



THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590

February 26, 2010

Mr. William E. Reukauf
Associate Special Counsel
U.S. Office of Special Counsel
1730 M Street, NW, Suite 218
Washington, DC 20036

Re: OSC File Nos. DI-09-2147

Dear Mr. Reukauf:

I am responding to your letter of June 18, 2009, which referred for investigation aviation safety concerns raised by Randall Buxton, an Air Traffic Controller at the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Potomac Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) in Warrenton, Virginia. Mr. Buxton alleges that employees have compromised safety by failing to report and investigate pilot deviations that occurred when planes flew an approach procedure called the ELDEE Area Navigation Standard Terminal Arrival Procedure to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. I delegated investigation of these matters jointly to the Department's Office of Inspector General (OIG) and FAA's Air Traffic Safety Oversight Office. Enclosed are the OIG's Report of Investigations and FAA Administrator Babbitt's response.

In summary, OIG found that a significant number of altitude-related pilot deviations occurred between late December 2007 and mid-September 2009 by aircraft arrival via the ELDEE Arrival procedure. Specifically, OIG found 29 ELDEE Arrival pilot deviations. The OIG, however, was unable to conclude from the evidence that air traffic controllers and front-line managers are failing to report and investigate ELDEE Arrival pilot deviation procedures. The OIG found only one instance when a controller failed to report a suspected pilot deviation to management. The OIG also verified only one controller-reported pilot deviation that management failed to investigate that was previously reported and investigated through the FAA Administrator's hotline. Finally, OIG did not substantiate the claim that Potomac TRACON officials have created a work environment that discourages controllers from reporting ELDEE Arrival pilot deviations by "unreasonably scrutinizing" the performance of other controllers who have reported deviations. By the enclosed memorandum, FAA Administrator Babbitt accepted OIG's findings.

I appreciate the whistleblower's diligence in raising these concerns.

Sincerely yours,

Ray LaHood

Enclosures



Federal Aviation Administration

Memorandum

Date: FEB 2 2010

To: Mr. Robert Westbrook, Acting Assistant Inspector General
for Special Investigations and Analysis

From: J. Randolph Babbitt, Administrator *JB*

Subject: FAA Response to Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
Report of Investigation Case No. #I090000057SINV, Jan. 25, 2010

Thank you for your Report of Investigation (ROI) regarding the following allegations relating to pilot deviations on ELDEE Four arrivals through the airspace handled by the Potomac Terminal Radar Approach Control (PCT TRACON):

Allegation 1: A significant number of pilot deviations have occurred at Potomac TRACON since the FAA implemented a flight pattern called ELDEE Four Standard Terminal Arrival Procedure.

Allegation 2: Air traffic controllers and Front Line Managers are failing to report and investigate ELDEE Arrival pilot deviations.

Allegation 3: Potomac TRACON officials have discouraged controllers from reporting ELDEE Arrival pilot deviations by "unreasonably scrutinizing" the performance of other controllers who have reported them.

We are pleased your investigation found no evidence to substantiate Allegations 2 and 3 above and that the FAA has addressed problems that resulted in a high number of pilot deviations (Allegation 1) between late-December 2007 and mid-September 2009 by aircraft arriving via the ELDEE Four Arrival. The ATO's PCT TRACON quality control personnel and the Office of Safety will continue to monitor the frequency of pilot deviation reports, investigations, and controller performance reports along the ELDEE Four Arrival route. Any abnormal trend in the number of pilot deviations will result in a closer analysis of causal factors related to the increased numbers of pilot deviations. Once we begin receiving voluntary safety reports through the Air Traffic Safety Action Program (ATSAP), additional insight and understanding will permit PCT TRACON to better address safety risk in all operations.

If additional information is needed please contact Robert Tarter, Vice President Office of Safety for the Air Traffic Organization at (202) 267-3341.


cc: Senior Vice President for Operations (AJN)
Chief Counsel, Audits & Evaluations (AAE)



U.S. Department of
Transportation
Office of the Secretary
of Transportation
Office of Inspector General

Memorandum

Subject: **ACTION:** OIG Investigation #I09Z000057SINV Date: January 25, 2010
Re: Underreporting of Pilot Deviations at Potomac
TRACON

From: Robert A. Westbrook 
Acting Assistant Inspector General Reply to
for Special Investigations and Analysis, II-3 Attn. of: R. Engler

To: Hank Krakowski
Chief Operating Officer
Air Traffic Organization, AJO-1

Margaret Gilligan
Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, AVS-1

This report describes the findings of our investigation of alleged improprieties regarding the reporting and investigating of pilot deviations involving aircraft arriving into the Washington, D.C. area via the ELDEE Four Arrival pattern by FAA management officials at the Potomac Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) facility in Warrenton, Virginia. These concerns were first reported to the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) by an air traffic controller, and were subsequently referred to the Office of Inspector General and FAA's Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service for a joint investigation. By law, we are required to provide a copy of our report and FAA's response to the Secretary, and the Secretary is required to submit the report and response to OSC.

Please review this report and respond to us in writing by February 1, 2010. Your response should include any comments, a statement of corrective action planned or taken as a result of our investigation (if any), and your timeframe for implementation of any planned corrective action. If you have any questions or concerns about this report, please contact me at (202) 366-1415, or Director of Special Investigations, Ronald Engler, at (202) 366-4189.



U.S. Department of Transportation
Office of Inspector General

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION	INVESTIGATION NUMBER #I09Z000057SINV	DATE Jan. 25, 2010
TITLE Re: Underreporting of Pilot Deviations at Potomac TRACON	PREPARED BY: Robert A. Westbrooks Acting Assistant Inspector General for Special Investigations and Analysis, JI-3 U.S. Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General	STATUS FINAL
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BACKGROUND

On June 18, 2009, U.S. Department of Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood received an investigative referral from the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC). An air traffic control specialist disclosed aviation safety concerns to OSC related to Potomac TRACON employees' failure to report and investigate pilot deviations that occurred when planes flew an approach procedure called the ELDEE Area Navigation Standard Terminal Arrival Procedure (STAR) to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. The Secretary delegated investigative responsibility to the Office of Inspector General and FAA's Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service (AOV). We conducted this investigation jointly with AOV, which concurs with this report. Attachment 1 describes the methodology of our investigation.

A pilot deviation is an action or error by a pilot, e.g., failing to comply with an altitude restriction or entering into a "no-fly" zone, that violates a Federal Aviation Regulation.

A STAR is a pre-planned Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) arrival procedure published in chart and text form for pilots and used to facilitate air traffic control from en-route airspace to the terminal area. A STAR is a specific route, like a roadmap for automobiles, with required altitudes at specific intervals. Each STAR procedure or route has a name, e.g., "ELDEE."

Most commercial airliners have a Flight Management System (FMS), an automated avionics system that holds the flight plan or automated STAR. The FMS uses various sensors to determine the aircraft's position and guide the aircraft along the STAR. The FMS causes the flight controls to automatically descend the aircraft at specific intervals as designated by the computer program. These intervals are also depicted on a Jeppesen navigation chart. Because the descent is a standardized procedure, there is no active air traffic control direction for descent clearances.

As reflected in the enclosed ELDEE FOUR Arrival diagram (Attachment 2), there are two mandatory crossing points or "fixes" at 15,000 feet for airplanes arriving from the southwest (labeled on the diagram as LINDEN and MORTY). There is also an "expect fix" crossing point at 15,000 feet (labeled on the diagram as DOCCS), which may be assigned by a controller to the pilot of an airplane arriving from the southwest. There is a mandatory crossing point at 15,000 feet for airplanes approaching from the northwest (labeled on the diagram as REVUE). And, there is an "expect fix" crossing restriction at 15,000 feet (labeled on the diagram as DRUZZ), which may be assigned by a controller to the pilot of an airplane arriving from the northwest.

The whistleblower alleged that pilots instructed by Potomac TRACON controllers to “descend via the ELDEE FOUR Arrival” often disregarded the mandatory 15,000 feet crossing points and reprogrammed or manually overrode the FMS system to meet the 12,000 feet crossing restriction at PUGEE. As a result, the descending aircraft risked coming into conflict with aircraft ascending from Dulles International Airport to altitudes as high as 14,000 feet.

SYNOPSIS

Our investigation found that a significant number of altitude-related pilot deviations occurred between late December 2007 and mid-September 2009 by aircraft arriving via the ELDEE STAR Arrival. Specifically, we found 29 ELDEE Arrival pilot deviations.

We were unable to conclude from the evidence that air traffic controllers and Front Line Managers are failing to report and investigate ELDEE Arrival pilot deviations. We found only one instance when a controller failed to report a suspected pilot deviation to management. We also verified only one controller-reported pilot deviation (which was previously reported and investigated through the FAA Administrator’s hotline), that management failed to investigate.

Finally, we did not substantiate that Potomac TRACON officials have created a work environment that discourage controllers from reporting ELDEE Arrival pilot deviations by “unreasonably scrutinizing” the performance of other controllers who have reported deviations.

Below are the details of the allegations and our findings.

DETAILS:

<p>Allegation 1: A significant number of pilot deviations have occurred at Potomac TRACON since FAA implemented a flight pattern called the ELDEE Standard Terminal Arrival Procedure.</p>

FINDINGS

We identified 29 pilot deviations, occurring between December 2007 and mid-September 2009, in which pilots were not at the required altitude established by the ELDEE Arrival when they crossed the fix. A spreadsheet of our findings is enclosed as Attachment 3. These deviations involved instances in which pilots either entered Potomac TRACON airspace below the required 15,000 feet fix or failed to maintain the required 15,000 feet altitude when crossing from one fix to the next. The evidence indicates, however, that managers and controllers have addressed this problem.

A meeting was held on April 13, 2009, which included Potomac TRACON personnel, Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center personnel, NATCA representatives, FAA officials from the Area Navigation (RNAV)/Required Navigation Performance (RNP) Program, personnel from three major air carriers (United Airlines, Northwest Airlines and USAir), and a representative from the Air Line Pilots Association. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the increasing number of altitude-related pilot deviations occurring on the ELDEE Arrival. Meeting notes indicate that data provided by MITRE Corporation reflected a deviation rate of over three percent for flights along the segment between DRUZZ and REVUE in 2008.

As a solution to this problem, the group agreed that Potomac TRACON personnel would work with Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center and the RNAV Program Office to change DRUZZ and DOCCs "expect fixes" in the ELDEE Arrival chart and database to "mandatory crossing restrictions." They also agreed a Notice would be issued to controllers instructing them to ensure that aircraft on the ELDEE FOUR Arrival are not issued a "descend via" clearance which commences prior to MORTY or REVUE, i.e., outside Potomac TRACON airspace. However, it was not until August 27, 2009, that local Notice PCT N 7110.119 was issued.¹

Also, an Air Traffic Organization-Safety investigation conducted August 25-27, 2009, determined that many controllers have taken their own action to prevent ELDEE Arrival pilot deviations. Specifically, they have taken aircraft off the STAR and incrementally "stepped down" the aircraft through direct air traffic control from one navigational fix to another.

¹ The Notice further states:

Use one of the following when issuing a "descend via" clearance on the ELDEE FOUR Arrival:

- a. Issue a crossing restriction combined with descend via...
Cross MORTY at one five thousand, then descend via the ELDEE FOUR Arrival or,
Cross REVUE at one five thousand, then descend via the ELDEE FOUR Arrival.
- b. Issue clearance to descend via after passing MORTY or REVUE
After passing MORTY descend via the ELDEE FOUR Arrival or,
After passing REVUE descend via the ELDEE Four Arrival.
- c. Withhold "descend via" clearance until the aircraft is at MORTY or REVUE.

Information we received from FAA's Flight Standards Division and ATO RNAV indicates that, since August 2009, the number of pilot deviations has decreased significantly in Potomac TRACON airspace. As such, officials from those offices told us they are satisfied the issue has been resolved.

Allegation 2: Air traffic controllers and Front Line Managers are failing to report and investigate ELDEE Arrival pilot deviations.

FINDINGS

We were unable to conclude from the evidence that air traffic controllers and Front Line Managers are failing to report and investigate ELDEE Arrival pilot deviations. Of the information provided to us by the whistleblower, we found only one ELDEE Arrival pilot deviation that was not reported by a controller and only one that was reported, but not investigated, by management.

Specifically, the whistleblower provided us with a list of 48 reported and unreported ELDEE FOUR Arrival pilot deviations alleged to have occurred from December 2007 to September 2009. Of these 48 incidents, we found evidence that 15 were properly reported and investigated. Of the 33 other incidents, we confirmed that one was reported by a controller; however, a manager failed to investigate it.² Of the remaining 32 incidents, we eliminated 10, because they were reported anonymously and extracted by the whistleblower from a public database. As such, the whistleblower had no first-hand knowledge of these incidents or second-hand information attributable to a witness we could interview. Further, the reports were missing information, e.g., the date or aircraft call sign, necessary to verify the alleged pilot deviations. Of the 22 remaining incidents, we identified documents that suggest five were investigated and reported as non-events. Finally, we found no evidence, e.g., radar or voice data or documentation, to conclude that the remaining 17 incidents were pilot deviations. We did, however, locate another 11 reported ELDEE Arrival pilot deviations not in the whistleblower's spreadsheet.

In sum, we identified 31 instances in which ELDEE Arrival pilot deviations were reported to the Potomac TRACON Operations Manager or other Potomac TRACON officials. We determined that management properly investigated each incident, and filed a preliminary pilot deviation report or concluded the incident was a non-event.

² The whistleblower reported a February 2, 2008, pilot deviation to a Front Line Manager who, in turn, notified an Operations Manager. As of February 4, 2008, no investigation had occurred, so the whistleblower reported the incident to the FAA Administrator's Hotline. A subsequent investigation confirmed the pilot deviation and that the Operations Manager failed to initiate a Quality Assurance Review (QAR).

Further, the other controllers and NATCA officials we interviewed denied knowledge of pilot deviations that were not reported or investigated. Similarly, Quality Assurance staff and Potomac TRACON managers, including the Operations Manager, denied failing to investigate any reported deviations.

Allegation 3: Potomac TRACON officials have discouraged controllers from reporting ELDEE Arrival pilot deviations by "unreasonably scrutinizing" the performance of other controllers who have reported them.

FINDINGS

We did not substantiate the whistleblower's claim that a QAR of a controller's performance during a pilot deviation has had a "chilling effect" on the willingness of other controllers to report deviations. As shown above, we identified 31 instances in which controllers reported pilot deviations to management. Further, none of the other controllers or union officials we interviewed supported the whistleblower's claim. Moreover, no evidence was presented by the whistleblower to support his claim.

In addition, the premise of the whistleblower's claim, i.e., that "scrutiny" of a controller's performance during a pilot deviation is "unreasonable," is not supported by our findings. A QAR of controller performance during a pilot deviation is a standard operating procedure. Potomac TRACON managers and Quality Assurance personnel are required to identify controller performance deficiencies which come to their attention, even if the initial purpose of their review was to verify the actions of the pilot. QAR and management personnel told us that, typically, they review the voice and radar tapes of the five minutes preceding and following a suspected deviation to determine what role the controller may have played in the event. There is, however, no rule which prohibits review of the controller's performance, where warranted, beyond those 10 minutes.

Finally, the whistleblower alleged that management has conducted QARs as retaliation against controllers for reporting pilot deviations. The reviews, he alleges, provided management with an opportunity to admonish controllers. Management and QAR staff we interviewed denied that the reviews were retaliatory. Further, the evidence does not indicate that other controllers who did not report deviations were treated differently than those who did. The emails and QAR records we reviewed indicate that those controllers who did not report deviations were also admonished for similar performance deficiencies, e.g., poor phraseology.

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ATTACHMENT 1: METHODOLOGY

We conducted our investigation with an OIG supervisory investigator, who received technical assistance from an FAA Air Traffic Safety Oversight Manager assigned to AOV, who is also certified as an Air Traffic Control Specialist. To address the complainants' concerns, we interviewed and held discussions with the following individuals:

- Randall Buxton, Potomac TRACON Air Traffic Control Specialist
- Kevin Propheter, Potomac TRACON Air Traffic Control Specialist
- Brendan Connolly, Air Traffic Control Specialist and National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) Facility Representative
- Bennie Hutto Jr., Air Traffic Control Specialist and Mt. Vernon area NATCA Representative
- Roderick Harrison, Acting Potomac TRACON District Manager
- Kevin Cuthbertson, Operations Manager, Potomac TRACON
- Anthony White, Acting Support Manager Plans and Programs
- Al Castillo, Front Line Manager, Potomac TRACON
- Michelle Crain, Support Specialist for Quality Assurance, Potomac TRACON
- Debra Cabral, Support Specialist, Potomac TRACON
- Stephen Smith, Acting Staff Manager, Potomac TRACON
- Coby Johnson, Deputy Director, Flight Standards Division, AFS-400
- Randolph Horner, Support Specialist for Quality Assurance, Potomac TRACON

In addition, our investigative team reviewed numerous records and documents obtained from the whistleblower, NATCA representatives, Potomac TRACON and FAA; these included: memoranda, emails, charts, spreadsheets, quality assurance review reports, facility logs, FAA regulations, orders, and notices, selected training records, and relevant

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radar data. We also reviewed data contained in Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), a public database maintained by NASA.

Specific Data Analysis

Of the 48 incidents identified by the whistleblower, 20 or 42% were investigated, and those incidents determined to be potential pilot deviations were reported to flight standards via a Preliminary Pilot Deviation Report (FAA Form 8020-17). Further, 10 of the remaining 28 events or 36% of the incidents reported by the whistleblower were based upon data he obtained from a public database maintained by NASA, called the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS).

Based upon public input from pilots, controllers, and other individuals, ASRS is intended to capture confidential report, analyzes the resulting aviation safety data, and disseminate vital information to the aviation community. However, the data is not necessarily reliable, as the person making the entry is allowed complete confidentiality, and can provide as little or as much information as they want. For instance, the whistleblower identified an event as occurring on March 1, 2008. When we reviewed the NASA ASRS public database, the entry, claimed to be made by the pilot of the aircraft, did not contain the aircraft call sign. In addition, the pilot indicated only the month and year of the incident, and gave a six hour timeframe in which the event occurred. Even if radar and voice data had been preserved, without the critical details, it is impossible to confirm whether the event was reported and investigated by Potomac TRACON officials.

In addition, if a controller receives a continuous readout from an aircraft and the readout varies by less than 300 feet from the field elevation, it is considered a valid Mode C (transponder) transmission and not a pilot deviation. Therefore, in instances identified by the whistleblower as having been a deviation which were investigated, the supervisor stated the altitude deviation was 300 feet or less therefore the event was not a pilot deviation. Without voice or radar data, we were unable to support the allegation that the incident was a pilot deviation and not a valid Mode C (transponder) difference. See *FAA Order 7110.65 5-2-17 Validation of Mode C*.

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ATTACHMENT 2: ELDEE FOUR ARRIVAL DIAGRAM

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ATTACHMENT 3: LIST OF ELDEE FOUR PILOT DEVIATIONS

ELDEE PILOT DEVIATIONS

SEQ	DATE	TIME Z	COMPANY	FLT #	OIG COMMENTS	Reported	Investigated	8020-17 Preliminary Pilot Deviation #
1	12/27/2007	1543	MEP	50	Unable to locate sufficient evidence to prove/disprove	UNK	UNK	N
2	12/31/2007	1514	NWA	1702	Whistleblower claimed he reported this event however we found no evidence to support	Y	UNK	N
3	12/31/2007	UNK	FLG	UNK	Insufficient data to prove or disprove	UNK	UNK	N/A
4	12/31/2007	UNK	MEP	UNK	Insufficient data to prove or disprove	UNK	UNK	N/A
5	1/12/2008	1545	CHQ	3086	Extracted from "the notebook" which does not indicate whether it was reported or investigated	UNK	UNK	N/A
6	1/26/2008	1540	UNK	UNK	Insufficient data to prove or disprove	UNK	UNK	N/A
7	2/2/2008	2109	COA	458	Reported by controller, manager failed to investigate	Y	N	PEARPCT08027
8	2/25/2008	0238	MEP	492	Preliminary Pilot Deviation Filed	Y	Y	PEARPCT08033
9	3/1/2008	UNK	UNK	UNK	Obtained from NASA ASRS database, not enough data to prove or disprove whether the incident was reported and investigated	UNK	UNK	UNK
10	4/1/2008	UNK	UNK	UNK	Obtained from NASA ASRS database, not enough data to prove or disprove whether the incident was reported and investigated	UNK	UNK	UNK
11	4/14/2008	UNK	EGF	UNK	Insufficient data to prove or disprove	UNK	UNK	UNK
12	4/18/2008	1827	EGF	582	Preliminary Pilot Deviation Filed	Y	Y	PEARPCT08075
13	5/1/2008	UNK	UNK	UNK	Obtained from NASA ASRS database, not enough data to prove or disprove whether the incident was reported and investigated	UNK	UNK	UNK
14	5/1/2008	UNK	UNK	UNK	Obtained from NASA ASRS database, not enough data to prove or disprove whether the incident was reported and investigated	UNK	UNK	UNK
15	5/1/2008	UNK	UNK	UNK	Obtained from NASA ASRS database, not enough data to prove or disprove whether the incident was reported and investigated	UNK	UNK	UNK
16	5/6/2008	UNK	UAL	600	No additional information provided, insufficient data to investigate	UNK	UNK	N
17	6/1/2008	UNK	UNK	UNK	Obtained from NASA ASRS database, not enough data to prove or disprove whether the incident was reported and investigated	UNK	UNK	UNK

					ELDER PILOT DEVIATIONS			
18	6/1/2008	UNK	UNK	UNK	Obtained from NASA ASRS database, not enough data to prove or disprove whether the incident was reported and investigated	UNK	UNK	UNK
19	6/1/2008	UNK	UNK	UNK	Obtained from NASA ASRS database, not enough data to prove or disprove whether the incident was reported and investigated	UNK	UNK	UNK
20	7/1/2008	UNK	UNK	UNK	Obtained from NASA ASRS database, not enough data to prove or disprove whether the incident was reported and investigated	UNK	UNK	UNK
21	10/1/2008	UNK	UNK	UNK	Obtained from NASA ASRS database, not enough data to prove or disprove whether the incident was reported and investigated	UNK	UNK	UNK
22	12/2/2008	UNK	JIA	UNK	Not enough data to investigate	UNK	UNK	UNK
23	12/23/2008	1632	UAL	606	Preliminary Pilot Deviation Filed	Y	Y	PEARPCT08202
24	12/23/2008	1638	JIA	472	Preliminary Pilot Deviation Filed	Y	Y	PEARPCT08203
25	2/3/2009	1313	COM	347	Investigated by Operations Manager who stated he forgot to add a "Q" in the column to flag the event for QA to conduct a follow-up review. OM stated his review determined that the deviation was less than 300 feet which is permissible.	Y	Y	N/A
26	2/3/2009	1402	AAL	884	Complainant could not recall individual he reported event to. We found no documentation or radar data, and supervisor on duty (OM Cuthbertson did not recall the event)	No record	UNK	N
27	2/25/2009	1721	CHQ	5870	No record event was investigated, however, facility log shows the supervisor identified as having been reported this event reported other events within the same period of time.	UNK	UNK	N
28	3/16/2009	1615	FFT	728	Whistleblower asserted controller failed to report event to supervisor. Controller denied not reporting event. No evidence to confirm or refute assertion.	UNK	UNK	N

					ELDEE PILOT DEVIATIONS			
29	3/18/2009	1515	MEP	411	Controller (complainant) alleged he reported the event, supervisor denied failing to investigate it. No radar or voice data available to confirm the event occurred. Same supervisor investigated and filed two other ELDEE pilot deviations during his shift this day, suggesting that he was investigating and filing events brought to his attention.	Y	UNK	N
30	3/18/2009	1622	CHQ	5870	Preliminary Pilot Deviation Filed	Y	Y	PEARPCT09026
31	3/23/2009	1321	UAL	602	QA investigated, could not file as controller failed to give altimeter reading to pilot	Y	Y	N/A
32	3/30/2009	1211	COM	347	Event was investigated, due to equipment malfunction on the aircraft no pilot deviation report was filed	Y	Y	N/A
33	4/11/2009	2235	EGF	4598	Preliminary Pilot Deviation Filed	Y	Y	PEARPCT09039
34	4/13/2009	0016	AAL	1544	Preliminary Pilot Deviation Filed	Y	Y	PEARPCT09040
35	4/20/2009	1413	NWA	238	both controller and supervisor denied failing to report or investigate. Given lack of evidence we did not substantiate this incident	UNK	N/A	N/A
36	4/22/2009	1713	NWA	236	Preliminary Pilot Deviation Filed	Y	Y	PEARPCT09050
37	4/27/2009	1545	EGF	3908	No evidence to confirm, controller was unable to be interviewed, never reported to supervisor	N	N	N
38	4/28/2009	1110	JIA	430	Was reported and investigated, QA determined that it was not a pilot deviation.	Y	Y	N/A
39	5/4/2009	1057	AWI	3946	Preliminary Pilot Deviation Filed	Y	Y	PEARPCT09054
40	5/25/2009	1040	AWE	49	Preliminary Pilot Deviation Filed	Y	Y	PEARPCT09067
41	5/25/2009	1052	AWI	3946	Preliminary Pilot Deviation Filed	Y	Y	PEARPCT09068
42	5/25/2009	1823	COA	358	Preliminary Pilot Deviation Filed	Y	Y	PEARPCT09069
43	7/14/2009	1643	AAL	1600	Quality Assurance investigation determined event was not a PD	Y	Y	N/A

					ELDER PILOT DEVIATIONS			
44	8/4/2009	1240	JIA	514	Complainant says he reported it to a CIC, but no evidence he did so. When interviewed by ATO-Safety personnel during their August 2009 visit, he did not provide them with this information, and the data has been subsequently destroyed. Therefore we are unable to verify the event.	UNK	UNK	N
45	8/11/2009	1239	JIA	514	controller (complainant) did not report as the pilot claimed equipment malfunction	N	N	N/A
46	8/26/2009	1245	EGF	4779	Preliminary Pilot Deviation Filed	Y	Y	PEARPCT09112
47	9/9/2009	1550	TRS	261	Preliminary Pilot Deviation Filed	Y	Y	PEARPCT09121
48	9/13/2009	0120	TRS	355	controller failed to report, was investigated upon our request	N	Y	PEARPCT09140
ADDITIONAL PILOT DEVIATIONS FOUND BY OIG INVESTIGATION								
	3/8/2008	1522	CHQ	3086	Preliminary Pilot Deviation Filed	Y	Y	PEARPCT08043
	3/12/2008	1930	UAL	614	Preliminary Pilot Deviation Filed	Y	Y	PEARPCT08049
	3/29/2008	1925	EGF	594	Preliminary Pilot Deviation Filed	Y	Y	PEARPCT08062
	4/29/2008	1434	AWI	4094	Preliminary Pilot Deviation Filed	Y	Y	PEARPCT08085
	6/15/2008	1533	NWA	228	Preliminary Pilot Deviation Filed	Y	Y	PEARPCT08114
	6/15/2008	1601	AWI	3968	Preliminary Pilot Deviation Filed	Y	Y	PEARPCT08115
	6/24/2008	1641	EGF	582	Preliminary Pilot Deviation Filed	Y	Y	PEARPCT08120
	9/22/2008	2009	NWA	232	Preliminary Pilot Deviation Filed	Y	Y	PEARPCT08168
	9/27/2008	2017	NWA	232	Preliminary Pilot Deviation Filed	Y	Y	PEARPCT08169
	10/16/2008	1655	NWA	236	Preliminary Pilot Deviation Filed	Y	Y	PEARPCT08177
	11/10/2008	1807	TYSON	08	Preliminary Pilot Deviation Filed	Y	Y	PEARPCT08190
	2/2/2009	2325	NWA	224	Preliminary Pilot Deviation Filed	Y	Y	PEARPCT09014
	4/14/2009	0021	AAL	1544	Preliminary Pilot Deviation Filed	Y	Y	PEARPCT09042