



FBI: Biosecurity and the Select Agent Program

Select Agent Program Workshop
National Animal Disease Center
Ames, Iowa
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Who is on the Biosecurity Highway? Where does it lead?






FBI and SAP





Threat/Risk Horizon





Al-Qai'da BW Program Planning: The Tarnak Farms Documents




Extensive document caches recovered from Tarnak Farms, near Qandahar, AF consist of BW-related books, manuals, letters, tutorials, fermentor photos, notes and other information. Taken together, they confirm:

- TF as one of the largest & most important al-Qai'da camps, pre 9/11.
- As of 9/11, AQ had an active program to acquire BW agent seed stock.
- Senior operatives had engaged international culture collection repositories for BW agent isolates



DoD BDA - Public Release



I have requested NCTC for the supply of following cultures which cost about


1. QC set of 44 cultures
2. Hazardous pathogens including *B. anthrax*, 2 cultures, *Salmonella typhi*, *S. paratyphi*, *Y. pestis*, *N. meningitidis*, *B. mallei*, *Cl. Diphtheria* and *Cl. botulinum*, *B. abortus*, *E. coli* 0157:H7.



Al Qa'ida Linked Subject

Aafia Siddiqui sought by FBI for questioning since 2004

MIT & Brandeis educated neuroscientist arrested in Afghanistan on 17 July 2008.



Search of computer data included references to Plum Island ADC, as well as other information regarding chemical and biological materials.

Convicted on charges of assault and attempted murder charges in February 2010

FBI Director Robert Mueller briefs during DOJ press conference, August 2004




Domestic Threats



**Firebombings Target 2 Calif. Scientists
Animal-Rights Activists Apparently
Behind Rash Of Attacks At U. Of Calif.,
Santa Cruz**

CBS News, San Francisco, August 4, 2008

**Dr. Dario Ringach (UCLA)
announced in 2006 that
he was giving up
research using primate
subjects because of the
years of harassment by
animal rights activists,
harassment included
threats to his children.**



**Dr. Jerry Vlasak told the "Animal Rights
2003" convention that he endorses the
murder of physicians who conduct
research on animals.**





New Trend in Domestic Threats



Camille Marino - Florida “Negotiation is Over”


When we attack professors, we can only expect limited gains. They are deeply entrenched in the holocaust, have vested financial interests, and enjoy a network of support and protection. Students, however, have no round-the-clock police protection, no access to the FBI, and no access to legislators. The weakest link in the chain is the student body. Vivisectors-in-training can be shut down with relative ease.

They also are the next generation and it is our responsibility to ensure that they are the last generation. Unless we intercede now, the students of today will be the mutilators of tomorrow. Conversely, there will be no animal torturers tomorrow if we effectively eliminate them today.

Students also need to understand that making the wrong choice will result in a lifetime of grief. Aspiring scientists envision curing cancer at the Mayo Clinic. **We need to impart a new vision: car bombs, 24/7 security cameras, embarrassing home demonstrations, threats, injuries, and fear.** And, of course, these students need to realize that any **personal risk they are willing to assume will also be visited upon their parents, children, and nearest & dearest loved ones.**



Biosecurity Outreach



Mitigating the Potential Risks:

- Outreach
- Partnership
- Effective Policy Making



Select Agent Facility Outreach



Southwest Foundation for Medical Research, Sept 9, 2010

Virginia Polytechnics Institute (VA Tech), Dec 10, 2010

University of Idaho, April 25, 2011

University of Washington, April 26, 2011

Seattle Biomed, April 27, 2011

University of Virginia, May 5, 2011

Houston, Texas Regional, TBA

University of North Carolina, TBA



❖ Goal

- Improve the cooperation among law enforcement agencies, select agent facilities, and community agencies to mitigate potential biosecurity issues that may affect public health and safety

❖ Objectives

- Identify biosecurity roles and responsibilities of law enforcement agencies
- Identify biosecurity roles and responsibilities of select agent facilities
- Identify benefits and potential obstacles to improve cooperation among community stakeholders regarding biosecurity
- Identify methods of improving communications among biosecurity stakeholders

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Academic Outreach

- Instilling a “culture of responsibility and awareness”
 - From undergraduates to VPs of research and compliance to amateur biologists

- International Genetically Engineered Machines (iGEM) competitions
- Regional Biosecurity Workshops
 - New England BioSafety Association
 - Northwest Association for Biomedical Research



Do-It-Yourself Biology outreach

- “Outlaw Biology” Symposium
- FBI – DIYbio Outreach Workshop



- Massachusetts Society for Medical Research



Policy Involvement

- **Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel (FESAP) – EO 13546**
(Optimizing the Security of Biological Select Agents and Toxins in the United States)
 - **Tiering Working Group**
 - **FBI Input based on cases**
 - **Physical and Cyber Security Working Group**
 - **Personnel Reliability Working Group**



Cyber Security

Hacking of DuPont, J&J, GE Were Undisclosed Google-Type Attacks

SAN FRANCISCO
Chronicle

Tuesday, March 8, 2011


The incidents described in the stolen e-mails portray industrial espionage by hackers based in China, Russia and other countries. U.S. law enforcement agencies say the attacks have intensified in number and scope over the past two years.

"We are on the losing end of the biggest transfer of wealth through theft and piracy in the history of the planet," said Democratic Senator Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island, who chaired a U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence task force on U.S. cyber security in 2010.





FBI/SRA





Applicant #1

DOA - 10/10/1988

Charge 1 - Receive/Etc Known Stolen Property

Charge 2 - Criminal Conspiracy

Charge 3 - Petty Theft Warrant

Conviction: Receive Etc Known Stolen Property (Misdemeanor)

DOA - 02/16/1990

Charge 1 - Petty Theft

Charge 2 - Insufficient Funds Checks Etc

Conviction: Insufficient Funds Checks Etc (Misdemeanor)

DOA - 07/26/1990

Charge 1 - Transport/Etc Controlled Substance

Charge 2 - Possession Controlled Substance Paraphernalia

Disposition: Dismissed/Insufficient Cause



Applicant #1



DOA - 10/20/1990

Charge 1 - Drive Under Influence Intoxication

Disposition: No charges filed with Municipal or Circuit Court

DOA - 11/11/1990

Charge 1 - Theft 3rd Degree

Disposition: Dismissed

DOA - 02/14/1991

Charge 1 - Take Vehicle W/O Owner Consent/Vehicle Theft

Charge 2 - Possession Controlled Substance

Charge 3 - Use/Under Influence Controlled Substance

Conviction: Take Vehicle W/O Owner Consent/Vehicle Theft
(Misdemeanor)

Possession Controlled Substance (Misdemeanor)



Applicant #1

DOA - 12/22/1991

Charge 1 - Possession Controlled Substance

Conviction: Possess Narcotic/Drug Paraphernalia (Misdemeanor)

DOA - 06/14/1992

Charge 1 - Warrant/Sell/Etc In Lieu of Controlled Substance

Disposition: Misdemeanor charge/Non-prohibiting

DOA - 02/22/1993

Charge 1 - DUI Alcohol/Drugs Cause Bodily Injury

Charge 2 - Under Influence Spec Controlled Substance: Possession
Firearm

Disposition: Dismissed/Furtherance Of Justice



Applicant #1 Conclusion

The maximum imprisonment for misdemeanors in California does not exceed 1 year; therefore, the applicant did not meet the "convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year" restrictor.

The applicant did not meet the "unlawful user of any controlled substance" restrictor.



Applicant #2



DOA - 12/06/1986

Charge 1 - **Fraud**

Conviction: **Fraud (Misdemeanor)**

DOA - 01/20/1990

Charge 1 - **Theft By Check**

Conviction: **Theft By Check (Misdemeanor)**

DOA - 06/24/1995

Charge 1 - **Aggravated Assault With Deadly Weapon**

Conviction: **Aggravated Assault (2nd Degree Felony)**

Disposition: **5 Year Suspended, Probation Discharge, Conviction Set-Aside**

DOA - 07/06/1997

Charge 1 - **Assault Causes Bodily Injury**

Disposition: **Dismissed**



Applicant #2

DOA - 07/06/1997

Charge 1 - Theft Property \geq \$20 $<$ \$500 By Check

Conviction: Theft \geq \$20 $<$ \$500 (Misdemeanor)

DOA - 07/12/1997

Charge 1 - Assault Causes Bodily Injury

Conviction: Assault Family Violence (Misdemeanor)

DOA - 01/14/2011

Charge 1 - Driving While Intoxicated

Charge 2 - Possession Controlled Substance PG 3 $<$ 28G

Disposition: Pending/Referred to County Attorney



Applicant #2 Conclusion

The maximum imprisonment for misdemeanors in Texas does not exceed 1 year; therefore, the applicant did not meet the "convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year" restrictor.

The applicant did not meet the "unlawful user of any controlled substance" restrictor.

The BRAG PSS will regularly check with the court for a final disposition on the most recent arrest. If the applicant is convicted of possession of a controlled substance, he/she will be meet the "unlawful user of any controlled substance" restrictor.



Applicant #3



Applicant checked "yes" to question 12E, which asked, "Have you ever been adjudicated as a mental defective or been committed to any mental institution?"

Applicant provided documentation concerning past treatment received on an inpatient basis at mental health facilities. This documentation stated the following:

- Chief complaint "I am depressed and suicidal."
- History of depression and bipolar disorder
- History of suicidal and homicidal ideations
- Difficulty concentrating on job and afraid of making mistakes at work
- Attempted suicide using a gun



Applicant #3 Conclusion

Applicant does not meet the "adjudicated as a mental defective or committed to any mental institution" restrictor. All commitments to mental institutions disclosed were voluntary. The medical records provided by the applicant did not reveal a determination by a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority that he/she was a danger to himself or others.



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QUESTIONS

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