Idaho-Eastern Oregon Potato Committee, for its maintenance and functioning, and for such purposes as the Secretary determines to be appropriate, will amount to $39,595.

(b) The rate of assessment to be paid by each handler in accordance with this part, shall be $0.0026 per hundredweight or equivalent quantity of assessable potatoes handled by him as the first handler during the fiscal period.

(c) Unexpended income in excess of expenses for the fiscal period may be carried over as a reserve to the extent authorized in § 945.44(b).

(d) Terms used in this section shall have the same meaning as when used in the marketing agreement and this part.

Dated: July 15, 1974.

CHARLES R. BRADER,
Deputy Director, Fruit and Vegetable Division, Agricultural Marketing Service.

[FR Doc.74-16475 Filed 7-17-74;8:45 am]

Rural Electrification Administration

[7 CFR Part 1701]

THREE-ELECTRODE GAS TUBE PROTECTORS

Proposed New REA Specification

Notice is hereby given that, pursuant to the Rural Electrification Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. 901 et seq.), including the amendment thereto enacted by Pub. L. 93-32, REA proposes to issue REA Bulletin 345-71 to announce a new REA Specification PE-56 for three-electrode gas tube protectors. On issuance of REA Bulletin 345-71, Appendix A to Part 1701 will be modified accordingly.

Persons interested in the new specification may submit written data, views or comments to the Director, Telephone Operations and Standards Division, Rural Electrification Administration, Room 1355, South Building, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. 20250, on or before August 19, 1974. All written submissions made pursuant to this notice will be made available for public inspection at the Office of the Director, Telephone Operations and Standards Division during regular business hours.

A copy of the new REA Specification PE-56 may be secured in person or by written request from the Director, Telephone Operations and Standards Division.

The text of REA Bulletin 345-71 announcing the issuance of the new specification is as follows:

REA BULLETIN 345-71

REA SPECIFICATION FOR THREE-ELECTRODE GAS TUBE PROTECTORS

I. *Purpose.* To announce issuance of a new REA Specification PE-56 for Three-Electrode Gas Tube Protectors.

II. *General.* This specification covers requirements for three-electrode gas tube protectors used to protect communication circuits and equipments from damages due to foreign voltages and currents. REA Specification PE-56 becomes effective on February 3, 1975. All three-electrode gas tube protectors furnished for REA projects bid or on orders placed to REA borrowers after that date shall comply in all respects with the new REA Specification PE-56. This does not preclude the adoption of the new specification by manufacturers prior to the effective date.

III. *Availability of specification.* Copies of the new PE-56 will be furnished by REA upon request. Questions concerning the new specification may be referred to the Chief, Station Equipment and Protection Branch, Telephone Operations and Standards Division, Rural Electrification Administration, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. 20250, telephone number 202 447-3173.

Dated: July 12, 1974.

H. A. SCHAFER, Jr.
Acting Assistant Administrator.

[FR Doc.74-16473 Filed 7-17-74;8:45 am]

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

[14 CFR Part 71]

[Airspace Docket No. 74-SO-73]

TRANSITION AREA

Proposed Alteration

The Federal Aviation Administration is considering an amendment to Part 71 of the Federal Aviation Regulations that would alter the Ahoskie, N.C., transition area.

Interested persons may submit such written data, views or arguments as they may desire. Communications should be submitted in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration, Southern Region, Air Traffic Division, P.O. Box 20636, Atlanta, Ga. 30320. All communications received on or before August 19, 1974, will be considered before action is taken on the proposed amendment. No hearing is contemplated at this time, but arrangements for informal conferences with Federal Aviation Administration officials may be made by contacting the Chief, Airspace and Procedures Branch. Any data, views or arguments presented during such conferences must also be submitted in writing in accordance with this notice in order to become part of the record for consideration. The proposal contained in this notice may be changed in light of comments received.

The official docket will be available for examination by interested persons at the Federal Aviation Administration, Southern Region, Room 645, 3400 Whipple Street, East Point, Ga.

The Ahoskie transition area described in § 71.181 (39 FR 440 and 14502) would be amended as follows: "° ° ° 13 miles west of the VORTAC ° ° °" would be deleted and "° ° ° 8 miles west of the VOR TAC ° ° °" would be substituted therefor.

The proposed alteration is required to provide controlled airspace protection for the proposed revised VOR/DME-A Standard Instrument Approach Procedure to Tri-County Airport.

This amendment is proposed under the authority of section 307(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1348 (a)) and of section 6(c) of the Department of Transportation Act (49 U.S.C. 1655(c)).

Issued in East Point, Ga., on July 9, 1974.

PHILLIP M. SWATEK,
Director, Southern Region.

[FR Doc.74-16383 Filed 7-17-74;8:45 am]

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

[10 CFR Part 50]

LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES

General Design Criteria for Fuel Reprocessing Plants

The Atomic Energy Commission has under consideration amendments to its regulation 10 CFR Part 50, "Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," which would add an Appendix P, "General Design Criteria for Fuel Reprocessing Plants."

Paragraph (a) of § 50.34 requires that each application for a construction permit include, in the safety analysis report, the preliminary design for the facility. The following information is specified for inclusion:

(i) The principal design criteria for the facility;

(ii) The design bases and relation of the design bases to the principal design criteria;

(iii) Information relative to materials of construction, general arrangements, and approximate dimensions, sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to the design bases with adequate margin for safety.

The "General Design Criteria for Fuel Reprocessing Plants" which follow would establish the minimum requirements for the principal design criteria for fuel reprocessing plants. Principal design criteria established by a license applicant and accepted by the Commission would be incorporated by reference into the construction permit. Before issuing an operating license under Part 50, the Commission would require assurance in the final safety analysis report that these criteria had been satisfied in the detailed design and construction of the facility and that any changes in such criteria are justified.

One of these criteria is that fuel reprocessing plants should be designed to facilitate decommissioning. The Commission requires that residual levels of radioactive contamination after decommissioning of a facility be sufficiently low as not to represent a hazard to the public health and safety. The Commission, after consultation with interested groups, intends to publish specific requirements for decommissioning which would be included in 10 CFR Part 50 after a rulemaking proceeding.

Concurrently with the publication for comment of this notice of proposed rulemaking, the Commission is making available to the public its "Environmental Impact Appraisal of Proposed Amendments to 10 CFR Part 50, General Design Criteria for Fuel Reprocessing

Plants." Copies of the "Environmental Impact Appraisal of Proposed Amendments to 10 CFR Part 50, General Design Criteria for Fuel Reprocessing Plants" may be obtained by writing the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545, Attention: Director of Regulatory Standards.

Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and section 553 of title 5 of the United States Code, notice is hereby given that adoption of the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 50 is contemplated. All interested persons who desire to submit written comments or suggestions for consideration in connection with the proposed amendments should send them to the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545, Attention: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff by September 16, 1974. Copies of comments received on the proposed amendments may be examined at the Commission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street NW, Washington, D.C.

1. Paragraph (a) (3) (i) of § 50.34 is amended to read as follows:

§ 50.34 Contents of applications: Technical information.

(a) Preliminary safety analysis report. Each application for a construction permit shall include a preliminary safety analysis report. The minimum information [1] to be included shall consist of the following:

* * * * *

(3) The preliminary design of the facility including:

(i) The principal design criteria for the facility.

Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, establishes minimum requirements for the principal design criteria for water-cooled nuclear power plants similar in design and location to plants for which construction permits previously have been issued by the Commission and provides guidance to applicants for construction permits in establishing principal design criteria for other types of nuclear power units. Appendix P, General Design Criteria for Fuel Reprocessing Plants, establishes minimum requirements for the principal design criteria for fuel reprocessing plants;

* * * * *

2. Footnote 2 to § 50.34 is deleted.

3. A new Appendix P is added to read as follows:

APPENDIX P—GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA FOR FUEL REPROCESSING PLANTS

I. INTRODUCTION

II. DEFINITIONS

Fuel reprocessing plant
Radiological protection
Confinement system
Single failure
Process safety features
Redundant equipment or system

[1] [Deleted]

III. CRITERIA

OVERALL REQUIREMENTS

	Number
Quality standards and records	1
Protection against environmental conditions, natural phenomena, and missiles	2
Protection against fires and explosions	3
Sharing of structures, systems, and components	4
Proximity of sites	5
Testing and maintenance of systems and components	6
Emergency capability	7

PROTECTION BY MULTIPLE CONFINEMENT BARRIERS AND SYSTEMS

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RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION

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FUEL AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE STORAGE

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DECOMMISSIONING

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I. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to the provisions of § 50.34, an application for a construction permit for a fuel reprocessing plant must include the principal design criteria for the proposed facility. The principal design criteria establish the design, fabrication, construction, testing, and performance requirements for structures, systems, and components important to safety; that is, structures, systems, and components that provide reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

These General Design Criteria are intended to aid the applicant for a construction permit for a fuel reprocessing plant in selection of the principal design criteria and to establish minimum requirements for the principal safety-related design criteria for fuel reprocessing plants. The development of these General Design Criteria is not yet complete. Any omissions do not relieve the applicant from the requirement of providing the necessary safety features in the design of a specific facility. In addition to satisfying the General Design Criteria, the applicant must:

1. Design against the loss of confinement capability or other capability which would jeopardize the health and safety of the public where such loss of capability results from any single failure in systems important to safety;

2. Provide redundancy and diversity in systems important to safety;

3. Minimize the possibility of non-random, concurrent failures of redundant elements in protection systems;

4. Provide design criteria for resistance of the facility to upper limit accidents and design bases for maximum probable natural phenomena;

5. Provide adequate protection for employees from hazards which could affect their performance of actions required to protect the public from exposure to radiation.

There may be some fuel reprocessing plants for which the General Design Criteria are not sufficient and for which additional criteria must be satisfied in the interest of public safety. In particular, it is expected that additional or different criteria will be needed to take into account variations in sites and environmental conditions. Also, some of the General Design Criteria may not be necessary or appropriate for a specific plant. For plants such as these, departures from the General Design Criteria must be identified and justified.

II. DEFINITIONS

Fuel reprocessing plant. A fuel reprocessing plant means the structures, systems, and components required for the separation, recovery, storage, and handling of fissile and fertile nuclear material, byproducts, and waste from irradiated nuclear fuels or materials, and includes those structures and protection systems or components required to provide reasonable assurance that the plant can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

Radiological protection. Radiological protection means protection against internal and external ionizing radiation.

Confinement system. A confinement system means the barrier and its associated systems, including ventilation, between areas containing radioactive substances and the environment or areas in the plant which are normally expected to have levels of radioactivity lower than that which the barrier is designed to confine.

Single failure. A single failure means an occurrence which results in the loss of capability of a component to perform its intended safety function(s). Multiple failures, i.e., loss of capability of several components, resulting from a single occurrence are considered to be a single failure. Systems are considered to be designed against an assumed single failure if neither (1) a single failure of any active component (assuming passive components function properly) nor (2) a single failure of any passive component (assuming active components function properly) results in a loss of the capability of the system to perform its safety functions.

Process safety features. A process safety feature means a feature designed to prevent, limit, or mitigate the release of radioactive material.

Redundant equipment or system. Any equipment or system that duplicates the essential function of any other equipment or system is considered to be redundant to the extent that either may perform the required function regardless of the state of operation or failure of the other.

III. CRITERIA OVERALL REQUIREMENTS

Criterion 1—Quality standards and records. Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed, fabricated, erected, and tested in accordance with quality assurance criteria in Appendix B. Appropriate records of the design, fabrication, erection, and testing of structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be maintained by or under the control of the

fuel reprocessing plant licensee throughout the life of the plant.

Criterion 2—Protection against environmental conditions, natural phenomena, and missiles. a. Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to withstand the effects of and to be compatible with the plant environmental conditions associated with operation, maintenance, plant shutdown, testing, and accidents.

b. Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, lighting, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches without impairing their capability to perform safety functions. The principal design criteria for these structures, systems, and components shall include: (1) Resistance to the most severe of the natural phenomena reported for the site and surrounding area, with appropriate modifications to take into account the limited quantity of the historical data and the period of time in which the data have been accumulated; (2) safety features to cope with combinations of the effects of accident conditions and the effects of natural phenomena; and (3) features which provide for safe shutdown under emergency conditions, confinement of radioactivity during the emergency, and safe startup following unscheduled shutdown.

c. Capability for determining the intensity of natural phenomena which may occur for comparison with design bases of structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be provided.

d. Structures, systems, and components shall be appropriately protected against dynamic effects, including seismic motion and the effects of missiles and discharging fluids, that may result from equipment failure and from other similar events and conditions both inside and outside the fuel reprocessing plant.

Criterion 3—Protection against fires and explosions. Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed and located so as to continue to perform their safety functions effectively under fire and explosion exposure conditions. Noncombustible and heat-resistant materials shall be used wherever practical throughout the facility, particularly in locations vital to the functioning of confinement barriers and systems, to methods of controlling radioactive materials within the facility, and to the maintenance of safety control functions. Explosion and fire detection, alarm, and suppression systems shall be designed and provided with sufficient capacity and capability to minimize the adverse effects of fires and explosions on structures, systems, and components important to safety. The design of the fire suppression system shall include provisions to protect against adverse effects in the event of system operation or failure.

Criterion 4—Sharing of structures, systems, and components. Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall not be shared between a fuel reprocessing plant and plants of any type unless it is shown that such sharing will not impair the capability of the fuel reprocessing plant to perform its safety functions, including the capability for orderly and safe shutdown in the event of an accident or incident.

Criterion 5—Proximity of sites. Fuel reprocessing plants located near other nuclear facilities and other activities licensed under this chapter shall be designed to assure that the cumulative effect of discharges resulting from their operation will not result in undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

Criterion 6—Testing and maintenance of systems and components. Systems and components that have safety-related functions shall be designed to permit inspection, maintenance, and testing to assure their continued functioning for the life of the facility.

Criterion 7—Emergency capability. Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to assure capability for safe shutdown of plant operations and handling of an emergency. The design shall assure capability for use, as necessary, of onsite facilities and available offsite facilities and services such as hospitals, fire and police departments, ambulance service, and utility personnel.

PROTECTION BY MULTIPLE CONFINEMENT BARRIERS AND SYSTEMS

Criterion 8—Confinement barriers and systems. The total confinement system shall consist of one or more individual confinement barriers and systems which successively control against the release of radioactivity to the environment. The confinement system shall be designed to protect against the effects of accidents or external natural phenomena and shall be fabricated, erected, tested, and maintained to assure prevention of abnormal leakage, rapidly propagating failure, or gross rupture during the design life.

Criterion 9—Ventilation and offgas systems. The ventilation and offgas systems shall be designed and tested to assure the confinement of radioactive materials during normal or abnormal conditions. To accomplish this objective, these systems shall be designed to meet the following requirements:

a. The proper ventilating air flow direction shall be maintained across the confinement barrier, that is, between areas inside the barrier and areas outside the barrier, under operating and accident conditions.

b. The ventilation system shall accommodate changes in operating conditions such as variations in temperature or pressure and shall be capable of safely controlling all radioactive offgases that could be associated with normal or accident conditions.

c. The continuity of necessary ventilation shall be assured by means of redundant equipment, fail-safe control systems, or other provisions.

d. Provisions shall be made for testing all safety-related components during normal operation of the systems to demonstrate their ability to perform at design efficiency and to function during emergency conditions and during transitions between normal and emergency conditions.

e. Ventilation systems shall be designed to permit the continued occupancy of any and all areas where such occupancy is required for normal plant operations, for safe shutdown or maintaining the plant in a safe shutdown condition. The design shall include protection against the intake or accumulation of radioactive materials. The design shall also permit the timely and safe execution of personnel from all areas.

f. Vessel and dissolver offgas systems shall be designed to confine the radioactive materials during normal operation and to assure that the concentration of radioactive materials in the effluent gases is as low as practicable. Such systems shall also be designed to retain their confinement and separation capability to reduce releases resulting from an accident condition to levels consistent with the regulations contained in this chapter.

PROCESS SAFETY FEATURES

Criterion 10—Protection systems. a. Protection systems shall be designed (1) to initiate action that will assure that specified acceptable operating design limits are not exceeded as a result of operational occurrences and (2) to sense potential hazardous or accident conditions and to activate systems and components required to assure the safety of operating personnel and the public or to give audible and visual alarm so that action can be taken in a timely manner to assure such safety. Protection systems and components shall be activated automatically where this mode is compatible with the safety requirements to be satisfied.

b. Protection systems shall have reliability and *in situ* testability. The design of protection systems shall provide for redundancy and independence at least sufficient to assure that (1) no single failure results in loss of the protection functions and (2) removal from service of any component does not result in loss of the required redundancy unless it can be otherwise demonstrated that the protection system will operate with acceptable reliability. The protection systems shall be designed to permit the periodic testing of its functions and efficiencies while the plant is in operation, to determine whether failures or losses of redundancy may have occurred.

c. Protection systems shall be designed to fail into a safe state or into a state demonstrated to be acceptable on some other defined basis if conditions such as disconnection of the system, loss of energy or motive power, or adverse environments are experienced.

Criterion 11—Instrumentation and control systems. Instrumentation and control systems shall be provided to monitor safety-related variables and operating systems over anticipated ranges for normal operation, for abnormal operation, for accident conditions, and for safe shutdown. These systems shall be provided with engineered safety features in the redundancy required to assure adequate safety of process and utility operations. The variables and systems that require constant surveillance and control include parts of the process, the overall confinement system, each confinement barrier and its associated systems, and other systems that affect the overall safety of the plant. Controls shall be provided to maintain these variables and systems within the prescribed operating ranges under all normal conditions. Instrumentation and control systems shall be designed to be fail safe or to assume a state demonstrated to be acceptable on some other basis if conditions such as disconnection, loss of energy or motive power, or adverse environments are experienced.

Criterion 12—Separation of process safety features and control systems. The process safety features shall be separated from control systems to the extent that a change or failure in either leaves intact a system which satisfies all reliability and independence requirements of the process safety systems.

Criterion 13—Control room. A control room or control areas shall be designed to permit occupancy and actions to be taken to operate the plant safely under normal conditions and to maintain the plant in a safe condition under accident or other abnormal conditions. Instrumentation and controls in the control room or control areas shall be designed with sufficient redundancy to allow the plant to be put into a safe condition if any one control room or control area is removed from service.

Criterion 14—Process systems. Process components and systems are the first confinement barrier. The design of each process system shall provide capability for the system to maintain its integrity and operability to protect the public health and safety under all normal process conditions and abnormal conditions, including the maximum expected inventories of fissile materials and other radionuclides. Provisions shall be included for the safe handling of anticipated nonroutine process requirements.

Criterion 15—Utility services. a. The design of each utility service system required

for emergency conditions shall provide for the meeting of safety demands under normal and abnormal conditions. The design of safety-related utility services and distribution shall include redundant systems to the extent necessary to maintain, wtih adequate capacity, the ability to perform safety functions assuming a single failure.

b. Emergency utility services shall be designed to permit testing of their functional operability and capacity, including the full operational sequence, of each system for transfer between normal and emergency supply sources, and the operation of associated safety systems.

c. Provisions shall be made so that, in the event of a loss of the primary electric power source or circuit, reliable and timely emergency power will be provided to instruments, confinement systems, utility service systems, and process systems in amounts sufficient to allow operations to be shut down safely and to be maintained in a safe shutdown condition with all safety devices essential to safe shutdown functioning. The onsite emergency power sources and the electrical distribution circuits shall have independence, redundancy, and testability to assure performance of their safety functions in the event of a single failure or an accident.

NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY

Criterion 16—Safety margins. The design of process and storage systems shall include margins of safety for the nuclear criticality parameters that are commensurate with the uncertainties in the process and storage conditions, in the data and methods used in calculations, and in the nature of the immediate environment under accident conditions. All process and storage systems shall be designed to be maintained subcritical and to assure that no nuclear criticality accident can occur unless at least two unlikely, independent, and concurrent or sequential changes have occurred in the conditions essential to nuclear criticality safety.

Criterion 17—Methods of control. a. Favorable geometry, in which equipment or systems are subcritical by virtue of neutron leakage under worst credible conditions, is the preferred method of nuclear criticality control.

b. Where the favorable geometry method of nuclear criticality control is not practical, the use of permanently fixed neutron-absorbing materials (poisons) is the next preferred method of control.

c. Where both the favorable geometry and the permanently fixed neutron-absorbing materials (poisons) methods of nuclear criticality control are not practical, administrative controls of moderation, fissile material concentration, total fissile material, or the use of soluble neutron-absorbing materials (poisons) shall be employed when combined with margins of safety measurements or appropriate analysis and engineered safety features.

Criterion 18—Neutron absorbers. Where solid neutron-absorbing materials (poisons) are used for the prevention of nuclear criticality, the design shall provide for positive means to verify their continued efficacy. Soluble neutron-absorbing materials may be used as a primary nuclear criticality control provided: (1) two independent methods are provided to assure the presence of the required concentration of neutron absorber and (2) the equipment containing the fissile material is located behind sufficient barriers and shielding to reduce the probability and extent of accidental contamination of the environment and accidental radiation exposure to personnel in the event of a criticality accident.

Criterion 19—Ancillary Criteria for Nuclear Criticality Safety. a. Process and storage systems shall be designed to assure that no mechanisms that could cause segregation of fissile materials can be present in components whose nuclear criticality safety is dependent on the homogeneous distribution of fissile material.

b. Components whose nuclear criticality safety is dependent on a limiting concentration of fissile material shall be designed so that either (1) mechanisms that could cause critical concentrations of fissile materials are not present or (2) concentration is controlled by positive instrumental means.

c. Process and storage systems shall be designed to assure that the transfer of fissile material from safety systems to unsafe systems is not possible as a consequence of any single failure or operating error.

d. Confinement system components shall be designed to assure that leakage from equipment or from one confinement zone to another confinement zone cannot result in a condition that would result in nuclear criticality.

e. The spacing between discrete accumulations of fissile materials shall be controlled so as to maintain a subcritical state.

RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION

Criterion 20—Access control. The design of the facility shall provide for control of access to the facility and to areas of potential contamination or high radiation within the facility. The facility shall be designed so that the spread of contamination can be monitored and controlled.

Criterion 21—Radiation shielding. Shielding shall be designed to assure that dose rates in accessible areas are consistent with the regulations contained in this chapter.

Criterion 22—Radiation alarm systems. Radiation alarm systems shall be provided to warn plant personnel of significant increases in radiation levels in normally accessible spaces and of excessive radioactivity released in plant effluents. Such systems shall be designed with redundancy and with capability to permit testing their efficiency of operation.

Criterion 23—Effluent monitoring. All plant effluent systems shall be designed to include means for measuring and recording the amount of radionuclides in any effluent. In order that the data thus measured and recorded can be used, the flow of environmental diluting media, either air or water, shall be determined.

Criterion 24—Effluent control. The design of the plant shall include means to control the release of radioactive effluents, whether gas, liquid, or solid, during normal operations and under accident conditions. Systems provided to guard against the release of radioactive materials shall be designed to be monitored and tested, and shall be provided with alarms. Capability shall be provided for prompt cessation of the flow of contaminated liquid effluents or for retention of such effluents as is necessary to assure that the concentrations of radioactive materials in liquid effluents are maintained as low as practicable.

FUEL AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE STORAGE

Criterion 25—Fuel and radioactive waste systems. Fuel storage, radioactive waste storage, and other systems that might contain or handle radioactive materials shall be designed to assure adequate safety under normal and accident conditions. These systems shall be designed (1) with a capability to test components important to safety, (2) with suitable shielding for radiation protection under normal and accident conditions, (3) with confinement systems, and (4) with a heat removal capability having testability and reliability that reflects the importance to safety.

Criterion 26—Waste disposal systems. The waste disposal systems shall be designed so that their performance will comply with the regulations in this chapter.

DECOMMISSIONING

Criterion 27—Decommissioning. In accordance with Appendix F, a design objective for fuel reprocessing plants shall be to facilitate decontamination and removal of all significant radioactive wastes at the time the facility is permanent decommissioned.

(Sec. 161, Pub. L. 83-703, 68 Stat. 948 (42 U.S.C. 2201))

Dated at Germantown, Md., this 12th day of July 1974.

For the Atomic Energy Commission.

PAUL C. BENDER,
Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc.74-16504 Filed 7-17-74;8:45 am]

[10 CFR Part 50]

LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES

Design Criteria for Protection of Fuel Reprocessing Plants and Licensed Material Therein

The Atomic Energy Commission has under consideration amendments to 10 CFR Part 50, "Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," which would require that fuel reprocessing plants licensed under Part 50 include certain design features for the express purpose of enhancing the protection of such plants and the licensed material in the plant. The proposed design criteria are intended to afford protection against acts of industrial sabotage of the plant having radiological consequences and against theft or diversion of the special nuclear material in the plant.

The Atomic Energy Commission has recognized the desirability of specifying design features for new fuel reprocessing plants that would simplify implementation and inspection of procedures required by the Commission for the protection of radioactive material. Accordingly, the AEC has developed design criteria similar to the design criteria in Appendix A of Part 50 for nuclear power plant safety, but for protection of licensed material in fuel reprocessing plants.

The Commission is now proposing to material protection. Amendments to 50 that would specify design criteria germane to fuel reprocessing plant and material protection. Amendment to §§ 50.34 and 50.35 would provide specifically for the submission of information pertaining to, and AEC approval of fuel reprocessing plant design features for the protection of the plant and the licensed material before the issuance of a construction permit.

Persons presently holding construction permits or operating licenses for fuel reprocessing plants would be required to submit within 60 days after the effective date of the amendments, plans for meeting the criteria and would be required, within 120 days after the effective date of the amendments, to comply with the criteria.