



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
61 FORSYTH STREET SW SUITE 23T85
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931

April 30, 2001

Carolina Power & Light Company
ATTN: Mr. John W. Moyer
Vice President
H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant
Unit 2
3851 West Entrance Road
Hartsville, SC 29550

SUBJECT: H.B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT- NRC INSPECTION REPORT
50-261/00-06

Dear Mr. Moyer:

On March 31, 2001, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Robinson facility. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on April 5, 2001, with Mr. T. Cleary and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

No findings of significance were identified by the NRC.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Public Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,
/RA/

Brian R. Bonser, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No.: 50-261
License No.: NPF-23

Enclosure: Inspection Report

cc w/encl: (See page 2)

cc w/encl:

T. D. Walt
Director, Site Operations
Carolina Power & Light Company
H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution

T. P. Cleary
Plant General Manager
Carolina Power & Light Company
H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution

Terry C. Morton, Manager
Performance Evaluation and
Regulatory Affairs CPB 9
Electronic Mail Distribution

H. K. Chernoff, Supervisor
Licensing/Regulatory Programs
Carolina Power & Light Company
H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution

B. L. Fletcher III, Manager
Regulatory Affairs
Carolina Power & Light Company
H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution

Henry J. Porter, Assistant Director
Div. of Waste Mgmt.
Dept. of Health and Environmental
Control
Electronic Mail Distribution

R. Mike Gandy
Division of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.
S. C. Department of Health and
Environmental Control
Electronic Mail Distribution

Mel Fry, Director
Division of Radiation Protection
N. C. Department of Environment,
Health and Natural Resources
Electronic Mail Distribution

William D. Johnson
Vice President & Corporate Secretary
Carolina Power & Light Company
Electronic Mail Distribution

John H. O'Neill, Jr.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
2300 N. Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037-1128

Peggy Force
Assistant Attorney General
State of North Carolina
Electronic Mail Distribution

Robert P. Gruber
Executive Director
Public Staff - NCUC
P. O. Box 29520
Raleigh, NC 27626-0520

Public Service Commission
State of South Carolina
P. O. Box 11649
Columbia, SC 29211

Distribution w/encl: (See page 3)

Distribution w/encl:
 R. Subbaratnam, NRR
 A. Boland (Part 72 Only)
 RIDSNRRDIPMLIPB
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PUBLIC DOCUMENT (circle one): YES NO

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| NAME | gm | bd | ah | ml (for) | kb (for) | kb (for) | gs |
| DATE | 4/30/2001 | 4/30/2001 | 4/30/2001 | 4/27/2001 | 4/27/2001 | 4/27/2001 | 4/24/2001 |
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| NAME | kb (for) | | | | | | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket No: 50-261
License No: NPF-23

Report No: 50-261/00-06

Licensee: Carolina Power & Light (CP&L)

Facility: H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2

Location: 3581 West Entrance Road
Hartsville, SC 29550

Dates: December 31, 2000 - March 31, 2001

Inspectors: B. Desai, Senior Resident Inspector
A. Hutto, Resident Inspector
R. Carrion, Health Physicist (Sections 2OS1 and 2OS2)
R. Gibbs, Senior Reactor Inspector (Section 1R02)
J. Jang, Health Physicist (Sections 2PS2 and 2PS3)
G. Salyers, Emergency Preparedness Inspector (Section 4OA1)
F. Wright, Senior Health Physicist (Sections 2OS1 and 2OS2)

Approved by: B. Bonser, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000261-00-06, on 12/31/2000 - 03/31/2001, Carolina Power & Light Company, H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2. Resident inspection report.

The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors, a senior reactor inspector, a senior health physicist, two health physicists, and an emergency preparedness inspector. No findings of significance were identified during this inspection. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (green, white, yellow, red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by "No Color" or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html> (See Attachment).

A. Inspector Identified Findings

None

B. Licensee Identified Findings

Violations of very low significance which were identified by the licensee have been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee appear reasonable. These violations are listed in section 4OA7 of this report.

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

The plant operated at 100 percent power until February 23, 2001, when the unit began a power coastdown to refueling outage 20 scheduled to commence on April 7. On March 31 the unit was at 72 percent power.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a plant walk-down with primary focus on the condition of the temporary enclosures and other measures taken by the licensee to protect equipment from cold weather. The inspectors reviewed in detail protection for the main steam and turbine first stage impulse pressure transmitters. The walk-down was conducted during actual cold weather conditions. The effectiveness of corrective actions from the freezing of a main steam pressure sensing line discussed in section 1R01 of NRC inspection report 50-261/00-05 was also reviewed by the inspectors.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R02 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments

a. Inspection Scope

The inspection was conducted to review implementation of the licensee's program for 10 CFR 50.59, Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments. The inspection was conducted by reviewing a sample of completed 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations performed by the licensee to determine if changes were appropriately evaluated in accordance with licensee procedures and that NRC approval was not required. The sample selected included evaluations from all three reactor safety cornerstones, and included the most risk significant items from a list of evaluations provided by the licensee. The sample also included evaluations from all site groups performing evaluations, and consisted of evaluations of plant modifications, procedure revisions, changes to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), tests, and non-routine operating configurations. The sample included a total of twenty seven evaluations, fourteen of which were screened as not requiring a safety evaluation.

In addition, the inspector reviewed the corrective actions for licensee identified problems with the 10 CFR 50.59 program, and reviewed a recently completed self- assessment of the program to determine if problems were being effectively identified and resolved.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed plant documents to determine correct system lineup, and performed several partial system walkdowns and one complete system walkdown to verify proper equipment alignment and to identify any discrepancies that could impact the safety function of the system or could contribute to an initiation of a plant transient. System walkdowns included:

- A Main condenser vacuum pump with B out of service (OOS)
 - Piping and Instrument Drawing (P&ID) number G-190197, Revision 46
- B Motor driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW)/steam driven AFW trains with A MDAFW OOS
 - P&ID number G-190197, Revision 46
- Component cooling water (CCW) B train with A CCW heat exchanger OOS
 - P& ID number 5379-376, Revision 30
- A containment (CV) spray train with B CV spray train OOS for SI-880D maintenance
 - P&ID number 5379-1082, Revision 24
- Residual heat removal (RHR) system (complete walkdown)
 - P&ID number 5379-1484, Revision 37

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

Following a review of the UFSAR and on-going maintenance activities, the inspectors conducted a tour of the following areas in the plant to determine licensee control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, material condition, fire detection and suppression equipment condition, and fire barrier condition.

- Auxiliary building included emergency diesel generator (EDG) rooms
- MDAFW pump rooms
- 4.16KV switchgear room
- Pipe alley
- Boron injection tank room

- Turbine building
- CCW pump room
- Charging pump room and RHR heat exchanger room

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR to identify areas that could be affected by internal or external flooding and reviewed the risk analysis that identified the plant areas with the greatest contribution to core damage frequency due to flooding concerns. The inspectors walked down the auxiliary building first floor, the EDG rooms, and the station battery rooms to assess flood protection measures. The inspectors also reviewed the abnormal operating procedures related to internal flooding for adequacy in dealing with the flooding events postulated in the UFSAR.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors witnessed the cleaning and inspection of the B CCW heat exchanger to verify that no deficiencies existed which could impair heat exchanger performance. Further the inspectors verified that no common cause heat sink performance problems were likely by observing the condition of the B CCW heat exchanger being cleaned. Satisfactory condition of the CCW heat exchanger was indicative of the condition of other safety related heat exchangers cooled by the service water (SW) system. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the results of the CCW heat exchanger inspection to determine whether current inspection and cleaning frequencies were adequate to detect degradation prior to loss of design basis heat removal function.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed operator training activities which included simulator scenarios for new license candidates. The training scenarios involved a small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The inspectors also observed operator human performance

training involving loss of various instrumentation and a reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal failure. The inspectors witnessed the post training critiques to determine if the training objectives were met. The inspectors assessed licensed operator performance during the scenarios by verifying that the appropriate procedures were used and that effective command and control of the crew was demonstrated.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensee's maintenance efforts by evaluating several conditions that occurred during the inspection period. The inspection determined the risk significance of the condition, licensee implementation of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65), and licensee utilization of the corrective action program. The specific conditions evaluated by the inspectors included:

- Refueling water storage tank (RWST) level instrument LI-948 functional failures
- Battery charger A-1 voltage swings
- D instrument air compressor maintenance and failed air dryer
- Reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature module TM-412 failure
- Spurious activation/failure PC-476, A main steam line pressure instrument
- Steam driven AFW pump unavailability for valve maintenance

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's risk assessments for the following plant configurations. The inspectors verified that the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) were being implemented by the licensee during scheduled and emergent maintenance activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately evaluated plant risk in accordance with Operations Management Manual OMM-048, "Work Coordination and Safety Assessment," Revision 11, during the scheduling of planned and emergent work items. The inspectors reviewed the effectiveness of licensee actions to plan and control scheduled work to minimize overall plant risk while the emergent work items were being addressed. The inspectors reviewed the applicable plant risk profiles, work week schedules, and maintenance work requests associated with the out of service equipment.

- Steam driven AFW pump maintenance with service water booster pump (SWBP) unavailable

- B main condenser vacuum pump unavailable with RCS loop flow transmitter FT-484 failed.
- A SWBP emergent work during scheduled maintenance on D instrument air compressor (IAC)
- RCS loop temperature channel TR-412 failure and replacement
- Safety injection (SI) pump C unavailable during switchyard construction and performance of EST-124.
- 115 KV switchyard construction with subsequent scheduled unavailability of SI pump A

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the operability evaluations contained in the following action request (AR) evaluation, engineering service request (ESR), and in-service test (IST) evaluation affecting mitigating systems and barrier integrity. The inspectors verified that operability was properly justified and the component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred.

- ESR 00-00214, "RTGB Panel Fasteners", was reviewed to verify that the ESR addressed the functionality of several safety related controls affected by the loose fasteners with respect to seismic requirements and to the introduction of loose fastener components within the reactor turbine gauge board (RTGB) wiring.
- In-service test evaluation 01-03 "Service Water Booster Pump A Flow Evaluation", was reviewed to determine if the service water booster pump flow was adequate to meet design basis requirements.
- AR 28210, "CVCS Piping Support", was reviewed to verify impact of a degraded pipe support on the chemical and volume control system piping.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Work-Arounds

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of existing operator work-arounds to determine any change from the previous inspection period. The review also considered the effect of the work-arounds on the operators ability to implement abnormal or emergency

procedures. Additionally, the inspectors periodically reviewed ARs and held discussions with operators to determine if any conditions existed that should have been identified by the licensee as operator work-arounds.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors witnessed the following post maintenance test (PMT) activities and/or reviewed the test data to verify that the systems or components met the design/licensing basis requirements and commitments, and demonstrated that the systems or components were capable of performing their intended safety functions. Specifically, the inspectors verified that the tests were adequate for the scope of maintenance and that the acceptance criteria and test results demonstrated the operational readiness of the systems structures and components (SSCs).

- OST-202, "SDAFW Component Test," Revision 48
- PM-420, "Votes 100 System MOV Testing Procedure," Revision A (CC-749B)
- OST-201-1, "MDAFW System Component Test - Train 'A'," Revision 14
- Breaker Testing on V2-16A following scheduled maintenance
- OST-201-2 "MDAFW System Component Test Train B," Revision 12 following scheduled maintenance
- Stroke time test of valve AFW-V2-14B following limitorque maintenance

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors witnessed the following surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data to verify that the surveillance test results demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their intended safety functions. Specifically, the inspectors considered the following: pre-conditioning, plant risk, appropriate acceptance criteria, adequate test equipment, procedure adherence, completeness of data, adequate test frequency, and configuration control.

- OST-750-2, "Control Room Emergency Ventilation System - Train B (Monthly)," Revision 11
- OST-251-2, "RHR Pump B and components test (Quarterly)," Revision 15*
- OST-302-2, "Service Water System component Test Train B (Quarterly)," Revision 24*
- OST-945, "Auxiliary Feedwater Switch Valve Position Verification," Revision 1
- MST-006, "Reactor Coolant Flow Protection Channel Testing," Revision 13
- MST-004, "Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel Testing," Revision 21
- OST-409-2, "EDG B Fast Speed Start," Revision 14

* This procedure included in-service testing requirements.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following planned temporary modifications to determine their impact on safety functions. The following ESRs involving temporary modifications to the SW system were reviewed, including the associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening, the system design basis, UFSAR, and TS. The review verified that configuration control of the modification was adequate and that the appropriate pre and post-modification tests were in place to verify system design flow requirements were maintained.

- ESR 00-00035, "Temporary Cooling for B EDG"
- ESR 00-00036, "Temporary Cooling for WCCU B "
- ESR 00-00037, "Temporary Cooling for B CCW Heat Exchanger"

The following calculations were reviewed by the inspectors as part of the inspection of the above temporary modifications:

- RNP-M/MECH-1667, "Thermal Hydraulic Analysis for WCCU B, EDG B, and CCW HX B with Temporary SW Discharge Piping," Revision 1
- RNP-C/SPPT-2088, "Misc. Calculations to Support CCW Exchanger Discharge Piping Replacement," Revision 1

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness1EP6 Drill Evaluationa. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's conduct of simulator scenarios involving licensed operators. In particular, the inspectors observed the scenarios to determine licensee opportunities for event classification and notification, and verified that the licensee successfully classified the emergency declarations during the simulator scenarios.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY**Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety [OS]**OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areasa. Inspection Scope

The licensee's access controls for high, locked high radiation areas (LHRAs), and very high radiation areas (VHRAs) were evaluated to determine compliance with 10 CFR 20, and TS requirements. Entrance ways to LHRAs and VHRAs outside the containment building were inspected.

During plant walk-downs radiological postings, radiation barriers, radiological surveys, and radiation work permits were reviewed. Independent radiation surveys were made by the inspector to confirm the licensee's surveys.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

OS2 As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controlsa. Inspection Scope

Title 10 CFR Part 20 requires licensees develop and implement radiation protection programs to achieve occupational radiation doses that are ALARA. The licensee's abilities to maintain collective radiation doses ALARA, during the assessment period, were evaluated by the inspector.

The inspectors reviewed pertinent information regarding plant collective exposure history, current exposure trends, and radiological work planning for an upcoming refueling outage. Other elements of the licensee's ALARA program that were reviewed included licensee radioactive source term reduction and control, collective dose estimates, collective dose goals, and exposure tracking systems.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's dosimetry records to verify declared pregnant women were not receiving occupational radiation exposures greater than 500 milli-rem for the full term. The inspectors reviewed licensee self-assessments, audits, condition reports, and specific pre-job ALARA planning documents.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety [PS]

2PS2 Radioactive Material Control Program

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following documents and performed the following activities to ensure that the licensee met the requirements specified in the licensee's program for the unrestricted release of material from the radiologically controlled area (RCA):

- licensee's criteria for the survey and release of potentially contaminated material;
- associated procedures and records to verify the lower limits of detection;
- most recent calibration results for radiation monitoring instrumentation (Small Article Monitors), including the (a) alarm setting, (b) response to the alarm, and (c) the sensitivity;
- observed several locations where the licensee monitors potentially contaminated material leaving the RCA, and methods used for control, survey, and release of material from the RCA; and
- observed the performance of personnel surveying and releasing material for unrestricted use.

The review was against criteria contained in 10CFR20, NRC Circular 81-07, NRC Information Notice 85-92, NUREG/CR-5569, Health Position Data Base (Positions 221 and 250), and the licensee's procedures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2PS3 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following documents to ensure that the licensee met the requirements specified in the Technical Specification/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (TS/ODCM):

- 1999 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report, including projected public doses required by 40CFR190;
- most recent ODCM (Revision 18, February 7, 2000) for the REMP portion and technical justifications for ODCM (REMP portion) changes, including sampling locations;
- most recent calibration results (performed on October 17, 2000) of the meteorological monitoring instruments for wind direction, wind speed, temperature, and delta temperature;
- most recent calibration results for all TS/ODCM required air samplers;
- implementation of QA/QC program of the contract laboratories, including the interlaboratory comparison program;
- implementation of the environmental thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) program;
- self-assessments (AR 25795-1, 10/30/00 - 11/3/00, Contractor laboratory);
- most recent QA audit (RR-ERC-00-01, July 18, 2000) for the REMP/ODCM implementation;
- Land Use Census procedure and the 1999 results; and
- associated REMP procedures.

The inspectors also performed the following activities to ensure that the licensee met the requirements specified in the TS/ODCM:

- discussion with the licensee regarding the operability of the meteorological monitoring instruments and the annual percent recovery;
- discussion with the licensee regarding environmental sampling techniques; and
- walk-down for determining whether air samplers, milk farms, composite water sampler, and TLDs were located as described in the ODCM and for determining the equipment material condition.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

.1 Mitigating Systems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified the accuracy of PI data submitted to the NRC for safety system unavailability for the period of October 2000 through December 2000. Specifically, the PI data was verified for emergency AC power, and high pressure safety injection. This was accomplished through a review of the licensee's PI data base and operator logs.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Barrier Integrity

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified the accuracy of the RCS leak rate PI data for the month of January 2001 through review of the licensee leak rate measurement procedure, review of actual RCS leak rates, and review of licensee methodology during the performance of the RCS leak rate. The inspectors also corroborated the RCS leak rate data with other parameters including containment sump level and containment radiation monitors.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Security

The inspectors verified the accuracy of PI data submitted to the NRC for Protected Area Equipment, Personnel Screening Program, and Fitness For Duty (FFD)/Personnel Reliability Program. This was accomplished through interviews with security personnel and a review of licensee security PI data and records. The data reviewed involved the time frame from April 2000 to December 2000.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

- .4 (Closed) URI: 50-261/00-05-01: The tabletop drills conducted by the licensee for the Control Room Emergency Communicators were determined to have reasonably simulated their performance during an event. Although inconsistencies were noted in the conduct of the table tops, they were evaluated and thus, including them in the original PI submittals as having participated in a drill was appropriate. There was no

violation of regulatory requirements for the first through third quarters 2000 submittal for the Emergency Response Organization Participation PI.

Notwithstanding the above, the licensee did not include any of the table top results in the PI submittal to the NRC for the first through third quarters 2000 for the Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP) PI. The NRC concluded that this submittal of inaccurate PI data represented a violation of 10 CFR 50.9, Completeness and Accuracy of Information. However, based on NRC review, the DEP PI would have remained Green even if the results were included. As such, this issue constitutes a violation of minor significance that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

4OA3 Event Follow-up

- .1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-261/2001-001-00: Reactor Protection System Low Reactor Coolant System Flow Channel Inoperable for Greater Than Technical Specification Allowable Time. The inspectors reviewed this LER which was dispositioned as a non-cited violation as described in section 4OA7 of this report. This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as AR 27677.

4OA6 Meetings, including Exit

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Cleary and other members of licensee management on April 5, 2001. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented during the exit meeting.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspections should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

4OA7 Licensee Identified Violations

The following finding of very low significance was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV).

If you deny this non-cited violation, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Robinson facility.

| <u>NCV Tracking Number</u> | <u>Requirement Licensee Failed to Meet</u> |
|----------------------------|---|
| NCV 50-261/00-06-01 | Reactor protection system low RCS loop 3 flow comparator FC-434 was inoperable for greater than the Technical Specification 3.3.1 allowable time, as described in licensee corrective action report AR 27677. Technical Specification Table 3.3.1-1, item 9 requires three flow channels in each RCS loop to be operable during power operation. One flow channel in RCS loop 3 was found inoperable for greater than the allowed time of six hours. This is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation. This issue was reported as LER 50-261/2001-001-00. |

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

E. Kapopoulos , Operations Manager
 C. Martin, Site Support Services Manager
 S. Collins, Radiation Protection Superintendent
 E. Caba, Engineering Superintendent
 D. Stoddard, Robinson Engineering Support Services Manager
 E. Rothe, Maintenance Manager
 T. Walt, Director of Site Operations
 R. Steele, Outage Management Manager
 T. Cleary, Plant General Manager
 W. Farmer, Engineering Superintendent
 A. Garrou, Site Licensing
 J. Fletcher, Regulatory Affairs Manager
 A. Williams, Training Manager
 J. Moyer, Vice President, Robinson Nuclear Plant

NRC

L. Plisco, Division Director of Reactor Projects, Region II
 B. Bonser, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 4, Region II
 R. Subaratnam, Project Manager, NRR

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSEDOpened

None

Opened and Closed

| | | |
|-----------------|-----|---|
| 50-261/00-06-01 | NCV | Reactor Protection System Low Reactor Coolant System Flow Channel Inoperable For Greater Than Technical Specification Allowable Time (Section 40A7) |
|-----------------|-----|---|

Closed

| | | |
|-------------------|-----|---|
| 50-261/2001-01-00 | LER | Reactor Protection System Low Reactor Coolant System Flow Channel Inoperable for Greater Than Technical Specification Allowable Time (Section 40A3) |
|-------------------|-----|---|

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| 50-261/2000-005-01 | URI | Adequacy of the Use of Tabletop Exercises for Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill Participation Performance (Section 40A1) |
|--------------------|-----|--|

Discussed

None

ATTACHMENT: LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

10 CFR 50.59s Reviewed:

00-0058, "Revision of UFSAR Section 15.6.2," Rev. 0
 00-0141, "ESR 99-00045 DS UPS Battery Replacement," Rev. 0
 00-0154, "ESR 00-00022 Reactor Vessel Head Adapter Plugs," Rev. 0
 00-0285, "Replacement of Damaged SW Piping," Rev. 0
 00-0301, "RNP Containment Re-analysis," Rev. 0
 00-0342, "ESR 00-000038, New Channel Cover for the "B" CCW HX," Rev. 0
 00-0414, "Temporary Mod to Provide Alternate Cooling to the "B" CCW HX," Rev. 0
 00-0539, "Temporary Cooling for "B" EDG During RO-20," Rev. 0
 00-0551, "ESR 00-00104, Leak Repair of SW Line CW-50A-3," Rev. 0
 00-0975, "Revision to TS Bases 3.4.11, PORV Operability," Rev. 0
 00-0984, "EDG "B" FO Transfer Pump Replacement," Rev. 1
 00-1093, "ECCS Sump Zone of Influence for Coatings Debris," Rev. 0
 00-1143, "Potential Loose Part in SG "B" Secondary Side," Rev. 0

10 CFR 50.59 Screen Outs Reviewed:

00-1215, "Modification of Unit 10 Emergency Lighting," Rev. 0
 00-1239, "Change Special Procedure No. 1419 to Maintenance Procedure CM-764," Rev. 0
 00-1313, "Revision of Maintenance Procedure MMM-010," Rev. 0
 00-1372, "Revision of Electrical Procedure EGR-NGGC-0100," Rev. 0
 00-1419, "ESR 00-00126, Expand EDG Pressure and Temperature Switch Tolerances," Rev. 0
 00-1462, "Correction of Leak to AFW Check Valve AFW-70," Rev. 0
 00-1142, "ESR 00-00191, Alternate Valve for as-171," Rev. 0
 00-0797, "Revision of TS 3.3.3 Bases," Rev. 0
 00-1394, "IST Evaluation 00-24 (Service Water Pump 'A'," Rev. 0
 00-0274, "PZR Level Calculation RNP-I/INST-1076 Revision," Rev. 0
 00-0277, "PZR Level Calculation RNP-I/INST-1118 Revision," Rev. 0
 00-0338, "Revision of Maintenance Procedure CM-032," Rev. 0
 00-0862, "Revision of Operations Procedure OP-306," Rev. 0
 00-0982, "Revision of Test Procedure OST-101-1," Rev. 0

Self-Assessments Reviewed:

Self-Assessment Report LIC/RP-99-072, "10 CFR 50.59 Process," Dated November 4, 1999

Condition Reports Reviewed:

00015141
 00019721
 00020907
 00021988
 00024607
 00026796

00027230
 00027798
 00027799
 00027801

Additional Documents Reviewed:

Administrative (ADM)-NGGC,-0105, "ALARA Planning," Revision 3;
 Corrective Action Program (CAP)-NGGC, "Corrective Action Program," Revision 002;
 CAP-NGGC, "Self-Assessment Program," Revision 003;
 NGGM-PM-"Radiation Control and Protection Manual," Revision 30;
 HPS-NGGC, "Radiological Posting, Labeling and Surveys," Revision 005;
 Plant Operating Manual (POM), Volume 1, Part 1, Administrative Procedure (AP) AP-31, "Administrative Controls or Entry Into Locked and Very High Radiation Areas, " Revision 29;
 POM, Volume 1, Part 2, Plant Program Procedure -17, "ALARA Program and ALARA Committee Activities/Responsibilities, Revision 18;
 POM, Volume 3, Part2, Operating Procedure (OP)-704, Spent Resin Transfer And Refill of Ion Exchangers," Revision 19;
 POM, Volume 5, Part 2, Health Physics Procedure (HPP), HPP - 001, "Radiologically Controlled Area Surveillance Program, Revision 73;
 POM, Volume 5, part 2, HPP-0013, "Radiation Protection During Diving Operations, Revision 3;
 POM, Volume 5, Part 2, HPP-500, "Health Physics - Conduct Of Operations," Revision 1;
 POM, Volume 5, Part 2, HPP-500-1, "Health Physics Posting," Revision 1;
 POM, Volume 5, Part 2, HPP-500-2, "Health Physics Labeling," Revision 0;
 POM, Volume 5, Part 2, HPP-500-3, "Radiation Control Work Planning Process," Revision 3;
 POM, Volume 5, Part 2, HPP-500-4, "Health Physics Conduct Of Pre-Job Briefings," Revision 0;
 Environment and Radiological Control (E&RC)-0004, "Setup and Use of Temporary ALARA Equipment," Revision 5; and
 E&RC-0014, "Environmental and Radiation Control Self-Evaluation Program," Revision13;

 "Radiation Control Monthly Report," December 2000, dated January 16, 2001; and
 "Environmental And Chemistry Monthly Report," December 2000, dated January 16, 2001;

NRC's REVISED REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS

The federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recently revamped its inspection, assessment, and enforcement programs for commercial nuclear power plants. The new process takes into account improvements in the performance of the nuclear industry over the past 25 years and improved approaches of inspecting and assessing safety performance at NRC licensed plants.

The new process monitors licensee performance in three broad areas (called strategic performance areas): reactor safety (avoiding accidents and reducing the consequences of accidents if they occur), radiation safety (protecting plant employees and the public during routine operations), and safeguards (protecting the plant against sabotage or other security threats). The process focuses on licensee performance within each of seven cornerstones of safety in the three areas:

Reactor Safety

- Initiating Events
- Mitigating Systems
- Barrier Integrity
- Emergency Preparedness

Radiation Safety

- Occupational
- Public

Safeguards

- Physical Protection

To monitor these seven cornerstones of safety, the NRC uses two processes that generate information about the safety significance of plant operations: inspections and performance indicators. Inspection findings will be evaluated according to their potential significance for safety, using the Significance Determination Process, and assigned colors of GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW or RED. GREEN findings are indicative of issues that, while they may not be desirable, represent very low safety significance. WHITE findings indicate issues that are of low to moderate safety significance. YELLOW findings are issues that are of substantial safety significance. RED findings represent issues that are of high safety significance with a significant reduction in safety margin.

Performance indicator data will be compared to established criteria for measuring licensee performance in terms of potential safety. Based on prescribed thresholds, the indicators will be classified by color representing varying levels of performance and incremental degradation in safety: GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW, and RED. GREEN indicators represent performance at a level requiring no additional NRC oversight beyond the baseline inspections. WHITE corresponds to performance that may result in increased NRC oversight. YELLOW represents performance that minimally reduces safety margin and requires even more NRC oversight. And RED indicates performance that represents a significant reduction in safety margin but still provides adequate protection to public health and safety.

The assessment process integrates performance indicators and inspection so the agency can reach objective conclusions regarding overall plant performance. The agency will use an Action Matrix to determine in a systematic, predictable manner which regulatory actions should be taken based on a licensee's performance. The NRC's actions in response to the significance (as represented by the color) of issues will be the same for performance indicators as for inspection findings. As a licensee's safety performance degrades, the NRC will take more and increasingly significant action, which can include shutting down a plant, as described in the Action Matrix.

More information can be found at: <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html>.