

**Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification
of the New START Treaty**

1 *Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concur-*
2 *ring therein),* That the Senate advises and consents to the
3 ratification of the Treaty between the United States of
4 America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the
5 Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
6 Arms, signed in Prague on April 8, 2010, with Protocol,
7 including Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol,
8 Annex on Notifications to the Protocol, and Annex on Tel-
9 emetric Information to the Protocol, all such documents
10 being integral parts of and collectively referred to in this
11 resolution as the “New START Treaty” (Treaty Docu-
12 ment 111–5), subject to the conditions of subsection (a),
13 the understandings of subsection (b), and the declarations
14 of subsection (c).

15 (a) CONDITIONS.—The advice and consent of the
16 Senate to the ratification of the New START Treaty is
17 subject to the following conditions, which shall be binding
18 upon the President:

19 (1) GENERAL COMPLIANCE.—If the President
20 determines that the Russian Federation is acting or
21 has acted in a manner that is inconsistent with the

1 object and purpose of the New START Treaty, or
2 is in violation of the New START Treaty, so as to
3 threaten the national security interests of the United
4 States, then the President shall—

5 (A) consult with the Senate regarding the
6 implications of such actions for the viability of
7 the New START Treaty and for the national
8 security interests of the United States;

9 (B) seek on an urgent basis a meeting with
10 the Russian Federation at the highest diplo-
11 matic level with the objective of bringing the
12 Russian Federation into full compliance with its
13 obligations under the New START Treaty; and

14 (C) submit a report to the Senate promptly
15 thereafter, detailing—

16 (i) whether adherence to the New
17 START Treaty remains in the national se-
18 curity interests of the United States; and

19 (ii) how the United States will redress
20 the impact of Russian actions on the na-
21 tional security interests of the United
22 States.

23 (2) PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATIONS AND RE-
24 PORTS ON NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.—(A) Prior
25 to the entry into force of the New START Treaty,

1 and annually thereafter, the President shall certify
2 to the Senate that United States National Technical
3 Means, in conjunction with the verification activities
4 provided for in the New START Treaty, are suffi-
5 cient to ensure effective monitoring of Russian com-
6 pliance with the provisions of the New START
7 Treaty and timely warning of any Russian prepara-
8 tion to break out of the limits in Article II of the
9 New START Treaty. Following submission of the
10 first such certification, each subsequent certification
11 shall be accompanied by a report to the Senate indi-
12 cating how United States National Technical Means,
13 including collection, processing, and analytic re-
14 sources, will be utilized to ensure effective moni-
15 toring. The first such report shall include a long-
16 term plan for the maintenance of New START
17 Treaty monitoring. Each subsequent report shall in-
18 clude an update of the long-term plan. Each such re-
19 port may be submitted in either classified or unclas-
20 sified form.

21 (B) It is the sense of the Senate that moni-
22 toring Russian Federation compliance with the New
23 START Treaty is a high priority and that the in-
24 ability to do so would constitute a threat to United
25 States national security interests.

1 (3) REDUCTIONS.—(A) The New START Trea-
2 ty shall not enter into force until instruments of
3 ratification have been exchanged in accordance with
4 Article XIV of the New START Treaty.

5 (B) If, prior to the entry into force of the New
6 START Treaty, the President plans to implement
7 reductions of United States strategic nuclear forces
8 below those currently planned and consistent with
9 the Treaty Between the United States of America
10 and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive
11 Reductions, signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002
12 (commonly referred to as “the Moscow Treaty”),
13 then the President shall—

14 (i) consult with the Senate regarding the
15 effect of such reductions on the national secu-
16 rity of the United States; and

17 (ii) take no such reductions until the Presi-
18 dent submits to the Senate the President’s de-
19 termination that such reductions are in the na-
20 tional security interest of the United States.

21 (4) TIMELY WARNING OF BREAKOUT.—If the
22 President determines, after consultation with the Di-
23 rector of National Intelligence, that the Russian
24 Federation intends to break out of the limits in Arti-
25 cle II of the New START Treaty, the President

1 shall immediately inform the Committees on Foreign
2 Relations and Armed Services of the Senate, with a
3 view to determining whether circumstances exist
4 that jeopardize the supreme interests of the United
5 States, such that withdrawal from the New START
6 Treaty may be warranted pursuant to paragraph 3
7 of Article XIV of the New START Treaty.

8 (5) UNITED STATES MISSILE DEFENSE TEST
9 TELEMETRY.—Prior to entry into force of the New
10 START Treaty, the President shall certify to the
11 Senate that the New START Treaty does not re-
12 quire, at any point during which it will be in force,
13 the United States to provide to the Russian Federa-
14 tion telemetric information under Article IX of the
15 New START Treaty, Part Seven of the Protocol,
16 and the Annex on Telemetric Information to the
17 Protocol for the launch of—

18 (A) any missile defense interceptor, as de-
19 fined in paragraph 44 of Part One of the Pro-
20 tocol to the New START Treaty;

21 (B) any satellite launches, missile defense
22 sensor targets, and missile defense intercept
23 targets, the launch of which uses the first stage
24 of an existing type of United States ICBM or

1 SLBM listed in paragraph 8 of Article III of
2 the New START Treaty; or

3 (C) any missile described in clause (a) of
4 paragraph 7 of Article III of the New START
5 Treaty.

6 (6) CONVENTIONAL PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE.—

7 (A) The Senate calls on the executive branch to clar-
8 ify its planning and intent in developing future con-
9 ventionally armed, strategic-range weapon systems.
10 To this end, prior to the entry into force of the New
11 START Treaty, the President shall provide a report
12 to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign
13 Relations of the Senate containing the following:

14 (i) A list of all conventionally armed, stra-
15 tegic-range weapon systems that are currently
16 under development.

17 (ii) An analysis of the expected capabilities
18 of each system listed under clause (i).

19 (iii) A statement with respect to each sys-
20 tem listed under clause (i) as to whether any of
21 the limits in Article II of the New START
22 Treaty apply to such system.

23 (iv) An assessment of the costs, risks, and
24 benefits of each system.

1 (v) A discussion of alternative deployment
2 options and scenarios for each system.

3 (vi) A summary of the measures that could
4 help to distinguish each system listed under
5 clause (i) from nuclear systems and reduce the
6 risks of misinterpretation and of a resulting
7 claim that such systems might alter strategic
8 stability.

9 (B) The report under subparagraph (A) may be
10 supplemented by a classified annex.

11 (C) If, at any time after the New START Trea-
12 ty enters into force, the President determines that
13 deployment of conventional warheads on ICBMs or
14 SLBMs is required at levels that cannot be accom-
15 modated within the limits in Article II of the New
16 START Treaty while sustaining a robust United
17 States nuclear triad, then the President shall imme-
18 diately consult with the Senate regarding the rea-
19 sons for such determination.

20 (7) UNITED STATES TELEMETRIC INFORMA-
21 TION.—In implementing Article IX of the New
22 START Treaty, Part Seven of the Protocol, and the
23 Annex on Telemetric Information to the Protocol,
24 prior to agreeing to provide to the Russian Federa-
25 tion any amount of telemetric information on a

1 United States test launch of a conventionally armed
2 prompt global strike system, the President shall cer-
3 tify to the Committees on Foreign Relations and
4 Armed Services of the Senate that—

5 (A) the provision of United States tele-
6 metric information—

7 (i) consists of data that demonstrate
8 that such system is not subject to the lim-
9 its in Article II of the New START Trea-
10 ty; or

11 (ii) would be provided in exchange for
12 significant telemetric information regard-
13 ing a weapon system not listed in para-
14 graph 8 of Article III of the New START
15 Treaty, or a system not deployed by the
16 Russian Federation prior to December 5,
17 2009;

18 (B) it is in the national security interest of
19 the United States to provide such telemetric in-
20 formation; and

21 (C) provision of such telemetric informa-
22 tion will not undermine the effectiveness of such
23 system.

24 (8) BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION.—
25 Not later than 15 days before any meeting of the

1 Bilateral Consultative Commission to consider a pro-
2 posal for additional measures to improve the viabil-
3 ity or effectiveness of the New START Treaty or to
4 resolve a question related to the applicability of pro-
5 visions of the New START Treaty to a new kind of
6 strategic offensive arm, the President shall consult
7 with the Chairman and ranking minority member of
8 the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
9 with regard to whether the proposal, if adopted,
10 would constitute an amendment to the New START
11 Treaty requiring the advice and consent of the Sen-
12 ate, as set forth in Article II, section 2, clause 2 of
13 the Constitution of the United States.

14 (9) UNITED STATES COMMITMENTS ENSURING
15 THE SAFETY, RELIABILITY, AND PERFORMANCE OF
16 ITS NUCLEAR FORCES.—

17 (A) The United States is committed to en-
18 suring the safety, reliability, and performance
19 of its nuclear forces. It is the sense of the Sen-
20 ate that—

21 (i) the United States is committed to
22 proceeding with a robust stockpile steward-
23 ship program, and to maintaining and
24 modernizing the nuclear weapons produc-
25 tion capabilities and capacities, that will

1 ensure the safety, reliability, and perform-
2 ance of the United States nuclear arsenal
3 at the New START Treaty levels and meet
4 requirements for hedging against possible
5 international developments or technical
6 problems, in conformance with United
7 States policies and to underpin deterrence;

8 (ii) to that end, the United States is
9 committed to maintaining United States
10 nuclear weapons laboratories and pre-
11 serving the core nuclear weapons com-
12 petencies therein; and

13 (iii) the United States is committed to
14 providing the resources needed to achieve
15 these objectives, at a minimum at the lev-
16 els set forth in the President's 10-year
17 plan provided to the Congress pursuant to
18 section 1251 of the National Defense Au-
19 thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Pub-
20 lic Law 111-84).

21 (B) If appropriations are enacted that fail
22 to meet the resource requirements set forth in
23 the President's 10-year plan, or if at any time
24 more resources are required than estimated in
25 the President's 10-year plan, the President

1 shall submit to Congress, within 60 days of
2 such enactment or the identification of the re-
3 quirement for such additional resources, as ap-
4 propriate, a report detailing—

5 (i) how the President proposes to rem-
6 edy the resource shortfall;

7 (ii) if additional resources are re-
8 quired, the proposed level of funding re-
9 quired and an identification of the stock-
10 pile work, campaign, facility, site, asset,
11 program, operation, activity, construction,
12 or project for which additional funds are
13 required;

14 (iii) the impact of the resource short-
15 fall on the safety, reliability, and perform-
16 ance of United States nuclear forces; and

17 (iv) whether and why, in the changed
18 circumstances brought about by the re-
19 source shortfall, it remains in the national
20 interest of the United States to remain a
21 Party to the New START Treaty.

22 (10) ANNUAL REPORT.—As full and faithful
23 implementation is key to realizing the benefits of the
24 New START Treaty, the President shall submit a
25 report to the Committees on Foreign Relations and

1 Armed Services of the Senate not later than Janu-
2 ary 31 of each year beginning with January 31,
3 2012, which will provide—

4 (A) details on each Party's reductions in
5 strategic offensive arms between the date the
6 New START Treaty entered into force and De-
7 cember 31, 2011, or, in subsequent reports,
8 during the previous year;

9 (B) a certification that the Russian Fed-
10 eration is in compliance with the terms of the
11 New START Treaty, or a detailed discussion of
12 any noncompliance by the Russian Federation;

13 (C) a certification that any conversion and
14 elimination procedures adopted pursuant to Ar-
15 ticle VI of the New START Treaty and Part
16 Three of the Protocol have not resulted in am-
17 biguities that could defeat the object and pur-
18 pose of the New START Treaty, or—

19 (i) a list of any cases in which a con-
20 version or elimination procedure that has
21 been demonstrated by Russia within the
22 framework of the Bilateral Consultative
23 Commission remains ambiguous or does
24 not achieve the goals set forth in para-

1 graph 2 or 3 of Section I of Part Three of
2 the Protocol; and

3 (ii) a comprehensive explanation of
4 steps the United States has taken with re-
5 spect to each such case;

6 (D) an assessment of the operation of the
7 New START Treaty's transparency mecha-
8 nisms, including—

9 (i) the extent to which either Party
10 encrypted or otherwise impeded the collec-
11 tion of telemetric information; and

12 (ii) the extent and usefulness of ex-
13 changes of telemetric information; and

14 (E) an assessment of whether a strategic
15 imbalance exists that endangers the national se-
16 curity interests of the United States.

17 (b) UNDERSTANDINGS.—The advice and consent of
18 the Senate to the ratification of the New START Treaty
19 is subject to the following understandings, which shall be
20 included in the instrument of ratification:

21 (1) MISSILE DEFENSE.—It is the under-
22 standing of the United States that—

23 (A) the New START Treaty does not im-
24 pose any limitations on the deployment of mis-
25 sile defenses other than the requirements of

1 paragraph 3 of Article V of the New START
2 Treaty, which states, “Each Party shall not
3 convert and shall not use ICBM launchers and
4 SLBM launchers for placement of missile de-
5 fense interceptors therein. Each Party further
6 shall not convert and shall not use launchers of
7 missile defense interceptors for placement of
8 ICBMs and SLBMs therein. This provision
9 shall not apply to ICBM launchers that were
10 converted prior to signature of this Treaty for
11 placement of missile defense interceptors there-
12 in.”;

13 (B) any additional New START Treaty
14 limitations on the deployment of missile de-
15 fenses beyond those contained in paragraph 3
16 of Article V, including any limitations agreed
17 under the auspices of the Bilateral Consultative
18 Commission, would require an amendment to
19 the New START Treaty which may enter into
20 force for the United States only with the advice
21 and consent of the Senate, as set forth in Arti-
22 cle II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of
23 the United States; and

24 (C) the April 7, 2010, unilateral statement
25 by the Russian Federation on missile defense

1 does not impose a legal obligation on the
2 United States.

3 (2) RAIL-MOBILE ICBMS.—It is the under-
4 standing of the United States that—

5 (A) any rail-mobile-launched ballistic mis-
6 sile with a range in excess of 5,500 kilometers
7 would be an ICBM, as the term is defined in
8 paragraph 37 of Part One of the Protocol (in
9 the English-language numbering), for the pur-
10 poses of the New START Treaty, specifically
11 including the limits in Article II of the New
12 START Treaty;

13 (B) an erector-launcher mechanism for
14 launching an ICBM and the railcar or flatcar
15 on which it is mounted would be an ICBM
16 launcher, as the term is defined in paragraph
17 28 of Part One of the Protocol (in the English-
18 language numbering), for the purposes of the
19 New START Treaty, specifically including the
20 limits in Article II of the New START Treaty;

21 (C) if either Party should produce a rail-
22 mobile ICBM system, the Bilateral Consultative
23 Commission would address the application of
24 other parts of the New START Treaty to that
25 system, including Articles III, IV, VI, VII, and

1 XI of the New START Treaty and relevant
2 portions of the Protocol and the Annexes to the
3 Protocol; and

4 (D) an agreement reached pursuant to
5 subparagraph (C) is subject to the requirements
6 of Article XV of the New START Treaty and,
7 specifically, if an agreement pursuant to sub-
8 paragraph (C) creates substantive rights or ob-
9 ligations that differ significantly from those in
10 the New START Treaty regarding a “mobile
11 launcher of ICBMs” as defined in Part One of
12 the Protocol to the New START Treaty, such
13 agreement will be considered an amendment to
14 the New START Treaty pursuant to Paragraph
15 1 of Article XV of the New START Treaty and
16 will be submitted to the Senate for its advice
17 and consent to ratification.

18 (3) STRATEGIC-RANGE, NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON
19 SYSTEMS.—It is the understanding of the United
20 States that—

21 (A) future, strategic-range non-nuclear
22 weapon systems that do not otherwise meet the
23 definitions of the New START Treaty will not
24 be “new kinds of strategic offensive arms” sub-
25 ject to the New START Treaty;

1 (B) nothing in the New START Treaty re-
2 stricts United States research, development,
3 testing, and evaluation of strategic-range, non-
4 nuclear weapons, including any weapon that is
5 capable of boosted aerodynamic flight;

6 (C) nothing in the New START Treaty
7 prohibits deployments of strategic-range non-
8 nuclear weapon systems; and

9 (D) the addition to the New START Trea-
10 ty of—

11 (i) any limitations on United States
12 research, development, testing, and evalua-
13 tion of strategic-range, non-nuclear weapon
14 systems, including any weapon that is ca-
15 pable of boosted aerodynamic flight; or

16 (ii) any prohibition on the deployment
17 of such systems, including any such limita-
18 tions or prohibitions agreed under the aus-
19 pices of the Bilateral Consultative Commis-
20 sion,

21 would require an amendment to the New
22 START Treaty which may enter into force for
23 the United States only with the advice and con-
24 sent of the Senate, as set forth in Article II,

1 section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the
2 United States.

3 (c) DECLARATIONS.—The advice and consent of the
4 Senate to the ratification of the New START Treaty is
5 subject to the following declarations, which express the in-
6 tent of the Senate:

7 (1) MISSILE DEFENSE.—(A) It is the sense of
8 the Senate that—

9 (i) pursuant to the National Missile De-
10 fense Act of 1999 (Public Law 106–38), it is
11 the policy of the United States “to deploy as
12 soon as is technologically possible an effective
13 National Missile Defense system capable of de-
14 fending the territory of the United States
15 against limited ballistic missile attack (whether
16 accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate)”;

17 (ii) defenses against ballistic missiles are
18 essential for new deterrent strategies and for
19 new strategies should deterrence fail; and

20 (iii) further limitations on the missile de-
21 fense capabilities of the United States are not
22 in the national security interest of the United
23 States.

24 (B) The New START Treaty and the April 7,
25 2010, unilateral statement of the Russian Federa-

1 tion on missile defense do not limit in any way, and
2 shall not be interpreted as limiting, activities that
3 the United States Government currently plans or
4 that might be required over the duration of the New
5 START Treaty to protect the United States pursu-
6 ant to the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, or
7 to protect United States Armed Forces and United
8 States allies from limited ballistic missile attack, in-
9 cluding further planned enhancements to the
10 Ground-based Midcourse Defense system and all
11 phases of the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile
12 defense in Europe.

13 (C) Given its concern about missile defense
14 issues, the Senate expects the executive branch to
15 offer regular briefings, not less than twice each year,
16 to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed
17 Services of the Senate on all missile defense issues
18 related to the New START Treaty and on the
19 progress of United States-Russia dialogue and co-
20 operation regarding missile defense.

21 (2) DEFENDING THE UNITED STATES AND AL-
22 LIES AGAINST STRATEGIC ATTACK.—It is the sense
23 of the Senate that—

24 (A) a paramount obligation of the United
25 States Government is to provide for the defense

1 of the American people, deployed members of
2 the United States Armed Forces, and United
3 States allies against nuclear attacks to the best
4 of its ability;

5 (B) policies based on “mutual assured de-
6 struction” or intentional vulnerability can be
7 contrary to the safety and security of both
8 countries, and the United States and the Rus-
9 sian Federation share a common interest in
10 moving cooperatively as soon as possible away
11 from a strategic relationship based on mutual
12 assured destruction;

13 (C) in a world where biological, chemical,
14 and nuclear weapons and the means to deliver
15 them are proliferating, strategic stability can be
16 enhanced by strategic defensive measures;

17 (D) accordingly, the United States is and
18 will remain free to reduce the vulnerability to
19 attack by constructing a layered missile defense
20 system capable of countering missiles of all
21 ranges;

22 (E) the United States will welcome steps
23 by the Russian Federation also to adopt a fun-
24 damentally defensive strategic posture that no
25 longer views robust strategic defensive capabili-

1 ties as undermining the overall strategic bal-
2 ance, and stands ready to cooperate with the
3 Russian Federation on strategic defensive capa-
4 bilities, as long as such cooperation is aimed at
5 fostering and in no way constrains the defensive
6 capabilities of both sides; and

7 (F) the United States is committed to im-
8 proving United States strategic defensive capa-
9 bilities both quantitatively and qualitatively
10 during the period that the New START Treaty
11 is in effect, and such improvements are con-
12 sistent with the Treaty.

13 (3) CONVENTIONALLY ARMED, STRATEGIC-
14 RANGE WEAPON SYSTEMS.—Consistent with state-
15 ments made by the United States that such systems
16 are not intended to affect strategic stability with re-
17 spect to the Russian Federation, the Senate finds
18 that conventionally armed, strategic-range weapon
19 systems not co-located with nuclear-armed systems
20 do not affect strategic stability between the United
21 States and the Russian Federation.

22 (4) NUNN-LUGAR COOPERATIVE THREAT RE-
23 DUCTION.—It is the sense of the Senate that the
24 Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
25 Program has made an invaluable contribution to the

1 security and elimination of weapons of mass destruc-
2 tion, including nuclear weapons and materials in
3 Russia and elsewhere, and that the President should
4 continue the global CTR Program and CTR assist-
5 ance to Russia, including for the purpose of facili-
6 tating implementation of the New START Treaty.

7 (5) ASYMMETRY IN REDUCTIONS.—It is the
8 sense of the Senate that, in conducting the reduc-
9 tions mandated by the New START Treaty, the
10 President should regulate reductions in United
11 States strategic offensive arms so that the number
12 of accountable strategic offensive arms under the
13 New START Treaty possessed by the Russian Fed-
14 eration in no case exceeds the comparable number of
15 accountable strategic offensive arms possessed by
16 the United States to such an extent that a strategic
17 imbalance endangers the national security interests
18 of the United States.

19 (6) COMPLIANCE.—(A) The New START Trea-
20 ty will remain in the interests of the United States
21 only to the extent that the Russian Federation is in
22 strict compliance with its obligations under the New
23 START Treaty.

24 (B) Given its concern about compliance issues,
25 the Senate expects the executive branch to offer reg-

1 ular briefings, not less than four times each year, to
2 the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed
3 Services of the Senate on compliance issues related
4 to the New START Treaty. Such briefings shall in-
5 clude a description of all United States efforts in
6 United States-Russian diplomatic channels and bi-
7 lateral fora to resolve any compliance issues and
8 shall include, but would not necessarily be limited to,
9 a description of—

10 (i) any compliance issues the United States
11 plans to raise with the Russian Federation at
12 the Bilateral Consultative Commission, in ad-
13 vance of such meetings; and

14 (ii) any compliance issues raised at the Bi-
15 lateral Consultative Commission, within thirty
16 days of such meetings.

17 (7) EXPANSION OF STRATEGIC ARSENALS IN
18 COUNTRIES OTHER THAN RUSSIA.—It is the sense of
19 the Senate that if, during the time the New START
20 Treaty remains in force, the President determines
21 that there has been an expansion of the strategic ar-
22 senal of any country not party to the New START
23 Treaty so as to jeopardize the supreme interests of
24 the United States, then the President should consult
25 on an urgent basis with the Senate to determine

1 whether adherence to the New START Treaty re-
2 mains in the national interest of the United States.

3 (8) TREATY INTERPRETATION.—The Senate af-
4 firms the applicability to all treaties of the constitu-
5 tionally based principles of treaty interpretation set
6 forth in condition (1) of the resolution of advice and
7 consent to the ratification of the Treaty Between the
8 United States of America and the Union of Soviet
9 Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their In-
10 termediate-Range and Shorter Range Missiles, to-
11 gether with the related memorandum of under-
12 standing and protocols (commonly referred to as the
13 “INF Treaty”), approved by the Senate on May 27,
14 1988, and condition (8) of the resolution of advice
15 and consent to the ratification of the Document
16 Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on
17 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of No-
18 vember 19, 1990 (commonly referred to as the
19 “CFE Flank Document”), approved by the Senate
20 on May 14, 1997.

21 (9) TREATY MODIFICATION OR REINTERPRETA-
22 TION.—The Senate declares that any agreement or
23 understanding which in any material way modifies,
24 amends, or reinterprets United States or Russian
25 obligations under the New START Treaty, including

1 the time frame for implementation of the New
2 START Treaty, should be submitted to the Senate
3 for its advice and consent to ratification.

4 (10) CONSULTATIONS.—Given the continuing
5 interest of the Senate in the New START Treaty
6 and in strategic offensive reductions to the lowest
7 possible levels consistent with national security re-
8 quirements and alliance obligations of the United
9 States, the Senate expects the President to consult
10 with the Senate prior to taking actions relevant to
11 paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article XIV of the New
12 START Treaty.

13 (11) TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS.—(A) The
14 Senate calls upon the President to pursue, following
15 consultation with allies, an agreement with the Rus-
16 sian Federation that would address the disparity be-
17 tween the tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles of the
18 Russian Federation and of the United States and
19 would secure and reduce tactical nuclear weapons in
20 a verifiable manner.

21 (B) Recognizing the difficulty the United States
22 has faced in ascertaining with confidence the num-
23 ber of tactical nuclear weapons maintained by the
24 Russian Federation and the security of those weap-

1 ons, the Senate urges the President to engage the
2 Russian Federation with the objectives of—

3 (i) establishing cooperative measures to
4 give each Party to the New START Treaty im-
5 proved confidence regarding the accurate ac-
6 counting and security of tactical nuclear weap-
7 ons maintained by the other Party; and

8 (ii) providing United States or other inter-
9 national assistance to help the Russian Federa-
10 tion ensure the accurate accounting and secu-
11 rity of its tactical nuclear weapons.

12 (12) FURTHER STRATEGIC ARMS REDUC-
13 TIONS.—(A) Recognizing the obligation under Arti-
14 cle VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nu-
15 clear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and
16 Moscow on July 1, 1968, “to pursue negotiations in
17 good faith on effective measures relating to cessation
18 of the nuclear arms race at any early date and to
19 nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and
20 complete disarmament under strict and effective
21 international control,” and in anticipation of the
22 ratification and entry into force of the New START
23 Treaty, the Senate calls upon the other nuclear
24 weapon states to give careful and early consideration

1 to corresponding reductions of their own nuclear ar-
2 senals.

3 (B) The Senate declares that further arms re-
4 duction agreements obligating the United States to
5 reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of
6 the United States in any militarily significant man-
7 ner may be made only pursuant to the treaty-mak-
8 ing power of the President as set forth in Article II,
9 section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United
10 States.

11 (13) MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT OF
12 UNITED STATES STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES.—
13 In accordance with paragraph 1 of Article V of the
14 New START Treaty, which states that, “Subject to
15 the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and re-
16 placement of strategic offensive arms may be carried
17 out,” it is the sense of the Senate that United States
18 deterrence and flexibility is assured by a robust triad
19 of strategic delivery vehicles. To this end, the United
20 States is committed to accomplishing the moderniza-
21 tion and replacement of its strategic nuclear delivery
22 vehicles, and to ensuring the continued flexibility of
23 United States conventional and nuclear delivery sys-
24 tems.