UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
61 FORSYTH STREET SW SUITE 23T85
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931

October 29, 2001

Florida Power and Light Company
ATTN: Mr. J. A. Stall
Chief Nuclear Officer
P. O. Box 14000
Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420

SUBJECT: ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-335/01-04 AND 50-389/01-04

Dear Mr. Stall:

On September 29, 2001, the NRC completed an inspection at your St. Lucie Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on October 1, 2001, with Mr. D. Jernigan and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, the inspectors identified one issue of very low safety significance (Green). The issue was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of its very low safety significance and because it has been entered in your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this issue as a Non-cited Violation in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. If you deny this non-cited violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the St. Lucie facility.

Since September 11, 2001, your staff has assumed a heightened level of security based on a series of threat advisories issued by the NRC. Although the NRC is not aware of any specific threat against nuclear facilities, the heightened level of security was recommended for all nuclear power plants and is being maintained due to the uncertainty about the possibility of additional terrorist attacks. The steps recommended by the NRC include increased patrols, augmented security forces and capabilities, additional security posts, heightened coordination with local law enforcement and military authorities, and limited access of personnel and vehicles to the site.

The NRC continues to interact with the Intelligence Community and to communicate information to you and your staff. In addition, the NRC has monitored maintenance and other activities which could relate to the site's security posture.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

John D. Monninger, Acting Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-335, 50-389
License Nos. DPR-67, NPF-16

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-335/01-04,
50-389/01-04

cc w/encl: (See page 3)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos:	50-335, 50-389
License Nos:	DPR-67, NPF-16
Report No:	50-335/01-04, 50-389/01-04
Licensee:	Florida Power & Light Company (FPL)
Facility:	St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2
Location:	6351 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, FL 34957
Dates:	July 1 to September 29, 2001
Inspectors:	T. Ross, Senior Resident Inspector D. Lanyi, Resident Inspector S. Rudisail, Project Engineer (Sections 1R01, 1R06) G. Hopper, Senior Operations Engineer (Section 1R11) B. Holbrook, Senior Project Engineer (Section 1R11)
Approved by:	J. Monninger, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000335-01-04, IR 05000389-01-04 on 07/01-09/29/01, Florida Power & Light Company, St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 & 2. Operability Evaluations.

This inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors and three region based inspectors. The inspectors identified one Green finding, which was a non-cited violation. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 609 "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html.

A. Inspector Identified Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green. A Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.f and the Fire Protection Plan was identified for failure to adequately implement the necessary compensatory measures to address a degraded condition affecting operability of the Unit 1 Fire Alarm Computer.

This finding was of very low safety significance because the degraded condition was of very low safety significance. Furthermore, the Fire Alarm Computer capability remained functional during the limited time the compensatory measures were not completed. (Section 1R15.2)

B. Licensee Identified Violations

Violations of very low safety significance which were identified by the licensee have been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee appeared reasonable. These violations are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

Both units operated at essentially full power for the entire report period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity (Reactor - R)

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

.1 Annual Baseline Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

During the week of July 9, the inspectors verified that the licensee had completed actions in accordance with administrative procedure ADM-04.01, Hurricane Season Preparation. This verification included physical walkdowns of the licensee's property and discussions with appropriate licensee personnel. The inspectors verified that systems, structures, and components (SSCs) vulnerable to high winds and potential flooding were in a condition to remain operable during a hurricane or tropical storm affecting the site. The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR, Chapter 3), Individual Plant Examination of External Events, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP), and Technical Specifications (TS). Additionally, selected areas and equipment were walked down to verify that the licensee had adequately implemented the requirements of ADM-04.01. Administrative Procedure (AP) - 0005753, Severe Weather Preparations, was also reviewed.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Tropical Storm Gabrielle

a. Inspection Scope

On September 14, the inspectors verified that the licensee was taking actions in accordance with AP-0005753, Severe Weather Preparations, to prepare for the onset of Tropical Storm Gabrielle, and potential escalation to hurricane conditions. This verification included physical walkdowns around the power block and discussions with the appropriate licensee supervision. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the licensee was identifying and correcting problems that could affect important plant systems or personnel safety during severe weather conditions.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted partial alignment verifications of the safety related systems listed below to evaluate the operability of the redundant trains or backup systems while the other trains were inoperable or out of service. The verifications included reviews of plant lineup procedures, operating procedures, and piping and instrumentation drawings which were compared with observed equipment alignments to identify any discrepancies which could affect TS operability of the redundant train or backup system.

- 1B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)
- 2A and 2B Auxiliary Feedwater Systems (AFW)
- 2C AFW System

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted tours of the fire areas listed below that are important to reactor safety and reviewed AP-1800022, Fire Protection Plan. The inspectors verified that any transient combustibles in the areas inspected were being controlled in accordance with licensee procedures. They also verified that all hot work or other ignition sources were being properly controlled by the licensee. The inspectors ensured that the material condition, operational status, and operational lineup of fire protection systems, equipment and features were in accordance with the Fire Protection Plan. Also, the inspectors confirmed that any compensatory measures in place were being performed per the licensee's procedures, and the condition of fire barriers met all requirements of the Fire Protection Plan.

- Unit 1 Electrical Penetration Rooms
- Unit 2 Electrical and Mechanical Penetration Rooms
- 2B EDG hot work area
- Unit 2 AFW Pump areas
- Unit 2 Transformer Area
- 2A EDG hot work area
- Unit 1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Rooms

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

a. Inspection Scope

During the week of July 9, the inspectors reviewed the UFSAR (Chapters 2 and 3), and safety significant design basis documents and conducted walkdowns of risk significant areas for both units to verify that flood mitigation plans and equipment were consistent with the design requirements and the risk analysis assumptions. Plant areas containing risk significant systems or components which were susceptible to either internal or external flooding were examined to evaluate the condition of flood protection equipment. The inspectors also reviewed Off-Normal Procedure ONP-24.01, Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) Flooding, to verify that operator actions to mitigate an internal flooding event could reasonably be used to achieve the desired conditions.

In addition, the inspector reviewed Condition Report (CR) 00-1588 which documented a condition where the Unit 2 manholes or catch basins were not being inspected for flooded conditions. The inspector verified that appropriate corrective actions were taken by Electrical Maintenance to identify and incorporate Unit 1 and 2 manholes into their routine preventive maintenance program.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

.1 Routine Review

a. Inspection Scope

During the week of August 21, the inspectors observed and assessed simulator training for actions taken during a main steam line break outside containment with a loss of all feedwater. The inspectors assessed the following items:

- Clarity and formality of communication
- Ability to take timely action to safely control the unit
- Prioritization, interpretation, and verification of alarms
- Correct use and implementation of procedures, specifically use of Annunciator Response Procedures and Emergency Operating Procedures
- Control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions
- Oversight and direction provided by the shift supervisor, including ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions, regulatory reporting requirements, and emergency plan actions and notifications
- Effectiveness of the post training critique

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Biennial Regional Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the facility operating history since the last requalification program inspection for indications of operator weaknesses. In addition, the inspectors reviewed AP-0005720, Licensed Operator Requalification Program. The inspectors also reviewed the biennial written examinations administered for three out of five weeks of shift crews and evaluated their effectiveness in providing a basis for assessing operator knowledge of material covered in the requalification training program. Examination quality, licensee effectiveness in integrating industry, plant and student feedback into the requalification training program, and examination development methodology were evaluated as well. The inspectors observed annual dynamic simulator examinations (four scenarios) for three operator teams to assess the adequacy of the licensee's evaluation of operator knowledge and abilities. During these observations, the inspectors assessed licensee evaluator effectiveness in pinpointing operator performance deficiencies requiring supplemental training. The inspectors also evaluated and observed portions of the walkthrough examination administered during this requalification segment to assess evaluator performance.

The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensee's remedial training program for operator deficiencies identified during the previous two years. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of licensed operator requalification attendance records, watchstanding records, reactivation records and ten percent of the licenses operator medical records. The reviews and evaluations were performed to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 55.59, Requalification and 10CFR 55.53, Conditions of License.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the equipment performance problems listed below and assessed the effectiveness of licensee efforts in accordance with Administrative Procedure ADM-17.08, Implementation of 10 CFR 50.65, The Maintenance Rule. Reviews focused on maintenance rule scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 and characterization of failed systems or components. Additionally, the risk significance classifications, the (a)(2) classifications, and the appropriateness of performance criteria for systems or components classified as (a)(2), or goals and corrective actions for those classified as (a)(1) were also reviewed. The inspectors also verified that equipment problems were being identified, entered into the corrective action program, and being dispositioned appropriately.

- CR 00-1940/Sup. 1 ECCS Exhaust Fans HVE-9A/9B
- CRs 01-1768/1855 1C and 1D Instrument Air Compressors

- CR 01-1989 Unit 1 MV-21-3 Failure (Component Cooling Water(CCW) to Turbine Cooling Water (TCW) Isolation)
- CR 01-2077 Unit 2 MV-21-3 Failure (CCW to TCW Isolation)
- CR 01-2167 Low Flow on 2B Charging Pump
- CR 01-2166 2B Charging Pump Failed to Start

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed and witnessed the following emergent and planned maintenance tasks to evaluate the effectiveness of licensee scheduling, configuration control, and management of online risk in accordance applicable program procedures such as ADM 17.16, Implementation of the Configuration Risk Management Program. The inspectors also verified that appropriate contingencies were taken to reduce risk and minimize unavailability, and that emergent work activities were properly planned per ADM-10.03, Work Week Management. The inspectors confirmed that problems with maintenance risk assessments and emergent work were identified and appropriately addressed as part of the corrective action program.

- 1A EDG Surveillance with D Reactor Protection System Out of Service
- 1A EDG Critical Maintenance During Hurricane Season
- 2C Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Critical Maintenance
- 2A AFW System and 2C CCW System Out of Service

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

.1 Routine Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the interim disposition and operability assessment of the following CRs to ensure that TS operability was properly justified and the SSC remained available to perform its safety function with no unrecognized increase in risk. Reviews of the UFSAR, applicable supporting documents and procedures, and interviews of plant personnel, were performed to assess the adequacy of the interim CR disposition.

- CR 01-1709 1A Charging Pump
- CR 01-1691 1B Battery Bus Corrosion
- CR 01-2043 Unauthorized Jumper for MV 08-13 DC Control
- CR 01-1845 Unit 1 and 2 Fire Alarm Computer

- CR 00-2056 Safety Injection Actuation System Valve
- CR 01-2188 2A EDG Scaffolding Issue

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions to disposition and correct a degraded condition that affected operability of the Unit 1 and 2 Fire Alarm Computers (FACs). The inspector evaluated the licensee's cause determination and verified associated corrective actions against the requirements of the Fire Protection Program Report (UFSAR Appendix 9.5A) and AP-1800022, Fire Protection Plan.

b. Findings

Green. A Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.f and the Fire Protection Plan was identified for failing to adequately implement the necessary compensatory measures to address a degraded condition affecting operability of the Unit 1 FAC.

On July 26, the licensee completed an operability assessment of the Unit 1 and 2 FACs that was documented as part of the interim disposition for CR 01-1845. This CR was initiated to address several circuit boards that were found to be missing from the Unit 1 and 2 FACs resulting in a degraded condition. These circuit boards performed various fault detection, trouble monitoring, and supervisory functions that were now no longer operational. For example, due to the missing Channel Switch Card, control room operators would have been unaware that they could no longer receive any fire detector alarms in the control room, if the FAC locked-up.

As part of their interim disposition and operability assessment, the licensee developed compensatory measures to reestablish adequate defense in depth for fire protection. These compensatory measures included having control room operators perform an Alarm Summary Test of each FAC every hour. This test would verify the FAC was functioning and communicating properly, which would maintain an equivalent level of protection as the originally designed fire detection system.

On August 15, the inspectors discovered that Unit 1 operators had ceased implementing the compensatory measures due to their unfamiliarity with the need to perform the hourly FAC Alarm Summary Test and their misunderstanding of FAC status. A contributing factor was that no formal instructions had been issued to explain the compensatory measures of CR 01-1845. The compensatory measures lapsed for about 16 hours until they were reinstated on August 16. CR 01-2089 was initiated to address the inadvertent termination of the Unit 1 compensatory measures and CR 01-2148 was initiated to address the need for an OWA (Section 1R16.2). To address the potential generic implications of Operations failure to properly institute the compensatory measures developed by Engineering, the licensee initiated CR 01-2448.

This issue is considered to be more than minor since a single failure of the FAC (e.g. lock-up) could have resulted in a complete undetected loss of fire detection capability in the control room. The failure to adequately implement the compensatory measures was considered to be of very low safety significance because the degraded condition itself was determined to be of very low safety significance (see Section 4OA7). Furthermore, the Unit 1 FAC capability remained functional, all fire detectors were operable, and no fires occurred during the limited time compensatory measures were improperly terminated.

Technical Specification 6.8.1.f requires the licensee to establish, implement, and maintain Fire Protection Program procedures. Section 8.9 of AP 1800022, Fire Protection Plan, requires that appropriate compensatory measures be established when fire protection features are determined to be inoperable. The licensee concluded in CR 01-1845 that the Unit 1 FAC was degraded but operable, as long as operators performed an hourly Alarm Summary Test to compensate for the missing Channel Switch card. The licensee's failure to adequately implement the Unit 1 FAC compensatory measures that were deemed necessary to establish an equivalent level of fire protection constituted a violation of TS 6.8.1.f and the Fire Protection Plan. Because this violation is of very low safety significance and has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program (CRs 01-2089, 01-2148, 01-2448), this finding is considered a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The finding is identified as NCV 50-335/01-04-02, Inadequate Implementation of Interim Corrective Actions to Compensate for a Degraded Fire Alarm Computer.

1R16 Operator Workarounds

.1 Semi-annual Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a semi-annual evaluation of the licensee's Operator Workaround (OWA) program against Operations Policy OPS-510, Operator Workarounds. This inspection included a review of all outstanding OWAs for both units, confirming their current status in the control room, and evaluating any potential cumulative effects. The inspectors also attended two quarterly meetings of the OWA team led by the Operations Supervisor. During these meetings, the inspectors observed the OWA team as they went over individual OWA status and repair priority, and assessed the overall cumulative effects.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Fire Alarm Computer

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the OWA associated with the Unit 1 and 2 Fire Alarm Computer. This review examined the affect of this OWA upon the computers' functional capability to promptly identify system failures and reliably report valid fire alarms. Furthermore, the inspectors interviewed responsible operators to assess their knowledge and familiarity with applicable compensatory instructions, and assessed the OWA impact upon their ability to implement applicable abnormal operating procedures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the modification package for Plant Change and Modification (PC/M) 00071. This PC/M modified the actuator for Unit 2 valve, MV-08-3, 2C AFW Pump Trip and Throttle Valve. The inspector verified that the modified valve actuator did not require significantly more power than the original valve, and that the timing and operation of the valve still met the requirements of TS 4.8.1.2 and UFSAR section 7.4.1. Furthermore the inspector confirmed that excess heat removal capability, control signal integrity, equipment protection capability, pressure boundary integrity remained unchanged. The inspectors reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screening performed by the licensee and verified that TS changes and NRC approval were not required for the modification. The inspector observed the post-modification testing and reviewed the results to verify that the acceptance criteria were met, there were no unintended system interactions, new system performance characteristics met the design basis as described in section 7.4.1 of the UFSAR, and design assumptions were appropriate.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed post maintenance test (PMT) procedures and witnessed testing activities for selected risk significant mitigating systems to determine if the: (1) Effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and/or engineering personnel; (2) Testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; (3) Acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents (e.g., TS, UFSAR, etc.); (4) Test instrumentation had current calibrations and the appropriate range and accuracy consistent with the

application; (5) Tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied; (6) Jumpers were installed or leads lifted were properly controlled; (7) Test equipment was removed following testing; and, (8) Equipment was returned to the status required to perform its safety function. The inspectors also verified that selected problems associated with PMTs were identified and appropriately resolved as part of the corrective action program. Post maintenance testing for the following Work Orders (WOs) were witnessed and reviewed:

- WO 31013663 Unit 2 Pressurizer Level Controller LC-1110YL Replacement
- WO 31015454 Unit 1 MV-21-3 (Intake Cooling Water (ICW) to TCW Isolation) Repair
- WO 31008468 1A Charging Pump Internal Valve Replacement
- Various WOs 2C AFW Pump Code Run and Operational Check
- WO 31015896 Unit 2 MV-21-3 (ICW to TCW Isolation) Repair
- WO 31014189 1B Battery Cell Replacement
- WO 31016221 Unit 2 ECCS Exhaust Fan, HVE-9B, flow transmitter, FT-25-21B,1 Repair

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed and witnessed the conduct of the surveillance tests listed below in accordance with applicable operating procedures (OP), operations surveillance procedure (OSP), and Inservice Pressure Test procedure (IPT). Applicable test data was reviewed to verify whether they met TS, UFSAR, and licensee procedure requirements. Also, the inspectors verified that the testing effectively demonstrated that the systems were operationally ready, capable of performing their intended safety functions, and that identified problems were entered into the corrective action program for resolution.

- OP 1-2200050A 1A EDG Fast Start
- OP 2-0010125A Unit 2 Shield Building Ventilation System Exhaust Fan, HVE-6B, Periodic Test
- 2-IPT-42 Hydrostatic Test of the 2B EDG Fuel Oil Transfer System
- OP 0-0360050 Ultimate Heat Sink Valve Test
- OP 2-2200050B 2B EDG Monthly Surveillance Test
- 1-OSP-25.02 Unit 1 Containment Fan Cooler Surveillance

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Temporary System Alteration TSA 1-01-009, 1B Battery Cell 37 Bypass. The inspectors evaluated this temporary modification and associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening against the system design basis documentation (UFSAR section 8.3.2), and verified that the modification did not adversely affect system TS operability or availability. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the installation was consistent with applicable modification documents and was conducted with adequate configuration control.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness (EP)

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

On July 11, the inspectors observed an emergency preparedness quarterly drill conducted by the site emergency response organization. The inspectors observed licensee activities in the main control room simulator and technical support center to assess whether emergency classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development activities were in accordance with EPIPs. Additionally, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the post drill critiques conducted in the simulator. The inspectors verified that a performance deficiency involving late emergency class classification was identified and appropriately recognized as a performance indicator hit.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

.1 Mitigating Systems Cornerstone

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector verified the accuracy of the performance indicators for Safety System Unavailability reported to the NRC against the criteria specified in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, for the systems listed below. The inspector reviewed reported data for the preceding four quarters of operation, beginning with the third quarter of 2000 and ending with the second quarter of 2001. To confirm

this data was complete and accurate, the inspector reviewed applicable reactor operator logs, CRs, and Maintenance Rule history. Furthermore, the inspector interviewed the applicable system engineer.

- Unit 1 & Unit 2 High Pressure Injection
- Unit 1 & Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

The licensee's failure to adequately implement compensatory measures for a fire protection computer deficiency is described in Section 1R15.2.

4OA3 Event Follow-up

.1 (Closed) LER 50-335/2001-03: Reactor Coolant System Instrument Nozzle Leakage Caused By Primary Stress Corrosion Cracking

The LER was reviewed and no significant findings were identified. This LER is closed.

.2 (Closed) LER 50-335/2001-07: Reactor Coolant Pump Trip Results in Reactor Trip

This LER documented an Unit 1 reactor trip due to unexpected trip of the 1A2 reactor coolant pump breaker. The LER was reviewed and determined to be accurate and consistent with NRC observations following the reactor trip (see IR 50-335, 389/01-03). The reactor trip event was addressed in the licensee's corrective action program as CR 01-1441. No significant findings were identified and the trip was considered to be of very low safety significance. This LER is closed.

4OA6 Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Jernigan and other members of licensee management on October 1, 2001. Interim exits by regional inspectors were held on July 13 and September 14. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

4OA7 Licensee Identified Violations

The following findings of very low significance were identified by the licensee and are violations of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as NCVs.

NCV Tracking Number	Requirement Licensee Failed To Meet
NCV 50-335, 389/01-04-01	Operating License DPR-67 (Unit 1), Condition 2.C(3), and Operating License NPF-16 (Unit 2), Condition 2.C(20), require the licensee to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the UFSAR and as approved by NRC safety evaluation reports. Section 3.5.2 of the UFSAR, Appendix 9.5A, Fire Protection Program, requires that fire protection systems shall be designed in accordance with NFPA 72A-1972 and NFPA 72D-1973 to ensure that detection system failures would be monitored and alarmed. Contrary to these system design requirements, several circuit boards were discovered missing from the Unit 1 and 2 Fire Alarm Computers. This condition, which has probably existed since shortly after original system installation, was subsequently dispositioned by the licensee's corrective action program as CRs 01-1845 and 2113. (Green)
NCV 50-335/01-04-03	Criterion XVI of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50, Corrective Action, states in part that, "Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality . . . are promptly identified and corrected." Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to adequately correct a severely degraded radiator on the 1B EDG. The radiator subsequently failed on May 22, 2001 and again on June 11, 2001. The radiator was ultimately replaced and the EDG returned to service on June 17. This issue was captured in the licensee's corrective action program as CRs 01-1491 and 01-1491 Supplement 1. (Green)

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

G. Bird, Protection Services Manager
D. Calabrese, EP Supervisor
R. De La Espriella, Site Quality Manager
B. Dunn, Site Engineering Manager
W. Guldemond, Operations Manager
D. Jernigan, Site Vice President
A. Pell, Training Manager
R. Rose, Work Control Manager
A. Scales, Operations Supervisor
E. Weinkam, Licensing Manager
R. West, Plant General Manager
C. Wood, Maintenance Manager

Other licensee employees contacted include office, operations, engineering, maintenance, chemistry/radiation, and corporate personnel.

NRC

B. Moroney, NRR Project Manager

ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

Opened and Closed

NCV 50-335,389/01-04-01	Failure to Maintain Control of Fire Alarm Computer Design Features Required by the NRC Approved Fire Protection Program (Section 4OA7)
NCV 50-335/01-04-02	Inadequate Implementation of Interim Corrective Actions to Compensate for a Degraded Fire Alarm Computer (Section 1R15.2)
NCV 50-335/01-04-03	Inadequate Corrective Actions Taken to Resolve Degradation of the 1B Emergency Diesel Generator Radiator (Section 40A7)

Closed

LER 50-335/2001-03	Reactor Coolant System Instrument Nozzle Leakage Caused By Primary Stress Corrosion Cracking (Section 4OA3.1)
LER 50-335/2001-07	Reactor Coolant Pump Trip Results in Reactor Trip (Section 4OA3.2)