



# SECURING IRAQ

**MOD**  
Ministry of Defense  
248,450 personnel  
Total 2011 Budget: \$5.5 Billion  
Capital Budget \$170.9 M  
Operating Budget \$5,348.8 M

**ARMY (IA)**  
191,500 personnel  
According to USF-I, force generation for foundational external defense will not be achieved by the end of 2011 because equipment and training lags. U.S. support for equipping, training, and integrating of M1A1 tank and artillery units, as well as mechanized infantry vehicles, will continue through 2013 under OSC-I.

**Challenges/Concerns Noted by USF-I:**

- IA Maintenance and Sustainment: Iraqis do not see themselves well, and their logistics system is immature and too bureaucratic; serious shortfalls in supply-chain management.
- Preparation for Modernization: There is still much work to be done to integrate modern equipment into their formations.
- Developing a Mindset for External Operations: Training centers and schools have achieved MEC for training support of COIN; no shift to conventional operations.
- Infrastructure Development/Maintenance: The United States built fine facilities, but ISF units struggle to maintain them given the current Iraqi procedures.
- 11-01 Plan and OSC-I Transition: More work must be done to set the conditions to transfer mission.

**IRAQI NAVY (IqN)**  
1,800 personnel trained through combined ITAM-Navy and Iraqi efforts

ITAM-Navy reported that the IqN will be prepared to assume full responsibility for offshore critical infrastructure and Iraqi territorial waters before 12/2011.

4 fleet squadrons with a combined 49 operational combat vessels & 10 aircraft

**Challenges/Concerns Noted by USF-I:**

- Long-term sustainment and maintenance.

**TRAINING AND SUPPORT**  
47,000 personnel operating out of 9 general training centers, 14 location commands, and 1 combat training center—all Iraqi-led.  
**Challenges/Concerns Noted by USF-I:**

- Training and equipping efforts, as well as establishment of joint committee to develop mobilization and authorities for KRG forces is on hold.

**ARMY AIR CORPS (IqAAC)**  
2,150 personnel conduct rotary-wing aviation operations (formerly under the IqAF)  
By the end of its mission, USF-I expects the IqAAC will be able to effectively support the IA, ISOF, and GOI ministries with battlefield mobility, casualty evacuation, and limited non-precision ground attack capability for internal security.

**Ground Forces**  
1 Joint Operations Center  
2 Presidential Guard Forces Brigades (protect the PM)  
6 Special Operations battalions (4,200 ISOF personnel)  
14 Independent Protection Battalions (protect the CoM)  
14 IA Divisions: 3 modernized/mechanized, 4 modernized infantry, 7 light infantry

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**AIR FORCE (IqAF)**  
6,000 personnel conduct fixed-wing aviation operations

By end of mission, USF-I expects the IqAF to achieve MEC—Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; ground attack, and development of Iraqi airmen and combat support.

**Challenges/Concerns Noted by USF-I:**

- Airspace control and airlift will not meet MEC before end of USF-I mission.

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**OIL POLICE (OP)**  
28,700 personnel (12,000 below goal)  
The OP is expected to come under increasing pressure to assume responsibility from the IqP for protection of the world's largest petroleum reserves by the end of 2011. Integration of the Sons of Iraq into the OP has been under consideration, but may have been set back by the GOI's focus on higher priorities, Iraqi internal politics, security concerns, and resource constraints.

**Challenges/Concerns Noted by USF-I:**

- Very limited capability; requires great assistance
- Limited capability; requires some assistance
- Functional; requires minimum to no assistance

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**Challenges/Concerns Noted by USF-I:**

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**MOI**  
Ministry of Interior  
513,030 personnel  
Total 2011 Budget: \$6.3 Billion  
Capital Budget \$167.4 M  
Operating Budget \$6,146.0 M

**Ministerial-Level Challenges**

- linking strategic policy and resources with requirements
- timely budget execution
- HR management
- maintenance of Command and Control (C2) systems
- information system expertise
- coordination of first responders

**FACILITIES PROTECTION SERVICE (FPS)**  
97,000 personnel—all transitioning to serve under the MOI

In January, MOI academies began training for FPS personnel; more than 10,600 underwent training this quarter at 13 locations around the country.

**Challenges/Concerns Noted by USF-I:**

- Required December 31, 2011, capability for foundational internal-external defense
- Projected capability at the end of 2011 without DA, EDA, or FEPP

**DEPARTMENT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT (DBE)**  
39,330 personnel assigned; 45,550 authorized

DoD reported that DBE units are moving to address manpower and infrastructure requirements to adequately provide reconnaissance and surveillance along Iraq's borders.

**IRAQI FEDERAL POLICE (FP)**  
45,000 personnel working in conjunction with the IA and IP to supplement security needs of the Iraqi people

A Federal Police 5th Division—which includes the DBE, Port of Entry Units, OP, Electric Police, and FPS—has been proposed, but ISF funding for the equipment needed to fully stand up the division has not been allocated in FY 2011, and the force generation status remains unclear.

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**Department of Border Enforcement**  
Iraqi Police  
Federal Police  
Army  
Air Force  
Navy  
Special Forces  
Strategic Objectives

**Police Force Capabilities**

Police Force	Lead	Man	Train	Equip	Sustain	C-E	ROL	J9 Data	Forensics	PJCC	Emergency Response	Overall Assessment
Iraqi Police	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Federal Police	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
POE	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
ERB	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
DBE	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●

**Annual Security Incidents per 10,000 People, by Province**

Insurgency Period (1/1/2004–2/21/2006)  
Civil-conflict Period (2/22/2006–5/2/2007)  
Post-Surge Period (5/1/2008–12/28/2010)

Over the course of the U.S. "surge" in Iraq (when US forces in-country exceeded 150,000), monthly security incidents decreased by two-thirds. Key surge-related events include:

- 9/2006: Anbar Awakening Council formed
- 1/10/2007: President Bush announces U.S. surge
- 2/14/2007–11/24/2007: Operation Fardh al-Qanoon
- 8/29/2007: Muqtada al-Sadr declares cease-fire
- 3/25/2008–3/31/2008: Battle of Basra
- 3/25/2008–5/21/2008: Battle of al-Sadr City

**SECURING IRAQ**  
U.S. Reconstruction Expenditures To Support the Iraqi Security Forces

**\$8.4 Million per Day**  
Amount the United States has expended to develop the Iraqi Security Forces since IRRF 2 was appropriated

Defense Forces  
Interior Forces  
Related Activities

**PROFESSIONALISM**  
**PRODUCTIVITY**  
**PERSISTENCE**

