



Do you have a Safety Culture?

- "... it is worth pointing out that if you are convinced that your organization has a good safety culture, you are almost certainly mistaken."
- " ... a safety culture is something that is striven for but rarely attained..."
- "...the process is more important than the product."

James Reason, "Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents."





NTSB Perspective on Corporate Culture



Symposium on Corporate Culture and Transportation Safety

"We've found through 30 years of accident investigation that sometimes the most common link is the attitude of corporate leadership toward safety."

- Honorable Jim Hall











• Culture is a set of established beliefs, values, norms, attitudes and practices of an organization.









Lautman-Gallimore Study

- Looked at the worldwide Boeing fleet for a 10 year period (1975-1984)
- 16 percent of the operators account for over 80 percent of the accidents.



Lautman-Gallimore Findings: Best Practices

- Management emphasis on safety
 - Safety begins at top of organization
 - Safety permeates the entire operation



Lautman-Gallimore Findings: Best Practices

Standardization and discipline

- Management stresses need for these items
- Cockpit procedural compliance, callouts, and checklist usage are tightly controlled.





Standardization



- Maneuvers Guide contained key procedures for briefing and conducting instrument approaches
 - Pilots were expected to adhere to procedures in Maneuvers Guide
 - Maneuvers Guide was only issued to the chief pilot and instructors



Standardization

- Company check airman: rated company's standardization as "6"
- Company pilot: "Fair to good"
- · Lead ground instructor: "Fair"
 - Suspected that some pilots were following SOPs while others were not
 - Aware that some pilots used their own checklists, instead of company checklists
- Another pilot: never seen any standardized callouts documented in any company manual
 - To compensate, she used callouts she used at another company



Lautman-Gallimore Findings: Best Practices

- Flight Operations quality control programs
 - conducted safety audits
 - confidential incident reporting systems



Lautman-Gallimore Findings: Best Practices


- Training
 - Strong quality control program of training
 - Accomplished their own training so that positive control of standardization and discipline are maintained




Lautman-Gallimore Findings: Best Practices

- Management emphasis
- Standardization and discipline
- Flight Ops quality control
- Training








Excellence

- "Without exception, the dominance and coherence of culture proved to be an essential quality of the excellent companies."
- "In these [strong culture] companies, people way down the line know what they are supposed to do in most situations because the handful of guiding values is crystal clear."
 - T.J. Peters and R.H. Waterman, "In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America's Best-Run Companies."



Components of Safety Culture Informed Culture Reporting Culture Learning Culture Just Culture Source: James Reason, Ph.D.


Informed Culture – the organization collects and analyses "the right kind of data" to keep it informed of the safety health of the organization Creates a safety information system that collects, analyzes and disseminates information on incidents and near-misses, as well as proactive safety checks.





Reporting Culture

- Employees are open to report safety problems
 - They know they will not be punished or ridiculed for reporting
 - · Non-reprisal policy signed by CEO
 - Confidentiality will be maintained or the data are de-identified
 - They know the information will be acted upon









Learning Culture

"Learning disabilities are tragic in children, but they are fatal in organizations."

- Peter Senge, "The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practicing of the Learning Organization"






"Just" Culture

- Basically, this means that employees realize they will be treated fairly
 - Not all errors and unsafe acts will be punished (if the error was unintentional)
 - Those who act recklessly or take deliberate and unjustifiable risks will be punished
- Substitution test





Just Culture

 "An atmosphere of trust in which people are encouraged (even rewarded) for providing safetyrelated information, but in which they are also clear about where the line must be drawn between acceptable and unacceptable behavior."



Engineering a Just Culture

he term "no blame culture" flourished in the 1990s and still endures today.

Compared to the largely punitive cultures that it sought to replace, it was clearly a step in the right direction. It acknowledged that a large proportion of unsafe acts were "honest errors" (the kinds of slips, lapses and mistakes that even the best people can make) and were not truly blameworthy, nor was there much in the way of remedial or preventative benefit to be had by punishing their perpetrators. But the "no blame" concept had two serious weaknesses. First, it ignored — or, at least, failed to confront — those individuals who willfully (and often repeatedly) engaged in dangerous

behaviors that most observers would recognize as being likely to increase the risk of a bad outcome. Second, it did not properly address the crucial business of distinguishing between culpable and nonculpable unsafe acts.

In my view, a safety culture depends critically upon first negotiating where the line should be drawn between unacceptable behavior and blameless unsafe acts. There will always be a gray area between these two extremes where the issue has to be decided on a case-by-case basis. This is where the guidelines provided by "A Roadmap to a Just Culture" will be of great value. A number of aviation organizations have

embarked upon this process, and the general indications are that only around 10 percent of actions contributing to bad events are judged as culpable. In principle, at least, this means that the large majority of unsafe acts can be reported without fear of sanction. Once this crucial trust has been established, the organization begins to have a reporting culture, something that provides the system with an accessible memory, which, in turn, is the essential underpinning to a learning culture. There will, of course, be setbacks along the way. But engineering a just culture is the all-important early step; so much else depends upon it.■

- James Reason





