans are keyed to delays in political decisions. Saigon 763 to Acheson, 4 November 1950 (see Enclosure A to Document No. 146, below)..... 405
143. The U.S. does not favor use of the Peace Observation Commission in Indochina and if the Indochina subject is to come into the United Nations, it is preferred that the French do it. Acheson 516 to UN, 22 November 1950..... 395
144. The U.S. publicly welcomes the French statement which assures independence of the Associated States of Indochina within the French Union and that their resources will be directed "to the defense of Indochina against communist colonialism." Department of State press release 1187, 27 November 1950.... 397
145. "If the Communists are successful in Korea, this may so weaken the French in Indochina that they will pull out. He [Secretary Acheson] doubted if any one of the President's advisers would urge him to intervene in that situation." Extract from Truman-Attlee Conversations, 4 December 1950..... 398
146. The Joint Chiefs of Staff position paper on possible future action in Indochina, 28 November 1950, is circulated for NSC consideration. This paper includes the Brink report (4 November 1950) as a reference. The JCS short term objectives emphasize urgent action to deny Indochina to communism, insure retention of responsibility by France, and development of an over-all military plan for Indochina. The long term objectives seek to prevent communist expansion, to establish internal security conditions such as the foreign armed forces would be removed, to press the French to carry out commitments, and to establish a regional security arrangement in Southeast Asia. Executive Secretary to the NSC, NSC 64/1, 21 December 1950..... 399

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147. President Truman reasserts that U.S. aid to the French Union forces and National armies of the Associated States will continue. Truman-Pleven Conversations, 30 January 1951..... 417
148. The U.S. is very unlikely to engage itself to finance the budgetary deficit of France (25 billion francs) required for the National armies in Indochina. Acheson 974 to Saigon, 30 January 1951..... 419

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149. The first progress report on NSC 64, which was approved on 27 March 1950, assesses the most severe threat to French Indochina as the increased capability of the Viet Minh resulting from Red Chinese aid. Optimistically, the report concludes that "American military aid furnished the State's forces and the Army of the French Union may have been the decisive factor in the preservation of the area against communist aggression." State Department Memorandum to NSC, 15 March 1951.....	421
150. President Truman approves NSC Action 48/5 which states U.S. policy on Asia. With respect to Indochina, U.S. policy seeks to continue to increase French military effectiveness, to encourage internal autonomy, and to promote international support for the three Associated States. NSC 48/5, 17 May 1951.....	425
151. Dulles discusses problems with Parodi of participation of the three Associated States as "sovereign" with respect to U.N. membership, Viet Minh rival government, and positions of India, Burma, and Indonesia. Dulles-Parodi Conversation, 11 June 1951.....	446
152. The U.S. invites Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to participate in signing of Japanese Peace Treaty. Saigon 132 despatch to State, 6 September 1951.....	447
153. The U.S. and Vietnam enter into an economic cooperation agreement. Agreement entered into force 7 September 1951...	449
154. The U.S. agrees with France that they will continue to be primarily responsible for Indochina, that U.S. troops should not be used, and that first priority in military aid should go to Indochina. U.S.-France Foreign Ministers Meeting, 11 September 1951.....	452
155. President Truman and Secretary Acheson pledge support for General DeLattre and that "we would not let Indochina fall into enemy hands." Memorandum of Conversation, Acheson, Schuman, and DeLattre, 14 September 1951.....	454
156. General DeLattre comments to the State Department that the aid program had not been working out satisfactorily due to the "missionary zeal" of certain "young men" which made it appear that the U.S. was extending its influence. State Department Discussions with DeLattre, 17 September 1951.....	456

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157. The U.S. recounts the doubts and distrust remaining on the subject of colonialism in Indochina but maintains that the real issue is whether or not the Indochinese people will be allowed to exercise sovereignty or be subjected to communist terror. Dean Rusk Address, 6 November 1951.....	459
158. France requests that conversation take place immediately between U.S., U.K. and France concerning concerted action in the event of seemingly imminent Chinese intervention in Indochina. Bruce (Paris) 3765 to Acheson, 22 December 1951.	460
159. France delivers an <u>aide-memoire</u> to the U.S. on a proposal to appeal to the U.N. if Red China intervenes. Paris 3856 to Acheson, 29 December 1951.....	462

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160. Acheson reviews tripartite military discussions in which State did not participate. General Bradley, while unable to commit or indicate the extent of U.S. military assistance in the event of CHICOM invasion, would recommend to the President that a declaration be issued to Red China that retaliation would follow any aggression. Acheson 974 to Saigon, 15 January 1952.....	465
161. The NSC considers the consequences to the United States of communist domination of Southeast Asia. Loss of Southeast Asia is seen as putting economic and political pressures on Japan, opening sources of strategic materials to the Soviet Bloc, rendering the U.S. position in the Pacific precarious and jeopardizing lines of communication and trade routes to South Asia. If Red China intervenes, the U.S. should take appropriate military action as part of a U.N. action or in conjunction with others but not unilaterally. Annex to NSC 124, 13 February 1952.....	468
162. The CIA estimates that a joint warning against CHICOM intervention in Southeast Asia would tend to deter them, that initiation of action in the U.N. would probably bring a response similar to that regarding Korea, and CHICOM defiance of a joint warning would probably involve prior consent of the USSR. CIA Special Estimate, SE-22, 29 February 1952.	477
163. The JCS views on NSC 124 and Annex to NSC 124 are that military operations in defense of Indochina against Chinese Communist invasion must be accompanied by action against Communist China itself -- a course of action which might result in a long and expensive war, and that from a military point of view, the JCS oppose acceptance of all the military commitments of NSC 124. JCS Memorandum for the SecDef (forwarded to the National Security Council), 3 March 1952..	486

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164. The NSC recommends that the military implications of going to war in China be studied further and explained to the Council and the President; that the greater danger to Southeast Asia is subversion and not external aggression; and that contingencies for a French withdrawal be examined. NSC 113th Meeting (Item 3), 5 March 1952.....	502
165. The U.S. stresses to the British that rumors of French intentions to withdraw or negotiate with Ho Chi Minh are not true. The U.S. believes that France will stay in Indochina as long as sufficient U.S. aid is forthcoming. Acheson Conversation with British Ambassador, 28 March 1952.....	508
166. French stress their problems at tripartite meeting concerning their EDC commitments: (1) the French effort in Indochina, (2) financial difficulties and whether the strategic importance of SEA justified continued effort, and (3) Indochina <u>is</u> part of the European defense problem. France cannot continue to bear "alone such great share Indochinese burden." French attach great importance to U.S. aid. Acheson 7415 to State, 28 May 1952.....	511
167. If the Chinese invade Indochina, "he [Acheson] said it was clear that it was futile and a mistake to defend Indochina in Indochina. He said we could not have another Korea.... we could not put ground troops in Indochina....our only hope was of changing the Chinese mind." Secretary of State Note (L.D. Battle), 17 June 1952.....	515
168. U.S. informs France that appropriations would be prepared to provide up to 150 million dollars additional FY 1953 aid in support of overall French effort in Indochina. Acheson 7404 to Paris, 17 June 1952.....	517
169. Acheson publicly announces optimism over the conduct of the National armies in Indochina and that communist "aggression has been checked" and that the "tide is now moving in our favor." State Department Release 473, 18 June 1952.....	518
170. The President approves NSC 124/2 (NSC 124/1 as amended) on the U.S. objectives and courses of action with respect to Southeast Asia. With respect to Indochina, the U.S. would continue to assure the French of the international interest of the Indochina effort; use U.S. influence to promote political, military, economic, and social policies; provide increased aid in the absence of overt Chinese aggression; oppose French withdrawal; and seek collective action against Red China intervention. NSC 124/2, 25 June 1952.....	520

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171. The U.S. and Britain discuss issuing a warning to Red China on intervention in Indochina. French successes could trigger Chinese intervention and the U.S. had "no infantry available for operations within Indochina." The U.S. thinking is along the lines of a naval blockade of China's coast. London Ministerial Talks, 26 June 1952..... 535
172. The French request that 150 American Air Force mechanics be detailed to Vietnam receives an opinion for favorable action from General Trapnell, MAAG Chief, who also recommends expediting delivery of aircraft promised for 1953. Saigon 1149 to Acheson, 5 December 1952..... 538
173. The U.S. approves participation of 25-30 USAF personnel in maintenance of French aircraft in Vietnam. Acheson 1286 to Saigon, 22 December 1952..... 540

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Washington, D. C.

26 January 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

Subject: Military Objectives in Military Aid Programs

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the current Mutual Defense Assistance Program and have considered the military implications of future programs of this nature. From their study, they evolved the following objectives as the military basis for future military assistance programs.

The long-range overall military objective of United States military defense assistance programs should be the development of conditions which will improve to the maximum extent possible, within economic realities both current and foreseen, the ability of the United States in event of war to implement in conjunction with its allies a long-range strategic concept. Briefly, that concept is that the United States, in collaboration with its allies, will seek to impose the allied war objectives upon the USSR by conducting a strategic offensive in western Eurasia and a strategic defensive in the Far East.

Specific long-range objectives in furtherance of the overall military objective for future military defense assistance programs should be:

- a. Development of sufficient military power in Western Europe to prevent loss or destruction of the industrial complexes in that region and to control those areas from which future operations can best be projected;
- b. The security and the use of Greenland, Iceland, the Azores, the United Kingdom, and French Northwest Africa;
- c. Denial to our enemy of naval and air bases in Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France;
- d. Development of the Italian armed forces authorized by the peace treaty to their maximum strength and combat effectiveness. If peace treaty limitations are lifted, development of sufficient military power in Italy to delay materially and possibly to check Soviet invasion, to prevent loss of Sicily to an enemy, and to defend successfully those sea and air approaches within and adjacent to Italy which will be necessary for offensive operations;

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e. Development of sufficient military power in selected nations of the Eastern Mediterranean-Middle East area to prevent Greece, Turkey, and Iran from capitulating to communism during the ideological conflict; and in event of war, to retain for the United States and its allies base areas in Turkey, to delay materially any USSR advance, possibly to deny to the enemy the oil resources and oil facilities of the Middle East and, with allied support; to assure control by the western powers of the Eastern Mediterranean and the security of base areas in Egypt;

f. Development of sufficient military power in South Asia (India and Pakistan) to promote the internal security of the area and to assure its Western orientation.

g. Development of sufficient military power in selected nations of the Far East* and the Western Pacific Ocean area, to prevent further encroachment by communism in those areas; to insure, with the United States support, that in event of war, Japan, and the other Asian offshore islands, including the Philippines, are available for military use in order to constitute a multiple-front threat to the USSR, and by military action to delay any Communist invasion in other Far East and southeast Asia areas; and

h. Development of sufficient military power in Latin America to insure the security of the area and its external lines of communications and to furnish military forces for which United States or other allied forces might otherwise be used.

In connection with the foregoing specific military objectives for future military defense assistance programs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would reaffirm their view that military cooperation between Spain and members of the North Atlantic security system would be in the security interests of the United States. Western Germany, and Austria, when and if granted authority to rearm, should be included in this security system. In the security interests of the United States, sufficient military assistance should be provided to Yugoslavia to insure continued resistance to Moscow control since such an example of successful opposition might encourage movements of resistance to Moscow control in other satellite states.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are unable to predict the finite benefits to be achieved through the implementation of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. They expect, however, that, as implementation progresses, the internal security situation of the recipient nations should improve concurrently. In addition, from the standpoint of United States military planning, increases in the armaments of the nations of

* For the purposes of this paper, Far East is defined as that part of Asia east of India, including Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Indonesia, Indo-China, China, Japan, and eastern Siberia.

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Western Europe can be considered as a means of buying increased time for both preparations and movements, if there should be an invasion of that area. Further, the provision of new armaments of United States manufacture would serve to strengthen the industrial mobilization base of United States forces. The overall benefits to be derived are cumulative but over a period of time must depend largely upon the self-help efforts of the recipient nations.

The major portion of the funds appropriated in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 is earmarked for members of the North Atlantic Treaty organization possessing major capabilities for self-help. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot at this time recommend definite limitations on future assistance to these nations, they would suggest both progressive reductions in the aid to be provided in the future, and a time limit determined primarily by:

- a. Planned force requirements;
- b. The world situation generally;
- c. The finite benefits derived from each program toward the attainment of United States objectives; and
- d. The concrete demonstrations by recipient nations of self-help toward their national and collective security.

Further, and as a contingency in addition to a limit in time beyond which assistance to the North Atlantic Treaty members will not be extended, it should be emphasized the continuation of military aid even within that limit will be dependent upon the efforts for self-help and mutual aid exerted by each recipient nation since United States military aid can support but not replace efforts at self-help and will to resist.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue to review the objectives of future military assistance programs and will recommend changes in these objectives to you as they become appropriate.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(SIGNED)

OMAR N. BRADLEY,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington
February 2, 1950

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: U.S. Recognition of Vietnam,
Laos and Cambodia

1. The French Assembly (Lower House) ratified on 29 January by a large majority (396 - 193) the bill which, in effect, established Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as autonomous states within the French Union. The opposition consisted of 181 Communist votes with only 12 joining in from other parties. The Council of the Republic (Senate) is expected to pass the bills by the same approximate majority on or about February 3. President Auriol's signature is expected to follow shortly thereafter.

2. The French legislative and political steps thus taken will transform areas which were formerly governed as protectorates or Colonies into states within the French Union, with considerably more freedom than they enjoyed under their prior status. The French Government has indicated that it hopes to grant greater degrees of independence to the three states as the security position in Indochina allows, and as the newly formed governments become more able to administer the areas following withdrawal of the French.

3. Within Laos and Cambodia there are no powerful movements directed against the governments which are relatively stable. However, Vietnam has been the battleground since the end of World War II of conflicting political parties and military forces. Ho Chi Minh, who under various aliases, has been a communist agent in various parts of the world since 1925 and was able to take over the anti-French nationalist movement in 1945. After failing to reach agreement with the French regarding the establishment of an autonomous state of Vietnam, he withdrew his forces to the jungle and hill areas of

Vietnam

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Vietnam and has harassed the French ever since. His followers who are estimated at approximately 75,000 armed men, with probably the same number unarmed. His headquarters are unknown.

The French counter efforts have included, on the military side, the deployment of approximately 130,000 troops, of whom the approximately 50,000 are local natives serving voluntarily, African colonials, and a hard core made up of French troops and Foreign Legion units. Ho Chi Minh's guerrilla tactics have been aimed at denying the French control of Vietnam. On March 8, 1949 the French President signed an agreement with Bao Dai as the Head of State, granting independence within the French Union to the Government of Vietnam. Similar agreements were signed with the King of Laos and the King of Cambodia.

Recent developments have included Chinese Communist victories bringing those troops to the Indochina border; recognition of Ho Chi Minh as the head of the legal Government of Vietnam by Communist China (18 January) and by Soviet Russia (30 January).

4. Recognition by the United States of the three legally constituted governments of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia appears desirable and in accordance with United States foreign policy for several reasons. Among them are: encouragement to national aspirations under non-Communist leadership for peoples of colonial areas in Southeast Asia; the establishment of stable non-Communist governments in areas adjacent to Communist China; support to a friendly country which is also a signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty; and as a demonstration of displeasure with Communist tactics which are obviously aimed at eventual domination of Asia, working under the guise of indigenous nationalism.

Subject to your approval, the Department of State recommends that the United States of America extend recognition to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, following ratification by the French Government.

(signed) DEAN ACHESON

Approved

9(signed)

Harry S. Truman

February 3, 1950

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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FEB 4 1950

AMCONSUL,

SAIGON,

59

You SHLD deliver (for timing see DEPTTEL 58) the FOL Messages from the PRES to Bao Dai Laos and Cambodia After consultation FR High Commissioner Actual letters will FOL by pouch.

QTE Your Imperial Majesty:

I have Your Majesty's letter in which I am informed of the signing of the agreements of March 8, 1949 between Your Majesty, on behalf of Vietnam, and the President of the French Republic, on behalf of France. My Government has also been informed of the ratification on February 2, 1950 by the French Government of the agreements of March 8, 1949.

QTE Since these acts establish the Republic of Vietnam as an independent State within the French Union, I take this opportunity to congratulate Your Majesty and the people of Vietnam on this happy occasion. .

QTE The Government of the United States of America is pleased to welcome the Republic of Vietnam into the community of peace-loving nations of the world and to extend diplomatic recognition to the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. I look forward to an early exchange of diplomatic representatives between our two countries.

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QTE I take this opportunity to extend my personal greetings to Your Majesty with my best wishes for the prosperity and stability of Vietnam.

QTE His Imperial Majesty
Bao Dai,
Head of State of the
Republic of Vietnam. UNQTE

.
While you will present the letters in your capacity as CONGEN, PLS point out to the FOW Ministers of the three states that the letters of recognition also invite reply to the suggestion of exchange of DIPL REPS. DEPT understands France will acquiesce to this if requested by the three states. DEPT plans establish LEG Saigon with single Minister accredited three states. Mission to be headed by Chargé pending selection and appointment of Minister.

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ACHESON

¹Portion of telegram here deleted consists of similar letters to Kings of Laos and Cambodia.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE—DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

TELEGRAPH BRANCH

Icon: FE
0:

Control 8725

Rec'd February 18, 1950
7:31 p.m.

FROM: Bangkok
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 160, February 17, 10 p.m.
FOR MERCHANT FROM BUTTERWORTH.

View imminent departure Griffin mission and indications in Department 95 of February 10, noon that firm decision may be in process of being taken re military and other aid to Indochina, I thought you might like to have my impressions from conference discussions and talks with Thailand Prime Minister and Foreign Minister during which Stanton, Jessup and I pressed hard for recognition.

It is transparently clear that Asiatic neighbors of Indochina consider Bao Dai a French creation and a French puppet; despite current and anticipated actions of support by US and western powers they prepared sell his regime short, if status Bao Dai remains undradically modified; even if such changes made promptly, he must exert effective leadership comparable to Ho's.

We should realize that ECA and military aid from US, just as recognition by US, do not constitute "missing components". While absence of ECA and military aid, just as lack recognition, would prove disadvantageous, under present circumstances they are not of primary importance and will not constitute decisive factors. Conference found Gullion's analogy with Greece far from persuasive and, in fact, dangerous delusion.

"Missing component"

SEARCHED	✓
SERIALIZED	✓
INDEXED	
FILED	
APR 1950	
STATE DEPT	
COMMUNICATIONS	
RECORDS	
SECTION	
NO. 160	
DATE FEB 17 1950	

H. C. Hoy - P

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Return to the Liaison Center

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-2- #160, February 17, 10 p.m., from Bangkok

"Missing component" is further action by French which would place Vietnam in category of independent states.

Accordingly, Griffin mission should receive very precise and careful instructions prior to departure and it would be my recommendation that no ECA or military aid be committed to French Indochina unless France gives requisite public undertakings re further steps leading to status similar to Indonesia. Current French intentions seem epitomized by Parodi's statement to Gullion (INTEL February 7, 7 a.m.,) that "French Parliament could not be told Indochina accord ratified February 2 of only passing value and it would do more harm than good kindle unrealistic appetites in Vietnam which would necessarily be disappointed." Question, therefore, is what are the realistic nationalist appetites which will not be disappointed.

STANTON

ENL:MEM

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NSC 64

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February 27, 1950

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

to the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA

The enclosed report by the Department of State on the subject is submitted herewith for urgent consideration by the National Security Council and the Secretary of the Treasury.

It is recommended that, if the Council and the Secretary of the Treasury adopt the enclosed report, it be submitted to the President for his consideration with the recommendation that he approve the Conclusions contained therein and direct their implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government under the coordination of the Secretary of State.

JAMES S. LAY, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury

NSC 64

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D R A F T

REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA

THE PROBLEM

1. To undertake a determination of all practicable United States measures to protect its security in Indochina and to prevent the expansion of communist aggression in that area.

ANALYSIS

2. It is recognized that the threat of communist aggression against Indochina is only one phase of anticipated communist plans to seize all of Southeast Asia. It is understood that Burma is weak internally and could be invaded without strong opposition or even that the Government of Burma could be subverted. However, Indochina is the area most immediately threatened. It is also the only area adjacent to communist China which contains a large European army, which along with native troops is now in armed conflict with the forces of communist aggression. A decision to contain communist expansion at the border of Indochina must be considered as a part of a wider study to prevent communist aggression into other parts of Southeast Asia.

3. A large segment of the Indochinese nationalist movement was seized in 1945 by Ho Chi Minh, a Vietnamese who under various aliases has served as a communist agent for thirty years. He has attracted non-communist as well as communist elements to his support. In 1946, he attempted, but failed to secure French agreement to his recognition as the head of a government of Vietnam. Since then he has directed a guerrilla army in raids against French installations and lines of communication. French forces which have been attempting to restore law and order found themselves pitted against a determined adversary who manufactures effective arms locally, who received supplies of arms from outside sources, who maintained no capital or permanent headquarters and who was, and is able, to disrupt and harass almost any area within Vietnam (Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina) at will.

4. The United States has, since the Japanese surrender, pointed out to the French Government that the legitimate nationalist aspirations of the people of Indochina must be satisfied, and that a return to the prewar colonial rule is not possible. The Department of State has pointed out to the French Government that it was

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and is necessary to establish and support governments in Indochina particularly in Vietnam, under leaders who are capable of attracting to their causes the non-communist nationalist followers who had drifted to the Ho Chi Minh communist movement in the absence of any non-communist nationalist movement around which to plan their aspirations.

5. In an effort to establish stability by political means, where military measures had been unsuccessful, i.e., by attracting non-communist nationalists, now followers of Ho Chi Minh, to the support of anti-communist nationalist leaders, the French Government entered into agreements with the governments of the Kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia to elevate their status from protectorates to that of independent states within the French Union. The State of Vietnam was formed, with similar status, out of the former French protectorates of Tonkin, Annam and the former French Colony of Cochinchina. Each state received an increased degree of autonomy and sovereignty. Further steps towards independence were indicated by the French. The agreements were ratified by the French Government on 2 February 1950.

6. The Governments of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were officially recognized by the United States and the United Kingdom on February 7, 1950. Other Western powers have, or are committed to do likewise. The United States has consistently brought to the attention of non-communist Asian countries the danger of communist aggression which threatens them if communist expansion in Indochina is unchecked. As this danger becomes more evident it is expected to overcome the reluctance that they have had to recognize and support the three new states. We are therefore continuing to press those countries to recognize the new states. On January 18, 1950, the Chinese Communist Government announced its recognition of the Ho Chi Minh movement as the legal Government of Vietnam, while on January 30, 1950, the Soviet Government, while maintaining diplomatic relations with France, similarly announced its recognition.

7. The newly formed States of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia do not as yet have sufficient political stability nor military power to prevent the infiltration into their areas of Ho Chi Minh's forces. The French Armed Forces, while apparently effectively utilized at the present time, can do little more than to maintain the status quo. Their strength of some 140,000 does, however, represent an army in being and the only military bulwark in that area against the further expansion of communist aggression from either internal or external forces.

8. The presence of Chinese Communist troops along the border of Indochina makes it possible for arms, material and troops to move freely from Communist China to the northern Tonkin area now controlled by Ho Chi Minh. There is already evidence of movement of arms.

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9. In the present state of affairs, it is doubtful that the combined native Indochinese and French troops can successfully contain Ho's forces should they be strengthened by either Chinese Communist troops crossing the border, or Communist-supplied arms and material in quantity from outside Indochina strengthening Ho's forces.

CONCLUSIONS

10. It is important to United States security interests that all practicable measures be taken to prevent further communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Indochina is a key area of Southeast Asia and is under immediate threat.

11. The neighboring countries of Thailand and Burma could be expected to fall under Communist domination if Indochina were controlled by a Communist-dominated government. The balance of Southeast Asia would then be in grave hazard.

12. Accordingly, the Departments of State and Defense should prepare as a matter of priority a program of all practicable measures designed to protect United States security interests in Indochina.

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON



In reply refer to
IC

March 1, 1950

RESTRICTED

The Honorable
Robert Allen Griffin,
Chief, Economic Survey Mission to the
Southeast Asian Countries.

Sir:

I am pleased to inform you that the President has approved your designation as Chief of the Economic Survey Mission to the Southeast Asian Countries, with the personal rank of Minister. There is enclosed the President's letter of appointment.

This Mission has been established with the following basic objectives: (1) To determine justifiable projects needed in the countries to be visited for financing out of funds appropriated by Congress pursuant to Section 303 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act which will have immediate political significance; (2) To lay the groundwork for the anticipated Point 4 program in the Southeast Asian countries, with special attention given to the problem of avoiding disillusionment by keeping proposed projects within a proper perspective; (3) To advise the local authorities on the preparation for the Point 4 program, particularly with reference to the local conditions that will be required for Point 4 assistance, the extent and kind of participation which would be required of them in any joint project, and to the anticipated operating methods; (4) To brief the United States representatives in the area on current Department thinking regarding the anticipated Point 4 program; and (5) To investigate regional aspects of technical assistance programs. More detailed instructions for the conduct of this Mission will be furnished you in separate communications and may be supplemented from time to time by cable.

Since this is an official government Mission, it must act as a unit and express the views of the Government rather than the views of individuals. As Chief, you shall be responsible for such coordinated action, and in the event of disagreement within the Mission, your decision shall be final and binding.

However

RESTRICTED

However, this is not intended to bar the expression of personal views, provided such views do not run counter to the laws of the United States, the policy of the Administration or your instructions. Where personal views are properly expressed, they should be clearly identified as personal.

You will appreciate, I am sure, that the members of the Mission are not authorized to offer any written or oral statement which might be construed as committing this Government to a definite course of action or which might involve an obligation to expend governmental funds not previously appropriated and allocated.

You are requested to communicate with the Chief of the United States Mission in each country on your itinerary and to seek his advice and counsel as circumstances warrant. Mr. McAfee of the Department, who has been designated as one of your Advisers, may be looked to for assistance in your relations with the United States Missions and with the Department.


You are authorized to delegate to another member of the Mission all authority held by you in the event of your inability to exercise the functions of your position.

Details of the financial and transportation arrangements for your journey are contained in a Travel Order which will be sent to you under separate cover.

It is expected that you will transmit by air pouch or cable preliminary reports from each country visited, and at the conclusion of the Mission a comprehensive report listing justifiable immediate projects, appraising the local governments' attitudes toward collaboration in anticipated programs, and appraising the possibilities of a regional approach to the implementation of programs to meet regional needs. Enclosed for your convenience is the usual outline for conference reports, which, though it will not quite fit your requirements, may nonetheless prove useful as a convenient checklist of a number of the items to be covered and the format which is desirable in all reports to the Department. You may wish to supplement this formal report with a confidential report.

You and your colleagues undertake your responsibilities with the assurance of my keen interest and wholehearted support. I have every confidence in the individual ability of the Mission members and in the capacity of the Mission as a whole, under your able leadership, to reflect credit on the United States in this important undertaking.

Very truly yours,


Under Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Letter of appointment.
2. Outline for report.

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March 7, 1950

Dear General Burns:

Embodied below is a brief statement of Department of State policy in Indochina and Southeast Asia. I believe that an examination of this statement will facilitate your consideration of NSC 64.

The Department of State continues to hold that Southeast Asia is in grave danger of Communist domination as a consequence of aggression from Communist China and of internal subversive activities. The Department of State maintains that Indochina, subject as it is to the most immediate danger, is the most strategically important area of Southeast Asia.

The Department of State believes that within the limitations imposed by existing commitments and strategic priorities, the resources of the United States should be deployed to reserve Indochina and Southeast Asia from further Communist encroachment. The Department of State has accordingly already engaged all its political resources to the end that this object be secured. The Department is now engaged in the process of urgently examining what additional economic resources can effectively be engaged in the same operation.

It is now, in the opinion of the Department, a matter of the greatest urgency that the Department of Defense assess the strategic aspects of the situation and consider, from the military point of view, how the United States can best contribute to the prevention of further Communist encroachment in that area.

The military assessment requested above is necessary to a final determination by this Government of the manner in which United States policy in this area shall be executed.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Dean Rusk
Deputy Under Secretary

Major General James H. Burns,
Office of the Secretary
of Defense,
Department of Defense.

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T E L E G R A M R E C E I V E D

From: SECSTATE WASHINGTON

Date: March 9, 1950.

No: 136

Code: Secret

Recd: March 10, 1950

Sent Saigon 136, Paris 1023, London 1070, repeated Tokyo 212

March 9, 5 PM, Secret

Re Paris tel 62 to Saigon. Dept believes situation clearly points to possibility of friction between French and Viets re mechanics of handling US military aid. Although vitally interested in satisfactory solution, Dept feels nothing to gain by US intervention in what is a matter for joint decision three states and French. Therefore Legation should exercise caution in maintaining neutral attitude unless lack agreement endangers program, in which case Dept will act. Your continuing progress reports required.

Similarly the related problems concerning the relations of the states with France and with each other are obviously capable of friction, which US should be careful to avoid.

In meantime, the status of the French prepared request for military aid has been received in only basic form, and awaits further clarification from Paris (see Deptel 850 to Paris, repeated Saigon as 109). Request for economic aid in more understandable terms has been received. Embassy here states PIGNON has copies both economic and military lists Saigon for information GRIFFIN Mission and Legation. Exercise care ensure no embarrassment to French or states results from your use such lists. BAO DAI's long request to JESSUP now being translated, and not yet available for study. French request for military aid from UK not yet available Dept.

Against background foregoing, following comments on Urtel 157, March 6.

Paragraph 2. Agencies represented on NAC working group have received all relevant documents on economic discussions. Summary Bao Dai Memo likewise available, but full translation not completed. Military requests in present basic form (see above) not made available to all civil agencies pending clarification.

Paragraph 3. Dept has no information.

Paragraph 4. Three states and French must, we feel, reach own agreement on unique lists. Above all, we cannot urge acceptance of one or another draft unless we are prepared to accept it, and this is not true of any presentation hitherto made.

Paragraph 5. Griffin Mission function is clearly understood to be fact finding.

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ACHESON

Copy for Griffin Mission

CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAM SENT

To: SECSTATE, WASHINGTON

Date: March 13, 1950

No: 176, 86 to Paris

Code: Conf

Charged to: Goe

Sent Dept 176 repeated Paris 86, Dept pass Paris CONFIDENTIAL

FROM GRIFFIN.

1. Mission work till now has been limited to receiving requests Fr, Viets, Cambodians, Laotians. None of these coordinated yet by them or us, although French have shown at least part of their program as developed here to Viets. This has been time consuming process of many meetings and postponements. No difficulty anticipated with relatively simple Cambodian Laotian program as these people cooperate with French and are suspicious of Viets.

2. Puzzled by paragraph five Deptel 136, March 9. My understanding was that this Mission was instructed Cable program recommendations from field after examination (fact finding) proposals and that subject had urgency. We have repeatedly informed French and Viets of our hope that they have meeting of minds at least on essential and urgent items so that US could act more promptly. We have not tried to force either party to consolidate its program with the other and we have not urged any course in the sense second sentence of your paragraph 4. In fact our concern, clearly stated in Legtel reference, has been to preserve our government from being put into such a position.

3. I understand that ours is an economic aid mission and our remarks in sense of paragraph 2 above have been confined to economic aid. However, two programs should be mutually supporting and will possibly overlap to some extent. Dept is entirely right in foreseeing grave friction on distribution of military aid. The controversy on military aid which is budding without any help from the mission could jeopardize success of economic program. (Legation believes Department's views about not venturing any remarks on subject reconciling views on military aid may be inconsistent with Deptels 122, March 4 and 128, March 8). In view of effervescence in press and French and Viet Govt circles over AFP report that all aid would be through France, mission and Legation have thought opportune to let things simmer down before trying sell Bao Dai and Carpentier on views in referenced Deptels. My denial of agency report should calm matters somewhat.

4. Extremely urgent to prepare and initiate program at earliest date or political benefit will be vitiated. Fact finding here should produce report reasonably believed to be acceptable Pignon as well as Bao Dai. If entire matter is put aside for negotiation in remote capitals in future sometime, efforts to make good-will for and with Bao Dai elements might be destroyed. We have just been informed by LEDOUX on his arrival from Paris that economic aid program for fifteen million submitted directly to Washington and being studied by interested agencies there. From Ledoux's brief comment on make-up this Paris/Washington submission not realistic economic or political being designed more to relieve French balance-of-payments position than achieve US objectives of political economic support in Indochina. (See Legtel 165, March 9 paragraph 10 (c). Ledoux requesting permission Pignon give us copy this evening. Composition of program is of course very important. Must emphasize strongly that how American aid is extended and how rapidly are factors at least as important as how much.

5. LIPSMAN, DICKINSON and BLUM have worked most usefully with Mission. Dr. MOYER's presence has been immeasurably helpful.

6. You may anticipate at least recommendation that five million dollars ECA funds if they can be made available current fiscal year should be employed here. We will suggest what phases program should be allocated that fund. You may also anticipate that in this particular country GRIFFIN and GULLION may recommend ECA Mission take complete charge all economic aid under coordination by Chief diplomatic mission. This respect perhaps ECA should be alerted as top job will require person good stature and capacity (Dickinson and Blum have seen, concurred this proposal and Dickinson will discuss on return).

7. Cambodians and Laotians welcome technical aid prospects. Viet have hitherto insisted without much documentation they well furnished with Viet technicians. We learn today they under misapprehension they would have to pay salaries American US technicians sent here which may account for their past attitude. They now preparing requests for considerable technical assistance. French have demonstrated great technical capacity here in past and have many able technicians. They show no enthusiasm for Point IV. While March 8 Agreements provide priority French technicians, French might show some latitude this connection. Their skepticism reported due belief Point IV has too little money and drive behind it and will not bear fruit for many years.

8. Gullion concurs.

Griffin
LAGullion/vdm/cla

GULLION

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SECSTATE

WASHINGTON

_____ MARCH 16, 1950. _____

Sent Dept as _____: Dept pass Paris _____ and ECA from
Saigon

FROM GRIFFIN

A- The visit of this mission in Indochina has resulted in fol conclusions:

1- The wave communism is riding in Indochina is predominantly a nationalist movement, not econ, social or ideological-

2- While situation is serious it does not justify defeatism, but does justify effective application US aid in endeavor to strengthen Bao Dai Viet Govt versus communist-controlled Vietminh.

3- Viet Govt of Bao Dai is not a puppet, but an intensely nationalistic Govt struggling to secure more control and authority from Fr. Most these Viet elements with whom we have come in contact are outspokenly anti-Fr.

4- It is feasible thru econ aid program help win from HO's Vietminh the non-Communist elements that continue support Ho, as well as large proportion of present numerous fence-sitters. It is believed this can be promoted by application Amer aid thru means Bao Dai Govt, increasing its appearance of independence, its local and international prestige, its ability to conduct useful works for benefit of common people. US aid wld thereby become major contributing factor psychologically and materially, provided it is bold, quick and generous.

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5. Fr Army altho under severe pressure is gradually achieving its important limited objective of clearing Tonkin and Saigon deltas; most important population, rice-producing, communications and urban sectors. As far as we able observe locally, Fr Army and Viet units of same well led, efficient, will not withdraw in face of Commie threat, US aid following closely in wake of operations will speed task by villege rehabilitation program.

6. Chi-Commie invasion threat does not appear immed. US aid will better prepare Fr and Viets to checkmate it and sterilize areas of Vietminh infection which might link up with threat. On other hand, mil intelligence has verified that limited but potentially increased Chi-Commies material support to HO has begun, suggesting advisability speedy US aid.

7. Purely econ justification lies in extreme poverty liberated areas, deterioration public works, irrigation systems, rice culture, destruction by Vietminh of farmsteads, villeges, telecommunications, health facilities, etc., as personally surveyed by mission in Tonkin. Deplorable health conditions of people in Tonkin warrant immed relief.

B. Above facts govern type and tempo of US aid.

In general it shld:

1. Concentrate on projects which will best support mil and polit objectives.

2. Show dramatic and immed results and arouse wide and realizable hopes of prompt effect.

3. Be designed improve welfare, living conditions as many people as soon as possible in preference long-term projects, or projects justified reference to Fr balance of payment needs.

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4. Develop competence in new Govt administrations and create basic services and beginnings long-range program.

C. Fol are specific urgent programs for 15 months ending Jan 30, 1951, totalling \$23,500,000, exclusive of mil aid and present indirect US aid thru Fr, and derived MI as result of study requests of local Govts for \$304,000,000 short term and \$316,000,000 long-term projects, incl both dollar and piastre costs.

1. Rural rehabilitation

a) Health and sanitation, med supplies and equipment, incl mobile units, educational supplies, bldgs for clinics, water purification--\$6,000,000.

b) Engineering Units--20 centers, to be pilot mechanized operations. Requirement for each center: 5 tractor units, attachments, and parts for land preparation, irrigation ditch repair, total 20 centers, \$2,000,000 (incl maintenance and supplies). Earth-moving equipment for dike operations and canals \$1,500,000.

c) Agricultural supplies

20,000 tons ammonium phosphate--\$2,000,000

Farm vegetable seed \$50,000. Farm tools (\$1,000,000)

d) Rice mills. \$2,000,000

e) Short-term construction roads, \$1,000,000.

2. Commodities-- \$2,500,000

cotton and cotton yarn

Reinforcing steel

Galvanized sheeting

Raw silk

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3. Telecommunications-- \$1,000,000
4. Technical equipment, publications, training aids-- \$600,000
5. Trainees to US (50 at \$5,000)-- \$250,000
6. Power, light and engineering, mines and ports, bridges, fish reduction plants, small craft-- \$3,000,000
7. Propaganda funds supplementing USIS program-- \$500,000.

Program at this time obviously preliminary. Complete fiscal info not yet available; mil security many regions in flux; and pending Interstate Conf may change bases entire program. There shld be continued development details of program by Leg at Saigon, pending establishment operating aid mission. Understand econ staff of Leg to be augmented and recommend be done without delay so studies can proceed vigorously. Fact that these recommendations tentative does not reduce urgency that operating mission be put in field with maximum speed. Even after operating mission established, must expect continued changes program view of fast-changing situation and additional fact-finding. Above program contained within moderate limits due to limitation of funds believed to be available. Program capable quick substantial expansion and therefore wider, stronger impact if China aid residue made available general area. Further study would also reveal additional outlets useful expenditures.

D. Field Organization

Fol mission organization recommended:

a) all econ aid programs, whatever legislative authority utilized, to be administered by single econ mission. It is recommended that ECA set up the field organization and direct the operations of Indochina economic aid program.

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b) Objectives of economic mission to be established in agreement diplomatic mission, and detailed activities having political impact to be undertaken, modified, or terminated in agreement diplomatic mission.

c) Chief of economic mission (GECOM) to have responsibility for effective contribution of all members of mission to objectives so established, and for coordination of their activities with policies established with diplomatic mission; and to have administrative authority over all members of mission whether on payroll of mission or of another government agency participating in economic program.

d) Activities of mission to be carried out only on the basis of renewable project or aid agreements, negotiated by chief of diplomatic mission and GECOM. In bilateral or multi-lateral bodies set up similar to JCRR or servicios; head US representatives to be responsible to GECOM.

e) GECOM to be appointed by ECA recognizing that GECOM must also derive authority under 303, Point IV, or other legislation covering available funds. GECOM and as many members of mission as possible should have good working knowledge of language.

f) Recommend consideration be given to Joint Administrative Staff to handle all house-keeping functions for Legation and Econ Mission.

1. Propaganda.

Separate cable prepared on this subject.

F. SOME PROBLEMS

(1) Financial Considerations

Principal financial question is extent to which Viet Nam and other States finance their requirements to support U.S. aid program possibly including payment of counterpart for at least some items U.S. aid.

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Viet Nam budgetary deficit, not including local French civilian and military items, approximately 1.5 billion piastres current fiscal year. Expenditures about 2.8 billions and revenues about 1.3 billions. This deficit being financed by Bank of Indo-China advances to Viet Nam Treasury secured by promise French Treasury make francs available to Bank. Do not yet know how it is planned finance deficit after Bank of Indo-China is no longer Bank of Issue.

Most of proposed U.S. aid would be through Government-type projects rather than directly to private consumers who could be expected pay piastres. Ability Viet Nam provide counterpart would depend on level its cash balances which we do not yet know; on whether Bank Indo-China or new Bank of Issue would lend to Viet Nam and on what terms; and on whether Viet Nam would be able divert present outlays to counterpart payments U.S. aid. Not to be expected Viet Nam would be able increase non-loan budgetary receipts or borrow by means of security issues. Possibility of borrowing from the New Bank of Issue cannot be determined until its powers established by forthcoming inter-State conference.

To certain extent counterpart requirement may reduce political effectiveness of aid because aid is no longer outright gift. However, this probably outweighed by usefulness of counterpart which can be very great in channeling local currency expenditures for constructive purposes. Because aid will probably come from several funds, possibly including ECA which generally requires counterpart, it seems desirable have rule requiring counterpart in principle but waiving wherever justified, e.g. where no local currency available or no economically productive results expected. In this connection

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suggest you consider possibility generating piastre counterpart through direct programing ECA dollar aid Indo-China now going indirectly through France.

(2) Locus of negotiations

Vietnamese very suspicious of all negotiations conducted in Paris. They have as yet no official representatives abroad. Moreover, they seem to trust Pignon more than other French. Consequently, as much economic and political negotiation as possible should be carried on in Saigon, if it is our desire increase status new governments.

(3) Administration of aid

In principle Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia should be direct recipients of economic aid and it is so recommended. Allocations deriving from French funds already appropriated or allocations of French counterpart would of course require French authorizations, preferably large scale en bloc.

Aid agreements should be with each separate state, but French will have to be handled with gloves. Extension of some kinds of aid to associated states en bloc has many merits; tends to promote regional understanding, but strongly opposed by Vietnam and to lesser extent by other states as device for continuing French control. French repudiate any idea such control, claim quadripartite cooperation as provided in March 8 agreement is necessary to prevent wrecking complementary economies IndoChinese countries, to preserve Laos and Cambodia from encroachments of Viet Nam, prevent corruption and inefficiency. Claim their only interest is as counselors. (See Leg. tel _____).

Present intransigency on both sides, Viet emotionalism, their impatience at delay in applying conventions for application of March 8 Agreements, feeling that latter is already outdated, bode no good for forthcoming

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Interstate conference and promise serious difficulties in relations French and three states in future.

(4) French Attitude Point 4 and U. S. Technicians

With respect to possible Viet Nam requests for U. S. Technicians, just before final meeting last night, French working civil representatives expressed very literal view of Section 4 March 8 Agreements reserving priority for French technical advisers. We have not yet had opportunity to confirm with (Pignon) French claim March 8 agreements represented basis their relations Indochinese states and should not be tampered with. Indicated possibility some latitude in definition of technicians and readiness to accept American technicians in a peculiarly U.S. field, but their general attitude was such as to cause us disquiet as to possibility exercising even minimum U.S. supervision of U.S. program.

(5) Maintaining equilibrium

Mission aware local national governments hold unrealistic views toward many government problems and that any precipitous weakening French influence and control might in near future lead to chaos playing into hands of Ho Chi Minh. Mission doubtful if local governments have administrative machinery capable most efficient handling aid but accepts this condition as inevitable calculated risk in complex situation. Mission reiterates this is delicate situation, and efforts to build up new governments should not undermine French prestige and morale here and in France.

(G) NEED FOR URGENT ACTION

Obstacles and difficulties innate in this complex and turbulent political situation must not be permitted to retard decision to allocate aid money required, to enter negotiations for aid agreements, to appoint and expedite

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operating mission, to have ships arrive earliest date with aid materiel.

The crux of the situation lies in prompt decisive action if desired political effect is to be attained.

(H) Gullion, Dickinson, Blum have collaborated in preparation this cable and concur.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRET

6 P.M.
MAR 29 1950

AMEMBASSY,

PARIS.
1363

Dept has predicated its course of action in Indochina since FEB 2 this year on assumption that fundamental objectives of US and France in Indochina are in substantial coincidence. Dept assumes:

1. That French are determined to protect IC from further COMMIE encroachments by POLIT, ECON as well as MIL measures.
2. That French understand that success of MIL operation, i.e. containment of northern border against COMMIE penetration as well as reduction of Ho's forces elsewhere IC, depends, in the end on overcoming opposition of indigenous population.
3. Therefore France proposes in support of this policy to strengthen Bao Dai and the Kings of Laos and Cambodia in every practical way, to end that non-COMMIE nationalists abandon Ho, support Bao Dai and Kings and can thus reduce guerrilla activity.

It is evident from reaction Asian states to US and FR effort to secure their recognition Bao Dai, from attitude Scandinavian powers and from reactions US press that large segment public opinion both East and West continues to regard Bao Dai and two Kings as French puppets not enjoying nor likely to enjoy degree of autonomy within FR Union accorded them under MAR 8 agreements, analogous to that accorded INDO by NETH.

US Govt has used its POLIT resources and is now engaged in measures to accelerate its ECON and financial assistance to IC states. As you know Dept has requested Joint Chiefs of Staff to QTE assess the strategic aspects of the situation and consider, from the mil point of view, how the United States can best contribute to the prevention of further Communist encroachment in that area. UNQTE You are of course familiar with position Jessup has taken RE SEM during his recent tour. Dept accordingly considers that its position is clear and that the character of its past actions and proposed undertakings justifies its suggesting to FR a course of action which it believes requisite to success of operation Indochina.

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As said foregoing it appears to Dept that true character FR concessions to IC nationalism under MAR 8 agreements and ultimate intentions in that area are clear to Dept but not RPT not clear to other interested parties. DEPT believes that Indochinese NATL movement, interested Asiatic states and large segment public opinion Western world unsympathetic and apathetic to this great issue because FR have not made these elements sufficiently clear. You will surely understand that DEPT does not RPT not believe that present situation IC calls for further substantive concessions from FR at this time involving parliamentary action to Bao Dai or two Kings. Obviously Bao Dai and company barely able to discharge responsibilities they are now facing. No part of representations which DEPT suggests you make to FR SHLD be construed as arguing for increase in concessions at this time. This connection, DEPT strongly of view that transfer of Palace to Bao Dai most important single propaganda move possible now; Abbott emphasizes this, suggesting suitable attendant ceremonies. It must be clear to you and through you to FR that DEPT's concern at present is only that FR make its present position and future intentions clear to non-COMMIE neutral world.

DEPT had previously considered asking that you transmit in appropriate form to FR FONOFF note quoted below. Upon reflection in the course of which views Jessup and Butterworth NECD DEPT believes you SHLD make strong oral representations FR FONOFF using FOL lines as basic guidance in such manner as WID in your judgment best serve the achievement objectives identified foregoing. Your advice as to manner and timing of such approach awaited by Dept.

QTE The US Govt has expressed its gratification at the ratification by the FR GOVT of the agreements with the GOVTS of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The real and continuing interest of the US in the strengthening and stabilization of anti-COMMIE NATL regimes in Indochina is well known to the GOVT of France as is the full confidence of the US in the intentions of the FR GOVT to adopt all measures requisite to providing the three states with the strength, POLIT and MIL, without which they will be unable to defeat Ho Chi Minh and his foreign COMMIE allies.

QTE The Govts of France and the US have long considered that the recognition of the GOVTS of the three states by Asian states was a matter of prime importance in order that the anti-COMMIE NATL movements in Indochina be accorded, in the eyes of the world, their true characters as genuine NATL movements and not, as world communism alleges, the creatures of INNER QTE Western imperialism END INNER QTE. The US Govt has, during the past several weeks, approached the several Asian GOVTS most IMED concern with the state of affairs in Indochina, impressing upon them the desirability of their IMED recognizing the GOVTS of the

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three new states. The Thai Govt recognized the Indochinese states on FEB 28. Unfortunately, the US REPS accredited to the remaining Asian countries have been informed by the officials of those countries that they regard the GOVTS of the three states as FR puppets and that, more important, they are not convinced of the genuine character of FR intentions ultimately to accord the states of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia the full measures of independence and sovereignty which have recently been transferred by the NETH to INDO. The responsible ministers of the Asian powers concerned have stated in substance that were the Republic of France to announce publicly that the present agreements were the first steps in an orderly evolutionary process, the end and purpose of which is to accord the three states of Indochina complete independence, sovereignty and administration of their own affairs (within the FR Union), those Asiatic states WID be prepared favorably to consider recognition of the three states in Indochina even before such additional transfers of sovereignty WID have actually been made. Therefore, while Dept obviously unable guarantee recognition and support for such statement, Dept believes that in absence such statement further acts of recognition by Asian states not forthcoming. Dept keenly aware of self-evident fact that INDO cannot administer complexities Indochinese affairs without FR assistance. Dept determined as matter of general policy to emphasize interdependence France and Indochina as was successfully done in case NETH and Indonesians. DEPT believes that independence and autonomy of three IC states must clearly be understood to lie within FR Union.

The GOVT of the US is aware of the concessions granted by the Republic of France in negotiating and ratifying the Agreements. The US GOVT has indicated to the Govt of France its desire to be of assistance to the three states and to the FR ADMIN in Indochina in enabling them successfully to contain and liquidate communism in Indochina. The US GOVT is aware of the fact that the GOVT of France shares its concern that communism be excluded not only from Indochina but from the entire SEA region. The execution of this policy requires, above all things, a unanimity of support on the part of the nations of SEA of the anti-COMME Indochinese nationalist GOVTS of Indochina.

QTE With full consciousness of the difficulties involved, the US GOVT requests the Govt of France seriously to consider the issuance at the earliest possible moment of a public statement of the character identified in the foregoing. While it is not for the DEPT to suggest the particularities of the text of such a statement, the DEPT believes that the FR GOVT SHID make clear therein the concessions to Indochinese nationalism which it made in the M.R. 8 agreements, and the supplementary accords lest both FR accomplishments and intentions in this great matter be tragically misunderstood not only in Asia but in the Western world as

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Mr. Griffin

Saigon via Dept

April 9, 3 pm, 1950

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Secret

April 11, 10 am, 1950

ROUTINE

EMBASSY DJAKARTA

Sent Dept 244 rptd Paris 121 Djakarta 19 from Saigon.

April 9, 6 pm for Griffin.

Fol is comment Huu appointment:

1. Appt tran Van Huu as Primin will be interpreted some quarters here and America as check to evolution independent Vietnam (Legtel 242 Apr 9) Huu is wealthy man from Cochina China traditionally more Francoophile than other areas. He is able citizen and patriotic Vietnamese but his background presents propaganda opportunities to enemies, northerners and disgruntled supporters of his rival primin Long.
2. On other hand nomination has certain advantages. As Bao Dai points out, principal soft spot is in south and Huu has real prestige, knows how to make influence felt in villages, has large amount Catholic support, has countryman's touch despite wealth. Bao Daists may also join govt. Huu claims to have abstained from joining earlier cabinet and his coming into new government shows he thinks Bao Dai-BR partnership going concern especially with US as silent partner.
3. Believe it will be easier negotiate aid formulas with Huu govt than Long not only because Long and Pignon crossed swords on matter but because Huu considerably more realistic. Long wanting to stay on would probably have grasped any aid formula given him by America.

4. Long failed for variety reasons. His personality rubbed people wrong way, he had few contemporaries in Govt (63 is ancient in these latitudes) he tried to run four jobs himself, he could not conciliate Tonkin, he did not work miracle in applying Mar 8 agreement, he had bad luck in having riot break out on Mar 19 (for which local officials more responsible than he) causing Viets lose face before America. UNPAID(daily?) his enemies taxed him with this and with failure to put on big show Griffin Mission. Finally he humiliated Fignon publicly at final five cornered meeting Griffin Mission.

5. Fr would probably never admit latter influenced them but it did. Fr have powerful leverage on any govt in controlling rate of transfer of powers under Mar 8 agreement and execution of supplementary accords. If a Vietnam govt does not get powers rapidly from Fr it comes under cross-fire of own people and Fr, situation Fr can maneuver to nicety. Of course this cannot be done indefinitely. Exact manner and extent to which it occurred this time may never be known but Bao Dai's and Long's accounts sufficiently circumstantial to indicate something like this happened. Nothing so crude as dictum by Fignon or consultation of him by Bao Dai took place. Think Fr would undoubtedly have preferred dictum but Bao Dai opposed, Saco saving continuance Long over Easter probably also his idea.

6. Fol are implications for US policy:

A. Prospect of US aid indirectly cause for crisis by inducing Viets hyper-confidence and also by furnishing occasion for Viet Minh demonstration.

B. Any Viets who lose by change and think we are responsible will be bitter and may magnify \hat{r} our role.

C. In view of overall objectives and aid programs and also because of absence party parliamentary system here as we know it, better for US if national union govt set up. Yet if we took any initiative we would have assume some re-

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responsibility. This may eventually become necessary as it did in Greece but not now. Nevertheless believe Long ought to stay in govt in some capacity probably information and that other cabinet broadening desirable. Do not believe we should go behind innocent inquiries and disingenuous hints for time being.

D. Aid program can be worked out more easily with Hu govt. But fact it appear to have promoted change at least partly because Long's insistence on Viet receiving aid directly should cause US stick to our guns in establishing formula giving Viet adequate recognition and participation. I aware best contribution I can make is to suggest Dept concrete proposals. This impractical in govt crisis and because press other business but hope produce something soon. Dept's reaction various points this tel would be useful.

Signed Gullion.

Acheson

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10 April 1950
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Strategic Assessment of Southeast Asia

(SECDEF HAS SEEN)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied your memorandum, dated 10 March 1950, with its enclosures,* in which you requested their views regarding:

a. The strategic importance, from the military point of view, of Southeast Asia;

b. NSC 64, a report by the Department of State on the position of the United States with respect to Indochina, which is now before the National Security Council for consideration;

c. The measures that, from the military point of view, might be taken to prevent Communist expansion into Southeast Asia;

d. The order of magnitude and means of implementation of such measures; and

e. A French aide-memoire on the subject of aid for Indochina, dated 16 February 1950.

1. In light of U. S. strategic concepts, the integrity of the offshore island chain from Japan to Indonesia is of critical strategic importance to the United States.

2. The mainland states of Southeast Asia also are at present of critical strategic importance to the United States because:

a. They are the major sources of certain strategic materials required for the completion of United States stock pile projects;

b. The area is a crossroad of communications;

c. Southeast Asia is a vital segment in the line of containment of communism stretching from Japan southward and around to the Indian Peninsula. The security of the three

*See letter from Mr. Rusk to General Burns, dated March 7, 1950, reproduced at the end of this memorandum.

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major non-Communist base areas in this quarter of the world--Japan, India, and Australia--depends in a large measure on the denial of Southeast Asia to the Communists. If Southeast Asia is lost, these three base areas will tend to be isolated from one another;

d. The fall of Indochina would undoubtedly lead to the fall of the other mainland states of Southeast Asia. Their fall would:

(1) Require changing the Philippines and Indonesia from supporting positions in the Asian offshore island chain to front-line bases for the defense of the Western Hemisphere. It would also call for a review of the strategic deployment of United States forces in the Far East; and

(2) Bring about almost immediately a dangerous condition with respect to the internal security of the Philippines, Malaya, and Indonesia, and would contribute to their probable eventual fall to the Communists;

e. The fall of Southeast Asia would result in the virtually complete denial to the United States of the Pacific littoral of Asia. Southeast Asian mainland areas are important in the conduct of operations to contain Communist expansion;

f. Communist control of this area would alleviate considerably the food problem of China and would make available to the USSR important strategic materials. In this connection, Soviet control of all the major components of Asia's war potential might become a decisive factor affecting the balance of power between the United States and the USSR. "A Soviet position of dominance over Asia, Western Europe, or both, would constitute a major threat to United States security"; and

g. A Soviet position of dominance over the Far East would also threaten the United States position in Japan since that country could thereby be denied its Asian markets, sources of food and other raw materials. The feasibility of retention by the United States of its Asian offshore island bases could thus be jeopardized.

3. In the light of the foregoing strategic considerations pertaining to the area of Southeast Asia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, concur in the conclusions in NSC 64.

4. Military forces of both France and the United Kingdom are now actively opposing communism in Southeast Asia. Small indigenous

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forces are allied with them. In addition, the generally inadequate indigenous forces of the independent states are actively engaged in attempting to maintain internal security in the face of Communist aggression tactics.

5. It appears obvious from intelligence estimates that the situation in Southeast Asia has deteriorated and, without United States assistance, this deterioration will be accelerated. In general, the basic conditions of political and economic stability in this area, as well as the military and internal security conditions, are unsatisfactory. These factors are closely inter-related and it is probable that, from the long-term point of view, political and economic stability is the controlling factor. On the other hand, the military situation in some areas, particularly Indochina, is of pressing urgency.

6. With respect to the measures which, from the United States military point of view, might be taken to prevent Communist expansion in Southeast Asia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend early implementation of military aid programs for Indochina, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Burma. Malaya might also be included provided the British by their actions in the areas in Asia where they have primary interest evince a determined effort to resist the expansion of communism and present sufficient military justification for aid. The effectiveness of these military aid programs would be greatly increased by appropriate public statements of United States policy in Southeast Asia.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the military aid from funds already allocated by the President for the states of Southeast Asia be delivered at the earliest practicable date. They further recommend that the presently unallocated portion of the President's emergency fund under Section 303 of Public Law 329 (81st Congress, 1st Session), be planned and programmed as a matter of urgency.

8. Precise determination of the amounts required for military aid, special covert operations, and concomitant economic and psychological programs in Southeast Asia cannot be made at this time since the financial requirements will, to a large extent, depend on the success of aid and other programs now in the process of implementation. In the light of the world situation, however, it would appear that military aid programs and other measures will be necessary in Southeast Asia at least during the next fiscal year and in at least the same general over-all order of magnitude. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, strongly recommend that appropriations for over-all use in the general area of Asia be sought for the next fiscal year in terms similar to those under Section 303 of Public Law 329 (81st Congress, 1st Session). It is believed that approximately \$100,000,000 will be required for the military portion of this program.

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9. In view of the history of military aid in China, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urge that these aid programs be subject, in any event, to the following conditions:

a. That United States military aid not be granted unconditionally; rather, that it be carefully controlled and that the aid program be integrated with political and economic programs; and

b. That requests for military equipment be screened first by an officer designated by the Department of Defense and on duty in the recipient state. These requests should be subject to his determination as to the feasibility and satisfactory coordination of specific military operations. It should be understood that military aid will only be considered in connection with such coordinated operational plans as are approved by the representative of the Department of Defense on duty in the recipient country. Further, in conformity with current procedures, the final approval of all programs for military materiel will be subject to the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a Southeast Asia Aid Committee be appointed with State, Defense and ECA representation which will be responsible for the development and implementation of the program for the general area of Southeast Asia. Requests for aid should be screened by the field representatives of the committee in consultation with the local authorities in the countries concerned.

11. Present arrangements for military aid to Indonesia through the military attaches and to the Philippines through the Joint United States Military Aid Group appear to be satisfactory and should be continued.

12. A small military aid group should be established in Thailand to operate in conformity with the requirements in paragraph 9 above. Arrangements for military aid should be made directly with the Thai Government.

13. In view of the very unsettled conditions in Burma, the program for military aid to that country should, for the time being at least, be modest. The arrangements should be made after consultation with the British, and could well be handled by the United States Armed Forces attaches to that country. Arrangements for military aid to Malaya, if and when authorized, should be handled similarly except that request should, in the first instance, originate with British authorities.

14. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the political implications involved in military aid to Indochina. It must be appreciated,

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however, that French armed forces of approximately 140,000 men are in the field and that if these were to be withdrawn this year because of political considerations, the Bao Dai regime probably could not survive even with United States aid. If the United States were now to insist upon independence for Vietnam and a phased French withdrawal from that country, this might improve the political situation. The French could be expected to interpose objections to, and certainly delays in, such a program. Conditions in Indochina, however, are unstable and the situation is apparently deteriorating rapidly so that the urgent need for at least an initial increment of military and economic aid is psychologically overriding. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, recommend the provision of military aid to Indochina at the earliest practicable date under a program to implement the President's action approving the allocation of 15 million dollars for Indochina and that corresponding increments of political and economic aid be programmed on an interim basis without prejudice to the pattern of the policy for additional military, political and economic aid that may be developed later.

15. In view of the considerations set forth in paragraph 14 above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the immediate establishment of a small United States military aid group in Indochina, to operate in conformity with the requirements in paragraph 9 above. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would expect the senior member of this group to sit in consultation with military representatives of France and Vietnam and possibly of Laos and Cambodia. In addition to screening requests for materiel, he would be expected to insure full coordination of military plans and efforts between the French and Vietnamese forces and to supervise the allocation of materiel. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe in the possibility of success of a prompt coordinated United States program of military, political, and economic aid to Southeast Asia and feel that such a success might well lead to the gaining of the initiative in the struggle in that general area.

16. China is the vital strategic area in Asia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are firmly of the opinion that attainment of United States objectives in Asia can only be achieved by ultimate success in China. Resolution of the situation facing Southeast Asia would therefore, be facilitated if prompt and continuing measures were undertaken to reduce the pressure from Communist China. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted the evidences of renewed vitality and apparent increased effectiveness of the Chinese Nationalist forces.

17. The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest the following measures with military implications:

a. An increased number of courtesy or "show the flag" visits to Southeast Asian states;

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b. Recognition of the "port closure" of Communist China seaports by the Nationalists as a de facto blockade so long as it is effective. Such action should remove some of the pressure, direct and indirect, upon Southeast Asia; should be of assistance to the anti-Communist forces engaged in interference with the lines of communication to China; and should aggravate the economic problems and general unrest in Communist China;

c. A program of special covert operations designed to interfere with Communist activities in Southeast Asia; and

d. Long-term measures to provide for Japan and the other offshore islands a secure source of food and other strategic materials from non-Communist held areas in the Far East.

18. Comments on the French aide-memoire of 16 February 1950, are contained in the substance of this memorandum. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not concur in the French suggestion for conversations between the "French and American General Staffs" on the subject of Indochina since the desired ends will best be served through conferences in Indochina among the United States military aid group and military representatives of France, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are not unmindful of the need for collaboration and consultation with the British and French Governments on Southeast Asia matters and recommend, therefore, that military representatives participate in the forthcoming tripartite discussions on Southeast Asia to be held at the forthcoming meeting of the Foreign Ministers.

FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

/s/ OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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State Paper: Indochina

JCS Comment: Repeat and reemphasize their views and recommendations on Indochina which you forwarded to Secretary of State on 14 April 1950. Recommend these recommendations be reflected in State paper.

Recommend that, besides telling French, U. S. prepared to assist French and Three Associated States, French also be told that arrangements for U. S. military aid be made as a result of conversations in Indochina between U. S., French, Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian military representatives. Also recommend State make unmistakable to French the firm desire of the U. S. to send a military aid group to Indochina at the earliest possible date.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington, 25, D.C.

2 May 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

Subject: Indochina

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have, from the military point of view, reviewed the Department of State draft position paper entitled "Indochina" (FM D C-3a, dated 25 April 1950) and have formulated the following views thereon:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff stated their views and recommendations concerning measures which, from the United States military point of view, might be taken to prevent Communist expansion in Southeast Asia in general and Indochina in particular in a memorandum to you, dated 5 April 1950, which views were forwarded by you to the Secretary of State on 14 April 1950. Among other things, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed in their memorandum:

- a. The urgent need for early arrival of military aid;
- b. The requirement that such aid be integrated with political and economic programs; and

c. That a small United States military aid group be established in Indochina immediately for the purpose of:

(1) Screening requests for military material, the requests to be subject to determination by the senior member thereof as to the feasibility and satisfactory coordination of specific military operations;

(2) Insuring full coordination of military plans and efforts between the French and Vietnamese forces; and

(3) Supervising the allocation of material to those forces.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff further recommended therein that military representatives participate in the forthcoming tripartite discussions on Southeast Asia at the meeting of the Foreign

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Ministers. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would reaffirm their views and recommendations expressed above, as well as in the remainder of their memorandum of 5 April 1950, and recommend further that they be reflected in the basic draft position paper.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff would make further specific comments on the basic draft position paper as follows:

a. The seventh unnumbered paragraph under the heading Background should be revised along the following lines:

The "missing component" in the picture consists of three factors, namely, political, military, and economic. The first two are at present the most important and should be emphasized. In the military field the greatest defect has probably been the lack of coordination between the French and the indigenous forces, coupled with immediate deficiencies in various items of equipment and material and with uncertain morale on the part of the Indochinese and the French. Very early, and continuing assistance is needed by the Indochinese and the French forces in order to meet their present needs. Such assistance must consist in general of additional equipment within reason (unavailable to the French from other sources) and of appropriate military advice.

b. The second unnumbered paragraph under the heading Discussion should be revised along the following lines:

The success of the military program depends upon the support given by the French, Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians to the coordinated operations plans prepared in Indochina, and, to a lesser extent, upon the receipt of specific items of military material from the United States. In view of the larger aspects of the struggle against world communism, judicious political concessions in Indochina by the French, and timely and adequate, but controlled, aid on the part of the United States will eventually pay dividends to both.

c. Under Recommendations, the paragraph headed Discussions with the French should be revised to:

(1) Incorporate in Recommendation 2) a provision that the arrangements for United States military aid be made in Indochina as a result of conversations there between United States, French, Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian military representatives; and

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(2) Change Recommendation 5) so as to make unmistakable the firm desire of the United States to send a military aid group to Indochina at the earliest possible date for the purposes indicated in your memorandum to the Secretary of State, dated 14 April 1950. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff regard with strong disfavor the desires and continued attempts of the French to settle, on the political level, the military and internal security problems of Indochina in Paris.

Recognizing their own responsibilities in the matter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the point of view of the military security interests of the United States, again urge the immediate establishment of an authoritative United States military aid group in Indochina.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ Omar N. Bradley

OMAR N. BRADLEY,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Washington, D.C.

2 May 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

Subject: Southeast Asia

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have formulated the following comments, from the military point of view, on the Department of State draft position paper entitled "Southeast Asia" (FM D C-2a, dated 25 April 1950).
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur fully in the expressions in the subject paper as to the importance of the area of Southeast Asia to the United States. They concur in general as to the need for British and French action along the lines indicated in the draft position paper. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the currently unfavorable situation in Southeast Asia, an area important both to the United States and to the Communist movement, warrants assumption by the United States of a much more forceful and positive position than is expressed or implied in the draft position paper.
3. As stated in the CONCLUSIONS in NSC 68, -- "Our position as the center of power in the free world places a heavy responsibility upon the United States for leadership. We must organize and enlist the energies and resources of the free world in a positive program for peace which will frustrate the Kremlin design for world domination by creating a situation in the free world to which the Kremlin will be compelled to adjust. Without such a cooperative effort, led by the United States, we will have to make gradual withdrawals under pressure until we discover one day that we have sacrificed positions of vital interest."
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States and the other Western Powers should take immediate and positive steps to achieve the initiative in the present conflict. Further, they consider that success in Southeast Asia might well lead to the gaining of the initiative in the struggle within the Far East.
5. In light of the foregoing and in order to retrieve the losses resulting from previous mistakes on the part of the British and the French, as well as to preclude such mistakes in the future, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it necessary that positive and proper leadership among the Western Powers be assumed by the United States in Southeast Asia matters. They, therefore, recommend that the draft position paper on "Southeast Asia" be revised along the lines of NSC 68 and paragraph 4 above.

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6. In addition to the foregoing general recommendation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would make the following specific recommendation regarding that part of the third paragraph of the subject paper headed REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS which states:

"For the United States to underwrite a regional coalition including Japan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand does not increase American commitments; we must accept responsibility for assisting in the defense of these powers against aggression."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, disagree in principle with such a single far-flung regional arrangement and do not concur in the statement that American commitments would not be increased by underwriting such a coalition. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would from the military point of view agree to appropriate military arrangements between nations in Southeast Asia capable of effective mutual support.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to reaffirm their views on this subject as transmitted by the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State on 14 April, and reemphasize the need for immediate consideration and implementation of an integrated and effective U.S. course of action for Southeast Asia.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(SIGNED)

OMAR N. BRADLEY,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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State Paper: Southeast Asia

JCS Comment: Concur fully in the expressions in the State paper as to the importance of Southeast Asia to U. S. Urge much more forceful and positive U. S. position than expressed or implied in State paper. Believe U. S. and Western powers should take immediate and positive steps to achieve the initiative in the present conflict. Consider it necessary that positive and proper leadership among Western Powers be assumed by U. S. in Southeast Asia matters. Recommend revision of State paper along the lines of NSC 68 and the above views.

Disagree that U. S. underwriting of a regional coalition in Asia would not increase U. S. commitments. Agree to appropriate military arrangements between nations in Southeast Asia capable of effective mutual support.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OUTGOING TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY,

May 3, 1950

LONDON.
2049

FOR MERCHANT.

PRES on MAY 1 approved allocation of ten million DOLS from 303 to Defense to cover current early shipment urgently needed MIL aid items to IC. Also approved was three million for Indonesia.

DEPT has requested Defense IMMED to start supply action on two hundred thousand rounds 37 mm ammunition plus 9,000 links to Army of FR Union IC consigned COMDR in Chief Saigon. At some time Dept has requested Defense to initiate supply action equipment (less small arms) for 12 infantry battalions for the Vietnam State Army (as separate from FR Union Forces). Dept has requested at least a part of latter equipment if at all possible be included in same shipment with 37 mm ammunition and consigned High MIL COMITE for Vietnam Army. Thus first shipment WLD contain items for both Army FR Union and Viet Army. Defense has no timetable yet for departure date of such shipment but Dept has pushed for early action. Aid will be subject usual bilateral agreements if in view Dept those required. Airplanes now under discussion between MAAG Paris and FR authorities. When mutual agreement is reached on airplane types and firm program emerges, DEPT will request further funds be allocated since ten million insufficient.

In view requests for INFO on US MIL aid to IC from both FR and Viets Dept believes above INFO SHLD be communicated to both FR and Viet Govts for their confidential RPT confidential INFO.

Dept proposes communicate this INFO this week to FR AMB WASH. US DEL London notify FR DEL, EMB Paris notify FR Govt and LEG Saigon notify High Commissioner and Viet Govt SUBJ to comments USDEL, Paris EMB and Saigon LEG.

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The Secretary of State

May 4, 1950

Mr. Griffin

Conference on Indo-China - May 2, 1950.

1. The Indo-China situation cannot be maintained in its present status quo.

Time is of the essence in the Vietnam situation. Bao Dai and his Government cannot maintain a status quo. Bao Dai must either quickly win additional support and begin showing gains in prestige or there will be a falling away of his present following. There is general cynicism in Vietnam about the French willingness to permit reasonable self-government, and that cynicism spreads to the Bao Dai Government. Bao Dai at present represents a minority group, but he still is potentially capable of achieving substantial majority support if he can prove that he is taking over authority and responsibility and is exercising them. He must be given face. Unless the present trend is materially and almost immediately corrected, Bao Dai's opportunity will be irretrievably lost and his strength will run to water. To salvage the situation a fundamental agreement must be brought about with the French, followed quickly and with certainty with action designed to make Bao Dai a success. If Bao Dai once starts slipping, it will be impossible to restore him.

2. Problem of a foundation for agreement.

In order to have a firm basis of agreement with the French regarding U.S. relations with the State of Vietnam and the Kingdoms of Cambodia and Laos, it is almost a necessity to secure from the French a rational evaluation of what they expect of Indo-China, a forecast of the situation they reasonably believe can be brought about that would satisfy the aspirations of the people of Vietnam within the French Union.

The French themselves were forced to the conclusion that a conclusive military solution of their problem was unattainable and they resorted, therefore, to the effort to bring about a political solution. In that effort the United States became involved in the recognition of the Government of Vietnam.

The French

The French also recognize the fact that they cannot afford a continued military cost of hundreds of millions of dollars a year in a campaign that has failed and that has no prospects of bringing about a military solution. As ERP aid is subsequently reduced, it will be impossible for the French to carry this expense. Even today, with the help of ERP, domestic plans of the French Government are deeply affected by this drain, which indirectly but powerfully affects the Government's capacity to deal with labor, social and educational exigencies at home.

The French are also aware, realistically, of the military weakness on the continent due to the maintenance of a military establishment in Indo-China that absorbs half of the regular army and the best cadres for troop training, whose losses are continuous, and whose depletion of French officer strength equals the output of new officers from the French military academies. This, incidentally though importantly, affects the United States position in military assistance to the Continent.

Despite French sentimental aspirations for absorbing colonial areas within the body and spirit of "metropolitan France," there is no doubt that the French are realistic enough, when not emotionally disturbed, to appreciate the fact that the peoples of Vietnam can no longer be "integrated" in that respect.

Therefore it appears that the time has come that an entirely rational French consideration of this problem must take place, that can be the foundation of policy considerations. It is strictly necessary that this consideration be made now, so that U.S. policy may reasonably and justifiably work in cooperation with the French in attempting to make firm and workable a self-governed Vietnam State conditioned to find it desirable and advantageous to be a part of the French Union.

In short, we must find out what the French expect of Vietnam.

3. Decisions and actions necessary to create public respect for the Bao Dai government.

- a. A clear definition of the French Union, its meaning, its responsibilities and guarantees including the guarantee of a method for "evolutionary" treatment of countries accepted as partners within the French Union. These conditions have never been defined, and no one knows what the French Union means.

b. Implementation

- b. Implementation of the provisions of the March 8 agreement. This should not be a mean or petty literal and parsimonious interpretation, but broad and generous. Not only have the French been laggard in carrying out the terms of the agreement but they have been jealous and circumscribed in interpretation of every provision. (In the matter of technical assistance to the Viets, the French Secretariat was adamant in its opposition to any form of American or other foreign aid, stating that such aid was a violation of the agreement.)
- c. The attitude of the French towards the Viet Government must be one of acceptance of a fact and a determination to make a success of that Government. This may be contrary to human nature, but it is doubtful if that Government can succeed without the most generous, if not passionate, French assistance. This assistance must be on a subordinate level, thorough and complete. It is indispensable. Until now the French attitude has been to point with scorn at the failures and aberrations of the untrained Viet Government leaders and to take the "I told you so" attitude.
- d. Acceptance of the principle of bilateral relations between other governments and the Bao Dai regime. This will be hard for the French to take. They desire to maintain the form or myth of a quadripartite arrangement. While a form of at least tripartite arrangement is necessary among the Vietnam, Cambodian and Laotian Governments -- for physical and economic reasons -- it is imperative for the prestige of the Bao Dai Government for it to be able to conduct some dealings with other governments. This should apply at least to a substantial part of the proposed economic aid program. When the U.S. and Britain recognized Bao Dai, that recognition was taken as a bilateral action. In itself it established a precedent. This is a vital issue, and one of the most difficult to work out.

e. Turning

- e. Turning over to Bao Dai of the No. 1 residence in Saigon, now occupied by the French High Commissioner. This is symbolic as well as practical. This is undoubtedly the reason why it is impossible for Bao Dai to take residence in the capital city, where his presence would be a sign of the reality of his Government. Even Pignon is opposed to this, on the grounds that it would affect French morale. Nevertheless this cannot be overlooked.
- f. Statement of the French that their purpose in training and preparing for field operations of a Bao Dai army is part of their plan for the complete protection of the country by Viet forces, which thereafter would enable them to withdraw.
- g. There are many other actions, most of them minor in importance in western eyes but highly significant to Orientals, that can be taken to set up the prestige and position of Bao Dai. Some of these proposals have been contained in Gallien's cables.

4. Current Military Problems.

A French army of mixed but "regular" troops of approximately 130,000 men is maintained in Indo-China, chiefly in the Province of Tonkin, to prevent the overrunning of the Province and the Red River valley by the Viet Minh and to stand guard against Chinese invasion of infiltration.

The presence of this army is indispensable even though many Bao Dai supporters would prefer to have it removed forthwith. These people believe they could settle their differences with Ho Chi Minh by negotiation if the French were withdrawn. The latter point of view is not realistic, and there is good reason to believe that withdrawal of French forces would quickly lead to Communist takeover.

French-trained Viet troops are effective and loyal, and those embedded in the French army are said to be the equal of any colonial troops. The French are vigorously training approximately 50,000 Viet troops for the Bao Dai army. Such units, once tried and found satisfactory,

can in

can in time begin to take over French garrisoned areas and make possible the return to the Continent of regular French contingents.

An American arms program can be used to stimulate this training and replacement program.

There is the danger that French public sentiment -- and some practical military pressure -- might cause the French to threaten to withdraw entirely from Indo-China and "cut their losses", if pressure on the French for "evolutionary" treatment of the Viet political problem became too severe. This consideration cannot be overlooked when working for concessions. There is already strong feeling in many French quarters that Indo-China should be written off before more blood and treasure are lost.

As the French are required by the situation and by our insistence to turn over more authority to the Viet Government, it must be recognized that the morale of the French army might be affected. No measure could influence that situation more favorably than if the United States were willing to pledge sea and air support for the Viet-French forces in the event of the threat of invasion of Vietnam from Communist China.

Generals Carpentier and Alessandri are officers of the highest calibre. Carpentier's apparent acquiescence to the arming of several Bao Dai battalions with American small arms is an indication that he is willing to yield on some subjects on which he had appeared to be adamant. He speaks frequently of his friendship and great respect for American Generals Gruenther and Mark Clark. In matters affecting important military decisions and American policy in the Indo-China field it might be most useful to send General Gruenther there, after a complete policy briefing, to discuss and review the entire military subject with Carpentier.

RAGriffin:okg

6-4-60

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

MAY 11, 1950
NO. 485

At his press conference today, Acting Secretary Webb made the following statement:

AID TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

A special survey mission, headed by R. Allen Griffin, has just returned from Southeast Asia and reported on economic and technical assistance needed in that area. Its over-all recommendations for the area are modest and total in the neighborhood of \$60 million. The Department is working on plans to implement that program at once.

Secretary Acheson on Monday in Paris cited the urgency of the situation applying in the associated states of Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia. The Department is working jointly with ECA to implement the economic and technical assistance recommendations for Indochina as well as the other states of Southeast Asia and anticipates that this program will get underway in the immediate future.

Military assistance for Southeast Asia is being worked out by the Department of Defense in cooperation with the Department of State, and the details will not be made public for security reasons.

Military assistance needs will be met from the President's emergency fund of \$75 million provided under MDAP for the general area of China.

Economic assistance needs will be met from the ECA China Aid funds, part of which both Houses of Congress have indicated will be made available for the general area of China. Final legislative action is still pending on this authorization but is expected to be completed within the next week.

TOP SECRET
TRIPARTITE RECORD
MIN/TRI/DEC/5
13th May, 1950

MINISTERIAL TALKS
UNITED STATES/UNITED KINGDOM/FRANCE

Summary of conclusions reached at the Fifth
Meeting of the United States/United Kingdom/
France Ministerial Talks held at Lancaster
House on Saturday, 13th May, at 10.30 a.m.^{1/}

I. Item 5: South East Asia (MIN/TRI/P/9)

1. M. SCHUMAN gave a short review of French commitments in Indo-China and explained the difficulties facing the French Government. He emphasised that it should be recognised that France was serving the interests of the common cause and that the French Government needed urgently extensive military help.

2. The Ministers agreed that paragraph 7 should be amended to read:

7. Although the security of South East Asia is of strategic importance to the United States, the British and French have direct responsibilities in the area which make its security of even greater concern to them. The forcible expulsion of French and British forces from Indo-China and Malaya, respectively, would be both a military and political disaster. The United Kingdom therefore reaffirms its intention to continue to discharge its responsibilities in British and British-protected territory in the area. The French Government considers that it is only within the framework of close and active co-operation with the United Kingdom and United States Governments that it will be able to continue effectively to discharge its particular responsibilities in this region."

¹Copy held in S/S-R.

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M. Schuman thereupon withdrew the French reservation in regard to paragraphs 7 and 8.

3. MR. BEVIN said that the United Kingdom representatives in the field were unenthusiastic about either a joint declaration or individual declarations by Governments with respect to their attitude towards South East Asia. There was the particular question of relations with Pakistan, India and Ceylon. He would prefer not to make a declaration of any sort.

M. SCHUMAN said that the French view was still that a joint declaration should be made. However, he recognises the difficulties of the United Kingdom position.

M. BEVIN suggested and the Ministers agreed that this question should be followed up through the diplomatic channel after the Commonwealth Conference at Sydney with the possibility of a more fruitful outcome than at present.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM
Department of State

SECRET

FROM: London

General
Rec'd May 14, 1950
4:46 p.m.

TO: SECTO 256, May 14, 9 p.m.

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 256, REPEATED PARIS 848, FRANKFORT 23

Reference TELAC 8m May 12.

Following summarized highlights tripartite meetings:

.....

7. SEA - Indochina. Based on our preliminary bilateral conferences there was agreement reached on the assessment of the situation and our common objectives in SEA. It was decided that no tripartite declaration on the subject would issue from the conference. The British objected to such a declaration, partly because it would exclude Commonwealth. I did not advocate this and the French reluctantly reconciled to its absence. We also trilaterally agreed to take certain common measures in an effort to suppress gun-running into French Indochina and to cooperate on our information policies and activities in the area.

.....

There follow highlights bilateral talks Schuman on matters not duplicated tripartite discussion.

1. Indochina. This was main subject discussed in detail Paris. Mr. Schuman in his opening statement to me substantially met us on the points which we have been impressing on the French without success up to this point. Mr. Schuman reaffirmed the acceptance of responsibility for Indochina by France; he acknowledged that US assistance must be supplementary and not substituting; he assured us that the March 8 agreements would be loyally executed and liberally implemented; he stated that the Cabinet had taken the decision to establish a new ministry for handling the affairs of the Associated States. Mr. Schuman did not make exaggerated requests for aid and seemed gratified with what I was able to tell him. In effect, I said that I was hopeful that for the balance of the fiscal year amounts might be found for both military

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#SECTO 256, May 14, 9 p.m., from London

and economic aid coming up to the neighborhood of \$20 million, that we were proceeding urgently on the top priority military items requested by the French and that I was hopeful favorable action on legislation now before Congress would enable us to continue military and economic support in the fiscal year 1951. On balance I feel that the talks with the French on the subject of Indochina were successful.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE .

FOR THE PRESS

MAY 25, 1950
No. 545

U.S. FORMALLY ANNOUNCES INTENT TO ESTABLISH
AN ECONOMIC AID MISSION TO THE THREE ASSO-
CIATED STATES OF INDOCHINA

On Wednesday, May 24, Charge d'Affaires Edmund Gullion delivered the following letter to the Chiefs of State of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia or their representatives at Saigon. Simultaneously, Ambassador Bruce delivered an identical letter to the President of the French Union in Paris.

The text of the letter follows:

"I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the United States has decided to initiate a program of economic aid to the States of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. My Government has reached this decision in order to assist Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam to restore stability and pursue their peaceful and democratic development.

"With these purposes in mind, the United States Government is establishing, with headquarters in Saigon and associated with United States Legation, a special economic mission to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. This mission will have the responsibility of working with the Governments of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam and with the French High Commissioner in developing and carrying out a coordinated program of economic aid designed to assist the three countries in restoring their normal economic life. The members of the American economic mission will at all times be subject to the authority of the Government of the United States and will not become a part of the administrations of the Associated States.

"The Government of the United States recognizes that this American assistance will be complementary to the effort made by the three Associated States and France, without any intention of substitution. American aid is designed to reinforce the joint effort of France and the governments and peoples

of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, on whom rests the primary responsibility for the restoration of security and stability.

"United States economic aid will be granted in accordance with separate bilateral agreements between each of the Associated States and the United States of America. The approval of these agreements will be subject to legal conventions existing between the Associated States and France. Initial economic aid operations, however, may begin prior to the conclusion of these agreements.

c "The United States Government is of the opinion that it would be desirable for the three governments and the French High Commissioner to reach agreement among themselves for the coordination of those matters relating to the aid program that are of common interest. The American economic mission will maintain contact with the three Associated States, with the French High Commissioner in Indochina and, if desired, with any body which may be set up by the Associated States and France in connection with the aid program.

"Mr. Robert Blum has been appointed Chief of the United States special economic mission to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

"Identical letters are being addressed today to the governments of Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and the President of the French Union."

The letter of intent refers only to economic aid which will be based on the recommendations of the Griffin mission which recently made a survey trip to Southeast Asia and carried on consultations with the leaders and technicians of Indochina.

Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced the policy of United States aid to Indochina at Paris on May 8 when he released this statement following an exchange of views with Foreign Minister Schuman of France:

"The Foreign Minister and I have just had an exchange of views on the situation in Indochina and are in general agreement both as to the urgency of the situation in that area and as to the

necessity for remedial action. We have noted the fact that the problem of meeting the threat to the security of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos which now enjoy independence within the French Union is primarily the responsibility of France and the governments and peoples of Indochina. The United States recognizes that the solution of the Indochina problem depends both upon the restoration of security and upon the development of genuine nationalism and that United States assistance can and should contribute to these major objectives.

"The United States Government convinced that neither national independence nor democratic evolution exist in any area dominated by Soviet imperialism, considers the situation to be such as to warrant its according economic aid and military equipment to the Associated States of Indochina and to France in order to assist them in restoring stability and permitting these states to pursue their peaceful and democratic development."

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

JUNE 3, 1950
NO. 583

The following is the text of a letter of June 2 from Secretary of State Dean Acheson to the Honorable Robert Allen Griffin, upon the conclusion of his assignment as Head of the Special Economic Mission to Southeast Asia:

"Dear Mr. Griffin:

"I congratulate you upon the successful conclusion of the Special Economic Mission to Southeast Asia which you led and extend to you and those on your staff my warmest personal thanks for the careful and thorough job you did. In surveying so large an area under conditions which called for constant diplomatic tact and skillful technical appraisal under the severest time pressure you performed with outstanding ability a most difficult assignment.

"On the basis of your recommendations the United States Government is launching a program which will offer rapid economic aid to those countries for which you drew up plans. The purpose of this assistance, as you well know, is to mobilize the natural and human resources of these countries for the improvement of the general welfare of the people and the strengthening of democratic governments throughout Southeast Asia.

"The fresh approach you took, unhampered by preconceived plans, and the creative ability which you displayed in working out a program with the approval of the Asian governments concerned have contributed much to the auspicious launching of this important program.

"Sincerely yours,

"DEAN ACHESON

"The Honorable
"Robert Allen Griffin,
"Pebble Beach, California."

* * *

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 27, 1950

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

In Korea the Government forces, which were armed to prevent border raids and to preserve internal security, were attacked by invading forces from North Korea. The Security Council of the United Nations called upon the invading troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the 38th parallel. This they have not done, but on the contrary have pressed the attack. The Security Council called upon all members of the United Nations to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution. In these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support.

The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.

Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.

I have also directed that United States Forces in the Philippines be strengthened and that military assistance to the Philippine Government be accelerated.

I have similarly directed acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of

France and the Associated States in Indo China and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces.

I know that all members of the United Nations will consider carefully the consequences of this latest aggression in Korea in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations. A return to the rule of force in international affairs would have far reaching effects. The United States will continue to uphold the rule of law.

I have instructed Ambassador Austin, as the representative of the United States to the Security Council, to report these steps to the Council.

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751G.5-MAP/7-150: Secret File

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

AMLEGATION,

July 1, 1950.

SAIGON.
No. 4.

TOMAP

DEPT desires clarify principles governing US MIL aid Indochina and ascertain that all parties to agreement fully understand and concur in arrangements for division of aid, TRANS of title, reception, distribution, accounting, maintenance and use this aid.

A. Principles.

Basic principles governing grant of aid are:

1. Provide MIL assistance as supplementary to FR assistance, and with their concurrence, to the three ASSOC States in order assist them in achieving internal security. It is firmly believed that such security is essential prerequisite ESTAB of stable economy and conditions wherein ECON assistance and aid such as Point IV can effectively be applied. Aid to States will enable them develop their regular armies and to extent considered desirable in accordance Section D, below, their irregular forces (garde civile, auto-defense units). Fighting conditions Indochina make it desirable utilize to greater extent native troops adaptable to conditions of area.

2. Provide assistance army of FR Union so that this force may be strengthened in its resistance to COMMIE aggression both from within and without Indochina.

PRES Truman's statement JUN 27 confirms DEPT'S belief that as FR forces represent only important unit in area capable decisive MIL action, a particular effort must be made assist them. US MIL aid, however, will continue supplement and not replace direct FR efforts in area.

3. Recent developments Korea indicate possible diversionary efforts elsewhere by COMMIES. Events may therefore

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751G.5-MAP/7-150

require reassessment aid requirements FR, involving additional assistance by US at expense aid ASSOC States. Until such eventuality develops DEPT will continue give strongest support possible to ASSOC States in order development independent and stable GOVTS shall not be impeded and their position strengthened in eyes INTERNATL public opinion.

B. Military Aid Agreement.

Draft agreement transmitted DEPTTEL 427, JUN 28, represents effort both to simplify requirements for furnishing MIL assistance and to take due account of existing treaties, especially on MIL matters, between ASSOC States and FR. In view LEGTEL 460, PARA II, five party agreement now appears more realistic than bilaterals countersigned by FR. DEPT urgently awaits your comments re applicability in unusual Indochina situation.

C. Application Agreement.

1. TRANS title, receipt, distribution, accounting, maintenance of US MIL assistance furnished.

DEPT desires be assured MIL aid program will be administered in most efficient manner. Since forces ASSOC States are not yet fully organized DEPT hopes FR and ASSOC States will ESTAB mutually suitable working arrangements (REF LEGTEL 460) and subsequently will work in close COOP LEG and its MAAG to assure SATIS handling and utilization of US MIL aid provided.

REFTEL PARA II indicates FR and ASSOC States already developing such working arrangement for MIL EQUIP destined ASSOC States. DEPT and DEF proceeding assumption procedures outlined now effective, and particularly that (a) HMC is official consignee EQUIP destined each ASSOC State; (b) MEM or REP of HMC has been or will be designated to take title to and receipt for such EQUIP; and (c) actual unloading, reception, assembling, distribution, protection, and continued maintenance, including stocking of spare parts, such EQUIP will be as indicated. Desire LEG confirm.

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D. Aid to Unofficial Forces.

DEPT concurs MIL aid SHLD be supplied units such as Caodai, Catholics, etc. Such aid, however, SHLD not be given direct either by US or FR. DEPT strongly feels aid to these units must be distributed only by ASSOC States, at discretion of Chiefs of State with concurrence FR. Such aid SHLD prove excellent POLIT weapon encourage integration these currently useful but potentially troublesome groups with regular forces ASSOC States. As active part of NATL forces these units SHLD prove to be valuable assistance guerrilla fighting. Uncontrolled, with possibility direct aid, they may well become embarrassing liability.

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tant's Meeting
y, 25 July 1950

Indo-China

1. Existing Policy

a. U.S. Policy with respect to Indo-China as approved by the President on 24 April 1950 concludes that:

(1) Indo-China is a key area of Southeast Asia and is under immediate threat.

(2) The neighboring countries of Thailand and Burma could be expected to fall under Communist domination if Indo-China were controlled by a Communist-dominated government. The balance of Southeast Asia would then be in grave hazard.

(3) Accordingly, the Departments of State and Defense should prepare as a matter of priority a program of all practicable measures designed to protect United States security interests in Indo-China.

b. On 10 April 1950 the JCS concurred in the above conclusions and recommended early implementation of military aid programs for Indo-China, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Burma. Such aid programs to be closely controlled and be integrated with political and economic programs.

c. On 7 July 1950 the JCS (J.C.S. 1924/14) approved the following in their review of NSC 73.

"If the Chinese Communists provide overt military assistance to Southeast Asian Communist elements, the United States should prevail upon the British to reverse their proffers of recognition to Communist China and to provide such military assistance as is practicable to assist the Burmese and/or the French in resisting Chinese Communist aggression. In addition:

"a. If overt military assistance is provided the Viet Minh forces of Indo-China, the United States should increase its MDAP assistance to the French and urge the French to continue an active defense, with the United States giving consideration to the provision of air and naval assistance.

"b. The United States should ask the United Nations to call upon member nations to make forces available to resist the Chinese Communist aggression."

Chinese Communist military moves against Southeast Asia states in the near future are possible and in such an event the U.S. should be prepared to provide military assistance short of actual participation of U.S. Armed Forces at this time.

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d. On 14 July the JSPC submitted a report (J.C.S. 1924/20 - Not yet approved) for consideration by the JCS which included the following with reference to Southeast Asia:

"The French military position in Indo-China has continued to improve. . . . No unusual Chinese Communist or Vietminh activities have occurred since the Korean invasion. While the entire East Asia situation is potentially explosive there are no present indications that the situation will be immediately worsened unless the Korean situation further deteriorates. With respect to Burma, Thailand, and Malaya, internal subversive moves will probably remain the chief threats to the established governments. Chinese Communists would probably move against these countries only if first successful in Indo-China. . . ."

"e. Southeast Asia

"(1) In the event of Chinese Communist moves against Indo-China or Burma, U.S. military equipment and supplies would be required on an increased scale and U.S. naval and air forces might be called upon to assist the French in Indo-China. It is unlikely that U.S. forces would be employed in Burma. This is considered to be an area of British responsibility.

"(2) If Indo-China, Burma and Thailand were to fall under Communist domination, British forces in Malaya should be augmented. Except for possible naval support, it is unlikely that U.S. armed forces would be employed in Malaya since this is an area of British responsibility."

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751G.5/8-2350: Top Secret File

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

AMLEGATION

September 1, 1950.

SAIGON

NO 238

DEPT has viewed growing signs of POLIT and MIL deterioration in Indochina with increasing concern. The failure of the Vietnam GOVT and its leaders to inspire support, the slow pace of the Pau CONF and inability or disinclination of Bao Dai to assume leadership as exemplified by his prolonged stay in FR are among disturbing POLIT factors. Of even greater immediate import are MIL considerations - the increasing indications of CHI COMMIE-Viet Minh military collaboration and ever present threat of CHI invasion.

Whatever prompt action we can take ourselves or recommend to FR to stem unfavorable tide must bear FOL objectives in mind: 1) Have sufficient dramatic impact to stir all factions of Vietnamese POLIT thought, preferably to extent of swaying fence sitters;

2) Serve to repudiate claim that FR are not sincere in implementing MAR 8th Accords and are using "independence within FR Union" as a cloak for colonialism;

3) Have sufficient psychological attraction to nationalists to appease, at least temporarily, their hunger for further evidences of autonomy;

4) Will not in any way jeopardize the already inadequate FR and allied MIL potential in Indochina;

5) Attract other potential non-COMMIE combatant units (Cao Daists, Hoa Hao, Catholics) to side of FR Union troops;

6) Cause no further depletion of West EUR MIL potential and even improve it by releasing FR troops from service in IC.

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751G.5/8-2350

DEPT concurs fully with Paris and Saigon that formation of NATL army; at least in Vietnam and possibly to lesser extent in Laos and Cambodia, is action which approaches closest to these requirements while still remaining within realm of possibility.

We are, nevertheless, conscious of complexity of technical and other problems involved in accomplishing task and aware that it might be matter of years before armies actually exist in usual sense. We, therefore, are seeking means whereby psychological benefits of action may begin to be harvested IMMED even though full realization must, in fact, be delayed. The FOL plan is therefore submitted for your study, comment and discussion with appropriate FR authorities and possibly Bao Dai.

1) At earliest moment it be solemnly (and simultaneously) declared by FR (Auriol?) and Bao Dai that in keeping with provisions of March 8 Accords, Vietnam NATL Army under command of Emperor will become fact and that all indigenous troops then serving in FR Union forces are incorporated into new NATL Army.

2) That pursuant to ART 3 of Mar 8 Accords it is declared that a state of NATL emergency exists and that His Majesty as Commander in Chief has therefore placed NATL forces under command of FR High Command in the face of threat of FON invasion.

3) That FOL emergency NATL Army will be released from service under FR command to resume fundamental task of assuring internal order, etc., and that in meanwhile officer and NCO training program will proceed.

These are bare outlines which if found feasible may later be enlarged to include invitation to other partisan forces to join colors, provide for Viet staff officers on FR staff, devise program for replacement FR officers by Viets, etc.

In suggesting such a plan DEPT does not seek to oversimplify problem or overlook drawbacks. It is realized that for the time being this will only be a paper transfer which will be SUBJ to customary Viet criticism of another

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751G.5/8-2350

meaningless gesture. However, it wld legally establish a Viet Army presumably with distinctive insignia and to this extent represent a step forward. We believe need for action so great we must give consideration every possible action within practical limitations.

Nor does DEPT intend ignore obvious corollary Alphanand Plevien request 200 billion francs two year period for establishment Natl Army. Paris may inform French this question receiving active consideration and comment thereon will be forthcoming soonest.

For UR CONF INFO matter of formation NATL Armies will be brought up in conjunction our discussions IC at FONMINCONF preliminaries of which commence today. UR and Paris recent reporting this related SUBJS of which UR 265 Aug 23 outstanding have been very helpful.

ACHESON

FE:PSA:DMCoors
WMGibson

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TRIPARTITE MEETING
FOREIGN MINISTERS OF FRANCE, UNITED KINGDOM, AND UNITED STATES

New York, New York - September 1950

SUMMARY MINUTES¹

Fourth meeting, Thursday, September 14, 3:00 p.m.¹

IV. Southeast Asia (Agenda Item 7 A)

10. M. Schuman expressed his approval of the statements on Indo-China in the paper on Southeast Asia (Doc. 8, Sept. 1, 1950)². He wished, however, to make a few additional comments. France favored large national armies in Indo-China. There were already 77,000 troops in the armies of the three Associated States and 44,000 Indo-Chinese nationals in the army of the French Union. Great difficulties were being encountered in building up the national armies. There was difficulty in finding an adequate staff of trained officers and in financing the equipment for the troops. The French Union army in Indo-China now numbered 150,000 men. Financing of this army also imposed a heavy burden on France and assistance was urgently needed. The proximity of Communist China was an additional threat which made it necessary for France to request direct tactical air support from the United States in the event of Chinese Communist aggression. This was in addition to the present need of France for aircraft in Indo-China. Finally, in connection with the tripartite conversations mentioned in part B of Document 8, France would welcome [sic] in particular military talks to discuss the means of meeting Chinese Communist attacks on Indo-China.

¹Copy held in S/S-R.

²Not included here.

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11. Mr. Acheson stated that his government attached the greatest importance to the increase of military forces in Indo-China, including both national and French Union forces. The U.S. had given substantial assistance in the past and was prepared to increase this assistance. As to financial aid, the United States would be able to furnish items of military equipment manufactured in the United States, but could not supply money to be used locally. Mr. Acheson stated that the United States could not furnish the direct tactical air support requested by M. Schuman. Finally, the military discussions described in Part B of Doc. 8 should take place soon in the Far East and should involve military commanders now engaged in operations in that area, to study, among other things, measures to be taken.

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T O P S E C R E T

SEAC D-21, Rev. 1

October 11, 1950

SOUTHEAST ASIA AID POLICY COMMITTEE

Proposed Statement of U.S. Policy on
Indo-China for NSC Consideration

The attached paper, prepared by the Department of Defense and the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs of the Department of State, is a revision and expansion of the brief draft statement considered by the Committee on October 6. It is now being considered by the JCS.

Martin G. Cramer
Secretary

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE

FROM: Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee

The Committee is submitting for approval by higher authority, the attached draft joint memorandum to the National Security Council on Indochina. This draft joint memorandum contains a statement of U.S. policy with respect to Indochina. It is the Committee's view that the U.S. Government should decide, in principle, to contribute, in whatever ways are feasible and desirable, to the formation of national armies in Indochina. Such a contribution appears to the Committee as the most effective method by which the U.S. can, at present, strengthen the security of Indochina and add to its stabilization.

The Committee would like to point out that the extent and character of the contribution which the U.S. might consider furnishing for the formation of national armies in Indochina can only be determined by negotiations between officials of the French and U.S. Governments, on a ministerial level. During the course of those negotiations French officials may be expected to present, for the first time, detailed information on their plans for the formation of these armies. Approval of the draft joint memorandum would provide the authorization from the President for U.S. representatives to consider and act with full knowledge of the plans of the French.

It is recommended that, if negotiations are conducted with representatives of the French Government, U.S. representatives secure French acceptance of the following conditions which shall attach to the extension of U.S. assistance in the formation of national armies in Indochina: (1) French Union forces would not be withdrawn from Indochina until such Associated States armies were fully trained and ready to act effectively in replacement; (2) France would not decrease its outlays for Indochina below the 1950 rate during the period of the American military aid requested; (3) the national armies projects would have the approval of the three Associated States governments; (4) the High Commissioner for Indochina, the French Command, and the three Associated States would maintain full consultative relations with the Legation and MAAG during the period of the formation of the armies.

If approved, this joint memorandum would provide the measures called for by NSC 64 - "Position of the U.S. with Respect to Indochina", approved by the President on 23 April 1950. It is understood that the draft of this joint memo will be reviewed by the JCS before it is finally approved by the Secretary of Defense.

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DRAFT STATEMENT OF U. S. POLICY ON INDOCHINA
FOR USG CONSIDERATION
(Reference NSC 64, NSC 73/4)

1. Firm non-Communist control of Indochina is of critical, strategic importance to U. S. national interests. The loss of Indochina to Communist forces would undoubtedly lead to the loss of Southeast Asia as stated in NSC 64. In this respect, the National Security Council accepts the strategic assessment of Southeast Asia which the Joint Chiefs of Staff made on 10 April 1950 (Annex No. 1.).

2. Regardless of current U. S. commitments for provision of certain military assistance to Indochina, the U. S. will not commit any of its armed forces to the defense of Indochina against overt, foreign aggression, under present circumstances. In case of overt aggression, the Department of Defense will immediately re-assess the situation, in the light of the then existing circumstances.

3. To strengthen the security of Indochina against external aggression and augmented internal Communist offensives, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are authorized to conduct military talks with U. K. and French military commanders in the Far East. Such talks would seek, first, an agreed military plan for the internal defense of Indochina and, second, the coordination of operations in Southeast Asia in the event of invasion. Such talks should clearly indicate to French authorities that increases in U.S. military aid will be provided

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provided in accordance with operational plans which are acceptable to the U. S. and are compatible with U. S. capabilities in the light of other U. S. commitments.

4. The U. S. should secure plans from the French and the Associated States for, and assist the French and the Associated States in the prompt acceleration of the formation of new national armies of the three Associated States (Annex No. 3 contains descriptive information on the magnitude of such plans). The employment of such armies would be for the purpose of maintaining internal security with a view to releasing the bulk of the French forces in Indochina for other duties, in accordance with the strategic plan for the defense of Indochina. In due course, as these national armies are able to assume responsibility for the functions of national defense, the U. S. will favor the phased withdrawal from Indochina of French forces in order to strengthen the defense of Metropolitan France under the NATO arrangements. U. S. and French support for the formation of national armies in Indochina should be given wide and vigorous publicity. Since it is a policy of the United States (NSC 48/2) to use its influence in Asia toward resolving the colonial-nationalist conflict in such a way as to satisfy the fundamental demands of the Nationalist movement, while at the same time minimizing the strain on the colonial powers who are our Western allies, the U. S. should, for the time being, continue to press the French to carry out, in letter and spirit, the agreements of March 8, 1949 and the conventions of December 30, 1949 providing for self-government within the French Union.

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5. since the security of the Associated States of Indochina will be affected, to some extent, by the capabilities of neighboring or nearby countries to resist Communist encroachments, the U.S. should use its influence, wherever appropriate, to promote close relations and firm understandings, in political, military and economic fields, among the Associated States and Thailand, Burma and the Philippines. In particular, the U.S. should seek to envelope full diplomatic relations between the Associated states and other countries in Southeast Asia, collaboration among military staff officers of these countries on the security of neighboring or adjacent frontiers, and effective agreements on the control of arms smuggling and the movement of subversive agents. The U.S. continues to favor the entry of the three Associated states into the United Nations. As a culmination of these efforts the U.S. should encourage the Associated States, in due course, to participate in such arrangements for regional security under Article 51 and 52 of the United Nations' Charter, as will effectively contribute to the common defense of the area.

6. The U.S. will have to devolve substantial resources if the policies stated above are to be carried out effectively enough to assist in strengthening the security of Indochina. It is impossible at this time to set the exact cost in dollars to the United States of the formation of the national armies. When the details of the U.S. contribution have been determined, after discussions with representatives
of France

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of France and the Associated States, The U.S. plan for assisting
in the formation of the National Armies of Indochina will be
submitted to the National Security Council for approval.

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ANNEX NO. 1

STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

1. On 10 April 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made the following strategic assessment of Southeast Asia, including Indochina:

"4. The mainland states of Southeast Asia also are at present of critical strategic importance to the United States because:

- a. They are the major sources of certain strategic materials required for the completion of United States stock pile projects;
- b. The area is a crossroad of communications;
- c. Southeast Asia is a vital segment in the line of containment of communism stretching from Japan southward and around to the Indian Peninsula. The security of the three major non-Communist base areas in this quarter of the world--Japan, India, and Australia--depends in a large measure on the denial of Southeast Asia to the Communists. If Southeast Asia is lost, these three base areas will tend to be isolated from one another;

d. The fall of Indochina would undoubtedly lead to the fall of the other mainland states of Southeast Asia. Their fall would:

- (1) Require changing the Philippines and Indonesia from supporting positions in the Asian offshore island chain to front-line bases for the

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defense of the Western Hemisphere. It would also call for a review of the strategic deployment of United States forces in the Far East; and

(2) Bring about almost immediately a dangerous condition with respect to the internal security of the Philippines, Malaya, and Indonesia, and would contribute to their probable eventual fall to the Communists;

e. The fall of Southeast Asia would result in the virtually complete denial to the United States of the Pacific littoral of Asia. Southeast Asian mainland areas are important in the conduct of operations to contain Communist expansion;

f. Communist control of this area would alleviate considerably the food problem of China and would make available to the USSR important strategic materials. In this connection, Soviet control of all the major components of Asia's war potential might become a decisive factor affecting the balance of power between the United States and the USSR. 'A Soviet position of dominance over Asia, Western Europe, or both, would consistute a major threat to United States security'; and

g. A Soviet position of dominance over the Far East could also threaten the United States position in Japan

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since that country could thereby be denied its Asian markets, sources of food and other raw materials. The feasibility of retention by the United States of its Asian offshore island bases could thus be jeopardized."

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ANNEX NO. 2

MILITARY SITUATION IN INDOCHINA

1. View of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In a memorandum of 7 September to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated the following:

"Prior to 1 January 1951, the currently planned level of United States military aid to the French and native allied forces of Indochina should increase their military capabilities but not to the extent of counterbalancing Viet Minh capabilities. In view of these considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that the proposed United States position take cognizance that the situation in Indochina is to be viewed with alarm and that urgent and drastic action is required by the French if they are to avoid military defeat in Indochina. Such a setback would not only be detrimental to the prestige of the French and the United States but it could also jeopardize the United States military position in Asia."

2. Conclusions of Joint MDAP Survey Mission, After observing conditions in north and south Indochina, General Erskine, Chief of the Military Group of the Joint MDAP Survey Mission in Southeast Asia, reported the following conclusions on 5 August 1950:

- "(a) Military assistance will have to be provided to the French in Indo-China on a considerable scale if the broad objective of assisting in resisting the encroachment of Communism in Southeast Asia is to be successfully achieved. The assistance which has been requested, up to this time, is considered inadequate to fully consummate the U.S. broad objective. Additional material and equipment will require additional personnel.
- "(b) The French forces in Indo-China, after approximately five years of warfare, are stalemated. Casualties in this type of warfare have been very high.
- "(c) The French Command and troops, after a very brief study and observations, appear to have lost a considerable amount of offensive spirit and have been frustrated in their efforts to restore internal security.

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- "(d) The failure of the French to restore internal security is attributed to the lack of cooperation on the majority of the people in Indo-China and a deep-seated hatred and distrust which exists among a large part of the population. A large measure of the distrust and non-cooperative action on the part of the people has undoubtedly been inspired by Communist propaganda and the desire of the Oriental to 'push the white man out of Asia.'
- "(e) Military action alone can not solve the internal security problem in Indo-China because of the lack of cooperation on the part of the people, the distrust and hatred of the French, and the effect of Communist activities and propaganda. A political solution, which includes concessions on the part of the French, and definite plans for eventual independence of Viet Nam is a necessary complement to military action.
- "(f) The failure to organize Viet Nam armed forces as a separate entity and employ them as Vietnamese troops, not as French Union troops, has been the source of much dissatisfaction on the part of the people and has created a considerable amount of distrust which has withdrawn the support of many people from French efforts.
- "(g) The Viet Minh still controls the major portion of Indo-China and, for all practical purposes, have the French forces pinned to their occupied and garrisoned areas to the extent that French movement is impossible through practically all areas without armed escort.
- "(h) The Viet Minh forces have steadily grown in strength and improved their discipline and combat effectiveness. Much of the success in these fields can be attributed to assistance and supplies from the Chinese Communists and Communist propaganda.
- "(i) A serious and dangerous external threat from Communist China exists along the northern frontier.
- "(j) The French forces disposed throughout Indo-China, with their present equipment and organization, are not capable of dealing with the Viet Minh within the borders of Indo-China and resisting a strong Chinese Communist attack from the north. The defenses along the frontier of Tonkin

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are weak and inadequate. The absence of artificial obstacles, demolition plans and adequate mobile reserves, adequate aircraft support, and the very small amount of artillery, which is now disposed so that it is impracticable to coordinate and mass fires, appear to be the most outstanding weaknesses in the Tonkin area. Another important deficiency is to lack of sufficient personnel now available. Anti-tank defenses in the Tonkin area are practically non-existent. The Viet Minh activities in this area will probably prevent the free movement of such reserves as are now available there."

3. CIA Estimate of the Prospects for Chinese Communist Action in Indochina During 1950 (ORE 50-50, 7 September 1950)

"Communist China at present possesses the capability for a successful invasion of Indochina. If Communist China, as a participant in the world Communist movement, were called upon to invade Indochina, it could probably be persuaded to initiate such an operation. Chinese Communist military commitments elsewhere would not necessarily militate against an invasion of Indochina because the Chinese Communists possess the forces necessary for military action - separately or simultaneously - against Indochina, Korea, Taiwan, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macao.

"Despite this general capability and despite the existence of Chinese Communist military concentrations along the Indochina border, adequate for the task, it is estimated that an open Chinese Communist invasion - While possible and capable of being launched with little or no preliminary warning - is improbable in 1950 because considerations (from the standpoint of Ho Chi Minh, the Chinese Communists, and international Communism) favoring such action appear to be outweighed by considerations opposing it. It is highly probable, however, that the Chinese Communists will continue to expand military assistance to the Viet Minh forces (by measures short of open invasion) on a scale sufficient to provide those forces with the capability of achieving significant, but limited, objectives in 1950 and assuming that the French receive no more aid than is presently programmed, of eventually expelling the French without the aid of a Chinese Communist invasion."

4. Chinese Communist Military Capabilities (ORE 50-50)

"Any invasion of Indochina by the Chinese Communists would probably be undertaken in cooperation with the forces of Ho Chi Minh. Sizable Chinese Communist military forces are in position to intervene in Indochina. Despite reports of actual and scheduled northward movements of certain Chinese Communist field forces, approximately 100,000 troops remain deployed along the Indochinese border. These units could launch an invasion of Indochina without

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appreciable forewarning. Although reliable reports do not indicate the presence of armored units on the Indochina border, a division of armored cars, plus a battalion of tanks attached to the Fourth Field Army, are stationed in South China within 700 miles of the frontier. Moreover, approximately 150,000 additional Chinese Communist troops could arrive at the Indochina border within ten days to bolster initial invading forces. Even in the event of a simultaneous assault on Taiwan, these reinforcements would be available and would bring the potential invading force to a total of at least 250,000 troops. In view of the Chinese Communists' improving capability for waterlift, it is possible that some Invasion forces might be moved by sea to Viet Minh-held sections of the Indochina coast. There is no evidence, however, of Chinese Communist preparations for such a move.

"Although there have been no indications of any significant build-up of Chinese Communist Air Force strength in Southwest China and although this air force has not yet appeared in combat, the estimated 200-250 operational combat types (including fighters and light bombers) in the Chinese Communist Air Force could furnish effective air support to operations in Indochina. There are six airfields in China within 170 miles of the Tonkin border. In addition, construction of new airfields and the restoration of others in Southwest China are reportedly in progress in the Tonkin Kwangsi border area and on Heinan Island."

5. Viet Minh Military Capabilities (ORE 50-50)

"The forces of Ho Chi Minh, which have been engaged in resistance activities against the French since September 1945, are capable of expanding their operations. Ho's organization, commonly known as the 'Viet Minh', possesses approximately 92,500 regular troops and an estimated 130,000 irregulars. The Viet Minh forces include 2,000 Khmer Issaraka in Cambodia and 500 Issarakas in Laos.

"The Viet Minh forces are geared primarily for guerrilla warfare. The demonstrated effectiveness of a few task forces, each totaling as many as three to five thousand men and equipped with adequate infantry weapons and some artillery, points to a developing capability for more conventional warfare. Under present circumstances, the Viet Minh should have little difficulty in maintaining relative freedom of action throughout most of Indochina while simultaneously supporting pockets of resistance within French-occupied territory and continuing to harass French lines of communication. In addition, the Viet Minh is capable of seizing one or more French border outposts and holding them for a short time at least.

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"Following the de jure recognition of the 'Democratic Republic of Vietnam' by Communist China and the USSR, a general plan for closer collaboration between the Chinese Communists and the Viet Minh probably was formulated. As many as 10 to 20 thousand Viet Minh troops are being trained in Communist China. There is evidence that the Chinese Communists have supplied the Viet Minh with significant quantities of material, probably confined to small arms, ammunition, mortars, and light artillery. Access to training facilities in Communist China, the expansion of routes and facilities for supply, and the possibility of accelerating recruitment give the Viet Minh the potential capabilities for initiating a large-scale offensive against the French at an early date."

6. Capabilities of French-Controlled Forces (ORE 50-50)

"French ground, naval and air forces in Indochina are under the operational control of GHQ, Armed Forces in the Far East (FAEO). As of 1 July 1950 French regular ground forces totalled approximately 150,500 men. An estimated 66,700 troops in the armies of the Associated States, although subject to the nominal political control of these states, are under FAEO operational control. In addition there are 122,500 quasi-military and miscellaneous indigenous troops under over-all FAEO control. Of these local forces, only the Vietnamese army, at present weak and ineffective, has the potential for developing into a significant force. French ground forces are capable of penetrating the Viet-Minh held areas of Indochina but at the expense of garrison strength engaged in pacification duties elsewhere. The French have demonstrated a lack of aggressiveness. The French-controlled ground forces have a dual problem - the elimination of the Viet Minh forces and the defense of the China border. Indications are that current emphasis is on the former. Under these circumstances, the most they can hope to achieve in the immediate future is the destruction of enemy supply caches and the consequent postponement of a large-scale Viet Minh offensive.

"The strength of the French Air Force in Indochina, which is severely strained by its actions against Viet Minh forces, presently totals 84 fighters and fighter-reconnaissance aircraft, 68 transports and 50 liaison planes. The level of serviceability of fighter aircraft, now about 55 percent, will probably continue to drop as maintenance shortages become more acute. Many of the French air installations - few in number and generally in poor condition - are vulnerable to sabotage and some even to direct Viet Minh attack.

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"French naval forces are adequate for supporting the army in small-scale amphibious operations and for conducting raids against the rebel-held sections of the Indochina coast. Their inability to maintain a complete blockade of the coast is demonstrated by the extent of over-water arms smuggling now in progress. French Naval Forces, Far East, stationed in Indochina, consist of 166 small craft and ships and 21 aircraft manned by 8,750 personnel. Vessels in the most important categories currently stationed in Indochina waters include one old cruiser, 11 fleet minesweepers, two LST's, nine submarine chasers of various types and a number of supporting service and repair craft. Naval aircraft include nine patrol bombers and 12 reconnaissance aircraft."

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ANNEX NO. 3

INFORMATION ON THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL
ARMIES OF THE ASSOCIATED STATES

1. General Considerations. The organization and utilization of manpower in the non-Communist countries of Asia is possibly the key to the successful development of the security of Indochina and of Asia. In several years of warfare, the French have discovered that the Vietnamese fighting for Ho Chi Minh provided tough and persistent forces. The military campaign in Korea has demonstrated that Koreans can handle modern weapons and conduct sustained offensive and defensive operations. It may be presumed that Communist China, under the tutelage of often reported Soviet assistance, in developing integrated armies along modern lines. In addition, it would appear that Communist China has, for some time, actively benefited the North Korean armies and now is training and equipping the Viet Minh for operations in Indochina. The basic problem for the western powers is to find ways and means to utilize the manpower resources of Asia in order that the military forces of the west are not committed to actions in areas of limited or less strategic importance.

2. The French Position. On 17 August 1950, U.S. Ambassador Bruce, in Paris, reported to the Department of State that Premier Pleven, in discussing with him the situation in Indochina, had stated that (a) the only possible solution was to build up a strong and sufficient native army to make possible the gradual withdrawal of the French army for use

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in Europe, (b) this was the only program that would convince the people of the three Associated States of Indochina "of the honesty of French intentions to give them full independence within the French Union," and (c) the French Government would welcome the replacement of French troops by indigenous forces and would aid in every way possible short of assuming an added financial burden which would directly impair its ability to increase its forces in Western Europe. Premier Pleven further stated that it was impossible for the French Government to implement this program due to the lack of funds.

On 22 September, the French Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense informed the Secretaries of State and Defense of "the need to create immediately powerful national Indochinese armies due to necessity of repatriating as many French forces as possible, since 20 percent of French regular officers and 40 percent of French noncoms were frozen in Indochina." Schuman and Moch stated that there were 72,000 men in local armies but "the desired substantial increase in this number would present budgetary problems which neither France nor the Associated States could presently meet."

Although the French have stated their objective, they have not, as yet, provided the U.S. Government with any firm figures on the size or the costs of the proposed National Armies. The French High Commissioner in Saigon has frequently used the figure of a regular Vietnamese forces of 120,000 men to be organized by July 1951.

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3. Views of the U.S. Minister in Saigon. On 19 September, Minister Heath, in Saigon, reported as follows:

"There is little doubt in our minds here that it we are to find a fairly rapid cure for this 'civil war' which invites further Chinese intervention, native forces in the field must be greatly increased. This will, of course, involve more equipment and cash. Legation cannot state, of course, whether or how much it would be possible for French Government to increase its cash outlay in Indochina at this time. French finances might be able to afford some increase in their Indochina budgets. If they cannot, however, meet full bill for maintenance of increased national army and urgently needed pacification troops, then we shall be obliged to contribute some direct financial aid if we want this dangerously festering situation cleared up. I trust that French delegate now in Washington can provide prompt estimates as to French and Associated States financial possibilities in this regard.

"Politically, I strongly hold opinion that purpose of national army concept will be dissipated unless Vietnam (and Cambodia and Laos as well) are brought into discussions, their wishes consulted and their desires met to the extent that military efficiency will permit. In this connection President Huu's most recent press conference, in which he declared that only Viet forces could obtain necessary rallyings and pacification brought him close to position advocated by nationalists of Nguyen Phen Long-Iam Viet stripe. Key figure in such consultations will, of course, be Bao Dai and I cannot emphasize too insistently my belief that the U.S. should make no definite large-scale commitments

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for the support of the national army project without consultation with Bao Dai and determination exactly where he stands and what role he proposes to assume vis-a-vis the Viet national army.

"Finally, but with equal importance, I would strongly urge that definition of U.S. participation in policy and strategic decisions affecting the use of national armies and of American assistance furnished to them accompany any underwriting of the sort French have requested. This participation would involve continuing consultative relationships with French commanding general, with French military missions to the Associated States and with the high military committee and cannot be worked out, in its initial phases, away from Indochina."

4. Summary of Non-Communist Indigenous Forces in Indochina.

According to the military agreements concluded between France and the Governments of the three Associated States, in 1949, the French High Command retains operational control over all military and security forces in Indochina as long as an emergency exists. The total number of non-Communist forces in Indochina, French and indigenous, amounts to 340,000 troops. French ground forces number about 150,000. These include 44,000 indigenous regulars. The remainder of the total forces, amounting to some 190,000, are divided approximately as follows:

Vietnamese Regulars	28,200
Vietnamese Auxiliaries	29,000
Royal Khmer Army (Cambodia)	6,900
Laotian National Army	2,600
Forces of the Racial Minorities	4,500
Semimilitary Forces	78,000
FPEO Auxiliaries	<u>40,000</u>

Total non-Communist Native Forces 189,200

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The Vietnamese Regulars and Auxiliaries, the Royal Khmer Army, and the Laotian National Army constitute some 66,000 troops armed and trained to restore and maintain internal security. The other categories in the above list are essentially local police or militia. The 66,000 troops presumably would form the nucleus for the expanded national armies.

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

13 October 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MALONY

I have been reading over the draft statement of US policy on Indochina, in the light of the message which the French Premier sent Defense Minister Moch, who gave it to Secretary Marshall. This message, along with other French expressions, highlights the crux of the Indochina problem - the French are trying too little, too late, and not very hard. They have shown no vigorous leadership nor enlightened capacity. This observation leads to a number of implacable principles regarding U.S. policy on Indochina.

We must avoid, at all costs, the commitment of U.S. armed forces, even in a token or small scale fashion, for combat operations. Such a commitment would lead the French to shake off responsibilities and show even less initiative in Indochina. There are too many undone things to even consider such a commitment at this stage. And, even as a last resort, there would be serious objections to such a commitment from the U.S. point of view. U.S. officials must be on guard against French attempts to pressure or panic us into some sort of a commitment. Failing to get a satisfactory statement from the U.S., the French, over the next few months, may try a little psychological warfare on us. They may speak hopelessly of a coming Dunkirk. They may intimate the necessity to come to an understanding with the Chinese Communists. They may threaten to throw the problem into the United Nations, either in a political or a military way. The best defense against such tactics will be to make the French pull themselves up by their own efforts.

All the current phases of the Indochina problem seem to lead to the conclusion that the proposed military staff talks will provide the most effective leverage for reversing the present defeatist management of the military aspect of Indochina. Our talks with the military representatives in

CC: Mr. Dickinson, Jt Secretaries

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Washington were unproductive since it was impossible to discuss the actual situation in Indochina. The French Government in Paris has not yet been stunned into forthright and vigorous action. It is my impression that the U.S. Government has not yet spoken frankly and bluntly to the French regarding Indochina. Consequently, the staff talks should provide such an opportunity.

The draft statement of U.S. policy in Indochina is weak from the political side. In the drafting stage the Defense representatives argued for a strong, hard-hitting policy on political and economic concessions. The State Department representatives flatly refused and continued to refuse to consider Indochina in that manner. Consequently, the paper ended with a compromise. However, consideration should be given to making any large scale military, political and economical aid program conditional - the French talking vigorous political measures and reforms in Indochina. As it now stands, military aid will be given when its use appears acceptable to U.S. military authorities, from the military point of view. The conditional factor should be introduced with the French on a ministerial level so that the French Government knows of the American position in this matter. With respect to political measures and reforms, the Department of Defense is beyond this jurisdiction. However, we should have specific measures in mind since the State Department representatives reiterated their question "What more can be done in a political way in Indochina?"

Finally, we must resolve the problem of influencing the French to take a number of steps in Indochina, on the one hand, without our assuming the responsibility for the success or failure of the overall program to strengthen Indochina's security.

K. T. Young

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

OCTOBER 17, 1950
No. 1066

In the course of conversations which have taken place during the last few days between Messrs. Dean G. Acheson, Secretary of State; John W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury; George C. Marshall, Secretary of Defense; and William C. Foster, Economic Cooperation Administrator, on behalf of the United States, and Messrs. Jules Moch, Minister of Defense; and Maurice Petsche, Minister of Finance, on behalf of France, a review has been made of the United States contribution to the implementation of the French Rearmament Program within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This review has included the question of additional United States military aid to Indochina.

The United States Government has expressed the view that a military effort of the general magnitude and character planned by the French Government would be a vital contribution to the defensive strength of the North Atlantic area. Out of the sums appropriated by the United States Congress under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act for fiscal years 1950 and 1951, about \$5 billions have been earmarked for military equipment to be delivered to the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. France has been assigned by far the largest single part of these amounts.

In addition, the United States Congress has appropriated for military assistance in the Far East approximately one-half billion dollars. In view of the importance of the operations in Indochina, the major part of this sum is being used to provide military equipment, including light bombers, for the armed forces both of France and of the Associated States of Indochina.

This assistance will provide a very important part of the equipment required by the forces contemplated for activation in 1951 in France and for current operations in Indochina. Deliveries of equipment are being expedited and, with respect to Indochina, a particularly high priority has been assigned.

Moreover, the following agreement has been reached during the talks with respect to production assistance:

(a) On an interim basis, and within the funds already appropriated under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act by the Congress for the fiscal year 1951, the Government of the United States will make available in support of the French Government's increased military production program assistance in the amount of \$200 million, these funds to be obligated prior to June 30, 1951.

(b) The final amount of American assistance to support the expanded French defense effort will, subject to future provision of funds by the Congress, be determined on the basis of multi-lateral discussions within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization directed toward an equitable distribution among all the North Atlantic Treaty members of the economic burdens of the common rearmament effort.

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NSC 64
Series

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Informal State-Defense Meeting on Indochina,
17 October 1950, 1000 hours

Participants: General Harry Malony, Defense Member of
Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee
Mr. K. T. Young, Office of Foreign Military
Affairs, Department of Defense
Commander E. Talman, Office of Military
Assistance, Department of Defense
Mr. William B. Lacy, Director, Philippine
and Southeast Asian Affairs, State Department
Mr. Robert Hoey, Officer-in-Charge, Indochinese
Affairs, State Department
Captain G. A. Lange, OP-35, Department of
Navy
Lt. Colonel Jack B. Matthews, International
Branch, G-3, Department of Army
Colonel F. Barnes, Policy Division, Air
Force Operations
Mr. George Doyle, Policy Division, Air Force
Operations

1. Meeting was held to recapitulate the talks with the French, to analyze Saigon's views on the Indochina situation, and to review the proposed NSC policy statement on Indochina.

2. Talks With the French Ministers and Staff. According to available information, the principal results of talks with the French on their military budget were as follows, with respect to Indochina:

(a) Total budget for Indochina - 208 billion francs, or approximately \$600,000,000. This is an increase of 60 billion francs over the 1950 budget. This increase is not directly related to the formation of the National Armies. It includes a deficit of 35 billion francs carried over from 1950, which was due, in part, to payment for native troops. It was difficult to get adequate explanation from the French of this increase. U.S. representatives stated that the budgetary assistance to make up the overall military deficit has no relation to the formation of the National Armies. In other words, the French could not take

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a portion of whatever budgetary assistance is hereafter provided the French and apply it to equipping the National Army contingents.

(b) Major difference over 1950 is addition of about 20,000 indigenous troops. Increase in total troop strength is from 331,516 to 351,250. These figures were presented before the recent troop loss in Tonkin. The 20,000 increase is made up largely of the net addition of 18 battalions to the Vietnam Army. Equipment for this increase is over and above requests made to the Melby-Erskine Mission. Equipment for these 18 battalions is not included in the 1951 budget. It has not been programmed by the French. Apparently, the French do not give the formation of these battalions a very high priority. U.S. representatives emphasized to the French that equipment for the National Armies must come from the equipment requested of the Melby-Erskine Mission. The U.S. representatives also emphasized that, with respect to U.S. military assistance, the first concern was to equip French Union Forces to meet the immediate threat, but that the French could readjust the distribution of this equipment in such a way as to provide some materiel for the National Army contingents.

(c) French Ministers fully agree on formation of National Armies. They asked U.S. finance pay and maintenance, which U.S. representatives did not accept.

(d) The French accepted the U.S. suggestion that the distribution of U.S. equipment between French Union Forces and the National Army contingents shall be determined in collaboration with U.S. authorities in Saigon, i.e., General Brink. The State Department has included this point in a draft aide-memoire to the French Government to eliminate any possibility of misunderstanding.

(e) The French Ministers stated that no reduction in the Indochina budget was possible, that France is giving highest priority to equipment for Indochina, and that no evacuation of Tonkin is contemplated at the present time, but that any eventual evacuation will be taken only after consultation with the U.S. and the U.K.

(f) Defense Minister Moch asked for a squadron of B-26's which French authorities had requested of the Melby-Erskine Mission. Secretary Marshall informed Moch that 20 B-26's and 5 spares would be made available out of the U.S. pipeline to Korea. Delivery date is anticipated as early December, with some of the planes arriving in Indochina in November. The question of whether or not the French have the personnel and maintenance facilities for these planes was not raised with the French representatives.

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(g) It is understood that the French are planning to send reinforcements urgently from France and North Africa to replace the losses incurred in the evacuation of Caobang. These reinforcements may include the 10,000 non-commissioned and enlisted personnel planned for normal replacement in Indochina. In addition, there is a report that General Carpentier has requested 15 battalions for immediate reinforcement.

3. Saigon's Analysis of Situation (CMIN 1876). Recommendations in para c add nothing that is not already in process in Washington, other than calling in the U.N. to put out the big fire. Mr. Lacy opposes referring the Indochina problem to the U.N. He read his memorandum of conversation (attached) with Counselor of the French Embassy on Saturday, October 14. He and Mr. Hoey briefly noted the State Department's proposed reply to Saigon's cable.

4. Estimate of the Situation. Today's State-Defense informal meeting developed the following opinions on the overall situation, based on current information:

Political:

(a) There is no evidence of a French intention to withdraw from Indochina. There is considerable evidence of a French intention to withdraw from Tonkin or a part thereof.

(b) There is strong evidence of a French intention to throw the Indochina problem into the U.N. (see attached memorandum of conversation on 14 October.)

(c) There is no new evidence of a French intention to make a deal with the Chinese Communists. It should be noted that French reports from Saigon, particularly from High Commissioner Pignon, have begun to emphasize the presence of large numbers of "Chinese troops" on the Vietnamese side of the frontier.

Military:

(a) It is expected that the French will evacuate the posts of Laokay and Longson, and the entire border area to the small post of Monkay on the coast. Since this post can be supplied by sea it is possible that the French may try to hold it.

(b) According to the most recent estimate of G-2, the French can hold the Delta area because of their superior fire power and air cover.

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5. Draft Statement of NSC Policy. It was pointed out that this policy statement is now before the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Secretaries within the Department of Defense. The meeting today specifically did not consider the question of a commitment of U.S. armed forces since that question is beyond its authority and since the draft statement contains a policy statement on this question. It was the consensus of the meeting that the draft policy statement is quite adequate, even in the light of the deteriorating military situation which had been anticipated in the formulation of this draft statement. The meeting felt that the nub of the Indochina problem is this - "Can the French stabilize the military situation long enough to increase their troop strength sufficiently to match and overcome the rapidly growing manpower superiority of the Viet Minh?" Accordingly, the increase in available manpower is the primary need in Indochina. The draft statement of NSC policy addresses itself mainly to this problem. It was Mr. Lacy's opinion that this policy statement should be processed just as rapidly as possible.

6. General Malony emphasized the greatly increased importance of the forthcoming military staff talks with the French in the Far East; they may generate an invigorated determination to take the necessary measures to hold Indochina within the free world. The meeting felt that these talks should concentrate on Indochina and be held as soon as possible. Accordingly, it is necessary to obtain NSC consideration of Indochina shortly.

K. T. Young

Attachments -- 2

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D R A F T

AIDE-MEMOIRE

It is the understanding of the United States Government that the conversations between the French Ministers of Defense and Finance and the United States Secretaries of State and Defense produce the following results:

1. The Secretary of Defense informed the French Delegation the United States would dispatch to Indochina one squadron of B-26 bombers, these aircraft to be diverted from the American supply pipeline to the Korean Theater. The French Delegation was informed that these planes would be completely equipped for combat but that no American personnel would be involved in their operation after delivery had been accomplished. The French Delegation was advised that it would be impossible for logistic reasons to deliver these planes before December 1.

2. The Secretary of State advised the French Delegation that, without reference to the French request for budgetary assistance to Indochina in the amount of 60 billion francs, the United States Government would undertake to supply all those items identified in the French request for assistance of March 1950 as confirmed and supplemented by the Melby-Erskine report of August 1950. The French Delegation was further informed that, since it was apparent that the French request for 60 billion francs for budgetary assistance in Indochina bore no important relation to the project of forming large national armies in Indochina, the United States would expect the

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French authorities to accomplish the equipment of the Indochinese national armies (described by the French Delegation to the American Delegation in preliminary conversations) out of the equipment to be supplied by the United States. The French Delegation pointed out that equipment for French Union Forces now engaged in combat took precedence over equipment for national armies, the Secretary of State observed that the United States Government considered the formation of national armies a prerequisite to the final military and political solution of the Indochinese problem and, therefore, the United States Government must emphasize its desire that the French authorities accomplish the formation and training of the national armies described by them and the equipment of those armies from the military assistance program based on French requests of March as confirmed and supplemented by the Melby-Erskine report.

3. The French Delegation was advised that the United States had assigned to the initial military assistance program to Indochina the highest priority; that delivery of equipment under this program, totalling about \$31 million, would be accomplished for the most part by the end of the year. The French Delegation was further assured by the Secretary of Defense and by the Secretary of State that the United States Government would assign the highest priority to the delivery of military assistance identified in the French request of March 1950 as confirmed and supplemented by the Melby-Erskine Report. The French Delegation stated that of its request of March 1950 the first three categories (a), (b), and (c) will have been supplied by the end of the year; that their next priority requirements were expressed in categories

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(d), (e) and (f) in that order (the references are to the French request of March 1950).

4. It was agreed that the technical representatives of the French Delegation would meet immediately with the technical representatives of the Secretary of Defense to review present priority assignments to items embodied in the French program to the end that deliveries under that program conform to the realities of the military and political situation in Indochina as well as to the serious supply limitations under which the United States Government is now operating.

5. United States Government expressed the view, and the French Delegation appeared to agree, that the allocation of American military assistance as between armies of the French Union and national army contingents should be approved by French and American authorities in Indochina.

Department of State,
Washington.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: October 16, 1950

SUBJECT: Desirability of French Government Bringing Indochina
Situation to the United Nations.

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Pierre Millet - Counselor, French Embassy

Mr. Lacy - PSA

COPIES TO: FE American Embassy Paris
EUR American Legation Saigon
UNA - Mr. Hickerson
O - Mr. Matthews
S/A - Ambassador Jessup

Mr. Millet asked to see me during the afternoon of October 14. During the course of conversation on the military situation in Indochina (see Memorandum of Conversation entitled "Military Situation in Indochina", October 14) Mr. Millet said that his Ambassador had asked him to secure my entirely personal and unofficial views on the attitude of the Department toward the desirability of the French Government bringing the Indochina situation, in some unspecified manner, to the United Nations. He seemed to imply by several elliptical statements that either General MacArthur or the Department might consider that the success of the United Nations operation in Korea argued for a reproduction of the same operation in Indochina.

I replied that any views I might express were entirely my own and that, as he knew, this subject could be more profitably discussed with Mr. Hickerson. The rest of my remarks were designed to convey to Mr. Millet the idea that; (1) the decision as to whether to take the Indochina situation to the United Nations lay with the French Government and not with the United States. (2) I did not think that the Department had developed, during the last few weeks as Mr. Millet implied, a sentiment in favor of the French submission of the Indochina situation to the United Nations; that so far as I knew the Department continued to adhere to the position in respect of this problem agreed on between the United States, French and British delegations during the course of their discussions preliminary to the Foreign Ministers Conferences in New York. (3) United Nations activity in Indochina seemed to me

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to require either a border observation team or mediation between two parties at interest. I observed I thought that the border team, whose function would presumably be to observe indirect Chinese aggression, would necessarily include Asiatic membership and that as he well knew, the attitude of certain Asian countries toward Chinese Communism and toward Ho Chi Minh differed from the views held by the Western Powers; that I presumed the French Government did not look with favor on the treatment of Ho Chi Minh as a party of interest in any case.

I had the impression from Mr. Millet that in its desperation the French Government was for the first time seriously considering United Nations action in Indochina. I did not think it wise therefore, to give Millet even in personal conversation anything that he could describe as a Departmental position beyond that already discussed in the preliminary conversations with the British and French Delegations in September.

Mr. Merchant and Mr. Godley were given the sense of the foregoing on October 14.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

17 October 1950

IN REPLY REFER TO
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MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION

Subj: The Current Situation in French Indochina.

Annex: (A) Military Forces French Indochina.

1. The four year old military deadlock in Indochina has apparently been broken by the current Viet Minh offensive. This offensive action along the Sino-Tonkin border is forcing the French to withdraw to the Red River delta and is threatening the entire French position in northern Indochina. It now appears that the aid which Viet Minh have reportedly been receiving from the Chinese Communists over the past six months has been the deciding factor in breaking this stalemate in their favor.

2. The successful Viet Minh operations against Dong Khe on 16 September and more recently against the retreating French garrison from Cao Bang have revealed unsuspected strength on the part of the Viet Minh. They have abandoned their former hit-and-run tactics and are now capable of conducting a coordinated offensive and in general of waging a conventional form of warfare. The French admit that the forces which recently wiped out almost all of 4,000 French troops on the highway between Cao Bang and Langson, were equal to the French in equipment, training and technique. Important factors in the Viet Minh success have been excellent artillery support, accurate anti-aircraft fire and good intelligence.

3. The recent operations have revealed serious weakness in French manpower, leadership, and intelligence. The French lack the mobile reserves needed to engage in offensive operations or to counter the current Viet Minh threat. This lack of reserves has become especially acute since the French lost the better part of seven battalions near Cao Bang during the week of 5 October 1950. Moreover the creation of a loyal Vietnamese National Army has not progressed sufficiently to release an adequate number of French forces for offensive operations. The French have been further handicapped by inadequate intelligence, resulting partly from a reluctance to fly reconnaissance missions over or near Chinese territory. Finally, the French have delayed in effecting necessary tactical withdrawals in time to prevent the garrisons of border posts from being overwhelmed by superior enemy forces.

4. The French High Command has now recognized the need to regroup its forces in anticipation of a sustained Viet Minh attack on Hanoi and Haiphong. This regrouping will make necessary the early evacuation of all border posts in N.E. Tonkin unless the recent French request for fifteen additional battalions from France is quickly granted. In this area nine French battalions with a maximum strength of 7,200 men, are now facing approximately 13,000-14,000 Viet Minh regulars. It is also doubtful that the N.E. Tonkin outposts can be held. There are an estimated 3,800 French troops are surrounded by 4,000-5,000 Viet Minh forces.

5. French evacuation of the entire border area is likely to have certain serious consequences:

(a) It would facilitate the build-up of logistic support needed by the

17 OCT 1950

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Subj: The Current Situation in French Indochina

Viet Minh for their counter-offensive against the main French positions in the Red River delta.

(b) It would reduce the field of vision of French intelligence.

(c) It would completely upset previous French plans for extending their hold on the rice-growing delta area of Tonkin.

(d) It would open up a corridor from the Viet Minh mountain stronghold in Tonkin into Laos.

(e) It would have an unfortunate psychological impact on the already deteriorating political situation tending to cause a large number of Vietnamese in areas under French control to seek an accommodation with the Viet Minh or even to revolt openly.

6. A review of the situation in Indochina in the light of recent developments leads to the following conclusions:

(a) French military and political efforts have failed to date to restore order in Indochina. The fall of Cao Bang to the Viet Minh without French resistance will probably encourage the Viet Minh forces to further aggressive action.

(b) No significant build-up of Chinese Communist ground and air forces has been reported in southern or southwestern China, although rehabilitation and construction of airfields and roads in the region is in process.

(c) It is estimated that Viet Minh forces are building for a large-scale offensive to seize complete control in Indochina. This build-up is being fostered by aid from Chinese Communist sources in the fields of training and arms supply and, reportedly, by Soviet technical assistance.

(d) The Viet Minh attack and capture of Dong Khe and Pakha, and the subsequent withdrawal of French forces from Cao Bang and other border posts are considered indications that the initial phases of the offensive have commenced.

(e) A carefully planned Viet Minh offensive with clandestine participation by a portion of the 150,000 Chinese Communist troops in South China is more likely than an overt Chinese Communist invasion.


(f) The French are not considered capable of conducting an offensive in Tonkin, with troops and equipment presently available.

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Subj: The Current Situation in French Indochina

(g) Prior to 1 January 1951, the present level of U.S. military aid to the French and native allied forces will increase their capabilities but not to the extent of counterbalancing the probable increase of Viet Minh capabilities.

(h) In summary, the Viet Minh intention to attack the French forces is established and the initial phase of the operation has commenced. It is estimated that the Viet Minh forces will continue to (1) attack isolated border posts and French lines of communications without committing large numbers of troops, (2) open additional supply routes to China, and (3) re-organize and consolidate their forces prior to launching an all out attack.



FELIX W. STURZEN
Rear Adm. (ab), U.S. Navy
Director of Naval Intelligence


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MILITARY FORCES FRENCH INDOCHINA

FRENCH UNION FORCES

Personnel Strength: 353,970 Total

Army: 339,867

French Army Regulars: 150,667 (less 4,000 lost at Cao Bang)

Tonkin:	58,500 (41 battn))	(French:	49,267
Annam:	23,500 (16 battn))	(For. Legion:	18,500
Cochin China:	56,000 (23 battn))	(IC Native:	44,000
Laos:	7,000)	(N. African:	25,100
Cambodia:	5,500)	(Senegalese:	13,800

Loyal Native Forces: 189,200

Permanent Vietnam Army 28,200

(Paper strength; 9 mobile battns
are in being; of these 5 are in
operation)

Vietnamese Militia (Suppletifs): 29,000

Laotian Army: 2,600

Cambodian Army: 6,900

Racial Minority troops: 4,500

Semi-Military forces
(plantation guards, etc.): 78,000

FTEO Auxiliaries
(Suppletifs to regular French
Army): 40,000

Navv: 8,754 (including 3,234 fuseliers marins)

Air Force: 5,349 (including 262 pilots)

Naval Vessels: 161 Total

Old Light Cruiser (OCL):	1
Gun Boats (PG):	1
Fleet Minesweeper (AM):	9
Motor Minesweeper (AMS):	10
Net Laying Ship (AN):	1
Seaplane Tender (AVP):	2
Hydrographic Vessel (AGC):	1
Tankers (AO & TOG):	2
Transport (AP):	1
Repair Ship (AR):	1

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Naval Vessels (Continued)

Ocean Tug (Fleet) ATF):	1
Landing Ship (Tank) (LST):	3 (1 en route)
Landing Ship (Support) (LSSL):	6 (en route)
Miscellaneous Landing Craft:	96 (18 en route)
Submarine Chaser (175') (PC):	3
Submarine Chaser (110') (SC):	6
Harbor Defense Launch (YP):	7
Harbor Tug (Little) (YTL):	7
Motor Fishing Vessel (MFV):	3

Aircraft: 232 Total

Air Force

Fighters:	81
Transport:	60
Reconnaissance, Liaison, Misc.	70

(40 additional F6F planes expected to arrive from US in November)

Navy

PBY5A:	9 (3 more scheduled for reassignment to PIC)
Sea Otter:	12

VIET MINH FORCES

Regular Forces:	92,500 (163 battns)
Tonkin:	40,000 (76 battns)
	(War Office London estimate: 60,000)
Annam:	22,000 (46 battns)
Cochin China:	21,000 (41 battns)
Cambodia:	4,500 (including 2,000 Kimer Issarek)
Laos:	5,000 (including 500 Lao Issarek)
Irregular Forces:	150,000
People's Militia:	35,000 (66 battns)
Not organized in battn.	97,000

N.B.

A French battalion is approximately 800 men strong.

A Viet Minh battalion is approximately 500 men strong.

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lost or abandoned during
the last 20 days
French border posts still
held.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRET

OCT 18 1950
2 P.M.

PRIORITY

AMLEGATION
SAIGON
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DEPT wishes to have FOL MSG delivered to Bao Dai personally by MIN IMMED after Chief of State's arrival in Saigon. It SHLD be delivered informally without submission written text with sufficient emphasis to leave no doubt in Emperor's mind that it represents DEPTS studied opinion in matter now receiving ATTN highest auths US GOVT. Begin MSG:

Bao Dai will arrive in Saigon at moment when Vietnam is facing grave crisis outcome of which may decide whether country will be permitted develop independence status or pass in near future to one of Sino-Soviet dominated satellite, a new form of colony immeasurably worse than the old from which Vietnam has so recently separated herself.

The US GOVT is at present moment taking steps to increase the AMT of aid to FR Union and ASSOC States in their effort to defend the territorial integrity of IC and prevent the incorporation of the ASSOC States within the COMMIE-dominated bloc of slave states but even the resources of US are strained by our present UN commitments in Korea, the need for aid in the defense of Western Europe and our own rearmament program. We sometimes find it impossible to furnish aid as we WLD wish in a given AMT at a given time and in a given place.

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Leadership of Vietnam GOVT during this crucial period is a factor of preponderant importance in deciding ultimate outcome. GOVT must display unusually aggressive leadership and courage before a discouraged people, distraught and floundering in the wake of years of civil war. Lesser considerations concerning the modalities of relations between the States of the FR Union and the REP of FR must, for instance, be at least temporarily laid aside in face of serious threat to very existence of Vietnam as autonomous state, within FR Union or otherwise.

We are aware (as is Bao Dai) that present Vietnamese GOVT is so linked with person of Chief of State that leadership and example provided by latter takes on extraordinary importance in determining degree of efficiency in functioning of GOVT. Through circumstances of absence in FR of Bao Dai and other Vietnamese leaders for prolonged period, opportunity for progress in assumption of responsibilities from FR and extension authority and influence of GOVT with people was neglected. Many people, including great number AMERS, have been unable understand reasons for Emperor's GTE prolonged holiday UNQTE on Riviera and have misinterpreted it as an indication of lack of patriotic attachment to his role of Chief of State. DEPT is at least of opinion that his absence did not enhance the authority and prestige of his GOVT at home.

Therefore, DEPT considers it imperative Bao Dai give Vietnamese people evidence his determination personally take up reins of state and lead his country into IMMEDIATE and energetic opposition COMMIE menace. Specifically he SHLD embark upon IMMEDIATE program of visits to all parts Vietnam making numerous speeches and public appearances in the process. Chief of State SHLD declare his determination plunge into job of rallying people to support of GOVT and opposition to VM IMMEDIATE upon arrival Saigon. He SHLD announce US, FR support for formation NATL armies and his own intention assume role Commander in Chief. He SHLD take full advantage of FR official declaration of intention to form NATL armies (confirmed yesterday by MIN ASSC States Letourneau) and set up precise plan for such formation IMMEDIATE.

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Finally, it SHLD be tactfully suggested that any further display procrastination in facing realities in the form prolonged periods of seclusion at Dalat or otherwise WLD confirm impressions of those not as convinced of Emperor's seriousness of purpose as DEPT and LEG are and raise questions of the wisdom of continuing to support a Vietnamese GOVT which proves itself incapable of exercising the autonomy acquired by it at such a high price. End of MSG.

Endeavor obtain private interview soonest possible after arrival for DEPT regards timing as of prime importance. Simultaneously or IMMEDIATELY inform Letourneau and Pignon of action. Saigon advise Paris in advance to synchronize informing FONOFF

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

19 October 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY FINLETTER

SUBJECT: Indo-China

Item 1. Sr. NSC Staff Agenda, Thursday, 19 October, 2:30 p.m.

The Southeast Asia Policy Committee has prepared the attached, which furnishes background and a proposed policy. This is now under review by the Joint Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Military Aid

We have been giving military aid to the French and Vietnamese in Indo-China. The Melby-Brakine Mission have completed a survey as to the needs. We are preparing to give greater aid, and according to priorities to be furnished by Brigadier General Brink, USA, Chief of MAG, now on the spot in the Tonkin area. As you know, this speed-up has been under discussion with the French authorities this past week. A total of 6 French battalions have either been destroyed or isolated by the Viet Minhs. This leaves 15 Battalions available to the French to oppose about twice that number of Viet Minhs, with some 300 miles of the Chinese border open, with an open line of supply from China and with some 10,000 Vietnam troops in training in China. The French are planning to retreat further but to hold the Delta area. They should be able to hold, with the addition of 4 replacement battalions now enroute and the capability of moving some other troops from Cochin China. The arrival of General Juin and the French Minister for Colonies should ensure an adequate appraisal of the situation.

Political Steps

With our eye on the main objective in Western Europe and our policy against colonialism, and for nationalism (except where our worthwhile allies would be unduly weakened) our ends could best be served by bringing about on the part of the French:

a. Definite announcement by the French of a decision on their part to phase out their political government in Indochina (action on their part similar to ours in the Philippines)

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b.. Building up the prestige and strength of the troops of the Associated States and giving them greater autonomy.

c. Giving greater governmental powers to the States, within the framework of the French Union.

It is, of course, most important that the French do not quit cold and leave a political vacuum behind them.

U.S. Military Intervention

The case of the French military in Indo-China is not believed to be hopeless. We are not desirous of being a party to colonialism. We should therefore avoid military intervention, at least for the present. Instead, we should do what we think is to their best interest and ours in the long run; that is, rely mainly on the political stumps noted and give increased military aid, aimed primarily at enabling the Associated States to protect themselves against the encroachment of communism.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

SECRET

OCT 25 1950

AMLEGATION

SAIGON
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In view both State and Defense IMMEDIATE POLIT and MIL advantages sought in NATL army plan must be found THRU IMMEDIATE integration into NATL army commanded by Bao Dai of armed native contingents such as Caodists, Hoa Hao, Catholics, etc. Technical difficulties inherent in this effort well known but must somehow be overcome.

Caodists offer (LEGTEL 638) development of highest importance in DEPTS opinion. We believe every possible effort SHLD be made by LEG, EMB Paris and DEPT to get these men in the fight as part of the new NATL army.

Discussions with Bishops Thuc and Chi and Ngo Dinh Diem during past month centered in large part around DEPTS expressed conviction that MIL forces of Bishop must become part of NATL army at once. DEPT believes that these conversations will bear fruit and will advise developments soonest.

Technical conversations PRELIM to Moch-Petsche conferences FR MIL stated that seventy-six thousand suppletives CLD be incorporated ULTLY into the NATL armies. These they describe as three state forces including regulars and irregulars (see DEPTTEL 307, SEP 27).

LEG advise DEPT and Paris of any steps believe practical to expand Caodists offer and incorporation suppletives NATL armies.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRET

OCT 27 1950

AMEMBASSY

PARIS ,
2250

TOMAP

MAAG TEL France 663, OCT 25, signed Richards, PARA 1, approved.

In order effect compliance with bilateral agreement which covers MDAP assistance, you should hand note to French Government in following sense: QTE My government has noted the request of your government concerning the disposition of certain items of military equipment previously furnished your government pursuant to the terms of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between our two governments, dated January 27, 1950. This request affects 24 howitzers (105 mm.) and 6 howitzers (155 mm.) which your government desires to transfer for use in operations now being conducted in Indochina. Having in mind the urgency of these operations, I am pleased to inform you that my government, pursuant to the terms of Article I of the Agreement referred to, gives its consent to the use of these items for the purpose requested by your government. It is understood, of course, that if it should become necessary in the future to devote these howitzers to any other purpose, your government will again request the prior consent of my government, and that the provisions of any agreement to which our two governments may adhere generally covering equipment furnished by the United States for use in Indochina will apply to these howitzers, UNQTE.

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S E C R E T

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington,
November 22, 1950
6 p.m.

USUN,

NEW YORK 516

RE UNTEL 833 NOV 16:

1. DEPT does not favor Peace Observation Commission use in Indochina situation now although we can see that POC can provide evidence of CHI Commie aid to Viet Minh which may be helpful in winning support for our position RE necessity military aid to FR-Vietnamese.

2. However, the Asian UN members WLD undoubtedly insist that, given the present relationship of France toward the Associated States, the UN SHLD examine the whole IC situation rather than merely sending a POC subcommittee whose mission, if able to be accomplished, WLD only look toward cutting down CHI Commie aid to the Viet Minh so that the FR might be able to reduce the warfare to guerrilla activity.

3. We agree that if IC subject is to come into the UN, it is obviously preferable FR do it. However, we see no benefit in FR appeal to UN without FR declaration of intent to grant eventual independence to IC, along lines Letourneau's statements at Saigon press conference (Saigon's 657, OCT 24). Without such declaration by FR, we believe any attempt to secure UN aid, including use of POC, WLD lead to UN insistence on

scrutinizing

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scrutinizing entire IC situation and FR role toward both Associated States and Viet Minh, with unforeseeable but hazardous results. Attempt to use FOC is not worth the risks we see inherent in UN consideration of the IC situation at the moment.

Consequently, we do not consider it desirable for you to explore this question further jointly with UK and FR DELS.

ACHESON

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

NOVEMBER 27, 1950
No. 1187

STATEMENT ON INDOCHINA BY THE
HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
November 27, 1950

The United States Government welcomes the definition of the policy of France in Indochina as described in the statement of Monsieur Letourneur, the Minister of Associated States, as confirmed by the Prime Minister, Monsieur Plevin, and by the resolution of the National Assembly which approved that policy. It will be particularly reassuring to nations of the free world to know that the independence of the Associated States of Indochina within the framework of the French Union is now assured and that the military and economic resources of the French Republic and of the Associated States of Indochina will be directed with boldness and renewed resolution to the defense of Indochina against communist colonialism.

To the end that the armies of the Associated States of Indochina and the French Union accomplish their mission and in order that the new states in Indochina attain stability and offer their people a better life, the United States is extending to them military and economic assistance.

The United States Government hopes that other free nations will make every contribution within their power to enable the Associated States and their partners in the French Union to accomplish their mission of freedom.

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Extract from Minutes of Truman - Attlee Conversations,
Washington, December 4-8, 1950
First Meeting, December 4, 1950

Secretary Acheson:...This moment for negotiation with the communist movement is the worst since 1917. If we do not negotiate and do not have a settlement, what do we do? We may fight as hard as we can in Korea, keeping going as long as possible, punishing the enemy as much as we can. Our negotiating position would be no worse then. If we are pushed out later and cannot hold Korea, we are still on the islands. We must refuse to recognize their gains. We could make as much trouble for the Chinese Communists as possible and hold Formosa, retaining what strength we can. If the Communists are successful in Korea, this may so weaken the French in Indochina that they will pull out. He doubted if any one of the President's advisers would urge him to intervene in that situation.

¹Copy held in S/S-R.

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December 21, 1950

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

to the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA

Reference: NSC 64

At the request of the Secretary of Defense, the enclosed memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject is circulated herewith for the information and consideration of the National Security Council and referred to the NSC Staff for use in the preparation of a report for Council consideration.

In transmitting the enclosure, the Secretary of Defense stated that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained therein are based on their review of a proposed draft statement of policy on Indochina which was formulated by the Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee early in October.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director of Defense Mobilization

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D. C.

28 November 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

SUBJECT: Possible Future Action in Indochina

1. In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum, dated 13 October 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied the proposed Statement of U. S. Policy on Indochina for NSC Consideration, which you enclosed, in the light of the message enclosed herewith (Enclosure "A") from Brigadier General F. G. Brink (USA), Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina. You will recall that the Joint Chiefs of Staff withheld final comment on the subject draft policy statement until the Brink report was received.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the statement of United States policy proposed by the Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee conforms generally to their previously expressed views, including those contained in their memorandum to you on Indochina dated 12 October 1950. They are of the opinion, however, that the draft statement of United States policy on Indochina proposed by the Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee should be recast so as to meet more effectively the immediate and critical situation in that country. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have formulated the following statement of short-term and long-term policies which they recommend be substituted for those included in the paper prepared by the Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the military problems of Indochina are closely interrelated with the political problems of the area. Accordingly, many of the policies recommended herein lie largely in the political field. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider, however, that the fundamental causes of the deterioration in the Indochinese security situation lie in the lack of will and determination on the part of the indigenous people of Indochina to join wholeheartedly with the French in resisting communism. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, without popular support of the Indochinese people, the French will never achieve a favorable long-range military settlement of the security problem of Indochina.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the following short-term objectives for Indochina:

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SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES

a. The United States should take action, as a matter of urgency, by all means practicable short of the actual employment of United States military forces, to deny Indochina to communism. ✓

b. As long as the present situation exists, the United States should continue to insure that the primary responsibility for the restoration of peace and security in Indochina rests with the French. ✓

c. The United States should seek to develop its military assistance program for Indochina based on an over-all military plan prepared by the French, concurred in by the Associated States of Indochina, and acceptable to the United States. ✓

(1) Both the plan and the program should be developed and implemented as a matter of urgency. It should be clearly understood, however, that United States acceptance of the plan is limited to the logistical support which the United States may agree to furnish. The aid provided under the program should be furnished to the French in Indochina and to the Associated States. The allocation of United States military assistance as between the French and the national armies of Indochina should be approved by the French and United States authorities in Indochina.

(2) Popular support of the Government by the Indochinese people is essential to a favorable settlement of the security problem of Indochina. Therefore, as a condition to the provision of those further increases in military assistance to Indochina necessary for the implementation of an agreed over-all military plan, the United States Government should obtain assurances from the French Government that:

(a) A program providing for the eventual self-government of Indochina either within or outside of the French Union will be developed, made public, and implementation initiated at once in order to strengthen the national spirit of the Indochinese in opposition to communism.

(b) National armies of the Associated States of Indochina will be organized as a matter of urgency. While it is doubtful that the build-up of these armies can be accomplished in time to contribute significantly to the present military situation, the direct political and psychological benefits to be derived from this course would be great and would thus result in immediate, although indirect, military benefits.

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(c) Pending the formation and training of Indochinese national armies as effective units, and as an interim emergency measure, France will dispatch sufficient additional armed forces to Indochina to insure that the restoration of peace and internal security in that country will be accomplished in accordance with the timetable of the over-all military plan for Indochina.

(d) France will change its political and military concepts in Indochina to:

i. Eliminate its policy of "colonialism".

ii. Provide proper tutelage to the Associated States.

iii. Insure that a suitable military command structure, unhampered by political interference, is established to conduct effective and appropriate military operations. The effective implementation of these changes will require competent and efficient political and military leaders who will be able to cope with the conditions in that country.

(3) At an appropriate time the United States should institute checks to satisfy itself that the conditions set forth in subparagraph c-(2) above are being fulfilled.

d. The United States should exert all practicable political and diplomatic measures required to obtain the recognition of the Associated States by the other non-communist states of Southeast and South Asia.

e. In the event of overt attack by organized Chinese Communist forces against Indochina, the United States should not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China but should, in concert with the United Kingdom, support France and the Associated States by all means short of the actual employment of United States military forces. This support should include appropriate expansion of the present military assistance program and endeavors to induce States in the neighborhood of Indochina to commit armed forces to resist the aggression.

f. The United States should immediately reconsider its policy toward Indochina whenever it appears that the French Government may abandon its military position in that country or plans to refer the problem of Indochina to the United Nations. Unless the situation throughout the world generally, and Indochina

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specifically, changes materially, the United States should seek to dissuade the French from referring the Indochina question to the United Nations.

g. Inasmuch as the United States-sponsored resolution, "Uniting for Peace", has been adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, and should a situation develop in Indochina in a manner similar to that in Korea in which United Nations forces were required, the United States would then probably be morally obligated to contribute its armed forces designated for service on behalf of the United Nations. It is, therefore, in the interests of the United States to take such action in Indochina as would forestall the need for the General Assembly to invoke the provisions of the resolution, "Uniting for Peace".

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the following long-term objectives for Indochina:

LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES

a. United States security interests demand that this government, by all means short of the actual employment of United States military forces, seek to prevent the further spread of communism in Southeast Asia generally and, in particular, in French Indochina.

b. The United States should seek to insure the establishment of such conditions in Indochina that no foreign armed forces will be required for the maintenance of internal security.

c. The United States should continue to press the French to carry out in letter and in spirit the program referred to in paragraph 4-c-(2)-(a) above, providing for the eventual self-government of Indochina either within or outside of the French Union.

d. The United States should continue to favor the entry of the three Associated States of Indochina into the United Nations.

e. The United States should encourage the establishment of an appropriate form of regional security arrangement embracing Indochina and the other countries of Southeast Asia under Articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter.

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6. There is enclosed (Enclosure "B") for possible use by the National Security Council Staff the Analysis which was prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection with their study of the problem. This Analysis, however, has not received their detailed approval.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(SIGNED)

OMAR N. BRADLEY,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Enclosures

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ENCLOSURE "A"

STATE DEPT MSG

FROM: US MINISTER SAIGON VIETNAM SGD HEATH

TO: SECRETARY OF STATE

NR: 763

TOMAP
660718Z

4 November 1950

Sent Dept 763 rptd info Paris 267; Dept pass CofSA for action.
From Chief MAAG signed Brink.

Reference unnn Deptel 28, Oct 1950.

French are gradually withdrawing from northern frontier and plan to hold general line Moncay-Lackay in Tonkin; in order protect Hanoi-Haiphong area and coal mining area north of Haiphong. Perimeter of these areas is to be organized as main line of resistance. Pacification measures throughout rest of Indochina will continue in effect. Northern portion of new defensive area is mountainous with corridors running generally, but not invariably so, toward the Haiphong-Hanoi Delta area. No natural barriers lie between the new line and the Delta area. Haiphong and Hanoi are both surrounded by open Delta paddy country with numerous winding tributaries of the Red River. Railroads lead from Hanoi to Langson and Haiphong. The latter, along with the highway, are the main supply routes to the operational area. The presence of Viet Minh troops prevents land communications between Saigon and Hanoi requiring movements by water and air only. Average time for movements of troops and materiel from Saigon to Haiphong or Hanoi by water and rail varies from 3 to 4 weeks. Airlift between the same places is 36 hours.

Weather during November, December and January in Tonkin area generally excellent with intermittent thunderstorms; in central coastal area poor with average of 20 days per month heavy rain and low ceilings. In southern area generally excellent with intermittent thunderstorms. In the Tonkin Delta area February weather is extremely poor with heavy fog and mist. In central coastal area February weather conditions remain unchanged until June. Weather, therefore, favors general offensive operations in next 3 months by the Viet Minh which has not yet materialized.

Army: The Army combat strength equals the combat strength of the Viet Minh. Army superiority in artillery, engineer services,

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weapons, transportation signal equipment and level of supply. It is inferior to Viet Minh in mobility. The Army needs:

(A) Minimum 9 additional battalions in North Tonkin area to make a limited offensive possible. These battalions are not available in Indochina and must come from France or its possessions.

(B) Weapons and equipment to supplement materiel now in use and to replace unserviceable materiel. Adequate spare parts must be furnished.

Navy: Navy has complete Naval superiority and can operate freely along the coast; and inland waterways provided formations of armored craft are used. Navy mission is:

(A) To support ground forces in shore operations by providing shipping convoys for the transportation of personnel and equipment;

(B) To furnish gunfire support and maintain control of off shore areas to prevent Viet Minh smuggling and possible amphibious assault. The Navy has moved additional amphibious craft and commando units to Tonkin

(a) To reinforce the line Haiphong-Moncay,
(b) To prevent possible flanking by sea and
(c) To conduct operations with ground force along inland waterways. The flexibility and ability to move concentrations rapidly as needed, made possible by employment of amphibious units, should prove a powerful advantage in Delta fighting. At present the line of defense is still too far inland to allow much Naval participation in active combat.

Air: Viet Minh air strength reported as 40 aircraft which can be successfully engaged by French Air Reserve. Viet Minh anti aircraft artillery is negligible at this time (a few 20mm guns have recently made their first appearance). French have a small and highly coordinated efficient air transport organization for routine and emergency supply and troop movements which has been operating for 3 years from Hanoi Bay. It is capable of ready expansion. Military Air Transport can be supplemented by commercial airlines. There is a specific need for light bombers, fighter bombers, air transport craft and low level reconnaissance planes for photography. The potential of the French Army, Navy and Air supported by their greater resources of all kinds is greater than Viet Minh potential. But as present closer coordination of the action of these forces is needed.

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The French state that they now contemplate changing their troop dispositions from a "pacification pattern" of widely scattered small units in North Tonkin intended to gain the good will of the natives and keep down local incidents, to an "operational pattern". This will require a political decision.

The present problem in Indochina under current plans is:

- (A) To regroup companies and smaller units now in Tonkin area into combat fighting battalions or regiments with cross-country ability in order to maintain a flexible line of resistance,
- (B) To achieve the proper coordinated action of these forces in local area action,
- (C) To at least maintain the pacification status quo throughout remainder of Indochina.

A withdrawal to the Hanoi-Haiphong Delta area will permit a stronger coordinated defense in which combined French Army, Navy, and Air Forces can begin dual support and be employed to their utmost capabilities, when their action is properly coordinated. There are excellent fields of fire for Infantry and Artillery. Air will not be forced to operate in restricted mountainous areas and targets will be better defined and more accessible. Numerous waterways in the Delta area will greatly hamper Viet Minh movements because of the necessity to move on foot. Viet Minh routes of advance will be canalized and opportunity for rendezvous made more difficult. French troops will have greater ground, water and air transportation facilities which will afford greater opportunity for quick concentration of larger French troops against the Viet Minh forces. The withdrawal will also permit a regrouping of troops for local offensive action or a general offensive. French supply lines will be shortened and Viet Minh lines lengthened forcing them to establish sub-arsenals and sub-depots south of the frontier where they will be subject to French air attack and ground penetration. The withdrawal, however will permit the Viet Minh to consolidate the area from which these units are withdrawn giving them airstrips, better bases in Indochina and permit political organization and their conscription of the population and may produce an unfavorable chain reaction among the population of Indochina. It is possible that relatively few weapons and possibly aircraft will be given by the Chinese Communists as token gift to the Viet Minh. Chinese Communists may be loath to spare many of these weapons because of their commitments in Manchuria, Changhai-Amoy area, Kowloon, Canton and Tibet.

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It must be assumed that, in general, French are fighting in unfriendly territory in all their military efforts in Vietnam. Their military operations may be jeopardized by transfer of loyalty to the Viet Minh throughout Vietnam unless further politically effective concessions are made by France to Vietnam and the formation of Vietnamese Army is initiated.

Weakness of present French military organization appears to be:

(A) An excessively static organization of defensive area with no provisions for mutual support. Detachments from general reserves are sent to the areas as needed and pass to control of area commander,

(B) There are not yet combat organizations greater than battalion size and this does not provide adequate striking forces for strong military effort,

(C) Lack of proper coordination of forces. Few air-ground liaison teams exist.

Conclusions:

(1) There has been unduly exaggerated military importance attached to Cao Bang incident; political effect has been serious,

(2) French military forces have been greatly shocked by this incident and better reorganization of their fighting forces can be expected,

(3) Contemplated withdrawal will involve series of difficult operations and further French losses must be expected,

(4) If adequate military aid arrives within next two months and French forces in Tonkin receive an additional 9 battalions and are reorganized and properly trained as the French plan, serious penetrations by Viet Minh of Hanoi-Haiphong Delta area and coal mines north of Haiphong can be prevented,

(5) Monçay-Laokay line is over-extended and can be easily penetrated by Viet Minh forces. Laokay itself offers little military advantage except as bar to Viet Minh advance down Red River but can be by-passed or captured by Viet Minh. Possession of Monçay denies Viet Minh port on the gulf. This port and the port immediately south, if held, can be used as bases from which to launch French counter-offensive.

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(6) French at present are in no position initiate counter-offensive to drive Viet Minh to northern border, nor will then be in predictable future in view of increasing Viet Minh strength, unless additional trained troops are brought in from France or its possessions,

(7) Viet Minh activities Cambodia and Laos as well as Vietnam are increasing and no troops can be spared from these areas or operations in Tonkin,

(8) Formation of Vietnamese Army is still under discussion, and not likely to become consolidated force within a year, and will not have any appreciable military value before 1952 except possibly as police force in pacification areas. Conclusions are based on assumption that Chinese Communists will not openly participate in Viet Minh operations and immediate military aid requested in Legtel 566, October 16 will arrive by 1 January 1951.

Extremely fast-moving political situation in Indochina presents many complications for French Military Command. Current plans of French military here are at present still dependent on controversial negotiations and political decisions which must be made quickly, and the military is being delayed in implementing their current plans. Three main questions at this time are:

(A) Decision which must yet be made as to changing the mission of military in Tonkin entirely from pacification to direct operational,

(B) Manner and speed with which Vietnamese Army will be activated,

(C) Speed with which military air will be delivered. Current French plans will be successful only if these questions are resolved successfully without delay.

Participated in conference with Juin and have discussed situation and plans with Carpentier here, Alessandri in Hanoi, and chiefs of major forces. General Valluy, Juin assistant, has remained here with him and I have had similar discussion with him.

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He has requested another conversation Monday 6th. General Harding visited here one day, gave him situation briefly but no prolonged discussion since he returned Singapore after Carpentier had denied him visit to northern Tonkin. Carpentier has given me free access to himself, his staff and commanders and authority to visit Tonkin, which I have done, including Hanoi and Haiphong. Will keep you informed.

Note: DEPTTEL 28 is CM IN 6446 (30 Oct) G2.
LEGTTEL 566 is CM IN 6223 (30 Oct) G2.

ACTION: G2

INFO: G3, JCS G4, MUN

CM IN 8337 (6 November 1950)

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ENCLOSURE "B"

ANALYSIS

1. On 5 April 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense in which it was stated, among other things, that:

"The mainland states of Southeast Asia also are at present of critical strategic importance to the United States because:

"a. They are the major sources of certain strategic materials required for the completion of United States stockpile projects;

"b. The area is a crossroad of communications;

"c. Southeast Asia is a vital segment in the line of containment of communism stretching from Japan southward and around to the Indian Peninsula. The security of the three major non-Communist base areas in this quarter of the world--Japan, India, and Australia--depends in a large measure on the denial of Southeast Asia to the Communists. If Southeast Asia is lost, these three base areas will tend to be isolated from one another;

"d. The fall of Indochina would undoubtedly lead to the fall of the other mainland states of Southeast Asia. Their fall would:

"(1) Require changing the Philippines and Indonesia from supporting positions in the Asian off-shore island chain to front-line bases for the defense of the Western Hemisphere. It would also call for a review of the strategic deployment of United States forces in the Far East; and

"(2) Bring about almost immediately a dangerous condition with respect to the internal security of the Philippines, Malaya, and Indonesia, and would contribute to their probable eventual fall to the communists;

"e. The fall of Southeast Asia would result in the virtually complete denial to the United States of the Pacific littoral of Asia. Southeast Asian mainland areas are important in the conduct of operations to contain communist expansion;

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"f. Communist control of this area would alleviate considerably the food problem of China and would make available to the USSR important strategic materials. In this connection, Soviet control of all the major components of Asia's war potential might become a decisive factor affecting the balance of power between the United States and the USSR. A Soviet position of dominance over Asia, Western Europe, or both, would constitute a major threat to United States security; and

"g. A Soviet position of dominance over the Far East would also threaten the United States position in Japan since that country could thereby be denied its Asian markets, sources of food and other raw materials. The feasibility of retention by the United States of its Asian offshore island bases could thus be jeopardized."

2. The series of defeats suffered recently by the French in northern Tonkin serves to focus attention upon the urgency of the current military situation in Indochina and points up the fact that the Viet Minhs now constitute a direct threat to the French military position in Indochina. The current military situation is serious since the effect produced by the impact of French defeats can gain momentum which may have dire repercussions upon an already deteriorating political situation in Southeast Asia. By taking over border posts, the Viet Minhs now can maintain uninterrupted liaison with Communist China. At this time when a majority of the Indochinese are favorably disposed toward the Viet Minhs, as opposed to the French and Bao Dai, any increases in popular support of the Viet Minhs could have alarming consequences. The deteriorating military and political situation in French Indochina demands that the United States policy toward Indochina be recast in order to assist in restoring the balance in favor of the French and Vietnamese.

3. There is an important difference between the strategic importance of Indochina to the United States in a major war and its strategic importance in a cold war. Current war plans do not contemplate the deployment of United States military forces for the retention of Indochina in the event of global war. However, if the communists gained control of Indochina at any time other than in the course of a global war, this would bring about almost immediately a dangerous condition with respect to the internal security of all of the other countries of Southeast Asia, as well as the Philippines and Indonesia, and would contribute to their probable eventual fall to communism. Even India and Pakistan would be threatened. Thus the loss of Indochina to communism would have direct implications on United States security. In addition, this loss would have widespread political and psychological repercussions upon other non-communist states throughout the world. In view of United States security interests in the country, and the critical situation now

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existing there, the United States should take action, as a matter of urgency, by all means practicable short of the actual employment of United States military forces, to deny Indochina to communism.

4. It appears that the French are only now beginning to recognize the military and political measures which must be undertaken in order to secure the French position in Indochina. The French attitudes and actions, however, must not be permitted to obscure the United States interest in the solution of the Indochina problem.

5. It has been suggested that if the French remain in Indochina that country might be lost to communism, regardless of the military aid programs which the United States may implement. This thinking presupposes either such a low order of military power in France and her colonies as to make it utterly impossible for that nation to cope with the Viet Minhs or such intransigence and unrealism in the French Government as to preclude it from facing facts. Current intelligence estimates do not accord France and her colonies this low order of military power. While, up to this time, the attitude of the French Government toward French Indochina has been one of temporization and consequently one of weakness, it is believed that the seriousness of the situation, particularly the political situation, may now have been recognized by the French Government.

6. The United States should urge France to meet its responsibility by taking the military, political, and economic action, including the injection of new leadership, necessary to save Indochina from communism. If France decides to withdraw from French Indochina, there would, in all probability, be only a slight chance that the United Nations could retrieve the situation in that country in favor of the Western Powers.

7. The following are the three major courses with military implications which might be adopted to achieve peace and security in Indochina against either the internal threat of the Viet Minhs or the external threat of Communist China:

a. Through armed action by France and the Associated States of Indochina together with the forces of the United States and/or other Western Powers;

b. By armed action by France and the Associated States of Indochina supported by United States military aid and assistance; and

c. By United Nations action either under the United States-sponsored resolution, "Uniting for Peace," or by French withdrawal from Indochina and action by the United Nations similar to that followed in the case of the Netherlands and Indonesia.

8. In the event of overt attack by organized Chinese Communist forces against Indochina the United States should not permit itself

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to become engaged in a general war with Communist China and should not, therefore, commit United States forces to that area; neither should the United States commit its military forces to Indochina in order to assist the French in restoring internal security. The considerations underlying these views are:

- a. Involvement of United States forces against Viet Minh forces would be likely to lead to war with Communist China.
- b. A general war with Communist China would, in all probability, have to be taken as a prelude to global war;
- c. Our major enemy in a global war would be the USSR;
- d. Our primary theater in the event of a global war would, in all probability, be Western Europe; and
- e. The forces of the Western Powers are insufficient to wage war on the mainland of Asia and at the same time accomplish the predetermined Allied objectives in Europe.

9. While minor commitments of United States military forces might be sufficient to defeat the Viet Minhs in Indochina it is more probable that such commitments would lead to a major involvement of the United States in that area similar to that in Korea or even to global war. Accordingly, there would be great potential danger to the security interests of the United States in the commitment of any "token" or "minor" United States forces in Indochina.

10. Indochina is an area in which the French bear primary responsibility, and the problem of restoration of peace and security to that country should continue to rest with the French. Overt intervention by any foreign power on the side of France would immediately enhance the danger of a global war and would lay France and the other foreign powers open to a charge of imperialism.

11. Thus far the French apparently have failed in Indochina to provide adequate political and military leadership, to develop sound military plans, and to utilize properly their military resources. The urgency of the situation in Indochina, however, is so great that the present United States military aid program for that country should continue, and steps should be taken to expedite shipment of the materiel earmarked for that area. However, it would be desirable for the United States military assistance program to be based on an over-all military plan for Indochina developed by the French, concurred in by the Associated States of Indochina, and acceptable to the United States. This plan should be developed as a result of staff talks conducted in Saigon among representatives of the three countries. It should be made clear from the outset

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that United States acceptance of the plan is limited to the logistical support which the United States may agree to furnish. If time permits, military representatives of the United Kingdom also might be invited to attend. There should be a timetable to the plan. Estimates of materiel requirements which the United States would be expected to provide on an accelerated basis should also be submitted.

12. Popular support of the Government by the Indochinese people is essential to a favorable settlement of the security problem of Indochina. Therefore, as a condition to the provision of those further increases in military assistance to Indochina necessary for the implementation of an agreed over-all military plan, the United States Government should obtain assurances from the French Government that:

a. A program providing for the eventual self-government of Indochina either within or outside of the French Union will be developed, made public, and implementation initiated at once in order to strengthen the national spirit of the Indochinese in opposition to communism;

b. National armies of the Associated States of Indochina will be organized as a matter of urgency. While it is doubtful that the build-up of these armies can be accomplished in time to contribute significantly to the present military situation, the direct political and psychological benefits to be derived from this course would be great and would thus result in immediate, although indirect, military benefits;

c. Pending the formation and training of Indochinese national armies as effective units, and as an interim emergency measure, France will dispatch sufficient additional armed forces to Indochina to insure that the restoration of peace and internal security in that country will be accomplished in accordance with the timetable of the over-all military plan for Indochina; and

d. France will change its political and military concepts in Indochina to:

- (1) Eliminate its policy of "colonialism";
- (2) Provide proper tutelage to the Associated States;
and
- (3) Insure that a suitable military command structure, unhampered by political interference, is established to conduct effective and appropriate military operations.

The effective implementation of these changes will require competent and efficient political and military leaders who will be able to cope with the conditions in that country.

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13. At an appropriate time the United States should institute checks to satisfy itself that the conditions set forth in paragraph 12 above are being fulfilled. The United States should also continue to maintain the situation in Indochina under continuing review and should be prepared to revise its policy when conditions warrant.

14. In the event of overt attack by organized Chinese Communist forces against Indochina, the United States should not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China but should, in concert with the United Kingdom, support France and the Associated States by all means short of the actual employment of United States military forces. This support should include appropriate expansion of the present military assistance program.

15. Any appeal by France to the United Nations would, in all probability, be embarrassing for the Western Powers since the rule of France over its colony is not likely to be well received by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The USSR has recognized the Viet Minh Government and, therefore, a veto by the USSR of any assistance for France would have to be expected in the Security Council. In view of the foregoing, unless the situation throughout the world generally and in Indochina specifically changes materially, the United States should seek to dissuade the French from referring the Indochina question to the United Nations.

16. Inasmuch as the United States-sponsored resolution, "Uniting for Peace," has been adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, and should a situation develop in Indochina in a manner similar to that in Korea in which United Nations forces were required, the United States would then probably be morally obligated to contribute its armed forces designated for service on behalf of the United Nations. It is, therefore, in the interests of the United States to take such action in Indochina as would forestall the need for the General Assembly to invoke the provisions of the resolution, "Uniting for Peace." Should France, however, refer the question of Indochina to the United Nations, the United States should give consideration to adopting a position favoring early French withdrawal from Indochina and action by the United Nations similar to that followed in the case of the Netherlands and Indonesia.

17. It appears that, in view of the unrest in Southeast Asia generally and in Indochina specifically, any military victory in Indochina over the communists would be temporary in nature. The long-term solution to the unrest in Indochina lies in sweeping political and economic concessions by France and in the ultimate self-government of the three Associated States within the French Union or their complete independence of France. From the viewpoint of the United States, pressure on France to provide the much needed leadership to initiate these reforms and to grant self-government will prove less expensive in United States lives and national treasure than military commitments by us.

NSC 64/1.

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JAMES S. LAY, JR.,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL¹

SUBJECT: Results of the Conversations Between the
President and the French Prime Minister

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2. The following statements which are given in quotation are taken from the final communiqué of January 30, 1951, the full text of which is attached. This communiqué accurately reflects the agreements on the points covered. The statements which are not in quotation were not specifically covered in the joint communiqué.

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FAR EAST

4. a. "The President and the Prime Minister found themselves in complete agreement as to the necessity of resisting aggression and assisting the free nations of the Far East in their efforts to maintain their security and assure their independence." They agreed, however, that the US and France should not over-commit themselves militarily in the Far East and thereby endanger the situation in Europe.

b. "The President and the Prime Minister agreed that continuous contact should be maintained between the interested nations on these problems." The Prime Minister's suggestion to create a US, UK, French consultative body to coordinate the three governments' Asiatic policies was not accepted by the President who preferred to rely on existing mechanisms.

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¹Copy held in S/S-R, drafted 2-21-51. For additional information, see Historical Division, American Policy and Diplomacy in the Korean Conflict, part 10 (Jan.-Mar. 1951), section H, pp. 121-123, top secret, and US MIN 1, First Meeting, Jan. 30, 1951, United States-French Washington conversations, top secret, (on file in S/S-R).

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d. With regard to Indochina, "the Prime Minister declared that France was determined to do its utmost to continue" its efforts to resist "the Communist onslaught in order to maintain the security and independence of the Associated States, Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos."

e. There was agreement that it was desirable to build up the native Indochinese forces as rapidly as possible, but we held out no hope for the provision of US budgetary assistance for the National Army in Indochina, stating that we continue to believe that we cannot become directly involved in local budgetary deficits of other countries.

f. "The President informed the Prime Minister that United States aid for the French Union forces and for the National Armies of the Associated States will continue, and that the increased quantities of material to be delivered under the program authorized for the current fiscal year will be expedited." Additional measures for US aid to Indochina included: 1) an indication of our willingness to relax the original restrictions placed on the use by the French of the US aircraft carrier Langley in the Mediterranean in view of our inability to provide another US carrier for service in Indochina; and 2) an agreement to study the possibility of reallocating funds now available in an effort to provide equipment for four Vietnamese divisions.

g. The President said that the United States was agreeable to US, UK, French military consultations on Indochinese matters.

h. In the event of a Chinese Communist attack on Indochina, the US agreed to give all possible assistance in the evacuation of French forces if such action becomes necessary. The extent of the aid would be limited by other demands on our forces, such as Korea, which exist at the time any request for assistance is made.

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and are now engaged in detailed studies at specialists level concerning matter. For your INFO it is very unlikely that this GOVT will engage itself to finance the budgetary deficit of another GOVT but we hope to devise some other method to assure that necessary funds for the development of the NATL armies be forthcoming.

Although we did not accede to the FR request for another aircraft carrier, GEN Marshall informed Plevin that the present restrictions on the use of the Langley WLD be removed, thus apparently making Langley available to FR for use in Far Eastern waters if they so choose. We assured the FR that the effect of the loss of Tonkin or of all of IC to rest of SEA is constantly under study by this GOVT.

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ACHLSON

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

March 15, 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JAMES S. LAY, JR.,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: First Progress Report on NSC 64, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina".

NSC 64, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina", was approved as government policy on March 27, 1950. It is requested that this first progress report as of March 1, 1951, be circulated to members of the Council for their information.

I - POLICY IMPLEMENTATION.

Military Aid

The Military Aid Program to Indochina enjoys the highest priority immediately after the military effort in Korea. The first deliveries began in June 1950 and by the end of January 1951 military assistance totalling approximately \$50 million had been delivered to Indochina. Approximately \$113 million in further military aid already has been programmed and is at varying stages in the supply process. An additional \$52 million of military aid is now being programmed out of remaining FY '51 funds and something approaching \$170 million for this purpose has been included in the tentative budget estimates upon which the President's FY '52 budget was based. This aid program follows in general the request submitted to the United States Government by the French Government in March 1950. During August 1950 Indochina was visited by a Joint Survey Mission under the chairmanship of Mr. John Melby of the Department of State, of which Major General Erskine, USMC was the senior military member. The mission recommended that the United States continue its efforts to supply the assistance requested by the French in March 1950, with certain additions. Equipment already delivered to Indochina, or enroute, includes various aircraft, naval vessels, equipment for twelve infantry battalions (less small arms), and miscellaneous equipment and ammunition, supplied both from the United States and the United States Far East Command. In addition to the military assistance initially requested, materiel has now been requested for the equipping of national armies in each of the three States. The cost and availability of this materiel is now unknown.

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U. S. military aid already received in Indochina has increased the capability of the State forces and French Union forces considerably. If aid already furnished had not been supplied, those forces would not have been able to maintain their present positions. It is realized, however, that American assistance is supplemental to, and does not replace the primary responsibility of the three States and of the French Republic.

Indochina Foreign Relations

The United States has continued to extend political support to the States of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. Agrément has been granted for the first Cambodian Minister to the United States. The United Kingdom has sent a diplomatic representative to the three States. Vietnam is planning to open a mission in Bangkok and has sent a minister to London. Cambodia has named a minister to Bangkok.

The three State Governments have been recognized by some 30 powers. They have been elected to membership in several UN organs such as FAO, WHO and ILO. The USSR and its satellites, including Communist China, have recognized the Ho Chi Minh movement as constituting the legal government of Vietnam, but not of Cambodia and Laos.

Although the Government of Thailand and the Republic of Korea have extended diplomatic recognition to the three Governments, the majority of the Asian states continue to be apathetic toward recognition. This attitude is based on an anti-colonial rather than a pro-Communist sentiment. The result, nevertheless, has been indirectly to encourage the Communist-directed Viet Minh forces through failure to support the legal governments. The French Government has done little in the past to publicize the progressive transfer of authority to the three States, which was completed by the end of 1950. In external affairs, the French Government has the right to be consulted on the selection of diplomatic posts, designation of Chiefs of Missions and negotiation of international agreements. The continuing presence in Indochina, however, of a French High Commissioner and some 70,000 French troops, as well as the fact that France continues to finance, to a large degree, the budget deficits of the three State Governments, may constitute in Asian eyes evidence of continued French control. A withdrawal of French financial and military support would result in rapid successes by the Viet Minh forces and the formation of Communist governments within the three States. Asian states are only slowly becoming aroused to this threat to their own independence as a result both of United States efforts to identify it and of Chinese activities in Korea and Tibet, in addition to Indochina.

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Indochina Internal Situation

Internal administration was transferred by the French to the State Governments on December 30, 1949, except for certain powers reserved to the French High Commissioner and certain interstate matters to be settled by an interstate conference. This conference was concluded in November 1950 when it was agreed that all internal administration would be turned over by the French to the State Governments by December 31, 1950. However, the piastre would continue to be pegged to the franc (at a rate highly beneficial to the piastre); the French have military base rights similar to those of the United States in the Philippines as provided in the United States-Philippine Treaty; and French functionaries would continue to carry out certain educational, war damage, and French military security functions. Other French functionaries would be employed by the Associated States only as desired by the latter.

The three State Governments are now limited in their assumption of powers only by the availability of qualified indigenous officials their dependence on continued French financial support and their lack of popular support. The planned formation during 1951 of national armies is expected to contribute toward the actual attainment of sovereignty in each State. This should have a beneficial political effect in winning additional popular support for the governments.

The most severe threat to the continued growth and even to the continued existence of the State governments is the increased capability of the Viet Minh forces, resulting from the extension of military and materiel aid from Communist China. There is also some evidence of Soviet support. Such aid from Communist China began in April 1950, and has increased steadily. Up to now, light artillery, mortars and automatic weapons have been shipped to Indochina for the Viet Minh. Training centers in South China have trained and equipped some 50 Viet Minh battalions which have returned to Vietnam. The capacity of the training centers has been estimated at 10 to 30 thousand men rotated about every three months with some 50,000 having already completed their training. It has been reported that there are 15 to 20 Chinese technicians with each China-trained Viet Minh battalion, usually directing the artillery. The capability of these troops is rated as equal to that of French Union Forces. Chinese Communist troops in South China, within easy striking distance of the border, are estimated at two to three hundred thousand. Airfields at the border posts evacuated by the French are available to the Viet Minh, and air training is reportedly being conducted in China. However, no Viet Minh air power has yet been used, and in this respect the French Union Forces hold a present advantage due almost entirely to United States Military Aid. French Naval power is also superior

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but is incapable of interdicting all small craft smuggling arms.

The Viet Minh forces have the present ability to continue to occupy the major area of Tonkin (North Vietnam), and to threaten the two large cities of Hanoi and Haiphong. Scattered elements throughout central and southern Indochina, continue to have a harassing ability, preventing peaceful conditions and the resumption of orderly life and trade. With continued assistance at the present level from Communist China, the Viet Minh forces will remain a serious threat to the ability of the States and the French Union Forces to defend and hold the major portion of Indochina. If massive Chinese Communist armies actually invade Indochina, such an attack could not be successfully resisted by the presently available forces and most of Indochina could be overrun within a matter of months.

The ability of the State and the French Union Forces to maintain their present positions in Indochina, therefore depends only upon the absence of an actual Chinese Communist invasion in force. Their ability to improve their present position, that is, defense against the Viet Minh as presently augmented by Chinese Communist aid, will depend upon continuing materiel and financial aid from France and the United States, and the skill with which such resources are utilized.

II - POLICY EVALUATION

The policy adopted in NSC 64 and the measures taken to implement it have made a valuable contribution toward the stability of Indochina and of Southeast Asia. American military aid furnished the States' forces and the Army of the French Union may have been the decisive factor in the preservation of the area against Communist aggression.

Future policy with regard to Indochina will be the subject of new studies now under preparation for the NSC.

/s/ JAMES E. WEBB

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May 17, 1951

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

to the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES, POLICIES AND COURSES OF ACTION IN ASIA

- References:
- A. NSC 48 Series
 - B. NSC Action No. 471
 - C. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 14 and 15, 1951
 - D. NSC 13 Series
 - E. NSC 22 Series
 - F. NSC 34 Series
 - G. NSC 37 Series
 - H. NSC 60/1
 - I. NSC 81 Series
 - J. NSC 101 Series

The President has this date approved the statement of policy contained in NSC 48/4 as amended and adopted at the 91st meeting of the National Security Council (NSC Action No. 471), and directs its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the United States Government under the coordination of the Secretaries of State and Defense.

The approved statement of policy is accordingly circulated herewith for information and appropriate action. Also enclosed for information is the NSC staff study on the subject contained in the Annex to NSC 48/3, appropriately revised.

The President has also approved the Council's recommendation in NSC Action No. 471-c. Accordingly, the statements of policy contained in NSC 48/2, the NSC 13 Series, the NSC 22 Series, the NSC 34 Series, the NSC 37 Series and the NSC 81 Series are superseded herewith; further action on the NSC 101 Series is canceled; but NSC 60/1 is not superseded.

JAMES S. LAY, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director of Defense Mobilization

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STATEMENT OF POLICY

on

ASIA

General Considerations

1. United States objectives, policies, and courses of action in Asia should be designed to contribute toward the global objective of strengthening the free world vis-a-vis the Soviet orbit, and should be determined with due regard to the relation of United States capabilities and commitments throughout the world. However, in view of the communist resort to armed force in Asia, United States action in that area must be based on the recognition that the most immediate overt threats to United States security are currently presented in that area.

2. Current Soviet tactics appear to concentrate on bringing the mainland of Eastern Asia and eventually Japan and the other principal off-shore islands in the Western Pacific under Soviet control, primarily through Soviet exploitation of the resources of communist China. The attainment of this objective on the mainland of Eastern Asia would substantially enhance the global position of the USSR at the expense of the United States, by securing the eastern flank of the USSR and permitting the USSR to concentrate its offensive power in other areas, particularly in Europe. Soviet control of the off-shore islands in the Western Pacific, including Japan, would present an unacceptable

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threat to the security of the United States.

3. The United States should, without sacrificing vital security interests, seek to avoid precipitating a general war with the USSR, particularly during the current build-up of the military and supporting strength of the United States and its allies to a level of military readiness adequate to support United States foreign policy, to deter further Soviet aggression, and to form the basis for fighting a global war should this prove unavoidable. This should not preclude undertaking calculated risks in specific areas in the over-all interest of the defense of the United States.

4. The United States should seek the firm establishment and effective application of the principle of collective security and should, except in those instances when on balance the need for unilateral action outweighs other considerations, act in and through the United Nations, preserve solidarity with its principal allies, and maintain the continued cooperation of other friendly nations.

Long-Range Objectives

5. The long-range national security objectives of the United States with respect to Asia are:

a. Development by the nations and peoples of Asia, through self-help and mutual aid, of stable and self-sustaining non-communist governments, friendly to the United States, acting in accordance with the purposes and

Reluctant - from

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principles of the United Nations Charter, and having the will and ability to maintain internal security, withstand communist influence, and prevent aggression.

b. Elimination of the preponderant power and influence of the USSR in Asia or its reduction to such a degree that the Soviet Union will not be capable of threatening from that area the security of the United States or its friends, or the peace, national independence and stability of the Asiatic nations. *Pac*

c. Development of power relationships in Asia which will make it impossible for any nation or alliance to threaten the security of the United States from that area. *Pac*

d. Insofar as practicable, securing for the United States and the rest of the free world, and denying to the communist world, the availability through mutually advantageous arrangements, of the material resources of the Asian area. *Pac. 2000*

Current Objectives

6. In view of the threat to United States security interests resulting from communist aggression in Asia, it should be the policy of the United States to:

a. Detach China as an effective ally of the USSR and support the development of an independent China which has renounced aggression. *Pac*

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b. Maintain the security of the off-shore defense line: Japan-Ryukyus-Philippines-Australia and New Zealand. Deny Formosa to any Chinese regime aligned with or dominated by the USSR and expedite the strengthening of the defensive capabilities of Formosa. Attempt by all practicable means to forestall communist aggression in South and Southeast Asia.

^{omitted}
c. Assist Japan to become a self-reliant nation friendly to the United States, capable of maintaining internal security and defense against external aggression and contributing to the security and stability of the Far East.

d. Promote the development of effective security and economic relationships among the free nations of Asia and the Pacific area, including the United States, on the basis of self-help and mutual aid, with appropriate United States assistance.

^{omitted}
e. Continue as an ultimate objective to seek by political, as distinguished from military means, a solution of the Korean problem which would provide for a united, independent and democratic Korea. Seek, through appropriate UN machinery, as a current objective a settlement acceptable to the United States, of the Korean conflict which would, as a minimum
(1) terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements; (2) establish the authority of the Republic of Korea over all Korea south of a northern boundary so located as to

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facilitate, to the maximum extent possible, both administration and military defense, and in no case south of the 38th Parallel (3) provide for the withdrawal by appropriate stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea; (4) permit the building of sufficient ROK military power to deter or repel a renewed North Korean aggression. Until the above current objective is attainable, continue to oppose and penalize the aggressor.

f. Consistent with e above and the protection of the security of U. S. and UN forces, seek to avoid the extension of hostilities in Korea into a general war with the Soviet Union, and seek to avoid the extension beyond Korea of hostilities with Communist China, particularly without the support of our major allies. *omitted*

g. Assist the countries of South and Southeast Asia to develop the will and ability to resist communism from within and without, and to contribute to the strengthening of the free world. *Political-economic*

h. In accordance with 5-d above, take such current and continuing action as may be practicable to maximize the availability, through mutually advantageous arrangements, of the material resources of the Asian area to the United States and the free world generally, and thereby correspondingly deny these resources to the communist world. *NSC 1244*

7. In accordance with the above, the United States should pursue in the respective areas of Asia the courses of action set

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forth in the following paragraphs.

8. While continuing to recognize the National Government as the legal government of China, the United States, with respect to Communist China, should now:

a. Continue strong efforts to deflate Chinese Communist political and military strength and prestige by inflicting heavy losses on Chinese forces in Korea through the present UN operation.

b. Expand and intensify, by all available means, efforts to develop non-communist leadership and to influence the leaders and people in China to oppose the present Peiping regime and to seek its reorientation or replacement.

c. Foster and support anti-communist Chinese elements both outside and within China with a view to developing and expanding resistance in China to the Peiping regime's control, particularly in South China.

d. Stimulate differences between the Peiping and Moscow regimes and create cleavages within the Peiping regime itself by every practicable means.

e. Continue United States economic restrictions against China, continue to oppose seating Communist China in the UN, intensify efforts to persuade other nations to adopt similar positions, and foster the imposition of United Nations political and economic sanctions as related to developments in Korea.

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f. In order to be prepared for Chinese aggression outside Korea, to protect the security of UN and U. S. forces, and to provide for appropriate military action in the event that UN forces are forced to evacuate Korea, expedite the development of plans for the following courses of action, if such action should later be deemed necessary:

(1) Imposing a blockade of the China coast by naval and air forces.

(2) Military action against selected targets held by Communist China outside of Korea.

(3) Participation defensively or offensively of the Chinese Nationalist forces, and the necessary operational assistance to make them effective.

g. Continue as a matter of urgency to influence our allies to stand with us and fully support the taking of such actions as those indicated in f above if military operations outside Korea should be required.

9. With respect to the situation in Korea, the United States should:

a. Seek an acceptable political settlement in Korea that does not jeopardize the United States position with respect to the USSR, to Formosa, or to seating Communist China in the UN.

b. In the absence of such a settlement, and recognizing that currently there is no other acceptable alternative, continue the current military course of action in Korea, without commitment to unify Korea by military force, but designed to:

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- (1) Inflict maximum losses on the enemy.
 - (2) Prevent the overrunning of South Korea by military aggression.
 - (3) Limit communist capabilities for aggression elsewhere in Asia.
- c. Continue its efforts to influence our allies to increase their support of and contribution to the UN operations in Korea.
 - d. Develop dependable South Korean military units as rapidly as possible and in sufficient strength eventually to assume the major part of the burden of the UN forces there.
 - e. If the USSR commits units of Soviet "volunteers" sufficient to jeopardize the safety of UN forces in Korea, give immediate consideration to withdrawing UN forces from Korea and placing the United States in the best possible position of readiness for general war.
 - f. If the USSR precipitates a general war, withdraw UN forces from Korea as rapidly as possible and deploy United States forces for service elsewhere.
 - g. Working in and through the organs of the United Nations where feasible, continue to strengthen the government and democratic institutions of the Republic of Korea, and continue to contribute to the United Nations efforts for economic recovery and rehabilitation in the Republic of Korea and in areas of Korea liberated from communist control.

*supplemented by
NSC 125/2*

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10. With respect to Japan the United States should:

a. Proceed urgently to conclude a peace settlement with Japan on the basis of the position already determined by the President, through urgent efforts to obtain agreement to this position by as many nations which participated in the war with Japan as possible.

b. Proceed urgently with the negotiation of bilateral security arrangements with Japan on the basis of the position determined by the President to be concluded simultaneously with a peace treaty.

c. Assist Japan to become economically self-supporting and to produce goods and services important to the United States and to the economic stability of the non-communist area of Asia.

d. Pending the conclusion of a peace settlement continue to:

(1) Take such steps as will facilitate transition from occupation status to restoration of sovereignty.

(2) Assist Japan in organizing, training, and equipping the National Police Reserve and the Maritime Safety Patrol in order to facilitate the formation of an effective military establishment.

e. Following the conclusion of a peace settlement:

(1) Assist Japan in the development of appropriate military forces.

(2) Assist Japan in the production of low-cost military materiel in volume for use in Japan and in other non-communist countries of Asia.

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Superseded by NSC 48/5

(3) Take all practicable steps to achieve Japanese membership in the United Nations and participation in a regional security arrangement.

(4) Establish appropriate psychological programs designed to further orient the Japanese toward the free world and away from communism.

11. With respect to Formosa the United States should:

a. Continue, as long as required by United States security interests, the mission presently assigned to the 7th Fleet.

b. Encourage political changes in the Nationalist regime which would increase its prestige and influence in China proper.

c. Provide military and economic assistance to increase the potential of the Chinese forces on Formosa for the defense of Formosa and for such other uses as may be determined [as a result of the planning pursuant to 8-f above.]

12. The United States should continue the policy with respect to the Philippines set forth in NSC 84/2.

13. The United States should continue the policy with respect to South Asia set forth in NSC 98/1.

14. With respect to Southeast Asia, the United States should:

a. Continue its present support programs to strengthen the will and ability to resist communist encroachment, to render communist military operations as costly as possible, and thus to gain time for the United States and its allies to build up the defense of the off-shore chain.

b. Continue programs of information and educational exchange in the countries of Southeast Asia.

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c. Encourage the countries of Southeast Asia to restore and expand their commerce with each other and the rest of the free world, stimulate the flow of the raw material resources of the area to the free world, and assist in establishing small arms production in appropriate locations in Southeast Asia under suitable controls.

d. In Indochina:

✓ (1) Continue to increase the military effectiveness of French units and the size and equipment of indigenous units by providing timely and suitable military assistance without relieving the French authorities of their basic military responsibilities or committing United States armed forces.

(2) Continue to encourage internal autonomy and progressive social and economic reforms.

(3) Continue to promote international support for the three Associated States.

e. In Indonesia, the United States should seek to strengthen the non-communist political orientation of the government, promote the economic development of Indonesia, and influence Indonesia toward greater participation in measures which support the security of the area and Indonesian solidarity with the free world.

sup. provided by TSC 12-1-12

15. With respect to regional security arrangements, the United States should:

a. Conclude the post-treaty security arrangements with Japan as provided for in 10-b above.

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b. Maintain the security relationships with the Philip-
pines as provided for in 12 above.

c. Conclude a security arrangement with Australia and
New Zealand. *done*

d. Consider the desirability of security arrangements
with other countries of Asia, either on a bilateral or multi-
lateral basis.

e. Encourage and support closer economic and political
cooperation with and among the countries of Asia in keeping
with the objective stated in 6-d above.

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NSC STAFF STUDY

on

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES, POLICIES AND COURSES OF ACTION IN ASIA*

PROBLEM

1. To determine United States national objectives, policies, and courses of action with respect to Asia.

UNITED STATES LONG-RANGE NATIONAL OBJECTIVES IN ASIA

2. The long-range national security objectives of the United States with respect to Asia are:
 - a. Development by the nations and peoples of Asia, through self-help and mutual aid, of stable and self-sustaining non-communist governments, oriented toward the United States, acting in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, and having the will and ability to maintain internal security and prevent communist aggression.
 - b. Elimination of the preponderant power and influence of the USSR in Asia or its reduction to such a degree that the Soviet Union will not be capable of threatening from that area the security of the United States or its friends, or the peace, national independence and stability of the Asiatic nations.
 - c. Development of power relationships in Asia which will make it impossible for any nation or alliance to threaten the security of the United States from that area.
 - d. In so far as practicable, securing for the United States and the rest of the free world, and denying to the communist world, the availability through mutually advantageous arrangements, of the material resources of the Asian area.

*For the purposes of this report, "Asia" is defined as that part of the continent of Asia south of the USSR and east of Iran together with the major off-shore islands -- Japan, Ryukyus, Formosa, the Philippines, Indonesia, Ceylon, Australia and New Zealand.

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ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION

3. United States objectives, policies, and courses of action in Asia should be designed to contribute toward the global objectives of strengthening the free world vis-a-vis the Soviet orbit, and should be determined with due regard to the relation of United States capabilities and commitments throughout the world. However, in view of the communist resort to armed force in Asia, United States action in that area must be based on the recognition that the most immediate threats to United States security are currently presented in that area.

4. Current Soviet tactics appear to concentrate on bringing the mainland of Eastern Asia and eventually Japan and the other principal off-shore islands in the Western Pacific under Soviet control, primarily through Soviet exploitation of the resources of communist China. The attainment of this objective on the mainland of Eastern Asia would substantially enhance the global position of the USSR at the expense of the United States, by securing the eastern flank of the USSR and permitting the USSR to concentrate its offensive power in other areas, particularly in Europe. Soviet control of the off-shore islands in the Western Pacific, including Japan, would present an unacceptable threat to the security of the United States.

5. Asia is of strategic importance to the United States.

a. The strategic significance of Asia arises from its resources, geography, and the political and military force which it could generate. The population of the area is about 1,250,000,000. The demonstrated military capacity of the North Korean and Chinese armies requires a re-evaluation of the threat to the free world which the masses of Asia would constitute if they fell under Soviet Communist domination.

b. The resources of Asia contribute greatly to United States security by helping to meet its need for critical materials and they would be of great assistance in time of war if they remained available. At least until stockpiling levels are met, this phase of the area's importance to the United States will continue. Further, the development of events which might lead to the exhaustion of such stockpiles would magnify the importance of this source of supply. The area produces practically all the world's natural rubber, nearly 5% of the oil, 60% of the tin, the major part of various important tropical products, and strategic materials such as manganese, jute, and atomic materials. Japan's potential in heavy industry is roughly equal to 50% of the Soviet Union's present production. Therefore, it is

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important to U. S. security interests that U. S. military and economic assistance programs be developed in such a manner as to maximize the availabilities of the material resources of the Asian area to the United States and the free world.

c. Control by an enemy of the Asiatic mainland would deny to us the use of the most direct sea and air routes between Australia and the Middle East and between the United States and India. Such control would produce disastrous moral and psychological effects in border areas such as the Middle East and a critical effect in Western Europe.

6. The fact of Soviet power and communist aggression in Asia establishes the context within which the policies of the United States must operate.

a. The problem of China is the central problem which faces the United States in Asia. A solution to this problem, through a change in the regime in control of mainland China, would facilitate the achievement of United States objectives throughout Asia. Therefore, United States policies and courses of action in Asia should be determined in the light of their effect upon the solution of the central problem, that of China.

b. The communist attack in Korea has transformed the Far East into a theater of combat. Whether the Kremlin or Peiping intends that hostilities be extended into other areas of Asia or aggression committed in another part of the world is as yet unknown. The United States must expect either eventuality. In any case, the United States should use the resources which can be disposed, without unacceptably jeopardizing our objectives elsewhere, to prevent the communists from achieving a victory in Korea and to build resistance to communist encroachments in Asia.

c. Our ability to achieve national objectives in Asia will be conditioned by the capabilities and global commitments of the United States and by the weight of the effort the enemy is willing and able to make. Consequently, there is required a constant and careful scrutiny of policies and actions on the basis of which decisions can be made which will advance us toward our ultimate objectives without sacrificing immediate security interests.

7. The guiding principle of U. S. foreign policy as it relates to meeting the threat of Soviet aggression is the promotion of the establishment of a system of collective security based on the principles of the UN Charter. The United States, is consequently forced inevitably to weigh elements of policy toward Asia against their effect upon the free world coalition, a coalition fundamental to our world-wide struggle for security against Soviet aggression.

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8. The principal obstacles to the execution of United States policy in pursuit of its objectives in the Far East are as follows:

a. The policy and action of the Soviet Union.

(1) The Soviet Communists have historically considered Asia as one of their principal objectives; Bolshevik ideology devotes a prominent place to the capture of the "colonial and semi-colonial" areas of the world, by which is meant principally Asia. Soviet policy in Asia has been aided by the fact that communists have been successful to a large degree in subverting indigenous nationalist movements; the capture of these movements has been a goal of Kremlin policy.

(2) The Kremlin has not yet resorted to the large-scale and open employment of Soviet armed forces, although the aggression by both North Koreans and Chinese Communists indicates that the Kremlin is willing to undertake greater risks than in the past.

(3) The Kremlin, besides supplying and directing leadership of communist parties in Asia, and building centers of subversion, infiltration, and revolution, is providing military assistance to communist forces in Asia, both in materiel and in technical personnel.

(4) The fact that the Soviet threat is world-wide in character has prevented the concentration of free world effort against the various forms of communist aggression in Asia. The combination of political, military, technical and propaganda support given by the Soviet Government to the communist assault in Asia confronts the United States and its principal allies with a major challenge which vitally affects world power positions.

b. The policy and action of Communist China.

(1) Communist China is already involved in a major military aggression in Korea, is publicly committed to an attempt to seize Formosa, may attack Hong Kong, and may increase its support to Ho Chih Minh to include the use of Chinese forces in Indochina. Communist success in these efforts would expose the remainder of Southeast Asia to attack and would sharply increase the threat to Japan and the remainder of the off-shore island chain. Such prospects lend greater effectiveness to the ordinary communist techniques of penetration and subversion and cause many Asians to remain on the side lines during the present phase of the struggle.

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Strengthening of Southeast Asia

41. It is important to the United States that the mainland states of Southeast Asia remain under non-communist control and continue to improve their internal conditions. These states are valuable to the free world because of their strategic position, abundant natural resources, including strategic materials in short supply in the United States, and their large population. Moreover, these states, if adequately developed and organized, could serve to protect and contribute to the economic progress and military defense of the Pacific off-shore islands from Japan to New Zealand. Communist control of both China and Southeast Asia would place Japan in a dangerously vulnerable position and therefore seriously affect the entire security position of the United States in the Pacific. The fall of the mainland states would result in changing the status of the off-shore island chain from supporting bases to front line positions. Further, it would tend to isolate these base areas from each other, requiring a review of our entire strategic deployment of forces. Communist domination of the area would alleviate considerably the food problem of China and make available to the USSR considerable quantities of strategically important materials.

42. In the absence of overt Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia, the general problems facing the United States in this area are: the real threat of Chinese Communist invasion and subversion, the political instability and weak leadership of the non-communist governments, the low standards of living and under-developed resources of the peoples of the area, the prevailing prejudice against colonialism and Western "interference" and the insensitivity to the danger of communist imperialism. Further acts of communist aggression in Southeast Asia can be expected to stimulate resistance on the part of countries which have thus far failed to take a positive stand.

43. Therefore, the general objectives of the United States in Southeast Asia are: (a) to contribute to the will and ability of all countries in the region to resist communism from within and without, and (b) to aid in the political, economic and social advancement of the area. For this purpose, the United States has developed support programs to strengthen the governments' administrative and military capabilities, to improve living standards, to encourage pro-Western alignments, and to stave off communist intervention.

44. Chinese Communist conquest of Indochina, Thailand and Burma, by military force and internal subversion, would seriously threaten the critical security interests of the United States. However, in the event of overt Chinese aggression, it is not now in the over-all security interests of the United States to commit any United States armed forces to the defense of the mainland states of Southeast Asia. Therefore, the United States cannot guarantee the

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denial of Southeast Asia to communism. The United States should continue its present support programs to strengthen the will and ability to resist the Chinese Communists, to render Communist military operations as costly as possible, and to gain time for the United States and its allies to build up the defenses of the off-shore chain and weaken communist power at its source.

45. The United States should develop its support programs in such form and in such manner in each country as will effectively stimulate the use of its resources to the advantage of the free world, contribute to the development of sound economies and adequate military establishments, and take into account the ability of each country to absorb and its willingness to put to effective use American aid. In any instance where a government friendly to the United States is conducting actual resistance to internal subversive forces or overt aggression, the United States should favorably consider contributions to the ability of such a government to continue resistance.

46. The general security problems of Southeast Asia are the subject of military staff conversations among the United States, the United Kingdom and France.

47. Programs of information and educational exchange should be continued in the countries of Southeast Asia and should be designed to develop on the part of the governments and peoples of the area, realization, and action in accordance therewith, of the vital objectives which they share with the United States and of the ways in which the achievement of these objectives are threatened by the aggressive purposes of Soviet Communism.

48. At the present time, the United States faces the following major problems in Southeast Asia:

a. Defense of Indochina. The loss of Indochina to communist control would greatly increase the threat to the other mainland states of Southeast Asia and to Indonesia. The Viet Minh with the aid of strong Chinese Communist military intervention can conquer Indochina. Therefore, the forces opposing the Viet Minh must rapidly increase their military strength. Increased anti-communist manpower must come from the Associated States, principally Vietnam.

b. Chinese Imperialism. The United States should expand and intensify the psychological warfare effort to increase an awareness in the area of the threat which Soviet and Chinese imperialism poses to the national independence, economic betterment and traditional ideals of each country in the region. The United States should seek to reduce the ties be-

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tween the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and the Peiping regime, to neutralize the pro-communist support among these communities, and to endeavor to direct the political power and economic wealth of the Chinese communities toward the support of the countries which they are resident.

c. The Role of Singapore and Malaya in the Defense of Southeast Asia. The location of the Malayan Peninsula makes it of great importance to Indonesia and Australia and New Zealand in the event Indochina and Thailand fall to the communists. Although the defense and internal security of Singapore and Malaya are British responsibilities, the Peninsula cannot be defended against an invasion from the north without outside support. Accordingly, the United States should coordinate its operational planning with the United Kingdom with respect to Malaya and adjacent areas.

d. The Alignment of Indonesia. Indonesia's strategic position, economic wealth including oil reserves, and political importance as an independent, non-communist nation are assets to the security of the United States in the Pacific. Consequently, the policies and actions of the United States must be directed to strengthening and maintaining the non-communist political orientation of the government and to promoting economic health and development. At present the Indonesian Government is pursuing a policy of political neutrality. The United States must endeavor to influence Indonesia toward greater participation in measures which promote the security of the area and toward solidarity with the free world. Among the factors which affect United States aid to Indonesia are (1) the results to be achieved in terms of United States national interests, (2) the attitude of the Indonesian government, (3) the needs of Indonesia, and (4) the ability to use aid profitably. The United States should give particular attention to the problem of technical assistance, in view of the serious lack of leadership and trained personnel in the country.

49. With respect to Southeast Asia, the United States should:

a. Continue its present support programs to strengthen the will and ability to resist communist encroachment, to render communist military operations as costly as possible, and to gain time for the United States and its allies to build up the defense of the off-shore chain.

b. Continue programs of information and educational exchange in the countries of Southeast Asia.

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c. Encourage the countries of Southeast Asia to restore and expand their commerce with each other and the rest of the free world, stimulate the flow of the raw material resources of the area to the free world, and assist in establishing small arms production in appropriate locations in Southeast Asia under suitable controls.

d. In Indochina:

(1) Continue to increase the military effectiveness of French units and the size and equipment of indigenous units by providing timely and suitable military assistance without relieving the French authorities of their basic military responsibilities or committing United States armed forces.

(2) Continue to encourage internal autonomy and progressive social and economic reforms.

(3) Continue to promote international support for the three Associated States.

e. In Indonesia, the United States should seek to strengthen the non-communist political orientation of the government, promote the economic development of Indonesia, and influence Indonesia toward greater participation in measures which support the security of the area and Indonesian solidarity with the free world.

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694.001/6-1451: Secret File
From Paris, desp. 3607, June 14, 1951

Paris, June 11, 1951

Extract from Memorandum of
Conversation Between John Foster Dulles
and Officials of the French Foreign Office

4) Associated States. M. Parodi raised the question of participation of the three Associated States of Indochina. Mr. Dulles stated that he did not think the U.S. would be opposed in principle to such participation provided it did not constitute a precedent and commit the U.S. to treating these States as in all respects sovereign for other purposes, for example membership in the U.N., as to which matter Mr. Dulles did not know what U.S. policy would be. Mr. Dulles stated however that he anticipated that some of the other prospective co-signers, such as India, Burma and Indonesia, might object to signing with the three Associated States as sovereign, particularly as there was a rival government of Viet Minh recognized by the Soviet bloc. He said that if this created serious difficulties it might be necessary for these States to participate through subsequent identical bilateral pacts with Japan. M. Parodi reiterated that it was very important for France to secure recognition of the independent sovereign status of these States.

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694.001/9-651: Confidential File

CONFIDENTIAL

From Saigon, desp. 132, Sept. 6, 1951.
Enclosure no. 5, UNCLASSIFIED

US invites Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to participate
in signing of Japanese Peace Treaty.

No. 11

The Legation of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Vietnam and has the honor to transmit the following message on behalf of the United States Government.

"The Government of the United States of America and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have the honor to enclose herewith two copies of a draft of the Peace Treaty with Japan, of two declarations which have been prepared on the basis of earlier drafts and observations thereon by countries which were actively concerned in the Japanese war. The draft protocol which is open for signature at any time has been proposed by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and is circulated for the information and comment of these countries whose domestic law permits them to sign it. It is believed that the enclosed draft treaty and declarations combine and reconcile, as far as is practicable, the point of view of all the allied powers which were at war with Japan and will establish, with Japan, a just and durable peace.

"The Government of the United States of America has the honor to invite your Government to a conference for conclusion and signature of a treaty of peace with Japan on the terms of the enclosed text. The conference will convene at San Francisco, United States of America, on September 4, 1951.

"Invitations have also been sent to the allied powers at war with Japan, except where special circumstances exist.

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"The Government of Japan has advised the Government of the United States of America that it will be represented at San Francisco by duly accredited delegates empowered to sign the treaty and declarations on behalf of the Government of Japan.

"It will be appreciated if your Government will, in due course, notify the Government of the United States of America at Washington whether it accepts this invitation.

"Any inquiries relating to the organization of the conference and the provision of facilities for duty [sic] accredited delegates, their advisers and staff, may be addressed to the Division of International Conferences, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C."

The Legation will be pleased to be of any assistance it can in providing facilities to the Vietnamese delegation or in communicating with the Department of State or in other ways.

American Legation,

Saigon, August 22, 1951.

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ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA¹
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM¹

Entered into force September 7, 1951

The Government of the United States of America and
the Government of Vietnam:

Recognizing that individual liberty, free institu-
tions, and independence depend largely upon sound economic
conditions and stable international economic relation-
ships;

Considering that the Congress of the United States
of America has enacted legislation enabling the United
States to furnish assistance to the Government of
Vietnam in order that the Government of Vietnam, through
its own individual efforts and through concerted effort
with the other Associated States and other parts of the
French Union, with other countries or with the United
Nations, may achieve such objectives;

Desiring to set forth the understandings which
govern the furnishing of assistance by the Government of
the United States of America, the receipt of such
assistance by the Government of Vietnam and the measures
which the two Governments will take individually and
together in furtherance of the above objectives: with
due regard to accords and agreements previously entered
into by the High Contracting Parties;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Government of the United States of America
will, subject to the terms and conditions prescribed
by law and to arrangements provided for in this Agree-
ment, furnish the Government of Vietnam such economic
and technical assistance, as may be requested by it
and agreed to by the Government of the United States of
America. The Government of Vietnam will cooperate
with the Government of the United States of America
to assure that procurement will be at reasonable
prices and on reasonable terms. Commodities or

¹Similar agreements were also signed with Cambodia
and Laos (Treaties and other International Acts Series
2343 and 2344).

services furnished under the present Agreement may be distributed within Vietnam on terms and conditions agreed upon between the two Governments.

ARTICLE II

In order to assure maximum benefits to the people of Vietnam from the assistance to be furnished under the present Agreement by the United States of America, the Government of Vietnam will use its best endeavors:

A. To assure efficient and practical use of all resources available and to assure that the commodities and services obtained under this Agreement are used for purposes consistent therewith and with the general objectives indicated in the aid program presented by the Government of Vietnam and agreed to by the Government of the United States of America.

B. To promote the economic development of Vietnam on a sound basis and to achieve such economic objectives as may be agreed upon.

C. To assure the stability of its currency and the validity of its rate of exchange, and generally to assure confidence in its financial stability.

D. To cooperate with other countries to reduce barriers to international trade, and to take appropriate measures singly and in cooperation with other countries to eliminate public or private restrictive practices hindering domestic or international trade.

ARTICLE III

The Governments will, upon request of either of them, consult regarding any matter relating to the application of this Agreement or operations thereunder. The Government of Vietnam will provide detailed information necessary to carrying out the provisions of this Agreement including a quarterly statement on the use of funds, commodities, and services received under the present Agreement and to evaluate the effectiveness of assistance furnished or contemplated.

ARTICLE IV

The Government of Vietnam agrees to receive a

Special Technical and Economic Mission which will discharge the responsibilities of the Government of the United States of America under the present Agreement and upon appropriate notification from the Government of the United States of America will consider this Special Mission and its personnel as part of the Diplomatic Mission of the United States of America in Vietnam for the purpose of enjoying the privileges and immunities accorded to that Diplomatic Mission and its personnel of comparable rank. The Government of Vietnam will further give full cooperation to the Special Mission, including the provision of facilities necessary for observation and review of the carrying out of this Agreement including the use of assistance furnished under it.

ARTICLE V

1. This Agreement shall take effect upon notification by the Government of Vietnam to the Government of the United States of America that all necessary legal requirements in connection with the conclusion of this Agreement by the Government of Vietnam have been fulfilled.[1] This Agreement shall continue in force until the date agreed upon by the two Governments or may be terminated three months after a written notification has been given by either of the two Governments.

2. The Annex to this Agreement forms an integral part thereof.

3. This Agreement shall be registered with the Secretary General of the United Nations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized for the purpose, have signed the present Agreement.

DONE AT SAIGON this Seventh day of September, 1951 in duplicate, in each of the English, French, and Vietnamese languages, all texts authentic except that in the case of divergencies, the English and French texts shall govern.

For the Government
of the
United States of America

Edmund A. Gullion
[seal]

For the Government
of
Vietnam

Nguyen-Khac-Ve

1Sept. 7, 1951.

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MEETING OF THE U.S. - FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTERS:
FIRST MEETING, WASHINGTON, SEPTEMBER 11, 1951,
3:30 p.m.

Extract from Minutes¹

Indochina

1. M. SCHUMAN said that his Government was preparing a note on Indochina dealing with the present troop strength and casualties and containing a projection of plans and problems for 1952. Without going into details it was clear that it would be impossible for France to carry out the proposed effort in Indochina and to fulfill its obligations with respect to the defense of Europe. France planned to spend a billion francs a day in Indochina alone and faced many problems in obtaining a maximum effort there as it was engaged to do. As to the financial problem the Finance Ministers would be discussing it further. In brief, after July 1, 1952, the French would be unable to continue their effort at the present rate and would face a 150 billion franc deficit for the year. This deficit incidentally was included in the French estimate on the dollar gap. It was not suggested that the U.S. finance French policy directly but it was hoped that the U.S. could assist by arms and other troop supplies, especially in establishing the national armies of the Associated States. In this connection General de Lattre hoped to expand the present strength of 25 battalions to 50 battalions.

2. Mr. ACHESON said that M. Mayer, French Finance Minister, had discussed this matter with General Marshall and had made a deep impression upon him. The need for a solution was generally recognized. There was general agreement on the principle as discussed during the talks with M. Pleven, that France should continue to be primarily responsible for Indochina, that U.S. troops should not be used, and that first priority in military aid should go to Indochina. This difficult problem needed careful study, since funds directly available for Indochina under the present aid program were not sufficient. Both General Marshall and Mr. Foster of ECA were examining all possible ways to find other routes to reach the common goal. All that could be

¹Copy held in S/S-R. For JCS position opposing commitment in Indochina of US forces "under such circumstances as overt Chinese Communist aggression", see memorandum of JCS to Marshall (Defense), Aug. 31, 1951, top secret.

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said now was that the importance of this problem was fully understood, that the question would be given urgent attention, and that the U.S. had the will--even if it were not sure as to the means--to assist in solving this problem. Perhaps General de Lattre would be able to make some helpful suggestions.

3. M. SCHUMAN said that Mr. Acheson's reply was cause for hope in the future. He recalled the first promise in May 1950 for aid to Indochina which has been effective and well used. General de Lattre would develop more information on the long-term problem and relate it to the Singapore Conference. When he presented General de Lattre to Mr. Acheson personally on September 14 it might be possible to explore this problem further.

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751G.00/9-1451: Secret File

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Extracts from memorandum of conversation among
Acheson, Schuman, and DeLattre, Sept. 14, 1951

General de Lattre opened the conversation with the remark that he was particularly pleased to see the Secretary today for he had not expected to see him until after the Ottawa talks. That he should meet him on his first day in the United States and on the same day he had met the President was especially gratifying. He spoke of the cordial and "encouraging" interview he had had at noon with the President. He believed that the President had a thorough understanding of the Indochina problem and had been very reassured by his statement to the effect that "we would not let Indochina fall into enemy hands".

After the formalities had been completed, Mr. Schuman made a particular point of stating to the Secretary that he was glad to be able to present General de Lattre himself and to state that General de Lattre would be speaking on behalf of the French Government during his visit to the United States. The Secretary acknowledged this fact and remarked that General Marshall, Mr. Lovett and our own officials in the Department were all looking forward to discussing the details of the Indochina problem with the General.

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The General spoke in some detail on the subject of the national armies. . . . He hoped more progress would be made after his return from the United States with news that the Americans had promised to support the Franco-Vietnamese program on the basis that in Vietnam, as in the rest of the Orient, nothing succeeds like success.

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At this point General de Lattre referred again to his hope that he would return to Vietnam with news of a successful American trip. The Secretary stated, referring to the Department's responsibilities in the

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matter, "we shall support you very strongly".

De Lattre referred to the prospect of peace in Korea and his hope that, if successful, it would result in the diversion of military materiel from Korea to Indochina. The Secretary answered that he didn't think the prospects of a cease fire in Korea were particularly bright at this moment. The General expressed his theory that the Korean and Indochina wars were "one war" and that in order to be effective there must be "one peace".

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Finally, Mr. Schuman spoke of the excellent impression the Associated States delegations had made at San Francisco. The Secretary agreed with this observation.

The interview closed with the General's comment that "we must save these countries from the fate of communism"; the Secretary reaffirmed this conviction and the Department's intention to cooperate fully with the General in the course of his presentation to the United States authorities.

FE:PSA:WMGibson

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DEPARTMENTAL DISCUSSIONS WITH GENERAL de LATTRE de TASSIGNY:
MINUTES OF SECOND MEETING, WASHINGTON
SEPTEMBER 17, 1951, 3:30 p.m.¹

MR. MERCHANT said that the Department of State would re-emphasize to the Defense Department the political and strategic problems faced by Indochina and would make every effort to insure that the question of equipment would receive proper attention at the Pentagon. It was the will of the Department of State, he said, to speed the delivery of military equipment to Indochina, and the urgency of the situation was well understood by Mr. Young and Mr. Bingham, both of whom were most anxious to talk with the General's staff about the specific items needed. MR. MERCHANT inquired whether the General could estimate how long a period would elapse before the first new division of the National Army would reach the front, thus permitting French units to be released for European duty. GENERAL de LATTRE answered that three units of Vietnamese troops should reach the Tonkin front next month.

ECA Assistance

MR. MERCHANT asked whether the General wished to comment on the US economic aid program in Indochina, adding that he should realize that the U.S. felt that it was to the common interest of both countries to give such aid directly to the governments of the three Associated States and to keep local French leaders informed of current economic arrangements. MR. MERCHANT understood, however, that the General felt that economic aid could be used more directly for military purposes. GENERAL de LATTRE replied that when he had first arrived in Indochina in December, 1950, he had felt that the aid program was not working out on a satisfactory basis. According to the General, the problem was caused by the fact that a number of young men with a "missionary zeal" were dispensing economic aid with the result that there was a feeling on the part of some that they were using this aid to extend American influence. The results

¹Copy held in S/S-R.

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could only be bad, the GENERAL explained, if somebody was attempting to "put rocks" into the machinery of the Vietnam-Franco relationships and into the machinery of Franco-American friendship, particularly when the French Commonwealth was involved. He had informed him that since such projects were not under State Department jurisdiction, it would be advisable that the General explain his difficulties to Mr. Blum. Discussion had taken place with Mr. Blum early in August at which time the General explained that, while direct aid might rightly be sent directly to the Associated States, such economic assistance should remain within the framework of the concept of the French Union. He had also explained to Mr. Blum at that time that if economic aid were used to extend American influence, great harm would result. However, these discussions had proved most successful and a basis of agreement had been reached regarding the relationship between the economic aid program and the French Union. He had been informed that Mr. Blum was no longer in Indochina but hoped that his relationship with Mr. Blum's successor would be equally harmonious. MINISTER HEATH commented that he thought the past misunderstanding had been cleared up. MR. GRIFFIN concurred, saying that he did not feel that future misunderstandings would arise because liaison channels between ECA and the General's staff had improved and a continued exchange of information through informal talks had been planned. By a more acute examination of the places in which economic aid would have the most advantageous military results it would be possible to build greater faith in the program. MR. GRIFFIN added that the major purpose of the U.S. program was to make the people of Indochina feel that the economic aid was contributing to the welfare of all. GENERAL de LATTRE reiterated that the earlier disagreements were due largely to the overly zealous activity of the "young missionaries" and suggested that future programs should be directed more toward

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strengthening the infrastructure and toward building roads, railroads, port facilities and factories. He suggested that the allocation of aid funds might be handled through a committee composed of defense representatives of France, the U.S., and the Associated States.

MR. MERCHANT promised that the State Department representatives would work actively to help the General wherever possible and suggested that the General's staff discuss their individual problems with the military leaders.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

November 6, 1951

NO. 996

FOR RELEASE AT 11:00 P.M., E.S.T., (8:00 P.M., P.S.T.)
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1951....

ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, TO
THE SEATTLE WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL, SEATTLE,
WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1951

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In Indo-China, the United States has taken a friendly interest in the efforts made to resolve points of difference between France and the Associated States and has vigorously supported the determination of France and of the Associated States to restore security and order in the country. Many Americans have been troubled in the past about the issue of colonialism in Indo-China. We believe that that question is well on the way to solution, that the peoples of the Associated States are free to assume the extensive responsibility for their own affairs that has been accorded them by treaties with France. It is not surprising that doubts remain on this point in Indo-China, among other countries of Asia, and among some heritage of bitterness and suspicion, those who have recently passed through a colonial experience are sensitive and distrustful of western influence, and the slowness with which the Associated States have been able to assume the responsibility which is awaiting them has not demonstrated the extent to which the issue of colonialism has been resolved. The real issue in Indo-China is whether the peoples of that land will be permitted to work out their future as they see fit or whether they will be subjected to a Communist reign of terror and be absorbed by force into the new colonialism of a Soviet Communist empire. In this situation, it is generally agreed in the United States that we should support and assist the armies of France and of the Associated States in meeting the armed threat in Indo-China and should furnish economic and technical assistance to the Associated States as they shoulder the heavy burdens of independence.

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790.5/12-2251: Top Secret File

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SECURITY INFORMATION

FROM: Paris

Rec'd: Dec. 23, 1951
8:57 a.m.

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 3765, December 22, 10 p.m.

Informal translation Pleven note follows:

"Prime Minister French Govt calls attention of US Govt to fact that possibility of Chi intervention in Indochina appears to be becoming more definite.

Analysis of entirety intelligence reports concerning South China and assistance given Viet Minh by Mao Tse-Tung Govt gives fol results:

Effectives of Chi forces stationed southern provinces bordering on Tonkin have increased in last six months from 170,000 to 290,000 men.

South China communications network and particularly roads leading to Tonkin border being constantly reconditioned and already much improved in correlation this improvement of South China rail and road system, highways in Viet Minh area of north Tonkin are being reconditioned. For instance Kunming-Yen Bay road now open to traffic.

Lastly, Chi materiel aid to Viet Minh has vastly increased over last three months. During recent operations French have ascertained that great part captured equipment was of US origin and have seized arms dated 1950 which apparently are part war booty Chi troops in Korea.

Furthermore, analysis of Chi press over last few weeks shows that emphasis once more placed on struggle of Viet Minh against French Union forces Indochina.

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TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

Quite clear that while Franco-Viet forces are successfully standing up to VietnMinh activities, nonetheless true that former do not (rpt not) possess strategic reserves ("masse de manoeuvre") necessary to oppose Chi attack.

Consequently French Govt considers it of utmost importance that conversations which were to take place between US, UK and French following recommendations of Singapore conference commence immediately. It desires that this wish be brought to personal attention of President Truman."

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751G.00/12-2951:TOP SECRET FILE

Rec'd December 29, 1951
7:52 a.m.

FROM: PARIS
TO: SECRETARY OF STATE
NO: 3856, December 29, 11 a.m.

Foreign Office has given us aide memoire dated December 28 setting forth French Govt reply questions outlined DEFTEL 3613, December 21 and additional comment, informal translation of which follows:

"I. French command know military potential Viet Minh forces and follows its development closely. It knows these forces already benefit from Chinese aid in form equipment and material all kinds, advisers and technicians in Tonkin and training Viet Minh units or personnel in Chinese territory. There is, therefore, already certain Chinese Communist intervention Indochina, such intervention preserving for time being more or less concealed character.

"In order define criteria according which justification wld exist for considering there is attack or aggression against Indochina by Communist China, French Govt cld take into account either effectiveness Chinese intervention or form under which it appears.

"From last point view French Govt wld be justified denouncing Chinese aggression especially in following cases:

"Intervention by air forces under conditions such that their take-off from bases in Chinese territory cld not (rpt not) be technically contested (for example, medium or heavy bombers, modern or jet pursuits, for which no (rpt no) air strip now (rpt now) exists in Viet zone);

"Penetration maritime forces Indochina territorial waters, when they clearly originate only from home ports outside Indochina peninsula;

"Identification Chinese combatants, volunteers or not, as individual reinforcements or as units incorporated among enemy forces.

"From point

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"From point view effectiveness, Chinese intervention under present forms can be intensified to point of upsetting, to Viet advantage, equilibrium of opposing forces out of proportion to known possibilities of Viet alone. French Govt in this case wld also consider Chinese intervention as genuine aggression.

"II. As French Govt has already made known to US Govt, it wld, in these eventualities, appeal to UN. It wld do so in agreement with Associate States Govts and wld not (rpt not) fail to consult beforehand with US and UK.

"III. It wld ask China be declared aggressor and immediate application to China of political and economic sanctions under UN Charter. Finally it wld request member states to have their available forces participate in defense Indochina territory.

"IV. If its request met Security Council veto, French wld request meeting GA.

"V. It is essentially on Atlantic Pact member countries and British Commonwealth dominions of white race, as well as SEA countries more directly threatened by Chinese aggression, that French Govt wld consider itself able to count principally for conduct military action recommended by UN. It wld furthermore anticipate adherence to other measures by all UN member states which have decided oppose Communist bloc aggressions in Asia and elsewhere in world.

"French recourse to UN wld be effected without prejudice to requests for immediate aid by French to US and UK.

"Massive increase Chinese aid to Viet wld clearly create situation whose sudden aggravation wld not (rpt not) permit awaiting development slow UN procedures and wld call for immediate decisions on strategic plane.

"In contrary sense, it might happen that Chinese intervention wld be of character insufficiently defined to have UN decision interpose without very long discussion on real character Chinese aggression while extremely grave threat hanging over expeditionary corps.

"With this double hypothesis in view French Govt continues consider necessary speedy implementation Singapore conference recommendations.

"It is not

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C-39 (page 3)

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"It is not (rpt not) unaware such implementation poses certain number important problems for Washington as well as London, and it is with view facilitating their solution that French Govt has supported British suggestion prior Rome conference have meeting three powers Chiefs of Staff.

"French Govt can, therefore, only confirm to US Govt its very keen desire have such conference convened immediately."

End verbatim text.

Foreign Office tells us aide memoire approved by Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Minister Associate States and stresses highly classified nature information therein. With reference SEA countries French Govt wld expect support military action, Foreign Office explains it wld expect such support only from Philippines and Thailand and apparently is dubious re support it wld obtain on any measures in UN from Burma, India, Pakistan and Indonesia.

Embassy is forwarding original text by air pouch. Both this telegram and original text being furnished USDEL.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TOP SECRET

JAN 15 6:42 PM '52

Amlegation SAIGON 974

EYES ONLY HEATH.

CODE CLERK: THIS MSG TO BE DELIVERED TO MR. HEATH
FOR HIS EYES ONLY.

Tripartite MIL conversations held Washington JAN 11 concerning defense SEA were convened through direct NEGOTS between three Chiefs of Staff. Only at last moment were single REIS of each FONOFF permitted to be present as observers. DEPT had no opportunity contribute to agenda nor formally participate in discussions. Nevertheless LEG TELS concerning this SUBJ were and are most helpful.

Part one of agenda entitled "Exchange of Views with Respect to Southeast Asia" consists of two PTS.

1. Problems of SEA in light of world wide implications of situation, and
2. Defense SEA including action in event of deterioration of situation.

Part two concerned recommendations of Singapore Conference.

Summary of discussions covering both Parts has been given to BARTLETT for transmittal to LEG. He is expected to arrive Saigon APPROX JAN 26.

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FOL IS

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FOL is brief summary of discussions on Part one.

1. GEN Bradley advised GEN Juin that he was unable to commit his GOVT at this time as to extent and character of US MIL assistance in event of massive CHI intervention. This SUBJ being considered at highest official level as matter of urgency. Field Marshal Slim concurred. Juin appealed for US and UK dispatch of air and naval support if not ground forces. Air cover necessary to allow his forces to retire on Haiphong.

2. Juin stated, under INSTRS from his GOVT, that FOL massive CHI intervention FR Union forces WLD retire to Haiphong and fight to last man. Air cover needed for this operation while naval assistance needed in evacuating 50,000 FR and Indochinese civilians. Juin stated that if Haiphong held, invasion of IC difficult or impossible.

3. Three Chiefs agreed to recommend to their GOVTS the transmittal of a declaration to Red China that aggression against SEA WLD bring certain retaliation from the three powers, not necessarily limited to the area of aggression. An AD HOC COMITE of REPS of the three powers plus AUSTRAL and NZ was appointed to

study

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study and report urgently on the measures the
give GOVTS might take singly or jointly in event
Red China failed heed warning. Above two steps
resulted from mutual recognition that present
problems consist of (1) discouragement against
aggression and (2) retaliation.

4. All agreed that CHI aggression against SEA
might well mean war with China.

5. Neither the recommendation as to proposed decla-
ration nor the report of AD HOC COMITE have been
recd by DEPT.

6. It SHLD be noted that the language of proposed
declaration must still be approved by each of the five
GOVTS concerned as well as joint agreement reached
concerning method and timing of transmittal to Red
China. Likewise, the recommendations of AD HOC
COMITE which WLD presumably be of very broad nature
WLD necessarily influence course of action of the
five GOVTS with respect to transmittal proposed
declaration.

Bartlett has been fully briefed and LEG will be informed
of developments as they occur.

ACHESON

FE:ISA:REHoey

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ANNEX TO NSC 124

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February 13, 1952

NSC STAFF STUDY

on

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION WITH
RESPECT TO COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA*

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the policy of the United States toward the countries of Southeast Asia, and in particular, the courses of action which may be taken by the United States to strengthen and coordinate resistance to communism on the part of the governments and peoples of the area, to prevent Chinese Communist aggression, and to meet such aggression should it occur.

ANALYSIS

I. CONSEQUENCES TO THE UNITED STATES OF COMMUNIST DOMINATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

2. Communist domination of Southeast Asia, whether by means of overt invasion, subversion, or accommodation on the part of the indigenous governments, would be critical to United States security interests. Communist success in this area would spread doubt and fear among other threatened non-communist countries as to the ability of the United States and the United Nations to halt communist aggression elsewhere. It would strengthen the claim that the advance of communism is inexorable and encourage countries vulnerable to Soviet pressure to adopt policies of neutralism or accommodation. Successful overt Chinese Communist aggression in this area, especially if achieved without encountering more than token resistance on the part of the United States or the United Nations, would have critical psychological and political consequences which would probably include the relatively swift alignment of the rest of Asia and thereafter or the Middle East to communism, thereby endangering the stability and security of Europe. Such a communist success might nullify the psychological advantages accruing to the free world by reason of its response to the aggression in Korea.

3. The fall of Southeast Asia would underline the apparent economic advantages to Japan of association with the communist-dominated Asian sphere. Exclusion of Japan from trade with Southeast Asia would seriously affect the Japanese

*The term Southeast Asia is used herein to mean Indochina, Burma, Thailand, the Malay Peninsula, and Indonesia.

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economy, and increase Japan's dependence on United States aid. In the long run the loss of Southeast Asia, especially Malaya and Indonesia, could result in such economic and political pressures in Japan as to make it extremely difficult to prevent Japan's eventual accommodation to the Soviet Bloc.

4. Southeast Asia, especially Malaya and Indonesia, is the principal world source of natural rubber and tin. Access to these materials by the Western Powers and their denial to the Soviet Bloc is important at all times and particularly in the event of global war. Communist control over the rice surpluses of the Southeast Asian mainland would provide the USSR with a powerful economic weapon in its relations with other countries of the Far East. Indonesia is a secondary source of petroleum whose importance would be enhanced by the denial to the Western Powers of petroleum sources in the Middle East. Malaya is the largest net dollar earner for the United Kingdom, and its loss would seriously aggravate the economic problems facing the UK.

5. Communist control of all of Southeast Asia would render the United States position in the Pacific offshore island chain precarious and would seriously jeopardize fundamental United States security interests in the Far East. The extension of communist power via Burma would augment the communist threat to India and Pakistan and strengthen the groups within those countries which favor accommodation. However, such an event would probably result in a stiffer attitude toward communism on the part of the Indian government.

6. Communist domination of mainland Southeast Asia would place unfriendly forces astride the most direct and best-developed sea and air routes between the Western Pacific and India and the Near East. In the event of global war, the development of Soviet submarine and air bases in mainland Southeast Asia might compel the detour of U.S. and allied shipping and air transportation in the Southeast Asia region via considerably longer alternate routes to the south. This extension of friendly lines of communication would hamper U.S. strategic movements in this region and tend to isolate the major non-communist bases in the Far East--the offshore island chain and Australia--from existing bases in East Africa and the Near and Middle East, as well as from potential bases on the Indian sub-continent.

7. Besides disrupting established lines of communication in the area, the denial of actual military facilities in mainland Southeast Asia--in particular, the loss of the major naval operating bases at Singapore--would compel the utilization of

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less desirable peripheral bases. Soviet exploitation of the naval and air bases in mainland Southeast Asia probably would be limited by the difficulties of logistic support but would, nevertheless, increase the threat to existing lines of communication.

II. REGIONAL STRATEGY

8. The continued integrity of the individual countries of Southeast Asia is to a large extent dependent upon a successful coordination of political and military measures for the entire area. The development of practical measures aimed at preventing the absorption of these countries into the Soviet orbit must therefore recognize this interdependence and must, in general, seek courses of action for the area as a whole.

9. However, it must be recognized that the governments and peoples of Southeast Asia have little in common other than their geographic proximity and their newly awakened nationalism and anti-colonialism. For the most part, their economies are competitive rather than complementary. The countries are divided internally and from each other by language and ethnic differences. The several nationalities and tribal groups are the heirs of centuries of warfare, jealousy, and mutual distrust. In addition, their present governments are sharply divided in their attitudes toward the current East-West struggle. The governments of the three Associated States of Indochina are not recognized by any other Asian states except Nationalist China and Thailand.

10. In the strategic sense, the defense of Tonkin is important to the defense of mainland Southeast Asia. If Communist forces should succeed in driving the French Union forces from Tonkin, military action in the remainder of Indochina might have to be limited to delaying action and the perimeter defense of certain coastal areas pending reinforcement or evacuation. With the appearance of communist success, native support would probably swing increasingly to the Viet Minh.

11. Thailand has no common border with China and no strong internal communist element. It adjoins areas of Indochina now controlled by the Viet Minh, but the border areas are remote and difficult. Hence, communist seizure of Thailand is improbable except as a result of the prior loss of either Burma or Indochina.

12. Communist control of either Indochina or Burma would expose Thailand to infiltration and severe political pressures,

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as well as to the threat of direct attack. Unless substantial outside aid were forthcoming, it is possible that in such a case, political pressure alone would be sufficient to bring about the accommodation of Thailand to international communism within a year. However, substantial aid, together with assurance of support by the United States and the UN might be sufficient to preserve a non-communist government in Thailand in spite of any form of pressure short of overt attack.

13. Thailand would be difficult to defend against an overt attack from the east by way of the traditional invasion route through Cambodia. Thailand is more defensible against attack from Burma owing to the mountainous terrain and poor communications of the Thai-Burmese border. In either case it might be possible to defend an area in southern Thailand centering on Bangkok. Since any attack on Thailand would necessarily be preceded by communist encroachment on Indochina or Burma, the defense of Thailand would probably be part of a broader pattern of hostilities.

14. If the loss of Thailand followed the loss of Burma, the defense of Indochina would be out-flanked; and any substantial communist forces based on Thailand would render the position of the French Union Forces in Indochina untenable in the long run. If the collapse of Thailand followed the loss of Indochina, the psychological and political consequences would accelerate the deterioration of Burma. However, the military consequences in such a case would be less immediate, owing to the difficult terrain of the Thai-Burmese border country.

15. Communist control of Thailand would aggravate the already serious security problem presented by the Thai-Malayan border and greatly increase the difficulties of the British security forces in Malaya. However, assuming control of the sea by the Western Powers, Malaya offers a defensible position against even a full-scale land attack. The Kra Isthmus of the Malayan Peninsula would afford the best secondary line of defense against total communist domination of Southeast Asia and the East Indies. Such a defense would effectively protect Indonesia against external communist pressure. By thus defending Malaya and Indonesia, the anti-communist forces would continue to hold the most important strategic material resources of the area, as well as strategic air and naval bases and lines of communication.

16. The strategic interdependence of the countries in Southeast Asia, and the cumulative effect of a successful

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communist penetration in any one area, point to the importance of action designed to forestall any aggression by the Chinese Communists. The most effective possible deterrent would be a joint warning by the United States and certain other governments regarding the grave consequences of Chinese aggression against Southeast Asia, and implying the threat of retaliation against Communist China itself. Such a warning should be issued in conjunction with other nations, including at least the United Kingdom, France, Australia and New Zealand. Participation in such a warning involves all the risks and disadvantages of a precommitment to take action in future and unknown circumstances. However, these disadvantages must be weighed against the alternative of a costly effort to repel Chinese invasion after it has actually occurred. A second, but probably less effective, means of attempting to deter such an invasion would be to focus world attention on the continuing threat of Chinese Communist aggression against Southeast Asia and to make clear to the Soviet and Chinese Communist Governments the fact that the United States views the situation in Southeast Asia with great concern. In fact, statements along these lines have already been made. Such means might also include a Peace Observation Commission, if desired and requested by the countries concerned, public addresses by U.S. officials, and "show the flag" visits by naval and air units.

17. The Chinese Nationalist forces represent considerable reserve upon which to draw in the event of military action against Communist China. The deficiency in equipment and training seriously limits the possible employment of these forces at present, however, continuation of our training and supply efforts should serve to alleviate these deficiencies. The manner of employment of these forces is beset not only with military but also with political difficulties. Hence the decision as to the best use of these forces cannot be made at this time. Nevertheless, we should be prepared to make the best practicable use of this military augmentation in light of the circumstances existing at the time.

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III. INDOCHINA

18. In the long run, the security of Indochina against communism will depend upon the development of native governments able to command the support of the masses of the people and national armed forces capable of relieving the French of the major burden of maintaining internal security. Some progress is being made in the formation and development of national armies. However, the Vietnamese Government has been slow to assume its responsibilities and has continued to suffer from a lack of strong leadership. It has had to contend with: (a) lingering Vietnamese suspicion of any French-supported regime, combined with the apathetic and "fence sitting" attitude of the bulk of the people; (b) the difficulty, common to all new and inexperienced governments, of training the necessary personnel and building an efficient administration; and (c) the failure of factional and sectional groups to unite in a concerted national effort.

19. The U.S. economic aid program for Indochina has as its objectives to increase production and thereby offset the military drain on the economy of the Associated States; to increase popular support for the Government by improving the effectiveness of Government services; to make the Government and the people aware of America's interest in their independence and welfare; and to use economic aid as a means of supporting the military effort. Because of their strained budgetary situation, the Associated States cannot meet the local currency costs of the projects; about 60 percent of the program funds is, therefore, devoted to importing needed commodities which are sold to generate counterpart.

20. The military situation in Indochina continues to be one of stalemate. Increased U.S. aid to the Franco-Vietnamese forces has been an essential factor in enabling them to withstand recent communist attacks. However, Chinese aid to the Viet Minh in the form of logistic support, training, and technical advisors is increasing at least at a comparable rate. The prospect is for a continuation of the present stalemate in the absence of intervention by important forces other than those presently engaged.

21. While it is unlikely under the present circumstances that the French will suffer a military defeat in Indochina, there is a distinct possibility that the French Government will soon conclude that France cannot continue indefinitely to carry the burden of her total military commitments. From the French point of view, the possible means of lessening the

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present burden include: (1) a settlement with the communists in Indochina; (2) an agreement to internationalize the action in Indochina; (3) reduction of the NATO obligations of France.

22. A settlement based on a military armistice would be more complicated in Indochina than in the case of Korea. Much of Indochina is not firmly under the control of either side, but subject to occasional forays from both. Areas controlled by the opposing sides are interspersed, and lines of contact are fluid. Because of the weakness of the native governments, the dubious attitudes of the population even in areas under French control, and the certainty of continued communist pressure, it is highly probable that any settlement based on a withdrawal of French forces would be tantamount to handing over Indochina to communism. The United States should therefore continue to oppose any negotiated settlement with the Viet Minh.

23. In the event that information and circumstances point to the conclusion that France is no longer prepared to carry the burden in Indochina, or if France presses for a sharing of the responsibility for Indochina, whether in the UN or directly with the U.S. Government, the United States should oppose a French withdrawal and consult with the French and British concerning further measures to be taken to safeguard the area from communist domination. In anticipation of these possibilities, the United States should urgently re-examine the situation with a view to determining:

a. Whether U.S. participation in an international undertaking would be warranted.

b. The general nature of the contributions which the United States, with other friendly governments, might be prepared to make.

24. A cessation of hostilities in Korea would greatly increase the logistical capability of the Chinese Communists to support military operations in Indochina. A Korean peace would have an even more decisive effect in increasing Chinese air capabilities in that area. Recent intelligence reports indicate increased Chinese Communist military activity in the Indochinese border area. If the Chinese Communists directly intervene with large forces over and above those introduced as individuals or in small units, the French would probably be driven back to a beachhead around Haiphong. The French should be able to hold this beachhead for only a limited time at best in the absence of timely and substantial outside support.

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25. In view of the world-wide reaction to overt aggression in Korea, Communist China may prefer to repeat in Indochina the method of "volunteer" intervention. Inasmuch as the French do not control the border between China and Indochina nor large areas north of Hanoi, it may be difficult to detect the extent of preparation for such intervention. It is important to U.S. security interests to maintain the closest possible consultation with the French Government on the buildup of Chinese Communist intervention in Indochina. The Government of France has agreed to consult with the United States before it requests UN or other international action to oppose Chinese Communist aggression in Indochina in order that the two countries may jointly evaluate the extent of Chinese Communist intervention.

26. If it is thus determined that Chinese Communist forces (including volunteers) have overtly intervened in the conflict in Indochina, or are covertly participating to such an extent as to jeopardize retention of the Tonkin Delta by the French forces, the United States should support the French to the greatest extent possible, preferably under the auspices of the UN. It is by no means certain that an appropriate UN resolution could be obtained. Favorable action in the UN would depend upon a change in the attitude of those governments which view the present regime in Indochina as a continuation of French colonialism. A new communist aggression might bring about a reassessment of the situation on the part of these governments and an increased recognition of the danger. Accordingly, it is believed that a UN resolution to oppose the aggression could be passed in the General Assembly by a small margin.

27. Even if it is not possible to obtain a UN resolution in such a case, the United States should seek the maximum possible international support for and participation in any international collective action in support of France and the Associated States. The United States should take appropriate military action against Communist China as part of a UN collective action or in conjunction with France and the United Kingdom and other friendly governments. However, in the absence of such support, it is highly unlikely that the United States would act unilaterally. It is probable however, that the United States would find some support and token participation at least from the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries.

28. The U.S. forces which would be committed, and the manner of their employment, as well as the military equipment

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which could be furnished to bolster the French Union forces, would be dependent upon certain factors which cannot now be predicted with accuracy. These include the extent of progress in U.S. rearmament, whether or not hostilities in Korea were continuing, and strategic developments in other parts of the world. It would be desirable to avoid the use of major U.S. ground forces in Indochina. Other effective means of opposing the aggression would include naval, air and logistical support of the French Union forces, naval blockade of Communist China, and attacks by land and carrier-based aircraft on military targets in Communist China. The latter could be effective against the long, tenuous, and vulnerable supply lines by which Chinese operations in Indochina would have to be supported. In the event of a forced evacuation, U.S. forces might provide cover and assistance. United Kingdom participation in these measures might well result in the seizure of Hong Kong by the Chinese Communists.

29. It is recognized that the commitment of U.S. military forces against Communist China would: (a) increase the risk of general hostilities in the Far East, including Soviet participation under cover of the existing Sino-Soviet agreements; (b) involve U.S. military forces in another Asiatic peripheral action, thus detracting from U.S. capabilities to conduct a global war in the near future; (c) arouse public opposition to "another Korea"; and (d) imply willingness to use U.S. military forces in other critical areas subject to communist aggression. Nevertheless, by failing to take action, the United States would permit the communists to obtain, at little or no cost, a victory of major world consequence.

30. Informed public opinion might support use of U.S. forces in Indochina regardless of sentiment against "another Korea" on the basis that: (a) Indochina is of far greater strategic importance than Korea; (b) the confirmation of UN willingness to oppose aggression with force, demonstrated at such a high cost in Korea, might be nullified by the failure to commit UN forces in Indochina; and (c) a second instance of aggression by the Chinese Communists would justify measures not subject to the limitations imposed upon the UN action in Korea.

31. The military action contemplated herein would constitute, in effect, a war against Communist China which would be limited only as to its objectives, but would not be subject to any geographic limitations. Employment of U.S. forces in a de facto war without a formal declaration would raise questions which would make it desirable to consult with key members of both parties in Congress in order to obtain their prior concurrence in the courses of action contemplated.

Captain John A. Webster, USN

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SPECIAL ESTIMATE

CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COURSES
OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA, BURMA,
OR THAILAND

SE-22
29 February 1952

Advance Copy for the NSC

In order to expedite delivery, this estimate is being
given a special preliminary distribution.

The intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint
Staff participated with the Central Intelligence Agency
in the preparation of this estimate. All members of
the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
estimate on 28 February 1952. See, however, footnotes
to paragraphs 1, 2, and 3b.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

29 February 1952

CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COURSES OF
ACTION WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA, BURMA, OR
THAILAND

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the consequences of certain possible US courses of action with respect to an identifiable Chinese Communist military intervention* in Indochina, Burma, or Thailand.

ASSUMPTION

The United Kingdom, France, Australia, and New Zealand will join the United States in warning Communist China that the five powers will meet Chinese Communist

* The term "identifiable Chinese Communist military intervention" is intended to cover either an open and acknowledged military intervention or an unacknowledged military intervention of such a scale and nature that its existence could be demonstrated.

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military intervention in Southeast Asia with military counteraction. Whether or not the four other powers will join the US in such a warning is beyond the scope of this estimate. We are also unable to assess which of various conceivable methods of transmitting a warning would have the greatest deterrent effect.

ESTIMATE

I. THE EFFECT OF A JOINT WARNING AGAINST CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

On Communist Intentions

1. We do not believe that a joint warning against an "identifiable military intervention" by the Chinese Communists in Southeast Asia would tend to provoke such intervention. If, however, the Chinese Communists contemplate an early "identifiable military intervention" in Southeast Asia, or if in the future they should contemplate such an intervention, a joint warning by the five powers would tend to deter them.*

2. Even in the absence of a joint formal warning, the Chinese Communists probably estimate that "identifiable

* The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, would add the following sentence: "On the other hand, if the Communist leaders conclude from Western actions and statements that the West intends to attack Communist China regardless of Communist actions in Southeast Asia, the deterrent effect of a warning would be nullified."

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military intervention" in Southeast Asia would entail substantial risk of joint military counteraction, and that such a risk is unwarranted in view of the prospects for further Communist gains in Southeast Asia without such intervention. They may, however, discount this risk, estimating that there are differences in policy among the five powers and that these powers may not be able or willing to take timely* and effective military counteraction.

3. The effectiveness of a joint warning as a deterrent would depend in large measure on Communist conviction that:

- a. The five powers were not bluffing, and were united among themselves as to the military counteraction to be taken.
- b. The five powers were actually capable of timely and effective military counteraction.*
- c. The counteraction would be directed against Communist China itself as well as toward repelling the Chinese Communist intervention.

4. If the Communists were convinced on the foregoing points they would have to recognize that intervention in Southeast Asia would bring military counteraction, the probable

* The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State holds the view that the Communists might be seriously concerned over the prospect of delayed military counteraction, even though they believed that timely counteraction need not be feared. He therefore believes that the words "timely and" should be omitted.

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consequences of which would be general hostilities between Communist China and the five powers, if not global war. It is improbable, therefore, that they would initiate an "identifiable military intervention" in Indochina, Burma, or Thailand in the face of a joint warning by the five powers unless, on the basis of global considerations, they were willing to accept global war or at least general hostilities in the Far East. So far both Communist China and the USSR have shown a desire to localize the hostilities in Korea, Indochina, Burma, and Malaya. Furthermore, the favorable prospects for the success of present Communist tactics in Southeast Asia make probable a continuation of these tactics, unless, because of global considerations, the USSR and the Chinese Communists decide to accept grave risk of global war.

5. It is unlikely that additional signatories would increase the effectiveness of a joint warning. India would almost certainly refuse to participate in such a warning. It is improbable that Japan would take such a provocative step at this time and uncertain whether Thailand would do so. Few, if any, additional governments would join in a formal warning. Even if the Philippines, Japan, and Thailand did participate, the Communists would discount their adherence because of the military weakness of these countries and their existing ties with the West. The Communists would assume Chinese Nationalist support of the warning, whether or not explicitly expressed.

Other Effects

6. A public joint warning would considerably improve the morale of the Thai and Vietnamese governments. In Burma

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any encouragement derived from the warning would probably be offset by fear of involvement in a conflict between the great powers and by general suspicion of Western "imperialist" motives.

7. Elsewhere in East and South Asia the effect would be mixed. There would be a tendency, notably in Japan and the Philippines, to applaud this new manifestation of Western determination to check Communist aggression. On the other hand, the feeling would be widespread, especially in India and Indonesia, that the warning represented another instance of Western meddling in Asian affairs in pursuit of colonial objectives.

8. The effect of a warning on other countries probably would not be of major importance. A warning might well revive the fears in the smaller NATO powers regarding the dangers of general war or of an overextension of Western strength in the Far East, but it is unlikely that the basic attitudes of these countries would be changed.

9. The inclusion in the warning of a threat to use atomic weapons would produce a widespread and serious adverse reaction throughout the non-Communist world.

II. INITIATION OF ACTION IN THE UN AND PROBABLE UN REACTIONS THERETO

10. If identifiable Chinese Communist military intervention in Southeast Asia actually took place, the UN could

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probably be led to adopt countermeasures similar to those taken regarding Korea if the US, UK, and France advocated these measures. Action by the Security Council would certainly be blocked by a Soviet veto, but the matter could then be taken to the General Assembly within twenty-four hours under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. The General Assembly would probably begin by calling for a cease-fire. Were this action to be ignored (as it presumably would be), a two-thirds majority could probably be mustered for resolutions condemning Communist China as an aggressor, recommending military counteraction to repel the aggression, and setting up a unified military command (though not necessarily under the US) to that end. Most UN members, however, because of their fears of a general war, would probably not be willing to give specific authorization for military counteraction against Communist China itself.

11. The willingness of the UN to adopt a stand against Communist intervention in Southeast Asia would be affected by the readiness of the victim to appeal to the UN. Indochina and Thailand would almost certainly be prompt in seeking UN assistance against Chinese Communist military intervention, but Burma might fail to make a timely appeal or fail to support an appeal by another UN member.

12. The degree of UN support for action against Chinese Communist aggression would hinge on various other factors. A large number of Arab and Asian countries probably would abstain if Indochina, which they regard as a French puppet, were invaded. The Arab-Asian reaction might be more favorable if the victim were Burma, which has followed a policy of non-involvement. If the five powers took any countermeasures without UN authorization, support of their action would be considerably lessened.

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III. PROBABLE EFFECTS OF THE EXECUTION OF
JOINT MILITARY COUNTERMEASURES

Reaction of the Chinese Communist and Soviet Governments*

13. If the Chinese Communists undertook an identifiable military intervention in Southeast Asia despite a joint warning against such a move, Chinese Communist planning unquestionably would have considered the likelihood of Western counteraction and would have been coordinated with the USSR. It is possible that such an intervention might be undertaken in the belief that the warning was a bluff, or at least that the countermeasures would be confined to the area of the aggression. In this case the execution of forceful military countermeasures might induce the Communists to seek a settlement. It appears far more likely, however, that such an intervention would be undertaken in full recognition of the risks involved. Under these circumstances, the immediate reaction to such military counteraction would probably be an attempt to accelerate Chinese Communist military operations. The Chinese Communists would probably attempt to extend their operations to other parts of Southeast Asia and, having already accepted the danger of expanded hostilities, they might well intensify operations in Korea and seize Hong Kong and Macao. Highest priority would be given, however, to the defense of Communist China.

14. Chinese Communist defiance of a joint warning would almost certainly involve the prior consent of the USSR. The degree of Soviet aid to Communist China would depend upon (a) the nature, scope, and degree of success of the Western counteraction, and (b) the degree to which the existence of the Peiping regime seemed to be jeopardized.

* SE-20: "The Probable Consequences of Certain Possible US Courses of Action with Respect to Communist China and Korea" treats most of the material discussed in this section in more detail.

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The Secretary of Defense

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

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SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO. 4

March 4, 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: United States Objectives and Courses of Action
with Respect to Communist Aggression in South-
east Asia

REFERENCE: NSC 124 and Annex to NSC 124

At the request of the Secretary of Defense the attached views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the reference report on the subject are circulated herewith for the information of the National Security Council in connection with Council consideration of NSC 124 at its meeting on March 5, 1952.

It is requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling of the enclosure.

James S. Lay, Jr.
JAMES S. LAY, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director of Defense Mobilization

JUL 3 1952

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(Date)

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C O P Y

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TOP SECRET
Washington 25, D. C. SECURITY INFORMATION

3 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: United States Objectives and Courses
of Action with Respect to Communist
Aggression in Southeast Asia.

1. In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum, dated 16 February 1952, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied NSC 124, a draft statement of United States policy on the above subject, and a staff study relating thereto, both prepared by the National Security Council Staff. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the proposed policies enunciated therein are set forth below.

2. NSC 124 recommends United States courses of action in the several areas of Southeast Asia. Taken either separately or together, acceptance of most of these courses of action and hence of NSC 124, involves the making of a single basic decision. This basic decision is whether or not the United States, in support of the objective of NSC 124 stated as "to prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into the Communist orbit," would be WILLING to take military action which would, in effect, constitute war against Communist China. An affirmation at this time within the National Security Council of such a willingness does not necessarily involve taking a decision now whether or not to go to war in advance of the nature and extent of the aggression becoming apparent. On the other hand, affirmation of this willingness should be made with a clear understanding of the implications which the adoption of these courses of action would entail. In addition, such affirmation of this willingness is essential in order to provide the basis for determining:

a. The cost of these courses of action, in terms of men, money, and materiel;

b. The impact of these courses of action upon the economy of the United States;

c. The impact of these courses of action upon United States military assistance programs with particular reference to the inevitable reduction in the United States contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) effort; and

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d. The firmness of support of our principal allies for our global policies generally and these courses of action in particular.

3. The military action, as proposed in NSC 124, would be limited as to its objectives, but it would not be subject to any geographic restrictions with respect to Communist China. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that any new communist aggression in Asia undoubtedly would stem from a deliberate design, in the formulation of which the possibility of counteraction by the United States against the source of aggression would, in all probability, have been considered.

4. The making of such a decision now or in the eventuality of overt aggression by Communist China against a country of Southeast Asia is complicated by, among other things, the following:

a. Whether or not the United Nations would be willing to call upon its members to engage in hostilities with Communist China;

b. Whether or not the member nations of the United Nations would be willing to engage in military action against aggression by Communist China in Southeast Asia;

c. Whether or not the United Kingdom and France would be willing to engage directly in military action against Communist China itself, other than action limited to the area of and/or the approaches to the land battle with the aggressor forces;

d. The ability and the willingness of the United States to take the military actions involved including unilateral action against Communist China itself, in event of Communist Chinese military aggression in the countries of Southeast Asia. Such actions would call for considerable increase over current military production rates with a corresponding curtailment of the production of goods for the civilian economy; until increased U.S. production is achieved, these actions would reduce the military assistance programs to other nations, especially those in high priority.

e. The possible effect upon United States alliances in Europe and upon the United Nations organization itself if the United States Government should consider it necessary, in its own interests, to take military action unilaterally against Communist China; and

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f. The implications and the political effects of a probable refusal by the United States to provide ground forces for collective United Nations action or for combined military operations in support of France and the United Kingdom in Southeast Asia.

5. The basic decision, in light of the factors set forth in paragraph 3 above, those developed in NSC 124, and the military considerations set forth herein, is essentially political in nature. Its resolution will have direct bearing upon future United States global strategy. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that consideration by the members of the National Security Council itself of these factors and military considerations is necessary prior to any final decision regarding the policy statement in NSC 124.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to report that, during the course of their preliminary discussions with representatives of the Chiefs of Staffs of the United Kingdom and France on the matter of possible courses of action to meet Chinese Communist aggression against Southeast Asia, the British and French military position opposed even the concept of action against Communist China other than that limited to the area of, or approaches to, the land battle in opposition to the aggressor forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the British and French would, at least initially, oppose taking military action against Communist China as a nation, even in the face of aggression.

7. The British and French appear to think almost exclusively in terms of defense, at least as far as Europe and Southeast Asia are concerned. Their unwillingness to take even those measures for the defense of Southeast Asia which are within their capability, indicates that they may not recognize the actual long-term danger to themselves involved in the possible loss of Southeast Asia.

8. Piecemeal actions by Soviet satellites, such as the overrunning of Southeast Asia, can eventually lead to attainment by the USSR of its objective, among others, of dominating the continent of Asia and possibly the continent of Europe. It is emphasized that each Communist gain directly involves a loss to the Western World.

9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that there would be grave danger to United States security interests if Southeast Asia should pass into the Communist orbit.

10. The military problems which would arise as a result

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of any overt Chinese Communist aggression against Southeast Asia are different in character and in scope from those of Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that any restrictions which would limit the military action taken in French Indochina, Thailand, and/or Burma to the area of, or the approaches to, the land battle in opposition to the aggressor forces would result in such military action becoming wholly defensive in character. Such action would, in their opinion, at best be indecisive and would probably extend over an indefinite period.

11. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that military measures taken to prevent the Chinese Communists from gaining control of Southeast Asia by military aggression should, from the outset, be planned so as to offer a reasonable chance of ultimate success. After consideration of the military factors involved, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that in order to offer such chance of success, military operations in defense against Chinese Communist invasion of French Indochina, Thailand, and/or Burma must be accompanied by military action against the sources of that aggression, namely, Communist China itself. Accordingly, and in view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would recommend, SOLELY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, that a strong defense be maintained against such Chinese Communist aggression and that concurrent offensive operations be undertaken against the nation of Communist China. They would point out, however, that this course of action, while offering promise of ultimate success, might result in a long war, and an expensive one at least materiel-wise.

12. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, must, in any event, oppose acceptance of all of the military commitments devolving from NSC 124 without a clear understanding that the United States must be accorded freedom of action and, if possible, support in the undertaking of appropriate military action to include action against Communist China itself. Failing such freedom of action, the United States should accept the possibility of loss of at least Indochina, Thailand, and Burma. Such acceptance would call for a United States policy which would limit United States military commitments in Southeast Asia to those necessary to cover and assist possible forced evacuations of the French and/or the British from their positions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their position that United States ground forces should not be committed in French Indochina, Thailand, or Burma and for the defense of those countries. Further, they strongly oppose the United States joining a combined military command for the defense of those countries.

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13. Military action by the United States against Communist China would inevitably involve the acceptance of increased risks. Such risks, however, should not necessarily be an overriding deterrent to United States action. As NSC 48/5 points out, the risk of global war "should not preclude undertaking calculated risks against specific areas in the over-all interests of the United States."

14. If Communist China commits overt major acts of aggression against French Indochina, Thailand, or Burma and if in the face of such aggression the British and/or French refuse to offer either military or political support to possible United States action against Communist China itself, the effect of United States unilateral action upon our military alliances and positions in Europe as well as in Asia should be appraised and the risk calculated. Further, in such an eventuality, the validity of our alliances might well be re-examined.

15. In the light of all of the foregoing and, to meet the contingencies:

a. That Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia poses a threat unacceptable at that time to the position of the United States, both in the Far East and world-wide, and

b. That the United Kingdom and/or France decline to support action against the nation of Communist China, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, strongly recommend the inclusion in any National Security Council policy statement with respect to Southeast Asia stipulation that the United States Government will consider taking military action, unilaterally, if necessary, against the nation of Communist China.

16. Acceptance of the policies proposed in NSC 124 would serve to increase the commitments of the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that such increase should be accompanied by a substantial upward revision of our economic and military assistance programs for Southeast Asia and for Formosa and by some (possibly substantial) increase in our forces in being. In this connection, current slippages in the military production programs have already reduced planned United States and allied military readiness. There should be no increase in the risk resulting from such shortages in military production. Accordingly, the increases in our assistance programs and our ready forces, required by acceptance of the proposed policies, would call for a substantial

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and immediate increase in the scale of United States production, and pending that increase, would reduce the military assistance programs to other nations, especially those in high priority.

17. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in paragraph 67 of the study in the Annex to NSC 124, which is quoted below for ready reference:

"In order to pursue the military courses of action envisaged in this paper to a definite favorable conclusion within a reasonable period, it will be necessary to divert military strength from other areas thus reducing our military capabilities in those areas, with the recognized increased risks involved therein, or to increase our military forces in being, or both. The magnitude of the United States military requirements to carry out these courses of action and the manner in which they could best be met can be determined only after study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

Such determination will follow completion of the military studies called for in subparagraph 6c(3) of the draft policy statement in NSC 124 dealing with the military measures called for in subparagraphs 6d, 7f, 8c, 9b, and 10c thereof. In this connection, an armistice in Korea will not of itself permit major redeployment or redistribution of ground forces in the Far East in the near future except at the risk of losing Korea and endangering Japan in the event hostilities in that area are resumed.

18. In connection with the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff contemplate no employment of United States ground force units in French Indochina, Thailand, or Burma; rather the Joint Chiefs of Staff anticipate that the major increase in United States forces required for contemplated operations against aggression in that area would be naval and air force units. It should be noted that the creation of any new units would, in general, strengthen the United States military position for the eventuality of global war and that such forces would be capable of rapid redeployment in that eventuality.

19. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the United States military point of view, do not wish to join in a combined military command at this time or under present circumstances for the defense of Southeast Asia against Chinese Communist aggression. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States should not at this time contemplate relieving the French of their responsibility in Indochina if present United States global strategy, includ-

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ing France's role therein, is to be continued. Further, they feel that, while French Indochina, Thailand, and/or Burma are being defended by other friendly nations, the role of the United States in support of such defense should be primarily military action against Communist China itself. This latter action should, of course, involve military support from the British and French as well as from other friendly nations, but should remain under the control of the United States.

20. It will be noted that the foregoing comments are in general limited to United States courses of action relative to Indochina, Thailand, and Burma. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it premature for the National Security Council to attempt to decide now as to the military courses of action which would be taken with respect to Malaya, Indonesia, or in the Southwest Pacific in the event the integrity of any of these is directly threatened by foreign aggression which could only follow aggression in Indochina and/or Burma. Accordingly, in the event that the Chinese Communists threaten Malaya or Indonesia, the United States should then, in the light of the world situation generally and the situation in the Far East specifically at that time, consider the military measures it might take as a part of a United Nations collective action or in conjunction with the United Kingdom and any other friendly governments.

21. In the light of all the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the National Security Council consider:

a. Whether the United States, unilaterally, if necessary, would be willing to extend the war to the forces and territory of Communist China in event of Communist Chinese military aggression in Southeast Asia;

b. Whether the United States should insist that French Indochina, Thailand, and/or Burma be defended by other friendly nations and that the role of the United States in support of such defense be primarily military action against Communist China itself; and

c. Failing freedom of action against Communist China itself, United States policy should limit United States military operations to those necessary to cover and assist possible forced evacuation of the French and/or the British from their positions.

22. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have a number of substantive and specific comments with respect to the statements of policy

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in NSC 124. These comments are contained in the Enclosure attached. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Enclosure and their views herein be furnished to the National Security Council prior to its action on this paper. The military studies referred to in the Annex to NSC 124 and in paragraph 17 of this memorandum will be furnished in due course to the Representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the National Security Council Staff, if such action is indicated following National Security Council action.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

HOYT S. VANDENBERG,
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force.

Enclosure

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C O P Y

E N C L O S U R E

D R A F T

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SENIOR STAFF

Subject: United States Objectives and Courses of Action
with Respect to Communist Aggression in Southeast
Asia.

1. The following specific comments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on NSC 124 are submitted in order that these may be reflected as appropriate in the revision of that document.

2. Change subparagraph 2 c to read (changes indicated in the usual manner):

"Communist control of all of Southeast Asia would ~~render the U.S. position in the Pacific offshore island chain precarious~~ would seriously jeopardize fundamental U.S. security interests in the Far East."

REASON: In the interests of conciseness and accuracy. In the light of the discussion in the analysis, the original wording overstates the immediate military threat to the U.S. position in the Pacific offshore island chain in the event of the fall of Southeast Asia.

3. Revise the present last sentence of subparagraph 5 d in such a manner as to refer to every paragraph in the paper (in addition to subparagraphs 6 d, 7 f, and 8 c) which involves military measures against Communist China.

4. Add the following sentence at the end of subparagraph 5 d:

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"In this connection, it should be made clear to the other nations that United States ground forces will not be committed to the defense of French Indochina, Thailand, or Burma."

REASON: For consistency and accuracy and in order to preclude misunderstanding.

5. Change subparagraph 5 h to read as follows (changes indicated in the usual manner):

"Take ~~whatever~~ such measures other than military as may be practicable to promote the coordinated defense of the area, and encourage and support the spirit of resistance among the peoples of Southeast Asia to Chinese Communist aggression and to the encroachments of local communists."

REASON: For preciseness and to preclude any implication that the United States will join in a combined military command for the defense of the area.

6. Change subparagraph 6 c (3) to read as follows (changes indicated in the usual manner):

"In view of the immediate urgency of the situation, involving possible large-scale Chinese Communist intervention, and in order that the United States may be prepared to take whatever action may be appropriate in such circumstances, ~~make-the-plans~~ determine now the measures necessary to carry out the courses of action indicated in subparagraph d below."

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REASON: This subparagraph as presently written directs the Department of Defense and other agencies to engage in certain formal planning which, in the case of the Department of Defense, would involve the formulation of specific war plans. In addition, formal military planning would have to be initiated with the French, with the British, with the Chinese Nationalist Government, with the Government of Burma, and possibly with other friendly governments, including States Members of the United Nations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff question the feasibility and desirability of such action and, in any event, from the military point of view, they would find it impracticable to formulate war plans for all of the contingencies suggested in the basic paper beyond United States military courses of action and force bases therefor. On the other hand, the Joint Chiefs of Staff support the desirability of undertaking unilaterally appropriate studies of the problem involved.

7. Change subparagraph 6 c (4) to read as follows (changes indicated in the usual manner):

~~"In the event that information and circumstances point to the conclusion that France is no longer prepared to carry the burden in Indochina, or if France presses for a sharing of the responsibility for Indochina, whether in the UN or directly with the U.S. Government, Oppose a French withdrawal and consult with the French and British concerning further measures to be taken to safeguard the area from communist domination. from Indochina."~~

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REASON: The United States should not at this time contemplate relieving the French of their responsibility in Indochina if present United States global strategy, including France's role therein, is to be continued. There would, however, be no objection to a discussion of this contingency appearing in the Analysis to the basic paper.

8. Change subparagraph 6 d (3) to read as follows (changes indicated in the usual manner):

"Consistent with world-wide U.S. commitments take appropriate military action against the forces and territory of Communist China as part of a UN collective action or in conjunction with French and the United Kingdom and any other friendly governments."

REASON: To emphasize that any military action against Communist China must be without geographic limitations.

9. Insert the following new subparagraph immediately following subparagraphs 6 d, 7 f, and 8 e and any others referring to possible military measures against Communist China, renumbering subsequent paragraphs accordingly:

"In the event that the United States, in the face of Chinese Communist aggression into Southeast Asia, overt or volunteer, deems it advisable to take military action against Communist China itself, and if the United Kingdom and/or France refuse to support such action, the United States will consider in the light of

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the world situation at the time, and in the light of the possible consequences upon the role of the United Kingdom and France in United States world strategy, whether United States security interests require taking such military action unilaterally."

REASON: In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff this reservation is vital to the security of the United States.

10. Change the first sentence of subparagraph 7 b to read as follows (changes indicated in the usual manner):

"Arrange to conduct a full and frank exchange of views with the British Government with the object of re-examining policy toward Burma and seeking any joint or coordinated action other than military which might contribute toward an improvement in the situation in Burma."

REASON: For preciseness and to preclude any implication that the United States will join in a combined military command for the defense of the area.

11. Change the first sentence of subparagraph 7 d to read as follows (changes indicated in the usual manner):

"Encourage the British to develop united action and cooperation among indigenous, anticommunist groups in Burma to resist communist encroachments."

REASON: Burma is an area of British responsibility.

12. Change subparagraph 7 f (2) to read as follows (changes indicated in the usual manner):

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"Consistent with world-wide U.S. commitments take appropriate military action against the forces and territory of Communist China as part of a UN collective action or in conjunction with France and the United Kingdom and any other friendly governments."

REASON: To emphasize any military action against Communist China must be without geographic limitations.

13. Change subparagraph 8 b (2) as follows (changes indicated in the usual manner):

"Immediately put into effect whatever measures other than military may be determined as feasible to forestall an invasion of Thailand or a seizure of power by local Thai communists."

REASON: Military operations by the United States in Thailand would, in all probability, be infeasible in the premises.

14. Change subparagraph 8 c (2) to read as follows (changes indicated in the usual manner):

"Consistent with world-wide U.S. commitments take appropriate military action against the forces and territory of Communist China as part of a UN collective action or in conjunction with France and the United Kingdom and any other friendly governments."

REASON: To emphasize that any military action against Communist China must be without geographic limitations.

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15. Change subparagraph 9 b as follows:

a. Revise the second clause of subparagraph 9 b to clarify the statement "in addition to the appropriate military action contemplated above against Communist China."

b. Change the third and fourth clauses of subparagraph 9 b to read as follows (changes indicated in the usual manner):

"the United States should, assist in the light of the world situation generally, and the situation in the Far East specifically, consider the military measures it might take for the defense of Malaya as-appropriate, as part of a UN collective action or in conjunction with the United Kingdom and any other friendly governments."

REASON: Although the world situation generally and the situation in the Far East specifically will be controlling, it may be possible for the United States to provide those reinforcements which are essential for a successful defense of Malaya at the Isthmus of Kra, thus insuring the retention by the British of Singapore while concurrently decreasing the danger of a successful communist invasion of Indonesia.

16. Clarify subparagraph 10 b to indicate action the United States would take in the event of attempted seizure of power by internal communist action in Indonesia.

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17. Delete subparagraph 10 c and substitute the following therefor:

"In the event of the imminent or actual fall of Malaya to communism, consider in the light of circumstances existing at the time, what if any measures, including military, the United States in its own self-interest should undertake to prevent the fall in Indonesia to communism."

REASON: It would be neither sound nor realistic for the National Security Council to attempt to determine now the course of action which would be undertaken in Indonesia and in the Southwest Pacific if Malaya should fall to the enemy; rather, the course of events globally and in Southeast Asia must be re-examined at that time in order to arrive at any valid decision.

18. Revise the paper where applicable to reflect the latest intelligence estimates.

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NSC 113th Meeting
5 March 1952

ITEM 3 (FOR CONSIDERATION)

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION WITH
RESPECT TO COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (NSC 124)

SUMMARY

A summary of our present policy and of the proposed policy contained in NSC 124 is annexed, (Tab A).

COMMENTS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have submitted eight pages of comments, including an Annex, which have been circulated to the Council. The primary points made by the JCS are:

1. NSC 124 involves the making of a single, basic decision, which is political in its nature, i.e., whether or not the United States would be willing to take military action which would in effect constitute war against Communist-China to prevent Southeast Asia from passing into the Communist orbit. They propose in effect that the NSC affirm this willingness in order to provide the basis for determining the cost of the courses of action in terms of men, money, material, impact on the U.S. economy and upon U.S. military assistance programs.

2. The JCS report that their preliminary discussions with the Chiefs of Staff of the UK and France indicate that both are opposed to the concept of action against Communist-China other than that limited to the area of or approaches to the land battle in opposition to the aggressor forces.

3. The JCS believe that such limitations of the military action would result in the action being defensive in character and at best indecisive and indefinite in duration. They recommend solely from the point of view of military operations that in order to offer a chance of success military operations in defense against Chinese-Communist invasion of French Indochina, Thailand, and/or Burma must be accompanied by military action against the sources of that aggression, namely, Communist-China itself. The JCS concede that this course of action might result in a long war and an expensive one, at least materiel-wise.

4. The JCS therefore insist that the U.S. must be accorded freedom of action and if possible support in the undertaking of appropriate military action to include action against Communist-China itself. Failing such freedom of action, the U.S. should accept the possibility of the loss of mainland Southeast Asia. The JCS oppose the use of U.S. ground forces in SEA and oppose joining a combined military command of the defense of those countries, *at this time & in present circumstances.*

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5. The JCS strongly recommend the addition of a stipulation that the U.S. will consider taking military action unilaterally if necessary against Communist-China.

6. Approval of the policies would require a substantial upward revision of our economic and military assistance programs for SEA and Formosa, some (possibly substantial) increase in our forces in being -- primarily, Naval and Air force units --, and a substantial and immediate increase in the scale of U.S. production.

7. Further military studies relating to the magnitude of military requirements to carry out these courses of action and the manner in which they could best be met will be furnished in due course to the NSC.

COMMENTS OF THE JOINT SECRETARIES

The Joint Secretaries have not yet submitted any written comments.

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

A CIA Special Estimate (SE22) (Tab B), and NIE 35/1, "Probable Developments in Indochina in 1952", (Tab C), relate to NSC 124.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you discourage the making of any policy decisions by the NSC at this meeting.

This matter was put on the agenda of this meeting so that the President could discuss it with the Council before leaving on his vacation. He understands that the matter has not progressed far enough for final decision. There has not been sufficient time for anyone fully to consider the comments of the JCS. The JCS themselves need further time to complete their studies of the military requirements involved and the impact of fulfilling these requirements on other programs and on our global strategy.

2. That the paper be referred back to the Senior Staff for revision in the light of the Council's discussion and the additional information which will be brought to bear on the problem.

The Senior Staff would, of course, take into account the general and specific comments of the JCS together with the further military studies which the JCS will submit to them.

3. That you advise the Council that in your opinion the basic decision involved in this paper should not be taken until the military implications have been fully explored; that you are requesting the JCS to proceed immediately with studies of the nature referred to in their memorandum, with a view to providing the fullest possible information to the NSC -- this on the planning assumption that the decision will be

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taken and that the British and French will support the action.

It would seem inappropriate to make a decision as to our willingness to go to war without having fully explored the military implications. It would appear desirable for you to take the position that the Defense Department is not prepared to make such a recommendation to the President until it is satisfied that the military implications are acceptable and it had full opportunity to explain its findings and conclusions to the Council and the President.

4. That you raise the question whether, in view of the crucial importance of reaching agreement with the French and British, the Council should contemplate reaching a firm national policy decision before such negotiations are undertaken.

In view of the great complexities of the problem involved and the heavy reliance we necessarily must place on our allies in regard to SEA, it would be perhaps more sensible to postpone a final Government decision on SEA policy until after further exploratory talks with the British and French -- either on the Governmental or the political-military level.

5. That you indicate that in your view it is unnecessary and unwise for us to contemplate unilateral action against Communist-China under present circumstances; and in view of the possibility of leaks, etc., you would prefer that no reference be made to this possibility in the present NSC policy paper. You might point out that as far as overt aggression is concerned, our main objective is to deter it by a joint warning. We should not engage in a bluff. The primary need is, therefore, to reach sufficient agreement with the U.K. and France as to courses of action to permit the issuance of such a warning.

6. That you express the view that the present paper concentrates far too heavily on action to be taken against aggression; that by far the greater danger is that Southeast Asia will fall to subversive tactics; that in the absence of overt aggression it is probable that before long France will be unable or unwilling to continue to carry the burdens of the civil war; that the paper proposes no courses of action to meet these contingencies which are commensurate with the burdens and risks which it proposes we assume to deal with the lesser risk of aggression; and that you propose that this deficiency in the paper be remedied by the Senior Staff in their next draft.

This is a major deficiency in the proposed policy. If nothing is to be done beyond what is now being done to prevent Communist subversion in this area, there is grave doubt as to the wisdom of assuming

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very grave risks of general war in an attempt to save the area from further overt aggression.

Most of the actions available to deal with the danger of subversion lie in the political and economic fields. One means of reducing this danger and of improving the situation would involve a greater degree of U.S. supervision over the use of U.S. military assistance in Indochina, particularly with respect to the development of the native army.

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SUMMARY OF PRESENT POLICY AND
PROPOSED POLICY CONTAINED IN
NSC 124

Present Policy

Our present policy in the Far East, as set forth in NSC 48/5, draws the line which the United States will go to war to defend along the offshore island chain, namely, Japan, the Ryukus, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, with special treatment of Formosa. With respect to Southeast Asia, the substance of our policy is to continue our present support programs to strengthen the will and ability to resist Communist encroachment and render Communist military operations as costly as possible, and thus to gain time for the United States and its allies to build up the defense of the offshore island chain. With respect to the fighting already going on in Indochina, the policy is to give military supplies to the French Union forces on a high priority basis but to avoid relieving the French authorities of their basic military responsibilities, and to avoid committing United States armed forces under any circumstances.

The present policy does not appear to result from a lack of awareness of the great importance of the Southeast Asian nations, both strategically and in terms of their raw material resources, but on a recognition of the difficulties involved in holding the area. The States of those areas are inherently weak and there are formidable difficulties involved in building up the will of the peoples in the area to resist Communist encroachment. One of the greatest of these difficulties is the inability of the French to enlist the support of the Indochinese or of neighboring States in support of their fight against Communism due to the feeling against French colonial rule. In the face of these difficulties, the world-wide commitments of the United States and the obvious military difficulties of utilizing United States forces in an effective defense of Burma, Thailand and Indochina, it has been the Government's position that it could not undertake to commit United States forces to defend the area against aggression even though it is of great importance.

Proposed Policy

The policy paper under consideration proposes several major changes. It proposes:

A. That in case of overt aggression of Communist-China against Burma, Thailand or Indochina, the United States take appropriate military action against Communist-China consistent with our world-wide commitments provided the United Nations will act or the British and French will join.

B. That in an attempt to deter China from such overt action, we issue a joint warning with a number of other States that we shall take military action in such an event, provided that at least the British and French will agree to such a joint warning and to the general plan of action in case the warning is ignored.

C. That in case of overt aggression, Chinese Nationalist forces would be employed as desirable and feasible in military operations in Southeast Asia, Korea, or China proper.

D. The proposed policy with reference to the Malay States and Indonesia is that appropriate military action should be taken to defend them, thereby in effect placing them within the offshore island defense chain. It is contemplated that in case the three mainland States fall, the British ground forces in Malaya, combined with British and United States naval and air power, could defend these areas.

E. With respect to the threat of Communist subversion of the Southeast Asian States, the paper contemplates minor changes, such as

- a. Strengthen psychological activities
- b. Encourage trade and cooperation with Western countries
- c. Strengthen covert operations
- d. Promote the co-ordinated defense of the area.

No increase is contemplated in our economic and technical assistance programs, or military aid programs. Minor recognition is given to the danger that France may not be willing much longer to carry the burden in Indochina, but the paper provides only for consultation with the French and British and opposition to French withdrawal in this event. A major strengthening of our policy in Indonesia is contemplated by a provision that in case of seizure or attempted seizure of power by internal Communist action, we would take appropriate military action consistent with our world-wide commitments to prevent Communist control of the area.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Copy 3 of 10 copies.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

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DATE: March 28, 1952

SUBJECT: Interview with British Ambassador; Secretary's Presentation of Preliminary Views Concerning British Memorandum of March 15th Regarding Indochina

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador
Mr. Gibson, PSA

COPIES TO: The Secretary
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After the customary amenities, the Secretary proceeded to give response to the British memorandum of March 15th, point by point, as outlined in Mr. Allison's guidance memorandum of March 25th. After he had finished the Ambassador expressed his thanks and asked if he might summarize the Secretary's presentation in order to check. He did so as follows:

"We do not believe that the British concern regarding French intentions in Indochina is justified and cite Mr. Letourneau's comments made at his press conference March 12th to substantiate our point of view. We have no evidence that any of the rumors cited in the British memorandum as indications of French intention to negotiate with Ho Chi Minh or withdraw from Indochina are true. We would be gratified to have proof of any or of all of them. If it were obtained we would consider it necessary to reconsider our policy concerning the French and Indochina generally. We believe that the French will stay in Indochina providing they have: (a) assurances of continued US military aid, (b) sufficient financial aid to assist them with that portion of their budgetary deficit attributable to the Indochina operation and, (c) reason to expect that a solution can be found to their manpower problem. It is suggested that this solution lies in the formation of national armies. We do not believe that the French are negotiating with Ho Chi Minh if only for the reason that Ho does not choose to negotiate and could not even if he wished to do so. We do not believe that the French are planning a withdrawal if only for the reason that such an operation could not be accomplished successfully without the assistance of the British and ourselves. We

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may therefore expect prior notice. We had hoped to be prepared to present more specific US views on the nature and extent of retaliatory action against Communist China following an identifiable aggression in Southeast Asia and other related subjects to the British by this time but have not yet been able to do so. We are finding it difficult to reconcile the proposed diplomatic and military courses of action. Progress is being made and it is hoped that something will be ready in the near future." (Note: Here the Secretary apparently had NSC 124 in mind although he made no direct reference to it.)

The Secretary confirmed to the Ambassador that these were our main points.

The Ambassador referred to the increasing concern in London with Southeast Asia. H.M.G. is concerned not only with the present precarious situation in the area, a concern which has been greatly accentuated in recent weeks by their suspicions of French intentions in Indochina, but also with the snowballing effects of any action which might follow a further Chinese aggression. The question of Korea is of course related to their concern.

The Ambassador then noted that the last Ad Hoc Military Committee's findings were a failure in that they resulted only in the presentation of three parallel sets of views which never met. The time is now fitting, in the opinion of H.M.G., to make a serious effort to reconcile US and UK views. It is therefore requested that we give urgent thought to the following proposal. A politico-military conference be held as soon as possible in which a limited number of British and American military and Foreign Office officials should take part. He spoke of himself, Mr. Matthews, General Bradley and Marshal Elliot. In answer to the Secretary's question he replied that he did not propose that the Joint Chiefs or any other group be brought from London in order to participate. He believes that the conversations should be concerned with the hypothesis that the Chinese Communists would commit an overt aggression in Indochina, that we were resolved to oppose that aggression and that our objective was to combat the aggression itself and not necessarily to overthrow the Chinese Peoples Republic. On that basis we would concern ourselves with the following two considerations: (a) the kind of retaliatory action which we are able to take and its expected effectiveness, and (b) an assessment of what would be the results of the retaliatory action in bringing the Sino-Soviet pact into operation.

The Ambassador stated that H.M.G. believes that any Chinese aggression could be countered not only where it takes place but also, to a limited degree, at the base of the enemy's operations in China without bringing the Sino-Soviet pact into operation. The question to be determined, however, arises out of the difference of opinion between the UK and the US as to where that limit is to be found.

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The Ambassador emphasized that it is suggested these discussions were to be carried on without any commitment of any kind by either government.

In commenting on the Ambassador's suggestion the Secretary noted that the studies of the last Ad Hoc Committee appointed by the Tripartite Military Conference had not achieved their purpose because the British participants were hampered by the fact that they gave first consideration to the policy questions behind any proposed military action while the American representatives thought only of the effectiveness of the action without considering policy at all. He said that there had not been enough advance thought concerning the subject on either side.

The Secretary stated in closing that he would make the British proposal known to the appropriate American officials on Monday, March 31st, and hoped to be able to give the Ambassador a prompt reply.

FE:PSA:WMGibson

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751G.00/5-2852:Top Secret File

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Rec'd May 28, 1952
Midnight

From: Paris
To: Secretary of State
No: 7415, May 28 8.p.m.

1. Tripartite meeting held this morning on Indochina - with Prime Minister Pinsky presiding and Schuman, Plevin, Guaville and Letourneau present.
2. French stressed obstacles to rapid increase French military strength under EDC commitments as (1) French effort Indochina (2) financial difficulties and again raised questions whether French effort Indochina regarded as in purely French interest or in general Allied interest and whether SEA considered of sufficient strategic importance justify continued French effort. French also emphasized Indochina part of European defense problem. They explained effort build up Associated States national armies to total approx 200,000 men and described limits on French action as (1) financial (2) cadres and (3) material. While expressing appreciation US aid, Pinay, Plevin and Schuman made clear France could not (rpt not) continue bear alone such great share Indo-chinese burden. They pointed out serious difficulties French Govt would face in National Assembly in connection ratification EDC treaty, approval military budget and continuation Indochinese effort and Plevin earnestly asked that reply to French request for increased aid for national armies be given as quickly and as generously as possible.

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as possible. Pinay concluded meeting with request we take into account political difficulties Pleven and Schuman faced in National Assembly.

3. The Secretary addressing himself to Pleven's two queries made clear US considered French effort Indochina in general international interest and as of great strategic importance, failure in which would have important repercussions in Asia, Middle East and Europe. He pointed out US in Korea, UK in Malaya and Suez making similar effort in common interest and each of three powers had initial responsibility in its respective area and Allies had function aiding and supporting in every way possible. Eden agreed. Referring to French policy build up national armies and our previous vigorous support, he said US would be willing to go into question increased aid for national armies with Letourneau in Washington. He explained bill now before Congress and no (rpt no) figures could be given but believed finally approved bill will permit increased aid for this purpose and said we would be in better position talk in mid June. Pleven raised question possibility legis and the Secretary expressed belief bill sufficiently flexible but promised, in reply Letourneau request, inform Letourneau through Embassy Paris re degree flexibility and items possible and asked Letourneau give us list items French have in mind.

4. The Secretary raised question position US-UK-Fr in event Chinese Commies took more active part in Indochina and said US now prepared discuss question joint position with UK and France, at political and military levels. He stressed importance preventing action rather than acting after event, raised question joint warning to Chinese Commies, and stressed importance discussing possible action if warning disregarded. He stated as preliminary view actions should be taken against Chinese attack in Indochina. He said questions should be discussed first in political talks and then military, perhaps at Paris. He added while not (rpt not) wishing anticipate military talks, US would not (rpt not) be able furnish ground forces SEA but would expect bear considerable share air and naval effort. He emphasized essential no (rpt no) leaks re consideration warning to Chinese Commies.

5. French

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5. French immed brought up ad hoc comite conclusions, said French Govt had approved them one month ago and wished have US-UK views. Eden said he could make no (rpt no) commitment but he evisaged, as he had stated at Columbia University, UN action on basis similarity to aggression in Korea. He reserved position and said would not discuss with colleagues. He comite conclusions he could not (rpt not) comment except to say they had been examined. French said attention should be given both on timing and form of warning as wrong timing might provoke Chinese Commies and be used as pretext extending conflict. It was agreed this subject would discussed in future political-military talks. Letourneau asked that some parts ad hoc comite conclusions, on which there had been no (rpt no) difference of opinion, be lifted out for approval by three govts, stressing ever present danger (although he did not (rpt not) consider it immed probable) of Chinese Commie massive attack endangering French Expeditionary Corps and civilians in Indochina and need, therefore, for advance planning on evacuation and transport. The Secretary while noting lack of agreement in ad hoc comite conclusions, agreed re-examine it and noted desirability picking out certain points upon which action could be taken now. There was general agreement with desirability drawing up general political principles as guide to military talks and the Secretary said Department would prepare draft for forwarding to London and Paris Embassies guide for military talks after which Mins could later examine overall subject.

6. Importance French attach to question increased aid for Indochinese effort and concern French Govt feels over this question in face of National Assembly and general public attitudes are evidenced both by presence of Pinay at this conference and tone and content of remarks of French representatives. Pinay, Pleven and Schuman each brought out that France could not (rpt not) increase its present effort in Indochina and that there was serious concern over difficulties which govt expected to face in National Assembly. Pinay, for example, while expressing agreement with principle that each of three nations had its individual problems and responsibilities,

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said that each was part of overall picture and account must be taken of disparity of means, which, in view of long French burden in Indochina, justified French requests for increased assistance.

7. As question UN action in event Chinese aggression in Indochina adequately brought out by Lden and French, the Secretary did not (rpt not) consider it necessary to comment further on point on which there was general agreement.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

June 17, 1952

Following his telephone conversation with Sir Oliver Franks today, which is reported separately, the Secretary saw General Bradley and Mr. Perkins. Later Sir Oliver dropped in at the office following a meeting in Mr. Jessup's office. He asked if he could see the Secretary for a few minutes to get the further report on the matter of talks on Southeast Asia. He repeated what he told us earlier that he had had a second message from London following the report which the Embassy had sent of Mr. Perkins' conversation with Mr. Steele.

The Secretary said that he had talked about this matter with General Bradley this afternoon and that Friday was the only day which General Bradley could possibly meet and that was very inconvenient for Mr. Acheson. He said, therefore, he thought that any talks were impossible to arrange. He then said that he would be glad to talk to Sir Oliver right at that moment and see where we stood.

The Secretary reviewed the situation and the talks which took place in Paris. He said that in the earlier meetings which had taken place on Southeast Asia, everyone had started from a different point and there had been little in the way of conclusion reached. He said that he felt what was needed now was political decisions.

The Secretary then analyzed the situation as we saw it. He said that if the Chinese came into Indochina in force, we would have to do something. We could not remain passive. He said that none of the things we could do were very pleasant ones and we felt that a warning was highly desirable. He said that we felt we should not give a warning, however, if there had been no agreement on what we did in the event the Communists moved in anyway. He said this would make us look very silly and would weaken the effect of any other warnings.

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He said it was clear that it was futile and a mistake to defend Indochina in Indochina. He said we could not have another Korea. He said it was also true we could not put ground forces in Indochina. We do not have them and we could not afford to immobilize such forces as we had. He said we could take air and naval action, however, and had discussed whether this should be confined to approaches.

He concluded that our only hope was of changing the Chinese mind. He said that we could strike where it hurts China or we could set up a blockade against trade. He said we had concluded that our mission would not be to destroy the Communist regime. He also said that we fully realized the danger of bringing the USSR into the show.

The Secretary concluded that there was no point in getting our military people into any talks. He said we must get political decisions first. He said that if firm decisions could not be reached that we perhaps could reach tentative decisions. He said that it had been clear at Paris that he was somewhat "ahead of the play" while the French and the British had urged us to discuss these matters and had wanted discussions before decisions were made. When the question actually came up, they were not ready to talk.

The Secretary remarked that Mr. Letourneau had said in Paris that the military talks had reached some decision as to how to evacuate the wounded, etc., in the event of difficulties. He said that our Navy had talked to Mr. Letourneau regarding port sizes, capacity of ships, etc., with regard to evacuation.

Sir Oliver said he thought he understood the point, would report back to London and would let us know if there were anything further on it.

Mr. Acheson said that if his analysis were wrong and the British Chiefs of Staff had any different one, he would be glad to hear of it.

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751.5-MSP/6-1752: Secret File

Outgoing Telegram

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

TO: Amembassy PARIS 7404

June 17, 1952
6 45 p.m.

In course Letourneau talks today, US side informed FR that subject appropriations US WLD be prepared provide up to 150 MIL DOLS ADDL FY 1953 aid in support overall FR effort in IC, which probably will remain, as stated in Letourneau memo (EMBTTEL 7682 June 9), substantially same next year. It might be considered this ADDL aid WLD in effect add to FR resources to meet increased overall FR requirements in EUR in 1953. Relation this ADDL aid to overall US aid to FR in FY 1953 and total FR defense effort in calendar 1953 will be determined in course NATO annual review.

FR informed that in view Lisbon understanding, no ADDL aid available for FR calendar 1953 budget for IC, but that we are considering Pleven request for ADDL OSP in 1952.

Copies US position paper and minutes being pouched marked Sprouse. Texts communique FOLS in separate TEL.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

JUNE 18, 1952

NO. 473

Secretary Acheson made the following statement at his news conference today:

VISIT OF M. JEAN LETOURNEAU

As you are aware, M. Jean Letourneau, Minister of the Associated States for the French Government, has been spending the last few days in Washington exchanging views with representatives of various agencies of this Government. The Ambassadors of Cambodia and Vietnam have also participated in conversations with M. Letourneau and with our own representatives.

A communique covering the substance of the talks will be issued later today and I will therefore not go into details now. Yet I would like to share with you the feeling of encouragement and confidence which M. Letourneau inspires. His thorough grasp of the situation and his constructive approach to the problems involved - military, political and economic - have impressed us all.

As you know, the Communist aggression in Indochina has been going on for six years. It has been greatly stepped up because of assistance received from Communist China during the past two years. Yet, under French leadership, the threat to this part of the free world has been met with great courage and admirable resourcefulness. The military situation appears to be developing favorably. It has been good to hear from M. Letourneau of the part played in achieving this result by the considerable quantities of American arms and material which the magnificent fighting qualities of the French Union forces, including those of the Associated States, have justified us in devoting to this area of the struggle against Communist aggression. The effort to make of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia secure and prosperous members of the free world community has made great progress.

I have been particularly impressed by what M. Letourneau has told me of what is being done to enable the people of the three Associated States to play the constantly greater role in their own defense to which they rightly aspire. Much has been accomplished toward the creation, training and equipping of the national armies. Units of these armies have distinguished themselves

in battle and are performing vital security functions in many parts of the country. They look forward with confidence and determination to assuming an increasing share of the burden of carrying on the struggle. Their effectiveness full justifies the program of expansion to which the governments concerned are committed and underlines, I believe, the soundness of our own decision, subject of course to the availability of Congressional appropriations, to render increasing assistance in building these armies. M. Letourneau described these programs in the course of his address before the Overseas Writers yesterday.

Favorable developments have not been confined to the fighting fronts and to the national armies. There are increasing evidences of the growing vitality of the Associated States in handling their political, financial and economic affairs. M. Letourneau's account of the manner in which these new member States of the French Union are envisaging and meeting their responsibilities was heartening. I do not think it is generally realized to what extent these new states in fact control their own affairs. Only a limited number of services related to the necessities of the war remain temporarily in French hands.

We in the United States are aware of the vital importance of the struggle in Indochina to the cause of the free world. We have earmarked for Indochina economic and materiel aid to a considerable amount during the past two years. We are doing our best to activate deliveries: as you are aware the 150th ship bearing American arms and munitions to Indochina arrived in Saigon within the last few weeks. We are now bearing a considerable portion of the total burden of the war in Indochina expressed in financial terms, although of course the entire combat burden is being carried by the French Union and the Associated States with the latter assuming a constantly increasing share.

The Communists have made a most determined effort in Indochina. Their aggression has been checked and recent indications warrant the view that the tide is now moving in our favor. Once again the policy of meeting aggression with force is paying off and we can I believe be confident that as we carry out the plans upon which we have agreed we can anticipate continued favorable developments in the maintenance and consolidation of the free world bulwark in Indochina.

NSC 124/2

June 25, 1952

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NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

to the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND COURSES
OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

- References:
- A. NSC 124/1
 - B. NSC 124 and Annex to NSC 124
 - C. NSC Action Nos. 597, 614 and 655
 - D. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 24 and June 25, 1952
 - E. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia," dated March 4, April 15, April 30 and May 21, 1952
 - F. NSC 48/5
 - G. NSC 64
 - H. SE-22 and SE-27

At the 120th Council meeting with the President presiding, the National Security Council and the Acting Secretary of the Treasury adopted NSC 124/1, subject to changes in paragraphs 2-a, 3, 5, 10-c-(2), 10-c-(3), 11-(1), 11-(3), and 12 thereof, as incorporated in the enclosure (NSC Action No. 655).

In adopting NSC 124/1, as amended, the Council and the Acting Secretary of the Treasury noted the following statement by the Acting Secretary of Defense with respect to the views of the Joint Secretaries regarding NSC 124/1:

"In our opinion, if this policy is to be truly effective, it must be clearly recognized that the U. S. policy 'to make it possible for the French to reduce the degree of their participation in the military, economic and political affairs of the Associated States' (par. 8-d) must be emphasized and reemphasized to the French at each and every political, economic or military negotiation which the U. S. Government enters into with the Government of France, especially those

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negotiations which deal with the providing of U. S. economic or military aid to France or to Indochina."

The report, as amended and adopted, was subsequently submitted to the President for consideration. The President has this date approved NSC 124/1, as amended and enclosed herewith, and directs its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government under the coordination of the Secretaries of State and Defense.

Accordingly, NSC 64 and paragraph 14 of NSC 48/5 are superseded by the enclosed report. The enclosure does not supersede, but supplements the statement of the current objective with respect to Southeast Asia contained in paragraph 6-g of NSC 48/5.

It is requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling of the enclosure, and that access to it be restricted on a need-to-know basis.

JAMES S. LAY, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Acting Director of Defense Mobilization

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STATEMENT OF POLICY
by the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT
TO SOUTHEAST ASIA*

OBJECTIVE

1. To prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into the communist orbit, and to assist them to develop the will and ability to resist communism from within and without and to contribute to the strengthening of the free world.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

2. Communist domination, by whatever means, of all Southeast Asia would seriously endanger in the short term, and critically endanger in the longer term, United States security interests.

a. The loss of any of the countries of Southeast Asia to communist control as a consequence of overt or covert Chinese Communist aggression would have critical psychological, political and economic consequences. In the absence of effective and timely counteraction, the loss of any single country would probably lead to relatively swift submission to or an alignment with communism by the remaining countries of this group. Furthermore, an alignment with communism of the rest of

*Southeast Asia is used herein to mean the area embracing Burma, Thailand, Indochina, Malaya and Indonesia.

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Southeast Asia and India, and in the longer term, of the Middle East (with the probable exceptions of at least Pakistan and Turkey) would in all probability progressively follow. Such widespread alignment would endanger the stability and security of Europe.

b. Communist control of all of Southeast Asia would render the U. S. position in the Pacific offshore island chain precarious and would seriously jeopardize fundamental U. S. security interests in the Far East.

c. Southeast Asia, especially Malaya and Indonesia, is the principal world source of natural rubber and tin, and a producer of petroleum and other strategically important commodities. The rice exports of Burma and Thailand are critically important to Malaya, Ceylon and Hong Kong and are of considerable significance to Japan and India, all important areas of free Asia.

d. The loss of Southeast Asia, especially of Malaya and Indonesia, could result in such economic and political pressures in Japan as to make it extremely difficult to prevent Japan's eventual accommodation to communism.

3. It is therefore imperative that an overt attack on Southeast Asia by the Chinese Communists be vigorously opposed. In order to pursue the military courses of action envisaged in this paper to a favorable conclusion within a reasonable period, it will be necessary to divert military strength from

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other areas thus reducing our military capability in those areas, with the recognized increased risks involved therein, or to increase our military forces in being, or both.

4. The danger of an overt military attack against Southeast Asia is inherent in the existence of a hostile and aggressive Communist China, but such an attack is less probable than continued communist efforts to achieve domination through subversion. The primary threat to Southeast Asia accordingly arises from the possibility that the situation in Indochina may deteriorate as a result of the weakening of the resolve of, or as a result of the inability of the governments of France and of the Associated States to continue to oppose the Viet Minh rebellion, the military strength of which is being steadily increased by virtue of aid furnished by the Chinese Communist regime and its allies.

5. The successful defense of Tonkin is critical to the retention in non-Communist hands of mainland Southeast Asia. However, should Burma come under communist domination, a communist military advance through Thailand might make Indochina, including Tonkin, militarily indefensible. The execution of the following U. S. courses of action with respect to individual countries of the area may vary depending upon the route of communist advance into Southeast Asia.

6. Actions designed to achieve our objectives in Southeast Asia require sensitive selection and application, on the

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one hand to assure the optimum efficiency through coordination of measures for the general area, and on the other, to accommodate to the greatest practicable extent to the individual sensibilities of the several governments, social classes and minorities of the area.

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COURSES OF ACTION

Southeast Asia

7. With respect to Southeast Asia, the United States should:

a. Strengthen propaganda and cultural activities, as appropriate, in relation to the area to foster increased alignment of the people with the free world.

b. Continue, as appropriate, programs of economic and technical assistance designed to strengthen the indigenous non-communist governments of the area.

c. Encourage the countries of Southeast Asia to restore and expand their commerce with each other and with the rest of the free world, and stimulate the flow of the raw material resources of the area to the free world.

d. Seek agreement with other nations, including at least France, the UK, Australia and New Zealand, for a joint warning to Communist China regarding the grave consequences of Chinese aggression against Southeast Asia, the issuance of such a warning to be contingent upon the prior agreement of France and the UK to participate in the courses of action set forth in paragraphs 10 c, 12, 14 f (1) and (2), and 15 e (1) and (2), and such others as are determined as a result of prior trilateral consultation, in the event such a warning is ignored.

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e. Seek UK and French agreement in principle that a naval blockade of Communist China should be included in the minimum courses of action set forth in paragraph 10c below.

f. Continue to encourage and support closer cooperation among the countries of Southeast Asia, and between those countries and the United States, Great Britain, France, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, South Asia and Japan.

g. Strengthen, as appropriate, covert operations designed to assist in the achievement of U. S. objectives in Southeast Asia.

h. Continue activities and operations designed to encourage the overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia to organize and activate anti-communist groups and activities within their own communities, to resist the effects of parallel pro-communist groups and activities and, generally, to increase their orientation toward the free world.

i. Take measures to promote the coordinated defense of the area, and encourage and support the spirit of resistance among the peoples of Southeast Asia to Chinese Communist aggression and to the encroachments of local communists.

j. Make clear to the American people the importance of Southeast Asia to the security of the United States so that they may be prepared for any of the courses of action proposed herein.

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Indochina

8. With respect to Indochina the United States should:

a. Continue to promote international support for the three Associated States.

b. Continue to assure the French that the U.S. regards the French effort in Indochina as one of great strategic importance in the general international interest rather than in the purely French interest, and as essential to the security of the free world, not only in the Far East but in the Middle East and Europe as well.

c. Continue to assure the French that we are cognizant of the sacrifices entailed for France in carrying out her effort in Indochina and that, without overlooking the principle that France has the primary responsibility in Indochina, we will recommend to the Congress appropriate military, economic and financial aid to France and the Associated States.

d. Continue to cultivate friendly and increasingly cooperative relations with the Governments of France and the Associated States at all levels with a view to maintaining and, if possible, increasing the degree of influence the U.S. can bring to bear on the policies and actions of the French and Indochinese authorities to the end of directing the course of events toward the objectives we seek. Our influence with the French and Associated

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States should be designed to further those constructive political, economic and social measures which will tend to increase the stability of the Associated States and thus make it possible for the French to reduce the degree of their participation in the military, economic and political affairs of the Associated States.

e. Specifically we should use our influence with France and the Associated States to promote positive political, military, economic and social policies, among which the following are considered essential elements:

(1) Continued recognition and carrying out by France of its primary responsibility for the defense of Indochina.

(2) Further steps by France and the Associated States toward the evolutionary development of the Associated States.

(3) Such reorganization of French administration and representation in Indochina as will be conducive to an increased feeling of responsibility on the part of the Associated States.

(4) Intensive efforts to develop the armies of the Associated States, including independent logistical and administrative services.

(5) The development of more effective and stable Governments in the Associated States.

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(6) Land reform, agrarian and industrial credit, sound rice marketing systems, labor development, foreign trade and capital formation.

(7) An aggressive military, political, and psychological program to defeat or seriously reduce the Viet Minh forces.

(8) US-French cooperation in publicizing progressive developments in the foregoing policies in Indochina.

9. In the absence of large scale Chinese Communist intervention in Indochina, the United States should:

a. Provide increased aid on a high priority basis for the French Union forces without relieving French authorities of their basic military responsibility for the defense of the Associated States in order to:

(1) Assist in developing indigenous armed forces which will eventually be capable of maintaining internal security without assistance from French units.

(2) Assist the French Union forces to maintain progress in the restoration of internal security against the Viet Minh.

(3) Assist the forces of France and the Associated States to defend Indochina against Chinese Communist aggression.

b. In view of the immediate urgency of the situation,

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involving possible large-scale Chinese Communist intervention, and in order that the United States may be prepared to take whatever action may be appropriate in such circumstances, make the plans necessary to carry out the courses of action indicated in paragraph 10 below.

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no
c. In the event that information and circumstances point to the conclusion that France is no longer prepared to carry the burden in Indochina, or if France presses for an increased sharing of the responsibility for Indochina, whether in the UN or directly with the U. S. Government, oppose a French withdrawal and consult with the French and British concerning further measures to be taken to safeguard the area from communist domination.

to 11
10. In the event that it is determined, in consultation with France, that Chinese Communist forces (including volunteers) have overtly intervened in the conflict in Indochina, or are covertly participating to such an extent as to jeopardize retention of the Tonkin Delta area by French Union forces, the United States should take the following measures to assist these forces in preventing the loss of Indochina, to repel the aggression and to restore peace and security in Indochina:

a. Support a request by France or the Associated States for immediate action by the United Nations which would include a UN resolution declaring that Communist China has committed an aggression, recommending that

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member states take whatever action may be necessary, without geographic limitation, to assist France and the Associated States in meeting the aggression.

b. Whether or not UN action is immediately forthcoming, seek the maximum possible international support for, and participation in, the minimum courses of military action agreed upon by the parties to the joint warning. These minimum courses of action are set forth in subparagraph c immediately below.

c. Carry out the following minimum courses of military action, either under the auspices of the UN or in conjunction with France and the United Kingdom and any other friendly governments:

(1) A resolute defense of Indochina itself to which the United States would provide such air and naval assistance as might be practicable.

(2) Interdiction of Chinese Communist communication lines including those in China.

(3) The United States would expect to provide the major forces for task (2) above; but would expect the UK and France to provide at least token forces therefor and to render such other assistance as is normal between allies, and France to carry the burden of providing, in conjunction with the Associated States, the ground forces for the defense of Indochina.

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11. In addition to the courses of action set forth in paragraph 10 above, the United States should take the following military actions as appropriate to the situation:

a. If agreement is reached pursuant to paragraph 7-e, establishment in conjunction with the UK and France of a naval blockade of Communist China.

b. Intensification of covert operations to aid anti-communist guerrilla forces operating against Communist China and to interfere with and disrupt Chinese Communist lines of communication and military supply areas.

c. Utilization, as desirable and feasible, of anti-communist Chinese forces, including Chinese Nationalist forces in military operations in Southeast Asia, Korea, or China proper.

d. Assistance to the British to cover an evacuation from Hong Kong, if required.

e. Evacuation of French Union civil and military personnel from the Tonkin delta, if required.

12. If, subsequent to aggression against Indochina and execution of the minimum necessary courses of action listed in paragraph 10-c above, the United States determines jointly with the UK and France that expanded military action against Communist China is rendered necessary by the situation,

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the United States should take air and naval action in conjunction with at least France and the U.K. against all suitable military targets in China, avoiding insofar as practicable those targets in areas near the boundaries of the USSR in order not to increase the risk of direct Soviet involvement.

13. In the event the concurrence of the United Kingdom and France to expanded military action against Communist China is not obtained, the United States should consider taking unilateral action.

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MTL USUK-3

July 14, 1952

MINISTERIAL TALKS IN LONDON, JUNE 1952

Summary Minutes^{1/}

3:00 - 4:30 P.M., Thursday, June 26, 1952
British Foreign Office

EXTRACT

Mr. EDEN opened the conversation on Indo-China by stating that it might be well, during the bilateral discussions, to go over together what could be said to Mr. Schuman in the trilateral discussions. He anticipated that Mr. Schuman might take the by now familiar line that there was little prospect for victory in Indo-China and that, unless a general settlement were reached, the best we could hope for would be a stalemate. This did not accord to the understanding of the British Government, which has the impression that the situation is improving somewhat; certainly there is a better government, there is wider representation in the government, and active Vietnamese participation. Mr. EDEN said that he planned to discuss the situation with Mr. Schuman along such lines in the hope of stimulating his morale and divorcing him from his relatively defeatist attitude. THE SECRETARY replied that he had been discussing Indo-China with the French along the lines he and Mr. Eden had taken in the tripartite discussions in Paris. He expressed the opinion that the only avenue to success in Indo-China is the rapid build-up of native armed forces and the assumption by the people of Vietnam of an

increasing

^{1/} Copy held in S/S-R. The June 26 discussions are also described in tel. SECTO 19, June 27, 1952, from London.

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increasing share of the financial and military burden, THE SECRETARY announced that the French had been informed that the United States was prepared to increase its military assistance program for Indo-China by \$150 million. He added that the United States, feeling that the French military training program was badly strained, had offered to assist them in this respect, but that the French, always skittish over what they might regard as undue American interference, had not taken up this offer. Certainly it is not up to the Americans to press on the French assistance along these lines. THE SECRETARY said that it was obvious that Mr. Letourneau was much encouraged as a result of his visit to Washington. He asked Dr. Jessup to read the text of the Department's telegram 2014, June 18, to Saigon, summarizing the discussions with Mr. Letourneau.

THE SECRETARY said that he had warned the French that success in the military field in Indo-China carried with it certain dangers, including the increased possibility of a large-scale Chinese Communist military intervention. He said that this in turn points up the question, "How can we prevent this from happening?" He felt it would be desirable to issue a warning statement of some sort, whether public, private, detailed and specific, or otherwise, but it would be essential to have a general understanding as to the action which we might take if the warning were to go unheeded. To issue a warning and take no effective action would be calamitous. Perhaps the United States and the United Kingdom, preferably in conjunction with France, Australia, and New Zealand, can reach a tentative agreement on political policy in this regard which would form a framework for joint military planning. This, in turn, leads to the major question: "What form could retaliation against aggression take?" The American military authorities are of the strong opinion that action only against the approaches to Indo-China would be ineffective. In fact, the first problem which we would likely have to face would be the evacuation of French military and civilians from Tongking. Action confined to the air and naval arms directed against the Chinese Communists in Indo-China would likewise be ineffective and, in the light of world commitments, the United States has no infantry available for operations within

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within Indo-China. The United States thinking is along the lines of a blockade of the coast of China, combined with air action, designed to upset the economy of mainland China and to lessen the will of the Chinese Communists to continue their aggression. Such action would cease when aggression ceased, and this would be made clear to everyone. Every effort should be made to avoid action in the areas of acute sensitivity to the Soviet Union. We are of the opinion that the Soviet Union would probably not enter the conflict if it understood clearly that we had no intention of attempting to overthrow the Chinese Communist regime by force. We must bear in mind that the Chinese Communists have a formidable air force, and we may be forced to attack it wherever it is found. If the Chinese Communists do invade Indo-China in substantial force, it will be a threat to the vital interests of all of us.

Mr. EDEN said that he saw no serious objection to the issuance of a warning; he recalled that he had already issued a public warning in his speech at Columbia University. He felt that, whether or not a warning is issued, it would be important to have the Chinese Communists know that retaliation against further Chinese aggression is being urgently considered.

THE SECRETARY reiterated that there was an urgent need for basic political guidance on the basis of which military talks could proceed. Mr. EDEN said that he would wish to consult the Cabinet on basic policy, noting that a naval blockade involving Hong Kong was a serious question.

There was general agreement that the Secretary and Mr. Eden would conduct their discussions with Mr. Schuman along the above lines.

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751G.5/12-552:TOP SECRET FILE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

Rec'd: December 5, 1952
7:41 a.m.

FROM: Saigon

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1149, December 5, Noon

SENT DEPT 1149, RPTD INFO PARIS 182, HANOI 127, MANILA 114.

Re DEPTTEL 1141, December 3.

The French have not (rpt not) asked for additional aircraft. What they do request and General Trapnell is urgently recommending is that the 30 F-8's already programmed be expedited to arrive here not (rpt not) later than January and that delivery of the 8 B-26's scheduled to arrive at rate of one a month during calendar year 1953 be accelerated.

The French yesterday made, however, urgent request on which in Trapnell's and my opinion immediately favorable action in some form or other should be taken. The request is that 150 American Air Force mechanics be detailed immediately to Nha Trang Air Base for one month to give 50-hour checks to 18 C-47's and 100 hour checks on another 18 C-47's. Nha Trang was chosen presumably because presence mechanics would be less conspicuous than if detailed to at Tonkin base or to Saigon. The French have made the same imperative request of the French Air Ministry, but according local information, French Metropolitan Air Force has only a few if any surplus mechanics for immediate despatch. The French request is entirely legitimate. When Salan asked for and was granted the 50 additional C-47's late

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last summer (21 were provided by US), sufficient crews were available for normal maintenance. It was expected these would be used for tactical drops of parachute troops. No (rpt no) sustained air lift operation was or could have been foreseen at that time. With loss of Nghialo and the ensuing necessary decision of French command to attempt hold Na San to prevent overrunning that country and Laos, an air lift had to be instituted. As a result, the C-47's are operating at several times the normal rate, entailing urgent increased maintenance.

As an alternative to sending American mechanics, Trapnell and I have suggested possibility of the 36 planes being sent for repairs and checks to Clark Field. Trip to Manila would add extra flying time to the planes, but that might be the more practical operation. I can see no (rpt no) policy objection either to despatching American maintenance crews for a few weeks stay here or providing maintenance at Clark Field. On several occasions we have provided mechanical specialists for brief periods for instruction and repair of certain American equipment. This emergency maintenance is vital to holding of Na San and for meeting any other emergency air-borne operations.

General Chassin, CINC French Air Force Fe, arrives today from Tonkin to consult with Trapnell.

HEATH

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OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Dec 22 1952
6:21 PM

SENT TO: Amembassy SAIGON 1286
" PARIS 3523

EYES ONLY HEATH AND DUNN FROM ALLISON.

Saigon TELS 1190 and 1197.

DEPT concurs in US participation maintenance C-47s by 25-30
USAF personnel at Nha Trang on temporary loan basis. Defense
notified and has taken similar position.

Defense has directed FEACOM to undertake such support and is in-
forming MAAG Saigon.

Defense additionally queries MAAG French intentions on possibility
retention mechanics due rotation.

ACHESON

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