

NTSB National Transportation Safety Board

Work Hours vs. Fatigue Management: The Transportation Experience

Honorable Mark R. Rosekind, Ph.D. Board Member

American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons National Orthopaedic Leadership Conference April 8, 2011

Go! Flight 1002




• early starts, multiple segment days, sleep apnea



Reagan National Airport (DCA)

- March 23, 2011: 0004 0028 EDT
 - air traffic control service interruption
 - 2 AC/TRACON unable to establish contact
- Controller
 - supervisory controller working alone
 - 20 years' experience, 17 at DCA
 - fourth consecutive night shift (10 pm 6 am)
 - reported to NTSB he had fallen asleep





Probable Cause (fatigue)

"... driver's fatigue, caused by the combined effects of acute sleep loss, circadian disruption associated with his shift work schedule, and mild sleep apnea, which resulted in the driver's failure to react to slowing and stopped traffic ahead by applying the brakes or performing any evasive maneuver to avoid colliding with the traffic queue..."



Owatonna, MN/July 31, 2008



8 fatalities



Probable Cause/Contributing Factors

"The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the captain's decision to attempt a go-around late in the landing roll with insufficient runway remaining. Contributing to the accident were (1) the pilots' poor crew coordination and lack of cockpit discipline; (2) fatigue, which likely impaired both pilots' performance; and (3) the failure of the Federal Aviation Administration to require crew resource management training and standard operating procedures for Part 135 operators."



Fatal Airline Accidents (fatigue cited)

- 8/97 Guam: 228 fatalities
- 6/99 Little Rock AK: 11 fatal
- 10/04 Kirksville MO: 11 fatalities
- 8/06 Lexington KY: 49 fatalities
- 2/09 Buffalo NY: 49 fatalities




NTSB Fatigue Recommendations

MOST WANTED since 1990

190+ fatigue recommendations



Complex Issue: Requires Multiple Solutions



- Scheduling Policies and Practices
- Education
- Organizational Strategies
- Raising Awareness
- Healthy Sleep
- Vehicle and Environmental Strategies
- Research and Evaluation



Scheduling Policies and Practices







Hours of Service / Scheduling

- Science-based hours of service
- Allow for at least 8 hours of uninterrupted sleep
- Reduce schedule irregularity and unpredictability



Scheduling Policies and Practices

- When possible, address:
 - schedule inversion
 - day sleep/night work
 - rotating schedules
 - extended duty days
 - opportunity for 8 hrs uninterrupted sleep



Fatigue Management Systems

- Develop guidance based on empirical and scientific evidence for operators to establish fatigue management systems
- Develop and use a methodology that will continually assess the effectiveness of fatigue management systems



The Challenges . . .

- Diverse operational requirements
- Individual differences
- Complex physiology
- History ("that's how its always been")
 - Economics



Hours of Service

Necessary but not sufficient



Fatigue Management Programs

- Comprehensive approach
- Multiple components
- Science based
- Continuously evaluated and updated
- Complements HOS regulations



Fatigue Management Program

Education

Outcomes/evaluation

Strategies

Design/technology

Scheduling

Policy/regulation (HOS)

Healthy sleep

Scientific basis/guidance



Considerations for Healthcare

- Activities/policies science-based:
 - 'evidence-based practice'
 - acknowledge 'gaps'
- Translate science
 - practical
 - effective
- Evolve
 - data-driven measures
 - incorporate change process





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