


Audit Report



Management of Personnel Assigned to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad, Iraq

Report Number 04-002

June 25, 2004

**Office of the Inspector General
Coalition Provisional Authority**

Acronyms

CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
DoD	Department of Defense
HRM	Human Resource Management
NGO	Non-Government Organization
TDY	Temporary Duty Travel



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

June 25, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMINISTRATOR, COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

SUBJECT: Report on Management of Personnel Assigned to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad (Report No.04-002)

We are providing this report for your information and use. We undertook this review in response to concerns about the apparent lack of controls over the identification and tracking of personnel being deployed to CPA Baghdad.

Comments on the draft of this report were not required. Therefore, no additional comments are necessary.

We appreciate the assistance extended to the staff. Questions should be directed to Mr. Brian Flynn, (703) 343-8953 or Mr. Douglas Ickes, (703) 343-8954. Management may request a formal briefing on the results of this review.

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.
Inspector General
Coalition Provisional Authority

**Office of the Inspector General
Coalition Provisional Authority**

Report Number 04-002

June 25, 2004

(Project No. D2004-DCPAAO-0027)

**Management of Personnel Assigned to the
Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad**

Executive Summary

Introduction: The deployment of civilian and military personnel to support the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in the post-war environment in Iraq began in April 2003. To date, a host of Federal agencies, multiple military organizations, and many non-government organizations (NGOs) have operated in the CPA area of responsibility. Until February 2004, the Military Personnel Center tracked all government personnel (military and civilian). However, by the end of January 2004, many distinct personnel tracking mechanisms appeared that were intended to provide accountability for select groups of individuals. In addition, contractors were tracking their own employees. As of March 8, 2004, the CPA believed it had a total of 1,196 personnel assigned to CPA operations in Baghdad. The CPA had been authorized 2,117 positions. The 1,196 included all military and civilian personnel assigned to CPA operations in Baghdad (including contractors who are working within the Presidential Palace on infrastructure contracts).

Objective: The objectives of this review were to determine whether CPA had control over and insight into the number of civilians assigned to CPA in Baghdad, including both U.S. Government and contractor personnel and whether there were lessons to be learned from CPA's management of civilian personnel in a post-war coalition environment.

Conclusion: The CPA did not have an accurate count of civilian personnel assigned to the CPA operations in Baghdad. In March 2004, CPA officials believe that their rosters were between 90 and 95 percent accurate. With an estimated population of 1,196 government and contractor personnel assigned to the CPA Baghdad, there could be more than 100 individuals not properly accounted for. Several factors have contributed to this condition. First, individuals were able to enter Iraq several different ways, some of which circumvent a primary control established to identify and track new people reporting to CPA Baghdad. Second, components within CPA Baghdad did not adhere to the policies and procedures established by CPA officials when deploying civilians to Baghdad. Third, the short-term nature of assignments, generally 4 to 6 months, presented a management challenge. Lastly, the absence of an interlinked civilian personnel database hindered the efficient management of the rapid deployment of civilians from various agencies and contractors that were needed to meet the CPA mission. As a result, CPA Baghdad may not confidently predict the resources that were needed to support the actual CPA Baghdad workforce, especially in an emergency or contingency operation. This report is being prepared to alert officials to the need for capturing the several important lessons learned from this situation that can be applied to future multi-agency coalitions. There are no recommendations.

Lessons Learned. CPA Inspector General understands that working groups have been established to explore potential lessons learned from the operations of the CPA during its relatively brief existence. We are providing this assessment to those groups for their consideration. Additionally, we believe that the working groups should look to the Modern Defense Civilian Personnel Data System of the Department of Defense as a way of better supporting future joint contingency operations like the Coalition Provisional Authority.

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Background

Reason for Review. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Inspector General was created to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of CPA programs and operations; to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in such programs and operations; and to keep the head of the CPA fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations. We undertook this review in response to concerns about the apparent lack of controls over the identification and tracking of personnel being deployed to CPA Baghdad.

Chronology of Personnel Identification and Tracking. The deployment of civilian and military personnel to support the CPA in the post-war environment began in April 2003. To date, a host of Federal agencies, multiple military organizations, and many non-government organizations (NGOs) have operated in the CPA area of responsibility. Until February 2004, the Military Personnel Center tracked all government personnel (military and civilian). However, by the end of January 2004, many distinct personnel tracking mechanisms appeared that were intended to provide accountability for select groups of individuals. In addition, contractors were tracking their own employees.

Personnel Authorized and Assigned. As of March 8, 2004, the CPA believed it had a total of 1,196 personnel assigned to CPA operations in Baghdad. The CPA had been authorized 2,117 positions. The 1,196 included all military and civilian personnel assigned to CPA operations in Baghdad (including contractors working within the Presidential Palace in Baghdad on infrastructure contracts). This total did not include contractors working in Iraq on individual construction projects or military organizations conducting operations under Combined Joint Task Force 7 control.

Factors Effecting Ability to Control Assigned Personnel. At the initial formation and staffing of the Baghdad portion of the CPA (CPA Baghdad), the CPA Baghdad's personnel office, the Human Resources Management office (HRM Forward) was manned by one individual who was on a 3 month assignment and then replaced. CPA officials stated that CPA senior advisors were responsible for determining their staffing needs for their offices and providing those requirements to HRM Forward, who in turn consolidated the staffing needs and sent them to CPA Washington for action. HRM representatives in Washington contacted agencies throughout the Government and began the process of recruiting personnel to fill CPA positions. However, throughout this process, CPA staffing needs changed constantly in terms of the number of required personnel. There was no known ceiling to the number of civilians authorized to support the CPA.

Objective

The objectives of this review were to determine whether CPA had control over and insight into the number of civilian personnel assigned to CPA Baghdad, both US Government and contractor personnel, and whether there were lessons to be learned from CPA's management of civilian personnel in a post-war coalition environment.

Finding: Accuracy of the Number of Personnel Assigned

The CPA did not have an accurate count of civilian personnel assigned to its operations in Baghdad. In March 2004, CPA officials believe that their rosters are between 90 and 95 percent accurate. With an estimated population of 1,196 government and contractor personnel assigned to the CPA Baghdad, there could be more than 100 individuals not properly accounted for. Several factors have contributed to this condition. First, individuals were able to enter Iraq several different ways, some of which circumvent a primary control established to identify and track new people reporting to CPA Baghdad. Second, components within CPA Baghdad did not adhere to the policies and procedures established by CPA officials when deploying civilians to Baghdad. Third, the short-term nature of assignments, generally 4 to 6 months, presented a management challenge. Lastly, the absence of an interlinked civilian personnel database hindered the efficient management of the rapid deployment of civilians from various agencies and contractors that were needed to meet the CPA mission. As a result, CPA Baghdad may not confidently predict the resources that were needed to support the actual CPA Baghdad workforce, especially in an emergency or contingency operation. This report is being prepared to alert officials to the need for capturing the several important lessons learned from this situation that can be applied to future multi-agency coalitions.

Concerns About Management and Control of Personnel. We undertook this review based on concerns that CPA Baghdad did not have adequate control and visibility over the number of people assigned to activities in Iraq. In discussions with HRM Forward, it was apparent that an accurate count of personnel assigned to CPA Baghdad was not available. HRM Forward officials estimate that 1,196 personnel are permanently assigned to CPA Baghdad, but they are only 90 to 95 percent confident of this estimate. HRM Forward had recognized that this issue was problematic in January 2004 and hired a full-time civilian Human Resources Manager. Additionally, two Department of State Human Resource specialists arrived in Iraq in March to work the issue and prepare for the transition from CPA to Department of State.

Factors Inhibiting Control. In discussing the situation with CPA officials, we determined several factors that inhibited maintaining accurate information on the number of personnel assigned to CPA Baghdad. These factors involved the existence of multiple points of entry into CPA Baghdad, the failure of organizations within CPA Baghdad to follow published procedures with regard to in-processing and out-processing of individuals at CPA Forward locations, the short term nature of the assignments, and the absence of an interlinked civilian personnel database to manage a joint combined civilian force coming from multiple agencies across government and contractors.

Due to a lack of a controlled, centralized entry point into the CPA area of responsibility, civilian personnel were deploying forward in support of the CPA operations from multiple locations. CPA officials stated that if personnel departed Kuwait or other rear area to a forward site, other than Baghdad, such as Al Hilla, Basrah, or Erbil, in support

of CPA Operations there were no reliable procedures to identify and account for these individuals. Additionally, personnel hired to work directly for Iraq Ministries in Baghdad provide limited, if any, information to the CPA in Baghdad or Washington, D.C. For example, during our review we found that an individual can fly from the United States into Jordan and drive across the border without ever reporting his presence to the CPA in Baghdad or Washington, D.C. To exacerbate the situation, those that were coming to the CPA Presidential Palace in Baghdad did not always follow the controls that were in place. The system was circumvented at all levels.

Many CPA personnel and organizations fail to comply with policies and procedures set forth for processing in and out of the CPA Baghdad area of responsibility. Most personnel arriving at CPA Baghdad came through Baghdad International Airport and were bussed to the Palace. A Military Personnel Center representative met the personnel arriving from the airport. The representative explained the check-in process, issued each person a temporary ID, assigned transit billeting, and provided each individual with a copy of a checklist. Further instructions were available on the CPA Intranet. While these procedures were clearly defined and documented, we observed instances where organizations circumvented the process.

Most personnel were detailed to Baghdad in a temporary duty status for a period of 4 to 6 months, rarely was someone assigned for a year or more. Another contributing factor to the situation was the fact that personnel were not formally assigned to a particular location. This together with the large number of transient staff who arrives TDY for as little as 2 days and as many as 45 days further inhibited accountability.

Attempts to Validate Assigned Personnel through Alternative Means. We attempted to validate the accuracy of the number of personnel assigned to CPA Baghdad through alternative means. We spoke with CPA contracting officials responsible for food service to obtain a count of the average number of meals served daily. CPA officials stated that all personnel, military, civilian, and local national would be served meals. Because of this, use of the number of meals served daily would have greatly inflated the estimate of the number of people assigned to CPA Baghdad.

In addition, we learned that the CPA Security Pass and Identification Office had issued over 10,000 CPA security badges and the office did not differentiate between badges provided to permanently assigned personnel and those on temporary duty to CPA Baghdad. Lastly, we determined that the CPA Baghdad network administrator had issued over 3,500 user accounts to individuals to access the system. Although, not everyone assigned to CPA Baghdad was issued an account to access the network, there is no assurance that individuals leaving the country had their account terminated. The network administrator of those assigned permanently did not differentiate temporary personnel to CPA Baghdad.

Impact on Support. The existing infrastructure within the CPA area of operation is straining to support the current workforce. Without an accurate accounting of civilian personnel assigned to CPA Baghdad, senior officials cannot confidently estimate the cost

to support ongoing CPA operations, predict the transition costs associated with the Department of State taking responsibility for operation in July, or anticipate the requirements to care for personnel in an emergency situation.

Increased Need for Accurate Personnel Data. As the CPA begins the transition to the Department of State on July 1, 2004, there should be a heightened urgency and increased priority to gain control over the number of civilian personnel assigned to CPA Baghdad and, more importantly, knowing who will remain or be assigned here under the new organization. Strict adherence to Department of State regulations for U.S. personnel deployed to a foreign country in support of a U.S. Government mission must occur. Transition planning has begun. A draft official manning document with the assignment of individuals to specific positions in the Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office (IRMO), which will succeed CPA, has been established.

Limitations of Corrective Actions Identified to Date. The CPA HRM activity in Washington, DC has developed the “CPA Coalition Provisional Government Human Resources Management Personnel Database.” This database is maintained in Washington, D.C. and can be accessed in CPA Baghdad to record the arrival of new civilian employees and produce management reports. Conceptually this database was to be used to account for all the personnel assigned to CPA and capture general information on all the personnel deployed. This database will not, nor was it initially designed for, replacing the deploying individual’s organizations personnel system. (The deployed individual’s agency still has the responsibility for maintaining the records for career management, pay, and benefits.) However, there are no plans to verify the accuracy of the information in the database. The CPA plans to turn the database over to the Department of State for tracking personnel assigned to the successor organization; it will supplement the database maintained by the Department of State and provide the basis to establish a manning document of the Department of State and other federal civilian employees.

Because of the complexities of activities such as Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the possibility that conflicts in the future will be manned in similar fashions, there is no easy solution or recommendation that will fix the problem of managing human resources in a dynamic, volatile environment. It is in the best interest of the Department of Defense (DoD) to further study and learn from the many challenges faced by CPA and develop procedures to avoid the same pitfalls in future conflicts. Future contingency operations will be more dependent on civilians to provide support as the military transitions its personnel to focus on war fighting capabilities. The lessons learned from the civilian deployment to support Operation Iraqi Freedom should be captured and acted upon with the utmost diligence. The need for interlinked civilian personnel databases for managing a joint combined deployment force composed of all civilian agencies with the capability of uploading a contractor contingent is something to be considered. Additionally, an appropriate process that serves, as a single entry point for all deployed and re-deployed staff should be created, and a greater accountability for compliance with the established procedures should be built into the process. The necessity for an HRM system to be in-place prior to the next such endeavor is warranted.

Lessons Learned. CPA Inspector General understands that working groups exist to further research lessons learned from the operations of the CPA during its relatively brief existence. We are providing this assessment to those groups for their consideration. Additionally, we believe that consideration should be given to the Modern Defense Civilian Personnel Data System of the DoD to better support future joint contingency operations like the CPA.

Appendix A: Scope and Methodology

We performed this review in March 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Our scope was limited to reviewing procedures and processes related to the management of personnel assigned to the CPA in Baghdad, Iraq.

To determine whether the CPA had control over and insight into the number of civilian personnel assigned to CPA Baghdad, both U.S. Government and contractor personnel, and whether there are lessons to be learned from CPA's management of civilian personnel in a post-war coalition environment. We visited the CPA's HRM office, contracting personnel responsible for foodservice, Security Pass and Identification Office, and Network Administrator. At each entity, we interviewed personnel to determine the policies and procedures for management of personnel assigned to the CPA in Baghdad and to determine how those policies and procedures could be improved. Additionally, we corresponded with personnel from the DoD.

Appendix B: Report Distribution

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition

Department of the Army

Assistant Secretary of the Army, Acquisition, Logistics & Technology
Auditor General, Department of the Army

Other Defense Organizations

Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority
Director, Coalition Provisional Authority Program Management Office
Department of Defense Inspector General
Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency

Non-Defense Federal Organization

Office of Management and Budget
General Accounting Office
Department of State
U.S. Agency for International Development
Department of Health and Human Services Inspector General
Department of Commerce Inspector General

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and Ranking Minority Member

Senate Committee on Appropriations
Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
Senate Committee on Armed Services
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
House Committee on Appropriations
House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
House Committee on Armed Services
House Committee on Government Reform
House Subcommittee on Government Efficiency and Financial Management, Committee on Government Reform
House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform
House Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, and the Census, Committee on Government Reform
House International Relations Committee

Appendix C: Audit Team Members

This report was prepared by the Financial Management Division, Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, Coalition Provisional Authority.

John Betar
Brian Flynn
Douglas Ickes