

HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE

STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL ROBERT F. WILLARD, U.S. NAVY
COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
BEFORE THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
ON U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE

14 APRIL 2011

HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE

Introduction

Chairman Young, Congressman Dicks and Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to provide an update on United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). Today is my second testimony as the Commander of USPACOM. Since the 2010 hearings, much has happened in this increasingly important region. I have travelled throughout the Asia-Pacific visiting a dozen different countries—some multiple times—and gained valuable insight into the extensive contributions by our regional Allies and partners.

What follows is my assessment of the strategic environment and the role of USPACOM forces assigned throughout the region. Included in this testimony is a discussion of the military construction (MILCON) programs that enable these forces to perform their mission effectively while sustaining the quality of life our servicemen and women deserve.

Strategic Environment in the Asia-Pacific

The USPACOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) is vital to U.S. national interests. It spans half the earth and is home to more than three billion people living in three dozen nations—five of which are allied with the U.S. and many more of which are important economic and security partners. The region contains the world's three largest economies, and almost one-third (over \$1 trillion) of U.S. two-way trade in goods and services is with nations in the region. Moreover, much of the world's trade and energy that fuels the world economy moves on Asia's sea and air lines of communication.

The vastness of the region makes permanent and rotational U.S. force presence essential to enabling security and strategic deterrence throughout the region while protecting and defending the homeland. Military construction provides necessary facilities for new weapon systems, supports the Services' evolution to become more efficient and effective, offers warfighters and their families quality-of-life facilities while at home, and renovates existing facilities that are beyond their useful lives. Thus the MILCON projects in this testimony enhance

the capabilities of USPACOM forces that underpin security in this increasingly important and dynamic region.

While the region remains relatively secure and stable, the strategic environment also includes traditional and asymmetric challenges that drive the need for forward presence and the subsequent MILCON recommendations in this testimony. Sustaining the conditions that have underpinned unprecedented prosperity for over six decades remains challenging for a variety of reasons, including the following:

- The threat to the United States and its allies posed by North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities, its proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated technologies, and its potential for instability
- Transnational violent extremist organizations (VEOs) undermine stability and threaten traditional Allies and emerging partners
- China's significant military modernization associated with its unclear intent
- Territorial disputes, and increasingly assertive actions to resolve them, present the potential for conflict and instability
- Increasingly persistent and sophisticated cyber threats that challenge unencumbered operations.
- Transnational criminal activity—to include piracy and trafficking in narcotics and persons—that rejects the rule of law and challenges international order
- Humanitarian crises such as pandemics and famines, as well as natural disasters such as tsunamis, earthquakes, and volcanoes
- Environmental degradation caused by poor resource management, the pillaging of natural resources, and disputes over resource sovereignty

Despite these many challenges, the region remains one of immense opportunity for peaceful growth, cooperation, and prosperity. Realizing such opportunity relies upon continued

U.S. ability and willingness to underwrite security, extend deterrence, and protect the global commons upon which the region's livelihood depends. U.S. military strength, presence, and engagement provide the means to ensure security and peace and avoid confrontation and conflict. Secretary of Defense Gates emphasized this point in Singapore in June 2010: "The strength of the U.S. commitment and deterrent power will be expressed through the continued forward presence of substantial U.S. forces in the region."

USPACOM thus embraces a theater strategy that leverages an evolving force posture. In concert with other government agencies, this posture is designed to simultaneously hedge against traditional and asymmetric challenges as well as advance alliance and partner-nation relationships. Extensive analyses clearly indicate a need to build an integrated posture framework that prioritizes adjustments by maximizing strength, balancing and biasing disposition, and sustaining readiness in all sub-regions (Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Oceania).

Regional Force Posture Assessment. Broadly, the U.S. military in the Asia-Pacific enjoys freedom of action, numerous dependable Allies and partners, and ready access to theater forces (e.g., Hawaii, Guam, and Japan) as well as to global and continental (especially West coast and Alaska garrisoned) forces. Other existing posture strengths include the collocation of command elements in Hawaii, pre-positioned stocks, maintenance support, and several distributed, forward sub-commands.

Current force posture throughout the Asia-Pacific remains heavily influenced by post-World War II- and Cold War-era basing and infrastructure. While maintaining access and capabilities in Northeast Asia remains essential, attaining better access to and support from Allied and partner nations in South and Southeast Asia is increasingly important. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen stated in the 2011 National Military Strategy, "our

presence and alliance commitments remain the key to preserving stability in Northeast Asia, [and] we must also invest new attention and resources in Southeast and South Asia.”

USPACOM strives to continuously optimize its force posture to meet emerging 21st-century conventional and asymmetric threats. Nevertheless, forward forces remain potentially vulnerable to cyber attack on networks and logistics systems. Also, growing anti-access and area-denial challenges make joint capabilities and cooperation imperative; further development of the Air-Sea Battle concept will establish a better institutionalized method to address this threat.

Northeast Asia

Northeast Asia is a complex region with distinct challenges and a wealth of opportunities to positively influence the security environment. It contains many of the most significant economies and militaries in the Asia-Pacific and the world, including Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), China, and Russia. Strong U.S. presence, basing, access, and support in this important sub-region serves to not only protect the homeland but also furthers U.S. interests regarding Allies, partners, extended deterrence, and treaty obligations.

Northeast Asia is home to North Korea, one of the most likely and persistent threats to the U.S. and its Allies. This nation presents a multifaceted problem set for the U.S.-ROK Alliance, the region, and the international community. In addition to the conventional threat it poses to the ROK, its nuclear program, missile development, proliferation activities, provoke-bargain-cheat cycles, add to North Korea’s capacity to disturb peace and stability throughout the region and globally.

Japan and the ROK are strong U.S. Allies that host U.S. forces, enjoy U.S. extended deterrence, and stand with the U.S. in containing North Korea’s aggression and meeting other regional and global security challenges.

Japan. Rapid response in the Asia-Pacific region hinges on flexibility and forward basing of military forces. Despite some recent deliberation related to U.S. basing realignment in Japan, the military relationship and the overall Alliance remain strong. As the Alliance enters its 51st year, it endures as relevant and as a key component of security in Northeast Asia and the larger Asia-Pacific. The U.S. and Japan continue to share similar security interests; therefore continued collaboration is vital to address challenges that include DPRK, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), and support for freedom of action in the maritime domain as well as in space and cyberspace.

Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI). To transform and realign U.S. forces in Japan, the Government of Japan (GOJ) and the U.S. Government agreed in 2005 to implement changes that would allow USPACOM forces to adapt to the changing regional and global security environment. The Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) remains a key transformation goal of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and USPACOM remains committed to its implementation. Major realignment elements include relocating two U.S. air bases from urbanized to rural areas, co-locating U.S. and Japanese command and control capabilities, deploying U.S. missile defense capabilities to Japan in conjunction with their own deployments, and improving operational coordination between U.S. and Japanese forces.

DPRI implementation, in large measure, is on track due to the significant contributions provided by the GOJ. The issue lacking progress and most familiar to members of Congress is the development of a Futenma Replacement Facility and the subsequent move of approximately 8,000 Marines to Guam. While this lack of progress is disappointing, it does not undermine the ability of USPACOM to maintain trained and ready forces in the region or to fulfill U.S. treaty obligations to Japan. Meanwhile, U.S. forces will continue to operate from the existing facility at Futenma Marine Corps Air Station while USPACOM works with Department of Defense leadership and the Japanese to find a solution acceptable to both nations.

Guam. Like the Okinawa-based Marines, Guam-based forces offer the response and deterrence required to enhance security to meet U.S. interests and fulfill commitments to regional U.S. Allies. Per the original agreement, U.S. MILCON funds will also contribute to the facility and infrastructure construction costs on Guam to support the relocating Marines and their dependents. In addition, investments will be needed to improve off-base Guam infrastructure, such as roads and bridges critical to the successful movement of materiel to the planned Marine Corps installation.

The FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act did not include \$320 million for three projects that were submitted in the President's Budget that support the move of Marines from Okinawa to Guam. The reasons for not funding the three priorities are explained in the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee on the Armed Services. Currently, the U.S. and Japanese governments continue to reaffirm agreements and provide associated funding, including the second Japanese funding increment of \$498 million to support the move of Marines to Guam.

Also, recent approval of the Programmatic Agreement in the National Historic Preservation Act Section 106 process will enable DPRI-related construction to begin. Therefore, for FY2012 the Marines are resubmitting requests for North Ramp Utilities improvement and Finegayan Water Utilities & Site Preparation for a total of \$156 million to support U.S. contribution to the 2006 Realignment Roadmap. The Finegayan project was reduced by \$70 million to include only the water distribution infrastructure. The funding for these projects is critical to the success of the DPRI roadmap and an important signal of U.S. commitment to treaty obligations with Japan.

The Republic of Korea. The U.S.-ROK Alliance remains strong and is critical to U.S. strategy and military force posture in Northeast Asia and the region. This Alliance is also transforming to ensure it matures as an effective contributor to Peninsula and regional security.

Current initiatives are underpinned by the transition of military wartime operational control of the ROK to its own forces during peacetime and war by the end of 2015. Overall, this transformation effort is designed to improve responsiveness to an evolving peninsular, regional, and global security environment. To this end, the transformation must ensure U.S. forces, which are stationed on the Korean Peninsula to deter North Korea's aggression and respond to North Korea's hostility, are also accessible for regional and global employment. Further, the transformation will ultimately support the ROK military's continued development of extra-peninsular capabilities and capacities, and enable additional contributions like those seen recently in the Gulf of Aden combating piracy, providing peacekeeping forces to Haiti and Lebanon, and in Afghanistan leading a Provincial Reconstruction Team.

USPACOM posture transformation in the ROK entails multiple efforts. Projects for the Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan Relocation Plan include relocating U.S. troops out of downtown Seoul, returning the majority of Yongsan Army Garrison to the ROK government, and consolidating U.S. forces into two primary hubs south of Seoul. This effort sustains a strong U.S. combat presence on the Peninsula while reducing force presence in major urban centers like Seoul. Of note, this realignment is funded largely by the ROK, but MILCON funds are needed for some facility construction and infrastructure developments. While the Services are not submitting MILCON projects related to transformation in FY2012, additional, important projects will be submitted in future fiscal years.

Trilateral Cooperation. Trilateral security cooperation between the U.S., ROK, and Japan also continues to improve. Building on longstanding efforts to enhance policy coordination and strategic dialogue among the three countries, Secretary Clinton met with Foreign Ministers Maehara and Kim here in Washington on December 6, 2010, to discuss ways to address enduring and emerging challenges. When the devastating earthquake and tsunami hit Japan, the ROK demonstrated unprecedented support by immediately dispatching rescue

teams and sending emergency supplies. That said, there are outstanding political, military, and historical impediments to the Japan-ROK relationship that must be overcome. The shared values and common interests, as well as the financial resources, logistical capabilities, and planning potential to address complex contingencies throughout the region, make expanding this trilateral partnership a worthy effort. Encouraging steps are also apparent in the burgeoning trilateral relationships between the U.S., Japan, and Australia, and between the U.S., Japan, and India.

The People's Republic of China (PRC). China's rise will largely define the Asia-Pacific environment in the 21st century. As noted in the 2010 National Security Strategy, "We welcome a China that takes on a responsible leadership role in working with the United States and the international community to advance priorities like economic recovery, confronting climate change, and nonproliferation. We will monitor China's military modernization program and prepare accordingly to ensure that U.S. interests and allies, regionally and globally, are not negatively affected. More broadly, we will encourage China to make choices that contribute to peace, security, and prosperity as its influence rises."

In support of this broader national strategy toward China, forward-postured USPACOM forces are focused on deterrence and reassurance missions as they apply to China and U.S. allies and security partners in the region. In addition, USPACOM's interactions with China assist the Administration's broader goals by contributing to an overall military-to-military relationship that is healthy, stable, reliable and continuous. Such a relationship is important to avoid misperception, miscommunication, and miscalculation while it expands opportunities for cooperation where our security interests overlap. However, our military relationship with China continues to suffer from an on-again/off-again cycle of interactions which limits its ability to accomplish the above tasks. China suspended bilateral military relations following our arms sales to Taiwan in January 2010 and restarted them in fall 2010. We look forward to continuing

the progress made in recent months which includes Secretary Gates' successful visit in January of this year.

China's Military Modernization Program. Beginning in the mid-1990s, China's peacetime military modernization program has progressed at a rapid rate. While force modernization is understandable in light of China's growing regional and global roles and accompanying requirements, the scope and pace of its modernization without clarity on China's ultimate goals remains troubling. For example, China continues to accelerate its offensive air and missile developments without corresponding public clarification about how these forces will be utilized. Of particular concern is the expanding inventory of ballistic and cruise missiles (which include anti-ship capability) and the development of modern, fourth- and fifth-generation stealthy combat aircraft. In conjunction, China is pursuing counter-space and -cyber capabilities that can be used to not only disrupt U.S. military operations, but also to threaten the space- and cyber-based information infrastructure that enables international communications and commerce.

Absent clarification from China, its military modernization efforts hold significant implications for regional stability. The region is developing its own conclusions about why the People's Liberation Army (PLA) continues to expand its ability to project power outside China's borders, and to range both U.S. forces and U.S. Allies and partners in the region with new anti-access and area-denial weaponry. Of growing concern is China's maritime behavior. China's recent official statements and actions in what Beijing calls its "near seas" represent a direct challenge to accepted interpretations of international law and established international norms. While China does not make legal claims to this entire body of water, it does seek to restrict or exclude foreign, in particular, U.S., military maritime and air activities in the "near seas" - an area that roughly corresponds to the maritime area from the Chinese mainland out to the "first island chain" (described, generally, as a line through Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and Indonesia)

and including the Bohai Gulf, Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea. Chinese naval and maritime law enforcement vessels have been assertive in recent years in trying to advance China's territorial claims in the South China and East China Seas which has resulted U.S. partners and allies in East Asia seeking additional support and reassurance to balance and curb the Chinese behavior. Many of China's maritime policy statements and claims stand in contrast to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The U.S. has consistently sought the appropriate balance between the interests of countries in controlling activities off their coasts with the interests of all countries in protecting freedom of navigation. China has questioned whether a non-party may assert such rights under UNCLOS, a baseless argument but one that would be removed if the U.S. was a party to UNCLOS.

The current situation in the Taiwan Strait remains stable as tensions have declined in recent years; however, the Taiwan issue remains a challenge to long-term regional stability. China refuses to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan question. As China's military modernization proceeds, the cross-Strait military balance continues to shift in the mainland's favor. U.S. policy in support of a peaceful resolution remains consistent and clear. We are committed to our one-China policy, based on the three U.S.-China communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act. We do not support Taiwan independence, and would oppose unilateral changes, by either side, to the status quo.

Russia. Russia's Pacific armed forces have not re-emerged from their post-Cold War decline. Moscow is nonetheless attempting to reassert influence in the region through increased naval and strategic air force operations, cyberspace activities, and arms sales to the region's emerging and rising nations. That said, USPACOM enjoys a relatively positive military-to-military relationship with Russia, especially between each country's Pacific Fleets.

Mongolia. Mongolia endures as a small but strong partner in Northeast Asia. It continues to demonstrate support for U.S. regional and global policy objectives—especially

those linked to the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative and security operations in Afghanistan—while managing positive relations with neighbors China and Russia.

Northeast Asia Force Posture Assessment. Strategic deterrence in the USPACOM AOR is concentrated in Northeast Asia where the great majority of U.S. force posture is based. Although the overall combined strength in this sub-region is formidable, there remain areas of concern such as ballistic missile defense and regional contingency support. While both the U.S. and its Northeast Asian Allies and partners have invested in the technical capabilities required to mount effective defenses against ballistic missile attack, the broader missile defense of the region remains problematic, especially in response to a large-scale attack. Further, while Taiwan's military strength is currently sufficient to deter full-scale amphibious or air assault by China, Taiwan's ability to maintain that capability will hinge, in large measure, on whether Taiwan continuously invests in upgraded systems. Lastly, while U.S. military posture in the Asia-Pacific has traditionally focused on the sea, undersea, air, and land domains, the modern realities of warfare demand that it defend against challenges to operate freely in the space and cyberspace.

Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia is a diverse sub-region, rich in natural resources, and strategically located at the crossroads of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. It is host to a mix of democratic and authoritarian governments, prosperity and poverty, , disparate military capabilities, and significant human capital potential. Prospects for continued development, increased security, and regional integration are promising, but the sub-region presents significant security challenges. China's increasing engagement in this sub-region—which, in many cases, is aimed at supplanting U.S. influence—as well as its expansive claims to, and growing assertiveness in, the South China Sea are two notable challenges. Southeast Asia is also home to transnational challenges and threats that include violent extremism, piracy, refugee migrations, and

transnational crime such as narcotics and human trafficking. Additionally, this sub-region is particularly susceptible to natural disasters such as typhoons, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, floods, and tsunamis.

The myriad of challenges faced by U.S. Allies and partners in Southeast Asia converge with U.S. interests; therefore strengthening defense partnerships is important to regional security. To further military interoperability and build regional capacity to respond to these challenges, the establishment of foundational information, logistics, and technology exchange agreements with these Allies and partners is important.

In response to the growing threat posed by VEOs, USPACOM supports improving the CT capabilities with security assistance programs, executed in partnership with the Department of State and embassy country teams, designed to build host-nation capacity and capability. Foreign Military Financing—the program for funding the acquisition of U.S. military materiel, services, and training that support regional stability goals—has been particularly important to supporting partners engaged in combating violent extremism, especially the Philippines and Indonesia. Additionally, International Military Education and Training funding has been very valuable to establishing the network of relationships that underpin cooperative success and access to leadership in Southeast Asia.

Philippines. The U.S. and the Philippines share democratic values, a long and unique history, and a desire to contribute to regional security. Underpinned by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the U.S.-Philippines Alliance remains important to U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific. A significant effort in the Philippines is conducted by Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P). This task force operates in support of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) against the VEO threat posed mainly by the Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamaiya in Southern Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago Region. The task force has enjoyed significant success advising, training, exercising with, and informing the AFP, and contributed to

the killing or capture of a significant portion of VEO leadership, the denial of safe havens to extremists, and the enhancement of quality of life for local populations. USPACOM engages in many other ways with the Philippines—to include the Joint Staff-sponsored Exercise BALIKATAN—to help shape the AFP into a force capable of responding to various natural disasters as well as border and self-defense (particularly important regarding maritime security and sea lines of communications).

Thailand. Thailand is an important Southeast Asian Ally and engagement partner, with whom USPACOM intends to further strengthen and broaden the Alliance. The U.S. and Thailand have worked together to bolster regional stability and security through cooperation on humanitarian and disaster relief, peacekeeping training, and counter-proliferation. This past year, the United States and Thailand partnered to deploy two Thai naval vessels, with U.S. Navy personnel aboard, to join Combined Task Force-151 combating piracy off the Horn of Africa. The Royal Thai Army, working with the United States, also deployed a full battalion of peacekeepers to Darfur to assist with UN humanitarian relief operations. Our relationship has even broken new ground in the field of public health, where U.S. and Thai military medical professionals have worked to combat infectious diseases from malaria to HIV. Further, U.S. forces benefit from our mutually beneficial relationship with Thailand, which allows access and engagement in an important geo-strategic location. Further the broad access granted to U.S. Forces to logistical facilities, ports, airfields and training areas is crucial to enabling regional force projection and contingency response. The premier Exercise COBRA GOLD is a Thailand-hosted USPACOM multilateral exercise that includes seven participating nations (U.S., Thailand, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia) and observers from over 15 additional nations. COBRA GOLD is just one of many military exercises that we co-host with the Thais, each of which bolsters unique capabilities within our forces and develops key areas of interoperability with our Thai allies and other partners.

Singapore. The U.S.-Singapore relationship has matured significantly in the past six years and contributes in many ways to enhanced regional security. In 2005, Singapore and the U.S. advanced the relationship with the signing the Strategic Framework Agreement that identifies the two nations as “Major Security Cooperation Partners.” Singapore hosts transiting U.S. Navy ships and deployed personnel, works with U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and plays a leading role in the multi-national, counter-piracy, Combined Task Force in the Gulf of Aden.

Indonesia. The relationship between USPACOM and Indonesia—the world's fourth most populous nation, third largest democracy, and largest Muslim-majority country—continues to mature. Following a decade of political and economic reform, Indonesia has emerged as a vibrant democracy, increasingly confident about its leadership role in Southeast Asia and the developing world, particularly in disaster risk reduction, HA/DR, and peacekeeping operations. Indonesia, along with Japan, recently demonstrated its leadership role in building regional capacity for humanitarian assistance by co-hosting the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum Disaster Relief Exercise.

After years of limited engagement with the Indonesian Armed Forces, an increase in transparency and pace of institutional reforms have recently provided impetus to renew, advance, and broaden the U.S.-Indonesia military-to-military relationship. In recognition of Indonesia's pledges to protect human rights and advance military accountability, in July 2010, Secretary Gates noted that after a 12-year hiatus, the U.S. intends to begin a measured and gradual program of security cooperation activities with Indonesian Army Special Forces (KOPASSUS) within the limits of U.S. law.

Malaysia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Brunei and Timor-Leste. The U.S. has extensive interests across the rest of Southeast Asia, and USPACOM seeks to continue maturing military relations with Malaysia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Brunei, and Timor-Leste. Malaysia maintains a strong leadership role in the region especially combating terrorism and

enhancing maritime security. Military relations with Vietnam continue to grow in areas such as disaster management, conflict resolution, personnel recovery, medical capability, and trafficking in persons. Cambodia is emerging as a strong supporter of U.S. policy in the region, and activities with Laos, Brunei and Timor-Leste have expanded over the past year.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Focused efforts by the President and Secretaries Clinton and Gates have set the conditions for increased security cooperation with ASEAN. Accordingly, USPACOM now actively seeks opportunities to support ASEAN initiatives that complement developing coordinated, multilateral approaches to maintaining regional security. ASEAN and USPACOM have several convergent interests that include humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, maritime security, terrorism, and peacekeeping. With an evolved scope and influence, ASEAN and its offshoots (ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus, and the East Asia Summit) offer a framework to guide regional efforts to secure the commons and underpin cooperation across governmental institutions.

Burma. Burma presents a number of challenges to regional security, including violence between Burmese military forces and various domestic ethnic armies which sparks significant, refugee flows into Thailand; a maritime border dispute with Bangladesh, narcotics and human trafficking, and the potential for rapid spread of pandemic disease. Of increasing concern is Burma's role in regional weapons proliferation, evidenced by increasing defense cooperation and procurement from the North Korea, in violation of several UNSCRs. In addition, Burma's government continues to rule without respect for democracy or basic human rights. The U.S.-Burma military-to-military relationship remains suspended as a matter of U.S. policy and public law.

Engagement Programs. Two significant engagement programs USPACOM employs are PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP and PACIFIC ANGEL. They are designed to enhance regional stability by building partner-nation resiliency; focus on growing multilateral capacities and

capabilities in the areas of consequence management, civic assistance, and HA/DR. In 2010, U.S. Naval Ship *MERCY*, with personnel from ten nations, successfully accomplished this mission during a five-month deployment to Vietnam, Cambodia, Timor-Leste, and Indonesia. The mission treated over 110,000 patients, conducted scores of community relations projects, and completed many engineering and infrastructure projects. In 2011 PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP will return to Oceania aboard *USS CLEVELAND*. PACIFIC ANGEL, meanwhile, utilizing C-17 aircraft, cared for tens of thousands of patients and completed several medical and civic action projects in the Philippines, Vietnam, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka.

Southeast Asia Force Posture Assessment. U.S. force posture in Southeast Asia is achieved almost entirely with deployed U.S. forces, which is a costly and inefficient way to achieve presence and conduct the requisite security and influence activities. Singapore, which allows a modest mix of U.S. service capabilities, is the only exception in the region.

Expanding U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia is a mid- to long-term prospect. In general, the Philippines remains restrictive regarding U.S. military access, except for JSOTF-P CT support which operates at the invitation of the Philippine government. Thailand has permitted consistent access to its military facilities for transient and exercise-related operations, but any additional force presence would require thorough discussions with our Thai allies.

South Asia

The South Asian sub-region is dominated by India, an emerging U.S. strategic partner, and also includes Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bhutan. While there are prospects for enduring peace and prosperity, this sub-region is challenged by historical animosity between India and Pakistan, contested borders between India and China, and transnational threats that include terrorism, WMD proliferation, piracy, and narcotics trafficking. The sub-region is also prone to a wide array of natural disasters and lacks the resources and

capabilities to effectively respond. This is exacerbated by the absence of a strong multilateral security structure.

The encroachment of piracy emanating from Somalia into the USPACOM AOR in South Asia is a growing concern. This issue poses a particular threat to the vast sea lines of communication that span the Indian Ocean. As a result of this expanding problem, USPACOM seeks to partner with India to counter this threat.

India. In July 2010 at the Asia Society, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Flournoy characterized the U.S.-India relationship as follows: “This bond is grounded in common democratic values and converging interests that make India and U.S. natural partners. The U.S. and India have an overarching shared interest in promoting global stability and security.” Given the numerous areas where U.S. and Indian interests converge, plus many shared national values, a strong India-U.S. partnership is important to future South Asian security.

Cooperation is especially noteworthy in the areas of counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and maritime security. The recent removal of Indian defense- and space-related industries from the U.S. Entity List not only recognizes India’s record of responsible stewardship of sensitive technologies but further enables bilateral cooperation in areas of mutual interests.

Nevertheless, India’s historic leadership of the non-alignment movement and desire to maintain strategic autonomy somewhat constrain cooperation at a level USPACOM desires. The U.S.-India relationship remains challenged by a degree of suspicion fueled by Cold War-influenced perceptions, complicated Indian political and bureaucratic processes, and the U.S.-Pakistan relationship.

Relations with both India and Pakistan are vital to U.S. national interests and cannot be addressed in isolation. To that end, the leadership and staffs of United States Central

Command and USPACOM continue to engage in order to ensure a coordinated strategic approach that best meets U.S. interests.

Maldives, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. The U.S. has extensive interests throughout the rest of South Asia. USPACOM is working to advance relations with Maldives, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Collectively, these countries are important collaborators with the U.S. for combating terrorism and transnational criminal activity. South Asia is susceptible to natural disasters, but these nations lack the national resources and capacity to respond and therefore require significant assistance from the international community to respond to such contingencies. Toward that end, USPACOM is working with South Asian militaries to build capacity so that they may better address the challenges in their sub-region.

USPACOM is helping the Maldives address the growing threat from Somali piracy and transnational crime. In Nepal, USPACOM's focus is humanitarian assistance and efforts to support the peaceful integration of members of the Maoist People's Liberation Army into the Nepalese security forces. Bangladesh continues to partner with the U.S. to enhance regional security, and USPACOM has initiated multiple programs to improve Bangladesh's civil-military trust, transparency, and cooperation. Engagement with Sri Lanka is limited to humanitarian assistance until allegations of human rights abuses are resolved.

Violent Extremism. Violent extremism is among the most pervasive and urgent challenges in South Asia. VEOs are associated with a wide-range of activities, which include supporting insurgencies that seek political autonomy and fomenting conflict between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan as a means of spreading radical Islamic ideology. Consequently, USPACOM continues to expand its relationships with host-nation militaries and CT agencies to increase regional capacities to counter this threat.

Responding to VEOs requires a comprehensive and cooperative CT strategy focused on developing CT capacity with India and other South Asian partners, particularly regarding the

threat posed by Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). LeT involvement in the November 2008 attacks on Mumbai, India, validates India's concerns regarding terrorist threats originating from outside India. Significantly, LeT deliberately targets westerners and specifically engages coalition forces in Afghanistan. USPACOM is keenly aware of the threat posed by this terrorist organization and continues to develop a coordinated multi-national and U.S. interagency approach to address this global threat.

South Asia Force Posture Assessment. USPACOM force posture in South Asia is relatively limited, even though this sub-region is significant and faces various challenges. The only continuous U.S. force presence in the region is at Diego Garcia. These forces are primarily prepositioned ships used for rapid response but are not typically used for routine training or engagement. For the most part, U.S. military engagement in South Asia is achieved with transient and deployed forces and PACOM Augmentation Teams (PATs); however, plans are underway to expand these teams to assist host nations in their counterterrorism efforts.

Oceania

U.S. Ally Australia and, to a lesser extent New Zealand, are the most prominent forces in Oceania. The sub-region's challenges are generally associated with numerous Pacific island countries spread across the South Pacific. In concert with other U.S. Government agencies, Allies, and partners, USPACOM seeks an Oceania sub-region that cooperates and collaborates to solve regional and international security challenges, maintains capable security or defense forces that abide by international norms, and effectively manages resources. USPACOM strives to maximize Maritime Domain Awareness and information sharing, assists with the development of responsive decision-making architectures, contributes to improved maritime interdiction capabilities, and cooperates to ensure the existence of, and adherence to, appropriate legal authorities.

Oceania's economies are largely reliant on fishing and other natural resources, and tourism. These Pacific island countries are also vulnerable to illegal activities such as illicit drug trade, human and weapons trafficking, smuggling of goods, illegal fishing, and other transnational crimes related to under-governed spaces within the maritime domain. Sub-region national capacity to conduct surveillance and police respective exclusive economic zones is uniformly limited.

A coordinated effort to assist with sub-regional challenges is the Oceania Maritime Security Initiative. Under this program, U.S. Navy vessels already transiting the region embark U.S. Coast Guard shipriders to support maritime domain awareness and information sharing between the Coast Guard and five Pacific island countries (Republic of the Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, Tonga, and Kiribati). PACOM and the Coast Guard are currently reviewing the possibility of embarking law enforcement representatives from these five Pacific island countries.

Natural disasters are frequent and challenge domestic and regional HA/DR capacities and require coordinated international response assistance. In that vein, the 2011 PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP mission will deliver assistance to the people of the Micronesia, Tonga, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, and Timor-Leste.

Australia. The U.S.-Australia alliance, which marks its 60th anniversary this year, comprises the most significant partnership in the Oceania sub-region, and indeed one of the most significant in the entire Asia-Pacific. Australia remains a resolute, capable Ally that is firmly committed to enhancing global and regional security – it is the largest non-NATO contributor of forces to the coalition efforts in Afghanistan -- and to providing assistance throughout the Pacific. Australia is significant to the entire AOR; its stature throughout the region is expanding in multiple ways. An especially promising relationship is developing

between Australia, Japan, and the U.S., which will advance multilateral security efforts throughout the region.

Australia values advancing defense cooperation with the U.S., particularly through training events and acquisition programs. This year, TALISMAN SABRE—a large-scale, biennial, combined-arms exercise that focuses on strengthening U.S.-Australia military-to-military capability—will occur with the participation of over 20,000 U.S. and Australian military personnel. U.S. and Australian militaries also collaborate extensively in areas such as information sharing; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; HA/DR; and most recently space and cyber security.

New Zealand. New Zealand is also a recognized leader in Oceania. Our two nations share many security concerns such as terrorism, maritime security, transnational crime, and proliferation of WMD. While New Zealand's nuclear policies preclude a formal resumption of our alliance, we have close defense cooperation and information sharing with New Zealand, and value New Zealand's contribution of its forces to security operations throughout the Asia-Pacific as well as Afghanistan. New Zealand remains active in security initiatives, from stabilization efforts in Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands, to operations in Korea, Sudan, and throughout the Middle East. New Zealand has also contributed its multi-role maritime patrol vessel to regional, multilateral HA/DR operations. Additionally, the New Zealand Defense Force supports National Science Foundation efforts in Antarctica by serving as the primary staging area for the multinational Operation DEEP FREEZE.

Compact Nations. USPACOM partners with three Compact Nations: the Federated States of Micronesia, The Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau. U.S. obligations to these nations under the Compacts of Free Association are met through implementation of Homeland Defense planning and preparation. The Compacts provide these nations with critical economic assistance. In return, the U.S. gains strategically important

access. Within this framework of authority and responsibility, the United States is entitled to significant access privileges in these nations and retains the right to deny access to the military forces of other nations.

Oceania Force Posture Assessment. Current U.S. military force posture in Oceania is limited, but it includes facilities in the Marshall Islands, joint facilities in Australia, and operations by occasional transiting or deployed forces. Due to the sub-region's geography, U.S. force presence is largely limited to maritime forces and occasional HA/DR efforts. Australia is supportive of extensive visitation and engagement by U.S. forces and has recently indicated an interest in doing more to facilitate USPACOM regional posture. The U.S. and Australia are considering forms of access, supply support, joint training, and rotational presence.

Exercise and Engagement Programs

In order to maintain ready forces and to plan, train, and exercise to accomplish the full range of military contingencies, USPACOM requires annual Congressional support for its Joint Training and Exercise Program (JTEP). This essential program is comprised of 18 major exercises and involves joint military forces, interagency activities, and 27 of 36 USPACOM partner nations. JTEP is funded by the Combatant Command Exercise and Engagement Program Fund, more commonly known as CE2, which directly influences USPACOM's ability to conduct directed and opportunity-based Joint training exercises and theater security engagement events in the Pacific region. Thus, Congressional support for the CE2 program plays a vital role in maintaining security not only in the USPACOM AOR, but in Combatant Commands worldwide. USPACOM also supports improving and enabling realistic joint training through the Pacific Joint Training Strategy. The Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) is used to conduct training and to support joint exercises and mission rehearsals.

A new interagency program is the Global Security Contingency Fund, which will provide an integrated State and Defense capacity-building tool for Allies and partners. By joining

resources of both Departments, the U.S. can more effectively and efficiently align priorities and integrate planning to enhance U.S. Ally and partner capabilities.

Military Construction Sustainment

MILCON is another important enabler of ready forces in the Pacific. Because of the MILCON Subcommittee's support in the past, the USPACOM MILCON program continues to meet transformation, operational readiness, and quality-of-life requirements. Military construction projects for readiness and quality of life are discussed below. The two other significant MILCON programs—DPRI and ROK transformation—are included in the previous Japan and ROK sections, respectively.

Readiness. In addition to the MILCON required to implement transformation initiatives in the Pacific, USPACOM Service Components continue efforts to sustain readiness at their major installations (i.e., those facilities with a military-civilian population of more than 2,500 personnel). For FY2012, the Service Components in the Pacific seek a total of \$1.6 billion to sustain the readiness capabilities of their installations. The items included below are the significant MILCON requests for FY2012.

U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC). USARPAC maintains ten major installations throughout the Pacific, including those in Alaska, Hawaii, ROK, and Japan. MILCON funds will help ensure USARPAC soldiers are trained and equipped to enable full spectrum operations. Thus USARPAC seeks \$297 million for FY2012 readiness-related MILCON programs, of which \$114 million is requested for an aviation task force hangar at Ft. Wainwright, Alaska. Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, requires \$78 million for phase two of an engineer brigade complex and for tactical vehicle parking. Wheeler Army Airfield in Hawaii requires \$73 million to complete the first phase of a combat aviation brigade complex. Schofield Barracks in Hawaii requires a \$32 million military vehicle wash facility.

U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT). PACFLT manages five major naval facilities throughout the AOR and has operational forces at several installations on the West coast of the U.S. mainland. PACFLT installations provide vital forward presence for the world's largest fleet, including the homeport of the only forward-deployed aircraft carrier (in Japan). Readiness MILCON requirements total \$229 million in FY2012. Two naval bases in Washington State require \$160 million in support of the strategic weapons facility. California's requirement totals \$77 million at the naval bases in Coronado and Ventura County for an aircraft maintenance facility and aircrew training facility, respectively. Finally, a \$10 million electrical upgrade and a \$7 million electronics shop conversion in Hawaii are essential for PACFLT's readiness requirements in FY2012.

U.S. Pacific Air Forces (PACAF). Nine major PACAF installations are located in the region, stretching from Alaska through Hawaii and Guam to Japan and Korea. This web of air bases provides USPACOM integrated expeditionary Air Force capabilities to conduct their many peacetime and wartime missions. The Air Force continues its plan to make Guam the hub for strike and refueling assets in the Asia-Pacific and requests \$212 million for FY2012. Guam has also been building projects to establish the Pacific Regional Training Center and seeks \$29 million to continue this effort.

U.S. Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC). MARFORPAC manages nine major installations located in Arizona, California, Hawaii, and Japan. MARFORPAC installations in the Asia-Pacific provide the launching point for forward deployed combat ready Marine forces both ashore and afloat. MILCON projects supporting MARFORPAC readiness is expected to cost \$788 million. Vehicle Maintenance, a Mountain Warfare Training Center and Land Expansion will cost \$44 million in 29 Palms, California. Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, requires \$162 million for two aircraft maintenance hangars and infrastructure improvements. A total of \$287 million for construction at Camp Pendleton Marine Corps Base, California, is requested to

include projects to support the arrival of the MV-22 and a \$29 million Infantry Squad battle Course Defense Range. Finally, \$57 million will be used to construct an airfield operations complex at Marine Corps Base Hawaii.

Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The vastness of the Pacific AOR increases the importance of providing and sustaining sufficient forward-based logistics infrastructure. The services and materiel that DLA provides to the Pacific is a critical enabler. DLA requests \$105 million for readiness related projects. Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam in Hawaii requests \$14 million to upgrade refueling truck parking and to reconfigure a warehouse to operate more effectively, which will result in long-term cost savings. Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, requests \$17 million to upgrade a rail line to improve refueling capabilities. Naval Base Coronado, California, needs \$22 million to replace fuel storage tanks and pipelines. The fourth increment of funding to replace a fuel storage facility at Naval Base Point Loma, California, requires \$27 million.

Quality of Life. Quality of Life for active duty soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and their dependents continues to be a key enabler and retention factor for these Americans serving overseas—often thousands of miles and many time zones away from family and loved ones. In FY2012, \$620 million will ensure adequate housing, medical, education, family support, and recreation opportunities are provided to these men, women, and their families. The following include the significant projects:

Bachelor Housing. In FY2012, USPACOM requests \$254 million for five barracks projects. Specifically, the Air Force plans to construct barracks in Osan, Korea, and Eielson Air Force Base and Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, worth \$165 million. The Army requests \$89 million for new barracks at Camp Henry and Camp Carroll in Korea.

Family Housing. USPACOM Service components have made tremendous strides using MILCON and the Military Family Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) to renovate and replace

antiquated housing throughout USPACOM. While MHPI has accelerated the pace of modernization, MILCON is still required overseas in Japan and Korea since privatization is not authorized in these foreign countries.

In FY2012, USPACOM requests \$113 million for family housing. Specifics for each Component are as follows: PACAF seeks \$45 million to improve over 1,300 homes at Misawa and Kadena Air Bases in Japan. The Navy requests \$45 million to improve 219 homes at Yokosuka, Atsugi, and Sasebo Naval Bases in Japan. MARFORPAC requests \$23 million to completely renovate 76 homes at Iwakuni Air Station in Japan.

Medical. Providing outstanding medical care in high-quality facilities continues to be an important priority. Although no medical projects are being submitted in the USPACOM AOR due to more pressing needs in other areas, several non-MILCON-level projects will be executed in FY2012. Additionally, a comprehensive medical needs assessment for all services in Hawaii is currently being conducted to better enable joint planning of future projects.

Family Support and Recreation. The Army requests \$26 million in Hawaii to expand an existing fitness center and build a new pool and \$18 million for a new Child Development Center for elementary school children. The Marine Corps seeks \$19 million for a multi-use recreational field and \$24 million for a child development center at 29 Palms, California. The Navy asks for \$47 million to build a new fitness center at Naval Base Coronado, California.

USPACOM Organizations

The following units uniquely contribute to the USPACOM mission:

Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC). The PACOM JIOC is the central hub for intelligence across the theater, responsible for managing intelligence requirements at the strategic level and providing operational support to Components and Subordinate Commands. The size and complexity of the Asia-Pacific demand a federated intelligence approach, leveraging the intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance contributions of all USPACOM intelligence enterprises. The JIOC also partners with the offices of the Director of National Intelligence, the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, and national and allied intelligence agencies and centers. In addition to traditional sources and methods, open source Intelligence is an area that can provide critical insights and understanding with modest, targeted resources.

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS). APCSS supports USPACOM multi-national security cooperation and capacity-building efforts through international executive education and tailored assistance programs that educate and connect key regional security practitioners. APCSS brings together military and interagency civilian representatives to identify cooperative solutions to security challenges. These communities of interest include vice presidents, ministers of defense and foreign affairs, chiefs of defense, and ambassadors.

Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC). JPAC's mission is to achieve the fullest possible accounting of all Americans missing as a result of past conflicts. JPAC successfully accomplished 75 investigation and recovery operations globally last year and is projected to execute 75 investigation and recovery operations in 2011. Expanded operations will begin in FY 2012 as JPAC begins the path to the congressionally mandated 200 annual identifications. Discussions between JPAC and the governments of India and the Philippines continue in an effort to resume investigation and recovery operations in those countries. Meanwhile, operations in North Korea and Burma remain suspended.

Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-West). JIATF-West is the USPACOM Executive Agent for countering drug-related transnational crimes in the Asia-Pacific. This unique mission provides intelligence support and partner-nation capacity building. JIATF-West currently supports U.S. law enforcement agencies through Task Force initiatives focused on

Iranian, Eurasian, and South Asian drug trafficking organizations that pose a regional and national security threat.

Conclusion

The preceding testimony outlines the Asia-Pacific strategic environment, addresses the optimal force posture in each of the four sub-regions, and outlines MILCON recommendations necessary to properly support USPACOM forces and their families. Among the many notable challenges are a belligerent DPRK and dangerous VEOs, which remain dangerous concerns for which the U.S. must be prepared. China's rapid military expansion coupled with its unclear intent poses a concern to the U.S. and many regional nations; however, opportunities for collaboration between the U.S. and China are also apparent. Overall the region remains ripe for peaceful growth, cooperation, and prosperity, due in large measure to mutual interests shared by our five regional U.S. treaty Allies and many more security partners. Longstanding support from the American people and Congress for the first-rate resources in use by the 330,000 men and women of U.S. Pacific Command enable these forces to protect and defend the homeland while advancing U.S. interests throughout the Asia-Pacific.