



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064

August 28, 2000

Gregory M. Rueger, Senior Vice
President, Generation and Chief Nuclear Officer
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Diablo Canyon Power Plant
P.O. Box 3
Avila Beach, CA 93424

SUBJECT: Diablo Canyon - NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-275/00-11; 50-323/00-11

Dear Mr. Rueger:

On August 10, 2000, the NRC completed an inspection at your Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, facilities. The results of this inspection were discussed on August 10, 2000, with Mr. Larry Womack and other members of your staff.

This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to the design adequacy and performance capability of the auxiliary saltwater and 4160 Vac systems and their support systems. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel. Within the scope of the inspection, no findings were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Jeffrey L. Shackelford, Chief
Engineering and Maintenance Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos.: 50-275; 50-323
License Nos.: DPR-80; DPR-82

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report No.
50-275/00-11; 50-323/00-11

cc w/enclosure:

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ENCLOSURE

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV

Docket Nos.: 50-275; 50-323

License Nos.: DPR-80; DPR-82

Report No.: 50-275/00-11; 50-323/00-11

Licensee: Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Facility: Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location: 7 1/2 miles NW of Avila Beach
Avila Beach, California

Dates: July 24 through August 11, 2000

Team Leader: C. J. Paulk, Senior Reactor Inspector
Engineering and Maintenance Branch

Inspectors: C. A. Clark, Reactor Inspector
Engineering and Maintenance Branch

P. A. Goldberg, Reactor Inspector
Engineering and Maintenance Branch

W. M. McNeill, Reactor Inspector
Engineering and Maintenance Branch

N. L. Salgado, Resident Inspector
Projects Branch D

Accompanying Personnel: R. Quirk, Consultant

Approved By: Jeffrey L. Shackelford, Chief
Engineering and Maintenance Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

ATTACHMENTS:

Attachment 1: Supplemental Information

Attachment 2: NRC's Revised Reactor Oversight Process

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000275-00-11; 05000323-00-11; on 07/24-08/11/00; Pacific Gas and Electric Company; Diablo Canyon Power Plant; Units 1 & 2; Inspection of Safety System Design and Performance Capability Report; No Findings Identified.

This report covers a 2-week onsite inspection by a team of five Region IV inspectors and one contractor. The report includes the results of a safety system design and performance capability team inspection of the auxiliary saltwater and 4160 Vac systems and their supporting systems. No issues were identified during the inspection.

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

- No findings were identified.

Report Details

1 REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R21 Safety System Design and Performance Capability

.1 System Requirements

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed operator actions and procedures associated with the auxiliary saltwater and 4160 Vac systems to ensure that they could be relied upon to meet their functional requirements. This review consisted of system walkdowns; review of normal operating, annunciator response, off-normal, and emergency operating procedures; and review of the Final Safety Analysis Report Update, the technical specifications, the system design criteria, and plant drawings. The purpose of this review was to verify that the auxiliary saltwater system, the 4160 Vac system, and appropriate support systems would perform the functions that were assumed to be available in the safety analysis.

The team reviewed the process media required for the operation of the auxiliary saltwater system. These media included the water, electrical, and air supplies for the auxiliary saltwater system; and the supply of auxiliary saltwater to the component cooling water heat exchangers. The review included piping and instrumentation diagrams, operating procedures, calculations, the Final Safety Analysis Report Update, system descriptions, and design bases documents. This review was performed to verify that the process media will be available and unimpeded during accident or event conditions.

The team verified that the system needs for the emergency diesel generators were met. The supply of air and the required amount of clean and tested diesel fuel and lubricating oil required by the technical specifications were verified through a review of the design of the emergency diesel generators' air start system, fuel oil storage and transfer system, lubricating oil storage system, and the licensee's fuel oil testing program.

The team reviewed the licensee's program for chemical analysis and treatment of the auxiliary saltwater system, as well as, the cleaning and testing requirements for the component cooling water heat exchangers. The existence of corrosion control and testing programs identified in the licensee's response to Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment," was reviewed on a sampling basis. Applicable condition reports and maintenance action items were reviewed to verify that problems with system needs were being identified and addressed.

The team reviewed the availability of the ac and dc power supply systems; minimum voltage requirements; system grounding requirements; the design requirements of the auxiliary saltwater pumps' motors; equipment cables; circuit breakers and protective devices; and emergency diesel generators and fuel storage.

b. Issues and Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 System Condition and Capability

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed system operations for the auxiliary saltwater and 4160 Vac systems and their required support systems. This review consisted of system walkdowns; review of normal operating, annunciator response, off-normal, and emergency operating procedures; and review of the Final Safety Analysis Report Update, the technical specifications, the system design criteria, and plant drawings.

The team reviewed the environment and environmental qualification of equipment in the auxiliary saltwater pump rooms and the emergency diesel generator rooms to verify that the equipment was qualified to perform its intended function when required, subject to the assumed accident environment.

The team performed a walkdown of the auxiliary saltwater system: auxiliary saltwater pump rooms, and the 4160 Vac system to verify that the changes and modifications to the initial design had not affected or changed the system design bases or required functional performance. The team used design drawings, piping, isometric and diagram drawings to assist in the as-built verification walkdowns.

The team verified that required inputs to components, such as flow, pressure, and temperature parameters, were consistent with design basis analyses for the auxiliary saltwater and 4160 Vac systems and their support systems.

Through a review of historical and current maintenance records including performance tests, the team evaluated for signs of degradation of the auxiliary saltwater and 4160 Vac systems and support system components.

b. Issues and Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed a sample of auxiliary saltwater and 4160 Vac systems and support systems design-related problems identified by the licensee's corrective action program.

The team also reviewed Procedure OM7.ID1, "Problem Identification and Resolution - Action Requests," Revision 12.

The team reviewed the actions the licensee has taken in response to industry-identified problems with the auxiliary saltwater and 4160 Vac systems and support equipment. This review included the status of modifications to replace 4160 Vac General Electric Magnablast circuit breakers.

b. Issues and Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 System Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The team performed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the auxiliary saltwater piping and 4160 Vac systems, as well as the required support systems. The walkdowns focused on the installation and configuration of piping, components, and instruments; the placement of protective barriers and systems; the susceptibility to flooding, fire, or other environmental concerns; the physical separation; the provisions for seismic concerns; accessibility for operator action; and the conformance of the currently installed configuration of the systems with the design and licensing bases.

b. Issues and Findings

No findings were identified.

.5 Design Review

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the design criteria for the auxiliary saltwater and 4160 Vac systems and then selected specific design criteria that assured the performance of safety functions during accident conditions. These criteria were reviewed to determine whether the design bases of the systems were met by the currently installed and tested configurations. Document reviews included drawings, procedures, calculations, vendor specifications, condition reports, and maintenance action items identified in the attachment, as well as the facility technical specifications and the Final Safety Analysis Report Update. These reviews further addressed the validity of design assumptions and calculations.

The team also assumed specific failures of individual safety- and nonsafety-related components to determine the potential effects of such failures on the capability of the systems to perform their safety functions. Instrumentation was reviewed to verify the appropriateness of setpoints with regard to the parameters that were monitored or measured and the function that was affected by or related to the monitored parameter.

Additionally, the team performed analyses in several areas to verify that design values were correct and appropriate.

b. Issues and Findings

No findings were identified.

.6 Safety System Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the program, procedures, and records associated with testing, cleaning, and inspecting the component cooling water heat exchangers and the auxiliary saltwater traveling screens. The team also verified that procedures, policies, and appropriate program requirements were in place to perform all technical specification-required surveillance testing or monitoring for the auxiliary saltwater and 4160 Vac systems. This included a review of required inservice testing of pumps and the NRC-granted exemptions for cases where ASME Section XI code requirements for testing were not met. Additional review was performed to verify that installed or test instrument uncertainties and system conditions that degrade safety system performance (e.g., heat exchanger fouling factors) were appropriately accounted for within the testing and analysis methodologies.

b. Issues and Findings

No findings were identified.

4 OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA6 Management Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Larry Womack and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the onsite inspection on August 10, 2000. The licensee's management acknowledged the findings presented.

The inspectors asked the licensee's management whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. While the licensee's representatives noted that some proprietary information had been reviewed by the team, no proprietary information is contained in this report.

ATTACHMENT 1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

J. Anastasio, Engineer, Engineering Services
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S. Chesnut, Director, Balance of Plant
D. Christensen, Engineer, Nuclear Safety and Licensing
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D. Vosburg, Director - Nuclear Steam System, Engineering Services
L. Womack, Vice President, Power Generation and Nuclear Services

NRC

D. Proulx, Senior Resident Inspector, Diablo Canyon Power Plant

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Procedures

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	REVISION
17.8	Preoperational test of auxiliary saltwater system	September 7, 1982
AR PD01-01	Annunciator response procedure asw sys delta P/HDR pressure	20A
AR PK01-01	ASW SYS HX DeltaP/HDR Press	20A
AR PK01-02	Aux Salt Wtr PPS Room	10A
AR PK01-03	Aux Saltwater Pumps	11
AR PK01-06	CCW Vital HDR A/B	17
AR PK13-01	Bar Racks/Screens	16
AR PK16-16	4kV Bus H DIFF Lockout	6A
AR PK16-17	4kV Bus H Bus or SU FDR UV	9A
AR PK16-18	4kV Bus H DC Control UV/Trouble	9
AR PK16-19	4kV Bus H Auto Transfer	6

Procedures

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	REVISION
AWP E-001	Development of Performance Measurement Equipment Channel Uncertainty Calculations	0A
CF3.DC5	Development of I&C Scaling Calculations	0A
CF5.ID11	Lubricant Storage, Selection, Dispensing, and Use	1
EOP ECA-0.0	Loss Of All Vital AC Power	13
EOP ECA-0.3	Restore 4kV Buses	9
LT 17-8A	Traveling Screens and Bar Racks Level Channel Calibration	4
LT 17-8D	Aux Saltwater Pump Intake Bay 1-7 Level Channel LT-240C Calibration	3
LT 17-8D	Auxiliary Saltwater Pump Intake Bay 1-7 Level Channel LT-240C Calibration	3
LT 17-23A	Auxiliary SWP 2-1 Bay Level Channel Calibration	1
MP E-50.308	Agastat Type ETR Timing Relay Maintenance	8
MP E-50.30B	AGASTAT Type ETR Timing Relay Maintenance	8
MP E-56.1	Electrical Equipment Lubrication Chart	3
MP E-63.3B	Maintenance of Potential Transformer Drawers in General Electric Metal-Clad 4kV and 12 kV Switchgear	5A
MP E-63.3C	Maintenance of 4 and 12 kV Switchgear	8
MP E-63.3D	4 & 12 kV Switchgear Bus Connection Resistance Test	1
MP E-63.6A	Maintenance of SF6 4kV Circuit Breakers	7
NSP-1-17-15A	Nominal Setpoint Calculation for the CCW Heat Exchanger Low DP Alarm	5
NSP-1-17-16A	Auxiliary Saltwater Pump Low Discharge Pressure Switches	1
OM4.ID3	Assessment of Industry Operating Experience	4
OM7.ID1	Problem Identification and Resolution - Action Requests	12
OM7.ID2	Quality Evaluations	9

Procedures

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	REVISION
OM7.ID3	Nonconformance Report (NCR) and Technical Review Group (TRG)	8
OM7.ID10	Quality Trend Analysis Program	6
OP AP SD-1	Loss of AC Power	11
OP AP SD-3	Abnormal Operating Procedure Loss of Auxiliary Salt Water	7A
OP AP-10	Abnormal Operating Procedure Loss of Auxiliary Salt Water	7
OP AP-11	Abnormal Operating Procedure Malfunction of Component Cooling Water System	17
OP AP-26	Loss of Offsite Power	3
OP J-6A	4160 Volt System	6A
OP J-6A: I	4160 Volt System - Make Available	9
OP J-6A: II	Transferring 4160 Volt Banks	6
OP J-6A: IV	4160 Volt Breaker Code Order	14
PEP EN-1	Emergency Engineering Guideline on Control Room EOP Consultation	5/5/99
Round Sheet 69-11829-6	Intake Structure/Outside Services Weekly Round Sheet	18
STP I-1C	Routine Weekly Checks	68
STP M-13A	Manual and Auto Transfer of 4kV Vital Busses Off-Site Power Sources	9A
STP M-13B3	ENGD SFGDS Auto Timers Setting VEF Loads Started SSPS Relay K-609, Train A	7
STP M-13B4	ENGD SFGDS Auto Timers Setting VEF Loads Started SSPS Relay K-609, Train B	7
STP M-13F	4kV Bus F Non-SI Auto-Transfer Test	24
STP M-13F	4kV Bus F Non-SI Auto-Transfer Test	24
STP M-13G	4kV Bus G Non-SI Auto-Transfer Test	18
STP M-13H	4kV Bus H Non-SI Auto-Transfer Test	18

Procedures

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	REVISION
STP M-15	Integrated Test of Engineered Safeguards and Diesel Generators	34
STP M-16	Safeguards Active Component Operation By Slave Relay Operation	9
STP M-16E	Operation of Train A Slave Relays K609 (Safety Injection) K633 (Motor Driven AFW Pump Start)	11
STP M-16F	Operation of Train B Slave Relays K609 (Safety Injection) K633 (Motor Driven AFW Pump Start)	12
STP M-235	Auxiliary Salt Water Piping Inspection	2
STP M-26	Auxiliary Salt Water System Flow Monitoring	23
STP M-26A	FCV-601, Auxiliary Salt Water Unit 1 and 2 Cross-Tie Dividing Valve, Flow Test	10
STP M-75	4kV Vital Bus Undervoltage Relay Calibration	23
STP M-90A	Monthly Surveillance of Diablo Canyon Breakwaters	2
STP M-90B	Annual Surveillance of Diablo Canyon Breakwaters	2
STP M-109	Test of Backup Air Accumulator System to Fcv-602, CCW Heat Exchanger No. 1 Saltwater Inlet Valve	8
STP M-110	Test of Backup Air Accumulator System to FCV-603, Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger No. 2 Saltwater Inlet Valve	8
STP P-ASW-11	Routine Surveillance Test of Auxiliary Saltwater Pump 1-1	15
STP P-ASW-12	Routine Surveillance Test of Auxiliary Saltwater Pump 1-2	11
STP P-ASW-21	Routine Surveillance Test of Auxiliary Saltwater Pump 2-1	14
STP P-ASW-22	Routine Surveillance Test of Auxiliary Saltwater Pump 2-2	11
STP P-ASW-A	Performance Test of Auxiliary Saltwater Pumps	11, 12
STP P-CCW-11	Routine Surveillance Test of Component Cooling Water Pump	10

Procedures

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	REVISION
STP P-CCW-12	Routine Surveillance Test of Component Cooling Water Pump 1-2	7
STP P-CCW-13	Routine Surveillance Test of Component Cooling Water Pump 1-3	7
STP V-2A1	Auxiliary Saltwater Cross Connect Header Valves	1
STP V-2A2	Auxiliary Saltwater Crosstie Valve FCV-601	3
STP V-2A3	Auxiliary Saltwater Demusseling Valves	1
STP V-2F	Component Cooling Water Valves	7
STP V-3F1	Exercising Valve FCV-495, ASW Pump 2 Crosstie Valve	15, 16
STP V-3F2	Exercising Valve FCV-496, ASW Pump 1 Crosstie Valve	14, 15
STP V-3F3	Exercising Valve FCV-601, Units 1 and 2 ASW Crosstie	15
STP V-3F4	Exercising Valve FCV-602 CCW HX No. 1 Saltwater Inlet	14, 15
STP V-3F5	Exercising Valve FCV-603 CCW HX No. 2 Saltwater Inlet	12, 13
STP V-3H8	Exercising FCV-430 & FCV-431, CCW Heat Exchanger Outlet Isol Valves	16

Calculations

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	REVISION
114-DC	Protection Relay Settings for Bus and Feeders	8
170-DC	Overcurrent Relay Setting for Class 1E, 4 kV Motors	15
174A-DC	Diesel Start and Load Shed First Level Undervoltage Relay Setpoint Calc	1
174B	Second Level Undervoltage Relay Settings	1
215-DC	Emergency Diesel Generator Loading Capability Study without KWS Relay	2
311-DC	Cable Sizing - 4.16kV Class 1E Loads	4
340-DC	Intake Structure Cable Ampacity	0

Calculations

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	REVISION
357A-DC	DCPP Units 1 & 2 Load Flow, Short Circuit, and Transient Stability	3
357M-DC	FLUR and SLUR Drift Analysis	1
357P-DC	SLUR Relay and Timer Setpoints	0
360-DC	125 VDC System Analysis Methodology & Scenario Development	2
D.1	DCPP Support System Event Trees	8
D.2.1.3	Electric Power Unit 1 Vital AC System	6
D.2.1.4	Electric Power Vital AC/DC System Unit 2	6
D.2.6	Auxiliary Saltwater Systems Analysis	6 and 7
EQP 301.1	Deflection of Impeller Shaft	May 18, 1988
J-002	Backup Air/nitrogen Accumulators and Bottles	6
M-9	Backup Air Supply, to Size Receivers	4
M-188	To Determine the Velocity of Slat Water Through the CCW Heat Exchanger under Design and Maximum Flow	2
M-370	Determine the Thrusts from the Auxiliary Saltwater Lines on the CCW Heat Exchangers for Units 1 & 2	May 23, 1983
M-854	Worst Case Brake Horsepower for AFW, ASW, and CCW Pumps	3
M-897	CCW Flow Balance	4
M-917	Determine the ASW Flows for Various Configurations Utilizing the Inter-unit Crosstie Piping	3
M-938	CCW Date Input for 1993 Containment Analysis Program	3
M-953	Determine If Adequate NPSH Is Available for 1 Pump Supplying 2 Heat Exchangers	January 17, 1994
M-966	Establish Maximum CCW Flow Rate to the RHR Heat Exchangers	August 4, 1994
M-988	To Evaluate the Effects of the New ASW Bypass Piping	6

Calculations

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	REVISION
M-1017	To Determine Flows in the CCW System	3
M-1020	Evaluate the CCW System for Mode 4 Operation with Elevated UHS Temperatures	1
M-1027	To Determine the Maximum Allowable ASW Temperature When 2 CCW Heat Exchangers Are Aligned	1
NSP-1-17-15	Nominal Setpoint Calculation for the CCW Heat Exchanger D/P Alarm	3
NSP-1-17-16A	Nominal Setpoint Calculation for Auxiliary Saltwater Pump Low Discharge Pressure Switches	1
NSP-1-17-23A	Nominal Setpoint for Auxiliary Saltwater Pump Bay Low Level Alarm	0
PLG 637	Diablo Canyon Probabilistic Risk Assessment	July 1988
SC-L-17-15A	Instrument Scaling Calculation CCW Heat Exchanger 1-1 Differential Pressure Channel PT-5 Calibration	2
SC L-17-16A	Instrument Scaling Calculation Auxiliary Salt Water Pumps Header Pressure Switches Calibration	1
SC L-17-23A	Instrument Scaling Calculation Auxiliary SWP 1-1 Bay Level Channel LS-163	0
SC L-17-23B	Instrument Scaling Calculation Auxiliary SWP 2-2 Bay Level Channel	0

Drawings

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	REVISION
053093	Outboard Bubbler for Bar Rack LT-240D, Sheet 50	52
053093	Inboard Bubbler for Bar Rack LT-240D, Sheet 50A	52
053093	Outboard Bubbler for Traveling Screen LT-240B & C, Sheet 50C	28
053093	Inboard Bubbler for Traveling Screen LT-240A, B, & C, Sheet 50D	28

Drawings

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	REVISION
57554	Cable tray and Conduit Layout Plan Below Elevation 140'-0" Area "A"	30
102017	Piping Schematic Saltwater Systems , Sheet 1	89
102017	Piping Schematic Saltwater Systems, Sheet 3B	87
102017	Piping Schematic Saltwater Systems, Sheet 3	95
102017	Piping Schematic Saltwater Systems, Sheet 5	86
102032	ASW Air Operated Valve Schematic, Sheet 42	143
102032	ASW Air Operated Valve FCV-602, 603 Schematic, Sheet 42E	140
102033	Traveling Screen and Bar Racks Instrument Schematics, Sheet 23C	115
102033	ASW Pump Level Instrument Schematic, Sheet 24A	115
106717	Operating Valve Identification Diagram (OVID), Sheet 1	110
106717	Operating Valve Identification Diagram (OVID), Sheet 7	109
106717	Operating Valve Identification Diagram (OVID), Sheet 8	108
108017	Piping Schematic Saltwater Systems, Sheet 5	53
108017	Unit 2 Saltwater Systems Piping Schematic, Sheet 1	71
108017	Unit 2 Screen Wash System Piping Schematic, Sheet 3	71
108017	Unit 2 Aux Saltwater System Piping Schematic, Sheet 3B	73
216191	Screen Wash Pumps and Screen Drive Logic	5
437533	Electrical Single Line Diagram Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 4160 Volt System	33
437589	Unit 1 SI Pump Schematic	14
437594	Unit 1 Aux Seawater Pump Schematic	24
437641	Screen Drive Schematic	12
437642	Screen Drive and Wash Schematic	14
437646	Salt Water System Motor Operated Valves FCV-432/433/604/605/495/496/601 Schematic	7

Drawings

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	REVISION
437681	FCV-602, 603 Schematic	18
441229	4160 V System Bus Section F Single Line	14
441287	Auxiliary Saltwater Pumps Schematic	21
441289	Screen Drive System Schematic	7
490093	Auxiliary Saltwater Pump Intake Level Bubbler L-163 Details, Sheet 25	63
502110	Single Line Diagram 500/230/25/12/4.16 kV Systems	10

Action Requests

A0122296	A0467127	A0475431	A0491419	A0504172
A0416737	A0467481	A0475677	A0491977	A0504648
A0419055	A0468144	A0477270	A0492483	A0504915
A0440794	A0468232	A0478268	A0495005	A0505103
A0441048	A0468320	A0478510	A0495066	A0507000
A0448591	A0469102	A0478576	A0495278	A0507382
A0452896	A0469559	A0482690	A0495318	A0508248
A0463722	A0470233	A0482692	A0496068	A0508383
A0463807	A0470978	A0482876	A0496465	A0511800
A0464840	A0471180	A0482901	A0496468	A0511987
A0465134	A0471484	A0483328	A0497475	A0512029
A0465736	A0471662	A0484387	A0500504	A0512581
A0465775	A0472876	A0484806	A0503381	Q0012080
A0465838	A0474755	A0486375	A0503389	
A0466445	A0474805	A0488881		

Design Change Packages

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	REVISION
A0404677	Teflon coated seat ring installation in Unit 1	November 10, 1999
A0437708	Teflon coated seat ring installation in Unit 2	June 19, 1997
A0475763	Request for design to eliminate ASW vacuum breaker counterweights	January 29, 1999
A0482876	Unit 2 design change to remove counterweights	April 16, 1999

Design Change Packages

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	REVISION
A0482901	Unit 1 Design Change to Remove Counterweights	April 16, 1999
A0486935	Revise Unit 1 ASW Vacuum Breaker STP Frequency	June 22, 1999
DCO-EM-39834	Increase Impeller Diameter in ASW Pumps	May 20, 1988
E049033	Replace ASW Pump Underground Cable	0
E049318	Replace the Electromechanical First Level Undervoltage Relay (FLUR) with Digital Relays	0
E049451	Raise the Second Level Undervoltage Relay (SLUR) Setpoint	0
M049251	Saltwater- Chemical Biofouling Control Systems Upgrade	1
M049376	Stop Valve in Code Relief Valve Path of CCW Heat Exchanger Should Be Controlled to Ensure Code Compliance	0
M049385	Revise the DCM and FSAR to Reflect ASW Pump Impeller Replacement	0
M050376	Stop Valves in Code Relief Valve Path of CCW Heat Exchanger Should Be Controlled to Ensure Code Compliance	0

Miscellaneous Documents

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	REVISION
	CCW Heat Exchanger 2-1 Test	February 1998
	Final Unit 2 Ccw Heat Exchanger Test Results	November 22, 1994
	Final Unit 1 CCW Heat Exchanger 1-1 Test Results	April 22, 1996
	Maintenance Rule Data Base	
	Monthly NPQ Quality Problem Reports for August 1999 to July 2000	

Miscellaneous Documents

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	REVISION
	Remote Internal Video Inspection of ASW Piping During 1R8 Refueling Outage	June 1997
	Remote Internal Video Inspection of ASW Piping During 2R10 Refueling Outage	April 1998
	Remote Internal Video Inspection of ASW Piping During 1R7 Refueling Outage	November 1995
	Remote Internal Video Inspection of ASW Piping During 2R7 Refueling Outage	May 1996
	Unit 1CCW Heat Exchanger Test	April 1995
	Inservice Testing Program Second Ten-Year Interval, Units1&2	16
	Supplemental Safety Evaluation of PG&E Response to Station Blackout Rule for Diablo Canyon	May 29, 1992
663030-17	Bingham-Willamette Co. Auxiliary Saltwater Pumps (20 x 34B "VCM" Single Stage Wet Pit Pumps) Vendor Instruction Manual	17
DCM S-17B	Units 1 and 2 Design Criteria Memorandum - Auxiliary Salt Water	16
DCM S-23G	Intake Structure Ventilation System	6
DCM S-63	4160 V System	11
E-5	Auxiliary Saltwater System	7
GEH-1802	Metal Clad Switchgear Types M-26 and M-36 Instruction and Renewal Parts	U
J-139	Uncertainty in Using the AMAG Ultrasonics Flowmeter for Calibration Checks on the ASW Magnetic Flowmeters	0
J6A	4kV System	8
M-270	Flood Level of the Auxiliary Saltwater Pump Vault Due To Pipe Crack and Floor Drain Plugging	6
M00172080	Repair/Replace PS-185A/185B	

Miscellaneous Documents

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	REVISION
PG&E 116.30	Asw Pump Testing for Run-out	February 26, 1994
PG&E 116.31	Evaluation of ASW Pumps in a Condition That the Available NPSH Was less than Required	February 9, 1994
PG&E 420DC	Tides Occurring at Diablo Canyon Power Plant	May 4, 1988
PM 51872	CCWHE1 Open Heat Exchanger WaterBoxes (Work Order R0192829 01)	01
PM 53586	CCWHE1-1 Clean/Inspect Seawater Side (Work Order R0088473 01)	01
PM 53601	ASP1-1 Forebay: Remove Debris (Diver) (Work Order R0192562 01)	01
Report 420DC-97.139	In-place Calibration Verifications of the DCPP Unit 1 ASW Magnetic Flowmeters	August 1997
Report 420DC-00.8	DCPP ASW Magnetic Flowmeter Comparison Tests January - February 2000	March 2000
STP M-13B4	Engineered Safeguards Auto Timers Verify Loads Started SSPS Relays K-609 Train B	March 4, 1999
Westinghouse PGE-00-503	RHR Heat Exchanger Flow Increase Evaluation	February 8, 2000
Westinghouse PGE-94-579	Excessive Shell Side Flow Rates for the Residual Heat Exchanger	March 30, 1994

Operating Events Analyses

99-006	99-069	99-120	Y0-065
99-035	99-111	99-167	

ATTACHMENT 2

NRC's REVISED REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS

The federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recently revamped its inspection, assessment, and enforcement programs for commercial nuclear power plants. The new process takes into account improvements in the performance of the nuclear industry over the past 25 years and improved approaches of inspecting and assessing safety performance at NRC licensed plants.

The new process monitors licensee performance in three broad areas (called strategic performance areas): reactor safety (avoiding accidents and reducing the consequences of accidents if they occur), radiation safety (protecting plant employees and the public during routine operations), and safeguards (protecting the plant against sabotage or other security threats). The process focuses on licensee performance within each of seven cornerstones of safety in the three areas:

Reactor Safety

- Initiating Events
- Mitigating Systems
- Barrier Integrity
- Emergency Preparedness

Radiation Safety

- Occupational
- Public

Safeguards

- Physical Protection

To monitor these seven cornerstones of safety, the NRC uses two processes that generate information about the safety significance of plant operations: inspections and performance indicators. Inspection Findings will be evaluated according to their potential significance for safety, using the Significance Determination Process, and assigned colors of GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW or RED. GREEN Findings are indicative of issues that, while they may not be desirable, represent very low safety significance. WHITE Findings indicate issues that are of low to moderate safety significance. YELLOW Findings are issues that are of substantial safety significance. RED Findings represent issues that are of high safety significance with a significant reduction in safety margin.

Performance indicator data will be compared to established criteria for measuring licensee performance in terms of potential safety. Based on prescribed thresholds, the indicators will be classified by color representing varying levels of performance and incremental degradation in safety: GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW, and RED. GREEN indicators represent performance at a level requiring no additional NRC oversight beyond the baseline inspections. WHITE corresponds to performance that may result in increased NRC oversight. YELLOW represents performance that minimally reduces safety margin and requires even more NRC oversight. And RED indicates performance that represents a significant reduction in safety margin, but still provides adequate protection to public health and safety.

The assessment process integrates performance indicators and inspection so the agency can reach objective conclusions regarding overall plant performance. The agency will use an Action Matrix to determine in a systematic, predictable manner, which regulatory actions should be taken based on a licensee's performance. The NRC's actions in response to the significance (as represented by the color) of issues will be the same for performance indicators as for inspection findings. As a licensee's safety performance degrades, the NRC will take more and increasingly significant action, which can include shutting down a plant, as described in the Action Matrix.

More information can be found at: <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html>.