Joint Supply
Joint Integrating Concept
Capabilities-Based Assessment

Solutions and Recommendations Report
15 June 2012

HQ Defense Logistics Agency
Strategic Initiatives Division (J352)
8725 John J. Kingman Road
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6221

Joint Chiefs of Staff
J4, Capabilities Division
Room 2C947, The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20318

Executive Summary

This report completes the Joint Supply Joint Integrating Concept (JS JIC) Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA). The Core Work Group (CWG), comprising the Joint Staff J-4 and DLA study co-chairs and the military Service and intergovernmental partner representatives, developed a solutions portfolio designed to operate the Joint Supply Enterprise (JSE). The CWG also responded to Joint Staff concerns, which were synthesized into three study questions.

The JS JIC was derived from the concepts delineated in the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (CCJO),[1] *Joint Concept for Logistics* (JCL),[2] and the *Net-Centric Environment Joint Functional Concept*.[3] The JS JIC development is part of the larger framework described within the JCL as the Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt). As such, the JS JIC is not an independent concept; it is a concept that must be integrated with other parts of the JLEnt, such as the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) proposed by the Joint Logistics (Distribution) JIC.

BACKGROUND

The nature of military operations is changing, and DoD supply capabilities must evolve to align with a new operating environment. Supply processes and systems should operate the same, regardless of operational environment or tempo.[4]

The JS JIC proposes the JSE as a means to advance supply operations and to effectively support future joint operations (2016 to 2028). The JSE, as envisioned, is an expansive, enabled network of suppliers and customers, which includes government agencies, non-government agencies, multinational partners, and private-sector organizations. In such an expansive environment, DoD joint supply activities must coordinate capabilities within the DoD and collaborate across many new non-DoD partners to simultaneously satisfy multiple mission requirements.

[1] Department of Defense, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, version 3.0, 15 January 2009, revision signed by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ADM Michael G. Mullen.

[2] DoD, *Joint Concept for Logistics*, 6 August 2010, signed by LTG Kathleen M. Gainey, Director for Logistics, J-4; approved by CJCS, ADM Michael G. Mullen.

[3] DoD, *Net-Centric Environment Joint Functional Concept*, version 1.0, 7 April 2005.

[4] The military services and their component commands—as well as the combatant commands and Joint Force commanders (JFCs)—are customers of the DoD supply process.

Capabilities-Based Assessment

The April 2010 Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum (JROCM) chartered the JS JIC capabilities-based assessment (CBA) to examine these concepts and determine what would be necessary to operate the JSE in this evolving operating environment. The JS JIC CBA, therefore, focused on the supplies and related processes necessary to field and sustain forces, including supply classes for subsistence (Class I); individual equipment, clothing, and tentage (Class II); packaged and bulk fuel and lubricants (Class III); construction, shelter, and barrier materials (Class IV); medical materiel and equipment (Class VIII); and repair parts and components (Class IX).[5]

The Joint Staff J4 synthesized its concerns about the JS JIC into the following three study questions:

- What are the joint supply business processes (JSBPs)?
- What are the functions, roles, responsibilities, and authorities that will enable success in the JSBPs?
- Is the Joint Supply Process Owner (JSPO) an effective solution for supply capability gaps?

The CWG analyzed and addressed these questions as part of the CBA.

Needs Assessment

The future operating environment and the impacts on current supply operations were documented in the *JS JIC CBA Needs Assessment Report* (NAR), which was published in June 2011. The NAR identified six areas where major gaps between capabilities and requirements exist and the underlying causes of those gaps:

- *Governance.* The lack of consistent policies for coordination within DoD and with other government agencies and non-DoD partners introduces the risk of delay in providing an effective and flexible response to supply requirements in a whole-of-government scenario.
- *Networking.* Networking refers to the interconnection of all members to share information and execute processes to achieve unity of effort. Within the context of the JSE, networking is broader than information technology and includes connections and relationships among partner and customer organizations, business and financial processes, and associated logistics information systems. Networking gaps were evident in all of the capability shortfalls for operating in the future environment.

[5] The JS JIC CBA did not include ammunition (Class V), personal demand items (Class VI), major end items (Class VII), and materiel for non-military programs (Class X).

- *Information transparency.* The inability to communicate using understandable formats and content degrades key capabilities, including networking, determining requirements, and developing processes to manage and track supply resources.

- *Requirements determination.* Requirements determination refers to the demand planning and forecasting of supply requirements in order to anticipate and provision for sufficient supply and distribution capability and capacity. Uncoordinated efforts risk insufficient supply capacity at the right time and place to sustain joint operations.

- *Resource identification and tracking.* The inability to perform this capability across the environment decreases confidence in supply chain responsiveness, causes redundant orders or no orders at all, and reduces the ability to provide coordinated and synchronized delivery to the destination.

- *Common metrics.* The absence of common metrics adversely affects the ability to analyze and assess joint supply performance as a whole and for each of its component process activities.

These capability gaps formed the foundation for developing a solutions portfolio and responses to Joint Staff concerns.

Solutions Development

To build the solutions portfolio, the CWG developed a solutions methodology that addressed shortfalls and ensured CBA assessment objectives were achieved. Key elements of that methodology enabled the CWG to identify specific issues while maintaining sufficient flexibility to still consider a wide range of solutions.

- *Supply process mapping.* The CWG mapped each commodity process from end to end to ensure all aspects of the supply processes were identified. The CWG used the Supply Chain Operations Reference (SCOR) model to lay out the supply chains in parallel, including those for commodities supported through military service–specific supply chain processes, such as Class IX repair parts. With a fully mapped supply process, the CWG could evaluate each solution to determine where it affected the supply processes and ensure all aspects were addressed within solutions portfolios.

- *Supply strategies.* The NAR identified two broad approaches to managing supply operations: a traditional inventory management model and a management strategy tailored to a specific commodity or function.

- *Identification and stratification of options and alternatives.* The CWG identified potential candidate solutions and employed the following approach to develop a solutions portfolio:

  - Determine candidate solutions that address underlying causes of a gap.

- Evaluate solutions in terms of how it addresses the cause of a particular gap as well as other cause of other gaps.
- Assess the solutions to determine whether other not-yet-proposed solutions might better address the area.

These individual solutions sets were then integrated into a solutions portfolio to achieve the objective of "operate the JSE."

- *Feasibility analysis.* The solutions portfolio was constructed explicitly to improve supply process effectiveness while considering technical risks and costs.

CONCLUSIONS

The JSE supports the JCL in furthering operational capabilities. It serves as an enabler for many other supply-oriented initiatives and fosters horizontal collaboration across functional boundaries. In short, the JSE provides a key means to realize the potential of the JLEnt architecture. The CWG identified the NAR findings, developed the solutions portfolio, and responded to the study question using quantitative information, including limited objective experiments, two wargames, surveys, official reports, studies, and a continuous literature review.

Solutions Portfolio

The CWG organized the solutions identified in the capability gaps analysis into a portfolio, which provided a structured approach to enable JSE operations. The solutions summarized below improve and expand DoD supply processes, including the collaboration with JSE partners:

- *Governance.* The CWG concluded that two elements were necessary for a capability-based approach to optimally implement CBA solutions and operate the JSE.
  - *Capability-based framework.* At the operational level, supply support must be aligned to specific functions or capabilities (Figure ES-1).
  - *Senior entity function.* At the strategic level, an entity is needed to coordinate, assess, advocate, and collaborate across the enterprise.

Figure ES-1. Illustrative Capability-Based Framework



- *Networking and information transparency.* In a joint and interagency environment, information must flow freely, with complete transparency and clarity. This portion of the solutions portfolio would achieve networking and information transparency capabilities by employing an information exchange solution.

- *Requirements determination.* The DoD needs to develop a formal collaborative framework to guide the development and application of analytic tools across JSE operations. This framework would provide a set of forums in which to examine and discuss analytic tools or processes from a JSE perspective. In this environment, underlying analytic assumptions and approaches could be assessed and harmonized across the JSE community.

- *Resource identification and tracking.* Supply and distribution processes must operate in concert to provide total logistics support to the end user, and JSE partners must coordinate (through information applications) to provide a common operating picture. Non-government supply process supporters (such as prime vendors and performance-based logistics contractors) must be integrated into this process.

- *Common metrics.* The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain Integration (DASD[SCI]) is leading an effort to develop supply chain metrics across DoD. The results of the DASD(SCI) effort will serve as the basis for a common metrics framework within which JSE partner metrics can be included and harmonized to facilitate a JSE common operating picture.

Joint Staff Study Questions

During the development of the solutions portfolio, the CWG defined the joint supply business processes; developed the associated functions, roles, responsibilities, and authorities required to operate the JSBPs; and determined the effectiveness of a JSPO. This was done to answer the three study questions developed by the Joint Staff for this CBA. The answers to those questions are presented below.

- *What are the joint supply business processes?* The CWG concluded that the JSBPs are as follows:
  - Anticipate supply demands with accuracy.
  - Establish robust and reliable supplier networks.
  - Provide visibility and control of materiel in storage and in transit.
  - Respond rapidly to demand triggers.
  - Link to financial processes.

  The CWG also noted that the scope of JSBPs, as described in the JS JIC, spans the source of supply to the point of employment—the point at which supplies are consumed.

- *What are the functions, roles, responsibilities, and authorities that will enable success in the JSBPs?*[6] The CWG determined the two primary functions that enable JSBP success are the functions described in the governance solutions: 1) a capability-based framework coordinated by 2) a senior entity. The CWG also determined the authorities required to support this framework could be developed within DoD policy, since the governance approach did not affect Title 10 or Title 32 responsibilities.

- *Is the JSPO an effective solution for supply capability gaps?* The CWG determined the JSPO, as originally defined in the JS JIC, was not an appropriate solution; however, the CWG recognized that a senior entity function, with the roles and responsibilities described in Figure ES-2, is necessary to operate the JSE. Accordingly, the CWG determined a JSPO (or another entity, such as a supply enterprise manager), if established within the senior entity function construct, would be an effective solution for supply capability gaps.

[6] A function describes the organizational constructs; roles and responsibilities describe the performance of those functions. Authorities to perform the functions, roles, and responsibilities are established in either law or policy.

Figure ES-2. Proposed Senior Entity Roles and Responsibilities



DOTmLPF-P Requirements

The JS JIC CBA solutions portfolio provides capabilities across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTmLPF-P) framework. The minimal materiel solutions can be met through an evolution of networking and information transparency technologies; the significant non-materiel solutions would involve potential refinement of statute (non-DoD JSE partners), policies, and processes. The CWG developed a draft DOTmLPF-P change recommendation (DCR) concurrently for follow-on submission through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process.

Recommendations

The conclusions of the CWG provide a framework to implement solutions that will address joint supply capability gaps and set the conditions necessary to operate the Joint Supply Enterprise. Therefore, the CWG recommends the following:

- The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) should approve the proposed JS JIC CBA solutions portfolio, including a capability-based governance framework coordinated by a senior entity.
- Upon approval, the JROC or Joint Staff should direct that an ordered assessment be conducted to develop appropriate courses of action to designate a senior entity and implement the capability-based governance construct.

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Chapter 1
Introduction

The Joint Supply Joint Integrating Concept (JS JIC) was developed to support the development and advancement of joint supply capabilities for the future Joint Force. A Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) memorandum approved the JS JIC on 21 April 2010. With this action, the JROC validated a recommendation for a capabilities-based assessment (CBA) to identify integrated doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTmLPF-P) solution sets required to operate a Joint Supply Enterprise (JSE) as described in the JS JIC.

This report completes the first CBA of the proposed JS JIC solution and provides the results of the Core Work Group (CWG) deliberations, including a solutions portfolio that addresses capability gaps and answers to key questions raised by the Joint Staff.

JS JIC EVOLUTION

The genesis of the JS JIC was the Joint Staff's 2006 and 2008 Combat Support Agency Review Team (CSART) assessments of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). During December 2008, the Director, Joint Staff, approved the development of a JS JIC and directed the Joint Staff J-4 and DLA to develop the joint concept as co-leads. In 2009, DLA and the Joint Staff J-4 led the development of the JS JIC in full collaboration with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, other Joint Staff offices, the Military Services, combatant commands, other DoD components, and external organizations. After several formal reviews, including a red team, two limited objective experiments, and senior officer staffing, the Logistics Functional Capabilities Board and the Joint Capabilities Board both approved the JS JIC in March 2010. The JROC formally approved the JS JIC by way of a memorandum in April 2010.

The JS JIC was developed not only in response to the CSART assessments but also to address joint supply issues associated with a future (2016–2028) operating environment described in the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (CCJO).[1] This future operating environment is characterized by increasing uncertainty, rapid change, greater complexity, and persistent conflict. A key concept central to the JS JIC is the Joint Supply Enterprise.

[1] Department of Defense, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, version 3.0, 15 January 2009, revision signed by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ADM Michael G. Mullen.

The JSE will be an enabled network of joint supply operations, partners, and customers that collectively are capable of producing sustained supply readiness and perfect order fulfillment (POF). The JSE is an expansive network of suppliers and customers that includes government agencies, non-government agencies, multinational partners, and private-sector organizations. In this environment, DoD joint supply activities will need to coordinate capabilities within the DoD and collaborate across many new non-DoD partners to simultaneously satisfy multiple mission requirements.

The JS JIC was derived from the concepts delineated in the *Joint Concept for Logistics* (JCL)[2] and the *Net-Centric Environment Joint Functional Concept*.[3] The development of the JS JIC is part of the larger framework described in the JCL as the Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt). As such, the JS JIC is not an independent concept; it must be integrated with other parts of the JLEnt, such as the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) proposed by the Joint Logistics (Distribution) Joint Integrating Concept.

JS JIC CAPABILITIES-BASED ASSESSMENT

The JSE represents a significant change in joint supply operations. The expansive nature of the JSE presents numerous challenges to DoD joint supply activities. As a result, the Joint Staff chartered a CBA to document gaps and risks, identify the JS JIC needs for which solution alternatives should be developed, provide necessary solutions portfolios, and address Joint Staff study questions. The basic effort of this CBA was to determine if the current joint supply processes can transition and operate effectively in the JSE.

This section reviews the underlying concepts and information used to develop a solutions portfolio. This information forms the foundation for the development of the solutions portfolio and responses to the Joint Staff study questions described later in this report.

Preparation, Guidance, and Objectives

DLA and the Joint Staff J-4 were co-leaders in the JS JIC capabilities-based assessment. The CBA examined specific joint supply capabilities and associated tasks that would enable the JSE to provide POF and sustained joint supply readiness (SJSR) to the Joint Force commanders (JFCs).

In developing the CBA, DLA and the Joint Staff established a CWG, which was co-chaired by DLA J35, Strategic Programs and Initiatives Directorate, and the Joint Staff J4 Capabilities Division. CWG operation and membership is described

[2] DoD, *Joint Concept for Logistics*, 6 August 2010, signed by LTG Kathleen M. Gainey, Director for Logistics, J-4; approved by CJCS, ADM Michael G. Mullen.

[3] DoD, *Net-Centric Environment Joint Functional Concept*, version 1.0, 7 April 2005.

fully in the *CWG Charter* (see Appendix A). Figure 1-1 lists the CWG core and plenary members.

Figure 1-1. CWG Core and Plenary Members

CWG Co-Chairs

Joint Staff J-4 Study Director **Joint Staff J-4 Capabilities Division**	**DLA Study Director** **Strategic Programs and Initiatives Directorate (J-35)**

CWG Core & Plenary Members

- Representative, Deputy Chief of Staff G4, Headquarters, Department of the Army
- Representative, Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
- Representative, Defense Medical Logistics Enterprise (DMLE)
- Representative, Assistant Commandant for Engineering and Logistics, U.S. Coast Guard
- Representative, Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
- Representative, General Services Administration (GSA)
- Representative, Director of Logistics (N4), Chief of Naval Operations
- Representative, Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Installations and Mission Support (A4/7), Headquarters, United States Air Force
- Representative, Deputy Director, Strategy, Policy, Programs, and Logistics Directorate (TCJ5/4), Headquarters, U.S. Transportation Command
- Representative, Logistics Directorate (J-4), National Guard Bureau
- Representative, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

The CWG was established to ensure a variety of perspectives were considered. During deliberations, CWG members sought out subject matter experts and other viewpoints to include in the development of solutions portfolios. Decisions ultimately reached by the CWG and identified in the solutions portfolio reflect a consensus among participants.

STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

The JS JIC aligns with strategic defense guidance, including the *National Security Strategy* (2010), *National Military Strategy* (2011), and *Defense Strategic Guidance Review* (2012). Collectively, this guidance describes the need for expeditionary forces to be capable of operating more frequently as part of coalitions in both traditional and non-traditional environments and circumstances. These documents speak to required capabilities of the Joint Force, and the need for solutions that promote greater compatibility and standardization across the DoD and with potential coalition partners.

In particular, *National Security Strategy* emphasizes the need to form strategic partnerships with allied nations, the private sector, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other community-based organizations. This is reflected in the following:

> The Joint Force, Combatant Commanders, and Service Chiefs shall actively partner with other U.S. Government agencies to pursue theater security cooperation to increase collective security skills with a wider range of partners. We seek to facilitate interagency [coordination] and enable international interoperability before crises occur. Preparation is indispensable when conditions demand collaboration.

Implicit in this guidance is the consequential need for Joint Force sustainment capabilities that are prepared to support joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) partners. In some cases, such forces must also be prepared to derive sustainment from coalition partner capabilities.

MILITARY PROBLEM

The *CBA Study Plan* and *CBA Study Definition Report* defined the problem to be addressed in the CBA as the military problem stated in the JS JIC:

> How will Joint Force Commands and Department of Defense (DoD) leverage and integrate joint, Interagency (IA), Multinational (MN), and contracted supply operations to improve and expand Joint Force Commanders' operational adaptability and freedom of action in the design, execution, and assessment of Combat, Security, Engagement, and Relief and Reconstruction (CSER) military activities in an environment characterized by increasing complexity, uncertainty, rapid change, and persistent conflict.[4]

The CWG acknowledged that the scope of the military problem encompasses a whole of government (WoG) approach to joint supply operations. A WoG approach calls for government-wide collaboration to achieve a coherent, combined application of available resources to achieve the desired objective or end state. The solutions portfolio in this report supports a WoG approach.

The JS JIC addressed the military problem in the context of the future joint operating environment, noting that current joint supply capabilities are capable of supporting today's JFC requirements; however, this is sometimes accomplished at an unacceptable cost and with inefficiency, as evidenced by the capability gaps documented during CBA wargames and in the JS JIC literature review. Moreover, the current capabilities will not be sufficient to meet future operating environment challenges.[5] If not addressed, these inefficiencies could result in a failure to meet mission requirements in future joint operations.

[4] DoD, *Joint Supply Joint Integrating Concept*, version 1.0, 31 March 2010, p. 9.

[5] DoD, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, version 3.0, 15 January 2009.

Figure 1-2 depicts the range of operations the JSE may be tasked to support.

Figure 1-2. Range of Potential JSE Support Requirements

The CWG noted that the terminology humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) and foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA)/defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) are used in various documents. The CWG considered these terms to address the same situations.

Assessment Objectives

As the solution to the military problem, the JS JIC proposes the concept of a JSE—coordinated by a joint supply process owner (JSPO)—to integrate or synchronize and subsequently optimize joint supply processes, capabilities, and resource application. In the Joint Capability Area (JCA) framework, Supply is one of seven interrelated Tier II capabilities of Logistics. Figure 1-3 depicts the five subordinate functions of Supply.

Figure 1-3. Supply Joint Capability Area Tier III Functions



In the CBA study plan, CBA sponsors prioritized the five Tier III supply capability areas and concluded that "Operate the JSE" was the highest priority and the focus for this CBA. In addition, the Joint Staff directed that the CBA address three specific study questions. Therefore, this CBA report has two assessment objectives.

ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE 1

The first CBA objective was to identify capability needs and gaps, recommend achievable solutions, and identify how to implement the solutions necessary to operate the JSE. That capability was further defined in the *JSE CBA Study Definition Report*:

> The ability to work collaboratively with all partners and customers within a networked JSE, i.e., Net-Centric Environment, to attain real time global visibility of requirements, total inventory, resources and capabilities, share knowledge and information, conduct integrated joint supply operations and performance reviews, and when required, coordinate adjustments to the end-to-end supply process and capabilities to optimize performance for the JFC.

ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE 2

The Joint Staff also identified key concerns that needed to be addressed as a part of the CBA. These concerns were synthesized into three study questions:

- What are the joint supply business processes (JSBPs)?
- What are the functions, roles, responsibilities and authorities that will enable success in the JSBPs?
- Is the Joint Supply Process Owner an effective solution for supply capability gaps?

These study questions were fundamental to a complete assessment of the JS JIC and form the second assessment objective of this CBA.

Key Definitions

During the CBA, the following terms required further definition:

- *Capability.* For purposes of this CBA, a capability is defined as the ability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and conditions through a combination of means and ways to perform a set of tasks.
- *Sustained supply readiness.* A steady state of materiel readiness, sustainment capacity, and industrial surge capability that enables JFCs full freedom of action to conduct operations without pause.

- *Perfect order fulfillment.* POF is defined in two ways. Generally, POF refers to providing the right items in the right condition when and where the customer requests them. To determine what that general definition means, POF is further defined as a discrete and specific measurement described as the percentage of orders that (1) are delivered on time and in full to the request or commit date; (2) meet the customer's three-way match (invoice, purchase order, and receipt); and (3) have no product quality issues.

- *Gap or shortfall.* A gap typically indicates a lack of forces, equipment, personnel, materiel, or capability that prevents mission accomplishment. A shortfall indicates the lack of forces, equipment, personnel, materiel, or capability adversely affects mission accomplishment. Because of the broad nature of the JSE, the determination of *prevent* versus *adversely affects* becomes a matter of perspective. Either expression could be argued successfully. To avoid debate, the CWG considered the terms synonymous.

Related Joint Capability Areas

The "Operate the JSE" CBA addresses the Tier II JCA, Supply, of the Tier I JCA, Logistics. Tasks performed when operating the JSE also relate to other capability areas in the JCA taxonomy. For example, developing collaborative relationships, such as those required for supply operations in interagency and multinational operations is a capability under the Tier I JCA, Building Partnerships. Planning for joint supply operations falls under the Tier II JCA, Planning, of the Tier I JCA, Command and Control. Medical materiel management falls under the Tier II JCA, Health Readiness, of the Tier I JCA, Force Support. Thus, operating the JSE would promote collaboration and cooperation across multiple Tier I JCAs.

Classes of Supply

The JS JIC centers on the supplies and related processes necessary to field and sustain forces; however, not all supply classes were considered as a part of the JS JIC CBA. Ammunition (Class V), personal demand items (Class VI), major end items (Class VII), and materiel for non-military programs (Class X) were excluded from this assessment. The classes of supply that were assessed as a part of this CBA are listed below:

- Class I Subsistence
- Class II Clothing, textiles, individual equipment, tools
- Class III Bulk petroleum, oils, and lubricants
- Class IV Construction and barrier materiel
- Class VIII Medical materiel
- Class IX Repair parts.

Timeframe

The JS JIC describes how a JSE would conduct future (2016–2028) joint supply operations to provide the JFC with POF and sustained joint supply readiness.

Assumptions

This CBA recognized the following JS JIC assumptions about the future joint operating environment and the capabilities necessary to operate the JSE in that environment:

- A combination of DoD and commercially owned net-centric enterprise services and the necessary assured communications capabilities available to allow forward-stationed and deployed forces to fully employ advances in logistics-related information technology.
- The Net-Centric JCA may not mitigate all cyber threats that could disrupt the network capabilities described in the JS JIC.
- The "Move and Sustain the Joint Force" and "Operate the JDDE" capabilities described in Joint Logistics (Distribution) JIC would be available in the 2016–2028 timeframe.
- Congress would permit more responsive and flexible authorizations to facilitate multinational and interagency logistics support partnerships.
- The U.S. industrial base may not have sufficient capacity to sustain joint forces without a global surge capacity to support persistent and simultaneous military operations as described in the CCJO.
- *The Joint Operating Environment 2010*[6] accurately describes the most likely security environment in the 2016–2028 timeframe.
- The fundamental tenets of current national strategy documents will remain applicable in 2016–2028.
- DoD's robust partnership with the U.S. commercial transportation industry would continue. Other commercial, interagency, and multinational logistics support partnerships will be established and agreements will be implemented when required.
- Future joint forces would consist of multinational and interagency organizations and would need to operate closely with NGOs, other governments, and commercial partners.

[6] U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), *The Joint Operating Environment 2010*, 18 Feb, 2010.

JS JIC CBA DEVELOPMENT TO DATE

During the CBA needs assessment phase, the CWG assessed the joint supply capability gaps identified during the JS JIC literature review (see Appendix B) and two CBA wargames. The CWG organized these gaps into six gap categories, then identified underlying causes for each category:

- *Networking.* The consequences of networking shortfalls were evident in all of the capability shortfalls for operating the JSE.
- *Information transparency.* The absence of information transparency degrades key capabilities required to operate the JSE, including networking, determining requirements, and developing processes to manage and track supply resources across the enterprise.
- *Requirements determination.* Gaps in requirements determination increase the risks that supply capacity will be insufficient when and where it is needed to sustain joint operations.
- *Resource identification and tracking.* Gaps in resource identification and tracking adversely affects all operations, decreases confidence in supply chain responsiveness, causes redundant orders (or no orders at all), and reduces the ability to provide coordinated and synchronized delivery to destination.
- *Common metrics.* The absence of common metrics adversely affects the JSE's ability to analyze and assess joint supply performance as a whole, from both the customer and JFC perspectives, and for each of its component process activities.
- *Governance.* The lack of consistent policies for collaboration with non-DoD partners risks delay in providing an effective and flexible response to supply requirements in a whole-of government scenario.

Within each category are gaps predominantly related to supply operations conducted by DoD components and those relating to the ability of DoD to plan and execute joint supply operations in collaboration with JIIM partners within the JSE framework. The CWG analysis of joint supply capability gaps is contained in the JS JIC *Needs Assessment Report* (NAR).[7]

The CWG analysis identified significant capability gaps that would prevent the JFC from being fully capable of operating the JSE in the 2016–2028 timeframe. The CWG concluded that today's JFCs cannot fully leverage and integrate JIIM and contracted supply operations to improve and expand operational adaptability and freedom of action during DoD operations. The CWG further recognized that chang-

[7] Defense Logistics Agency, *Joint Supply Joint Integrating Concept Needs Assessment Report (NAR)*, 2 August 2011.

ing authorities and U.S. laws would only affect U.S. government organizations; therefore, collaborative working relationships must be established and maintained with non–U.S. government JSE partners.

The CWG used the results of the needs assessment report to develop solutions portfolios that addressed each capability gap area. This final report combines all these solutions and recommendations with the CWG's answers to the JS study questions, and recommends the means required to implement proposed solutions.

FINAL REPORT ORGANIZATION

With the completion of the final interim report, the CWG devoted attention to consolidating the individual solutions into a comprehensive solutions portfolio. This report provides consolidated and integrated solutions portfolios to address capability gaps identified during the needs assessment. In addition, this report provides the final CWG responses to the Joint Staff's three study questions.

To fully develop and describe both the solutions portfolios and the responses to the Joint Staff study questions, this report has been divided into chapters. The contents of the remaining chapters are summarized below:

- Chapter 2, *Joint Supply Enterprise*. The JSE is a key concept introduced in the JS JIC. This chapter describes the JSE and its implications.
- Chapter 3, *Capability Gaps*. The capability gaps developed in the NAR are reviewed in this chapter to provide a context for the solutions portfolio and answer the Joint Staff's study questions.
- Chapter 4, *Solutions Methodology*. The CWG developed a structured methodology to develop solutions. The solutions methodology is elaborated in this chapter.
- Chapter 5, *Solutions Portfolio*. The CWG developed a detailed solutions portfolio. This chapter presents the solutions portfolio that addressed the NAR capability gaps.
- Chapter 6, *Joint Staff Study Questions*. As a part of the JS JIC CBA, the CWG addressed the Joint Staff's three study questions. The results of those working group deliberations are summarized in this chapter.
- Chapter 7, *Feasibility Analysis*. The feasibility of the JS JIC solution portfolios is an important part of the JS JIC CBA. The results of that feasibility analysis are summarized in this chapter.
- Chapter 8, *JS JIC in the Broader Context*. The JS JIC is one of many initiatives. In this chapter, the CWG describes how the JS JIC fits with other DoD initiatives.

- Chapter 9, *Conclusions and Recommendations*. This final chapter presents the CBA conclusions and the recommendations from the CWG.

Chapter 2
Joint Supply Enterprise

The JS JIC proposes a JSE as the solution to the military problem. The CBA study plan identifies "Operate the JSE" as the highest priority for solutions to achieve the "to-be" capabilities for joint supply operations. The JS JIC describes a JSE as a required capability to support a Joint Force commander's (JFC's) operational adaptability and freedom of action in future combat, security, engagement, and relief, and reconstruction (CSER) military activities. It further defines the JSE as, "an enabled network of joint supply operations partners and customers that is collectively capable of producing sustained supply readiness and POF for the JFC…"

The JSE is central to any consideration of the JS JIC. It extends far beyond DoD's borders and represents a way of engaging organizations outside the DoD as partners in a collaborative and cooperative framework. In order to provide the proper context for the developing solutions, the CWG reviewed the JSE concept described in the JS JIC and its intended approach to joint supply operations. The results of that review are described in this chapter.

JOINT SUPPLY ENTERPRISE

The JS JIC acknowledges that, in the future, a JFC may be called on to operate either as the lead or in a supporting role with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, or multinational (JIIM) partners. Given the anticipated challenges of the future operating environment, the supply operations of all partners must be capable of working together in harmony to achieve the desired JIC outcomes. Table 2-1 summarizes the central premise of the JS JIC.

Table 2-1. The JS JIC's Central Idea

The JSE will…	The JFC will benefit from…
◆ integrate or synchronize JSE processes and capabilities to optimize them to best support the JFC; ◆ plan, capture, and predict joint supply requirements; ◆ network joint supply operations; and ◆ link seamlessly to the JDDE.	◆ perfect order fulfillment and ◆ sustained joint supply readiness that enables operational adaptability and freedom of action.

The JSE's "enabled network of joint supply operations partners and customers" requires DOTmLPF-P solutions that integrate or synchronize DoD supply processes and enable DoD capabilities to more effectively engage JIIM partners in planning

and executing supply operations. Each JIIM partner currently has supply processes and systems developed to meet its specific missions and operational concepts.

An overview of this future DoD JSE is shown in Figure 2-1. The figure is illustrative rather than exhaustive; it depicts relationships, not control, governance, or organization. The addition of multinational (MN), interagency (IA), and non-governmental organization (NGO) partners varies according to the scenario and operational demands.

Figure 2-1. Joint Supply Enterprise



Although Figure 2-1 focuses on federal and international organizations, state and local governments as well as regional NGOs would be a part of the JSE. The main conclusion is that partners and participants will increase significantly and must be accommodated in future DoD operations.

In DoD, supply activities comprise a somewhat closed system, with processes focused on end-to-end integration of supply chain activities from customer demand through the Services' supply operations to DLA and supplier networks. Other government agencies that conduct or support supply operations—notably the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), General Services Administration (GSA), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)—establish their own supplier relationships and use processes and systems designed to support their assigned functions. Likewise, NGOs and MN organizations use their own tools to perform supply processes that are appropriate to their needs and capabilities. As a consequence, visibility of supply requirements and assets are not

easily shared across JIIM partners in an operation, and resources are "protected" for use within their own systems.

Further complicating the supply picture, the composition of partners that a JFC engages may change from operation to operation. The type of activity (e.g., combat versus relief or reconstruction) will involve very different capabilities, partners, and commodity requirements, as well as relationship types (i.e., supported versus supporting). Possible partnership combinations include *joint* capabilities provided by DoD and the *whole of government*, where DoD works with federal, state, and local government agencies, and the *whole community* involving DoD, other government, and non-governmental organizations.

The CWG noted the JSE framework will require an open architecture with regard to networking supply processes and systems that enable plug-and-play information sharing as well as established and practiced relationships among key potential JSE partners for planning, exercising, and executing supply operations. Figure 2-2 illustrates the three interactions that must be addressed.

Figure 2-2. Notional JSE Partner Interplay



JSE Partner Relationships

The JSE is defined as an "enabled network of joint supply partners and customers" and is not an isolated organization. The JSE itself cannot be assigned such roles

and responsibilities as, “integrate or synchronize JSE processes and capabilities” or “network joint supply operations.”

Moreover, the JSE framework requires an ability to achieve unity of effort in the absence of overall unified authority for operational control. Whether in a supported or a supporting role, the JFC will likely not have control of capabilities provided by non-DoD partners nor be subordinate to them. The JS JIC seeks to promote collaboration and synchronization of supply operations conducted by JSE partners such that capabilities and resources can be applied most effectively to operational priorities. The JS JIC construct calls first for improved interoperability and efficiency of joint supply processes and systems within DoD. In addition, it calls for DoD to establish the collaborative relationships and networking necessary to operate effectively with its non-DoD supply operations partners.

In this context, the JSE may be viewed as a DoD solution rooted in joint concepts (starting with the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*) and approved through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process. This does not minimize the role and importance of non-DoD partners. The JSE construct simply calls for a collaborative information-sharing, planning, and decision-making framework between DoD and its partners that can be adapted to any operational scenario or combination of partners. Within that context, DoD and non-DoD partners will operate as an “enabled network of joint supply partners …”

The proposed CBA solutions will rely on a defined collaborative framework for assigning and resourcing the initiatives necessary for their implementation. These initiatives address needs for policy and fiscal enablers to improve networking of processes and systems and advance collaborative supply planning both within DoD and with its non-DoD partners. This will promote linkage of joint supply capabilities with the JDDE and other joint logistics capabilities in DoD’s broader concept of a Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt).

Joint Supply Business Processes

The JS JIC links its central idea of a JSE to supporting ideas that describe how the JSE will operate. Key elements of these supporting ideas include establishment of integrated and aligned enterprise architecture; common standards for business processes and data; and the integration of strategic, operational, and tactical supply processes. In this context, the CWG identified the Joint Supply Business Processes (JSBPs) as the broad set of activities and tasks described in the JS JIC that the JSE must accomplish to operate the JSE. The JSBPs are as follows:

- Anticipate supply demands with accuracy.
- Establish robust and reliable supplier networks.
- Provide visibility and control of materiel in storage and transit.

- Respond rapidly to demand triggers.
- Link to financial processes.

The JSBPs represent the key activities and tasks the JSE must perform to provide effective supply support and to attain desired levels of perfect order fulfillment. In addition to describing the JSBPs, the JS JIC contained discussions centering on roles, responsibilities, and authorities required to perform the JSBPs. A more detailed discussion of those concepts is contained in Chapter 6 on the Joint Staff Study Questions.

JIC Philosophy

The JS JIC identifies six precepts as the foundation of future joint supply capability development. Four of these—reliable, rapid, and precise results; unity of effort; global visibility, shared knowledge and situational understanding; and performance evaluation in terms of JFC requirements—reflect joint supply outcome objectives to which the CBA solutions will contribute. The remaining two precepts reflect related philosophies that help define the approach to solutions described in the solutions portfolios:

- Process ownership as an effective means to manage joint supply activities
- Supply operations optimized for each supported functional capability area as well as across the JSE.

Process ownership is a responsibility for coordinating, sustaining, and improving processes (including creating new ones, where appropriate) and being accountable for their outcomes. Process owners advocate improvements across organizations to optimize effectiveness and efficiency when achieving process outcomes.

In supply operations, the ultimate outcome of a supply process is often measured by the ability to provide and sustain specific functional capabilities that are required and prioritized by the JFC; for example, equipment availability, mobility, troop support, or medical services.

These two precepts are related, in that end-to-end supply processes are typically organized around the needs of specific functional capabilities that drive supply demands and their associated supply commodities. The CWG noted that this is reflected in acquisition and distribution strategies that have proven effective when organized or tailored around best practices found in industry or government. Key functions typically have responsible expertise and leadership that are accountable for their performance. Such expertise and leadership is found predominantly in each DoD service component, as well as each non-DoD partner, which leads to the JS JIC challenge of integrating or synchronizing supply processes and capabilities across all partners in the JSE framework.

Solutions for policy and system improvements proposed to address capability gaps in operating the JSE must recognize these underlying JS JIC philosophies as well as the approach to commodity management. Solutions must enable supply business processes that transcend organizational boundaries and provide relevant, timely supply information to a broader JSE common operating picture.

CONCLUSIONS

While the JSE is a key concept in the JS JIC, the enterprise does not exist as an entity. JSE is a title that describes the participants associated with a particular kind of operation at a specific time and place. Further, supply processes among JSE partners are varied and directed toward different end users. The CBA responses to assessment objectives must recognize both the JSE and process characteristics and develop effective responses to each.

Chapter 3
Capability Gaps

As stated at the beginning of this report, the needs assessment report (NAR) documented capability gaps in six main areas. Those capability gaps form the basis for the development of the solutions methodology, culminating in the solutions portfolio described in Chapter 4. In this chapter, each of the six capability gap categories are described and the underlying gap causes are reviewed.

NETWORKING

Networking refers to the interconnection of all members in an enterprise to share information and execute processes to achieve unity of effort when accomplishing enterprise objectives. In the context of the JSE, networking is broader than information technology and includes connections and relationships among partner and customer organizations, business and financial processes, and associated logistics information systems.

The NAR documented the desired end-state as a flexible network that linked JSE partners and customers and supported best business practices for the JLEnt and other capabilities that drive supply demands. Further, any JSE information exchange must be resilient and contain sufficient capacity and capability to provide real-time or near-real-time authoritative supply data to all JSE partners. The NAR identified serious gaps in networking capabilities, including the following causes for those gaps:

- *Gap Cause 1.* No clear management framework exists to drive the development of the overall JSE architecture.
- *Gap Cause 2.* Existing relationships and organizational alignment do not facilitate sharing of information across the JSE.
- *Gap Cause 3.* Key partners (particularly the interagencies and National Guard) are not integrated into the JSE.
- *Gap Cause 4.* No JSE-wide methodology exists for accessing information from industry sources through end user.
- *Gap Cause 5.* No JSE-wide decision support system exists for integrating decisions and controlling actions of JSE elements (DoD and other).
- *Gap Cause 6.* No JSE-wide means exists for sharing key process area information.

Absence of an enterprise network degrades planning, sourcing, delivery of key commodities, and end-user support; it also increases the potential for misdirection and misuse of resources. The CWG concluded that the consequences of networking shortfalls were evident in all of the capability shortfalls for operating the JSE. Solutions need to address all of these gap causes to eliminate the identified networking capability gap.

INFORMATION TRANSPARENCY

Information transparency refers to the need for agreed-upon conventions to describe and convey data and information. These conventions are necessary to enable the sharing of accurate, timely, and relevant data and ensure interoperability of processes across an enterprise. Information transparency provides protocols that describe how data must be structured and communicated so all enterprise partners can understand and use the information being communicated. Further, information transparency is essential for an enterprise to transition to and operate in a net-centric, service-oriented architecture. In the context of the JSE, transparency is not limited to data systems, but it includes the taxonomy and lexicon used to describe processes, organizations, and materiel.

The NAR further defined information transparency as one in which the JSE must have established standards for data required to plan and execute joint supply processes and the necessary management structure and policies to maintain those standards. The JSE requires information transparency to synchronize supply data with key non-DoD entities that will be or could be JSE partners or customers in future operational scenarios.

The inability of the JSE to meet these requirements results from the following:

- *Gap Cause 1.* The lack of JSE information transparency resulted in defaulting to Military Service–centric supply business processes and supporting information management systems.
- *Gap Cause 2.* Policy and procedures necessary for harmonizing information transparency across the Military Services are lacking.
- *Gap Cause 3.* Policy and procedures necessary for harmonizing information transparency between DoD and other government agencies are lacking at all levels.
- *Gap Cause 4.* Policy and procedures necessary for harmonizing information transparency between DoD and JSE partners outside the U.S. Government (USG) are lacking.

- *Gap Cause 5.* Policy and procedures necessary for establishing standards for commercial product identification in some industries are lacking.

- *Gap Cause 6.* Enterprise-wide data dictionaries, common lexicons, and common data keys are lacking.

Absence of information transparency degrades DoD's abilities to operate the JSE, including networking, determining requirements, and developing processes to manage and track supply resources across the enterprise. It slows the exchange of information, increases risk of misinterpretation, and increases manual oversight and intervention. Ultimately, the lack of information transparency prevents the JSE from achieving timely and effective responses to requirements and priorities.

REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION

Requirements determination refers to the forecasting and planning of supply requirements to anticipate and provision for sufficient supply and distribution capability and capacity. It includes demand analysis, modeling and simulation, and prognostic methods to forecast demands, such as debits to perpetual inventory, projected maintenance failures, and other sensory indicators of demand.

The NAR documented the desired end-state as one in which the JSE employs predictive tools and processes that enable customers and partners to quickly anticipate supply demands associated with planned and alternative JFC courses of action (COAs). The JSE, through the JLEnt architecture, can sense and respond to demand triggers for all classes of supply and distinguish changes in demand patterns to enable proactive adjustment to supply and distribution operations. The JSE integrates joint supply planning with mission planning for supported functional capabilities (e.g., maintenance, engineering, troop support, and health readiness). Further, the JSE routinely employs collaborative supply planning within DoD and with other non-DoD partners (such as IA, MN, NGO, and private sector) to achieve unity of effort in support of JFC or whole-of government missions and priorities.

The NAR concluded that there were serious gaps in requirements determination capabilities and identified the following causes:

- *Gap Cause 1.* Requirements processes are Military Service–centric and there is a lack of joint collaboration in planning supply operations for support of similar functions that generate supply demands.

- *Gap Cause 2.* A JSE-wide methodology to facilitate collaboration across the multiple JSE partner fragmented and disparate processes is not available.

- *Gap Cause 3.* Visibility of DoD supply demands (by commodity) associated with specific types of operation to support demand analysis is not complete.

- *Gap Cause 4.* Analytic tools for forecasting line-item requirements (by commodity) based on variable factors associated with alternative scenarios and courses of action are not available.

- *Gap Cause 5.* Integration between joint supply planning and mission planning for supported functional capabilities (e.g., maintenance, engineering, troop support, and medical) is insufficient.

- *Gap Cause 6.* There is no authorized process to compute line-item requirements for DSCA and HA/DR contingency plans.

The requirements determination gaps significantly reduce the JSE's ability to identify and collect emerging requirements, make timely adjustments to plans and forecasts, and communicate changes to supporting partners. The inability to accurately predict supply requirements increases the risk of insufficient supply and distribution capacity at the right time and place to sustain joint operations. It affects supply planning from the establishment of adequate supplier networks to performance of a logistics supportability analysis (LSA) by the JFC for planned and alternative COAs.

The separate requirements processes means synchronization across the JSE relies on manual coordination, email, and spreadsheets, which reduces the effectiveness of joint supply support to the end users. Ultimately, the inability to anticipate requirements increases the risk of delay in response to supply demands and imposes limits on the JFC's freedom of action. Solutions collectively need to address all of these gap causes to eliminate the identified requirements determination capability gap.

RESOURCE IDENTIFICATION AND TRACKING

Resource identification and tracking refers to an enterprise-wide visibility of all supply requirements and resources (on hand, on order, in process, on contract, in transit, and received at point of need or employment) and to match those requirements and resources to the best sources for fulfillment. It includes the ability to direct and intervene to redirect resources in response to changes in operational conditions and JFC priorities.

The NAR further defined resource identification and tracking as a capability with which the JSE, in coordination with the JDDE, must be able to provide enterprise-wide visibility of all supply assets and enable their control at appropriate levels to respond rapidly and effectively to changes in operational conditions and JFC priorities. The JSE must provide JS process leaders with decision-support tools to evaluate COAs for optimal positioning and sourcing of supplies. This capability should also enable making informed decisions on supply allocation, redirection, and movement for both distribution, and return and retrograde actions. Finally, this capability provides the tools to execute operational decisions by interacting with JSE-wide partners and processes, including distribution and financial pro-

cesses and systems, to facilitate timely, controlled material movement. This movement runs from source through intermediate nodes to the point of employment, resulting in the customer receiving the right items in the right quantity and condition at the right time (POF). The inability of the JSE to meet these requirements has the following gap causes:

- *Gap Cause 1.* A common methodology among JSE partners concerning resource identification and tracking does not exist.
- *Gap Cause 2.* A common architecture for acquiring, sharing, and coordinating resource identification and tracking information is lacking.
- *Gap Cause 3.* Resiliency (such as adaptability and flexibility) to maintain visibility during technical interruptions is insufficient.
- *Gap Cause 4.* Common data standards are not available.

Absence of a coordinated and integrated JSE-wide resource identification and tracking process adversely impacts all operations. Without an effective process, supply managers may overlook or be unable to effectively match requirements to optimal sources capable of meeting the Services' or JFC's needs and priorities. A lack of visibility results in decreased confidence in the supply chain, causing redundant orders or no orders at all. Critical resources may be misdirected or lost. Further, a common operational picture for supply operations provides a shared, common visibility of requirements and resources and increases the ability to provide coordinated and synchronized delivery to the destination.

GOVERNANCE

In the context of an enterprise, governance refers to the process or framework for establishing policies, making decisions, and exercising responsibilities relative to the activities of its component members and partners. In the JSE, partners and customers operate within authorities derived from statutes and policies, and executed through their respective DoD, federal agency, Service, chain of command, or other governmental or nongovernmental organizational structure. Within an enterprise framework that is characterized by multiple chains of authority, governance processes may range from collaborative to the empowerment of organizations or entities with a specified span of authority or control.

The NAR concluded that, while governance was seldom directly cited as a capability gap in the CBA wargames, each of the capability categories reflected a lack of authority or mandate as a contributing factor. These references included a lack of authority to drive development of enterprise architecture and a lack of agreement on information sharing necessary for networking the JSE.

A lack of authority to mandate joint supply planning or to consider DSCA or humanitarian assistance contributed to shortfalls in joint supply requirements

determination. The lack of policy contributed to insufficient transparency of information and metrics within the JSE. The literature review found numerous references to a lack of authority to consider supply resources owned by one Service component to meet JFC priorities outside of that Service. The literature acknowledged various mechanisms to provide authority or assigned responsibilities to promote such unity of effort. These include designations for lead agency, executive agent, process owner, wartime executive agent, and directive authority for logistics. Such designations generally apply to specific commodities and operations; however, their execution may be sub-optimized by a lack of transparency and interoperability of information and processes.

The NAR summarized the following underlying causes for governance capability gaps:

- *Gap Cause 1.* Agreements among the JSE partners concerning management oversight of the JSE are insufficient.
- *Gap Cause 2.* Development of criteria that apply to all JSE partner operations is insufficient.
- *Gap Cause 3.* The methodology for resolving conflicts among JSE partners is insufficient.
- *Gap Cause 4.* The current management framework for JSE oversight is insufficient.

Gaps in governance capabilities are reflected by the absence of policies, formal partnerships, collaborative forums, and specified authorities to organize, synchronize, and direct partner activities to operate as a JSE. The development of solutions required to optimize supply performance from a JSE perspective is not a priority among the partners, who execute their responsibilities independently within Service or agency channels. During operations, the lack of common standards for managing supplies and the authority to provide access to all available supply resources compromises the ability to optimize supply support to the JFC. Also, a lack of consistent policies for collaboration with non-DoD partners increases the risk of delay providing an effective and flexible response to supply requirements in a whole-of government scenario.

COMMON METRICS

Metrics are units of measure that allow quantitative assessments of whether a desired end state has been attained. In an enterprise framework, common metrics should support actions and decisions that provide knowledge and incentives to promote unity of effort among partners in meeting the needs and priorities of the enterprise.

The objectives of the JSE are to provide SJSR and POF to a supported JFC. In meeting those objectives, metrics need to be applied to processes in the JSE and to those processes that must be performed in conjunction with distribution capabilities operating within the broader framework of the JLEnt to assess performance from the customer perspective. The JSE must have a common capability to measure and assess both supply and distribution performance using authoritative supply and distribution data. It must give customers and partners the ability to measure, analyze, and assess joint supply performance as a whole from the customer and JFC perspective and for each of its component activities. Through the JLEnt architecture, the JSE will provide leaders with performance information in real time or near real time to correct deficiencies or adapt to changes in JFC missions and priorities.

The inability of the JSE to meet these requirements stems from the following:

- *Gap Cause 1.* Agreements among the JSE partners concerning metrics definitions and data collection methods are lacking.
- *Gap Cause 2.* The methodology for collecting POF information down to the point of employment is limited.
- *Gap Cause 3.* Information transparency across JSE partners is not available.
- *Gap Cause 4.* There is no way to maintain visibility over the metrics components. (CWG determined this gap cause relates closely to Gap Cause 6. As a result, the CWG will consolidate this gap cause with Gap Cause 6. The combined gap cause will be stated under Gap Cause 6.)
- *Gap Cause 5.* There is no mechanism to provide incentives to both supply and distribution activities to share accountability in meeting the needs and priorities of the customer and JFC.
- *Gap Cause 6.* There is no way to maintain visibility over the metrics components, to include consistent Service reporting of distribution segments. (Previously, the CWG defined this gap cause as excessive variation in Service systems for capturing distribution segments.)

Absence of common metrics adversely affects JSE's ability to analyze and assess joint supply performance, from both the customer and JFC perspectives as well as for each of its component process organizations. Lack of metrics hampers tailored supply support.

JFC and the JSE partners will operate with incomplete information that may cause misdirection of critical assets, possibly adversely impacting operations. Critical information from metrics will be missing, severely restricting the ability of the JFC to anticipate and respond to changing situations. As a result, the JSE has no common ability to effectively measure POF and SJSR.

CONCLUSIONS

The capability gaps identified in the NAR form the basis for the development of solutions. In addition, the capability gaps, in conjunction with the development of the solutions, provide the basis for the development of responses to Joint Staff study questions.

Chapter 4
Solutions Methodology

The solutions methodology outlines the approach used by the CWG to develop solutions and address the Joint Staff study questions. The content of this chapter lays out the approach used by the CWG and includes descriptions as to how information was collected and used.

The CWG-developed solutions methodology relied on the guidance contained in the *CBA User's Guide*. The guide was used to accomplish the needs assessment phase of the CBA, and within the solutions phase, the solutions guidance focuses on addressing gaps identified during that phase. The guide cautions that a detailed solutions analysis is no longer a formal CBA requirement; however, the guide does point out that the CBA does need to provide some direction as to how to address identified gaps. The overall solutions process outlined in the guide is shown below (Figure 4-1).

Figure 4-1. CBA User's Guide Solutions Process



Source: Figure 8-1, CBA User's Guide, Version 3, March 2009

To develop solutions that address the JSE gaps, the CWG followed a structured approach using the *CBA User's Guide* guidance. The JSE represents a significant change in joint supply operations. The expansive nature of the JSE means that solutions must not only address DoD shortfall but also support partners external to DoD. Additionally, solutions needed to address the Joint Staff study questions. Therefore, the solutions approach necessarily expanded on the guidance.

SOLUTIONS METHODOLOGY

The solutions must effectively address both capability gaps and associated gap causes. As such, the solutions methodology must support the development of these solutions in an organized and thorough manner. With this in mind, the CWG developed a solutions methodology to do so.

The *CBA User's Guide* references to solutions portfolios recognize that many capability shortfalls are too complex to be adequately addressed in a single solution. The JS JIC is sufficiently complex that a single solution cannot address all facets of any capability gap. This is illustrated by the gap causes described under each capability gap in the NAR and summarized in the previous chapter.

The CWG fully recognized the need for a portfolio with tailored solutions and collected the many solutions with the intent of organizing them into one or more portfolios. The solutions portfolios were structured to identify and organize the solutions so that all gap causes are addressed and support the CBA objective: Operate the JSE.

As a part of solutions development, the CWG considered expected difficulty and costs. These considerations guided the development of two types of solutions to address capability gaps: those with transformational capabilities that transcend difficulty and cost, or those that mitigate or reduce difficulty and cost. Chapter 5 details the consolidated solutions portfolio with both types of solutions.

The CWG developed a structured approach to collect and develop solutions. The steps used in developing the solutions portfolio can be summarized as follows:

- Organize capability gaps to facilitate the development of mutually supporting solution sets
- Develop baseline supply chain maps to facilitate identification of both gap and solution impacts
- Identify the population of solutions that should be considered as candidates for the solutions portfolio
- Develop a solutions portfolio that address capability gap causes

While the focus of the discussion will be on capability gaps, it should be understood that the CWG maintained its focus on solutions that addressed capability gaps while also addressing the underlying assessment objectives of Operate the JSE and respond to the Joint Staff study questions. With that in mind, the particular elements of the solutions methodology are briefly described in the remainder of this chapter.

Gap Organization and Approach

The NAR highlighted the broad area encompassed by the JS JIC. Given the JS JIC scope, the CWG decided to address the gaps sequentially, ultimately integrating the solutions once all gaps had been addressed. The CWG further contended with both the wide range covered by the gaps and the need to develop solution sets in a timely manner.

After reviewing the gap categories, the CWG concluded that the gap categories could be better addressed as pairs. The reasoning was that certain gap categories related to other gap categories. Based on this insight, the CWG divided the categories into the following three pairings that reflect potential relationships which could influence solutions:

- *Pairing One.* Networking and Information Transparency
- *Pairing Two.* Requirements Determination and Resource Identification and Tracking
- *Pairing Three.* Governance and Metrics

The CWG made this determination to fully capture the solutions associated with each area and reduce the time required for this CBA. Order was also a consideration. Networking and Information Transparency were addressed first because these foundational communication and information capabilities are prerequisites to the other capability area gaps. To coordinate supply support across the JSE, all JSE partners must be able to rapidly and transparently share information (networking). If JSE partners are not sufficiently networked to adequately and accurately share information, then no other gaps can be effectively addressed without extensive and manual management oversight and intervention. More importantly, customers may not receive timely and effective supply support, with potential negative impacts across the operational spectrum.

Once information sharing is available to all JSE partners, information exchanged between partners must be transparent—that is, understandable and actionable (information transparency). A rapid, common understanding of what customers need and who in the JSE can fulfill those needs will enhance operational efficiency and mission effectiveness. Therefore, the CWG established Networking and Information Transparency, in that order, as the first two priorities to be addressed.

With these two capabilities as the top priorities, the CWG recognized that issues associated with the remaining gaps may be mitigated to some extent. For example, supply process gaps associated with requirements determination may be easier to resolve once communication and information exchange issues are resolved. By addressing networking and information transparency first, challenges associated with the remaining gaps will likely be more readily resolved.

Finally, governance and metrics cut across all capabilities. As a result, the CWG concluded that governance and metrics should be addressed last to ensure that governance and metrics solutions actually address capability gaps and support the desired solutions and approaches identified in the previous pairings.

Supply Process Baseline Development

The supply process baseline effort developed two major areas. First, the supply processes were mapped to fully describe the processes, including supporting system applications. Second, the supply processes for commodities were assessed to determine the methodologies used in management of commodities. Taken together, these two areas provide a basis for prudent analysis of supply process capabilities and potential solutions.

SUPPLY PROCESS MAPPING

Before determining potential solutions, the CWG mapped supply processes for each type of commodity considered as part of this CBA. This was important to ensure the various aspects of supply processes were identified. This mapping effort sought to describe the end-to-end processes. With a fully mapped supply process, solutions could be evaluated to determine where they impacted the supply processes and ensure that all aspects were addressed within solutions.

The Supply Chain Operations Reference (SCOR) model was used to structure the supply chain process maps. The SCOR model allowed the CWG to lay out all supply chains in parallel, including those for commodities supported through Service-specific supply chain processes, such as Class IX repair parts. In this manner, solutions could be related to different supply chains and their relative positions in the supply processes. A more detailed explanation of the SCOR model is included in Appendix C.

The result was a more detailed description of the status quo to guide the development of solutions. Both decentralized and tailored supply chains, discussed in the NAR, were laid out in parallel to identify key processes and supporting systems.

This approach facilitated linking solutions to relevant systems and process elements as the CWG worked through the gap pairs. Figure 4-2 provides a high-level view of the DoD supply chains and the other JSE partner supply chains.

Figure 4-2. Supply Chain Process Flow Overview



The general process flows are depicted in Figure 4-2, and the general kinds of systems are identified and linked to the general process areas that they support.

Figure 4-2 is not meant to be exhaustive. Retrograde, for example, is not shown, but it is addressed in the more detailed process charts. In addition, specific systems are not illustrated. For each commodity and service, the CWG described the process flows in much greater detail; the CWG used that information to develop solution portfolios. Figure 4-2 simply illustrates the process flows and provides a frame of reference for development of solutions.

Supply Strategies

To transition current processes to this desired end-state, the CWG refined the existing status quo processes. The NAR, produced as a part of the JS JIC CBA, recognized two broad approaches to the management of supply operations:

- A traditional inventory management model
- A management strategy tailored to a specific commodity or function.

This reflects the fact that commodities are sourced through distinct supplier networks, each with their own approaches to sales, distribution, product identification, and reimbursement. It also recognizes that each supported function has unique demand drivers as well as unique commodity characteristics. Organizing supply management strategies around functions or commodities enabled the CWG to optimize end-to-end business processes.

Initiatives to improve end-to-end processes by organizing joint partners around supply support to specific functional capabilities and/or commodities have successful benchmarks in each of the two management approaches. This is evident in the tailored supply strategies organized around DLA's role as a DoD Executive Agent, especially for Class I, Class III (Bulk), and Class VIII. In each case, the resulting business framework tends to have unique but common (joint) business processes and systems. Each is characterized by exceptionally lean supply chains enabled by strategic partnership and some level of integration of DLA and military service capabilities.

In addition, DLA has formed selected partnerships with the Army and Navy to link retail-level supply management systems with its Enterprise Business Systems (EBS) to streamline access to nationally managed Class II, IV, and IX inventories. DLA also assumed physical supply, storage, and distribution functions for the Army, Navy, and Air Force at selected locations, such as the Fleet Logistics Center, Yokosuka, Japan, and Air Force functions at Robins, Hill, and Tinker Air Force bases.

Candidate Solutions Collection

For each capability gap pairing, the CWG identified potential solutions. The capability gap causes provided the basis for the identification of potential candidate solutions. Each CWG member nominated potential solutions that addressed one or more of the capability gap causes associated with each of the gap pairs under consideration. At the conclusion of this effort, a wide range of solutions that covered all capability gaps had been collected.

This effort to collect solutions was, essentially, a brainstorming exercise. No solution was rejected, and solutions could address a single or multiple gap causes. In all, CWG members proposed a large number of solutions covering all capability gap areas. The solutions addressed not only DoD organizations but also intergovernmental and allied JSE partners.

Collectively, the solutions addressed all gap causes identified in the NAR for all capability gap areas. While these solutions formed the basis for the development of solutions portfolio, these solutions were not the extent of the solutions collection effort. As solutions were developed and reviewed, additional solutions as well as variants of solutions candidates were added for consideration.

STRATIFICATION OF OPTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES

To gain insight into the diversity of the solution approaches, the CWG divided them according to implementation strategy. For each solution, the CWG determined how that solution could best be implemented using a set of eight criteria that reflected the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTmLPF-P) criteria. For many solutions, implementation required application of multiple criteria.

For the *Networking* gap category, 32 options or alternatives were identified to close one or more gap causes. The implementation strategies for the solutions aligned to DOTmLPF-P as follows:

- Doctrine–21 solutions
- Organization–6 solutions
- Training–25 solutions
- Materiel–12 solutions
- Leadership–21 solutions
- Personnel–11 solutions
- Facilities–2 solutions
- Policy–24 solutions.

For *Information Transparency*, 27 options or alternatives applied to one or more gap causes. The implementation strategies aligned as follows:

- Doctrine–17 solutions
- Organization–5 solutions
- Training–21 solutions
- Materiel–11 solutions
- Leadership–17 solutions
- Personnel–10 solutions
- Facilities–0 solutions
- Policy–20 solutions.

For *Requirements Determination*, 15 options or alternatives applied to one or more gap causes. The implementation strategies aligned as follows:

- Doctrine–6 solutions
- Organization–0 solutions
- Training–7 solutions
- Materiel–6 solutions
- Leadership–8 solutions
- Personnel–3 solutions
- Facilities–0 solutions
- Policy–12 solutions.

For *Resource Identification and Tracking*, 18 options or alternatives applied to one or more gap causes. The implementation strategies aligned as follows:

- Doctrine–10 solutions
- Leadership–9 solutions
- Organization–2 solutions
- Personnel–5 solutions
- Training–9 solutions
- Facilities–2 solutions
- Materiel–9 solutions
- Policy–13 solutions.

For *Governance*, 20 options or alternatives applied to one or more gap causes. The implementation strategies aligned as follows:

- Doctrine–13 solutions
- Leadership–14 solutions
- Organization–7 solutions
- Personnel–5 solutions
- Training–11 solutions
- Facilities–2 solutions
- Materiel–7 solutions
- Policy–18 solutions.

Finally, for *Metrics*, 20 options or alternatives applied to one or more gap causes. The implementation strategies aligned as follows:

- Doctrine–11 solutions
- Leadership–11 solutions
- Organization–7 solutions
- Personnel–4 solutions
- Training–10 solutions
- Facilities–1 solutions
- Materiel–6 solutions
- Policy–17 solutions.

This stratification of options and alternatives represents the ideas that were proposed as potential approaches to address underlying capability gap causes. As such, these options and alternatives represent a starting point for the development of solutions and do not necessarily represent the actual solutions recommended for adoption. Finally, this stratification of options and alternatives indicates that non-materiel solutions may effectively resolve many or all capability gaps.

Assessment of Costs and Risks

CWG members assigned a cost and risk category to each of the identified solutions; categories were high, medium, and low. Assigning those costs and risks was subjective and designated by the contributing CWG member. However, this assessment phase provided an initial indication of difficulty and resources associated with the implementation of each solution.

The vast majority of the assessments fell into the medium to low categories. For Networking, Governance, and Metrics solutions, approximately 80 percent of the solutions were assessed at medium to low in both difficulty and costs for each capability category. For Information Transparency solutions, difficulty and costs were assessed at 84 percent and 87 percent medium to low, respectively. For both Requirements Determination and Resource Identification and Tracking, only two solutions were identified as having high difficulty and high costs. These assessments further indicate that the contributors consider most of the solutions to be executable within the current operational and fiscal environment.

Development of Solutions Portfolios

CBA User's Guide references to solutions portfolios recognize that many capability shortfalls are too complex to be adequately addressed within a single solution. The JS JIC is sufficiently complex that a single solution cannot address all facets of any capability gap. This is borne out both by the capability gap causes described under each capability gap and the number of solutions required to address the gap causes.

Using the candidate solutions, the CWG developed solutions portfolios to address the capability gap causes. In doing so, the CWG followed a general process:

- Determine candidate solutions that address underlying gap causes
- Evaluate solutions to determine the best solution both in terms of addressing the gap cause under consideration as well as other gap causes
- Assess the solutions to determine whether other not-yet-proposed solutions might better address the area

Using this general process, the CWG developed a small set of solutions that addressed the capability gap causes. With this smaller group, the CWG then evaluated the solutions as a portfolio to determine the effectiveness of the solutions in addressing the gap causes as well as achieving the assessment objective of 'Operate the JSE'. These solutions were tailored and modified to ensure that the gap causes and assessment objective were achieved.

As a key part of portfolio development, the CWG had to determine the joint supply business processes (JSBPs) as a basis for the solutions portfolios. The JSBPs establish the key activities that the JSE perform in order to provide effective supply support and to attain desired levels of POF. The CWG used JS JIC-described activities as a starting point for the review and determination of JSBPs. In addition to describing the JSBPs, the CWG also considered roles, responsibilities, and authorities required to realize the solutions described in the solutions portfolios and operate within the JSBP framework. The results of that CWG analysis are summarized in Chapter 6 on the Joint Staff Study Questions.

Finally, the CWG considered expected difficulty and costs. These considerations guided development of portfolios that either contained transformational capabilities that transcend difficulty and cost, or minimized difficulty and cost while addressing capability gaps.

This methodology guided development of solutions portfolios for all gap categories. With the completion of the final interim report, this process was repeated using the solutions portfolios from each interim report to develop a composite, integrated solutions portfolio that addressed the capability gaps and supported operating the JSE.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This solutions methodology sought to support development of solutions that addressed shortfalls and ensured the CBA assessment objectives were achieved. This methodology provided sufficient flexibility and adaptability to address a wide range of issues. Further, the methodology provided a mechanism to bound the issues but sufficient flexibility to allow a wide range of solutions approaches.

The CWG initially developed two solutions portfolios–one describing transformational solutions approach, and the other describing an evolutionary approach. However, over the course of the Solutions Phase deliberations and discussion, the CWG determined that the two portfolios were not sufficiently different to warrant separate treatment. Accordingly, the CWG decided to merge the transformational and evolutionary approaches into a single solutions approach. That approach is detailed in Chapter 5.

Chapter 5
Solutions Portfolio

To this point, the JS JIC CBA described the overall JSE and the approaches to identifying issues associated with the JS JIC and the approach to addressing, resolving, or mitigating those issues. The CWG, in developing solutions to individual capability gaps, determined these solution sets could be organized into one solutions portfolio.

In this chapter, the solutions portfolio is described in some detail in three sections. The first section contains an overview of the solutions portfolio, de-scribing the solutions from a systems and process perspective. The second section describes more fully the specific areas affected by the solutions. The third section describes the resource requirements associated with the solutions from a doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy perspective.

SOLUTIONS PORTFOLIO OVERVIEW

This solutions set addresses all capability areas and the underlying capability gap causes. In describing this portfolio, we identified the solutions in stages to provide a context and rationale for the solutions and associated decisions.

Before addressing the specific capability areas and underlying causes, the CWG reviewed the JS JIC concepts to clearly establish appropriate JSBP within which solutions would be applied. After considerable review and discussion, the CWG concluded that the following activities represent JSBPs:

- Anticipate supply demands with accuracy.
- Establish robust and reliable supplier networks.
- Provide visibility and control of materiel in storage and transit.
- Respond rapidly to demand triggers.
- Link to financial processes.

The JSBPs represent the key activities and tasks the JSE partners perform to provide effective supply support and attain the desired POF standard. While not explicitly described in the solutions below, these JSBPs guided CWG work when developing the solutions. A more detailed discussion of the JSBPs is contained in Chapter 6.

Governance

The CWG considered governance to be the critical enabler to realize any or all proposed solutions to joint supply capability gaps. The implementation of solutions and the management of associated change require action by organizations, offices, or individuals that have appropriate responsibility and authority. The approach for determining whether necessary responsibilities exist in current supply governance processes, or whether new governance roles or responsibilities are needed, required consideration of all capability gap categories and their proposed solutions. It also required consideration of the conceptual framework for JSE operations, the performance of JSBPs, and the analysis conducted to answer the Joint Staff–directed CBA questions. (The questions are addressed in Chapter 6).

There are two broad approaches to the management of supply commodities–traditional and tailored–summarized in the box below. Organizing supply management strategies around functions or capabilities enables us to optimize end-to-end business processes.

> The Needs Assessment Report (NAR) recognized two broad approaches to the management of supply operations,
>
> - A traditional inventory management model. Examples include Class II, IIIP, IV, VI, and IX
> - A management strategy tailored to a specific commodity or function. Examples include Class I, Class III (Bulk), and Class VIII
>
> This reflects that commodities are sourced through distinct supplier networks, each with their own approaches to sales, distribution, product identification, and reimbursement. Acquisition and distribution strategies have proven effective when organized or tailored around industry and /or government best practices.

The CWG considered several factors in governance. First, it noted the proposed CBA solutions primarily address functions associated with setting the conditions for JSE operations; that is, development of policies, processes, systems, and organizational relationships that enable networking of joint supply operations, visibility of requirements and assets, and sufficiency of supply resources. This suggests the command authority inherent to the JFC is sufficient to organize supply operations and affect coordination with JSE partners, provided that higher-level organizations, offices, or individuals have set the necessary policy, processes, and system conditions for operating the JSE.

The CWG observed that supply, in and of itself, is not a singular process. Supply management is performed in concert with functions that provide or sustain distinct functional capabilities that require supplies for their execution. These functions (mobility, maintenance, troop support, health services, etc.) drive supply demands and provide the context for planning and executing supply operations. This conceptual governance framework is reflected in Figure 5-1.

Figure 5-1. Capability-based Governance Framework



Materiel life cycle management processes typically conducted by each Service, as well as specific military activities and mission parameters, shape supply requirements and strategies for optimal acquisition and distribution. In this sense, supply is not managed as an end; rather, JSBPs are performed within the broader context of the JLEnt and the delivery and sustainment of functional capabilities required by the Services or the JFC.

CAPABILITY-BASED GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK

The CWG considered the JS JIC philosophies and multiple examples of successful JSBPs that are organized around common functions or capabilities (found in both traditional and tailored supply operations), which suggests the concept of process ownership should be applied along functional or capability lines. This brings together organizations and subject matter experts (SMEs) that have a common focus, shared understanding of capabilities and gaps, and familiarity with specific attributes of supplier networks, systems, distribution channels, and—perhaps most important—the needs of the customer.

The CWG noted that all CBA solutions require the development of collaborative frameworks to guide the policies, business processes, or systems necessary to

address supply capability gaps and promote interoperability and efficiency. In DoD, collaborative forums organized around common functions or capabilities would promote optimization of JSBPs across the Services and the networking of supporting systems within federated enterprise architecture. It would also identify the likely DoD organizations or offices as points of contact for collaboration with non-DoD JSE partners that may have similar constructs and common supply requirements.

The CWG concluded that a capability-based approach to organizing governance processes would be optimal when implementing CBA solutions and operating the JSE within the broader JLEnt framework. It further noted that the resulting governance processes must address underlying gap causes for both non-contingency and contingency situations. In other words, supply processes and systems should operate the same, regardless of operational environment or tempo. In that sense, the Services and their component commands, as well as the combatant commands and JFCs, are the DoD supply process customers. The CWG recognized that, in some circumstances, non-DoD partners may be DoD supply process customers within the JSE framework. This is an important distinction, and one that ensures the identified capability gaps are addressed over time and the supply processes retain their responsiveness and resiliency in support of the full spectrum of operational requirements.

GOVERNANCE ROLES

The CWG adopted the "bottom-up" functional approach illustrated in Figure 5-1. The working group concluded that supply is not a singular process. The organizational approach the CWG envisions is one in which DoD supply processes—both tailored and traditional approaches—are organized around a function or capability. From a practical standpoint, the framework aligns supply processes more closely with organizations that generate demands. For some commodities, this approach is established through the designation of DoD executive agents (e.g., medical, food, and bulk fuel). In the National Response Framework (NRF), responsibilities for resource support are generally aligned with appropriate organizations. For others, an alignment would need to be established. The repair parts commodity is exceptionally challenging, and may require differentiation among ground, air, and maritime support as well as life cycle management functions for the platforms that maintenance processes support.

To set conditions for operating the JSE, this governance framework would focus responsibilities and authorities on developing policies, JSBPs, and supporting systems to implement the solutions that address the underlying causes of supply capability gaps. Figure 5-2 illustrates this approach.

Figure 5-2. Functional Approach to Solution Implementation



To implement a capability-based governance framework, some organizations or offices must be assigned roles as focal points that organize the Services and provide structure and accountability for process improvements. In DoD, several models would support this approach, including executive agent, lead agent, and process owner. Additionally, this is analogous to approaches used in the NRF to designate primary and supporting roles. Consistent with the JS JIC philosophy of applying the concept of process ownership along functional or capability lines, these roles would guide development of common business processes and the functional requirements and data standards for information exchange to network JSBPs and systems.

The CWG recognizes the entities assigned governance roles would each require a formal, collaborative structure of key stakeholder representatives for each function or capability. Forums and processes for each line of business would include the necessary SMEs and be tailored to specific challenges and requirements of the supported functions or capabilities. To the extent possible, these should address the supply management aspects of all life cycle management processes from requirements development through operational sustainment, retrograde, reset, and disposition. Such governance structures should include collaboration at both action officer and leadership levels to maximize SME knowledge and collaboratively adjudicate issues.

JOINT SUPPLY ENTERPRISE SENIOR ENTITY

The current DoD supply processes do not attempt to balance or harmonize JSBPs across the Services or with non-DoD JSE partners. Any successful efforts are ad hoc and usually short-lived. The CWG concluded that, while a capabilities-based governance framework may optimize JSBPs in support of individual capabilities (such as maintenance, troop support and health services), it may not optimize overall supply support. In the absence of overall guidelines for networking and information standards to ensure shared situational understanding and decision support, there is risk that a capabilities-based approach would perpetuate real or perceived "stovepipes" of supply activity. The CWG concluded that an organizational entity is needed to provide a common vision and an integrating function for multiple, capability-oriented governance processes.

The CWG also recognized there currently are many and varied DoD senior logistics forums, including the following.

- Defense Logistics Board
- Joint Logistics Board
- Joint Deployment and Distribution Conference
- Council of Logistics Directors
- Joint Supply Chain Architecture (JSCA) Executive Advisory Committee
- Logistics Functional Capabilities Board.

Many of these forums address supply issues brought to their attention or otherwise address functions, initiatives, and issues that impact supply processes or requirements.

The CWG did not believe existing senior forums, as currently constituted and chartered, would be sufficient to effectively oversee implementation of solutions necessary to operate the JSE given the breadth and complexity of DoD supply functions and the changes in process and culture required. The JSE senior entity would require its own organizational structure sufficient to provide expertise and ongoing engagement with the functional or capability-based lines of business. This implies the need for either an organization with its own management structure to advocate for, coordinate with, and align JSBP improvements across functional lines—or a similar support structure established as a chartered entity under an existing senior forum.

This JSE senior entity would oversee and monitor the progress of JSBPs developed along functional lines. It would also ensure networking and information transparency solutions support a JSE operating picture within the broader JLEnt framework. It would guide the lead or executive agents in seeking opportunities

for cross-functional solutions and resource sharing to minimize redundancy and promote efficiency in DoD. The JSE senior entity should assess and monitor strategic issues with regard to supply availability and the overall integration of joint supply processes with distribution planning and operations. It should also monitor collaboration between DoD and other federal agencies in supply planning, mutual cooperation, and access to supplier networks, including Defense Support to Civil Authority (DSCA) and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief operations.

This JSE senior entity would not supplant the Services' authority. Rather, it would work with the Services and key JSE partners in a formal, collaborative framework to obtain agreements that shape and support Service supply processes, thus helping them operate effectively within the JSE framework and continuously improve joint supply performance.

The following are examples of responsibilities the CWG considered for the JSE senior entity:

- Serve as a senior level structure to engage senior DoD and JSE partner structures.
- Provide a common vision for joint supply processes.
- Serve as a collaborative partner to the Joint Distribution Process Owner and facilitate coordination of supply and distribution at the strategic level.
- Serve as an advocate to identify process deficiencies and engage organizations to resolve deficiencies and promote continuous process improvement.
- Facilitate alignment of functions and capabilities through charters or agreements.
- Foster greater coordination, synchronization, integration across supply processes and among JSE partners.
- Provide a means to coordinate key capability process improvements across supply processes.
- Coordinate development of a common metrics framework to enable measurement of supply performance across the JSE.

The JSE senior entity would maintain a strategic view, especially with respect to changes in DoD policies or procedures necessary to enable DoD supply operations to work effectively and efficiently with non-DoD partners in a "whole-of-government" or "whole community" response. It would advocate for collaborative planning and national or global assessments to identify potential supply constraints for critical items. It would also advocate for visibility of situations where multiple government and non-government organizations may compete for access to limited

supplier network capacity, and promote processes to facilitate establishing priorities that optimally meet JFC and Whole of Government/Community requirements.

Finally, the CWG noted that the JSE senior entity would provide a logical focal point to ensure coordination and synchronization of JSBPs with the distribution process owner (DPO). An effective relationship between distribution and supply processes, one that is pursued collaboratively and cooperatively, achieves synergies between these two core competencies and enables operational capability. This relationship, which is validated by the SCOR model, is shown in Figure 5-3.

Figure 5-3. Supply and Distribution Relationship



In setting the conditions for operating the JSE, the JSE senior entity would oversee development of standards for JSBP networking solutions that ensure interoperability with the Joint Deployment and Distribution Architecture (JDDA). Moreover, in development of JSBPs organized around functional or capability lines, the JSE senior entity would foster joint planning and networking processes that promote transparency of supply requirements in the context of operational implications and facilitate distribution planning and decisions. Figure 5-4 incorporates the JSE senior entity into the governance framework model.

Further assessment of the organizational approach to joint supply governance is addressed in the Joint Staff study questions evaluation in Chapter 6.

Figure 5-4. JSE Senior Entity



SUMMARY

The CWG concluded that a JSE governance framework should foster collaborative processes organized around common functions or capabilities in an overall structure for oversight and advocacy that provides strategic vision, pro-motes networking and information standards, and monitors the effectiveness and efficiency of DoD supply operations.

This governance approach is required to focus and direct implementation of business process, policy, and information system solutions necessary to transition from ‘status quo’ and enable operation of the JSE. These changes, especially the development of networking and information transparency solutions, would facilitate the capture and sharing of performance metrics for JSBPs across all capability categories.

Networking and Information Transparency

With the governance framework in place, the CWG determined that networking and information transparency formed the next logical step in the objective of operating the JSE. To jointly perform any operation, especially with JSE partners, information must flow freely with both format and content understood by senders

and receivers. The CWG considered these aspects to be foundational. From the NAR analysis, the CWG concluded that any means which makes moving understandable information among all JSE partners more practical would significantly improve opportunities to realize the JS JIC potential.

The CWG considered new development of major information technology solutions to be infeasible. Rather, this portion of the solutions portfolio proposes that the collaborative, capability-oriented governance framework would shape current supply management applications over a number of years to provide information transparency that supports improved JSBP. The intent is to take advantage of emerging capabilities for information sharing in a net-centric environment to achieve transformational outcomes in an evolutionary manner. This could include information exchange and transaction processing capabilities that facilitate networking, harmonization, and understanding of information among partners. This concept is illustrated in Figure 5-5.

Figure 5-5. Networked Supply Chain Process Flows



This figure displays the supply chain processes described earlier and illustrates how networked exchange and transaction processing solutions would provide a means to interface between DoD and other organizations.

The enterprise information exchange and transaction processing structure is notional and displayed to indicate a conceptual approach. Actual interplay of soft-

ware solutions needs to be analyzed, modified, and/or developed by appropriate information technology processes. The CWG intent is to identify the requirement for software solutions that allow and facilitate networking and information transparency between DoD and JSE partners by establishing minimal numbers of portals for information flow and, through those portals, a means to harmonize language and information content without disrupting any JSE partner applications.

Requirements Determination and Resource Identification and Tracking

The requirements determination and resource identification and tracking solutions build on the networking and information transparency solutions. From a supply process perspective, the requirements determination and resource identification and tracking capabilities are critical to the execution of joint supply business processes.

For requirements determination, existing systems have capabilities to collect demand information from JSE partners. Further, future enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems provide a broader range of capabilities for demand planning. Networking and information transparency solutions ensure Service and DLA systems can acquire demand information in an understandable form and use that information in demand planning.

One issue surrounding the requirements determination capability area is how to act on demand information from JSE partners. There are no issues associated with collecting demand information (both actual and anticipated) to gain situational awareness and to anticipate impacts on potential commodity suppliers. However, there are limitations as to when and how JSE partner demands can be used within the requirements determination processes to actually acquire assets.

The CWG determined that there were potential statutory and DoD regulatory challenges in this area, to include what organizations DoD can support through its requirements determination, retention, purchase, and funds transfer processes. As a result, the CWG concluded that the demand information for requirements determination processes would predominantly be used for situational awareness and executed within the confines of existing legal and DoD regulatory boundaries.

In addition to demand planning, the methodologies used to act on the demand information must be coordinated across the JSE. Though not everyone should use the same requirements determination methodology, a general understanding is required of how different requirements processes work. Additionally, the techniques used to anticipate demands should be shared to strengthen the community response to operational requirements. As a result, the CWG determined that the DoD needs to develop a formal collaborative framework to guide the development and application of analytic tools across the JSE operations. This framework would provide a set of forums in which to examine and discuss analytic tools across the JSE. In this environment, underlying analytic assumptions and analytic

approaches could be assessed, harmonized, and synchronized across the JSE community.

Resource identification and tracking is a complex process with shared responsibilities between the supply and distribution communities. Both information and physical assets are involved in these processes. Effectively accomplishing resource identification and tracking involves synchronizing both supply and distribution processes. Information and physical assets must be linked from the initial identification of need through fulfillment.

Additionally, resource identification and tracking within the DoD involves movement of physical assets using both government and non-government transportation channels. Increasing reliance on long-term contracts, prime vendor contracts, and service contracts that include supply support means that significant resources may move through non-government transportation channels.

The resource identification and tracking gap causes center on networking and information transparency issues that were addressed in those gap categories. However, the CWG concluded that the resource identification and tracking capability gaps needed to be addressed in greater detail within this section. Resource identification and tracking requires the capability to not only access the relevant information but also to employ the information in such a way as to support the Services, JFC, and other partners. These solutions address these fundamental gap causes.

Resource identification and tracking solutions require development of end-to-end information across supply and distribution processes to determine support effectiveness and provide a means to intervene and redirect assets as required. Redirection would occur within the capability-based functions. To achieve this capability, supply and distribution software applications would need to be coordinated to provide a common operating picture. Additionally, non-governmental supply process supporters (such as prime vendors and performance based logistics contractors) would need to be synchronized into this process.

Collectively, this represents CWG recognition that supply and distribution processes—DoD, JSE, and suppliers—while different, must operate in concert to provide total logistics support to the end user. In Figure 5-6, the requirements determination and resource identification and tracking solutions have been added to the networking and information transparency process map to illustrate the interrelationships of these systems.

Figure 5-6. Networked Supply Chain Process Flows with Requirements Capabilities



This figure illustrates the systems impacted in achieving the capabilities sought by the JS JIC. Connectivity between JSE partners and the DoD organizations is primarily through the networking and information transparency systems solution.

Common Metrics

Metrics provide the means to manage overall and specific operations, benchmark performance, and prioritize improvements. As such, metrics form the key capability to enable the governance structure to effectively function. In order to operate the JSE, DoD and JSE partners must employ a common approach to metrics. While common metrics across all commodities would be convenient, the CWG recognized that metrics must be tailored to accurately depict operational performance. As a result, the metrics should flow from a common framework but be tailored to support the unique operational characteristics of each capability or function.

Using this approach, the CWG developed solutions to address common metrics. The resulting solutions address all but one of the gap causes. The CWG concluded that Gap Cause 5 (i.e., “No mechanism exists that provides incentives to both supply and distribution activities to share accountability in meeting the needs and priorities of the customer and JFC”) will not be addressed in this solution. That

said, the solutions address the remaining gap causes through a combination of organizational and policy approaches.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain Integration (DASD[SCI]) has been leading the latest effort to develop metrics across DoD. The development framework corresponds to the SCOR model metrics framework. The CWG recognizes the value of using the SCOR model, a commercial benchmark and collection of best practices for supply chain management, and concluded the SCOR model should also be used to ensure the broad interests of the JSE partnership are recognized and incorporated. The governance structure and approach would leverage networking and information transparency solutions to enable collection of metrics data and development of a common operating picture.

SOLUTIONS PORTFOLIO POLICY AND APPLICATION IMPACTS

The previous section provided an overview of the solutions portfolio. Those solutions represent the means to address identified capability gaps and realize the potential of the JSE partnership. In describing the solutions, the CWG also established the prioritization for addressing the solutions. Governance, networking, and information transparency all must be established to effectively operate the JSE. Requirements determination, resource identification and tracking, and common metrics build on that initial foundation to provide the applications necessary to fully operate the joint supply business processes.

In this section, we discuss more fully the impacts associated with the solutions portfolio in relation to general policy, special policy, and application impacts.

Potential General Policy Impacts

Guidance and policy must change to both recognize the JSE and to provide the guidance and authority to include the JSE construct in the requirements determination process. Policies are necessary to establish relationships, conditions, and methodologies for an expanded approach to requirements determination; policies must also recognize effective and efficient business leveling rules to prevent treating every demand as an additive requirement. The more detailed descriptions of anticipated general policy impacts are described in the remainder of this section.

DOD BUSINESS PROCESS STANDARDS

Current DoD standards describe in general terms business processes in a DoD-centric manner. Most of the DoD supply policy guidance falls under the 4140 series of publications. In addition, key responsibilities for other players involved in resource identification and tracking (i.e., process owners and executive agents) are described in the 5100 series of publications. From these DoD policies, the Services develop Service-specific policies, guidance, and procedures to execute

supply processes within the DoD. In particular, the DoD guidance establishes the general methodologies for resource identification and tracking within the supply system. The policies tend to be general enough to allow for significant divergences among Services.

The DoD 5100-series publications address key organizational roles and functions, including those of DoD executive agents (EA) and process owners. Appropriate directives and instructions would be required to designate lead organizations within the capability-focused governance framework and set the responsibilities and expectations for collaborative development of optimal JSBP. Likewise, the 4140-series publications need to incorporate federal government standards and industry best practices in order to promote and facilitate development and execution of a collaborative governance structure across DoD and among JSE partners. Since this structure would operate in both contingency and non-contingency operations, the Services and combatant commands are all a part of this structure as participants and supported organizations.

The 4140 series of DoD policy documents need to incorporate federal government standards and industry best practices to facilitate improved operations among JSE members across all capability areas. In particular, DoD standards for supply business processes and information management, access, and sharing must be developed and published to provide formal guidance on DoD supply process and information management standards that include JSE constructs. Common metrics would be one key area requiring development. Further, supply processes increasingly rely on both government and commercial processes that apply to a U.S. government effort. Policies developed to address resource identification and tracking must include both processes. These DoD supply process and information management standards should provide sufficient guidance to strengthen all capability areas across DoD components and should be socialized with non-DoD partners to facilitate interoperability and cooperation in a collaborative enterprise framework.

Integral to key capabilities (such as resource identification and tracking) is the ability to direct and redirect assets. Effectively performing this direction (or redirection) requires a reassessment of the inventory investment and ownership construct. Both the Strategic Network Optimization (SNO) and Inventory Management and Stock Positioning (IMSP) initiatives are evaluating this aspect of ownership. The recommended policy approach is to capitalize inventory as far forward as possible. To facilitate rapid access and operation of resource identification and tracking capabilities, interagency and other similar agreements and processes need to be standardized and streamlined. In addition, JSE partners must be granted access to and, given appropriate parameters for, participate in DoD resource identification and tracking capabilities.

Finally, DoD policy must provide sufficient guidance to facilitate effective interplay between the supply communities among the JSE partners and between the supply and distribution communities and processes.

JOINT PUBLICATIONS LIBRARY

The Joint Publication Library contains a series of publications that particularly apply to the combatant commands and provide guidance for joint actions across the range of military operations. These publications center on the development and execution of plans in a variety of conditions and in support of a number of scenarios.

Once the concepts of a JLEnt and the JSE have become operational capabilities, the Joint Publication Library (series 4.0) should be amended to explicitly build in JLEnt concepts and include JSE partners. This would recognize the role for JSE partners and facilitate inclusion of JSE partners in planning. This should include an overview of the JLEnt and outline roles, responsibilities, and relationships. Specifics to be addressed include the construct for supporting and supported commands or organizations and JLEnt organization charts that reflect the DoD, intergovernmental organizations, other government agencies, and NGO interaction.

Revising the Joint Publication Library would incorporate the governance structure into the guidance for joint actions and allow the development and employment of common metrics in a contingency scenario. Specifically, joint publications must recognize the JSE construct and overlay the governance structure described in the previous section as well as key metrics, including the framework in which they are developed and managed.

DOD IT POLICY

Current DoD IT policies address the development and management of systems and software applications that support functional processes. These policies establish the methods for determining customers and clients that use systems and software applications as well as protocols for gaining access. As with other DoD policies, IT policies tend to be sufficiently broad to provide general direction. Service execution of the policies may lead to significantly divergent systems.

DoD policies must dictate development of solutions that make supply operations interoperable across DoD components and capable of working with non-DoD partners. DoD IT policies (such as connections and relationships among customers and organizations, business and financial processes, and associated logistics information systems) should incorporate federal government standards and industry best practices to improve supply support among JSE members. The policies should promote social networking across the JSE (as used in the JLEnt).

Potential Special Interest Policy Impacts

Specific areas of special interest cut across a wide range of policies and services and must also be addressed.

DEVELOP AND PUBLISH DOD POLICY AND COORDINATE WITH JSE PARTNERS FOR INTEROPERABILITY

Most DoD guidance related to demand planning for supply chain operations falls under the 4140 series of publications, while DoD policy for war reserve materiel (WRM) falls under DoDI 3110.06. In addition, the 5100 series of publications describe functions and responsibilities of DoD organizations and the designated roles for DoD executive agents and process owners. From these DoD policies, the Services develop Service-specific policies, guidance, and procedures to execute supply processes necessary to "organize, train, and equip" their respective forces. In particular, the DoD guidance establishes the general methodologies for the structure of requirements determination computations, including the stratification and retention of the resulting inventory.

These policies need to be broadened to address requirements determination within the JSE framework. For supply chain operations, the 4140 series publications should establish conditions in which JSE demand data should be collected, how JSE demand data may be used, and the methods that would allow inventory acquired in support of JSE plans to be retained.

These policies also need to establish the parameters for transparency of demand across the JSE, starting at the point of employment as well as in contingency planning factors. DoDI 3110.06 and the 5100 series revisions should promote collaborative processes for requirements computation and management across Services for common items. This would reduce inventory investment and provide flexibility in meeting contingency operations surge and sustainment requirements. Revision of these policies should incorporate both federal government standards and industry best practices to effectively address unique DoD as well as JSE support issues. Through these changes, individual supply processes can gain visibility over demands and maintain visibility over the resulting inventory or access to materiel through contingency contracts.

For example, DoDI 5101.15, DoD Medical Materiel Executive Agent (MMEA) Implementation Guidance (May 4, 2012) provides guidance for implementing DoDD 5101.9, DoD Executive Agent for Medical Materiel. It prescribes responsibilities and procedures for orchestrating effective and efficient medical supply chain support for the DoD, calling for close coordination among DLA, the services, and combatant commands. It ad-dresses common modeling and computation processes for Class VIII requirements determination, the alignment of system architecture, and the establishment of the Defense Medical Logistics Supply Chain Council (DMLSCC) as a joint forum for medical materiel strategies and initiatives, including the forecast, acquisition, and management of contingency requirements. The DMLSCC includes the Department of Health and Human Services, the lead federal agency for Health Services within the National Response Framework.

Finally, DoD policies must establish collaborative frameworks for requirements determination for specific functions or capabilities that generate supply demands. These policies would further establish the framework for collaboration with JSE partners. DoD policy should call for additional requirements forecasting for missions other than major combat operations, particularly for HA/DR and DSCA, and authorize materiel investment as needed to support such missions consistent with 2012 Defense Planning Guidance. Planning parameters should assess implications of providing support to partners or populations other than DoD, and encourage planning with JSE partners to enable whole-of-government and whole community risk assessment and optimal risk mitigation strategies development.

Revise Non-Traditional Supply Sourcing

Increasingly, DoD requires suppliers to deliver commodities to the end user as part of their contract obligation. In this approach, the contractor assumes responsibility for moving resources to the end user, using whatever means the contractor deems appropriate. Contractors are not normally obligated to provide resource identification and tracking visibility; rather, their task is simply to deliver the commodity to the end user.

Resources moved via contractor-arranged delivery require resource identification and tracking. The contracting instruments used to manage these sourcing approaches should be modified to task suppliers to provide this information. The degree of visibility should be determined through the JSE collaborative framework to manage resource identification and tracking. This visibility of resources should be directly linked to efforts that contribute to the U.S. government effort in a contingency.

Synchronize In-Transit Visibility with DoD and JSE Partners

In August 2011, the Secretary of Defense designated U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) as the in-transit visibility (ITV) lead proponent. Earlier (2006), USTRANSCOM had been designated as the DoD lead proponent for automatic identification technology (AIT). AIT and other data input mechanisms provide ITV when used in conjunction with DoD and commercial information systems and appropriate business processes.

Consistent with its role as the Distribution Process Owner, USTRANSCOM assembles the ITV community of interest to find solutions for strategic visibility issues, assist with theater distribution visibility issues, simplify and standardize logistics common operating pictures displaying in-transit visibility information, and simplify and improve shipping processes. As DoD's lead proponent for ITV, USTRANSCOM synchronizes efforts of all stakeholders involved in the integration of ITV, including finding solutions to problems that affect supply and transportation segments and overall supply and distribution performance. Designation as lead proponent for ITV further serves to produce coordinated data collection standards and processes, ensuring fully integrated AIT and ITV systems.

In coordination with ITV stakeholders (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, or ASD[L&MR], the Joint Staff, combatant commands (CCMDs), Services, DLA, and interested organizations), USTRANSCOM would draft an updated DoD ITV integration and implementation plan. The plan would describe the evolving defense operational and logistics environments and their relationship to ITV, and identify and discuss ITV-related initiatives, challenges, and technologies while validating the related responsible agencies and their roles. This would leverage existing ITV working groups and include on-going enterprise work to address and mitigate ITV challenges, gaps, and redundancies.

The Integrated Data Environment (IDE)/Global Transportation Network (GTN) Convergence (IGC) system would be the ITV system of record and would provide common integrated data and application services. Service and agency automated information systems provide essential movement data and interface with IGC, thereby enabling a common logistics picture, distribution visibility, and materiel asset or in-transit visibility.

Develop a Formal Collaborative Framework to Guide Resource Identification and Tracking across the JSE

Resource identification and tracking issues cut across supply and distribution communities. Numerous management structures address various facets of resource identification and tracking. ITV, order tracking, and other associated areas are addressed in various forums; however, these efforts tend to be internally focused and stove-piped within JSE organizations. Current policies do not capitalize opportunities for a coordinated, synchronized approach to resource identification and tracking across the JSE.

Develop a formal collaborative framework to guide resource identification and tracking across JSE operations.

This framework needs to involve current DoD resource identification and tracking efforts and be extended to JSE partners to facilitate a coordinated, synchronized approach across the JSE. Additionally, this framework must coordinate and synchronize with JSE partner bodies to fully achieve the resource identification and tracking capability in contingencies. For example, FEMA employs a Distribution Management Strategy Working Group (DMSWG)/Resource Management Group (RMG) to coordinate sourcing strategies. The collaborative framework must synchronize with groups such as these to fully realize resource identification and tracking capabilities across the JSE.

Develop a Formal Collaborative Framework to Guide the Collection and Application of JSE Operations Demand Information

DoD must develop a formal collaborative framework to guide the collection and application of JSE demand information. This framework should include the JSE

community and provide the basis for development of clear guidance that could be executed through policy changes or process applications by the DoD components. For example, FEMA employs DMSWG/RMG to address sourcing strategies. A collaborative framework would need to recognize and synchronize with similar JSE partner bodies. This framework would further support a collaborative approach toward identifying demands during contingencies, the methods to address demand, and the mechanisms required to execute these requirements.

Develop a Formal Collaborative Framework to Guide the Development and Application of Analytic Tools

DoD must develop a formal collaborative framework to guide development and application of analytic tools across the JSE operations. Analytic tools provide the basis for supply planning and execution. As a result, JSE collaboration and coordination concerning the content and planned development of analytic tools should improve supply process synchronization across the JSE. This framework would provide a set of forums to examine and discuss analytic tools from a JSE perspective. In this environment, underlying analytic assumptions and analytic approaches can be assessed, harmonized, and synchronized across the JSE community.

Develop a Formal Collaborative Framework to Manage Common Metrics across The JSE

Metrics development and employment cut across supply and distribution communities. A number of management structures in place address various facets of supply chain performance; however, these efforts tend to be internally focused and stove-piped within the DoD and JSE organizations. Current policies do not capitalize opportunities for a coordinated, synchronized approach to common metrics across the JSE.

The policy changes envisioned in DoD and joint publications should include the development and operation of a collaborative framework that develops, harmonizes, employs, and manages a common set of metrics. This collaborative framework should support the development of a common metrics architecture, consistent language, and general acceptance of a particular set of metrics as representing common approaches to supply support during contingencies. Additionally, this framework should serve as a JSE fusion center, harmonizing metrics “dashboards” across DoD and JSE partners. The structure of this framework should include membership from DoD and the JSE partners and provide a means to coordinate metrics across other functions such as distribution, maintenance, and contracting.

Develop Charters and Governance Documents

Charters and supporting governance documents establish the range of responsibilities for governance organizations. Key issues, such as membership, voting proto-

cols, management support, and conflict resolution, are normally contained in these documents.

Making changes to DoD and Joint publications is insufficient. These publications recognize and promote the governance structures; however, charters and supporting governance documents are needed to deal with the specifics of governing supply support activities. The charters must be sufficiently broad to allow for inclusion of JSE partners into the governance mechanisms as governance partners. The charters and supporting governance documents must included methods for supporting conflict resolution, both in preparation for contingencies and during actual contingencies. Finally, these documents should establish the criteria for promulgation of governance decisions as well as feedback from DoD and JSE partners concerning institutional acceptance and implementation.

Potential System Impacts

The capabilities required to realize the potential of the JS JIC would affect applications. The CWG, in reviewing the potential effects, recognized that as a body of functional experts it does not possess the requisite understanding of applications development to describe specific application impacts. As a result, CWG efforts in this area focused on identifying application capabilities necessary to resolve identified process gaps.

The CWG determined that planned application improvements in requirements determination and resource identification and tracking should provide the necessary inventory visibility and asset tracking capabilities for those organizations served by those applications. Applications that link JSE supply applications and facilitate the flow of information to all authorized parties are lacking. Applications with capabilities that move the data and provide the capability to translate data from a variety of sources into understandable and executable information for each relevant JSE participant are needed to overcome this deficit.

The CWG summarized the applications impacts into the following areas:

- Access points to the supply processes should be minimized. Ideally, one entry point should provide authorized users with access to supply applications, as determined by authorizations.
- Access should enable authorized DoD users to share information freely within DoD.
- Access to non-DoD JSE partners should not require special equipment but should require authorizations.
- Access should facilitate JSE partner participation to include the sharing of information between JSE partners and DoD organizations, as authorized.

The CWG identified a series of illustrative applications (see Appendix D) that may offer the capabilities needed to implement JS JIC concepts. The CWG also identified applications that cut across the spectrum of supply support and include transportation and distribution initiatives.

DOTmLPF-P Requirements

This section describes the resource requirements associated with the solutions portfolio from a DOTmLPF-P perspective. These solutions employ a mix of materiel and non-materiel solutions. Materiel solutions reside in the systems while non-materiel solutions would involve refinement of law, policies, and processes. A description of the requirements is summarized below.

Doctrine

DoD, Joint, and Service/Agency doctrine would need to be revised to incorporate the JSE construct, particularly with the need to incorporate non-DoD JSE partners. Further, the functions, roles, responsibilities, and authorities as well as the joint supply business processes would need to be clarified in doctrine.

Organization

The proposed governance solutions would affect organizations. There would be a requirement to add or change organizational structure, responsibilities, or forums to implement the proposed solutions.

Training

Training requirements would result from the incorporation of the JSE in doctrine and policy, as well as changes to joint supply business processes. The implementation of governance solutions would also drive training requirements with regard methods used to coordinate and collaborate across the JSE, particularly with regard to non-DoD JSE partners.

Materiel

Materiel implications of proposed solutions would leverage emerging capabilities for information sharing in a net-centric environment. The CWG proposed an approach to shape development of information applications to achieve transformational outcomes in an evolutionary manner.

Leadership and Education

Implementation of governance processes for collaboration across the JSE must be addressed by professional education of leaders charged with executing those roles.

Personnel

The proposed solutions would require minimal additional personnel above current or planned manning levels, similar to the DPO construct. The development of JSBPs may result in different ways of using institutional capabilities to support operations.

Facilities

The proposed solutions are not envisioned to affect facilities.

Policy

DoD, Joint, and Service/Agency policies would need to be revised to address implementation of proposed solutions. Policy would be required to designate governance roles. In particular, the DoD 5100- and 4140-series issuances would need to incorporate JSE constructs. These actions should be performed in concert with the Joint Concept for Logistics implementation plans.

CONCLUSIONS AND CAVEATS

This solutions portfolio addressed the capability gaps and underlying causes within the context of the JSBP. The transformational nature of the networking and information transparency solutions would require some software development, but the solutions should provide a better approach to collaboration across the JSE.

As noted in the governance area, the solutions would affect each commodity differently. Some commodities are already tailored to specific communities. Others, such as repair parts, serve a number of functions and missions and do not lend themselves to immediate adoption of the solutions. For this kind of commodity, the solutions may need to be adjusted to provide the best support to the end users while meeting the spirit of the solutions concepts.

This solutions portfolio addresses both assessment objectives outlined in the initial chapter. The solutions provide the means to operate the JSE; they also address the study questions raised by the Joint Staff. The detailed discussion of those study questions is presented in Chapter 6.

Chapter 6
Joint Staff Study Questions

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved the JS JIC on 21 April 2010 and validated the recommendation to conduct a CBA for operating the JSE. In establishing the scope of the CBA, the Logistics Functional Capabilities Board (Log FCB)–approved study areas were synthesized into three Joint Staff study questions. Subsequent to the first CBA wargame in June 2010, senior leaders overseeing the CBA process modified these study questions as follows:

1. What are the joint supply business processes (JSBPs)?
2. What are the functions, roles, responsibilities and authorities (FR2A) that will enable success in the JSBP?
3. Is the Joint Supply Process Owner (JSPO) an effective solution for supply capability gaps?

The CWG recognized these questions are all related. To develop the answers, the CWG constructed a logic framework to illustrate their interconnectivity. Figure 6-1 displays the complete construct.

Figure 6-1. Composite Process Flowchart



This model is deconstructed in the following paragraphs to explain how the CWG defined terms and answered the study questions. Figure 6-2 begins at the end of the model. It describes the key outcomes to be achieved by JSE partners and customers operating within the JSE framework as stated in the JS JIC's central idea.

Figure 6-2. CBA and JSE Outcomes



Through the CBA process, the CWG considered current supply operations and identified joint supply capability gaps and their underlying causes, which it documented in the NAR. In this report, the CWG developed solutions to address those gaps and enable the capabilities necessary to operate the JSE. Implementing those solutions would require actions performed in either existing or new roles and responsibilities. This leads to the study questions and identification of the business processes performed within the JSE framework that would produce these outcomes, and the roles and responsibilities required to implement the solutions and operate the JSE.

STUDY QUESTION 1: JOINT SUPPLY BUSINESS PROCESSES

What are the joint supply business processes?

The CWG introduced the first study question in its review of the JSE concept in Chapter 2. The CWG began its assessment by defining the term, business processes, and reviewing the JSC JIC to identify where JSBPs are described.

Definitions

In answering this study question, the CWG defined business processes as, "a collection of related management, operational, and supporting activities and tasks that provide a specified service or product." Within the context of the JS JIC, JSBP comprise the end-to-end value stream of activities and tasks that provide supplies needed to meet prioritized requirements. While the JS JIC does not specifically identify JSBP, it does describe the broad, interrelated sets of activities and tasks that must be accomplished to operate the JSE and achieve the central idea of the JS JIC. The CWG concluded that these sets of activities and tasks are the JSBP:

- *Anticipate supply demands with accuracy.* The need to "plan, capture, and predict requirements" is reflected in the JS JIC central idea. The NAR considers requirements determination as one of the six joint supply gap categories, noting the lack of tools and integrated processes to anticipate customer needs and translate them into supply sup-port actions. The ability to accurately predict supply requirements is essential for assessing risks related to supply availability, developing access to sufficient materiel, planning sufficient capacity for storage and distribution, and effectively responding to prioritized requirements.

- *Establish robust and reliable supplier networks.* The capability to establish and manage supplier networks is a separate Tier III function of Supply and outside the scope of this CBA; however, the capability to manage supplier networks is directly related to JSBPs that are within the scope of operating the JSE. Specifically, the capability to accurately forecast supply requirements is essential for planning and establishing sufficient access to supplier capacity, which in turn is necessary to enable timely and reliable response to customer demands. The NAR documented gaps relating to JSE relationships with supplier networks, including insufficient visibility of information from industry sources and lack of standards for commercial product identification.

- *Provide visibility and control of materiel in storage and in transit.* Providing visibility and control of materiel encompasses a set of business processes addressed in another Tier III function of Supply (inventory management) that is fundamental to the JS JIC's central idea with regard to the conduct of joint supply operations. It also highlights the inextricable link between joint supply and distribution processes. The JS JIC calls for JSE-wide visibility of supply resources and the ability, within a collaborative frame-work, to optimally apply those resources in meeting operational needs and priorities. The NAR recognized gaps in resource identification and tracking and governance, noting that joint supply operations may not be sufficiently networked and controlled to match resources to highest priority needs and respond quickly and reliably to changes in operational conditions or JFC, Service, or partner priorities.

- *Respond rapidly to demand triggers.* Responding to demand triggers, consistent with operational needs and priorities, represents another set of business processes central to the conduct of joint supply operations addressed in the Tier 3 Supply function for "inventory management." The JS JIC calls for near real-time, JSE-wide visibility of supply demands and the ability, within a collaborative framework, to prioritize them for timely and reliable fulfillment in accordance with operational needs. The JS JIC also calls for the ability to measure JSE performance in meeting objectives for POF and SJSR. The NAR recognized gaps associated with resource identification and tracking as well as metrics and governance, noting that joint supply operations may not be sufficiently networked and controlled to match requirements quickly and reliably to optimal sources and enable timely measurement of JSE supply performance.

- *Link to financial processes.* The set of JSBPs addressing the financial aspects of managing supply assets, responding to customer demands, and ensuring financially compliant records has a significant impact on supply operations. They also impact the complexity and cost of supporting supply management systems. The JS JIC calls for the ability to fulfill supply requirements for any JSE partner from the optimal source to meet operational conditions and priorities. The NAR recognized gaps associated with net-working and noted that differences in financial rules, processes, and systems were often cited as barriers to timely and efficient supply support in both wargames.

Figure 6-3 adds the definition of business processes and identification of JSBPs to the study question logic flow.

Figure 6-3. Joint Supply Business Processes



Conclusion—Study Question 1

These JSBPs begin with planning, include sourcing or making, delivering, and returning (when required), and end with accurate payments, reimbursements, and posting of appropriate financial records. The CWG noted that these activities can be related to the SCOR model for supply process mapping; however, the CWG determined that describing them as JSBPs provides a more useful means of approaching the activities required to operate the JSE. The CWG also noted that the scope of JSBPs as described in the JS JIC "spans from the source of supply to the point of employment–the point where supplies are consumed."

Implementing the CBA solutions would enable joint supply partners and customers to perform JSBPs within a JSE framework to achieve the outcomes envisioned by the JS JIC. The roles and responsibilities necessary to implement these solutions and to operate the JSE is the subject of the second study question.

STUDY QUESTION 2: FUNCTIONS, ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND AUTHORITIES

What are the functions, roles, responsibilities, and authorities that will enable success in the JSBPs?

Within the context of the JS JIC CBA, functions, roles, responsibilities, and authorities refers to the responsibilities and authorities assigned to organizations, offices, or individuals to control or perform functions necessary to accomplish JSBP. Where the JS JIC was relatively clear as to JSBPs, the FR2A were not as sharply focused. As a result, this section describes FR2A development in some detail. To ensure clarity and consistency, the CWG reviewed the definitions of these terms.

Definitions

In DoD, *functions* are defined as duties, responsibilities, missions, or tasks assigned to an individual, office, or organization (JP 1-02). *Roles* are the broad and enduring purposes for which Services and commands are created (JP 1). Within the JS JIC context, role may be considered a function or part of an assigned operation or process and synonymous with duties, missions or tasks. *Responsibility* is defined as the obligation to carry forward an assigned task to a successful completion. The DoD dictionary does not define *authority*; however, it is commonly defined as the right to control or command or the power to determine, adjudicate, or otherwise settle issues or disputes. Assigned *responsibilities* carry the *authority* to direct and take the necessary action to ensure success (JP 1-02). With these definitions, the CWG concluded that roles and responsibilities are inherent in the term functions and need not be further explained separately.

While the DoD dictionary does not define *authority*, but it does define types of authority and control inherent to various roles and responsibilities, such as command, coordinating authority, and directive authority for logistics. In DoD, authority is derived from statute, DoD policy directives, and policies, regulations, and orders of the DoD components. Likewise, authority, roles and responsibilities of non-DoD organizations are derived from applicable statutes establishing other government agencies (e.g., FEMA, GSA, and HHS) or foundational charters for non-governmental entities. Aside from formal, multinational military relationships, DoD organizations almost never exercise command or operational control over non-DoD entities.

The CWG reviewed the JS JIC using these definitions and also considered FR2A in the context of the solutions. The relationship of the terms comprising FR2A is reflected in Figure 6-4.

Figure 6-4. Functions, Roles & Responsibilities



In other words, assigned functions convey roles and responsibilities to perform activities and tasks that comprise JSBPs. Assignment of responsibilities also conveys the requisite authority to direct or take necessary action to ensure success. This requisite authority conveyed with a responsibility is derived from the statute, policy, or command directive that authorizes its assignment.

This explanation completes the logic reflected in Figure 6-5 within the context of the terms defined, above. Designated organizations, offices, or individuals are assigned functions that convey roles and responsibilities to control or perform activities and tasks that comprise the JSBPs. Through the CBA process, the CWG identified multiple capability gaps in current supply operations, and pro-posed solutions that should enable the outcomes reflected in the JS JIC central idea. The implementation of these solutions would impact roles and responsibilities (functions) for the control or performance of JSBP.

Figure 6-5. Composite Process Flowchart



The CWG noted that wording in the JS JIC sometimes implies that the JSE itself accomplishes the outcomes reflected in its central idea; however, the JSE is defined as an "enabled network of joint supply partners and customers" and is not a singular organization. The JSE itself, therefore, cannot be assigned roles and responsibilities such as, "integrate or synchronize JSE processes and capabilities" or "network joint supply operations." The solutions required to achieve these outcomes require the execution of FR2A by organizations or individuals operating within a JSE framework. This leads to a discussion of how FR2A for JSBP are performed in current supply operations, and what new or expanded responsibilities may be required to implement CBA solutions.

FUNCTIONS, ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND AUTHORITIES OVERVIEW

During an early phase of the CBA process, the CWG conducted a survey of DoD and key JSE partners to identify the FR2A associated with supply operations conducted by their respective organizations. This survey listed 80 supply functions found in the JS JIC and asked the respondents to indicate the levels to which these could be performed within their organization. This initial survey included National Guard Bureau (NGB), FEMA, GSA, and HHS, which are key organizations with significant supply responsibilities under the National Response Framework (NRF).

The survey results supported the following conclusions regarding the accomplishment of supply FR2A in current supply operations:

- Multiple organizations perform supply FR2A at various levels within their organization;
- All of the FR2A responsibilities listed in the survey were addressed at least partially within current DoD alignments; however, no organizations were identified that fully addressed any of the FR2A.

The CWG observed that FR2A for supply operations performed by JSE partners are shaped by their respective missions, policies, and operating concepts. As noted in the NAR, supply processes are also organized around acquisition and distribution strategies appropriate to specific commodities or supported functional capabilities. Assigned responsibilities include authority and resources to accomplish assigned functions, as well as accountability for how those resources are used and how well the functions are performed.

The CWG also observed that within DoD, authorities that direct and measure the performance of supply functions generally follow service and agency command channels within the policy purview of the OSD and service staff. Varying formal partnership levels cross Service and agency lines for development and conduct of *joint* supply processes and systems. Likewise, there are varying levels of coordination between DoD supply organizations and other government agencies, primarily focused on planning for whole of government or whole community operations.

The CWG sought to determine whether the FR2A represented in current supply operations would be sufficient to implement the solutions identified and recommended through the CBA process, or whether new responsibilities or delegations of authority are required.

FUNCTIONS, ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND AUTHORITIES ANALYSIS

The CWG conducted a second survey to gain insight into the FR2A that would be associated with implementing solutions proposed for the first four gap categories. For each proposed solution, CWG members were asked to identify the type of function involved in implementation, whether there is currently an organization or entity with the responsibility and authority to direct the necessary changes, and whether the scope of existing authority is sufficient to implement JSE solutions within DoD as well as across both government and non-government partners. Appendix D summarizes key results from this survey.

This survey revealed several significant conclusions. First, most of the solutions proposed in this CBA addressed functions associated with system development, business process development and oversight, and policy development. Second, while about half of respondents indicated that existing responsibilities and author-

ities may be sufficient to implement proposed solutions within DoD, most responses clearly indicated that existing responsibilities and authorities are insufficient to extend solutions from DoD to other government and non-governmental partners. Finally, across all proposed solutions, just under half of responses suggested a desired DoD role, such as an executive agent, process owner, or lead federal agency.

The JS JIC concluded that functions and authorities exercised in current supply operations would be insufficient to accomplish the JSBP changes required to achieve the intent and purpose of the JSE. The CWG agreed this survey supported that JS JIC conclusion with respect to implementation of some solutions. These are solutions where no current organization has the necessary responsibilities to address the solution, or where the responsibilities and authorities exist but are insufficient in scope. Examples of the kinds of responsibilities required include:

- Develop new, joint IT tools (e.g., information exchange).
- Develop system change descriptions and coordinate IT changes in existing systems to improve networking of joint supply processes across JSE partners.
- Establish and execute business processes to populate and manage data within new IT tools.
- Develop and coordinate policies to incorporate federal government standards and industry best practices into business processes and supporting IT systems across JSE partners.
- Develop and coordinate policies to improve information transparency across DoD components and their socialization with non-DoD partners.
- Coordinate development of policy, business process, protocols, and security issues necessary to facilitate access for IA, MN and NGO partners and training requirements to promote access of all JSE partners to JSE information tools.
- Develop or coordinate development of doctrine to recognize the role for JSE partners and facilitate inclusion of JSE partners in planning in accordance with the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance review.
- Establish and operate formal collaborative frameworks.

While the feasibility assessment of the solution portfolios concluded that none of the solutions proposed for the first four gap categories imposed significant technical difficulty or risk, the examples described above would certainly require expertise, time, and resources. In addition, there must be some organization, office, or individual that has the responsibility and authority to direct, coordinate, or oth-

erwise enable the implementation of solutions required to execute JSBP within the construct of "Operate the JSE."

The CWG next considered alternatives for establishing the roles & responsibilities necessary to implement the CBA solutions.

FUNCTIONS, ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND AUTHORITIES ALTERNATIVES

The CWG identified two broad approaches for establishing FR2A related to development of policy, business process, and systems:

- Create new joint supply roles, responsibilities, and authorities, or change the scope of existing ones.
- Channel existing roles, responsibilities, and authorities through a formal collaborative framework

Create or Change Joint Supply Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities

New authorities can be established by statute, policy or directive (e.g., command assignment). In addition, the roles and responsibilities of existing command or DoD staff elements could be expanded within the limits of their statutory authorities. This approach entails investing a singular individual, office, or organization with the role, responsibility and requisite authority to integrate or synchronize JSBPs and establish requirements and standards for supporting IT systems. Examples of roles defined in the DoD dictionary that could convey authority include the following:

- Command
- Coordinating authority
- Lead federal agency
- Executive agent
- Process owner
- Lead agent
- Directive authority for logistics
- Distribution manager
- Single integrated theater logistics manager.

The advantage of this approach is it is straightforward and appears to provide a single entity for directing policy, process and system changes necessary to achieve the purpose of the JSE. Each of these types of authority has examples of success (e.g., bulk fuel); however, the complexity of joint supply operations and the JSBPs associated with specific commodities and functional capabilities make it difficult for a single organization or entity to execute. No current organization has sufficient breadth of expertise to orchestrate all JSBPs with sufficient focus on distinctive requirements and characteristics of every commodity and supported function.

Channel Existing Authorities through a Formal Collaborative Framework

Formal, collaborative structures can be established by statute, directive, or mutual agreement. This approach brings individuals, offices, or organizations–and their inherent authorities - together in some type of formal, collaborative forum or process. These are designed to achieve consensus or to monitor performance with the purpose of each participant adjusting actions to achieve agreed upon goals and objectives. Examples include formally chartered boards or councils as well as formal agreements, such as IA or performance-based agreements (PBA). The following are examples of joint collaborative forums and processes:

- Joint Logistics Board
- DHS Executive Logistics Council (DELC)
- Council of Logistics Directors
- Defense Medical Logistics Supply Chain Council.

The advantage of this approach is that it avoids conflicts associated with realigning functions and resources and appears to be an efficient method of promoting collaboration and consensus. It may be the only way to address formal collaboration between DoD and non-DoD partners. On the other hand, collaborative forums such as boards and councils have limited utility in controlling operations or responding to rapid changes in missions or operations. They are more deliberate and less adaptive in nature. Agreements such as IA and PBA may be useful in establishing complementary responsibilities and resource sharing for specific functions or operations, and tend to be very focused in scope to specific commodities, functions, or circumstances. Finally, a major limitation of formal joint boards is that outside of formal acquisition program management processes, they seldom provide or control resources.

FUNCTIONS, ROLES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES ENABLING JSBP SUCCESS

The CWG drew from both approaches to develop the functions, roles, responsibilities, and authorities necessary to enable JSBP success. Using the terminology as defined, above, *functions* describe the organizational constructs for the performance of *roles and responsibilities*. The requisite *authority* to perform designated functions is conveyed with the responsibilities that are assigned to that function.

CWG identified the JSBP as the five broad, interrelated sets of activities and tasks identified in the JS JIC that that must be accomplished to operate the JSE. The functions and authorities for JSBP success are those that set the conditions for the JSE to promote POF and SJSR. In its analysis, above, the CWG's surveys reflected that current functions and authorities would be insufficient to implement solutions and accomplish JSBP changes required to resolve joint supply capability

gaps and enable supply operations partners to interact as an *enabled network*. Therefore, the CWG concluded that the FR2A for success in JSBPs are those necessary to implement solutions that resolve capability gaps and set the conditions for successful operation of the JSE

In development of governance solutions (Chapter 5), the CWG noted that supply processes are performed in concert with the distinct functional capabilities that drive supply requirements and provide the context for planning and executing supply operations (i.e., mobility, maintenance, troop support, health services, etc.). The CWG concluded that a capability-based approach to organizing governance processes–under the oversight of an overall senior entity - would be optimal to implement CBA solutions and operate the JSE within the broader JLEnt framework. As described in the solutions portfolio, the CWG concluded that some organizations or offices must be assigned roles as focal points for organizing the Services along capability lines of business and providing structure and accountability for JSBP improvements. The CWG also recognized that the entities assigned governance roles would each require a formal, collaborative structure representing the key stakeholders for the function or capability.

The CWG noted that designation of DoD Executive Agents is one example that has notably improved DoD supply acquisition and distribution processes along specific commodity lines. Executive or Lead agent designations may not be appropriate for other functionally-oriented efforts to develop JSBP; however, lessons learned with regard to successes and limitations of EA designations could be incorporated into implementing directives assigning roles within the governance framework. Implementing instructions would also establish collaborative forums necessary to represent partner and stakeholder interests, promote consensus, and provide formal mechanism to raise unresolved issues or alternatives to senior leadership.

An example of successful capability-focused, collaborative governance for developing JSBPs is the approach for medical materiel (Class VIII) required by the Military Health System (MHS). This is illustrated in Figure 6-6.

Figure 6-6. Capability-Based Governance Approach

Management of medical materiel (Class VIII) provides an example of a capability-based approach to supply management. Class VIII demands are driven by specific needs of health care and critical to the quality and cost of medical outcomes in all operational environments. Consequently, medical materiel management is performed within medical logistics capabilities of the jointly integrated and interoperable Military Health System (MHS).

While medical logistics capabilities remain under the control of the Military Services, they operate within a collaborative defense medical logistics (DML) enterprise framework in partnership with DLA, which serves as the DoD Executive Agent for Medical Materiel. Within this collaborative construct, JSBPs have been developed around industry best practices for acquisition and distribution of medical commodities. This tailored business framework is characterized by MHS organizations ordering and receiving directly from commercial suppliers, the use of commercial standards electronic data interchange (EDI) and product identification, and clinician selection of materiel. A suite of defense standard applications support Class VIII supply processes for all materiel life cycle management functions delivering and sustaining military medical capabilities. Medical materiel business strategies, processes, and systems support the continuum of health care from battlefield to definitive capabilities.

A collaborative, DML enterprise governance structure manages business process development and information management with oversight by both MHS and DLA leadership. It also fosters joint collaboration in Class VIII requirements determination and planning for medical logistics support to contingency operations. The collaborative structure includes representation by the Department of Health and Human Services (HSS), which is the lead for health services (ESF-8) in the NRF.

The efficacy of the acquisition and distribution strategy to support military healthcare across the range of operations has been validated by multiple assessments (including LMI, 2003, 2007, 2010; RAND 2010, 2012)

Conclusion—Study Question 2

In answer to the second study question, the CWG concluded the FR2A that will *enable success in the JSBPs* are those that would provide a capability-based governance framework to implement solutions and set the conditions for successful operation of the JSE. This joint supply governance framework would consist of two key functions:

- Capability-based focal points for organizing the Services along capability lines of business and providing structure and accountability for JSBP improvements
- A joint supply senior entity.

This blends the alternative approaches for establishing functions and authorities necessary to implement the CBA solutions. Consistent with the proposed govern-

ance solutions, it provides designated organizational entities to serve as the focal point for *collaborative* development of policies, JSBPs, and supporting systems along functional or capability lines. These roles would also provide logical DoD focal points for collaboration with non-DoD JSE partners.

The need for a Joint Supply Senior Entity leads to the third study question regarding the role of a JSPO.

STUDY QUESTION 3: JOINT SUPPLY PROCESS OWNER ASSESSMENT

Is the JSPO an effective solution for supply capability gaps?

The CWG concluded that a JSPO (or an entity called by another name, such as a Supply Enterprise Manager), appropriately constructed and focused, and established within the senior entity function construct, would be an effective solution for supply capability gaps.

The role of a JSPO is a leading theme of the JS JIC solutions framework, which envisions "a JSE coordinated by a JSPO with proper authority to integrate or synchronize and subsequently optimize joint supply processes, capabilities, and the application of resources…" Although the JROC approved the JS JIC, senior logistics leaders did not universally accept the need for a JSPO as described in the JS JIC. Consequently, the approved CBA study areas include the question, "Is the JSPO an effective solution for supply capability gaps?"

The CWG recognized this question has two elements:

- Are JSPO responsibilities and authorities described in the JS JIC fully appropriate; that is, would a JSPO with more focused responsibilities and authorities have more utility?
- Is a JSPO necessary; that is, is an organization with authority "to integrate or synchronize and subsequently optimize joint supply processes, capabilities, and the application of resources" needed to resolve the joint supply gaps?

JSPO Overview

The JS JIC first describes the role of a JSPO within the context of its proposed solutions to the military problem:

> The JSPO has the responsibility for coordinating, sustaining, improving, and proposing joint supply processes. The JSPO is accountable for the outcomes of those processes. The JSPO shall advocate improvements across all JSE partners and customers for optimized effectiveness and efficiency.

This description is based on the definition of Process Owner in JP 1-02, which was derived from JP 4.0, Joint Logistics, regarding designation of a Distribution Process Owner (DPO) and a Joint Deployment Process Owner (JDPO). In both cases, DoD unified commands (USJFCOM (since disestablished) and USTRANSCOM) were designated by DoD Directive to lead collaborative efforts to improve processes across Services in order to improve support to supported JFCs and their components.

In describing its solutions, the JS JIC further delineates JSPO responsibilities as follows:

- Operate the JSE–This capability includes those tasks detailed under the Operate the JSE capability in the JS JIC Appendix C, Table of Capabilities, Tasks, and Measures.

- Assess the risk and implications of national level decisions from global, regional and theater perspectives. Advise national level authorities on the impact of decisions on global materiel readiness (e.g., repositioning supplies from one Joint Operating Area (JOA) to another). Maximize the effective application of limited resources.

- Establish or revise metrics in collaboration with JSE partners and customers to measure supply effectiveness for the JFC. Metrics that measure the JSE's contribution to JFC effectiveness are the primary objective. JFC effectiveness shall not be compromised for the sake of JSE efficiency. The primary indicator of success is the rate of POF for the JFC.

- Coordinate and synchronize the networking of the JSE.

- Establish and administer a professional development certification program for Joint Supply Professionals consistent with the JCL call for "changes in culture, human capital development, and training in contingency and adaptive planning."

- Establish data standards across the entire JSE, and identify authoritative data sources.

- Define roles and access rules to control access to the JSE information network.

- Establish business rules and processes to facilitate prioritization and a hierarchy protocol to ultimately enable automated redirection of supplies.

These responsibilities are mostly consistent with established responsibilities described for the DPO and JDPO with regard to advocating and coordinating improvements in DoD distribution and deployment processes. The CWG observed that these are also consistent with the examples of responsibilities the CWG considered for the JSE senior entity in its discussion of governance solutions. How-ever,

the CWG also noted that JS JIC expands on JSPO responsibilities in descriptions and examples of how the JSE would operate that appear throughout the document.

JSPO Analysis

In addressing the third study question, the CWG considered separately the two elements of this issue; that is, are JSPO responsibilities and authorities described in the JS JIC fully appropriate, and is a JSPO necessary? In the first phase, the CWG sought agreement on the kinds of responsibilities and authorities that would be considered appropriate for a JSPO, should one be designated. In the second phase, it considered whether a JSPO would be necessary to address the supply capability gaps. Early on, the CWG concluded that the JSPO responsibilities as described in the JS JIC constituted potential over-reach, and impinged on Title 10 and Title 32 responsibilities. As a result, the CWG concluded that appropriate JSPO responsibilities needed to be developed. Therefore, in assessing the second element of this study question, the CWG considered a number of factors, including proposed governance solutions, focused surveys, and precedents from established DoD process owner designations. These re-defined JSPO responsibilities form the basis for answering this third study question.

WHAT ARE THE APPROPRIATE JSPO RESPONSIBILITIES?

To identify the kinds of roles that the majority of CWG members could agree on as appropriate–or at least not inappropriate–for a JSPO, it conducted a pair of surveys. In the first, every reference to a JSPO responsibility contained in the JS JIC was copied into a survey form with instructions for members to either agree or disagree with the propriety of each. Respondents were also asked to vet their choices to the extent possible within their organizations in order to socialize the discussion and attempt to reflect the positions of the JSE stakeholders they represent. Respondents were also asked to add responsibilities to the survey list they felt appropriate.

Results of the first survey drew some clear distinctions between what CWG members considered appropriate and inappropriate. Those considered suitable related to keywords, including “advocate, assess, coordinate, and focal point.” Those considered objectionable related primarily to responsibilities that implied operational accountability or actual performance of global supply functions.

A second survey followed the same methodology, but included additional responsibility statements submitted during the initial survey or discussed by the CWG. The survey results (reflected in Appendix D) were consistent with the first. A large majority of CWG members agreed that responsibilities and authorities related to actual supply operations should not be delegated to a JSPO, while those associated with assessing, coordinating and advocating supply process improvements were considered appropriate.

The CWG considered these survey results in relation to the DPO and JDPO designations. In comparing the directive assigning the DPO role to USTRANSCOM (DoDD 5158.06) with the guidance specifying its numerated functional responsibilities (DoDD 5158.04), the CWG noted a pattern. Nearly all of USTRANSCOM's specified authorities with regard to its DPO role pertain to its responsibilities for advocating and coordinating process improvements and managing joint architecture to enable effective networking of end-to-end distribution activities across DoD Components. Responsibilities that convey responsibility and authority for execution of distribution functions pertain to its mission as a unified command. Likewise, the process owner role assigned to USJFCOM (DoDI 5158.05) describes responsibilities related to leading efforts to transform and improve processes, conducting studies and analysis, developing joint distribution and deployment architecture (in coordination with DPO), and coordinating the integration of process improvements with the joint planning and execution community. Responsibilities for deployment operations relate to its unified command mission to deploy trained and ready joint forces.

The CWG concluded that the primary JSPO description in the JS JIC, above, is consistent with the established Process Owner responsibilities and authorities for DPO and JDPO[1] with regard to advocating and coordinating process improvements. However, the JS JIC expands on these responsibilities in its descriptions and examples of how the JSE would operate. In doing so, the JS JIC often combines established process owner responsibilities with operational responsibilities associated with a DoD organization that may be designated as a JSPO (i.e., DLA). The CWG agreed that while such operational responsibilities may be considered in determining who a JSPO should be (if one is necessary); the functional responsibilities of a JSPO should remain consistent with established DoD roles for process ownership.

The following list represents a compilation of JSPO responsibilities that correspond to similar responsibilities established for the DPO, and which had 90 percent or better agreement by the CWG in its second survey.

1. Develop and implement joint supply process improvements that enhance defense logistics and global supply chain management.

2. Advocate supply process improvements for and across all DoD Components for effectiveness, efficiency, and alignment that are relevant to the delivery and sustainment of functional capabilities required by the Services or JFC.

3. Advocate for coordination and synchronization of joint supply processes and capabilities with key non-DoD supply operations partners in accordance with Reference (JS JIC).

[1] JDPO responsibilities have been absorbed into the Joint Staff following inactivation of USJFCOM.

4. Oversee the overall effectiveness, efficiency, and alignment of DoD wide joint supply activities supporting force projection, sustainment, and return/redeployment operations.

5. Establish a Joint Supply Enterprise (JSE) Community of Interest (COI) to develop, review, coordinate, educate, and implement JSE capabilities, including Information transparency requirements in accordance with Reference (JS JIC).

6. Coordinate and collaborate with the JSE COI to establish a structure of governance bodies that meet regularly to develop, analyze, coordinate, and prioritize joint supply operations/commodity management improvement recommendations and business processes and rules to optimize supply support to the joint functional capabilities that drive supply demands.

7. Develop, coordinate, review, and take maintenance actions necessary to integrate the JSE, including making policy recommendations to OSD with respect to Directives, Issuances, and Decision Memorandums, and issue other supply related guidance as appropriate.

8. Establish, monitor, and improve joint supply relationships with the CCDRs, JTF Commanders, DLA, USTRANSCOM, GSA, and the Services to promote integration of supply improvement efforts and performance standards in accordance with Reference (JS JIC).

9. Serve as the DoD Joint Supply Portfolio Manager (JSPfM) for that subset of DoD logistics systems providing key capabilities in support of JSBPs in accordance with the DoDD establishing a JSPO. NOTE: Examples of corresponding responsibilities could include:

    - Improving the overall effectiveness, efficiency, and interoperability of capabilities and systems in the Joint Supply Portfolio;

    - Developing appropriate processes and procedures for liaison and coordination with systems owners to influence synchronization of Joint Supply Portfolio systems across the DoD;

    - Ensuring that supply and supply-related IT systems are aligned and integrated with current DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF) and DoD priorities;

    - Establishing supply-related IT standards, data standards (including those in support of asset visibility), enterprise performance standards, and metrics.

10. Collect and coordinate appropriate processes, systems, and technical information needed to build and maintain the integrated Joint Supply Enterprise Architecture (JSEA) for the DoD. Also responsible for managing the

JSEA in collaboration with the JSE COI and ensuring that the JSEA complies with the DoD Business Enterprise Architecture.

11. Assess the risk and implications of supply availability for all classes of supply from global, national, and theater perspectives.

12. Coordinate global and national assessments of supply requirements and availability with key non-DoD supply operations partners to promote understanding and prioritization within the NRF.

13. Establish and implement JSE performance standards and metrics to monitor and improve the JSE performance.

A JSPO serves as a strategic partner in execution of Service Title 10 and Title 32 functions but does not subsume logistics responsibilities and organizations inherent to the Services. As a process owner, a JSPO would be responsible for the overall outcomes of JSBP improvements to support service and JFC readiness and support JSE customers. The services retain responsibility for service readiness and their organizations/units that execute within the supply process.

IS A JSPO NECESSARY?

Once the CWG identified parameters for acceptable JSPO responsibilities, it turned to the question of whether a JSPO with those responsibilities and authorities is necessary to resolve the supply capability gaps. In considering this question, the CWG took into account its analysis of FR2A survey results, the conclusions from its assessment of governance capability gaps, and its comparisons with the DPO and JDPO with regard to process owners' role in setting the conditions for change. In considering these factors, the CWG remained mindful of the case for change posed by the JS JIC's statement of the military problem and challenges of the future operating environment, as well as current pressures driven by DoD and national fiscal realities.

In its assessment of joint supply FR2A in the second study question, the CWG agreed with the JS JIC premise that functions and authorities performed in current supply operations would be insufficient to implement solutions for many of the supply capability gaps. This was particularly evident with regard to advocating and coordinating solutions between DoD and non-DoD partners. The CWG concluded that a framework of capability-based functions focused on specific attributes and requirements of supported capabilities would optimize JSBPs and forestall "one size fits all" concepts that envision supply as a singular process. However, the CWG also recognized this approach may not be sufficient to optimize overall supply support within the JSE framework, and that there is a need for senior leadership to address issues that cannot be resolved through consensus or that cross functional/capability lines of business.

The CWG addressed this issue in its development of governance solutions, recognizing there is a need for an organizational entity to provide a common vision and

an integrating function for a capability-focused governance framework. It recognized the risk that a capabilities-based approach could perpetuate real or perceived *stovepipes* of supply activity, and proposed a JSE senior entity to ensure joint supply solutions support a JSE operating picture within the broader JLEnt framework.

A JSE senior entity would guide this capability-focused governance framework in seeking opportunities for cross-functional solutions and resource sharing to promote overall DoD logistics efficiency. It would maintain a strategic view, especially with respect to changes in DoD policies or procedures needed to work effectively with non-DoD partners in *whole-of-government* or *whole community* operations. The CWG identified several examples of responsibilities appropriate for a JSE senior entity, noting that these are consistent with the list of acceptable JSPO responsibilities outlined above.

The CWG recognized there are many DoD senior logistics forums that address supply issues or otherwise impact supply processes; but concluded that as currently constituted and chartered, they could not effectively oversee implementation of solutions necessary to operate the JSE. It concluded that a JSE senior entity would require its own staff structure to advocate for, coordinate, and align JSBP improvements across functional lines. It observed that the DPO and JDPO roles each properly relied on the command and staff structure of a unified command headquarters with a complementary operational mission. Also, the CWG noted that while complementary, these process owner responsibilities are separate and distinct from the commands' operational missions. It inferred that these designations demonstrate DoD's need for an explicit role to advocate, coordinate, synchronize and enable process improvements in complex logistics functions that cross its components' lines of interest and responsibility.

The CWG agreed that joint supply operations present a similar requirement, and that a senior entity fulfilling the need for JSE senior leadership is necessary to implement solutions addressing the supply capability gaps and to enable the operation of the JSE. Figure 6-7illustrates the role of a joint supply senior entity in oversight of a capability-focused framework for implementing solutions to the supply capability gaps. Figure 6-7also illustrates this senior entity relationship to the DPO in coordinating and synchronizing JSBPs to enable effective, efficient, and adaptive end-to-end supply chain support to the JFC.

Figure 6-7. Joint Supply Senior Entity Roles



Conclusion—Study Question 3

In answer to the third study question, the CWG conclusion is that a JSPO (or an entity called by another name, such as a Supply Enterprise Manager), appropriately constructed and focused, and established within the senior entity function construct, would be an effective solution for supply capability gaps.

This senior entity construct would be established to advocate, coordinate, collaborate, and assess the development and implementation of joint supply business process improvements. It would oversee the capability-oriented governance structure and promote cross-functional coordination to ensure that supply processes are synchronized with other functions within the broader JLEnt construct. The organizational structure of a senior entity would include a secretariat resource with roles and responsibilities to provide administrative and technical support and provide continuity in the performance of senior entity responsibilities. Figure 6-8summarizes the role of a senior entity with respect to the JSBPs.

Figure 6-8. Joint Supply Senior Entity Roles and Responsibilities



A senior entity would serve as a strategic partner in execution of Service Title 10 and 32 functions but would not subsume logistics responsibilities or organizations inherent to the Services. A senior entity would be responsible for the overall outcomes of JSBP improvements to support Service and JFC readiness and support JSE customers. The services would retain responsibility for service readiness and their organizations/units that execute within the supply process.

SUMMARY OF JOINT STAFF STUDY QUESTIONS

The CWG was tasked with answering three questions:

1. What are the joint supply business processes (JSBPs)?
2. What are the functions, roles, responsibilities and authorities (FR2A) that will enable success in the JSBPs?
3. Is the Joint Supply Process Owner (JSPO) an effective solution for supply capability gaps?

The CWG addressed the JS study questions by defining terms and developing a logical framework that links the answers to those questions to the implementation

of solutions required to address the supply capability gaps. The following are the CWG's major conclusions:

1. The JSBP are the broad, interrelated sets of activities and tasks that must be accomplished to operate the JSE and achieve the central idea of the JS JIC:

   - Anticipate supply demands with accuracy.
   - Establish robust and reliable supplier networks.
   - Provide visibility and control of materiel in storage and transit.
   - Respond rapidly to demand triggers.
   - Link to financial processes.

2. The FR2A that will enable success in the JSBPs are those that would provide a capability-based governance framework to implement solutions and set the conditions for successful operation of the JSE. This joint supply governance framework would consist of two key functions:

   - Capability-based focal points for organizing the Services along capability lines of effort and providing structure and accountability for JSBP improvements.
   - A joint supply senior entity.

3. A JSPO (or an entity called by another name, such as a supply enterprise manager), if appropriately constructed and focused and established within the senior entity function construct, would be an effective solution for supply capability gaps.

Chapter 7
Feasibility Analysis

The JS JIC CBA, chartered by the Joint Staff, requires an assessment of the feasibility of solutions. The CWG has identified solutions to address all six capability gap areas:

- Networking
- Information Transparency
- Requirements Determination
- Resource Identification and Tracking
- Governance
- Common Metrics

While the feasibility of each solution was both considered and documented in the solutions portfolio, this chapter reviews the feasibility analysis for each capability solution and summarizes the collective feasibility of the combined, integrated solutions portfolio.

At its simplest, a feasibility analysis is a preliminary examination as to whether a set of solutions is capable of implementation in a practical and useful way. In other words, a feasibility analysis reviews solutions sets to determine the efficiency and effectiveness of those solutions. A feasibility analysis should further identify potential problems and identify ways to mitigate those problems.

The CBA User's Guide includes little guidance or direction concerning the form or rigor of a feasibility analysis. The focus of discussion on feasibility often refers to technical feasibility. As a result, the focus of this feasibility analysis is on technical feasibility but will also include some consideration of the effectiveness of the solution and the implementation issues associated with them.

ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

As previously noted, the *CBA User's Guide* provides limited assistance for a feasibility analysis. The guide cautions that a detailed solutions analysis is no longer a formal CBA requirement, and the feasibility analysis appears to be a part of that caveat. The overall solutions process outlined in the guide is shown below (Figure 7-1).

Figure 7-1. CBA User's Guide Solutions Process



Source: Figure 8-1, CBA User's Guide, Version 3, March 2009

However, some analysis of feasibility is both prudent and desirable. To assess the feasibility of solutions, the CWG followed a structured approach. The feasibility analysis performed by the CWG consisted of the following steps to establish the responsiveness, technical feasibility, and cost feasibility:

- Individual assessment of feasibility for each proposed solution
- Collective determination of solutions responsiveness
- Collective determination of solutions implementation assessment
- Collective determination of risks such as costs and other factors

Individual Assessment

For each capability area, each CWG member completed a spreadsheet identifying potential solutions to address underlying gap causes associated with each capability area shortfall. As a part of this exercise, each CWG member determined the responsiveness of the proposed solution by linking the solution to an underlying gap cause. The CWG member further estimated both the technical feasibility and the cost impacts associated with the proposed solution. With regard to cost impacts, the CWG did not attempt to provide detailed cost estimates. Rather, the

CWG provided a rough estimation of the magnitude of implementation costs (i.e., low, medium, and high). These individual determinations were then collected and provided to the entire CWG membership for development of the CWG solutions portfolio. At this point, the remaining feasibility analysis was conducted in a collective and collaborative forum.

Collective Responsiveness Assessment

From the collected individual solutions, the CWG developed an integrated solutions set for each gap category. The CWG considered first whether the solutions made sense and addressed the gaps. The CWG also attempted to consolidate or eliminate non-value-added redundancies and ensure that the best solutions were included. At this point, the CWG conducted a detailed review of the solutions sets to link specific aspects of the solutions to the underlying gap causes. In this way, the CWG ensured that the capability gaps were fully addressed and that the solutions were responsive to all elements of the gap causes.

Collective Implementation Assessment

With the development of responsive solutions, the CWG considered the difficulty associated with implementation. Solutions deemed too technically challenging in this environment were analyzed against other approaches to identify the best solutions both in terms of responsiveness and feasibility.

Collective Risk Determination

With the development of a responsive and feasible set of solutions, the CWG addressed other risks that might impact execution and implementation of the solutions portfolio. Change management concerns were a major risk considered by the CWG. All CWG members recognized that, in the current environment, CBA solutions would need to be considered within the context of all changes within the Department. As such, members analyzed individual inputs to determine whether solutions would be practical in terms of perceived cost, implications for change, and senior leadership acceptance, particularly with regard to Service or partner equities.

SOLUTION PORTFOLIO FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENTS

The feasibility assessments performed by the CWG created a set of responsive and viable solutions. Because each set of gaps presented unique issues, the results of the CWG feasibility assessments are provided by capability gap area.

Networking

Networking focuses on the ability to communicate—not on the substance of the communications. As a result, networking solutions focused on how information can be exchanged without regard to message content, purpose, or potential usage.

Developing the networking solutions portfolios posed issues for the CWG. Primarily, the CWG discussed whether to pursue broad new technical solutions or to work within current and pending solutions. The CWG concluded that major new IT starts would not be feasible. Instead, the CWG proposed an approach to shape development of information applications over a number of years to achieve transformational outcomes in an evolutionary manner. This would leverage emerging capabilities for sharing information in a net-centric environment. To achieve this outcome, the CWG proposed a collaborative approach to develop joint supply business processes and supporting policies along capability-oriented lines.

POLICY IMPACTS

The CWG concluded that policy implications for proposed networking solutions are not difficult. However, policies will need to broaden to address the JSE framework and provide the basis for interaction between DoD and non-DoD partners. The CWG also recognized the need to ensure sufficient protections are in place for Service and JSE stakeholder equities. The CWG also recognized that networking solutions would be dependent upon solutions, including policies, regarding information transparency.

The difficulty associated with making the changes stem primarily from the number of policies that would need to change. The DoD 4140 series would need revision as would the related implementing policies in all of the Services and DLA. Joint publications would need to be revised to reflect the DoD 4140 series changes. National policy already reflects the need for JSE interaction. As a result, DoD policies (including Service and DLA) would need revision to reflect national policy changes. Absent an approach focused on the JSE construct, policy changes will be difficult to implement in a coordinated and comprehensive manner. To address the policy changes that support implementing networking solutions, the CWG concluded that a focused governance approach would be required. This is addressed in the governance solution set.

Because many of the systems under development are already using web-based technology, many network protocol and security issues have already been addressed from a DoD perspective. As such, while technical difficulties associated with this solution set should be manageable, incorporating non-DoD partners into DoD architecture may be challenging.

APPLICATIONS IMPACTS

To network the JSE, the CWG proposed an approach to achieve transformational outcomes in an evolutionary manner, leveraging emerging capabilities for information sharing in a net-centric environment. The CWG identified a number of existing systems/applications that could support the capabilities required to operate the JSE, provided they can be shaped to support JSE interaction.

The CWG concluded the main networking feasibility issues are associated with shaping the evolutionary development of applications to enable the JSE operations. The CWG developed required capabilities rather than identifying actual systems requiring change or development. Therefore, the CWG recognized that successful implementation will rely on the governance solution approach.

Information Transparency

Information transparency centers on the ability to understand and act on the information communicated among organizations. In this capability, message content is the focus–not the ability to communicate. As a result, information transparency solutions focused on understanding the information exchanged to facilitate comprehension and appropriate action.

Developing information transparency solutions portfolio posed similar issues for the CWG as were addressed in networking. Primarily, CWG discussion focused on whether to pursue an evolutionary approach or to propose a transformational approach. In the end, the CWG developed both approaches. With both approaches, the CWG identified policy and system impacts. The CWG feasibility assessment addressed both of these areas.

POLICY IMPACTS

As with the networking solutions the CWG concluded that the policy implications associated with both the evolutionary and transformational solutions are the same. The CWG further concluded that the policy requirements are not difficult. However, there are many policies that will need to be changed. Central to the policy implications is the need to establish policies that describe processes in which information can be shared and understood among JSE partners.

National policy already reflects the need for JSE interaction. However, the detailed nature of that interaction has yet to be determined. As a result, basic information transparency requirements will need to be defined and managed. DoD policies (including Service and DLA policies) would then need revision to reflect national policy changes.

There are two main feasibility issues that concerned the CWG. The first is the need for decision rules and structures in order to accommodate the wide range of information and to harmonize that information among JSE partners. Development

and management of these rules and structures must rely on an effective governance structure that is yet to be developed. The second feasibility issue is the difficulty associated with implementing the decision rules and structures into the large number of policies dealing with information handling within the DoD. The DoD 4140 series will need revision as will the implementing policies within all of the Services and DLA. Joint publications need to be revised to reflect the DoD 4140 series changes.

Feasibility issues can be addressed in an evolutionary manner. Decision rules and structures can be developed and revised over time, and policy changes would similarly be changed and adjusted over time. Risks associated with making these changes are low. Additionally, the costs associated with these changes should not be onerous. Much of the changes can be accomplished online. Similarly, most publications are online, with the publication available to users as they require. As a result, the CWG concluded that technical risk is low.

Application Impacts

To adequately address information transparency across the JSE, the CWG developed two approaches–an evolutionary approach and a transformational approach. The CWG concluded that the main information transparency feasibility issues are associated with systems impacts. Those impacts were assessed both for the evolutionary and the transformational solutions.

Evolutionary Systems Impacts. The content of these systems changes raises the technical risk. Information transparency means that additional fields and/or changes in definitions and entire fields may be necessary. Security and access protocols would require some technical development. Most costs should be low, since they would be absorbed over time during routine system updates and upgrades.

Transformational Systems Impacts. Systems changes are not viewed as technically difficult. Envisioned system changes do not require the development of new or cutting-edge technologies. However, the interaction of the databases and the programming involved in developing the decision rules and data handling will require a higher level of sophistication. Development of data field definitions and incorporating them into the databases will generate some costs. Additionally, the security and access protocols will require some technical development. Most costs should be medium, since this effort does involve systems development.

Requirements Determination

Requirements determination consists of the ability to forecast and plan of supply requirements in order to anticipate and provision for sufficient supply and distribution capability and capacity across the JSE environment. In order to realize these capabilities, requirements determination includes demand identification and analysis, modeling, and simulation. As a result, requirements determination solu-

tions focused on how to identify and respond to forecast and actual demand as well as the approaches to addressing both DoD and other JSE partner demand.

Developing requirements determination solutions built on the twin assumptions that networking and information transparency solutions portfolios were implemented. As a result, the CWG developed the requirements determination solutions assuming that networking and information transparency issues were resolved and, therefore, addressing the specifics associated with requirements determination.

The requirements determination solutions portfolio includes both policy and systems components. Since policy and systems are intertwined in requirements determination, both are integral to the solutions.

POLICY IMPACTS

The CWG determined that the focus of policy impacts will be in DoD policies. Policy adjustments will be required to recognize demand information across the JSE, appropriately handle the information (to include forecasting), and to collaborate with JSE partners to ensure that processes are harmonized. Integral to the collaboration process is the requirement to establish a management framework that, while requiring additional definition in the governance capability, will need to be incorporated into DoD policies. These policy recommendations will need to be first incorporated into the 4140 series of DoD publications and delineated further within Service and Agency publications. The CWG determined that policies to establish the methods of demand collection and review were not difficult and represented a low risk.

Employing JSE partner demand forecasts in DoD requirements determination systems is more problematic. The CWG did not perceive that acting on such information (i.e., executing repair and buy programs in support of JSE demand forecasts) would be easily accomplished. Any actions taken by the DoD requirements processes will need to be more clearly defined to meet statutory requirements and avoid accumulating assets excess to DoD needs. The CWG also recognized that DoD action on JSE demand may also require changes to existing retention policies. If employment of JSE partner demand forecasts is limited to direct contingency support, then risk to DoD investment strategies will be mitigated, and risk associated with employing JSE demand information in the requirements determination process will be low.

APPLICATION IMPACTS

The CWG recognized that the requirements determination processes across the DoD are undergoing transformations with the development and fielding of enterprise resource planning (ERP) solutions. Service and DLA systems should be completely fielded within the timeframe specified by the JS JIC. As a result, the CWG addressed solutions within the context of the ERP solutions.

The systems impacts will flow from the collaborative framework and, therefore, be assessed on a system by system basis to reconcile technical risks with community objectives. Further, the systems impacts will result from evolutionary changes as the community assesses and acts on coordinated and synchronized approaches.

Resource Identification and Tracking

Resource identification and tracking refers to an enterprise-wide visibility of all supply requirements and resources (on hand, on order, in process, on contract, in transit, and received at point of need or employment) and the ability to match those requirements and resources to the best sources for fulfillment. It includes the ability to direct and intervene to redirect resources in response to changes in operational conditions and JFC priorities.

Developing the resource identification and tracking solutions portfolio built on the twin assumptions that networking and information transparency solutions were implemented. As a result, the CWG developed the resource identification and tracking solutions assuming that networking and information transparency were issues were resolved. In point of fact, the resource identification and tracking solutions portfolio heavily relied on the systems identified in the networking and information transparency solutions portfolios.

The resource identification and tracking solutions portfolio consists of a policy piece and a systems piece. Since policy and systems are intertwined in requirements determination, both areas are integral to the solutions.

POLICY IMPACTS

The CWG recognized that the resource identification and tracking extends beyond strictly DoD or government resources. The increased reliance on long term and prime vendor contracts has reduced DoD inventory and also moved resource identification and tracking roles outside DoD organizations. The supply system policy requirements for the resource identification and tracking are to revise the DoD 4140 series to clearly lay out the resource identification and tracking responsibilities and to expand those policies to include JSE partners as well as linkage into the distribution community.

The CWG concluded that the policy requirements are not technically difficult. The changes needed within the supply community are consistent with existing supply system approaches to resource identification and tracking. However, the expanded scope of these policies will necessitate greater interaction with other communities. In particular, resource identification and tracking policies will necessitate greater coordination between supply and contracting as well as between supply and distribution communities. Long term and prime vendor contracts will need to be adjusted to provide for resource identification and tracking capabilities. Additionally, coordination and synchronization will be required between supply

and distribution communities to maintain visibility and control over assets throughout the fulfillment process.

As a result, policies will need to be changed. Changes to internal supply policies have low technical risk. Changes to contracting instruments can similarly be addressed in a routine manner. Finally, the link between supply and distribution, which already exists, will need to be strengthened. Again, this represents an evolutionary improvement on an existing process. As a result, risk associated with these changes is low. Costs associated with these policies should be low. However, any requirement for increased reporting and tracking requirements by commercial suppliers may increase costs for specific contracts.

Application Impacts

Resource identification and tracking solutions will impact the same systems as were identified in the networking and information transparency solutions portfolios. The CWG concluded that all three capabilities should be addressed as a single approach in order to integrate the capabilities, reduce any costs, and minimize technical issues. Given this approach, the CWG concluded that systems impacts represent a low degree of technical risk with minimal cost impacts.

Governance

Governance refers to the process or framework for establishing policies, making decisions, and exercising responsibilities relative to the activities of its component members and partners. Within the JSE, partners and customers operate within authority derived from statutory authorities and policies, and executed through their respective DoD, other federal agency, Service, chain of command, or other governmental or nongovernmental organizational structure. Within an enterprise framework characterized by multiple chains of authority, governance processes may range from collaborative to the empowerment of organizations or entities with a specified span of authority or control.

The proposed CBA solutions require development of JSBPs and supporting policies and applications that optimize supply support to the end customers that generate supply demands. Operating the JSE is not an end in itself. The JSE exists to support efforts to achieve and maintain joint force readiness. As such, the CWG recommended a capabilities-based governance framework to implement the CBA solutions and to set conditions for operating the JSE. This two-tiered approach envisions an entity to coordinate across Services and non-DoD JSE partners to implement solutions along capability lines, with a senior entity to provide overall strategic vision and oversight.

The governance solutions portfolio relies primarily on a policy component, with little expected systems impacts. Additionally, Service maintenance supply support constructs (e.g., performance based logistics contracts) may present challenges

for implementation. The governance structure must consider existing contractual obligations.

POLICY IMPACTS

The CWG concluded that governance should focus on DoD organizations and activities but also provide a means to accommodate JSE partners. This is consistent with the fluid nature of JSE partnership. Policy requirements should be incorporated into appropriate DoD 4140 and 5100 series and associated Service and Agency regulations. These policies need to establish the governance mechanisms and clearly define roles and responsibilities, to include JSE partner participation. Challenges associated with implementation of CBA solutions will rely on policies that establish the overall governance framework that will set the conditions for operating the JSE.

APPLICATION IMPACTS

Establishment of the governance framework is not reliant on systems.

Common Metrics

Metrics are units of measure that allow quantitative assessments of whether a desired end state has been attained. Within an enterprise framework, common metrics should support actions and decisions that provide knowledge and incentives to promote unity of effort among partners in meeting the needs and priorities of the enterprise.

JSE objectives are to provide sustained joint supply readiness and perfect order fulfillment to a supported JFC. To meet those objectives, metrics need to be applied to JSE processes and to processes performed in conjunction with distribution capabilities operated in the broader JLEnt framework to assess performance from the customer perspective. The JSE must have a common capability to measure and assess both supply and distribution performance using authoritative supply and distribution data.

Developing the common metrics solutions portfolio is built on the assumptions that networking and information transparency solution are implemented, and that the DASD(SCI)-developed common DoD metrics would serve as a source of JS JIC metrics. As a result, the common metrics solutions consists of a policy component alone. Systems aspects will be addressed in the DASD(SCI) initiative. JS JIC-associated access will be achieved through policy changes.

POLICY IMPACTS

The CWG recognized that common metrics within DoD should use the DASD(SCI)-developed metrics as the basis for common metrics. JSE partner metrics should then be coordinated to provide a collaborative common operating

picture of JSE supply process performance. Policy changes should facilitate access to metrics, metrics source data, and change management mechanisms associated with DoD metrics. Further, policies should provide sufficient guidance to facilitate coordination and collaboration with other JSE partners to develop a collaborative approach for measuring supply process performance.

The CWG concluded that the policy requirements are not technically difficult. Changes needed in the supply community are consistent with existing supply system approaches to metrics development and management. However, policies will need to expand to facilitate greater interaction with other communities (i.e., JSE partners).

As a result, some policies would need to change, particularly in the DoD 4140 series and the associated Service and Agency implementing regulations. Changes to internal supply policies have low technical risk. Finally, the CWG acknowledged the likelihood that DoD and JSE partner metrics may never be the same. However, the collaborative environment needs to strengthen to ensure that metrics are consistent or provide an accurate depiction of JSE supply process performance. This represents an evolutionary improvement on an existing process. As a result, risk associated with these changes is low. Costs associated with these policies should also be low.

Application Impacts

The systems impacts associated with common metrics will be addressed primarily in the DASD(SCI) metrics initiative. As such, there are no systems requirements specifically associated with the common metrics solutions. Given this approach, the CWG concluded that the systems impacts represent a low level of technical risk with minimal cost impacts.

Conclusions and Recommendations

This document describes the CWG approach to assess and minimize risks. Solutions were constructed with risk as an integral consideration. Responsiveness, technical risk, and cost were primary considerations with each developed portfolio. Responsiveness was explicitly considered in the portfolio's initial development to arrive at a best set of solutions. The CWG then evaluated the solutions portfolio against technical risk and potential cost to identify and reduce potential implementation issues. As a result, the solutions are fully responsive to identified capability gaps and can be implemented with low technical risk and within acceptable potential costs.

Chapter 8
JS JIC in the Broader Context

The JS JIC represents one of many ongoing initiatives in DoD. One obvious issue is: *Where does the JS JIC fit among the many initiatives?* The CWG considered this question while developing the solutions portfolio and the responses to the Joint Staff study questions.

JS JIC AND THE JOINT LOGISTICS ENTERPRISE

The overall relationship of the JS JIC to other major logistics initiatives may be considered through the 'ends, ways, and means' to meet the challenges of the future operating environment and realize the efficient and effective alignment of logistics capabilities within the Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt).

Ends

The Joint Concept for Logistics (JCL) describes a JLEnt as a conceptual framework to promote unity of effort among logistics partners in achieving common ends. The JLEnt serves as a conceptual end-state for integration and/or synchronization of DoD logistics capabilities across Services, as well as with those interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners. The JLEnt represents the '***ends***' for joint concepts developed for subordinate logistics capabilities (supply, deployment and distribution, engineering, operational contracting support, logistics services, maintenance, and medical logistics).

The JS JIC describes the JSE, coordinated by what the CWG now views as a senior entity (vice a JSPO, as discussed in Chapter 6), as the central idea to enable supply operations partners to collaboratively integrate and/or synchronize supply operations. This would lead to sustained supply readiness and optimal levels of perfect order fulfillment to support operational requirements. From this perspective, a JSE comprised of networked and enabled partners is the supply component of the JLEnt and part of the 'ends' for DoD logistics transformation.

Ways

The JS JIC CBA offers solutions for joint supply capability gaps and a governance approach for implementing those solutions and enabling operation of the JSE. The governance framework consists of designated roles to collaboratively optimize JSBPs that support functional capabilities driving supply demands. A senior entity would provide strategic vision and would advocate, coordinate, collaborate, and assess joint supply process improvements. This capability-oriented

JSE governance approach sets the conditions for successful operation of the JSE and provides the ***'ways'*** for resolving joint supply capability gaps and enabling joint supply operations within the JSE and JLEnt construct.

Means

There are several ongoing, significant logistics initiatives seeking to effectively position the logistics community to meet the demands of the future operating environment. Key initiatives are summarized, below. In addition, the JS JIC CBA proposes solutions that would require new initiatives and/or focused efforts to implement through development of policy, process, and system enablers. Collectively, these current and proposed initiatives provide the ***'means'*** for resolving joint supply capability gaps and realizing JSE and JLEnt capabilities.

The JS JIC represents a piece of the logistics puzzle that, when properly assembled, should provide expanded effective and efficient logistical support. The solutions portfolio was structured to provide a pliable platform from which supply support could integrate with other logistical partners—both within and outside of DoD.

RELATIONSHIP OVERVIEW

Figure 8-1 uses this ends, ways, means construct to illustrate how the central elements of the JS JIC fit into the evolving mosaic of strategic logistics initiatives monitored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff and senior logistics leaders to improve DoD logistics responsiveness and efficiency. In addition, there are multiple initiatives within individual Services, Defense Agencies, and Combatant Commands to transform their own logistics processes.

Figure 8-1. Key Joint Concept for Logistics Initiatives



With the scale and scope of DoD logistics and the logistics responsibilities held by its non-DoD partners, particularly FEMA, HHS, and GSA, it is an extraordinary challenge to synchronize efforts and find enduring synergy among JLEnt partners. Many initiatives are ad hoc efforts conducted by matrixed teams focused on specifics objectives or specific logistics functions, such as distribution or in-transit visibility. However, changes to strategies or processes in one logistics functions (e.g., distribution) will likely have implications for supply management as well as other logistics functions.

Establishing a JSE capable of integrating or synchronizing JSBPs across DoD and non-DoD partners, as well as across other logistics functions within the JLEnt construct, can be complementary to other logistics initiatives in several ways

- *Develop and improve JSBPs.* JSBP improvements will enable better use of distribution resources throughout the supply chain. As the JSE is better able to anticipate, sense, capture, and respond to supply requirements across the enterprise, it will facilitate the JDDE's ability to allocate optimal distribution resources, modes and routes. Likewise, visibility of supply requirements and resources will enable supply managers to quickly assess the implications of distribution constraints and work with demand generators to mitigate operational risks and adjust priorities, as necessary.

- *Integrating optimal JSBPs with other logistics functions.* As described in this report, the JSE governance will apply the concept of process ownership along capability or functional lines. This approach calls for designating an organization, office or individual as an enduring focal point for

collaboration among partners with common interests, expertise, and familiarity with relevant supply acquisition and distribution strategies that touch multiple logistics processes. This governance framework can serve as an integrating function that coordinates JSBPs throughout life cycle processes and with other logistics functions within the JLEnt framework.

- *Synchronizing with non-DoD partners.* Strategic guidance directs DoD to be prepared to operate effectively in partnership with non-DoD partners in support of 'Whole of Government' or 'Whole Community' operations. The capability-oriented governance framework would offer likely DoD organizations or offices as points of contact for collaboration with non-DoD partners. These points of contact would develop relationships and processes that facilitate planning, networking, and unity of effort for supply operations within the JLEnt framework.

- *Strategic advocate for joint supply.* A designated senior entity would provide advocacy and strategic vision for joint supply operations within the JLEnt as well as an integrating function for a capability-focused governance framework. A senior entity would serve as focal point for assessing the joint supply implications of other logistics initiatives and for coordination of issues, policies, and opportunities with senior leaders and other strategic partners, particularly other DoD Process Owners. A senior entity would advocate policies and practices necessary to transform the supply and distribution processes and respond to challenges of the future operating environment

JS JIC AND PROCESS OWNERSHIP

Process owner development has provided a means to manage entire processes. Process ownership designates or establishes an office responsible for process oversight. The process owner can assess and evaluate process effectiveness, coordinate and collaborate with key stakeholders to identify and resolve process issues, and advocate policies and practices that improve the process, both internally and with other related processes.

At present, DoD has established two process owners: the Distribution Process Owner and the Joint Deployment Process Owner. Because of the interdependent relationship between these processes and the supply process, a supply governance structure is needed to provide a logical point of collaboration and a means for coordinating supply and distribution processes. The Joint Supply senior entity, as described by the CWG and implemented within the capability-based governance framework as a part of the overall governance solution, fills this critical void.

JS JIC AND KEY INITIATIVES

In addition to process ownership, a series of initiatives are ongoing to address a number of supply and distribution issues. Figure 8-1 highlights some of the initiatives that are more central to areas addressed in the JS JIC. While each initiative appears to address a specific area, deeper investigation revealed that, in most cases, these initiatives cut across functional boundaries.

The JS JIC CBA offers solutions for joint supply capability gaps and a governance approach for implementing those solutions and enabling operation of the JSE. The governance approach consists of designated roles to collaboratively optimize JSBPs in support of functional capabilities that drive supply demands. A senior entity would oversee these capability-based lines of business, providing strategic vision and advocating, coordinating, collaborating, and assessing joint supply process improvements. In the remainder of this chapter, we will discuss how JS JIC solutions relate to and support process owners and initiatives.

Agile Transportation for the 21st Century

Agile Transportation for the 21st Century (AT-21) is an umbrella program that integrates and governs end-to-end distribution and provides key information sought by users at all levels. The focus of this system is the enhancement of USTRANSCOM command and control structures, with emphasis on USTRANSCOM/commercial coordination. Key elements of this system include order capture, a transportation scheduling engine, and collaborative technologies, enabling a virtual decision-making environment. These elements are critical to information transparency, as they provide the potential for visibility of information and collaboration to obtain assets.

The CWG reviewed the interplay between supply and distribution processes and concluded that it is essential that supply and distribution processes interface and mutually support the needs of the end user. To that end, the JS JIC solutions portfolio recognizes that key distribution initiatives, such as AT-21 capabilities, must be synchronized with supply capabilities to provide seamless support across supply and distribution processes. AT-21 offers opportunities to harmonize critical resource identification and tracking information. The AT-21 end-to-end distribution process orientation would provide JSE partners with key information and a means to maintain visibility over assets moving through government distribution channels and to coordinate their supply support activities. This information would support higher level planning and execution and provide a means to integrate the JSE with the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE).

From a JSE perspective, this system would provide a logical means to address information content and to drive harmonization among JSE partners when linked and synchronized with supply process information. In this sense, the JS JIC uses

the capabilities of the AT-21 to avoid process and systems duplications and to harmonize the flow of information and assets to end users.

Global Campaign Plan—Distribution

The 2011 Unified Campaign Plan, the 2010 Guidance for the Employment of the Force, and the 2010 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan assign USTRANSCOM responsibilities as the Global Distribution Synchronizer (GDS). As the GDS, USTRANSCOM is responsible for developing (through a collaborative, adaptive planning process) and executing the DoD Global Campaign Plan for Distribution (GCP-D). This responsibility is further assigned to the GDS Joint Planning Group with the responsibility to author, edit, and publish the GCP-D.

Through synchronized distribution planning, organizations will collaboratively ensure distribution capability and capacity to provide JFCs freedom of action. Distribution planners and stakeholders will: analyze the global environment; identify global opportunities, gaps, and mitigation strategies with respect to distribution threats; and identify seams and vulnerabilities. The GCP-D will document these strategies and identify specific actions to implement for infrastructure, access, relationships, and capabilities, integrating both regional and global perspectives and establishing standards to assess progress.

The JS JIC fills a key role in this initiative. Supply and distribution processes are mutually supporting. Vulnerabilities in distribution processes may be mitigated by effective, synchronized supply processes. The governance mechanism provides a means to ensure supply processes are effectively coordinated with distribution resources to meet the varied needs of functional and mission end users. In this sense, the JS JIC provides a means to facilitate success of the concepts and goals enumerated in the GCP-D and the ability of the GDS to execute against that plan.

Integrated Distribution Strategy

The Integrated Distribution Strategy (IDS) is focused on customer and stakeholder engagement and is designed to enhance warfighter support. Through the IDS, the distribution processes will be aligned to provide synchronized support to customer, stakeholder, and mission partner requirements. The IDS focus areas include geographic combatant command IDS, a whole of government IDS, a partnership with USTRANSCOM and executive agents, and Service engagement. As part of the IDS, USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM and USPACOM studies were completed and operational requirements were reviewed against physical distribution capabilities.

The JS JIC solutions portfolio supports the IDS in three primary ways. First, the JS JIC solutions portfolio provides a means, through the governance structures, to identify requirements and balance resources to most effectively employ distribution requirements. Second, the JS JIC solutions should improve the exchange of data between JSBPs and distribution management systems, enabling information sharing

and facilitating effective resource use. Finally, the JS JIC solutions portfolio provides an integrated forum that brings together the various partners within the tailored supply chains who provide the means to tailor and integrated distribution strategy in support of customer, stakeholder, and mission partner requirements.

Strategic Network Optimization

The Strategic Network Optimization (SNO) program is focused on distribution and disposal capabilities. The SNO program stems from the need to support DoD requirements for efficiencies and related savings in business operations and enable investment in force structure and modernization. SNO analysis supports DoD efficiency initiatives to conduct a 'clean-sheet review' to determine what DLA should be doing, where it should do it, and at what rank it should be done in keeping with the department's most critical priorities.

The SNO program seeks to identify and capitalize on logistics efficiencies that serve customers and save funds. As a part of this effort, the SNO program partners with DoD and non-DoD customers to provide recommended solutions to achieve the desired end-state of the next generation global distribution network. Key SNO program tenets include:

- Optimize global distribution capability using all channels–commercial, organic or hybrid–across the supply chain
- Strategically position and size distribution and disposal network capabilities to meet customer expectations at best value
- Leverage best practices and network optimization software tools in mission or strategy
- Pass on cost savings to the customer, or reinvest into optimization opportunities

The JS JIC solutions portfolio provides mechanisms that support the SNO program. The structure of the solutions portfolio provides logical interfaces between supply and distribution processes. The governance approach provides a mechanism to support tailored distribution initiatives and integrated supply/distribution support to the various supply customers. Finally, the governance approach establishes logical DLA responsibilities and focus areas within the overall construct of supply support. This approach sets conditions under which the SNO program initiatives can be developed and fielded in an integrated manner to achieve maximum customer support and financial results.

Comprehensive Materiel Response Plan

The Comprehensive Materiel Response Plan (CMRP) is a DoD initiative to examine Defense prepositioning programs. This effort examines how to effectively and

efficiently preposition stocks to enhance preparedness for a range of activities—such as major combat operations, security assistance, and humanitarian relief. DoD officials expect to complete this during 2012 and to provide additional guidance on its prepositioning programs.

The JS JIC solutions portfolio offers significant support to this plan. The governance approach links resources to end user requirements. The inclusion of JSE partners throughout JS JIC processes will provide additional insights into available resources and potential requirements. Taken together, the JS JIC offers a means to gain information and execute decisions in an efficient and effective manner.

Joint Supply Chain Architecture

The Joint Supply Chain Architecture (JSCA) is a DoD initiative designed to improve DoD supply chain effectiveness. The intent of this initiative, led by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness (ASD(L&MR)) and the Joint Staff J4, is to span organization boundaries and to institutionalize an integrated enterprise-wide, end-to-end supply chain.

The JSCA methodology provides DoD with an enterprise-spanning, end-to-end framework and common measurement system for optimizing the Department's supply chain processes to maintain or improve materiel readiness at best value. JSCA is not a software application; it is a framework for implementation and is focused on driving process improvements, enabling informed supply chain decision making, and facilitating communication and unity of effort across the DoD supply chain enterprise. The JSCA is a process reference model, derived from the SCOR model.

The JS JIC solutions portfolio directly supports the evolution of the JSCA. Development of the solutions portfolio employed SCOR model constructs which provides consistency between the JS JIC and the JSCA. The solutions portfolio provides a structural framework in which the capabilities of the JSCA can be fully realized. The networking and information transparency solution sets, for example, provide the capability within which the JSCA can be employed. The governance mechanisms provide logical constructs that would facilitate the application of JSCA concept. Finally, the primary JS JIC metric of POF conforms to the JSCA metrics and the JS JIC proposed solutions tie directly to those offices charged with the development of the JSCA metrics.

CONCLUSIONS

The JLEnt serves as the conceptual end-state for integration and/or synchronization of logistics capabilities across JIIM partners. The JS JIC describes the JSE as the supply component of the JLEnt, and the JS JIC CBA proposes a governance framework that provides the '***ways***' for resolving joint supply capability gaps and enabling joint supply operations within the JSE and JLEnt construct.

Establishing the proposed JSE governance framework will serve as an enabler for a number of logistics initiatives and a means to coordinate and resolve issues that cut across functional boundaries.

Chapter 9
Conclusions and Recommendations

This report concludes the solutions phase of the JS JIC CBA and describes actions necessary to "Operate the JSE" in the 2016 to 2028 timeframe. During this CBA, the CWG conducted two limited objective experiments, multiple senior leader reviews and subject matter expert surveys, a comprehensive and continuous literature review, and two wargames, all to objectively analyze the JS JIC concepts, identify shortfalls, and develop solutions. In particular, the wargames served to operationalize the JS JIC concepts in real-world scenarios to determine the viability of the concepts. The results of these efforts have been described in this report.

The JS JIC CBA evolved from the Director, Joint Staff's approval to develop a JS JIC. The resulting DLA and Joint Staff J-4 partnership developed the JS JIC and initiated the JS JIC CBA to explore the feasibility of JS JIC concepts. DLA and the Joint Staff J-4 formed the CWG to manage the JS JIC CBA process, including evaluation of the JS JIC.

The overarching complexity of the Joint Supply environment led DLA and the Joint Staff J-4 to focus the assessment objective for this initial CBA to the new joint supply capability proposed in the JS JIC - 'Operate the JSE'. The JS JIC defines this term as follows:

> The ability to work collaboratively with all partners and customers within a networked JSE, i.e., Net-Centric Environment, to attain real time global visibility of requirements, total inventory, resources and capabilities, share knowledge and information, conduct integrated joint supply operations and performance reviews, and when required, coordinate adjustments to the end-to-end supply process and capabilities to optimize performance for the JFC.

The Joint Staff further delineated the assessment objective by adding three study questions for the CWG to consider and answer during the course of the CBA:

- What are the joint supply business processes?
- What are the functions, roles, responsibilities, and authorities that will enable success in the joint supply business processes?
- Is the joint supply process owner an effective solution for supply capability gaps?

During the needs assessment phase, the CWG documented significant gaps in governance, networking, information transparency, requirements determination,

resource identification and tracking, and common metrics—all of which would preclude the effective operation of the JSE. These capability gaps were documented in the Needs Assessment Report (NAR) and provided the basis for addressing both assessment objectives.

CONCLUSIONS

The CWG carefully analyzed the findings from the NAR and developed approaches to address the capability gaps and underlying causes. Developing these approaches also enabled the CWG to evaluate and respond to the Joint Staff study questions.

Key Conclusions

The results of these efforts form the conclusions of this report. Key conclusions are summarized as:

- The JSE is a concept for achieving unity of effort in the absence of overall unified authority for operational control. It is a DoD construct to improve interoperability and efficiency in planning and execution of JSBP, while also enabling DoD supply operations to operate effectively with non-DoD supply operations partners.

- The Tier II JCA, ‘Supply’, does not represent a singular process. There is little evidence that operation of the JSE can be consolidated into a set of common business processes supported by a ‘single supply system’. The development and improvement of JSBPs can best be achieved by applying the concept of process ownership to network and optimize supply support along functional or capability lines.

- While gaps in networking and information transparency contribute to nearly all other joint supply capability gaps, the primary solutions approach is not developing new supply systems. Rather, it is to provide a means of organizing governance and management to promote unity of effort in the evolutionary development, improvement, and networking of JSBPs within the JSE framework.

- Current joint supply governance functions and authorities are insufficient to fully implement the proposed solutions portfolio and accomplish the JSBP changes required to set the conditions to operate the JSE. Specific roles–described in the solutions portfolio and the answers to the Joint Staff Study Questions–would be required within a capability-oriented governance framework.

Solutions Portfolio Conclusions

The solutions identified in the CWG analysis of capability gaps were organized into a solutions portfolio. This portfolio provided a structured approach to resolving identified gaps and enabling the JFC to 'Operate the JSE'. Those solutions, summarized below, improve DoD supply process synchronization and integration while expanding the supply process to include JSE partners.

Governance. The CWG concluded that a capability-based approach to organizing governance processes would be optimal to implement CBA solutions and operate the JSE within the broader JLEnt framework. A senior entity function would facilitate this approach, prevent 'stovepipes' of supply activity, and provide a basis for collaboration with other DoD functional and JSE partners. The CWG further noted that the resulting governance processes address underlying gap causes for both non-contingency and contingency situations. In other words, supply processes and systems should operate the same regardless of operational environment and/or tempo. In that sense, the Services and their component commands, as well as the Combatant Commands and JFCs, are the DoD supply process customers.

Networking and Information Transparency. With the governance framework in place, the CWG determined that networking and information transparency formed the next logical step in setting the conditions to operate the JSE. The CWG considered new development of major information technology solutions to be unfeasible (or impractical). Rather, this portion of the solutions portfolio proposes that the collaborative, capability-oriented governance framework would shape current ERP solutions and other supply management applications over a number of years to provide information transparency that supports improved JSBPs. The intent is to leverage emerging capabilities for information sharing in a net-centric environment to achieve transformational outcomes in an evolutionary manner.

Requirements Determination. For requirements determination, existing systems have capabilities to collect demand information from JSE partners, and future ERP systems provide a broader range of capabilities for demand planning. However, there are limitations as to when and how JSE partner demands can be used within the requirements determination processes to actually acquire assets. As a result, the CWG concluded that the demand information for requirements determination processes would predominantly be used for situational awareness and acted on only within the confines of existing legal and DoD regulatory boundaries.

The CWG also determined that DoD needs to develop a formal collaborative framework to guide the development and application of analytic tools across the JSE operations. This framework would provide a set of forums within which to examine and discuss analytic tools from a JSE perspective. In this environment, underlying analytic assumptions and analytic approaches can be assessed, harmonized, and synchronized across the JSE community.

Resource Identification and Tracking. The solutions in resource identification and tracking would leverage implementation of networking and information transparency solutions across supply and distribution processes from end-to-end to improve the JSBPs. This would enable authorities at appropriate levels to direct or redirect assets as required within the capability-based approach. In order to achieve this kind of a capability, the supply and distribution software applications would need to be coordinated to provide a common operating picture. Additionally, non-governmental supply process supporters (such as prime vendors and performance based logistics contractors) would need to be synchronized into this process. Together, this represents the CWG's recognition that supply and distribution processes—DoD, JSE, and suppliers—while different, must operate in concert to provide total logistics support to the end user.

Common Metrics. The CWG recognized there is much work already done in this area that should serve as a foundation for developing a common metrics framework. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain Integration has been leading the latest effort to develop metrics across DoD using the SCOR model. The CWG recognizes the value of using the SCOR model, a commercial standard for supply chain management, and has concluded that the SCOR model should also be used to ensure the broad interests of the JSE partnership are recognized and incorporated. The governance structure and approach would leverage networking and information transparency solutions to enable the collection of metrics data and a development of a common operating picture.

Joint Staff Study Questions

The Joint Staff study questions supported CWG development of this solutions portfolio. Through the CBA process, the CWG defined Joint Supply Business Processes, identified associated Functions, Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities, and evaluated the effectiveness of the Joint Supply Process Owner concept.

JOINT SUPPLY BUSINESS PROCESSES

The CWG concluded that JSBPs span the supply chain. They begin with planning, include sourcing and/or making, delivering, and returning (when required), and end with accurate payments, reimbursements, and posting of appropriate financial records. The CWG concluded that the JSBPs are:

- Anticipate supply demands with accuracy.
- Establish robust and reliable supplier networks.
- Provide visibility and control of materiel in storage and in transit.
- Respond rapidly to demand triggers.
- Link to financial processes.

The CWG also noted that the scope of JSBPs as described in the JS JIC spans from the source of supply to the point of employment–the point where supplies are consumed.

FUNCTIONS, ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND AUTHORITIES

Alignment of JSE functions provides a basis for discussing functions, roles, and responsibilities, since 'functions' describe the organizational constructs and 'roles and responsibilities' describe the performance of those functions. 'Authorities' establishes the functions, roles, and responsibilities in law or policy.

Using this approach, the CWG determined that two primary functions are the capability-base function and the senior entity function described in the governance solutions. Specific roles and responsibilities were described within the governance section. The CWG determined that authorities required to support this framework can be developed in DoD policy without the governance approach impinging on Service Title 10 or National Guard Title 32 responsibilities.

JOINT SUPPLY PROCESS OWNER (JSPO)

In order to assess the final Joint Staff study question, the CWG first defined a JSPO and then assessed a JSPO against the governance solution. In doing so, the JSPO concept could be objectively analyzed. The CWG determined that a JSPO (or an entity called by another name, such as a Supply Enterprise Manager), if established within the senior entity function construct, would be an effective solution for supply capability gaps.

The function of a senior entity would be to advocate, coordinate, collaborate, and assess the development and implementation of joint supply business process improvements. It would oversee the DoD capability-based governance structure and promote cross-functional coordination to ensure that supply processes are harmonized with other functions and with JSE partners in the broader JLEnt construct.

A senior entity would serve as a strategic partner in execution of Service Title 10 and Title 32 functions but would not subsume logistics responsibilities or organizations inherent to the Services. A senior entity would be responsible for the overall outcomes of JSBP improvements to support Service and JFC readiness and support JSE customers. Services would retain responsibility for readiness and their organizations/units that execute within the supply process.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The CBA conclusions provide a framework to implement solutions that would address joint supply capability gaps and set the condition necessary to operate the Joint Supply Enterprise (JSE). The CWG recommends that:

- The JROC approve the proposed JS JIC CBA solutions portfolio, to include a capability-based governance framework coordinated by a senior entity.
- Upon approval of this recommendation, the JROC or Joint Staff direct that an ordered assessment be conducted to develop courses of action to designate a senior entity and implement the capability-based governance construct.

Appendix A
CWG Charter

The CBA examined the specific joint supply capabilities and associated tasks that would enable the JSE to provide perfect order fulfillment and sustained joint supply readiness to the Joint Force Commanders. As co-sponsors and co-leaders of the JS JIC CBA effort, DLA and the Joint Staff J-4 established a Core Work Group (CWG) construct to manage the process. The DLA J-35 Strategic Programs and Initiatives Directorate and the Joint Staff J4 Capabilities Division were designated as co-chairs.

The CWG was envisioned to be an inclusive forum where interested organizations could participate in the JS JIC CBA. The co-chairs recognized early on that some formal structure was required to ensure that all relevant organizations were heard and that issues could be resolved in an orderly and fair manner. To establish this structure, the co-chairs developed a CWG Charter which they then socialized with the CWG membership. After concurrence by the CWG members, the co-sponsors formally signed the charter. That charter is enclosed in this appendix.

Joint Supply Joint Integrating Concept (JS JIC)

Core Work Group Charter

HQ Defense Logistics Agency
Strategic Initiatives Division (J352)
8725 John J. Kingman Road
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6221

Joint Chiefs of Staff
J4, Capabilities Division
Room 2C947, The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20318

LMI
Logistics Analysis Group
2000 Corporate Ridge
McLean, VA 22012

CHARTER

Joint Supply Joint Integrating Concept

Senior Panel and Core Work Group

1. **PURPOSE**. This document serves as the charter for establishing and operating the Joint Supply (JS) Joint Integrating Concept (JIC) management structure to include missions, scope, structure and reporting, and responsibilities.
2. **AUTHORITY**. This charter formalizes, for the JS JIC, the organization and governance responsibilities described in the Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) User's Guide, Version 3, March 2009 and the Joint Supply CBA Study Plan.
3. **MISSION**. The Senior Panel and Core Work Group described in this charter are collectively responsible for managing the JS JIC CBA. The primary objectives of this management structure are to:
   A. Manage the development of JS JIC CBAs:
      1) Determine schedules and timelines for CBA development;
      2) Review progress and make necessary changes to approaches, documents, and timelines;
      3) Evaluate results and documents for completeness and applicability; and
      4) Determine when and if CBA documents are ready for Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) review.
   B. Develop necessary documentation and approaches to support JS JIC CBAs:
      1) Analyze data and information in support of CBA development;
      2) Develop or direct development of key documents required for the various phases of the CBA; and
      3) Achieve necessary consensus on key approaches to CBA development.
4. **SCOPE**. The organizations chartered in this document shall be responsible for all facets of JS JIC CBA development, to include needs assessment and solutions recommendations, and all other activities and documents associated with a JS JIC CBA.
5. **ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE**. The organizational structure described in this charter is established to synchronize the combined efforts of all participants in the accomplishment of a JS JIC CBA. The management structure is divided into two separate groups: the JS JIC Senior Panel (SP) and the JS JIC Core Work Group (CWG). The attached chart (page 7) depicts the basic JS JIC support structure upon which this charter is based.
   A. **JS JIC Senior Panel (JS JIC SP)**. The JS JIC Senior Panel shall include both Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and Joint Staff J4 senior leaders who are involved in the JS JIC CBA process. The panel provides senior level coordination advice, direction, and review/approval for JS JIC CBA activities.

1) **Membership**. The JS JIC SP will consist of the following standing members:

   a) Co-Chairs. The DLA J3, Deputy Director of Logistics Operations, and the Joint Staff J4, Deputy Director for Strategic Logistics, will co-chair the JS JIC CBA Senior Panel.

   b) Joint Staff J4 Study Director (Chief, Capabilities Division)

   c) DLA Study Director (Chief, Strategic Initiatives Division)

   d) DLA J35 (Strategic Initiatives Division) (Secretariat)

2) **Meetings**.

   a) JS JIC SP meetings will serve as the forum to review and advise the JS JIC CWG on CBA development activities. Additionally, JS JIC SP approval will be required prior to JS JIC CBA documents moving forward through the JCIDS process.

   b) The JS JIC SP will convene based on the schedule developed by the JS JIC SP Chair and the JS JIC SP Secretariat. The Secretariat will publish the agenda and synchronize JS JIC SP meetings with other operational and logistics boards.

   c) The JS JIC SP will meet either in person or electronically by using the appropriate distance technology to support the meeting (i.e., teleconference, video-teleconference, etc). The JS JIC SP Chair will determine when distance technology is necessary. Once the decision is made to use distance technology, the JS JIC SP Secretariat will establish, coordinate, and disseminate the technology information and access codes to JS JIC SP members.

   d) The Secretariat will distribute all JS JIC SP correspondence, including meeting schedules, correspondence, and minutes. All correspondence will normally be distributed via email.

3) **Products**. JS JIC SP decisions will be documented in meeting minutes. The Secretariat will record the decisions and produce and distribute minutes within five work days of the meeting. Meeting minutes will normally be distributed via email to facilitate the rapid distribution and implementation of JS JIC SP decisions. JS JIC SP minutes will be provided to all members of the JS JIC SP and JS JIC CWG.

B. **JS JIC Core Work Group (JS JIC CWG)**. The JS JIC CWG is the key organization responsible for managing the JS JIC CBA process. The work group will develop and produce all schedules and documents associated with the JS JIC CBA. Organizational participants should be of appropriate position to make authoritative statements and binding decisions on behalf of their respective commands or organizations.

1) **Membership**. The JS JIC CWG shall include Core, Plenary, and Other Invitees / Advisory members. Representation will be determined and may be modified at any time by the Co-Chairs with concurrence from the membership.

   a) Co-Chairs. The DLA Study Director and the Joint Staff J4 Study Director will co-chair the JS JIC CBA Core Work Group.

b) Core Members. In addition to the co-chairs noted above, the Core Members will consist of the following standing members whose attendance, along with the co-chairs, will determine the quorum.

   i. DLA Strategic Initiatives Division (CWG Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) and Secretariat)

   ii. Joint Staff J4 Capabilities Division

   iii. Representative, Deputy Chief of Staff G4, Headquarters, Department of the Army (Army)

   iv. Representative, Deputy Commandant, Installations & Logistics, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps (Marine Corps)

   v. Representative, Director of Logistics (N4), Chief of Naval Operations (Navy)

   vi. Representative, Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Installations & Mission Support (A4/7), Headquarters, United States Air Force (Air Force)

   vii. Representative, Assistant Commandant for Engineering and Logistics, Headquarters, United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard)

   viii. Representative, Deputy Director, Strategy, Policy, Programs, and Logistics Directorate (TCJ5/4), Headquarters, United States Transportation Command

   ix. Representative, Defense Medical Logistics Enterprise (DMLE)

   x. Representative, Logistics Directorate (J-4), National Guard Bureau

c) Plenary Members. Plenary members have a standing invitation, ability to motion for a vote, and voting status when in attendance. Plenary members shall include:

   i. Representative, Assistant Administrator, Logistics, Federal Emergency Management Agency

   ii. Representative, Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, United States Department of Health and Human Services

   iii. Representative, Director of Emergency Management, Office of General Supplies and Services, Federal Acquisition Service, General Services Administration

   iv. Representative, United States Northern Command

   v. Representative, United States Central Command

   vi. Representative, United States European Command

   vii. Representative, United States Pacific Command

   viii. Representative, United States Southern Command

   ix. Representative, United States Africa Command

   x. Representative, United States Special Operations Command

   xi. Representative, United States Strategic Command

xii. Non-Governmental Organization staff representatives

xiii. Multi-National Partner staff representatives

xiv. Private Volunteer Organization staff representatives

d) Other Invited / Advisory Members. Other invited / advisory members have a standing invitation and ability to provide comment to the JS JIC CWG. These members can provide specific administrative and expertise support to facilitate the development of CBA products. Other invited / advisory members shall include:

i. DLA Operations Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA)

ii. Contract Support staff

iii. Other Organizations, as required and invited

2) **Meetings**.

a) JS JIC CWG meetings will serve as a forum to review and determine JS JIC CBA activities. The meetings will:

i. Review CBA status, including development and implementation;

ii. Communicate and coordinate issues and concerns about CBA developments;

iii. Review and revise milestones and timelines as necessary; and

iv. Assign tasks to members, including possible charters of subordinate teams.

b) The JS JIC CWG will convene based on the schedule developed by the JS JIC CWG Chair/Secretariat. The Secretariat will publish the agenda and synchronize JS JIC CWG meetings with other operational and logistics boards. Additional meetings will be called as required based on evolving CBA development demands.

c) The JS JIC CWG will meet either in person or electronically by using the appropriate distance technology to support the meeting (i.e., teleconference, video-teleconference, etc). For meetings that use distance technology, the JS JIC CWG Chair will establish, coordinate, and disseminate technology information and access codes to JS JIC CWG members.

d) The Secretariat will distribute all JS JIC CWG correspondence, including meeting schedules, correspondence, and minutes. Correspondence will normally be distributed via email.

3) **Products**. JS JIC CWG meetings, deliberations, and decisions will normally produce:

a) Meeting Minutes. The Secretariat will produce and distribute minutes within five work days of the meeting. Minutes will normally be distributed via email to facilitate the rapid distribution and implementation of JS JIC CWG decisions.

b) CBA Products. The JS JIC CWG will produce necessary documents in support of the CBA. Product development includes JS JIC CWG approval of these final documents.

c) JS JIC Team Charters. Because of the wide range of issues, the JS JIC CWG may find it necessary to charter subordinate teams that thoroughly analyze particular issues. As required, the JS JIC CWG will establish JS JIC Teams to address specific issues. These teams may be permanent or temporary.

6. OPERATING PROCEDURES.

A. Meetings of the SP or the CWG will be scheduled as noted in paragraph 5 above.

B. The quorum for full meetings of the CWG shall be the Co-Chairs or their representatives, and two thirds of the CWG Core members or their representatives.

C. Administrative support for meetings shall be coordinated as directed by the SP or CWG Secretariats.

D. The CWG will make decisions in the following manner:

(1) Issues requiring decision shall be moved for vote by any member of the CWG. If a Core Member seconds the motion, the issue shall be put to vote.

(2) Each member of the CWG shall cast a vote. The recommended disposition of an issue shall be determined by 75% agreement among the CWG voting members.

(3) Issues agreed to by the CWG voting members shall be recorded by the CWG Secretariat, coordinated with the members present for the vote, and submitted to the CWG Co-Chairs for ratification.

(4) The co-chairs will ratify or reject, by mutual consent, the CWG recommendation.

(a) If the co-chairs ratify the recommendation, it is carried forward for final review and/or action as appropriate by the SP.

(b) As appropriate for each issue, issues not ratified by the co-chairs will either be returned to the Secretariat for further action or referred to the SP for higher-level adjudication.

7. RESPONSIBILITIES. Key member responsibilities are described below:

A. All SP and CWG members are responsible for funding their own participation (i.e., all travel / TDY expenses, conference / meeting attendance, etc.).

B. **Senior Panel Co-Chairs.**

1) Review and approve meeting agendas;

2) Manage meetings;

3) Approve minutes and associated products; and

4) Ratify or reject CWG decisions.

C. **Core Work Group Co-Chairs**.

1) Review and approve meeting agendas;

2) Manage meetings;

3) Approve minutes and associated products; and

4) Submit CWG decisions to the SP.

D. **Secretariat.**

1) Develop meeting agendas;

2) Disseminate meeting agendas to members and set up meeting facilities;

3) Set up distance technology, as necessary;

4) Compile meeting notes and document action items;

5) Produce meeting minutes and submit them to the SP or CWG co-chairs (as appropriate) for review;

6) Record all CWG decisions and prepare them for submission to the SP;

7) Record all SP decisions, to include ratification or rejection of CWG decisions; and

8) Distribute minutes to members and interested parties.

E. **Senior Panel and Core Work Group Members.**

1) Attend panel and work group meetings;

2) Represent their organizations in the JS JIC CBA process; and

3) Participate in the JS JIC CBA process.

8. **CHARTER UPDATES**. The undersigned will review this charter annually. This charter will be automatically rescinded upon completion of the JS JIC CBA process, unless rescinded earlier by the joint decision of the CBA Study Directors or extended by the joint decision of the CBA Study Directors to facilitate future JS JIC work efforts.

9. **CHARTER APPROVAL AND RATIFICATION**.

Clyde R. Hobby 26/09/11

CLYDE R. HOBBY Date
Deputy Director
DLA Logistics Operations

James A. Hawkins 9/15/11

JAMES A. HAWKINS Date
Senior Executive Service
Deputy Director for Strategic Logistics
Joint Staff J-4

JS JIC CBA Support Structure



Appendix B
Literature Review

The literature review was developed to identify key documents supporting the work of the CWG in completing the JS JIC CBA. Fulfilling several key roles in this CBA, the literature review:

- Served as the repository for key JS JIC documents including the JS JIC, the JLC, and documents associated with the JS JIC CBA.
- Identified key strategic documents that described the future security environment and the planned DoD response to that future environment.
- Served as a means to collect relevant information for use in wargame development in support of the CBA.
- Provided supporting information that corroborated or further elaborated CBA findings.
- Provided additional supporting information necessary to guide the development of documents in support of the CBA.

It should be noted that the literature review was not meant to be exhaustive. Rather, the literature review was intended as a source to support completion of the JS JIC CBA. As such, the literature review was tailored to the areas of the JS JIC. Additionally, the literature review did not seek to duplicate information. For example, there are many sources that identify the same issues. Rather than include each, the literature review sought to identify key issues relevant to CWG deliberations. Finally, the literature review was a living document. While a basic literature review was completed early in the CBA process, the literature review was continually updated as new sources were identified. In this way, the literature review served as a ready resource that could support the CWG in completing the JS JIC CBA.

This appendix contains, in bibliography format, the list of references included in the most recent (31 May 2012) Consolidated Literature Review Report.

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Appendix C
SCOR Model

The supply-chain operations reference (SCOR) model was used extensively in the JS JIC CBA. This model formed the basis for all supply chain mapping and provided a means to lay out processes in parallel as well as compare processes across commodities and organizations. The CWG used the SCOR model to describe processes. Once the processes were described, the CWG used this basic structure to assess capability gaps and to assess and consider potential solutions. This appendix provides a basic description of the SCOR model.

The SCOR model is a process reference model developed by the management consulting firm PRTM and endorsed by the Supply-Chain Council (SCC) as the cross-industry de-facto international standard diagnostic tool for supply chain management. The SCOR model is a management tool, spanning from the supplier's supplier to the customer's customer. The model has been developed by the members of the Council on a volunteer basis to describe the business activities associated with all phases of satisfying a customer's demand.

By describing supply chains using process modeling building blocks, the model can be used to describe supply chains that are quite simple or highly complex using a common set of definitions. As a result, disparate industries can be linked to describe the depth and breadth of virtually any supply chain. The SCOR model is based on five distinct management processes: Plan, Source, Make, Deliver, and Return.

- *Plan*. Processes that balance aggregate demand and supply to develop a course of action which best meets sourcing, production, and delivery requirements.
- *Source*. Processes that procure goods and services to meet planned or actual demand.
- *Make*. Processes that transform product to a finished state to meet planned or actual demand.
- *Deliver*. Processes that provide finished goods and services to meet planned or actual demand, typically including order management, transportation management, and distribution management.
- *Return*. Processes associated with returning or receiving returned products for any reason. These processes extend into post-delivery customer support.

As with all reference models, the SCOR model is limited in scope to the following areas:

- All customer interactions, from order entry through paid invoice.
- All product (physical material and service) transactions, from the supplier's supplier to the customer's customer, including equipment, supplies, spare parts, bulk product, software, etc.
- All market interactions, from the understanding of aggregate demand to the fulfillment of each order.

The SCOR model does not attempt to describe every business process or activity. Relationships between these processes can be made and some have been noted within the model. Training, quality, information technology, and administration outside of supply chain management are not explicitly addressed in the model but rather assumed to be a fundamental supporting process throughout the model.

SCOR provides three levels of process detail. Each level helps a company define scope (Level 1), configuration or type of supply chain (Level 2), and process element details, including performance attributes (Level 3). Below level 3, companies decompose process elements and start implementing specific supply chain management practices. At this stage, companies define practices to achieve a competitive advantage and adapt to changing business conditions.

Appendix D
Authorities and Responsibilities Survey

Throughout the JS JIC CBA, the CWG developed and conducted surveys among the membership to collect data. In developing the governance approaches and the responses to the Joint Staff study questions, the CWG employed surveys to gain insights and to identify potential directions in the development of solutions.

The survey results in this appendix deal with authorities and responsibilities. This survey sought to identify areas where authorities and responsibilities exist, or do not exist but are needed, as well as identifying potential best approaches to managing processes.

The raw results of the survey are contained in this appendix. It is from these results that the CWG discussed potential approaches, developed potential solutions, and determined responses to the Joint Staff study questions. Finally, the data from the survey formed a basis for solutions development, but these results did not, in and of themselves, constitute the solutions. The CWG used the results to support the development of solutions and study question responses.

This appendix includes two spreadsheets. The first spreadsheet focuses on what CWG members said a JSE governance construct “should do”; the second spreadsheet focuses on what a JSE governance construct “should not do”. CWG members were asked to consider the potential responsibility in the far left column along with any explanatory remarks in the second column given by the person who originally proposed this responsibility. CWG members were then asked to select or propose the one word (“key word”) they thought best encapsulated this responsibility. CWG member responses were tallied and sorted to produce the final spreadsheets.

These two spreadsheets are organized alphabetically based on the “key word” chosen the most times by CWG members during the survey. Key words are shown at the top of the columns on the right side of the spreadsheets. The “should do” key words start with accountable and end with Responsible. The “should not do” key words start with accountable and end with WCF (for working capital fund). The grey row shows the number of responsibilities (left column) most often associated with that particular key word by a majority of CWG members.

The orange highlighted rows in each spreadsheet identify the small number of responsibilities for which a majority of CWG members disagreed with including that particular responsibility in the “should do” or “should not do” spreadsheet.

Authorities and Responsibilities Survey - "Should Do"

Responsibility	Original Submitter Comment		Agree	Disagree	Key Word Count	Key Word with maximum entries	Accountable	Advocate	Assess	Coordinate	Establish	Focal Point	Responsible	Other
	Comments below in this column were provided by the original submitter. ***Please do not add any additional comments in this column.***													
Within DoD, the JSPO, in conjunction with the Services, COCOMs, and JSE partners, is accountable for the outcomes of those processes			8	3		Accountable	4	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
Sustain, improve JSE supply processes, and coordinate the creation of new processes while being accountable for those supply process outcomes *(Class II and IX process management and sustainment responsibilities will be excluded, due to Service specific responsibilities).*			5	6		Accountable	2	1	0	2	0	0	2	1
The JSPO, in conjunction with the Services, COCOMs, and JSE partners, is accountable for the outcomes of those processes.			4	8		Accountable	5	1	0	0	0	2	0	0
The JSPO shall be accountable for the outcomes of those processes.			3	9		Accountable	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
					4									
Advocate improvements across all JSE partners and customers for optimized effectiveness and efficiency.			12	0		Advocate	0	9	0	1	0	0	0	0
The JSPO shall advocate improvements across all JSE partners and customers for optimized effectiveness and efficiency.			12	0		Advocate	0	9	0	1	0	0	0	0
Advocate improvements for and across all JSE partners for effectiveness, efficiency, and alignment relevant to joint supply processes.			12	0		Advocate	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0
Assist with process improvement studies, analyses, recommendations, and implementation relevant to JSE joint supply operations.			12	0		Advocate	0	5	1	1	0	0	2	1
A JSPO shall advocate improvements across all JSE partners and customers focused on optimizing effectiveness and efficiency.	A JSPO should be a collaborative entity that "advocates, advises, reviews, recommends, coordinates, synchronizes, etc."		12	0		Advocate	0	7	0	2	0	1	0	1
Advocates for coordination and synchronization of joint supply processes and capabilities with key non-DoD supply operations partners in accordance with Reference (JS JIC).			12	0		Advocate	0	8	0	2	0	0	0	0
Champion JSE supply issues within the JLE at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.			12	0		Advocate	0	7	0	1	0	1	1	0
The JSPO encourages and enables joint partnerships and teaming to minimize redundancy and improve flexibility among JSE partners.			12	0		Advocate	0	5	0	3	0	1	0	2
The JSPO shall foster a cooperative approach across all JSE partners and customers for optimized effectiveness and efficiency			12	0		Advocate	0	4	0	4	0	1	0	2
A JSPO will propose data standards across the entire JSE, and work to identify authoritative data sources.	Data standards are critical to information transparency.		11	1		Advocate	1	4	2	1	1	0	1	2
Advocates supply process improvements for and across all DoD Components for effectiveness, efficiency, and alignment that are relevant to the delivery and sustainment of functional capabilities requires by Services and/or JFC.			11	0		Advocate	0	8	0	0	0	1	0	0
Simplify business practices			10	2		Advocate	0	5	1	2	0	0	1	1
A JSPO will recommend an integrated or synchronized operational architecture, common standards, business processes, shared information, and decision support tools.	A JSPO should be a collaborative entity that "advocates, reviews, recommends, coordinates, synchronizes, etc."		10	2		Advocate	0	6	0	0	0	0	2	2
A JSPO will propose joint supply processes.	A JSPO should be a collaborative entity that "advocates, advises, reviews, recommends, coordinates, synchronizes, etc."		10	2		Advocate	0	5	0	2	2	0	0	1
Develop and implement joint supply process improvements that enhance the Defense Logistics and Global Supply Chain Management System in accordance with Reference a (Unified Command Plan).			10	1		Advocate	0	3	0	2	1	0	2	0
Develop, coordinate, review, and take maintenance actions necessary to integrate the JSE, including making policy recommendations to OSD with respect to Directives, Issuances, and Decision Memorandums, and issue other supply related guidance			8	3		Advocate	0	5	0	1	0	1	2	0
					16									
Advise national level authorities on the impact of decisions on global materiel readiness (e.g., repositioning supplies from one Joint Operating Area (JOA) to another).			12	0		Assess	0	1	6	0	0	2	1	0

Authorities and Responsibilities Survey - "Should Do"

Responsibility	Original Submitter Comment	Agree	Disagree	Key Word Count	Key Word with maximum entries	Accountable	Advocate	Assess	Coordinate	Establish	Focal Point	Responsible	Other
	Comments below in this column were provided by the original submitter. ***Please do not add any additional comments in this column.***												
Advise national level authorities on the impact of decisions on global, regional and theater supply readiness.		12	0		Assess	0	1	4	2	0	1	2	0
A JSPO will assess the risks and implications of national level decisions from global, regional and theater perspectives.	A JSPO should be a collaborative entity that "advocates, advises, reviews, recommends, coordinates, synchronizes, etc."	12	0		Assess	0	1	8	0	0	0	0	2
A JSPO will monitor and assess performance and make recommendations for improving joint supply readiness.	Performance assessment will be made against standardized metrics that are measurable and that then provide indicators to measure POF.	12	0		Assess	0	0	7	1	0	1	0	1
Monitor and assess joint supply performance to ensure joint supply readiness		11	1		Assess	0	0	9	0	0	1	0	0
Assess the risk and implications of supply availability for all classes of supply from global, national, and theater perspectives.		11	1		Assess	0	0	8	0	0	1	0	1
Assess the risk and implications of national level decisions from global, regional and theater perspectives. Advise national level authorities on the impact of decisions on global materiel readiness (e.g., repositioning supplies from one Joint Operating Area (JOA) to another). Maximize the effective application of limited resources.		11	1		Assess	0	1	7	0	0	0	1	0
A JSPO will advise national level authorities on the impact of decisions on global materiel readiness (e.g. repositioning supplies from one Joint Operating Area (JOA) to another).	A JSPO should be a collaborative entity that "advocates, advises, reviews, recommends, coordinates, synchronizes, etc."	10	1		Assess	0	2	5	0	0	0	1	2
A JSPO will conduct continuous supply chain risk assessments of JFC requirements and capabilities in collaboration with JSE partners and customers. The JSPO will conduct and report global assessment results in coordination with the JSE and JDDE and will make recommendations to the JFC on how best to position and manage stocks.	There is a federal initiative under Dept. of Commerce to assess risk in the US supply chain – this is an area where the JSPO should be fully engaged.	10	1		Assess	0	0	6	0	0	1	2	0
Establish or revise metrics in collaboration with JSE partners, OSD, and customers to measure supply effectiveness for the JFC. Metrics that measure the JSE's contribution to JFC effectiveness are the primary objective. JFC effectiveness shall not be compromised for the sake of JSE efficiency. The indicators of success are POF for DLA, Customer Wait Time (CWT) for the services		10	2		Assess	0	1	3	1	3	0	1	0
Provide benchmarking		9	3		Assess	1	1	3	1	1	0	2	1
Oversee the overall effectiveness, efficiency, and alignment of DoD wide joint supply activities supporting force projection, sustainment' and return/redeployment operations.		9	2		Assess	1	0	5	1	0	1	1	0
Assess the risk and implications of supply availability for all classes of supply from global, national, and theater perspectives		8	4		Assess	1	1	6	0	0	1	0	2
Monitor and assess joint supply performance to ensure joint supply readiness *(Class II and IX process management and sustainment responsibilities will be excluded, due to Service specific responsibilities).*		8	3		Assess	0	1	6	0	0	0	1	1
A JSPO will identify, understand, and anticipate JFC requirements by leveraging supply chain risk management strategies.	There is a federal initiative under Dept. of Commerce to assess risk in the US supply chain – this is an area where the JSPO should be fully engaged.	8	3		Assess	1	0	5	1	0	1	2	0
A JSPO will assist with JFC supply requirements planning to ensure supply capacity is identified to meet JFC courses of action.	A JSPO should be a collaborative entity that "advocates, advises, reviews, recommends, coordinates, synchronizes, etc."	8	3		Assess	0	1	3	1	0	0	3	1
				16									
Use JSPO governance structures to pursue supply process improvements through a transparent, repeatable process that facilitates making capabilities-based decisions for supply-related IT systems		12	0		Coordinate	1	3	0	5	0	0	1	1
Participate with the DPO in a mutually supportive relationship with common objectives, leveraging each other's authorities and capabilities to promote a cohesive and integrated supply chain		12	0		Coordinate	0	0	0	9	0	1	0	0
Establish or revise metrics in collaboration with JSE partners and customers to measure supply effectiveness for the JFC.		12	0		Coordinate	0	1	1	7	1	0	0	0
Establish or revise metrics in collaboration with JSE partners to measure supply effectiveness across the JSE.		12	0		Coordinate	0	0	2	5	2	0	1	0
In collaboration with JSE partners and customers, a JSPO will recommend changes to policies to achieve unity of effort and to resolve systemic barriers that negatively impact supply support.	A JSPO should be a collaborative entity that "advocates, advises, reviews, recommends, coordinates, synchronizes, etc."	12	0		Coordinate	0	4	0	6	0	0	0	1

Authorities and Responsibilities Survey - "Should Do"

Responsibility	Original Submitter Comment	Agree	Disagree	Key Word Count	Key Word with maximum entries	Accountable	Advocate	Assess	Coordinate	Establish	Focal Point	Responsible	Other
	Comments below in this column were provided by the original submitter. ***Please do not add any additional comments in this column.***												
Coordinate and collaborate with the JSE COI to establish a structure of governance bodies that meet regularly to develop, analyze, coordinate, and prioritize joint supply operations/commodity management improvement recommendations and business processes and rules to optimize supply support to the joint functional capabilities that drive supply demands.		12	0		Coordinate	0	1	0	7	1	0	1	0
Develop, in collaboration with all JSE partners, joint supply policy and metrics.		12	0		Coordinate	0	2	1	3	2	1	1	0
Coordinate and collaborate with the JSE COI to establish a structure of governance bodies that meet regularly to develop, analyze, coordinate, and prioritize joint supply operations/commodity management improvement recommendations and business processes and rules to optimize supply support to the joint functional capabilities that drive supply demands		11	1		Coordinate	1	1	0	8	1	0	0	1
Establish and implement JSE performance standards and metrics to monitor and improve the JSE performance		11	1		Coordinate	0	2	1	3	3	0	1	0
Be collaborative and cooperative		11	1		Coordinate	0	0	0	4	0	3	1	2
The DPO and JSPO shall leverage each other's authorities and capabilities to support a cohesive and integrated supply chain … JSPO shall ensure supply processes consider all ramifications of the		11	0		Coordinate	0	1	0	7	0	0	0	1
JFC effectiveness shall not be compromised for the sake of JSE efficiency.	This should be included in an earlier part of the report – not directly related to the JSPO.	11	0		Coordinate	0	1	0	3	0	0	2	3
A Joint Supply Enterprise (JSE) coordinated and synchronized by a Joint Supply Process Owner (JSPO) supports the CCJO call for improved joint Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) solutions.	A JSPO should be a collaborative entity that "advocates, advises, reviews, recommends, coordinates, synchronizes, etc."	11	0		Coordinate	0	2	0	4	0	1	0	2
A JSPO will not subsume logistics responsibilities and organizations inherent to the Services, but serves as a strategic partner in execution of their Title 10 and 32 functions.	This is a critical enabler for a JSPO – that Services will retain Title 10 responsibilities.	11	0		Coordinate	0	2	0	3	0	1	1	3
A JSPO and the DPO must coordinate in a supportive relationship with common objectives: joint sustained readiness, perfect order fulfillment, and effective/efficient distribution for the JFC.	A JSPO should be a collaborative entity that "advocates, advises, reviews, recommends, coordinates, synchronizes, etc."	11	0		Coordinate	0	1	0	5	0	1	0	3
Coordinating the operation of the macro-level end-to-end supply processes to ensure they function as designed.	Under this concept the JSPO would work closely with USTRANSCOM, as the Distribution Process Owner, as well as with each of the Services, CoCOMs, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational and non-Departmental JSE partners in an effort to enhance the JFC's unity of effort, JLE-wide visibility and to provide a rapid and precise response to the CCDR's needs.	11	1		Coordinate	0	1	0	7	0	0	2	0
Among JSE partners, the JSPO is responsible for collaborating with JSE partners to achieve a unity of effort		11	1		Coordinate	0	1	0	7	0	1	1	0
Coordinate and synchronize the networking of the JSE.		11	1		Coordinate	0	2	0	6	0	1	2	0
Have the responsibility for coordinating, sustaining, improving, and proposing joint supply processes.		10	2		Coordinate	0	1	0	6	0	0	3	0
Provide access to information		10	2		Coordinate	0	0	0	3	1	2	3	1
The JSPO and DPO must participate in a mutually supportive relationship with common objectives: Joint sustained readiness, perfect order fulfillment, and effective and efficient distribution for the JFC.		10	2		Coordinate	0	1	0	7	0	0	1	0
Establish data standards across the entire JSE, and identify authoritative data sources.		10	2		Coordinate	0	1	1	3	3	0	2	0
The JSPO has the responsibility for coordinating, sustaining, improving, and proposing joint supply processes.		10	2		Coordinate	0	1	0	6	0	0	2	0
Policy and governance will guide the activities of a JSPO outside the DOD. For example, laws such as Title 32 and policy such as the National Response Framework will guide JSPO authorities in a DSCA scenario. Interagency agreements defining DOD relationships with IA, MN, NGO, PVO, and commercial industry will be negotiated/ratified by appropriate authority.	A JSPO should be a collaborative entity that "advocates, advises, reviews, recommends, coordinates, synchronizes, etc."	10	0		Coordinate	0	2	0	3	0	1	0	3
Develop, coordinate, review, and take maintenance actions necessary to integrate the JSE, including making policy recommendations to OSD with respect to Directives, Issuances, and Decision Memorandums, and issue other supply related guidance		10	1		Coordinate	0	2	0	4	1	0	1	0

Authorities and Responsibilities Survey - "Should Do"

Responsibility	Original Submitter Comment	Agree	Disagree	Key Word Count	Key Word with maximum entries	Accountable	Advocate	Assess	Coordinate	Establish	Focal Point	Responsible	Other
	Comments below in this column were provided by the original submitter. ***Please do not add any additional comments in this column.***												
Establish, monitor, and improve joint supply relationships with the COCOMs, the JTF Commanders, DLA, USTRANSCOM, MHS, GSA, and the Military Services to promote integration of supply improvement efforts and performance standards in accordance with Reference (JS JIC)		10	1		Coordinate	0	2	0	3	2	2	0	0
Coordinate global and national assessments of supply requirements and availability with key non-DoD supply operations partners to promote understanding and prioritization within the National Response Framework (NRF).		10	1		Coordinate	0	0	1	7	0	1	0	0
The JSPO has the responsibility for coordinating, sustaining, improving, and proposing joint supply processes		10	2		Coordinate	1	2	0	3	0	0	2	1
Ensure continuity of effort		10	2		Coordinate	0	2	2	3	0	2	3	0
Oversee the overall effectiveness, efficiency, and alignment of DOD wide joint supply activities		9	2		Coordinate	1	3	0	4	0	0	2	1
A JSPO will coordinate and synchronize JSE Partner processes to accomplish assigned functions, responsibilities, and missions.	A JSPO should be a collaborative entity that "advocates, advises, reviews, recommends, coordinates, synchronizes, etc."	9	2		Coordinate	0	1	0	5	0	1	1	1
A JSPO engages JSE customers in order to understand their demands, and helps coordinate JSE processes to ensure responsiveness to JFC priorities.	A JSPO should be a collaborative entity that "advocates, advises, reviews, recommends, coordinates, synchronizes, etc."	9	3		Coordinate	0	1	0	5	0	0	3	1
Collect and coordinate appropriate processes, systems, and technical information needed to build and maintain the integrated Joint Supply Enterprise Architecture (JSEA) for the DoD.		9	2		Coordinate	1	1	2	3	0	0	3	0
Coordinating/synchronizing and if necessary re-engineering supply processes from the point of origin to the point of need/point of consumption in order to enhance the JFC's ability to sustain combat power over time, distance and space.	Defined as the lowest level commander who has the resources and responsibility to maintain and employ combat power to achieve the effects for his/her assigned mission.	9	2		Coordinate	0	1	0	5	0	0	2	0
Establish, oversee, coordinate, integrate, and synchronize the JSE supply processes to include operational architecture, common data standards, business processes, networking, and shared information.		8	4		Coordinate	0	1	0	3	2	0	2	0
Serve as a deliberate planner vice a crisis action responder		7	5		Coordinate	1	0	0	2	0	1	2	2
Sustain, improve JSE supply processes, and coordinate the creation of new processes while being accountable for those supply process outcomes		7	5		Coordinate	3	1	0	4	0	0	0	0
The JSPO can chair of the realigned DoD EA Offices and coordinate with a Whole of Government Office (to be established) on identifying initiatives.		7	3		Coordinate	1	1	0	3	1	1	0	1
Coordinate and oversee the DOD supply system to provide interoperability, synchronization, and alignment of DOD wide, end-to-end supply chain management		7	4		Coordinate	0	1	0	3	0	0	3	0
				39									
Establish a Joint Supply Enterprise (JSE) Community of Interest (COI) to develop, review, coordinate, and implement JSE capabilities, including Information transparency requirements		12	0		Establish	1	0	0	3	6	1	0	0
Establish a Joint Supply Enterprise (JSE) Community of Interest (COI) to develop, review, coordinate, and implement JSE capabilities, including Information transparency requirements in accordance with Reference (JS JIC).		12	0		Establish	0	0	0	2	5	3	0	0
Establish and implement JSE performance standards and metrics to monitor and improve the JSE performance.		11	1		Establish	0	2	2	0	4	0	1	0
Establish data standards across the entire JSE, and identify authoritative data sources.		11	1		Establish	1	3	1	1	4	1	0	0
The JSPO will establish an integrated or synchronized operational architecture, common standards, business processes, shared information, and decision support tools.		9	3		Establish	0	2	0	2	3	0	3	0
Develop and implement supply process improvements that enhance the JSE		8	4		Establish	1	2	0	0	6	0	2	0
Develop overarching strategy for whole of government logistics		7	5		Establish	1	1	0	1	4	3	0	1
Establish and administer a professional development certification program for Joint Supply Professionals consistent with the JCL call for "changes in culture, human capital development, and training in contingency and adaptive planning."		6	6		Establish	0	3	0	0	4	1	1	0

Authorities and Responsibilities Survey - "Should Do"

Responsibility	Original Submitter Comment		Agree	Disagree	Key Word Count	Key Word with maximum entries	Accountable	Advocate	Assess	Coordinate	Establish	Focal Point	Responsible	Other
	Comments below in this column were provided by the original submitter. ***Please do not add any additional comments in this column.***													
Establish business rules and processes to facilitate prioritization and a hierarchy protocol to ultimately enable automated redirection of supplies.			6	6		Establish	0	1	0	1	6	1	0	0
					9									
A JSPO serves as the focal point to establish JSE partnerships, shared information and programs that enable multiple organizations to achieve joint supply unity of effort.	This is a key element – the JSPO should be the main POC for JSE partners.		12	0		Focal Point	0	1	0	1	0	9	0	1
Provide advice for effective interagency coordination			12	0		Focal Point	0	1	0	4	0	5	1	1
The JSPO serves as the DOD focal point responsible to establish JSE partnerships, integrated processes, shared information and programs that enable multiple organizations to achieve unity of effort sustained supply readiness, and POF for JFC.			10	1		Focal Point	0	2	0	1	0	3	3	0
A JSPO may serve as the DOD capability area manager for joint supply support.	Must stay within CAM guidelines.		9	2		Focal Point	0	1	0	1	0	4	3	0
Serve as a supply technical advisor to commanders/heads of agencies at all levels.			8	4		Focal Point	0	0	0	3	0	4	1	1
Serve as the DOD capability area manager for joint supply support			5	7		Focal Point	1	0	0	0	0	4	3	1
A JSPO shall exist and function regardless of any external condition.			5	7		Focal Point	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	3
					7									
The establishment of the JSPO requires appropriate policy which designates the JSPO. The designation should include the codifying of roles, responsibilities, relationships, authorities, and resources to improve joint supply.			12	0		Other	2	1	0	2	2	0	0	3
Joint Doctrine must be refined to reflect a JSPO, procedures to coordinate joint supply within an enterprise construct, and address the nature of operations with IA, MN, NGO, PVO, and commercial industry partners.	A JSPO should be a collaborative entity that "advocates, advises, reviews, recommends, coordinates, synchronizes, etc."		9	1		Other	0	2	0	2	1	0	1	3
					2									
Serve as the DoD Joint Supply (JS) Portfolio Management (JSPfM) Manager for that subset of DoD logistics systems providing key capabilities in support of JSBP In accordance with Reference xx (Reference xx would be the DoDD establishing the JSPO). NOTE: There are several sub paragraphs of supporting responsibilities in the DPO DoDI that could be modified for JSPO.			10	1		Responsible	0	2	0	0	0	1	5	0
Also responsible for managing the JSEA in collaboration with the JSE COI and ensuring that The JSEA complies with the DoD Business Enterprise Architecture.			10	1		Responsible	1	1	0	2	0	0	5	0
Define roles and access rules to control access to the JSE information network.			9	3		Responsible	0	2	0	1	1	2	4	0
Focus is on responsibility for sustaining processes (not forces) and improving and creating new processes…and being accountable for those processes (not for the supply/sustainment of Service forces).			8	3		Responsible	1	1	0	0	0	0	5	0
Operate the JSE–This capability includes those tasks detailed under the Operate the JSE capability in the JS JIC Appendix C, Table of Capabilities, Tasks, and Measures.			7	5		Responsible	0	2	0	0	0	1	5	0
					5									

Authorities and Responsibilities Survey - "Should Not Do"

Responsibility	Original Submitter Comment		Agree	Disagree	Key Word Count	Key Word with maximum entries	Accountable	Authority	Business Rules	Coordinate	Global Supplier	ILS	Responsible	Synchronize	WCF	Other
	Comments below in this column were provided by the original submitter. ***Please do not add any additional comments in this column.***															
The JSPO should not serve as focal point for joint supply matters and is accountable for providing POF and sustained joint supply readiness to the JFC.			10	1		Accountable	6	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
Accountable for Service readiness			10	0		Accountable	4	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
A designated authority within the DOD joint supply governance structure shall not be accountable for providing perfect order fulfillment and sustained joint supply readiness to the JFC.			9	1		Accountable	7	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Be accountable for the outcomes of those processes.			9	2		Accountable	7	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
The JSPO is accountable for the outcomes of those processes.			9	2		Accountable	5	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1
The JSPO has DOD responsibility for establishing, implementing and improving joint supply processes, among JSE Partners, and is accountable to the JFC for JSE outcomes POF and sustained joint supply readiness. To achieve these benefits for the JFC the JSPO collaborates with all JSE Partners and Customers to ensure joint supply effectiveness. The Services shall involve the JSPO very early on in ILS planning, provide the JSPO with accurate requirements data for forecasting and sourcing the types and quantities of supplies needed, and engage in partnerships led by the JSPO to provide unity of effort in meeting JFC requirements.			9	1		Accountable	3	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	1
Be accountable for providing Perfect Order Fulfillment and sustained joint supply readiness to the JFC.			9	1		Accountable	5	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Manage defense working capital funds			9	2		Accountable	4	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
The JSPO is a designated authority within the DOD joint supply governance structure who serves as the focal point for joint supply matte and is accountable for providing POF and sustained joint supply readines to the JFC.	Joint supply governance is a JCS and OSD SCI role.		8	1		Accountable	3	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1
Serve as focal point for joint supply matters and is accountable for providing POF and sustained joint supply readiness to the JFC			8	3		Accountable	5	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
The JSPO has DOD responsibility for establishing, implementing and improving joint supply processes, among JSE Partners, and is accountable to the JFC for JSE outcomes POF and sustained joint supply readiness.	A JSPO cannot be accountable for final outcomes without infringement on Service Title 10 responsibilities. The JSPO would also need an organization and resources to enable the control needed in order to affect POF and SJSR outcomes.		7	2		Accountable	5	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0
					11											
Consolidation of supply management for common commodities and integration of JSPO capabilities inside Service organizations.	Service Title 10 responsibilities.		9	1		Authority	0	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1
Manage defense working capital funds and other resources within a financially-compliant information system that supports electronic financial transaction interchange between JSE Partners and Customers			9	1		Authority	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
The JSPO manages defense working capital funds and other resources within a financially-compliant information system that supports electronic financial transaction interchange between JSE Partners and Customers.	DWCF denotes a DOD-centric entity and view – Services are the bill payers.		8	2		Authority	1	2	0	1	0	0	1	0	2	0
The JSPO shall not exercises control of its own operational and strategic capabilities supporting the JFC, manages commercial supplier networks, and coordinates and synchronizes support delivered to and through enabled operational JSE partner organizations. The JSPO will coordinate directly with the JFC and Service Component logistics staffs to support contingency planning and development of integrated supply support concepts.			7	3		Authority	1	2	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	1
A JSPO as the head of a DOD organization designated to serve as the single DOD point of contact to coordinate and synchronize the end-to-end processes and capabilities necessary to provide all classes of supply support to a JFC.	This is accomplished via Service Component and GCC/JFC boards under DAFL.		7	2		Authority	0	3	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	0
The JSPO will define roles and access rules to control access to the JSE information network.	This belongs to the DOD and Service CIOs.		7	3		Authority	0	4	3	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
Establish business rules and processes to facilitate prioritization and a hierarchy protocol to enable automated redirection of supplies.	GCC/JFC already has this authority via DAFL.		6	4		Authority	0	3	2	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
					7											
Coordinate and synchronize the activities of JSE partners and enable them through management of supplier networks or strategic partnerships.			8	3		Coordinate	0	0	0	5	1	0	0	1	0	1
The JSPO exercises control of its own operational and strategic capabilities supporting the JFC, manages commercial supplier networks, and coordinates and synchronizes support delivered to and through enabled operational JSE partner organizations.			7	3		Coordinate	0	0	0	3	2	0	2	0	0	1
A JSPO must exist and function regardless of any external condition.			7	4		Coordinate	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
The JSPO coordinates and synchronizes the activities of the JSE partners and enables themthrough management of supplier networks, strategic partnerships, and its own assigned organizational capabilities. The JSPO also encourages and enables joint partnerships and teaming to minimize redundancy and improve flexibility among JSE partners.			6	5		Coordinate	0	0	0	4	1	0	1	1	0	1

Authorities and Responsibilities Survey - "Should Not Do"

Responsibility	Original Submitter Comment		Agree	Disagree	Key Word Count	Key Word with maximum entries	Accountable	Authority	Business Rules	Coordinate	Global Supplier	ILS	Responsible	Synchronize	WCF	Other
	Comments below in this column were provided by the original submitter. ***Please do not add any additional comments in this column.***															
The JSPO would not operate the JSE			6	5		Coordinate	0	2	1	3	0	0	1	0	0	1
The JSPO shall not coordinates and synchronizes the activities of the JSE partners and enables them through management of supplier networks, strategic partnerships, and its own assigned organizational capabilities. The JSPO also encourages and enables joint partnerships and teaming to minimize redundancy and improve flexibility among JSE partners.			5	6		Coordinate	0	0	2	6	0	0	0	0	0	0
The JSPO will coordinate directly with the JFC and Service Component logistics staffs to support contingency planning and development of integrated supply support concepts.			5	5		Coordinate	0	0	0	5	0	0	1	1	0	1
A JSPO coordinates the activities of the JSE partners and enables them through management of supplier networks, strategic partnerships, and its own assigned organizational capabilities.	A JSPO cannot manage supplier networks without an organization and resources to facilitate control.		5	4		Coordinate	0	0	0	4	1	0	1	0	0	1
Coordinate directly with the JFC and Service Component logistics staffs support contingency planning.			3	7		Coordinate	0	0	0	5	1	0	1	0	0	1
					9											
Serve as a global supplier			8	3		Global Supplier	1	1	0	0	4	0	2	0	0	0
As a global supplier, inherent JSPO responsibilities include the management and maintenance of robust supplier networks, management and visibility of supplies in storage and/or held under agreements by commercial partners.	To be a global supplier, a JSPO must be an organization with resources and control of materiel and supplies.		6	3		Global Supplier	1	0	0	0	4	0	2	0	0	1
					2											
A JSPO must exist and function regardless of any external condition.	There must be a precondition for JSPO existence – Services must show a wartime requirement for functions and organization – this presupposes a role without a defined external need.		7	2		Other	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	2
The JSPO exercises control of its own operational and strategic capabilities supporting the JFC, manages commercial supplier networks, and coordinates and synchronizes support delivered to and through enabled operational JSE partner organizations. The JSPO will coordinate directly with the JFC and Service Component logistics staffs to support contingency planning and development of integrated supply support concepts.	This connotes an organization with resources – DWCF organizations are funded by the Services through service level billing or cost recovery rates.		5	4		Other	0	2	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	3
					2											
Subsume logistics responsibilities and organizations inherent to the Services			11	0		Responsible	0	2	0	1	0	0	5	0	0	0
Responsible for tactical (unit level) sustainment			10	0		Responsible	0	2	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0
The JSPO also manages defense working capital funds and other resources within a financially-compliant information system that supports electronic financial transaction interchange between JSE Partners and Customers.			9	2		Responsible	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	1	1
Responsible for directing Service Title X resources (DAFL)			9	0		Responsible	0	2	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0
To this end, the JSPO is not responsible for coordinating and synchronizing JSE partners to deliver POF and sustained joint supply readiness To this end, the JSPO is responsible for coordinating and synchronizing JSE partners to deliver POF and sustained joint supply readiness.			8	2		Responsible	2	0	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	0
JSPO should not be responsible for Class II & IX parts	Class II and IX items have accountability, management, working capital, sustainment and complexity issues (TDP, CM, PICA, SICA and special tools). Additionally, the JSPO cannot be held accountable for POF and/or sustained joint supply action for these two classes of supply. The JSPO for these two classes of supply is not the manager and is not involved in the end-to-end supply chain process from initiation to delivery. However, the JSPO would be able to coordinate, collaborate, and communica whole of community/government supply requirements to the applicable Service for support.		8	2		Responsible	2	0	0	2	0	0	4	0	0	1
Be responsible for management and maintenance of supplier networks.			8	2		Responsible	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	1
The JSPO will establish and administer a professional development certification program for Joint Supply Professionals consistent with the JCL call for "changes in culture, human capital development, and training in contingency and adaptive planning."	This is a NDU responsibility.		8	1		Responsible	0	2	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	1
The JSPO shall not have DOD responsibility for establishing, implementing and improving joint supply processes, among JSE Partners, and shall not be accountable to the JFC for JSE outcomes POF and sustained joint supply readiness. To achieve these benefits for the JFC the JSPO collaborates with all JSE Partners and Customers to ensure joint supply effectiveness. The Services shall involve the JSPO very early on in ILS planning, provide the JSPO with accurate requirements data for forecasting and sourcing the types and quantities of supplies needed, and engage in partnerships led by the JSPO to provide unity of effort in meeting JFC requirements.			7	3		Responsible	2	0	0	0	0	1	5	0	0	0
The JSPO shall not manage defense working capital funds and other resources within a financially compliant information system that supports electronic financial transaction interchange between JSE Partners and Customers.			7	3		Responsible	2	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	1	0
Tasks to minimize "unnecessary" layers of inventory.	Too vague – this is an OSD SCI responsibility.		7	2		Responsible	0	2	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	1

Authorities and Responsibilities Survey - "Should Not Do"

Responsibility	Original Submitter Comment		Agree	Disagree	Key Word Count	Key Word with maximum entries	Accountable	Authority	Business Rules	Coordinate	Global Supplier	ILS	Responsible	Synchronize	WCF	Other
	Comments below in this column were provided by the original submitter. ***Please do not add any additional comments in this column.***															
Responsible for determining or directing Service resources (resides with COCOM)			7	0		Responsible	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0
As a global supplier, inherent JSPO responsibilities shall not include the management and maintenance of robust supplier networks, management and visibility of supplies in storage and/or held under agreements by commercial partners, and visibility of movement in synchronization with the DPO.			6	4		Responsible	0	0	0	1	3	0	4	0	0	0
To achieve this requires a JSE coordinated by proper authority to integra or synchronize and subsequently optimize joint supply processes, capabilities, and the application of resources to provide joint supply support to the JFC.			6	4		Responsible	0	0	0	3	0	0	4	0	0	0
Be responsible for management and visibility of supplies in storage or held under agreements by commercial partners.			6	5		Responsible	0	0	0	0	1	0	6	0	0	1
The Services shall involve the JSPO very early on in ILS planning, provide the JSPO with accurate requirements data for forecasting and sourcing the types and quantities of supplies needed, and engage in	ILS planning is part of the system acquisition process – within Title 10 and DOD 5000 responsibilities.		6	3		Responsible	1	1	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	2
					16											

Appendix E
Software Applications

In the main body of the report, the CWG addressed networking and information transparency solutions. The CWG concluded that the software solutions to be presented in the body of the report should represent requirements that the information technology (IT) community could integrate into ongoing initiatives. Consensus among CWG members was that many IT initiatives were unknown to the CWG, and the IT community would be best positioned to identify the optimal solutions to meet the needs of the capability gap solution requirements.

While the identification of requirements represents the solution approach within the report, this appendix attempts to capture the discussions and solutions approaches developed during CWG deliberations. Including this appendix provides additional insights into the requirements necessary to resolve identified capability gaps as described in the solutions portfolio. This appendix is not meant to be prescriptive. The systems identified in this appendix should be considered examples, but not necessarily the actual solution approach that should be adopted.

Potential software applications candidates may be spread across a wide range of systems. The CWG noted that full engagement of the JSE will necessitate use of systems that are web-enabled. Ensuring appropriate access both to the network and to appropriate systems and information will need to be controlled through security protocols. The CWG discussed solutions in three categories: transformational, evolutionary, and emerging.

TRANSFORMATIONAL

Rather than attempt to deal with networking and information transparency on a system-by-system basis, the CWG determined that developing a new supply processing and information exchange would be faster and more effective. This would be a tailored capability specifically designed to provide a common link between DoD and JSE partner processes.

The approach is to develop a process or system that overlays existing processes and systems. From a DoD or JSE partner perspective, there would not be any difference. The supply processing and information exchange capability would form a web-based interface or portal that allows supply information exchange between JSE partners and DoD organizations. This interface/portal would format data to meet the requirements of each organization’s systems. Key elements of this system are described below.

- The system would be built around the development of two major databases: a master supply data database and a master processing database.
  - The master supply data database would provide required data to enable processing non-DoD supply requests in DoD supply systems (e.g., unit identification code [UIC], document number, national stock number [NSN], and shipping address). It would use information from military Service data dictionaries, lexicons, part number-to-NSN cross reference files, and other appropriate supply data repositories to translate the request. Data dictionaries, common data keys, common lexicons, and logistics data warehouse information would also be available. Electronic data interchange or translation software would also be used.
  - The master processing database would contain information provided by all supply systems of the military Services, DoD agencies, and JSE partners, or a gateway entry to those systems. Non-DoD organizations would require customer codes compatible with the supply systems supporting the operation; they would also have been supplied with data from the master supply data database. Supply requests would be processed by the appropriate system depending on the requested item or other criteria (e.g., source of supply).
- The system would contain key management processes to assemble transactions into proper formats and to authenticate users.
  - Non-DoD transactions would be routed through the master supply data and master processing databases to reconfigure or modify the transactions according to JSE system requirements. This process would modify required data elements to ensure the transaction contained the data elements (e.g., ensure proper UIC, document number, NSN, and shipping address) that allow transactions to be routinely processed by the appropriate DoD system. DoD transactions would be processed automatically, without modification.
  - The authentication process would verify the requestor's authorization to order supplies (a code check would verify that organization is part of the operation), validate required supply processing information (priority, item number, shipping address, and other required supply process data elements), funding authorization, and other operational required data.
- Resulting transactions would be filled from normal sources of supply using standard processes. Similarly, transportation processes would allow shipment based on receipt of standard shipment release information.

- Both supply and transportation transactions would update the master processing database to support in-transit visibility and customer requests for information from a single database.

- Using metadata tags, supply transactions and information on assets can be used to generate supply reports and updates to user organizations.

DLA Transaction Services (DLATS) would be the logical organization to both develop and sustain this system. DLATS has historically performed these kinds of operations and has the management and systems expertise.

EVOLUTIONARY

The CWG recognized there are many systems currently in various stages of operation that would provide some of the capabilities required to resolve the identified capability gaps. Several of those systems are identified in this section.

Global Combat Support System–Joint (GCSS-J)

The GCSS-J is a DoD web portal that enables users at combatant commands and joint task forces to access joint logistics applications. The system supports planning, execution, and control for engineering, health services, logistics services, supply, distribution, and maintenance operations. Used in this environment, joint logisticians have the ability to view and access information for all commodities on their own user-defined operational picture. This capability is achievable via web service applications that allow systems to publish information for use by users.

GCSS-J is a robust system with the capability to provide a fused logistics information picture across the DoD. It has the potential to enable JSE partner collaboration and provides resource identification and tracking capabilities via web service applications, if JSE partners are provided access to the system and share/incorporate their authoritative data. Protocols, security issues, and training will need to be addressed.

Service/Agency Requirements Determination Systems (to include Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) Solutions)

The DoD employs multiple Service/Agency requirements determination systems. They are complex systems that may manage one or more commodities as well as many life cycle activities. Two activities are of particular interest. These systems collect demand information and determine whether assets are sufficient to meet demand. If not, these systems initiate actions to resolve shortfalls through repair or purchase. Additionally, these systems control or significantly influence retention decisions for existing inventory. Used in this environment, joint logisticians have the ability to view and access information for all commodities on their own

user-defined operational picture. This capability is achievable via Web service applications that allow systems to publish information for users.

Many DoD organizations are investigating or investing in ERP systems. These systems integrate many of the supply processes with other logistics and financial processes. Within requirements determination computations, ERP introduces a wide range of demand planning capabilities that can be integrated into Service/Agency forecasting tools. Under current schedules, most—if not all—ERP solutions will be implemented prior to or shortly after the operating window envisioned in this CBA. As a result, this solution portfolio will focus on ERP solutions.

ERP represents a future state for the individual Service requirements computation processes and systems. Communication between the individual Service and Agency ERPs is required to achieve the collaborative nature of the JSE. With appropriate policy guidance and interoperable business processes throughout the enterprise, ERP systems will employ JSE partner demand and forecasting information. Part of this effort is ensuring that ERPs capture logistics and sustainment costs incurred through all support channels, including but not limited to contractor logistics support, interim contractor support, and organic support. This communication between systems will enable demand transparency throughout the enterprise. This solution is not a proposal for a single ERP, but one to connect them in order to perform demand planning and demand visibility transactions that process smoothly.

The DLA Enterprise Business System (EBS) is an ERP solution that should be considered as a core part of any solution set. DLA manages many of the supplies and services required by the military Services and DoD partners. As a result, many policies that address collaboration in requirements determination would necessarily impact the DLA EBS. Accordingly, collaborating with this system could be essential to successful demand planning and forecasting interplay with JSE partners. EBS incorporates many ERP features that facilitate demand planning and collaborative requirements determination to include market research and more sophisticated demand collection processes.

Agile Transportation for the 21st Century (AT-21)

AT-21 is an umbrella program that integrates and governs end-to-end distribution and will provide key information sought by JSE partners. The focus of this system is enhancement of USTRANSCOM C2 structures, with emphasis on USTRANSCOM-to-commercial coordination. The key elements to this system include order capture, a transportation scheduling engine, and collaborative technologies, enabling a virtual decision-making environment. These elements are critical to information transparency, as they provide the potential for visibility of information and collaboration in order to obtain assets.

AT-21 offers opportunities to harmonize critical resource identification and tracking information. The end-to-end distribution process orientation would provide

JSE partners with key information and a means to maintain visibility over assets moving through government distribution channels and to coordinate their supply support activities. This information would support higher level planning and execution and provide a means to integrate the JSE with the JDDE. From a JSE perspective, this system would provide a logical means to address information content and drive harmonization among JSE partners.

Distribute.mil

Distribute.mil, an element of AT-21, provides an enterprise-accessible portal that enables smarter collaboration and greater situational awareness to realize faster execution of distribution processes. Its online workspace, on both Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) and Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) domains, organizes global distribution information in one place, available to the warfighter anytime. The portal is operator-oriented and can be user-configured to communicate with contacts from around the world through personal pages or within a community. Applications housed on the portal provide operators the tools they need to facilitate capturing, storing, and sharing knowledge.

The Distribute.mil portal offers an opportunity to network the JSE partners into a collaborative forum. Applications currently in use and under development will provide collaboration and workspace capabilities to synchronize processes between supply and distribution operators. However, protocols and security issues need to be addressed in order to facilitate access for IA, MN and NGO partners.

DLA Transaction Services (DLATS)

DLA Transaction Services designs, develops, and implements logistics solutions that improve customers' requisition processing and logistics management processes worldwide. DLATS missions are to receive, edit, and route logistics transactions for military Services and federal Agencies, provide value-added services for standard MILS transactions, and provide information about anything, anywhere, anytime, anyway, to anyone in the DoD and Federal Logistics Community.

DLATS access and support would facilitate JSE partner visibility over requisition and shipping status–key elements in resource identification and tracking. DLATS flexibility would enable JSE partners to collect key information about end user orders and track those requirements.

Defense Medical Logistics Enterprise System (DML-ES)

The DML-ES is a suite of DoD standard applications at both wholesale and retail levels that interoperate to support a tailored, end-to-end business framework for medical materiel. This framework provides a set of business process and supporting IT solutions for total life cycle management of specialized products and services required almost exclusively by the joint capability of *Health Readiness*. It

supports specific materiel needs of the Military Health System (MHS) for delivery of cost-effective, state-of-the-art healthcare worldwide in peace and war.

At the wholesale level (managed by DLA Troop Support), DML-ES supports acquisition and distribution programs that give MHS users in all operational environments direct access to commercial supplier networks using best industry business practices and electronic data interchange transactions. At the retail level (managed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Health Affairs), DML-ES provides discrete, interoperable IT solutions for Medical Treatment Facility (MTF), Service, theater, and tactical medical materiel management functions. The portfolio of DML-ES applications is collaboratively managed within a single DoD program management structure to ensure synchronization of user needs, ongoing business process improvements, and supporting IT requirements at both wholesale and retail levels.

The DML-ES continues the evolutionary development of these solutions. It incorporates net-centric, enterprise services capabilities to improve data and information sharing, close capability gaps, and promote greater agility and efficiency in the delivery of military healthcare in peace and war. These capabilities will improve visibility of Class VIII materiel in storage and in transit and support business strategies that promote flexibility in responding to Class VIII requirements for joint forces. DML-ES will enable an integrated, enterprise approach focused on the specific needs of a jointly interoperable and interdependent MHS. It will also facilitate sharing relevant, authoritative Class VIII data within the JSE and JLEnt and, as required, developing policies and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to enable other government agencies to be networked as customers into the DML-ES solutions.

In particular, selected DML-ES solutions could be extended to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in support of its role as lead federal agency for Emergency Support Function-8 (Health Services) within the National Response Framework. HHS currently does not have IT solutions to manage its medical sets or the sustainment of deployed medical teams. This would be a rapid and relatively inexpensive way to enable asset visibility and interoperability for ‘whole of government’ support to health services within the JSE framework.

Medical Contingency Requirements Workflow (MCRW)

Complete and implement the Defense Medical Logistics (DML) initiative to develop a Medical Contingency Requirements Workflow (MCRW). This effort is under the acquisition authority of DLA, and led by DLA Troop Support in collaboration with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) and the DoD medical services. A DML Requirements Review Team (RRT) serves as the collaborative body for developing functional requirements.

The MCRW initiative addresses significant gaps documented in the FCB-approved Joint Capability Document (JCD) for Joint Medical Logistics and Infrastructure

Support (JMLIS) regarding DoD capability to accurately forecast medical materiel requirements. The MCRW initiative will provide a joint process and supporting suite of IT tools to enable estimation of Class VIII requirements based upon the anticipated frequency & distribution of patient conditions and associated standardized, joint treatment protocols. It will support medical planning for various scenarios, types of operation, and population at risk (PAR). The MCRW is a key component of the Functional Executive Agent Medical Support (FEAMS) program intended to provide a single computation methodology for medical contingency requirements as described in DoDD 5101.9.

EMERGING

The CWG also considered emerging capabilities. In many cases, these operate in concert with existing systems and may not be fully recognized as JS JIC-related systems. The CWG concluded that these areas are important to the realization of the JS JIC constructs and the operation of the JSE.

Service/Agency Logistics Planning Tools

The Services/Agencies have developed a number of logistics planning tools that support demand forecasting. DLA has developed the Integrated Consumable Item Support (ICIS) model which provides ‘what if’ forecasting capabilities across several commodity areas. The Army employs OPLOG PLANNER as a planning tool that can estimate supplies required to support an operation. Another logistics tool, LOGSAFE, can provide planners the capability to estimate logistical requirements to support an operation. These represent the kinds of logistics planning tools available to support demand planning and forecasting in support of requirements determination.

As described in the policy section, these tools can be expanded to incorporate JSE partner information to assess implications of providing support to partners or populations other than DoD. This information will facilitate planning with JSE partners and enable whole of government risk assessment and development of optimum strategies for risk mitigation.

Evolution of these kinds of tools would require management oversight as described in the policy portion of the solutions portfolio. This oversight would facilitate synchronization of tools so that a broader set of commodities could be examined in the context of the JSE enterprise. Further, underlying assumptions in specialized commodity models could be harmonized to improve consistency of approaches across JSE partner demand planning and forecasting efforts. As a result, the JSE will have the ability to perform risk management/mitigation of requirements determination processes.

Applicable Service and Commercial Systems

The CWG recognized that there are a number of Service and commercial systems that must provide resource identification and tracking capability. Those systems must be identified and the associated capabilities included in the resource identification and tracking solution.

Appendix F
Full Sized Copy of Figures and Graphics

BACKGROUND

The CWG used Power Point figures to graphically depict concepts explained in the text of the report. Unfortunately, many of those charts are challenging to read in the body of the report due to size constraints when charts are embedded in the text.

Accordingly, this Appendix includes full page copies of each figure used in the report except for Figure 6-6. Figure 6-6 is not included in this appendix because it is composed of text only and is easily readable in the body of the document.



Figure ES-1. Illustrative Capability-Based Framework



Figure ES-2. Proposed Senior Entity Roles and Responsibilities

CWG Co-Chairs

Joint Staff J-4 Study Director
Joint Staff J-4 Capabilities Division

DLA Study Director
Strategic Programs and Initiatives Directorate (J-35)

CWG Core & Plenary Members

Representative, Deputy Chief of Staff G4, Headquarters, Department of the Army
Representative, Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
Representative, Defense Medical Logistics Enterprise (DMLE)
Representative, Assistant Commandant for Engineering and Logistics, U.S. Coast Guard
Representative, Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
Representative, General Services Administration (GSA)
Representative, Director of Logistics (N4), Chief of Naval Operations
Representative, Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Installations and Mission Support (A4/7), Headquarters, United States Air Force
Representative, Deputy Director, Strategy, Policy, Programs, and Logistics Directorate (TCJ5/4), Headquarters, U.S. Transportation Command
Representative, Logistics Directorate (J-4), National Guard Bureau
Representative, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

Figure 1-1. CWG Core and Plenary Members

Figure 1-2. Range of Potential JSE Support Requirements



Figure 1-3. Supply Joint Capability Area Tier III Functions



Figure 2-1. Joint Supply Enterprise



Figure 2-2. Notional JSE Partner Interplay



Source: Figure 8-1, CBA User's Guide, Version 3, March 2009

Figure 4-1. CBA User's Guide Solutions Process



Figure 4-2. Supply Chain Process Flow Overview



Figure 5-1. Capability-based Governance Framework



Figure 5-2. Functional Approach to Solution Implementation



Figure 5-3. Supply and Distribution Relationship



Figure 5-4. JSE Senior Entity



Figure 5-5. Networked Supply Chain Process Flows



Figure 5-6. Networked Supply Chain Process Flows with Requirements Capabilities



Figure 6-1. Composite Process Flowchart



Figure 6-2. CBA and JSE Outcomes



Figure 6-3. Joint Supply Business Processes



Figure 6-4. Functions, Roles & Responsibilities



Figure 6-5. Composite Process Flowchart



Figure 6-7. Joint Supply Senior Entity Roles



Figure 6-8. Joint Supply Senior Entity Roles and Responsibilities



Source: Figure 8-1, CBA Users Guide, Version 3, March 2009

Figure 7-1. CBA User's Guide Solutions Process



Figure 8-1. Key Joint Concept for Logistics Initiatives

Appendix G
Abbreviations

USAFRICOM	United States Africa Command
AIT	automatic identification technology
ASD (L&MR)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness
AT-21	Agile Transportation for the 21st Century
CBA	Capabilities-Based Assessment
CCJO	Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
CCMD	Combatant Command
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
CMRP	Comprehensive Materiel Response Plan
COI	Community of Interest
CSART	Combat Support Agency Review Team
CSER	Combat, Security, Engagement, and Relief and Reconstruction
CWG	Core Work Group
DASD(SCI)	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain Integration
DELC	DHS Executive Logistics Council
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DLATS	DLA Transaction Services
DML	defense medical logistics
DML-ES	Defense Medical Logistics Enterprise System
DMLSCC	Defense Medical Logistics Supply Chain Council
DMSWG	Distribution Management Strategy Working Group
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDAF	DoD Architecture Framework
DOTmLPF-P	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy
DPO	Distribution Process Owner

DSCA	Defense Support of Civil Authorities
EA	Executive Agents
EBS	Enterprise Business Systems
EDI	electronic data interchange
ERP	enterprise resource planning
FEAMS	Functional Executive Agent Medical Support
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FHA	Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
FR2A	functions, roles, responsibilities and authorities
GCP-D	DoD Global Distribution Campaign Plan
GCSS-J	Global Combat Support System–Joint
GDS	Global Distribution Synchronizer
GTN	Global Transportation Network
HA/DR	Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
HHS	Health and Human Services
IA	Interagency
ICIS	Integrated Consumable Item Support
IDE	Integrated Data Environment
IDS	Integrated Distribution Strategy
IGC	Integrated Data Environment (IDE)/Global Transportation Network (GTN) Convergence
IMSP	Inventory Management and Stock Positioning
IT	information technology
ITV	In-Transit Visibility
JCA	Joint Capability Area
JCD	Joint Capability Document
JCIDS	Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
JCL	Joint Concept for Logistics
JDDA	Joint Deployment & Distribution Architecture
JDDE	Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise
JDPO	Joint Deployment Process Owner
JFC	Joint Force Commander

JFCs	Joint Force Commanders
JIC	Joint Integrating Concept
JIIM	Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational
JLEnt	Joint Logistics Enterprise
JMLIS	Joint Medical Logistics and Infrastructure Support
JOA	Joint Operating Area
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JROCM	Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum
JS	Joint Supply
JS JIC	Joint Supply Joint Integrating Concept
JS JIC CBA	Joint Supply Joint Integrating Concept Capabilities-Based Assessment
JSBP	Joint Supply Business Process
JSCA	Joint SC Architecture
JSE	Joint Supply Enterprise
JSEA	Joint Supply Enterprise Architecture
JSPfM	Joint Supply Portfolio Manager
JSPO	Joint Supply Process Owner
L&MR	Logistics and Materiel Readiness
LSA	logistics supportability analysis
MCRW	Medical Contingency Requirements Workflow
MHS	Military Health System
MN	Multinational
MTF	Medical Treatment Facility
NAR	Needs Assessment Report
NGOs	non-governmental organizations
NIPRNET	Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network
NRF	National Response Framework
NSN	national stock number
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
PAR	population at risk

POF	perfect order fulfillment
RMG	Resource Management Group
RRT	Requirements Review Team
SCC	Supply-Chain Council
SCOR	Supply Chain Operations Reference
SIPRNET	Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
SJSR	sustained joint supply readiness
SME	subject matter experts
SNO	Strategic Network Optimization
UIC	unit identification code
USG	United States Government
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
WoG	Whole of Government
WRM	War Reserve Materiel