

#### NTSB National Transportation Safety Board

# Learning from Accidents

Pilatus PC-12 Accident Butte, Montana

Earl F. Weener NTSB Board Member



NBAA Single Pilot Safety Standdown, October 9, 2011

#### **Alfred Sheinwold**

"Learn all you can from the mistakes of others. You won't have time to make them all yourself"



- March 22, 2009
- 1432 mountain daylight time
- Butte, Montana
- Eagle Cap Leasing
- Departed Oroville, California
- Planned destination Bozeman,
  Montana



# **Debris Field**





# Fuselage Wreckage





#### **No Survivors**



- Impact crater 23 ft wide, 9 ft long, 16 in deep
- Pilot and 13 passengers fatally injured




## **Preflight Activities**

- Day before accident: pilot had airplane fueled to capacity
- Did not add fuel system icing inhibitor (FSII)
- Pilatus procedures require FSII for all operations below 0° C



- First flight: Redlands to Vacaville, California
  - Airplane refueled
  - No FSII added
  - Nine passengersboarded





- Second flight:
   Vacaville to
   Oroville, California
  - Four additional passengers boarded
  - 13 total passengers
  - Seating for nine passengers





- Planned flight: Oroville to Bozeman
- Pilot diverted to Butte 1 hour 52 minutes into flight
- Pilot did not specify reason



Accident occurred 30 min after divert



# Investigation

- Pilot properly certified
- No known medical issues
- Airplane properly certified
- No pre-impact structural, engine, or system failures
- Weather not a factor
- Additional passengers not a factor



# Investigation


- Low fuel pressure state
- Lateral fuel imbalance
- Lack of FSII
- Delayed diversion to another airport




## Safety Issues

- Fuel system icing prevention
- Crash protection for airplane occupants
- Flight recorder systems











# **Fuel System**


Delivery Fuel Pump

R






# **Fuel System**







# **Fuel System** R **Fuel Filter** To **Engine Bypass Valve** 18

# **Fuel System**






# **Fuel System**



### **Fuel Low Pressure**



## **Boost Pump Annunciation**






#### **Fuel Low Pressure**






# Fuel Quantity Imbalance



# **Fuel Quantity Imbalance**



#### **Accident Scenario**

- Low fuel pressure 1 hour 13 minutes into flight
- Corrected through fuel boost pump operation
- Annunciations first indications of anomaly




#### **Accident Scenario**


- Low pressure state
- Described in checklist
- Occurred on previous flights
- Ice accumulation
- Ice/water might have been found if pilot performed preflight inspection




# Flight Time - 1 Hour 13 Minutes



# Flight Time – 1 Hour 18 Minutes



# Flight Time - 1 Hour 21 Minutes



#### **Accident Scenario**

- Performance of fuel system degraded over time, resulting in significant fuel imbalance
- If pilot had added FSII, low pressure state and subsequent imbalance would not have developed



#### **Accident Scenario**

- By 1 hour 52 minutes, imbalance about 25% of one tank's capacity
- Pilot likely recognized fuel imbalance before this point
- Pilot attempted to manually balance fuel through activation of left boost pump
- Similar actions observed later in flight



## Flight Time - 2 Hours 17 Minutes






## Safety Issues

- Fuel filler placards not required to advise necessity for FSII
- FAA guidance on fuel system icing prevention does not include information on need for FSIIs



# **Fuel Quantity Indicator**







AFM: land as soon as practical when fuel imbalance reaches three-bar differential and difference cannot be balanced





- Three-bar differential exceeded by 1 hour 25 minutes into flight
  - Fuel pumps cycling
  - Left tank filling
  - Right tank emptying rapidly





- Divert to Butte occurred 25 minutes later
- 15-bar differential






- 27-bar differential on arrival at Butte
- Left tank completely full
- Right tank almost empty



# **Possible Diversion Airports**

- At time maximum allowable fuel imbalance exceeded
  - Boise, Idaho
  - Twin Falls, Idaho
  - Challis, Idaho
- At time of diversion to Butte
  - Challis, Idaho
  - Dillon, Montana









BTM – Butte, MT

BZN - Bozeman, MT



LLJ - Challis, ID




BOI - Boise, ID





TWF - Twin Falls, ID







#### **Decision to Divert**

- If pilot had diverted earlier to another airport, outcome of flight would have been different
  - Airplane would have had less severe fuel imbalance
  - Pilot would not have had to contend with deteriorating airplane handling qualities



#### **Decision to Divert**

- Should have landed at first opportunity
- Continued to Bozeman and condition worsened
- Did not divert to suitable airport
- Downplayed initial warnings



## **Descent Into Butte**

- Pilot reported airport in sight
  - -8 miles southwest of airport
  - -5,550 feet above runway
- Last recorded radar target
  - 1.8 miles southwest of runway threshold
  - -3,550 feet above runway
- Excessive descent rate



### **Witness Information**

- Witnesses reported that airplane
  - Approached runway at high altitude
  - Flew northwest away from runway
  - Made sharp left turn at 300 feet
  - Entered steep bank and pitched down



## **Loss of Control**

- Maneuvers near runway resulted in increasing left roll angle and steep descent
- Pulling back on control wheel exacerbated rolling moment
- Airplane controllable with left-wing-heavy condition
- Pilot did not maintain control while maneuvering

#### **Data Recorder Information**

- No FDR or CVR on-board
- Obtained significant fuel system data from CAWS
- Pilatus now making add-in independent recorders available
- Industry standards for light weight recorder (EUROCAE MOPS)
  - Video/audio/flight parameters



### **NTSB - Probable Cause**

- Failure to use FSII
- Failure to take appropriate actions after a low fuel pressure state
- Loss of control while maneuvering a left-wing-heavy airplane



# **Accident Prevention Strategies**

Accidents are generally the result of a chain of events



#### **Links in the Chain - Decisions**

- Did not use FSII in fueling at Redlands
- Did not use FSII in fueling at Vacaville
- Did not check fuel sumps at Vacaville



## **Links in the Chain - Decisions**

- Ignored CAWS fuel pump advisories
- Did not troubleshoot frequent boost pump cycling during first flight leg
- Passed up 3 suitable airports following the point of max allowable fuel imbalance



#### **Links in the Chain - Decisions**

- Diversion decision made 30 minutes after max allowable imbalance – to an airport 30 minutes away
- Passed up several closer suitable airports after deciding to divert



# **Accident Prevention Strategies**

Accidents are generally the result of a chain of events

Break a link in the chain



# **Douglas Adams**

Human beings, who are almost unique in having ability to learn from the experience of others, are also remarkable for their apparent disinclination to do so."





NTSB

#### **Pilot Professionalism**

- Filed 2 IFR flight plans with wrong fuel load & number of passengers
- Made 2 overweight takeoffs
- Initiated turn and descent to Butte prior to getting clearance from ATC

