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Problem-Oriented Guides for Police
Problem-Specific Guides Series
No. 47

Drive-By Shootings

by Kelly Dedel

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About the Problem-Specific Guides Series

The *Problem-Specific Guides* summarize knowledge about how police can reduce the harm caused by specific crime and disorder problems. They are guides to prevention and to improving the overall response to incidents, not to investigating offenses or handling specific incidents. Neither do they cover all of the technical details about how to implement specific responses. The guides are written for police—of whatever rank or assignment—who must address the specific problem the guides cover. The guides will be most useful to officers who:

- **Understand basic problem-oriented policing principles and methods**. The guides are not primers in problem-oriented policing. They deal only briefly with the initial decision to focus on a particular problem, methods to analyze the problem, and means to assess the results of a problem-oriented policing project. They are designed to help police decide how best to analyze and address a problem they have already identified. (A companion series of *Problem-Solving Tools* guides has been produced to aid in various aspects of problem analysis and assessment.)

- **Can look at a problem in depth**. Depending on the complexity of the problem, you should be prepared to spend perhaps weeks, or even months, analyzing and responding to it. Carefully studying a problem before responding helps you design the right strategy, one that is most likely to work in your community. You should not blindly adopt the responses others have used; you must decide whether they are appropriate to your local situation. What is true in one place may not be true elsewhere; what works in one place may not work everywhere.

- **Are willing to consider new ways of doing police business**. The guides describe responses that other police departments have used or that researchers have tested. While

not all of these responses will be appropriate to your particular problem, they should help give a broader view of the kinds of things you could do. You may think you cannot implement some of these responses in your jurisdiction, but perhaps you can. In many places, when police have discovered a more effective response, they have succeeded in having laws and policies changed, improving the response to the problem. (A companion series of *Response Guides* has been produced to help you understand how commonly-used police responses work on a variety of problems.)

- **Understand the value and the limits of research knowledge**. For some types of problems, a lot of useful research is available to the police; for other problems, little is available. Accordingly, some guides in this series summarize existing research whereas other guides illustrate the need for more research on that particular problem. Regardless, research has not provided definitive answers to all the questions you might have about the problem. The research may help get you started in designing your own responses, but it cannot tell you exactly what to do. This will depend greatly on the particular nature of your local problem. In the interest of keeping the guides readable, not every piece of relevant research has been cited, nor has every point been attributed to its sources. To have done so would have overwhelmed and distracted the reader. The references listed at the end of each guide are those drawn on most heavily; they are not a complete bibliography of research on the subject.

- **Are willing to work with others to find effective solutions to the problem**. The police alone cannot implement many of the responses discussed in the guides. They must frequently implement them in partnership with other responsible private and public bodies including other

government agencies, non-governmental organizations, private businesses, public utilities, community groups, and individual citizens. An effective problem-solver must know how to forge genuine partnerships with others and be prepared to invest considerable effort in making these partnerships work. Each guide identifies particular individuals or groups in the community with whom police might work to improve the overall response to that problem. Thorough analysis of problems often reveals that individuals and groups other than the police are in a stronger position to address problems and that police ought to shift some greater responsibility to them to do so. Response Guide No. 3, *Shifting and Sharing Responsibility for Public Safety Problems*, provides further discussion of this topic.

The COPS Office defines community policing as "a policing philosophy that promotes and supports organizational strategies to address the causes and reduce the fear of crime and social disorder through problem-solving tactics and police-community partnerships." These guides emphasize problem-solving and police-community partnerships in the context of addressing specific public safety problems. For the most part, the organizational strategies that can facilitate *problem-solving* and *police-community partnerships* vary considerably and discussion of them is beyond the scope of these guides.

These guides have drawn on research findings and police practices in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia. Even though laws, customs and police practices vary from country to country, it is apparent that the police everywhere experience common problems. In

a world that is becoming increasingly interconnected, it is important that police be aware of research and successful practices beyond the borders of their own countries.

Each guide is informed by a thorough review of the research literature and reported police practice and is anonymously peer-reviewed by line police officers, police executives and researchers prior to publication.

The COPS Office and the authors encourage you to provide feedback on this guide and to report on your own agency's experiences dealing with a similar problem. Your agency may have effectively addressed a problem using responses not considered in these guides and your experiences and knowledge could benefit others. This information will be used to update the guides. If you wish to provide feedback and share your experiences it should be sent via e-mail to cops_pubs@usdoj.gov.

For more information about problem-oriented policing, visit the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing online at www.popcenter.org. This website offers free online access to:

- the Problem-Specific Guides series
- the companion *Response Guides* and *Problem-Solving Tools series*
- instructional information about problem-oriented policing and related topics
- an interactive problem-oriented policing training exercise
- an interactive *Problem Analysis Module*
- a manual for crime analysts
- online access to important police research and practices
- information about problem-oriented policing conferences and award programs.

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Cynthia E. Pappas oversaw the project for the COPS Office. Research for the guide was conducted at the Criminal Justice Library at Rutgers University under the direction of Phyllis Schultze. Suzanne Fregly edited this guide.

Contents

The Problem of Drive-By Shootings

What This Guide Does and Does Not Cover

This guide begins by describing the problem of drive-by shootings and reviewing factors that increase its risks. It then identifies a series of questions to help you analyze your local drive-by shootings problem. Finally, it reviews responses to the problem and what is known about them from evaluative research and police practice.

Drive-by shootings are but one aspect of the larger set of problems related to gang and gun violence. This guide is limited to addressing the particular harms drive-by shootings cause. Related problems not directly addressed in this guide, each of which requires separate analysis, include:

- gun trafficking and availability
- gun possession
- general gun violence by adult and juvenile offenders
- drug markets
- gang violence
- road rage
- assaults in and around bars
- witness intimidation.

Some of these related crime problems are covered in other guides in this series, all of which are listed at the end of this guide.

Problem Description

A drive-by shooting refers to an incident when someone fires a gun from a vehicle at another vehicle, a person, a structure, or another stationary object. Drive-by shootings are a subset of more general gun violence and are less common than incidents in which someone approaches another on foot and fires at him or her.[§] Many drive-by shootings involve multiple suspects and multiple victims. Using a vehicle allows the shooter to approach the intended target without being noticed and then to speed away before anyone reacts. The vehicle also offers some protection in the case of return fire. In some situations, drive-by shootings are gang-related; in others, they are the result of road rage or personal disputes between neighbors, acquaintances, or strangers and are not related to gang membership. Non-gang-related drive-by shootings are not well researched, but journalistic accounts and police reports suggest that these constitute a significant proportion of the drive-by shootings to which police respond. Because of their prevalence, they are included in this guide, despite the dearth of research about their motivations and the lack of evaluative research showing which responses are most effective with this type of drive-by shooting. Even if a drive-by shooting problem is not patently gang-related, some of what is known about gang-related shootings may inform responses to other kinds of drive-by shootings.

Although some drive-by shootings result in the victim's death, many result in nonfatal injuries to the intended victim or innocent bystanders.[§§] Whether the shooting is lethal depends less on the intent of the offender and more on the location of the wound and the speed of medical

[§] Gun violence perpetrated by other means is far more prevalent than gun violence facilitated by vehicle use. For example, in West Oakland, California, offenders were 10 times more likely to walk up to the intended victim and shoot him or her than to use a vehicle to facilitate the attack (Wilson and Riley 2004). Similarly, an analysis of San Diego homicides from 1999 through 2003 revealed that drive-by shootings accounted for about 10 percent of all of them (Wilson et al. 2004).

[§§] For example, in Los Angeles, of over 2,000 victims of drive-by shootings in 1991, only 5 percent were fatally injured. Over half sustained a gunshot wound to the leg (Hutson, Anglin, and Eckstein 1996; Hutson, Anglin, and Pratts 1994).

attention.[1] The intended targets may be slow to mobilize in the face of an unanticipated attack, and their reactions may be delayed by drugs or alcohol.[2] The specifics of a drive-by shooting—in which the shooter is aiming a gun out the window of a moving vehicle at a moving target, and is often inexperienced in handling a gun—mean that shots often go wild and injure people or damage property that was not the intended target.[3,§] Deaths of innocent bystanders often receive significant media attention and result in passionate public outcry, particularly when the victim is extremely young, has a debilitating medical condition, or was shot while inside a supposedly "safe" structure, such as their home or place of worship.[4]

§ One study of Los Angeles drive-by shootings in the early 1990s found that the proportion of those injured in drive-by shootings who were innocent bystanders ranged between 38 to 59 percent each year (Hutson, Anglin, and Eckstein 1996).

There are no national data on the volume of drive-by shootings. National statistical databases such as the Uniform Crime Reports record the outcome (e.g., homicide, aggravated assault, weapons law violations) rather than the method (i.e., drive-by shooting). Local data on the scope of the problem are sometimes generated for the purposes of conducting research, but generally are not available on a consistent basis so that long-term trends can be tracked. What data are available suggest that large metropolitan cities with entrenched gang problems are more likely to be challenged by drive-by shootings than smaller suburban or rural jurisdictions. While smaller jurisdictions may have isolated drive-by shooting incidents stemming from a dispute between neighbors or customers at a bar or nightclub, they do not face the problems of retaliatory gang violence that characterizes the problem in large cities.

In these cities, an individual drive-by shooting is often one in a series of confrontations between street gangs with ongoing tensions.[5] Attacks are followed by reprisals, which are followed by counterattacks. As a result, the same individual may come to the attention of police as a perpetrator, victim, and witness.[6] Police often receive very limited information from witnesses because most drive-by shootings occur at night, happen very quickly and thus are very chaotic, and occur in neighborhoods in which gang members intimidate residents, some of whom distrust the police.

Factors Contributing to Drive-By Shootings

Understanding the factors that contribute to your problem will help you frame your own local analysis questions, determine good effectiveness measures, recognize key intervention points, and select appropriate responses.

Gang Membership[§]

Although gang membership is certainly not a prerequisite to being involved in a drive-by shooting, studies have shown that larger proportions of gang members reported being involved in drive-by shootings than at-risk youth who were not gang-involved.[7] While approximately equal proportions of males and females reported taking part in drive-by shootings, females were less likely to admit to having actually shot anyone, which suggests that their role in the event may have been minor or secondary.

Gang membership may facilitate involvement in drive-by shootings by placing members in risky situations—ones in which guns are present and behavioral norms often include violence.[8] Gang members are more likely than nongang members to own guns for protection, are more

§ Police departments use different thresholds in determining whether an event is "gang-related." The Los Angeles Police Department applies the label if the victim or offender is a known gang member. In Chicago, however, the event must exhibit a gang-related motive such as retaliation, initiation, or turf defense. Mere membership is not sufficient for the "gang-related" classification (Rosenfeld, Bray, and Egley 1999; Block and Block 1993).

likely to have friends who own guns for protection, and are more likely to carry guns when outside the home.[9] Further, while not all gang members engage in drive-by shootings, those who do are often attracted by the opportunity to demonstrate their loyalty and enhance their group status.[10]

Motivations

Depending on whether the drive-by shooting is gang-related or not, motivations differ. Those that are gang-involved tend to be motivated by mutual antagonism with rival gang members, disputes over territory or turf, a desire to show fearlessness or loyalty to the group, an effort to promote one's social status or self-image, or retaliation against real or perceived disrespect or insults.[11] The desire for excitement can provide momentum for the event, making the participants restless and unruly.[12] Sometimes, those involved in drive-by shootings use drugs and alcohol to rationalize their actions.

Disputes among drug dealers may also provide the motivation for drive-by shootings. Gang members and those involved in drug enterprises tend not to rely on the formal criminal justice system to resolve their disputes. Instead, they respond with their own forms of justice, often violent, to punish others for perceived wrongs and to deter future aggression.[13] Drive-by shootings are one way in which gang members and other street criminals exact revenge and enhance their status. These conflicts build and retaliation tends to lead to counter-retaliation, with each side believing they are acting in self-defense.[14]

Drive-by shootings that are not gang- or drug-motivated tend to occur in reaction to disputes among neighbors or acquaintances, or as an escalation of altercations that may have begun in a bar, restaurant, or nightclub. Obviously, not all disputes or tensions escalate to the point of violence, and research has not yet demonstrated what distinguishes those events that do from those that do not. At the most basic level, the aggressors must have access to both a vehicle and a gun, but beyond that, these events appear to be rather unpredictable. Newspapers are replete with accounts of incidents with unclear motivations involving shots fired from a vehicle at another vehicle, stationary target, person, or group of people.

Drive-by shootings that occur as an extreme form of road rage often occur in reaction to seemingly trivial events (e.g., another driver is driving "too slow," won't let another driver pass, is tailgating, fails to signal before turning). While triggered by these events, the underlying motivation usually appears to be a series of unrelated stressors in the perpetrator's life.[15] The protection, anonymity, sense of power, and ease of escape provided by the vehicle lead some motorists to feel safe expressing their hostility toward other drivers.[16]

Vehicle and Gun Availability

A drive-by shooting's prerequisites include access to a vehicle and a gun. Those who carry out drive-by shootings may use their own vehicle or one that has been borrowed, rented, or stolen. Because many drive-by shootings occur at night, dependable descriptions of the vehicle involved may be difficult to obtain.

When gun ownership is more prevalent, the risk of drive-by shootings increases as well. Although both juveniles and adults participate in them, most research on drive-by shootings has focused on the prevalence of gun ownership among adolescents. Substantial numbers of adolescents have owned guns at some point in their lives, although their ownership tends to be sporadic.[17] In recent years, as gun possession among juveniles has become more widespread, the threshold for using guns to resolve conflicts appears to have lowered.[18] Surveys of juvenile offenders have shown that over half obtained their first gun without a specific plan to do so; rather, they reported finding the gun or said a peer, sibling, or other relative gave it to them to use for self-protection.[19] Those who carry guns for protection may be resistant to voluntarily forfeiting their weapons, as they fear harm from peers or rival gang members more than they fear legal sanctions.[20]

It is not so much the number of guns in circulation, but rather the number of people carrying them in high-risk places and at high-risk times that creates the potential for a drive-by shooting.[21] Further, the number of events in which guns are actually used is only a fraction of the times in which guns are present.[22] As a result, it is important to know the times and places in which guns are present, and the factors that contribute to their use.

Times and Locations

Many drive-by shootings occur under the cover of darkness, either to help the shooters avoid detection or because the precipitating events occur at night.[23] Gang members tend to target rival groups at parties or lingering on the street. Not only do these people have little time to react, but also the offenders can boast about carrying out the shooting when they were vastly outnumbered.[24]

Wide open streets are often chosen as the preferred venue because they allow the shooters to approach without detection and to escape unhindered. Proximity to major roadways may facilitate access to and from the shooting location.[25] Targets may include people on the street, those in vehicles that are stopped at a light or parked, and those who are inside their homes.[26] Drive-by shootings that occur as an extreme form of road rage appear to be rather unpredictable in terms of the times and locations where they occur.

Understanding Your Local Problem

The information provided above is only a generalized description of drive-by shootings. You must combine these basic facts with a more specific understanding of your local problem. Analyzing the local problem carefully will help you design a more effective response strategy.

Stakeholders

In addition to criminal justice agencies, the following groups have an interest in the drive-by shooting problem and should be considered for the contribution they might make to gathering information about the problem, and responding to it:

- local hospitals and emergency services
- city public works agencies (e.g., parking, streets, transportation, utilities)
- federal law enforcement agencies (e.g., Drug Enforcement Administration; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives)
- probation and parole agencies
- corrections departments (particularly those with reentry programs that monitor offenders' return to the streets and their impact on the community)
- bar and nightclub owners and managers
- social service providers
- gang members and members of other neighborhood "groups"
- neighborhood associations.

Asking the Right Questions

The following are some critical questions you should ask when analyzing your particular problem of drive-by shootings, even if the answers are not always readily available.[§] Your answers to these and other questions will help you choose the most appropriate set of responses later on.

[§] The analysis phase of problem-oriented responses to gun violence has historically been weak. See Braga (2005) for guidance on making the analysis phase more robust.

Incidents and Motivations

- How many drive-by shootings have occurred?
- What proportion of the incidents appears to have arisen from spontaneous arguments or interpersonal conflicts?
- What proportion of the incidents appears to be connected to known tensions or rivalries among local gangs?
- What proportion of the incidents appears to be drug-related?
- What proportion of the incidents appears to be retaliatory?
- What other motivations for the incidents can you identify?
- Did anyone other than the victim witness the incidents?
- How did you identify the witnesses?
- Of what quality was the information obtained from witnesses? If poor, what interfered with the ability to get useful information from them?

Victims

- What were the characteristics of drive-by shooting victims (e.g., gender, age, race, or ethnicity)?

- Did the victims have any connections to or ongoing conflicts with the offenders? Or did they appear to be innocent bystanders?
- Were the victims gang-affiliated? Were they involved in the drug trade? Were they armed when the shooting occurred?
- Did the victims or bystanders return fire?
- What were the victims doing just before the shooting? Were they alone or with others?
- How did the victims arrive at the shooting location?
- Were the victims under the influence of drugs or alcohol during the shooting?
- What was the extent of the injuries sustained? How quickly was medical attention obtained?
- What were the characteristics of nonperson targets (e.g., car, house, other structure)? Why were these targets selected? Where there any characteristics making them vulnerable to attack?

Offenders

- What were the offenders' characteristics (e.g., gender, age, race, or ethnicity)?
- Did they have previous involvement with the criminal justice system? Were they currently under some form of criminal justice supervision that could be leveraged?
- Were the offenders gang-affiliated? Were they involved in the drug trade?
- Were the offenders under the influence of drugs or alcohol during the shooting?
- Did they target the victims specifically, or did they select them randomly?
- What type of gun was used, and how was it obtained? What happened to the gun after the shooting?

- Why was the offender carrying the gun at that time?
- What were the reasons offenders offered for owning a gun? Under what conditions might they be convinced to relinquish them?
- Whose vehicle was used? Was it owned, borrowed, rented, or stolen?
- How many other people were in the car during the shooting? What were their roles in the incident? How did they facilitate or discourage the offender from shooting?
- Was anyone in the vehicle injured? What was the extent of injury? How quickly was medical attention obtained?

Times and Locations

- Where do drive-by shootings occur? Are they concentrated in any identifiable patterns?
- What are these hotspots characteristics? Are they clustered near main thoroughfares? Businesses (e.g., bars and night clubs)? Other places where people congregate (e.g., residential parties, liquor stores, illegal gambling houses)? Do they provide for easy access and escape?
- Are there features of the immediate environment that shield the offenders from view (e.g., poor lighting, overgrown vegetation) or that otherwise make the location attractive? Are there any physical barriers at other locations that appear to prevent the problem?
- Do other types of crime affect the area?
- What times of the day and days of the week do drive-by shootings occur?

- Are there other features of the environment that are connected to these times and days (e.g., bar closing times)? Which of these could be strategically modified?

Current Responses

- How are intergang tensions currently monitored? Has your department made any efforts toward mediation? Which of these were successful?
- Are any controllers—i.e., people who could prevent the offenders from causing harm—available?
- How do bars and nightclubs monitor and try to defuse interpersonal conflicts on their premises? How could the managers of these places be engaged?
- Does traffic congestion or the physical condition of roads appear to contribute to road rage? How could these be modified?

Measuring Your Effectiveness

Measurement allows you to determine to what degree your efforts have succeeded, and suggests how you might modify your responses if they are not producing the intended results. You should take measures of your problem *before* you implement responses, to determine how serious the problem is, and *after* you implement them, to determine whether they have been effective. All measures should be taken in both the target area and the surrounding area. For more detailed guidance on measuring effectiveness, see the Problem-Solving Tools Guide, *Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory Guide for Police Problem-Solvers*.

The following are potentially useful measures of the effectiveness of responses to drive-by shootings. Process-related measures identify whether responses have been implemented as designed. These include:

- increases in the number of searches for illegal guns conducted in high-risk places
- increases in the number of guns seized, followed by a reduction in the number of guns seized
- increases in the number of intergang disputes that are mediated and settled without violence
- reductions in the number of instances in which gun owners rearm themselves after seizure
- increases in the number of bars and nightclubs that enact violence prevention measures
- improved witness cooperation with investigations of drive-by shootings
- increases in perceptions of safety among residents and local merchants.

Outcome-related measures are used to determine whether responses have reduced the size or scope of the problem. These include:

- reductions in the number of drive-by shooting incidents
- absence of displacement to other locations;
- reductions in the number of victims of drive-by shootings
- reductions in the number of stationary targets (e.g., structures, vehicles) damaged by drive-by shootings
- reductions in the severity of injuries victims sustain
- reductions in the number of nonfatal and fatal injuries victims sustain.

Responses to the Problem of Drive-By Shootings

Your analysis of your local problem should give you a better understanding of the factors contributing to it. Once you have analyzed your local problem and established a baseline for measuring effectiveness, you should consider possible responses to address the problem.

The following response strategies provide a foundation of ideas for addressing your particular problem. These strategies are drawn from a variety of research studies and police reports. Several of these strategies may apply to your community's problem. It is critical that you tailor responses to local circumstances, and that you can justify each response based on reliable analysis. In most cases, an effective strategy will involve implementing several different responses. Law enforcement responses alone are seldom effective in reducing or solving the problem. Do not limit yourself to considering what police can do: carefully consider who in your community shares responsibility for the problem and can help police better respond to it. The responsibility of responding, in some cases, may need to be shifted toward those who have the capacity to implement more effective responses. (For more detailed information on shifting and sharing responsibility, see Response Guide No. 3, *Shifting and Sharing Responsibility for Public Safety Problems*).

As discussed in the previous sections, while drive-by shootings are often gang-related, they are also carried out by people who are not affiliated with gangs and who execute a drive-by shooting during the course of interpersonal conflict. These incidents are both random

and unpredictable and do not lend themselves well to a problem-oriented response strategy. Therefore, most of the responses discussed below address those drive-by shootings carried out by gang members.

General Considerations for an Effective Response Strategy

1. Focusing on proximate causes. Given the complexity of factors driving gang membership, interpersonal violence, the facilitating influence of alcohol and drugs, and other motivations for drive-by shootings, police often feel overwhelmed by the prospect of addressing these root causes. A problem-focused approach suggests focusing on proximate causes, namely addressing those factors that make the drive-by shooting easier to carry out. For example, decreasing offenders' mobility in traveling to and from the targeted location or reducing the availability of weapons used to carry out drive-by shootings, while not addressing the underlying motivation, can frustrate the offenders' intention and result in a reduction of the problem.[27]

2. Targeting the activity, not the individual. One of the criticisms of civil gang injunctions and other measures that target individual group members is that they can inadvertently increase group cohesiveness.[28] By focusing on the activity (i.e., drive-by shootings) rather than the individual's gang membership, police can avoid conferring additional status on gang membership. Further, community relationships are often strained by the community's perception that police are focusing unfairly on underprivileged minorities. By remaining focused on the harm caused, rather than group membership, police can reinforce their fair and unbiased approach to crime prevention.[29] Many of the specific responses to drive-by shootings, discussed below, take this approach.

3. Understanding gang membership dynamics. Although not all drive-by shootings are carried out by gang members, a large proportion are motivated by the desire to join a gang, enhance one's status, satisfy peer expectations, establish dominance, or exact revenge in the gang's name. Knowledge of local gang dynamics, affiliations, rivalries, and tensions is essential to be able to understand and intervene effectively in the drive-by shooting problem.[30]

Specific Responses To Reduce Drive-By Shootings

Reducing Weapon Availability or Prevalence[§]

4. Conducting crackdowns. Enhancing police visibility and intensifying enforcement actions can effectively reduce the number of weapons available for use in drive-by shootings and other forms of violence.[31] This response is also commonly referred to as directed patrol, saturation patrol, and proactive patrol.[§§] After deploying additional officers to a specific geographic area (i.e., "saturating" the area), police are directed to stop people for any offense in which probable cause exists (i.e., "directed" patrol). Most often, motorists are stopped for traffic violations to ascertain whether the person has a weapon and whether it can be seized legally.[§§§] Focusing on specific people exhibiting suspicious behaviors can yield a greater number of weapons and arrests than a general strategy that does not target high-risk people or specific behaviors.[32]

Police can also set up roadblocks or checkpoints to identify and confiscate illegal weapons.[§§§§] A careful strategy should be developed to avoid claims of unlawful searches or racial profiling.[33] In addition, police should try to minimize the inconvenience to law-abiding residents. Police should meet with residents and community group

§ Responses that intensify enforcement activities, target high-risk offenders, or obtain consent to search private property must be supported by precise documentation that will protect the department from alleged civil rights violations if challenged in court.

§§ See the POP Guide titled *The Benefits and Consequences of Police Crackdowns* (Scott 2003) for a more thorough discussion of crackdowns.

§§§ This approach has been used successfully in Kansas City (Missouri), Indianapolis, and Dallas, among other places (see Sherman, Shaw, and Rogan 1995; McGarrell, Chermak, and Weiss 2002; and Fritsch, Caeti, and Taylor 1999). In Kansas City, directed patrol activities using traffic stops resulted in a 65 percent increase in gun seizures and a 49 percent reduction in gun violence (e.g., homicides, drive-by shootings) versus a comparison area, without causing displacement (Sherman, Shaw, and Rogan 1995).

§§§§ Crawford (1998) offers several recommendations for ensuring that checkpoints do not raise Fourth Amendment concerns. Among them: the purpose of the checkpoint must clearly advance the public's interest in resolving a serious community problem; residents should be given advanced notice and signs should be posted; officers must give clearly worded explanations for the stop and should limit its duration; all cars should be stopped to diminish fear or surprise; searches should not be conducted unless the situation gives rise to one of the search warrant exceptions; and legal consult should be sought before implementation.

leaders to explain the initiative and gain their support before implementation.[34] Further, officers should be trained to treat residents with respect and to clearly explain the reason for their being stopped. Community support is also vital, and thus police should meet with community leaders, businesspeople and residents whom crackdown activities will affect. One benefit to this approach is that crackdowns and checkpoints do not require complex coordination with other agencies and therefore can be implemented relatively quickly.

5. Initiating "sweeps" targeting known offenders. In addition to implementing crackdowns at high-risk locations, police can also target high-risk people using "sweeps." In cooperation with probation and probation agencies, police can identify people already under criminal justice supervision who have a high propensity for gun violence.[35] Using the probation's search provisions and parole agreements, teams of police and probation and parole officers can search offenders' residences, vehicles, and persons and confiscate any illegal weapons found.[36] Not only can sweeps be carried out swiftly, but also they can have a rather immediate impact on the gun violence level, although these reductions may be hard to sustain over time. Further, these searches can be perceived as harassment of offenders who are complying with their supervision's conditions.

6. Obtaining consent to search for and seize weapons. Parents of at-risk youth may be willing to allow police to enter their homes to search for and confiscate weapons.[37] Locations likely to yield weapons can be identified through citizen information or from reports from other police units. Permission for the search is granted in exchange for a promise from police that neither

the parents nor the youth will be charged or prosecuted if any weapons are found. Once the purpose of the search is explained and permission is granted, the responsible adult at the location should sign a consent form.[§] "Consent to Search" programs are most effective when community expertise is engaged to identify locations, and when the police department places an absolute priority on seizing guns rather than prosecuting those who have them.[38]

Identifying Situations With the Potential for Violence

7. Tracking current tensions and past altercations. Although some drive-by shootings occur spontaneously, many are catalyzed by past altercations and ongoing tensions between individuals or among rival gang members. Some bars and nightclubs have regular customers who may clash with other peer group members; gangs involved in the drug trade may have ongoing disputes over territory or may try to gain control of a certain segment of the drug market; more general gang rivalries may escalate into lethal violence. Most drive-by shootings are not isolated events, but rather are one in a series of confrontations. Specialized gang units can be an excellent source of intelligence on the alliances, rivalries, and ongoing tensions among local gang members, but this information must be shared freely with those addressing the drive-by shooting problem.[39] For those incidents that are instigated at a bar or nightclub, police can work with owners and managers to identify and intervene in those tensions with a potential for escalation.[§§] A targeted response requires knowledge about the specific people's activities, as well as the ongoing conflicts and alliances among other groups and gangs.[40] This information can also be passed on to mediators in an effort to prevent lethal violence.[§§§]

[§] In St. Louis, Missouri, the Consent to Search program yielded a high cooperation level (98 percent of those approached gave consent for their homes to be searched) and a high gun volume (guns were seized in half the homes searched, totaling 402 guns in the first year) (Decker and Rosenfeld 2004). Also, see Rosenfeld and Decker (1996) for a sample consent form.

[§§] See the POP Guide titled *Assaults in and Around Bars* (Scott and Dedel 2006) for ideas on how lower-level tensions can be dissipated before they escalate into gun violence.

[§§§] Successful mediation of gang conflicts requires an awareness of the forces that can deter members from participating, and the needs and interests that must be satisfied once they agree to mediation. Jones (2002) identifies the following essential elements: 1) developing personal, positive, and trusting relationships between gang members and mediators; 2) offering "excuses" for participating in mediation that allow gang members to "save face"; 3) showing respect for the gang members and their conflict through the formality of the process and by requiring each side to listen to the other; and 4) personalizing members of each gang so that the hostility originating from group membership is less potent.

8. Coordinating with hospitals. Drive-by shooting victims may not be identified by police and may seek medical attention on their own. When hospital emergency rooms notify police of all patients seeking treatment for gunshot wounds, police may be able to identify and intervene in situations with a potential for retaliation and escalating violence.[§]

9. Prohibiting high-risk people from riding in cars with each other. If police can identify gang members likely to be involved in drive-by shootings, they can use a variety of legal strategies to prohibit their riding in cars with each other. For example, such restrictions could be part of probation or parole conditions, or could be specified in a civil gang injunction. Assuming police are notified when the people violate these conditions, the violation could be sufficient probable cause for an arrest, possibly intercepting a planned shooting.

Civil gang injunctions have been used to combat gangs in several jurisdictions in southern California and Texas. In collaboration with prosecutors, police gather evidence that individual gang members represent a public nuisance. This evidence can include the people's criminal histories, community police officers' statements, or residents' statements. The injunction prohibits named people from participating in specific activities (e.g., associating with other gang members, loitering in parks, carrying pagers); violations are grounds for arrest. Research on the injunctions' effectiveness is somewhat limited and has shown mixed results, but some jurisdictions have found them to result in decreased visibility of gang members, fewer episodes of gang intimidation, and reduced fear of crime among residents.[41]

§ The National Violent Injury Statistics System at the Harvard School of Public Health is a national reporting system for gun-related injuries involving collaborations between the public health community and police. More information is available at www.hsph.harvard.edu/nviss/index.htm. The San Antonio (Texas) Police Department developed a "Cops and Docs" program to foster two-way communication between police and emergency medical services. When a shooting occurs and the police do not identify the victim, an alert is sent to the hospital with a description and the suspected injury's location. Conversely, when a gunshot victim seeks medical attention, the emergency room staff fax an injury report to police (David 1997).

Making Environmental Changes

10. Closing streets. When drive-by shootings are concentrated in a specific geographic area, closing streets that provide access to the neighborhood can reduce the ability of potential offenders to carry out drive-by shootings.[§] These closures block entry points and escape routes, forcing offenders to take a more circuitous route to their destination and often requiring them to backtrack to leave the area. The specific architecture of the closures should specify which streets will be closed, how they will be closed, how they will be supported by patrol, how they will be monitored, and when or whether to remove the barriers.[§§] Traffic flow is a key consideration: traffic should be routed into streets that offer the lowest opportunities for drive-by shooting and other crime (e.g., avoiding gang members' hangouts; focusing on routes bordered by open areas where the line of sight is unobstructed).[42] This response is most effective when offenders are from outside of the target area, which can be difficult to ascertain given the complexity of gang turf boundaries. Given the impact of street closures on the residents' normal daily activities, a wide range of stakeholder concerns must be addressed before implementation.[43] Coordinating with first responders—firefighters, EMTs, ambulance drivers, etc.—is essential to ensure their safe and efficient passage.

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Closing streets that provide access to the neighborhood can be effective when drive-by shootings are concentrated in a specific geographic area.

§ The Los Angeles Police Department determined that drive-by shootings were clustered on the periphery of a specific neighborhood, which was linked to major thoroughfares. They erected barriers to block the major roads leading to and from the neighborhood and supplemented them with high-visibility foot, bicycle, and horseback patrols. An immediate reduction in serious crime (e.g., homicides and drive-by shootings) was evident (Lasley 1998).

§§ See the POP Guide titled *Closing Streets and Alleys To Reduce Crime* (Clarke 2004) for guidance on implementing this response and on the considerable effort required to address stakeholders' concerns.

Responding to Incidents and Increasing Sanctions

11. Deploying response teams. The crime scenes of drive-by shootings often disintegrate rapidly as physical evidence is destroyed, witnesses leave the scene, and recollections of what occurred are influenced by discussions among witnesses and neighbors. Responding effectively to drive-by shootings not only increases the chances that those responsible will be charged, but also offers an opportunity to intercept plans for retaliation as they are created. Some jurisdictions immediately deploy specially trained response teams to freeze the scene, preserve physical evidence, and ensure that witnesses remain present for questioning and are kept separate from one another.[§] These teams develop high-level expertise in local gang dynamics and, with the continuity provided by a permanent assignment, can identify patterns among seemingly unrelated events.[44]

§ The El Paso (Texas) Police Department's Response Team noted improved cooperation from witnesses and an increase in the number of cases cleared. Arrests were made within 24 hours in approximately 90 percent of shootings. In addition, the number of drive-by shootings decreased over time (El Paso Police Department 2002).

§ See the POP Guide titled *Witness Intimidation* (Dedel 2006) for more information.

12. Creating witness incentives. Victims and other citizens who witness drive-by shootings are often reluctant to provide information to police. This reluctance may stem from a fear of reprisal, from general community norms discouraging cooperation with police, or from some planning among themselves for retaliation for the shooting.[45] Minimizing the risks witnesses who want to cooperate face, strengthening ties with the community, and offering support in the form of financial assistance and temporary relocation can encourage those with information to come forward.[§§] Improving the quality of information from witnesses helps police to identify offenders and to intervene in plans for retaliation.

13. Implementing a "pulling levers" focused deterrence strategy. Significant decreases in the rate of gun violence have been noted by several jurisdictions that have implemented a "pulling levers" focused deterrence response.[46,§] Targeting gang members with chronic involvement in serious crime, an interagency working group composed of police, prosecutors, and social service providers, among others, convenes groups of offenders, sets clear standards for their behavior (e.g., cease involvement in gun violence), and reinforces the message by "pulling every lever available" when standards are violated. The consequences for continued involvement in gun violence are specifically expressed, and pro-social alternatives (e.g., education and employment opportunities, drug treatment) are made available. If members of the target group are involved in gun violence, all of the members of the group are subjected to intensified supervision and other forms of enhanced enforcement. On-going communication with the targeted group makes a definitive connection between their involvement in gun violence and the consequences imposed.

§ See the POP Guide titled *Gun Violence Among Serious Young Offenders* (Braga 2004) for specific guidance on implementing this response.

Responses With Limited Effectiveness

14. Targeting gun traffickers. As part of a comprehensive response strategy, some jurisdictions try to reduce gun violence by targeting gun traffickers. Any effort to restrict the flow of guns into a community is generally a good idea, although such broad efforts are unlikely to have a demonstrable effect on a localized problem. The effectiveness of this response is limited by the fact that many people get their guns informally, from friends and relatives, rather than buying them from a dealer.[47] However, if the problem analysis demonstrates that straw purchasers are bringing large numbers of guns into the community, a response targeting these people would certainly be reasonable.

15. Implementing "gun buyback" programs. Some jurisdictions try to reduce gun violence by trying to reduce the number of people who own guns. Gun owners, under the promise of amnesty or anonymity, exchange their guns for money, goods, or services. While a significant number of guns may be taken off the street this way, research has shown that "gun buyback" programs do not target the guns that are most likely to be used in drive-by shootings and other violent crimes.[48]

16. Teaching conflict resolution skills. While conflict resolution skills curricula are a part of effective gang prevention programs (e.g., Gang Resistance Education and Training), their usefulness is more limited with people who are already affiliated with gangs and deeply involved in the conflicts that lead to gun violence. The curricula's limitations derive from the fact that the skills are taught out of context. The classroom setting does not mimic the typical situation in which violence unfolds—one with high levels of emotional arousal, the presence of drugs and alcohol, and other factors that alter the cognitive state of those involved.[49]

17. Restricting entry to high-risk neighborhoods. If the drive-by shooting problem is severe and confined to a small area, the neighborhood could be cordoned off and all vehicles trying to enter the area could be screened, allowing entry only to residents and people with legitimate business in the area. While this response would deny access to those intending to do harm to residents, it is very obtrusive to residents and business owners and will likely receive strong community opposition. Research on this response's effectiveness is quite limited, and it has raised serious Fourth Amendment concerns that must be addressed.[§]

§ In 1992, the New York Police Department cordoned off an eight-block area of the Bronx, denying access to all motorists except residents, commercial vehicle drivers, those dropping off children, and those visiting church. Others wishing to enter the area were allowed to park and travel within the boundaries on foot. The checkpoint operated on a random schedule of six hours per day, three days per week. This response's effectiveness in reducing the volume of drive-by shootings was not discussed in published research (Crawford 1998).

18. Impounding cars that are not properly registered. Similar to a DUI checkpoint, police can stop all vehicles to determine whether the vehicle is properly registered and the driver is appropriately licensed.[50] If not, the car can be impounded for a short time, thus denying potential offenders access to one of the needed tools for a drive-by shooting. Although only one jurisdiction has published research reporting this response's limited effectiveness, like other responses in this section, the low yield of weapons and inconvenience to residents suggest that it does not have sufficient power to decrease the number of drive-by shootings substantially.

Appendix: Summary of Responses to Drive-By Shootings

The table below summarizes the responses to drive-by shootings, the mechanism by which they are intended to work, the conditions under which they should work best, and some factors you should consider before implementing a particular response. It is critical that you tailor responses to local circumstances, and that you can justify each response based on reliable analysis. In most cases, an effective strategy will involve implementing several different responses. Law enforcement responses alone are seldom effective in reducing or solving the problem.

Response No.	Page No.	Response	How It Works	Works Best If…	Considerations
General Considerations for an Effective Response Strategy					
1.	16	Focusing on proximate causes	Addresses those factors that make drive-by shootings easier to carry out; frustrates shooters' intention	…responses target the tools and situations that give rise to the problem	Does not address the underlying factors that contribute to interpersonal violence, gang membership, or the facilitating influence of alcohol and drugs
2.	16	Targeting the activity, not the individual	Avoids conferring additional status on gang membership; avoids increasing group cohesiveness	…responses focus on the harm caused by the behavior rather than the group membership of the people causing the harm	Requires a narrow focus on a specific behavior and may leave other problems unaddressed
3.	17	Understanding gang membership dynamics	Focuses efforts on the motivations and current tensions that motivate drive-by shootings	…quality information on local gangs is available	Requires close, candid communication between gang units and officers combating the drive-by shooting problem

Response No.	Page No.	Response	How It Works	Works Best If…	Considerations
Specific Responses To Reduce Drive-By Shootings					
Reducing the Availability or Prevalence of Weapons					
4.	17	Conducting crackdowns	Enhances police visibility; deters potential offenders from carrying guns; incapacitates potential offenders when police seize weapons	…specific offenses, places, and offenders are targeted; its directed by crime analysis; those likely to commit gun violence drive, rather than walk	Can waste time and resources if large numbers of guns are not seized; can have a negative effect on police-community relations
5.	18	Initiating "sweeps" targeting known offenders	Incapacitating high-risk offenders by removing tools used to commit violence	…high-risk offenders are carefully targeted; offenders do not rearm themselves	Interagency collaboration can be challenging; reductions are likely to be short term; can be difficult to agree on most-high-risk offenders; can be perceived as harassing offenders who are complying with supervision conditions
6.	18	Obtaining consent to search for and seize weapons	Sends message that the police and the community will not tolerate gun possession; incapacitates gun owners by removing tools used to commit violence	…a low-key approach is used; great care is taken to ensure that consent is truly voluntary; the department places priority on reducing gun availability rather than prosecuting those who have guns; the program is of sufficient size to ensure that the number of weapons seized will affect the crime rate	Can aggravate some of the conditions it is intended to alleviate (e.g., rebellion against parents); youth may rearm themselves; will not reduce crimes adults commit

Response No.	Page No.	Response	How It Works	Works Best If…	Considerations
Identifying Situations With the Potential for Violence					
7.	19	Tracking current tensions and past altercations	Allows police to identify and intervene in situations with the potential for lethal violence	…information is properly organized so patterns can be identified; local gang dynamics are understood; skilled mediators are available	Need dependable sources of intelligence; need to be able to respond immediately to crisis situations; may legitimize gang membership; information needs to be continually updated; can be difficult to sustain analysis
8.	20	Coordinating with hospitals	Increases the likelihood of victim identification and understanding victims' relationships to offenders	…a simple communication procedure is established; police are dispatched to hospitals when victims are not known to them	Need to negotiate legal barriers to sharing medical information; could deter victims from seeking medical attention
9.	20	Preventing high-risk people from riding in cars with each other	Allows police to intervene in situations that could result in a drive-by shooting	...people likely to participate in drive-by shootings can be identified; police are notified when named people are seen in a car together	Injunctions have faced First Amendment challenges for prohibiting otherwise legal activities; injunctions are difficult and time-consuming to set up; probation and parole conditions must be enforced to carry a deterrent value

Response No.	Page No.	Response	How It Works	Works Best If…	Considerations
Making Environmental Changes					
10.	21	Closing streets	Controls access to targets; decreases offender mobility; increases defensible space	…supported by police and citizen patrols; offenders come from outside of the targeted area	Addressing the concerns of various stakeholders requires significant time and effort; the effects are likely to evaporate if barriers are removed; rival gang turf may not be clearly identified
Responding to Incidents and Increasing Sanctions					
11.	22	Deploying response teams	Provides rapid response to crime scenes; affords the opportunity to intercept retaliation plans	…assigned officers have expertise in local gang dynamics; residents trust assigned officers	Special assignments take officers out of regular patrol rotation; witnesses may remain unwilling to cooperate
12.	22	Creating witness incentives	Increases the likelihood that police will identify offenders; affords the opportunity to intercept retaliation plans	…community norms discouraging cooperation are addressed; expensive resources are conserved for witnesses at greatest risk	Must have resources for monetary incentives and relocation; community outreach efforts require time and patience
13.	23	Implementing a "pulling levers" focused deterrence strategy	Makes a clear connection between involvement in gun violence and consequences imposed; exploits the social structure of gangs by holding the group responsible for individual behavior	…a daunting array of sanctions and a tempting array of services are available	Strategy based on collective responsibility may not be effective if gangs are not cohesive; interagency coordination requires significant time and effort

Response No.	Page No.	Response	How It Works	Works Best If…	Considerations
Responses With Limited Effectiveness					
14.	23	Targeting gun traffickers	Assumes offenders procure guns from organized dealers		Does not focus on the sources of guns most likely to be used in drive-by shootings
15.	24	Implementing "gun buyback" programs	Assumes reducing gun ownership will lead to decreases in gun violence		Those willing to relinquish weapons are not the people likely to commit drive-by shootings; does not focus on the guns most likely to be used in drive-by shootings
16.	24	Teaching conflict resolution skills	Assumes skills learned in a classroom setting will transfer to situations with high emotional states and bystander encouragement		Classroom-based skill development does not mimic the actual conditions under which the skills will need to be applied
17.	24	Restricting entry to high-risk neighborhoods	Controls access to high-risk places		Likely to incur very strong opposition from residents and business owners; raises serious Fourth Amendment concerns
18.	25	Impounding cars that are not properly registered	Removes one of the tools needed to conduct a drive-by shooting		Likely to capture people who are not at risk of conducting a drive-by shooting; low weapons yield makes it difficult to justify the expenditure of resources

Endnotes

[1] Wilson and Riley (2004).
[2] Sanders (1994).
[3] Milkovits (2003).
[4] Sherman et al. (1989).
[5] Davis (1995); Lasley (1998); El Paso Police Department (2002); Sanders (1994); Sampson and Scott (2000).
[6] Milkovits (2003).
[7] Huff (1998); Huff (2001).
[8] Maxson (1999); Sanders (1994).
[9] Bjerregaard and Lizotte (1995).
[10] Block and Block (1993); Davis (1995); Huff (1998); Huff (2001).
[11] Block and Block (1993); Sanders (1994); Wilkinson and Fagan (1996).
[12] Davis (1995).
[13] Jacobs and Wright (2006); Jacobs (2004).
[14] Jacobs and Wright (2006).
[15] Mizell, Joint, and Connell (1997).
[16] Hemenway, Vriniotis, and Miller (2006).
[17] Lizotte et al. (1997).
[18] Ruddell and Mays (2003); Wilkinson and Fagan (2001).
[19] Wintemute, Romero, and Wright (2004); Ash et al. (1996).
[20] Ruddell and Mays (2003).
[21] Sherman, Shaw, and Rogan (1995).
[22] Wilkinson and Fagan (1996).
[23] Hutson, Anglin, and Pratts (1994).
[24] Sanders (1994).
[25] Lasley (1998).
[26] Hutson, Anglin, and Pratts (1994); Hutson, Anglin, and Eckstein (1996).
[27] Weisel and Steadman (1998); Lasley (1998).
[28] Klein (1998); Dunworth (2000).

[29] Fritsch, Caeti, and Taylor (1999).
[30] Davis (1995); Block and Block (1993); Jones (2002); Katz and Webb (2003); Braga (2005); McGloin (2005).
[31] McGarrell et al. (2001); McGarrell, Chermak, and Weiss (2002); Sherman, Shaw, and Rogan (1995); MacDonald, Wilson, and Tita (2005).
[32] McGarrell, Chermak, and Weiss (2002).
[33] Crawford (1998); Decker and Rosenfeld (2004).
[34] McGarrell, Chermak, and Weiss (2002).
[35] MacDonald, Wilson, and Tita (2005).
[36] Wilson and Riley (2004)
[37] Rosenfeld and Decker (1996); Rosenfeld and Decker (1998); Decker and Rosenfeld (2004).
[38] Decker and Rosenfeld (2004).
[39] Katz and Webb (2003).
[40] Braga (2005); McGloin (2005).
[41] Klein (1998); Dunworth (2000); Maxson et al. (2004).
[42] Lasley (1998).
[43] Clarke (2004); Zavoski et al. (1999); Lasley (1998).
[44] Dunworth (2000).
[45] Dedel (2006); Wilson and Riley (2004).
[46] Braga et al. (2001); McGarrell and Chermak (2003); Braga, Kennedy, and Tita (2002); Tita and Abrahamse (2004); Tita et al. (2005); Wakeling (2003).
[47] Ash et al. (1996).
[48] Sherman (2001); Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga (1996).
[49] Wilkinson and Fagan (1996).
[50] White et al. (2003).

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About the Author

Kelly Dedel

Kelly Dedel is the director of One in 37 Research Inc., a criminal justice consulting firm based in Portland, Ore. As a consultant to federal, state, and local agencies, she contributes to research on the juvenile and criminal justice systems by 1) developing written tools to enhance practice or inform public policy; 2) investigating confinement conditions in juvenile correctional facilities; and 3) rigorously evaluating various juvenile and criminal justice programs to assess their effectiveness. She has provided evaluation-related technical assistance to more than 60 jurisdictions nationwide for the Bureau of Justice Assistance. In this capacity, she has worked with a broad range of criminal justice programs implemented by police, prosecutors, public defenders, juvenile detention and confinement facilities, local jails, community corrections, and prisons. She consults with the Justice Department as a monitor/investigator of civil rights violations in juvenile correctional facilities, most often in the areas of education and protection from harm. Among her other research interests are prisoner reentry, risk assessment and offender classification, and juveniles in adult correctional facilities. Before working as a consultant, she was a founder and senior research scientist at The Institute on Crime, Justice, and Corrections at The George Washington University, and a senior research associate at the National Council on Crime and Delinquency. Dedel received bachelor's degrees in psychology and criminal justice from the University of Richmond, and a doctorate in clinical psychology from the Center for Psychological Studies, in Berkeley (California).

Recommended Readings

- **A Police Guide to Surveying Citizens and Their Environments**, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1993. This guide offers a practical introduction for police practitioners to two types of surveys that police find useful: surveying public opinion and surveying the physical environment. It provides guidance on whether and how to conduct cost-effective surveys.

- **Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory Guide for Police Problem-Solvers**, by John E. Eck (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2001). This guide is a companion to the *Problem-Oriented Guides for Police* series. It provides basic guidance to measuring and assessing problem-oriented policing efforts.

- **Conducting Community Surveys**, by Deborah Weisel (Bureau of Justice Statistics and Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 1999). This guide, along with accompanying computer software, provides practical, basic pointers for police in conducting community surveys. The document is also available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs.

- **Crime Prevention Studies**, edited by Ronald V. Clarke (Criminal Justice Press, 1993, et seq.). This is a series of volumes of applied and theoretical research on reducing opportunities for crime. Many chapters are evaluations of initiatives to reduce specific crime and disorder problems.

- **Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing: The 1999 Herman Goldstein Award Winners.** This document produced by the National Institute of Justice in collaboration with the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services and the Police Executive Research Forum provides detailed reports of the best submissions to the annual award program that recognizes exemplary problem-oriented responses to various community problems. A similar publication is available for the award winners from subsequent years. The documents are also available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij.

- **Not Rocket Science? Problem-Solving and Crime Reduction**, by Tim Read and Nick Tilley (Home Office Crime Reduction Research Series, 2000). Identifies and describes the factors that make problem-solving effective or ineffective as it is being practiced in police forces in England and Wales.

- **Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory for Crime Prevention**, by Marcus Felson and Ronald V. Clarke (Home Office Police Research Series, Paper No. 98, 1998). Explains how crime theories such as routine activity theory, rational choice theory and crime pattern theory have practical implications for the police in their efforts to prevent crime.

- **Problem Analysis in Policing**, by Rachel Boba (Police Foundation, 2003). Introduces and defines problem analysis and provides guidance on how problem analysis can be integrated and institutionalized into modern policing practices.

- **Problem-Oriented Policing**, by Herman Goldstein (McGraw-Hill, 1990, and Temple University Press, 1990). Explains the principles and methods of problem-oriented policing, provides examples of it in practice, and discusses how a police agency can implement the concept.

- **Problem-Oriented Policing and Crime Prevention**, by Anthony A. Braga (Criminal Justice Press, 2003). Provides a thorough review of significant policing research about problem places, high-activity offenders, and repeat victims, with a focus on the applicability of those findings to problem-oriented policing. Explains how police departments can facilitate problem-oriented policing by improving crime analysis, measuring performance, and securing productive partnerships.

- **Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the First 20 Years**, by Michael S. Scott (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2000). Describes how the most critical elements of Herman Goldstein's problem-oriented policing model have developed in practice over its 20-year history, and proposes future directions for problem-oriented policing. The report is also available at www.cops.usdoj.gov.

- **Problem-Solving: Problem-Oriented Policing in Newport News,** by John E. Eck and William Spelman (Police Executive Research Forum, 1987). Explains the rationale behind problem-oriented policing and the problem-solving process, and provides examples of effective problem-solving in one agency.

- **Problem-Solving Tips: A Guide to Reducing Crime and Disorder Through Problem-Solving Partnerships** by Karin Schmerler, Matt Perkins, Scott Phillips, Tammy Rinehart and Meg Townsend. (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 1998) (also available at www.cops.usdoj.gov). Provides a brief introduction to problem-solving, basic information on the SARA model and detailed suggestions about the problem-solving process.

- **Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies**, Second Edition, edited by Ronald V. Clarke (Harrow and Heston, 1997). Explains the principles and methods of situational crime prevention, and presents over 20 case studies of effective crime prevention initiatives.

- **Tackling Crime and Other Public-Safety Problems: Case Studies in Problem-Solving**, by Rana Sampson and Michael S. Scott (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2000) (also available at www.cops.usdoj.gov). Presents case studies of effective police problem-solving on 18 types of crime and disorder problems.

- **Using Analysis for Problem-Solving: A Guidebook for Law Enforcement**, by Timothy S. Bynum (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2001). Provides an introduction for police to analyzing problems within the context of problem-oriented policing.

- **Using Research: A Primer for Law Enforcement Managers**, Second Edition, by John E. Eck and Nancy G. LaVigne (Police Executive Research Forum, 1994). Explains many of the basics of research as it applies to police management and problem-solving.

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