



NOAA FISHERIES SERVICE



For more information on the
BSAI Non-Pollock
Cooperatives:

<http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/sustainablefisheries/amds/80/default.htm>

Bering Sea & Aleutian Islands (BSAI) Non-Pollock Cooperatives

Vital Stats

First year: 2008

Type of Catch Share Program: LAPP, Cooperatives

Management units: Non-American Fisheries Act (non-AFA) non-pollock BSAI groundfish trawl sector

Vessels / Gear types: Medium to large trawl vessels

Available Trend Data

Season length:

Before Program: Varied depending on fishery, but shorter than currently

After Program (2009): Jan 20 – Nov 1

Ex-vessel value:

Before Program (2003): ~ \$ 124 million

After Program (2008 est.): ~ \$200 million (~\$171 million in 2003 dollars)

Consolidation:

28 vessels are eligible to participate in the program, before and after implementation roughly 23 vessels are actively fishing.

Stock Status:

Before Program: Overfishing: NO; Overfished: NO

After Program (2008): Overfishing: NO; Overfished: NO

Nature of Harvest Privilege

Eligibility: Any person who is qualified under the definition of the non-AFA trawl catcher/processor sector as defined in section 219(a)(7) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, may apply for and receive quota shares (QS) that represent a portion of the catch history of a non-AFA trawl catcher/processor during 1998-2004. MNFS will issue an exclusive annual harvest privilege based on the catch history of eligible vessels. Vessel operators may choose to participate in a cooperative and receive an exclusive harvest privilege, or in a limited access fishery and compete with other participants in that fishery. A cooperative must include at least three separate QS holding entities not linked through a minimum of 10 percent direct or indirect ownership or control, and contain at least nine of the eligible vessels.

Duration: Open ended. Council can end the program through the normal Council process.

Transferability: Permanent transfers of an eligible vessel, its catch history and permit are allowed, subject to NMFS approval. Annual allocations to cooperatives are transferable among cooperatives and must be approved by NMFS.

Accumulation: No single person can collectively hold or use more than 30% of the quota share unless grandfathered in; no single vessel may catch more than 20% of the initial TAC assigned to the non-AFA trawl catcher/processor sector in a year.



Initial Allocation: Individual quota share for the six target fisheries is based on catch history between 1998-2004 (best five years). Including combinations of allocated species and fishing areas, there are a total of 11 quota categories. Qualified vessels that did not fish during the specified time receive an allocation of no less than 0.5% of the yellowfin and rock sole catch history, and 0.1% of the flathead sole catch history. Each year, a portion of the total allowable catch (TAC) for the six target species are allocated to cooperatives and the limited access fishery, after deductions for the Community Development Program (10.7% of each of the target species), incidental catch amounts, and apportionment between the non-AFA trawl catcher/processor sector and all other BSAI trawl vessels consistent with historic harvest patterns. Each year, NMFS also allocates a portion of the Pacific halibut and BSAI crab bycatch limit to the non-AFA trawl catcher/processor fleet to manage their allocations.

Management

Identified Costs: N/A

Cost recovery: None at this time

Monitoring: 200% observer coverage requirements (2 observers, and all hauls must be observed), flow scales, monitored fish holding bins, vessel monitoring systems, and daily electronic reporting of catch is also required.

Summary

The Bering Sea and Aleutian Island (BSAI) groundfish fishery consists of a pollock trawl fishery (managed under the American Fisheries Act or AFA), and a non-AFA sector that primarily participates in non-pollock groundfish fisheries.

The non-pollock groundfish fisheries target groups of species that share similar habitat, such as Atka mackerel, Aleutian Islands Pacific ocean perch, Flathead sole, Pacific cod, Rock sole, and Yellowfin sole. Because these species occur together they are typically harvested together, and fishermen have limited ability to target individual species as they race with their competitors. Under such conditions an economic incentive has existed to discard the less-valuable fish and retain only higher value species. Vessel operators have often discarded significant portions of their catch to maximize harvests of more valuable species, even though the discarded species had considerable market value in their own rights.

The BSAI Groundfish Non-Pollock Cooperatives were implemented in 2008 to create economic incentives to reduce discards and bycatch, while increasing the potential for economic returns. Known as Amendment 80 to the Groundfish FMP, the action implemented a limited access privilege program (LAPP) by allocating quota shares for six non-pollock groundfish species to non-AFA trawl catcher/processors. The program also facilitated the formation of voluntary harvesting cooperatives which manage community quota shares for target species, incidental catch allowances, and prohibited species allocations among themselves.

The initial fishing year under Amendment 80 has seen landings well under the catch limits, demonstrating a conservative approach to quota monitoring and management by cooperatives and limited access vessels. Fishermen have reported that they have been able to slow fishing operations, and be more selective regarding fishing areas and avoid prohibited and incidental species.

For additional Catch Share Spotlights in this series go to:

<http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/catchshares>

Questions, comments or need more information? Contact us via email at:

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