Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U. S. 2 ___ (2012)
R048; No. 10-1219; 4/18/12. There are no limitations on a patent applicant’s ability to introduce new evidence in a 35 U. S. C. §145 action against the Director of the Patent and Trade Office beyond those already present in the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; if new evidence is presented on a disputed question of fact, the district court must make de novo findings that take account of both the new evidence and the administrative record.
|
Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 566 U. S. 2 ___ (2012)
R049; No. 11-88; 4/18/12. The term “individual” as used in the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 encompasses only natural persons and thus does not impose liability against organizations for acts of torture and extrajudicial killing committed under authority or color of law of any foreign nation.
|
Wood v. Milyard, 566 U. S. 2 ___ (2012)
R050; No. 10-9995; 4/24/12. Federal courts of appeals, like district courts, have the authority—though not the obligation—to raise a forfeited timeliness defense to a habeas petition on their own initiative in exceptional cases; but the Tenth Circuit abused its discretion when it dismissed Wood’s petition as untimely after the State deliberately waived its statute of limitations defense.
|
United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U. S. 2 ___ (2012)
R051; No. 11-139; 4/25/12. Title 26 U. S. C. §6501(e)(1)(A), which extends from three to six years the period in which the Government must assess a deficiency against a taxpayer when a taxpayer “omits from gross income an amount . . . in excess of 25 percent” of stated income, does not apply to an overstatement of basis.
|
Hall v. United States, 566 U. S. 2 ___ (2012)
R052; No. 10-875; 5/14/12. Federal income tax liability resulting from a Chapter 12 bankruptcy petitioner’s postpetition farm sale is not incurred by the estate under 11 U. S. C. §503(b) and is neither collectible nor dischargeable in the reorganization plan.
|
Astrue v. Capato, 566 U. S. 2 ___ (2012)
R053; No. 11-159; 5/21/12. In determining whether a child is eligible for Social Security survivors benefits, the Social Security Administration’s interpretation—which is that 42 U. S. C. §§416(h)(2) and (h)(3)(C) entitle biological children to benefits only if they qualify for inheritance from the decedent under state intestacy law, or satisfy one of the statutory alternatives to that requirement—is better attuned to the statute’s text and its design to benefit primarily those supported by the deceased wage earner in his or her lifetime, and is at least a permissible construction entitled to deference under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837.
|
Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U. S. 2 ___ (2012)
R054; No. 10-1472; 5/21/12. Because “interpreter” ordinarily means someone who translates orally from one language to another, the category “compensation of interpreters,” which is among the costs that may be awarded under 28 U. S. C. §1920 to prevailing parties in federal-court lawsuits, does not include the cost of document translation.
|
Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U. S. 2 ___ (2012)
R055; No. 10-1542; 5/21/12. The Board of Immigration Appeals’ refusal to impute a parent’s years of continuous residence or lawful permanent residence (LPR) status to his or her child for purposes of 8 U. S. C. §1229b(a)—which authorizes the Attorney General to cancel the removal of an alien who meets a 5-year LPR status requirement or a 7-year continuous-residency requirement—is based on a permissible construction of §1229b(a).
|
Blueford v. Arkansas, 566 U. S. 2 ___ (2012)
R056; No. 10-1320; 5/24/12. Where a jury was instructed that either it could convict Blueford on one of several offenses—capital murder, first-degree murder, manslaughter, or negligent homicide—or it could acquit him of all of them, and where a mistrial was declared after the jury reported that it was deadlocked on manslaughter but had voted against guilt on capital and first-degree murder, the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar reprosecution of Blueford on the capital and first-degree murder charges.
|
Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 566 U. S. 2 ___ (2012)
R057; No. 10-1042; 5/24/12. In order to establish a violation of a Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act provision, 12 U. S. C. §2607(b)—which prohibits giving and accepting “any portion, split, or percentage of any charge made or received for the rendering of a real estate settlement service . . . other than for services actually performed”—a plaintiff must demonstrate that the allegedly unearned fee was divided between two or more persons.
|
RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U. S. 2 ___ (2012)
R058; No. 11-166; 5/29/12. In this Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, petitioner debtors may not obtain confirmation of a “cramdown” plan over respondent Bank’s objection, see 11 U. S. C. §1129(b)(2)(A), when the plan provides for the sale of collateral free and clear of the Bank’s lien, but does not permit the Bank to “credit-bid” at the sale.
|
Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U. S. 2 ___ (2012) (per curiam)
R059; No. 11-1053; 5/29/12. The evidence at Johnson’s trial was not nearly sparse enough to sustain a due process challenge under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319, which leaves juries broad discretion in deciding what inferences to draw from trial evidence and does not permit the type of fine-grained factual parsing in which the Third Circuit engaged.
|
Reichle v. Howards, 566 U. S. 2 ___ (2012)
R060; No. 11-262; 6/4/12. Petitioner Secret Service agents are entitled to qualified immunity from this 42
U. S. C. §1983 suit with respect to respondent’s claim that he was arrested in retaliation for his political speech, when the law at the time of the arrest did not clearly establish that an arrest supported by probable cause could violate the First Amendment.
|
Armour v. Indianapolis, 566 U. S. 2 ___ (2012)
R061; No. 11-161; 6/4/12. Where Indianapolis adopted a new method for financing public improvement projects, enacted a resolution forgiving the assessment amounts still owed by some homeowners for past projects, and refused to issue refunds to homeowners who had already paid their full assessments, the city’s administrative concerns provided a rational basis for distinguishing between the two groups and thus the distinction did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
|