Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976

Documents on East and Southeast Asia: Document List

Document 1: Memorandum of Conversation, San Clemente, February 10, 1973, 10:05–11:30 a.m.

Agnew briefed the President on his recently completed trip to Southeast Asia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1026, Presidential/HAK Memcons, January–March 1973. Secret. A transcript version of this conversation is ibid. Nixon’s talking points for the meeting, which he received under a February 9 memorandum from Scowcroft, are ibid., Box 952, VIP Visits, Vice-President’s SEA Visit, 1/28–2/10/73 [3 of 3]. Nixon saw a memorandum, February 9, from Agnew, which is the written report of the trip. (Ibid., [2 of 3])

Document 2: National Security Study Memorandum 171, Washington, February 13, 1973.

On behalf of the President, Kissinger ordered a review of U.S. strategy for Asia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–196, NSSM 171 [1 of 2]. Secret. The undated paper in response to NSSM 171 was organized in five parts: first, an overview of the study; second, the questions raised for presidential decision; third, the issues involved in U.S. force planning for Asia; fourth, possible U.S. deployment postures in Asia for the FY 74–78 period; fifth, uncertainties in Asian trends and their potential force implications. Six issues were raised for presidential decision: first, the role of theater nuclear forces in support of conventional forces; second, maintaining a counterforce capability to reduce the PRC nuclear threat; third, whether the U.S. should encourage the ROK to seek a more balanced capability between its ground, air, and naval forces; fourth, the deployment of Marines on Okinawa; fifth, the deployment of the U.S. Army division in Korea; sixth, long term deployment planning for Asia. The paper is ibid.

Document 3: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, August 1, 1973,

Kissinger recommended that Nixon approve the issuance of a NSDM on military strategy for Asia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–242, NSDMs, NSDM 230, Folder 2. Top Secret. Sent for action. Nixon initialed all four “approve” options, regarding security assistance, strategy guidance for U.S. forces, U.S. deployment planning, and the issuance of Tab A, the attached NSDM, which when signed became NSDM 230.

Document 4: National Security Decision Memorandum 230, Washington, August 9, 1973.

On behalf of the President, Kissinger issued NSDM 230 providing guidance on future U.S. military planning for Asia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–242, NSDMs, NSDM 230, Folder 2. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

Document 5: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 21, 1973, 10:05–11:30 a.m.

Nixon met with Sunthorn and discussed SEATO and Thailand.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 2. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. The President’s Daily Diary indicates that it lasted from 11:38 a.m. until noon. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) Kissinger’s talking points, September 21, for Nixon’s meeting with Sunthorn are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 278, Agency Files, SEATO.

Document 6: Memorandum From Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, Washington, September 27, 1973.

Clements reported on his trip to East Asia.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0001, Korea 337, 27 Sep 73. Secret. The memorandum is stamped “Sec Def has seen. 29 Sep 1973.”

Document 7: Memorandum From W.R. Smyser of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, January 15, 1974.

Smyser warned of the likelihood of domestic dissent in numerous Asian countries and of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs’ tendency to meddle in such situations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1338, Unfiled Material, 1974, 5 of 9. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action. Kissinger did not approve or disapprove any of the recommendations on the last page but, near the top of the first page, Scowcroft wrote, “HAK has seen. Just watch the outgoing traffic carefully.”

Document 8: Letter From President Nixon to Secretary of Agriculture Butz, Washington, June 5, 1974.

Nixon replied to Butz’s report regarding his recent tour of Asia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 196, Agency Files, Agriculture, 1971–1974, Vol. II (Part 1). No classification marking. Butz’s April 24 letter to Nixon is attached but not published.

Document 9: Minutes of the Acting Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, June 17, 1974, 3 p.m.

John Norton Moore discussed Pacific archipelagos and the Law of the Sea.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 3. Secret.

Document 10: Memorandum From W.R. Smyser of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, July 18, 1974.

Smyser described the situation in Asia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1338, Unfiled Material, 1974, 5 of 9. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Near the top of the first page, Kissinger wrote, “Good job. HK.” A handwritten addition, inserted before the last sentence on the final page, indicates that Smyser, in a telephone conversation, asked for the addition of the following sentence: “Our aid people also continually try to take money from Asian programs for other purposes elsewhere.” The earlier message from Smyser to Kissinger, to which Smyser refers, was not found.

Document 11: Minutes of the Acting Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, August 1, 1974, 11:15 a.m.

Kissinger met with the leadership of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 4. Secret. The papers to which Sneider and Hummel refer were not further identified.

Document 12: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 1, 1974, 5 p.m.

Scowcroft met with Sunthorn and discussed Thailand and SEATO.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Agency File, Box 17, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Confidential. The meeting was held at the White House.

Document 13: Minutes of the Acting Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, May 7, 1975, 8 a.m.

Kissinger and his staff discussed East Asian reactions to the fall of South Vietnam.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 7. Secret. The discussion of East Asian perceptions of U.S. foreign policy was not resumed at the next staff meeting, which occurred on May 9, 1975. (Ibid.)

Document 14: Memorandum From W.R. Smyser of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, May 7, 1975.

Smyser provided options for reconsidering policy toward Asia.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–36, NSSM 226, Review of U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Solomon and MacDonald concurred in the memorandum. Near the top of the first page, Kissinger wrote, “Agree. HK.” Attached but not published is Tab I, the memorandum to the President recommending NSSMs on Thailand and Korea, which Kissinger drew a line through and wrote, “not necessary.” Also attached but not published is Tab II, the memorandum to the President recommending a NSSM on Asia, which Kissinger drew a line through and wrote, “Not required.” As Smyser recommended, Scowcroft, acting on behalf of Kissinger, signed two NSSMs on May 27. NSSM 225, Document 401, requesting a review of U.S. policy toward Thailand and NSSM 226, Document 268, toward the Korean Peninsula.

Document 15: Minutes of the Acting Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, June 13, 1975, 8–9:05 a.m.

Habib reported on his trip to Asia.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 7. Secret.

Document 16: Memorandum From Secretary of State Kissinger to President Ford, Washington, June 13, 1975.

Kissinger gave Ford a report on Habib’s visit to Southeast Asia.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 1, Southeast Asia (3). Confidential; Exdis. Attached and published is Habib’s summary of his trip report. Ford initialed Kissinger’s covering memorandum.

Document 17: Memorandum From W.R. Smyser of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, July 15, 1975.

Smyser wrote a memorandum to Kissinger on the situation in Asia and recommended that the National Security Council staff study a possible Presidential visit to Manila, Jakarta, and Singapore.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 1, Southeast Asia (3). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action. Kissinger did not approve the recommendation on the last page, but the correspondence profile indicates that on July 16 Kissinger made a decision in response to Smyser’s recommendation. In December 1975, Ford visited Jakarta and Manila but not Singapore. The memorandum from Smyser to Kissinger, which is also discussed in Document 18, was not found.

Document 18: Memorandum From John A. Froebe of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, July 21, 1975.

Froebe recommended that the United States resist an Australian initiative to terminate SEATO.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 1, Australia (5). Secret. Sent for action. Kissinger did not initial a decision; a handwritten notation on the first page of the memorandum reads, “OBE.” At Kissinger’s staff meeting of July 22, Habib said, “The Australians have pulled away from the recommendations to dissolve SEATO.” Kissinger asked, “Would it be so bad for us if SEATO got dissolved, as long as we don’t do it?” Habib replied, “I think it’s important—what the Thais want—because the Thais are the ones that receive—they’re the only members of SEATO that don’t have a mutual security pact with us. And the Thais have indicated that they want very much for it to continue. There may be a halfway step where you keep the Manila Pact, where you don’t have the SEATO organization itself.” (National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 8)

Document 19: Telegram 196461 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand, August 19, 1975, 1459Z.

The Department offered its views on the dissolution of SEATO.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Niact; Immediate. Repeated to Priority to Canberra, London, Manila, Wellington, and CINCPAC. Drafted by Gallagher; cleared in EA/RA, EA, and S/P; and approved by Sisco. Telegram 4467 from USUN, October 24, stated, “As anticipated, SEATO Council meeting of September 24 resulted in decision to phase out SEATO organization over period of approximately two years. FYI: Philippines made statement for record that both treaty and organization should be phased out together but as result of compromise between Thai and Philippine delegations, Romulo agreed that Philippines would remain silent on the Manila Pact.” (Ibid.)

Document 20: Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes and Richard Solomon of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, September 11, 1975.

Barnes and Solomon made recommendations on whether Ford should stop in East Asia before or after his trip to China, but Scowcroft responded that there would probably be no other stop.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 18, President’s Trip to the Philippines and Indonesia, December 1975 (2). Secret. Sent for action. The Department of State concurred in the memorandum. None of the recommendations on the last page were approved or disapproved, but, in the top right hand corner of the first page, Scowcroft wrote, “Probably will be no other stop.”

Document 21: Memorandum from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, October 16, 1975.

Lord summarized Armacost’s paper on U.S. Strategy in Asia.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–40, NSSM 235, U.S. Interests and Objectives in the Asian-Pacific Region (2 of 2) (11). Secret. In the top right-hand corner of the first page, an unknown hand wrote, “Mike Armacost gave me this thoughtful document.” On October 3, Armacost drafted the attached paper, which is not published.

Document 22: Editorial Note

Document 23: National Security Study Memorandum 235, Washington, January 15, 1976.

On behalf of the President, Scowcroft directed the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense to review U.S. interests and objectives in the Asia-Pacific region in light of military base negotiations with the Philippines.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–39, NSSM 235, U.S. Interests and Objectives in the Asia-Pacific Region (2 of 2) (1). Secret. A copy was also sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On September 2, 1975, Barnes sent a memorandum to Kissinger suggesting a review of U.S. policy toward military bases in the Philippines in anticipation of future negotiations with the Philippine government. On the first page of Barnes’ memorandum, Scowcroft wrote, “HAK wants the review in terms of our entire Pacific posture and interests—not just SEA.” (Ibid., Box H–40, NSSM 235, U.S. Interests and Objectives in the Asia-Pacific Region [2 of 2] [11])

Document 24: Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes, Richard Solomon, and Clinton Granger of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, June 1, 1976.

Members of the National Security Council staff prepared a memorandum in anticipation of an Senior Review Group meeting on NSSM 235.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–17, Institutional Files, Meetings (IFM), SRG Meeting, NSSM 235, June 4, 1976 (1). Secret. Sent for action. Attached but not published are Tab A, Scowcroft’s undated talking points, and Tab B, the major judgments of the inter-agency review. Tab C refers to the NSSM 235 paper. Section I of the NSSM 235 paper is attached but not published. Section II is ibid., Box H–39, NSSMs, NSSM 235 (1 of 2). Tab F, the proposed NSDM is ibid., H–91, SRG Mtgs., 6/4/76, NSSM 235, Folder 6.

Document 25: Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting, Washington, June 4, 1976, 3:10–4:08 p.m.

Scowcroft led a discussion of the NSSM 235 study.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–24, Meeting Minutes, SRG, Originals, June 1976. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. The text of Walter’s briefing is ibid., H–91, SRG Meetings, June 4, 1976, NSSM 235, Folder 6. Scowcroft received these minutes under a covering June 28 memorandum from Davis. Michael Hornblow drafted the minutes and showed them to a colleague on the NSC staff (probably Thomas Barnes), who wrote, “My principle reaction is tears at how the meeting went, but I have made only minor adjustments to the disjointed proceedings which I think you caught quite well.” (Ibid.) In lieu of a NSDM, on November 5, Scowcroft sent out a new version of Part I of the NSSM 235 paper to DOS, DOD, and CIA, and noted, “The attached NSSM response as revised is circulated as a useful reference for U.S. interests and objectives in the Asia-Pacific region.” (Ibid., Box H–39, NSSMs, NSSM 235 [1 of 2], Folder 1)

Document 26: Memorandum From John Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, February 1, 1973.

Holdridge informed Kissinger of Whitlam’s recent foreign policy statements.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 504, Country Files, Far East, Australia, January 1972–December 31, 1973. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum on March 20.

Document 27: Memorandum From John Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, March 1, 1973.

Holdridge informed Kissinger of Whitlam’s discussions with Suharto.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 504, Country Files, Far East, Australia, January 1972–December 31, 1973. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum on March 20.

Document 28: Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, March 3, 1973.

Green notified Rogers of improvements in relations between Australia and North Korea.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL AUSTL–KOR N. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Picard. Concurred in by Sneider and Ranard in EA/K and Hall in EA/ANZ.

Document 29: Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, March 16, 1973.

Rogers reported on his conversation with Plimsoll.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 504, Country Files, Far East, Australia, January 1972–December 31, 1973. Secret.

Document 30: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 2, 1973, 5:40–6:35 p.m.

Kissinger and Wilenski discussed U.S.-Australian relations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 504, Country Files, Far East, Australia, January 1972–December 31, 1973. Secret. The conversation took place in Kissinger’s Office at the White House. Kissinger’s talking points from Froebe, May 2, are ibid. Following the meeting, Kissinger instructed Rodman to send Nixon a proposal for a visit by Whitlam. (Memorandum from Rodman to Kissinger, May 3; ibid. [secret])

Document 31: Précis of National Intelligence Estimate 44-73, Washington, May 17, 1973.

[2 pages not declassified.]

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 362, Subject Files, National Intelligence Estimates [1 of 3]. Secret.

Document 32: Telegram 3139 From the Embassy in Australia to the Department of State, June 6, 1973, 0820Z.

Green described his and Barnard’s discussion about a possible visit by Whitlam to the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 7 AUSTL. Confidential; Nodis. Kissinger approved a memorandum from Froebe, July 6, which approved a draft State cable directing Green to respond orally to a confidential letter of June 15 from Australian opposition party leaders recommending that Nixon receive Whitlam. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 504, Country Files, Far East, Australia, January 1972-December 31, 1973)

Document 33: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 8, 1973.

Hay and Godley discussed the future of Papua New Guinea.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 19 NEW GUIN. Confidential. Drafted by Martin. On May 22, the Embassy in Australia transmitted telegram 2850 about the future of Papua New Guinea. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files.)

Document 34: Memorandum From John Froebe of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 11, 1973.

Froebe advised Kissinger not to meet separately with Whitlam.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 910, VIP Visits, Australia, PM. Whitlam Visit, July, 1973 [2 of 2]. Secret. Sent for action. Concurred in by Eagleburger. Kissinger initialed his disapproval of the recommendation.

Document 35: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 25, 1973, 5:04–5:28 p.m.

Kissinger and Plimsoll discussed Whitlam’s upcoming visit.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 504, Country Files, Far East, Australia, January 1972–December 31, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.

Document 36: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 28, 1973, 12:30 p.m.

Kissinger and Green discussed U.S.-Australian relations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 910, VIP Visits, Australia, PM. Whitlam Visit, July, 1973 [1 of 2]. Secret; Sensitive. The conversation took place at the White House. Drafted by Froebe.

Document 37: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 30, 1973, 10–11 a.m.

Kissinger and Whitlam discussed U.S.-Australian relations with particular emphasis on Indochina.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 910, VIP Visits, Australia, PM. Whitlam Visit, July, 1973 [1 of 2]. Secret; Sensitive. The conversation took place in Kissinger’s office at the White House. Froebe sent this memorandum of conversation to Kissinger under a covering memorandum, August 9. (Ibid.)

Document 38: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 30, 1973.

Nixon and Whitlam discussed U.S.-Australian relations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 910, VIP Visits, Australia, PM. Whitlam Visit, July, 1973, folder 7. “Top Secret” is handwritten on the top of the first page. The President’s Daily Diary indicates that the meeting lasted from 11:15 a.m. until 12:33 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) Drafted by Green. Nixon’s undated talking points from Kissinger, which the President saw, are ibid. [1 of 2]. Rogers sent a briefing memorandum to the President On July 26. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 7 AUSTL)

Document 39: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 31, 1973.

Rogers and Whitlam discussed the international relations of East Asia.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 7 AUSTL. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Moser; cleared by Sneider and Green.

Document 40: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, September 27, 1973.

Kissinger reported on Kirk’s speech to the United Nations General Assembly.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 934, VIP Visits, New Zealand, Prime Minister Kirk [1 of 2]. Confidential. Sent for information.

Document 41: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 27, 1973.

Nixon and Kirk discussed relations between the United States and New Zealand.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1027, Presidential/HAK Memcoms, April–November 1973, HAK & Presidential [2 of 5]. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Undated talking points from Kissinger, initialed by Scowcroft and seen by the President, are ibid., Box 934, VIP Visits, New Zealand, Prime Minister Kirk, Folder 4.

Document 42: Editorial Note

Document 43: Letter From Acting Secretary of State Rush to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, Washington, December 21, 1973.

Rush communicated to Schlesinger the importance of Barnard’s visit.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0001, Australia, 091.112, 1973. Secret. On bottom of the first page “22 Dec 1973. Sec Def has seen” is stamped, Rush received this letter for his signature under a covering memorandum from Sneider dated December 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 7 AUSTL)

Document 44: Memorandum From W.R. Smyser of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, January 3, 1974.

Smyser reported on a recent conversation with Marshall Green.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 505, Country Files, Far East, Box 505, Australia, 1 January 1974–. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes, Only. Sent for action. Kissinger initialed his approval of recommendations 1, 3, and 4, and his disapproval of recommendation 5. He left recommendation 2 blank.

Document 45: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, January 9, 1974, 11:30–1:15.

Schlesinger and Barnard discussed U.S. facilities in Australia, U.S.-Australian relations, and visits by nuclear powered warships.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0011, Australia, 091.112, 1974. Secret. Prepared by Doolin and approved by Peet. The conversation took place in Schlesinger’s office. A memorandum of conversation from Schlesinger’s meeting with Marshall Green, which lasted from 9:55 until 11:05 and included discussion of Japan and U.S. facilities in Australia, is ibid.

Document 46: Editorial Note

Document 47: Telegram 1262 From the Embassy in Australia to the Department of State, March 2, 1974, 0255Z.

Rush described his meeting with Whitlam.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 105, Australia, March–August, 1974. Secret; Cherokee; Nodis.

Document 48: Minutes of the Acting Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, June 14, 1974, 3:10 p.m.

Ingersoll and Sisco discussed the election of Cairns as Deputy Prime Minister.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 3. Secret. At the June 21 meeting, Hummel said that EA had changed its attitude toward Cairns’ election: “we think that the problem is really not our problem to solve. For one reason, we do not in fact give clearances for individuals in the Australian Government for the sensitive intelligence and defense installations. The Australian Government does that itself and tells us afterwards. So it is not up to us to clear or not clear Mr. Cairns. The problem is really the Prime Minister’s problem to solve. And I think this is the proper and mature approach. So that we don’t tear down the relationships we have by arbitrary action on our part, so that we don’t engage in spooky fiddling with the situation, in which we might get caught—in some of the other proposals that have been made. They are logical to consider, but we think not logical to carry out.” (Minutes of Under Secretary Sisco’s Staff Meeting, June 21, 3 p.m.; Ibid., Box 4)

Document 49: National Security Study Memorandum 204, Washington, July 1, 1974.

NSSM 204 directed the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense to review U.S. policy toward Australia in light of recent changes in the Labor Government.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Container CL 316, National Security Council, National Security Memoranda, Studies, June 1973–September 1974. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Hummel, the Acting Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, sent Kissinger the response to NSSM 204 on August 5, 1974. The study recommended preservation of the ANZUS alliance, encouragement of Australia’s stabilizing role as a regional power, and encouragement of “Australian foreign policies that harmonize with, rather than undercut, those of the US.” The study also advocated maintenance of US access to defense installations in Australia and careful regard for political pressure that may require their eventual relocation. The study is attached to a memorandum on NSSM 204 from Smyser to Kissinger, August 22, in the Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–12, Institutional Files, Meetings (IFM), SRG Meeting, August 15, 1974, Australia, NSSM 204 [1]) There is no evidence that the SRG met to discuss NSSM 204.

Document 50: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 1, 1974, 5 p.m.

[text not declassified in time for publication]

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asia & Pacific Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 1, Australia, February–September 1974 [1]. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House.

Document 51: Telegram 6178 From the Embassy in Australia to the Department of State, September 20, 1974, 0607Z.

The Embassy provided advice for Ford’s meeting with Whitlam.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Priority; Exdis.

Document 52: Editorial Note

Document 53: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, February 7, 1975, 1600–1645.

Green and Schlesinger discussed US-Australian relations.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0058, Australia, 091.112, 1975. Top Secret. Drafted and approved by Crowe. The conversation took place in Schlesinger’s office.

Document 54: Telegram 97105 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Australia, April 26, 1975, 0054Z.

The telegram described the ANZUS Council meeting held in Washington on April 24 and 25.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Priority. Repeated for information to Bangkok, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Seoul, Geneva, USUN New York, Vientiane, Jakarta, Port Moresby, London, Paris, Manila, Tokyo and CINCPAC. Drafted by Michaud, officer for the ANZUS desk; and approved by Zurhellen. The memorandum of conversation recounting Kissinger’s remarks at the afternoon session of April 24 is ibid., P–820125–0600.

Document 55: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 7, 1975.

Kissinger and Rowling discussed U.S.-New Zealand relations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P–820125–0393. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Knowles and approved by Covey. According to his daily diary, Ford met with Rowling from 11:06 a.m. until 12:08 p.m. on May 7. (Ford Library, Staff Secretary’s Office, President’s Daily Diary) During this meeting, Ford stated that the United States would continue to play a major role in the Pacific despite the fall of South Vietnam, but that it might reexamine its defense commitments if South Pacific nations enact a restrictive nuclear free zone. The memorandum of conversation from this Rowling-Ford meeting is in Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 11.

Document 56: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 7, 1975, 3 p.m.

Ford and Whitlam discussed U.S.-Australian relations in the wake of the fall of Saigon.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 11, 5/7/75. Confidential. Drafted by Habib. Ford’s talking points from Kissinger, marked, “The President has seen,” are ibid., Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 1, Australia [3]. Before visiting Ford, Whitlam met with Kissinger at 2 p.m. The memorandum of conversation is available in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P – 820125 – 0398.

Document 57: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 9, 1975, 3 p.m.

Kissinger met the Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asia & Pacific Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 15, Kissinger memoranda (6), October–December 1975. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Knowles and approved by Covey. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office at the White House.

Document 58: Telegram 260731 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Australia, November 4, 1975, 1706Z.

The Department of State instructed the Canberra Embassy to deny accusations that the US government had given donations to Australian politicians.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated for information to Wellington, Melbourne, Sydney, and CINCPAC. Telegram 7446 from Canberra, November 5, reported that this directive was accomplished.

Document 59: Telegram 8624 From the Embassy in Australia to the Department of State, December 31, 1975, 0601Z.

The embassy outlined Fraser’s views on politico-military relations with the United States.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Exdis. On November 11, Governor General Sir John Kerr dismissed Whitlam and installed Fraser as interim Prime Minister. Fraser won election on December 13.

Document 60: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 17, 1976, 12:45 p.m.

Kissinger and Peacock talked about world affairs over lunch.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P–820117–1629. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Squire and approved by Covey.

Document 61: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 8, 1976, 1400.

Killen and Rumsfeld discussed NATO, Diego Garcia, nuclear powered warships, Thailand, Philippine negotiations, Law of the Sea, Australian defense, and Papua New Guinea.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–79–0037, Australia, 333, Memcons (only), 1976, June–September. Confidential. Prepared by Houser and approved by McAuliffe. The conversation took place in Rumsfeld’s office.

Document 62: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 27, 1976, 10:55 a.m.–12:27 p.m.

Ford and Fraser discussed international relations.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 20, 7/27/76. Secret; Nodis.

Document 63: Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, October 14, 1976.

Hormats recommended that Scowcroft intervene in a controversy over proposed meat import regulations.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 1. Confidential. Sent for action. Concurred in by Gleysteen. Attached but not published at Tab A is Scowcroft’s undated talking points; attached but not published at Tab B is Fraser’s undated letter to Ford. Fraser’s letter concluded, “it is my firm view that the quantity of Australian meat to be permitted entry to the USA this year, should be in no way reduced below the level of 632.2 million pounds previously agreed between our two governments.” On November 6, Deputy Executive Secretary Frank Ortiz notified Scowcroft that Australia had been informed that its quota for 1976 was 632.2 million pounds. (ibid.)

Document 64: Intelligence Memorandum, Washington, January 31, 1975.

This intelligence memorandum assessed the potential internal consequences of a communist takeover in Cambodia.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79R01142A, Box 1, Life in Cambodia After a Communist Takeover. Secret. According to the covering memorandum, not published, the CIA prepared this memorandum for Habib. CIA briefing memoranda, “The Khmer Communists’ ‘Communal’ Campaign,” January 29, 1974; “The Rebellious Chams,” January 22, 1974; and “Problems in the Pagodas,” February 5, 1974, attached but not published.

Document 65: Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, April 30, 1975, 8 a.m.

Kissinger and his staff discussed the situation in Vietnam and Cambodia.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 7, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. Secret. Kissinger chaired the meeting, attended by all the principal officers of the Department or their designated alternates.

Document 66: Telegram 3140 From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State, May 8, 1975, 1150Z.

Chapman reported on developments in Laos after the Communist victories in Cambodia and Vietnam and asked the Department of State for guidance on U.S. policy toward Laos.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, State Archiving System. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated for information to Bangkok, Paris, and CINCPAC.

Document 67: Memorandum For Secretary Kissinger, Washington, May 2, 1975.

The White House Situation Room summarized the situation in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Files, Presidential Daily Briefings, Box 3, 5/2/1975. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword.

Document 68: Defense Intelligence Notice, Washington, May 9, 1975.

The Defense Intelligence Agency reported on the depopulation of Phnom Penh.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 3, Cambodia (17). Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword. Prepared by A. Burger in DIA. A handwritten note at the top of the unpublished covering memorandum from Stearman to Kissinger, May 12, reads: “HAK has seen.”

Document 69: Telegram 109710 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos, May 11, 1975, 0234Z.

Responding to telegram 3140 from the Embassy in Laos, the Department of State outlined U.S. policy toward Laos.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 12, Laos, State Department Telegrams, From SECSTATE, Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Rives; cleared by Habib and Scowcroft; approved by Kissinger. Telegram 3140 is Document 66.

Document 70: Telegram 3300 From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State, May 13, 1975, 1208Z.

Chapman responded to telegram 109710 from the Department of State on the future of U.S. policy toward Laos.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 12, Laos, State Department Telegrams, To SECSTATE, Nodis. Secret; Nodis. Telegram 109710 is Document 69. The Department of State report, “Issues Paper on Laos,” May 14, prepared by Rives and Henderson, contains lengthy coverage of the situation in Laos. According to a covering memorandum, May 14, the Department prepared the report, not published, for Secretary Kissinger’s May 15 meeting with President Ford. Kissinger and Ford did not discuss the topic on May 15. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 12, Laos)

Document 71: Memorandum From William Smyser and William Stearman of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, May 16, 1975.

Smyser and Stearman prepared this memorandum to guide discussions at a scheduled May 17 WSAG meeting on Indochina; the group did not meet as planned.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 27, WSAG Meeting, Indochina, May 17, 1975. Secret. A slash appears across the first page of the memorandum; a handwritten note at the top of the page reads: “Meeting Cancelled.” Tab A, Talking Points, undated, attached but not published. For Tab B, see source note, Document 70. Tabs C and D not attached.

Document 72: Telegram 122371 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos, May 26, 1975, 0049Z.

The Department conveyed a message from Secretary Kissinger to Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma concerning U.S.-Lao relations.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 12, Laos, State Department Telegrams, From SECSTATE, Exdis. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted by Zurhellen; cleared by Eagleburger and Huntington; approved by Kissinger. In WH 50942/TOHAK 009, May 27, Scowcroft informed Kissinger, then traveling in Europe: “The President was very quiet this morning. He was pleased to see that the Embassy in Laos would be reduced to less than 50 people. My impression is that he would be sympathetic to closing it down entirely.” (Ford Library, NSC Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 9, May 26–June 3, 1975, Europe, TOHAK, 1)

Document 73: Telegram 3953 From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State, June 3, 1975, 0725Z.

Habib reported on his visit to Vientiane.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, State Archiving System. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Habib visited Vientiane from June 2 until 3. The Embassy in Laos relayed background papers to Habib in telegrams 3864 and 3876, May 30. (Ibid.)

Document 74: Memorandum From William Stearman of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, June 6, 1975.

Stearman outlined U.S. options in Laos for WSAG consideration.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 12, Laos. Secret. Urgent; Sent for information. Kissinger’s initials appear at the top of the first page. According to an attached correspondence profile, Kissinger noted the report on June 9. The NSC staff scheduled a WSAG meeting for June 27 to consider U.S. policy toward Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand, but a handwritten notation in the June 27 WSAG Briefing Books reads: “HAK Cancelled.” (Ibid., Box 27, WSAG Meeting, Indochina, June 27, 1975)

Document 75: Memorandum From William Smyser of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, June 9, 1975.

Smyser summarized and analyzed the DRV’s May 28 message to the United States and recommended that the United States respond positively.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, General Subject Files, Box 34, Vietnam, Camp David File (2), 3/24/75–12/11/75. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only; Outside the System. The DRV message, May 28, and draft U.S. response, June 11, are attached at Tabs A and B but not published. Text of the messages are in Document 76.

Document 76: Backchannel Message WH 51044 From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to the U.S. Air Attaché to France (Oveson), June 11, 1975, 0627Z.

Scowcroft provided the U.S. response to the DRV message for Oveson to deliver to the North Vietnamese in Paris.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 11, Vietnam (11). Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

Document 77: Telegram 139334 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos, June 13, 1975, 2321Z.

The Department relayed policy decisions to the Embassy on the U.S. presence in Laos.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 12, Laos, State Department Telegrams, From SECSTATE, Nodis. Drafted by Rosenthal and Gardiner; cleared by Stearman, Crowe, and Shackley; approved by Habib.

Document 78: Telegram 160796 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos, July 9, 1975, 0129Z.

The Department provided additional details on U.S. interests in Laos.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 12, Laos, State Department Telegrams, From SECSTATE, Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Miller; cleared by Habib; and approved by Kissinger.

Document 79: Backchannel Message 0124 From the U.S. Air Attaché to France (Oveson) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), July 17, 1975, 0944Z.

Oveson sent the text of the DRV response to Scowcroft.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 11, Vietnam (11). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. On August 9 the DRV again contacted the Embassy in France with an offer to return to the United States the remains of three U.S. servicemen killed during the Vietnam War. (Telegram 20633 from Paris, 9 August, ibid.)

Document 80: Memorandum From Secretary of State Kissinger to President Ford, Washington, September 29, 1975.

Kissinger reported on conditions in Vietnam since the communist takeover.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Files, Presidential Daily Briefings, Box 5, 9/29/1975. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword. In New York on September 28, Kissinger discussed Indochina with PRC Foreign Minister Ch’iao Kuan-hua. (See memorandum of conversation, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Vol. XVIII, China, 1973–1976, Document 119)

Document 81: Memorandum From Secretary of State Kissinger to President Ford, Washington, November 3, 1975.

[text not declassified in time for publication]

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Files, Presidential Daily Briefings, Box 5, 11/3/1975. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword.

Document 82: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Secretary of State Kissinger, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Secretary of Treasury Simon, and the Director of Central Intelligence (Colby), Washington, November 18, 1975.

Scowcroft requested studies with recommendations on U.S. policy concerning American arms captured in Indochina.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 16, SRG Meeting, Taiwan, February 27, 1976 (3). Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Document 83: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, December 17, 1975, noon.

President Ford discussed U.S.-Vietnamese relations and MIA issues with congressional representatives going to Hanoi.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 17, Chronological File. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. Brackets are in the original.

Document 84: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford, Washington, January 19, 1976.

Scowcroft summarized for President Ford a Department of State report on conditions in South Vietnam.

Source: Ford Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box 59, CO 165–2, Vietnam (South). Confidential. Sent for information. Ford initialed the first page of the memorandum; a notation at the top of the document reads: “The President has seen.” Airgram 313 from Bangkok, December 16, 1975, is attached but not published.

Document 85: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, January 26, 1976, 4:43–5:30 p.m.

Members of the House Select Committee on MIAs reported to President Ford on their trip to North Vietnam.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 17, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. Brackets are in the original. Article 21 of the January 1973 Paris Agreement involved postwar reconstruction.

Document 86: Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting, Washington, February 27, 1976, 3:40–4:02 p.m.

Members of the SRG discussed problems related to U.S. equipment captured in Vietnam.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), SRG Meeting Minutes, Originals, February 1976 (2). Top Secret. Briefing book, with documents requested by Scowcroft on November 18, 1975, is ibid., Box 16, SRG Meeting, Taiwan, February 27, 1976 (3).

Document 87: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford, Washington, March 29, 1976.

Scowcroft encouraged President Ford to approve the March 6 Senior Review Group policy recommendations on the sale of American arms captured in Vietnam. Scowcroft also asked the President to approve a NSDM on the issue.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), NSDM Files, Box 64, NSDM 322, American Equipment Captured in Indochina (3). Secret. Sent for action. Ford initialed his approval on page 5. A notation at the top of the first page reads: “The President has seen.” Tab A, a draft NSDM, undated; and Tab B, Department of State report, “American Arms Captured in Indochina,” undated, are attached but not published. For the NSDM as approved, see Document 88.

Document 88: National Security Decision Memorandum 322, Washington, March 31, 1976.

Statement on U.S. policy regarding American equipment captured in Indochina.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), NSDM Files, Box 64, NSDM 322, American Equipment Captured in Indochina (3). Secret. Copies were sent to the Attorney General, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Document 89: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford, Washington, May 10, 1976.

Scowcroft summarized for President Ford a Department of State report on life inside Cambodia.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 3, Cambodia (23). Confidential. Sent for information. Ford initialed the first page of the memorandum; a notation at the top of the document reads: “The President Has Seen.” Tab A, Airgram 74 from Bangkok, March 31, is attached but not printed. The NSC staff prepared a second report, “Life Inside Cambodia,” May 29, from unclassified sources for public dissemination. (Ibid., White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box 10, CO 26, Khmer Republic, Cambodia) Kissinger discussed Southeast Asian issues, including the Cambodian internal situation, with Australian Prime Minister Fraser on July 27. (See Document 62)

Document 90: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford, Washington, July 10, 1976.

Scowcroft summarized for President Ford the experiences of refugees fleeing Vietnam.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 20, Vietnam (30). Confidential. Sent for information. Ford initialed the first page of the memorandum; a notation at the top of the document reads: “The President Has Seen.” Tab A, Airgram 136 from Bangkok, June 16, attached but not published. A related NSC report, “Assessment of Developments in Indochina Since the End of the War,” July 15, requested by the President, offers a detailed appraisal of the situation in Southeast Asia. (Ibid., Box 1, Southeast Asia, 7)

Document 91: Telegram 33637 From the Embassy in France to the Department of State, November 12, 1976, 1805Z.

A summary of the November 12 meeting between Vietnamese and Embassy officials in Paris.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, General Subject Files, Box 34, Vietnam War, Camp David Files (3), 12/12/75–12/15/76. Secret; Flash; Exdis. In telegram 72569 to Paris, March 25, Kissinger sent a note to the DRV on the establishment of relations. (National Archives, Record Group 59, State Archiving System) On August 30, Kissinger approached Ford: “We got a note from Vietnam. Do you want meetings? We would say it was for the MIA’s.” The President responded: “As long as that cast was put on it.” Kissinger finished: “They would raise other things. But we could stick with MIA’s. Of course we could drag it out, and certainly no conclusion would come before November.” (Ibid., National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 20, Chronological File)

Document 92: Telegram 290657 From the Department of State to the Embassy in France, November 27, 1976, 1612Z.

The Department of State sent instructions for another meeting with the Vietnamese.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, General Subject Files, Box 34, Vietnam War, Camp David Files (3), 12/12/75–12/15/76. Confidential; Priority; Exdis.

Document 93: Telegram 35242 From the Embassy in France to the Department of State, November 29, 1976, 1805Z.

A report on the November 29 meeting between Vietnamese and Embassy officials in Paris.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, General Subject Files, Box 34, Vietnam War, Camp David Files (3), 12/12/75–12/15/76. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Telegram 290657 to Paris, November 27, is Document 92.

Document 94: Telegram 37000 From the Embassy in France to the Department of State, December 15, 1976, 1242Z.

Report on the December 15 meeting between Vietnamese and Embassy officials in Paris.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, General Subject Files, Box 34, Vietnam War, Camp David Files (3), 12/12/75–12/15/76. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Telegram 35242 from Paris, November 29, is Document 93. The Department of State did not respond to this message; no evidence of a January 10 meeting has been found.

Document 95: Research Study Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, December 1976.

The Office of Political Research assessment of the internal situation in Cambodia.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, Job 79T00889A, Box 9, “Democratic Cambodia: An Experiment in Radicalism.” Secret.

Document 96: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 24, 1973, 1405–1430.

Eagleburger and Galbraith discussed U.S. relations with Indonesia.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–76–117, Indonesia, 333, 1973, May 2. Secret. Drafted by Shaid and approved by Doolin. The conversation took place in Eagleburger’s office. Eagleburger’s talking points for the meeting are ibid. On April 25, Kissinger disapproved a recommendation that he meet with Galbraith. (Memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, April 23; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Far East, Box 533, Indonesia, Volume 4, 1 January 1973–)

Document 97: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 15, 1973, 4:30 p.m.

Scowcroft and Hasnan Habib discussed intergovernmental communication, military assistance, Indochina, the Sino-Soviet conflict, and Watergate.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Far East, Box 533, Indonesia, Volume 4, 1 January 1973–. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in Scowcroft’s office. John Froebe gave Scowcroft’s talking points, May 15, which began, “You have agreed to meet with General Hasnan Habib, aide to General Sumitro (the number three man in Indonesia), today at 4:30 p.m. As you know, General Sumitro maintains contact with Dr. Kissinger as the special channel of communication between President Suharto and the President.” (Ibid.)

Document 98: Letter From President Nixon to Indonesian President Suharto, Washington, July 12, 1973.

Nixon replied to Suharto’s request for three destroyer escorts.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence, Indonesia, Suharto [1970 –1974]. No classification marking. On August 7, Clements informed Kissinger that the Department of Defense would be able to transfer the destroyer escorts to Indonesia “approximately within the time frame desired.” (Ibid., Country Files, Far East, Box 533, Indonesia, Volume 4, 1 January 1973–)

Document 99: Letter From Ambassador Galbraith to Secretary of State Designate Kissinger, Washington, September 5, 1973.

Galbraith reported on the situation in Indonesia and asked to remain on as ambassador.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Far East, Box 533, Indonesia, Volume 4, 1 January 1973–. Confidential; Eyes Only; Personal. David Newsom replaced Galbraith as Ambassador in February 1974.

Document 100: Memorandum of Conversation, New York, October 4, 1973, 5:30–6 p.m.

Kissinger and Malik discussed Indochina, foreign aid, and the Middle East.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 533, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Volume 4, 1 January 1973–. Secret; Exdis. The meeting was held in apartment 35A at the Waldorf Towers. Cleared by Hummel and approved by Bremer. Talking points for this meeting are ibid.

Document 101: Memorandum From Charles A. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, November 24, 1973.

Cooper suggested that Kissinger send a backchannel cable about the level of aid to Indonesia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 533, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Volume 4, 1 January 1973–. Secret. Sent for urgent action. At the top of the document Scowcroft wrote, “Cable sent. BS.” The draft backchannel message is attached but not published. The backchannel message as sent to Galbraith, November 25, is ibid., Box 411, Backchannel Messages, Southeast Asia, Volume II, 1973, Part 1. Galbraith’s backchannel response, November 30, is also ibid.

Document 102: Memorandum From Charles A. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, December 4, 1973.

Cooper reported to Kissinger on Suharto’s decision about the level of aid to Indonesia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 533, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Volume 4, 1 January 1973–. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum. Attached Tab A is Galbraith’s backchannel message of December 3; attached Tab B is Kissinger’s November 25 backchannel to Galbraith; Tab C was not attached.

Document 103: Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Rush to President Nixon, Washington, January 16, 1974.

Rush recommended that Nixon send Suharto a letter on the Law of the Sea negotiations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence, Indonesia, Suharto [1970–1974]. Secret. The proposed letter, not attached, is Document 106.

Document 104: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, January 22, 1974, 1100–1130.

Newsom met with Department of Defense officials and discussed the Law of the Sea, military aid, and military liaison with Indonesia.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–77–0054, Indonesia, 333, 1974, January 31. Secret. Drafted by Shaid and approved by Peet. The conversation took place in the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Document 105: Telegram 1100 From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, January 26, 1974, 0304Z.

The embassy analyzed the Indonesian government’s view on oil prices.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Exdis. Repeated for information to Abu Dhabi, Caracas, Kuwait, London, Rome, Tehran, Jidda, and Tripoli.

Document 106: Letter From President Nixon to Indonesian President Suharto, Washington, February 1, 1974.

Nixon offered to send a delegation to Jakarta to discuss the Law of the Sea.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence, Indonesia, Suharto [1970–1974]. Secret. Kissinger sent this letter to Nixon under a covering memorandum, January 28, recommending that he sign the letter as proposed by Deputy Secretary Rush. (Ibid.) For Rush’s recommendation, see Document 103.

Document 107: Telegram 47882 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia, March 9, 1974, 0010Z.

The Department of State informed the Embassy of aid cuts.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 533, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Volume 4, 1 January 1973–. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Shakow and Deaver; cleared by MacDonald in AID/AA/ASIA, Griffel in AID/PPC, and Bushnell in the NSC; and approved by Ingersoll. The Embassy’s reply, telegram 3040 from Jakarta, March 12, is ibid.

Document 108: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 15, 1974, 12:45–1:15 p.m.

Kissinger and Malik discussed foreign aid, the Law of the Sea, Indochina, and the Middle East.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1028, Presidential/HAK Memcons, 1 March 1974–8 May 1974 [2 of 4]. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Dobbins. Kissinger followed up this meeting with a message to Malik explaining he would do all he could to support aid for Indonesia. (Telegram 083508 to Jakarta, April 24; ibid., Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

Document 109: Backchannel Message WH 42123 From W.R. Smyser of the National Security Council Staff to the Ambassador to Indonesia (Newsom), Washington, June 22, 1974, 1500Z.

Smyser sent a backchannel telegram to Newsom on aid levels for Indonesia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 412, Backchannel Messages, Southeast Asia, Volume III, 1974. Secret.

Document 110: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, undated.

Kissinger recommended that Nixon approve the issuance of a NSSM on U.S. policy toward Indonesia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–206, NSSMs, NSSM 205. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Kissinger initialed the “approve” option on behalf of Nixon. The correspondence profile indicates that the document was sent to Kissinger on July 16 and that he approved it on July 20, 1974. The tab is attached, but the approved NSSM is Document 111.

Document 111: National Security Study Memorandum 205, Washington, July 20, 1974.

NSSM 205 asked for a review of U.S. aid policy toward Indonesia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–206, NSSMs, NSSM 205. Secret; Sensitive. A copy was also sent to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to the counselor to the President for Economic Policy.

Document 112: Telegram 9984 From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, August 14, 1974, 0435Z.

The Embassy reported Malik’s comments about Portuguese Timor.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential. Repeated for information to the Embassies in Lisbon and Canberra, to the Mission at the UN, and to the Consulates at Medan and Surabay.

Document 113: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 25, 1974, 4:30 p.m.

Ford, Kissinger, and Malik discussed U.S.-Indonesian relations and Indochina.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 6. Secret. The conversation took place in the Oval Office. Tab A, not attached, is a letter from Suharto to Ford, September 12, expressing appreciation for Ford’s assurances of continuity in U.S. foreign policy. (Ibid., NSC Staff for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 3, Indonesia [3], September 1974–May 1975) Ford’s talking points for the meeting are ibid., Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 6, Indonesia (1).

Document 114: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 21, 1974, 1130–1155.

Newsom and Clements discussed military aid and Portuguese Timor.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–77–0054, Indonesia, 333, 1974, November 29. Secret. Drafted by Connors and approved by Ellsworth. The conversation took place in the office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Document 115: Memorandum From W.R. Smyser of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, December 30, 1974.

Smyser recommended that Kissinger meet with his special Indonesian contacts.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 6, Indonesia (1). Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for urgent action. Kissinger initialed the approve option and the option of meeting at the White House.

Document 116: Backchannel Message 179 From the Ambassador to Indonesia (Newsom) to W.R. Smyser of the National Security Council Staff, Jakarta, January 13, 1975, 1139Z.

Newsom responded to Smyser’s backchannel telegram about a proposed meeting between Kissinger and Indonesian emissaries.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Convenience File, Box 7, Backchannel Messages, Southeast Asia, Incoming, 1/75. Secret. The undated text of the January 11 backchannel message from Smyser to Newson, initialed by Scowcroft with a note that it was sent, is ibid., Outgoing, 1/75.

Document 117: Telegram 026805 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia, February 6, 1975, 0006Z.

The Department asks for Embassy assessment of the Portuguese Timor situation.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Lisbon and Canberra. Drafted by Ingraham; cleared in EUR/IB and INR/REA; and approved by Habib.

Document 118: Telegram 1731 From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, February 10, 1975, 0915Z.

The Embassy reported on Indonesian intentions toward Portuguese Timor.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Canberra and Lisbon.

Document 119: Telegram 2022 From the Embassy in Jakarta to the Department of State, February 19, 1975, 0001Z.

The Embassy summarized a contingency paper on Portuguese Timor.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Exdis. Repeated for information to Canberra Lisbon, and USUN.

Document 120: Memorandum From W.R. Smyser of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, March 4, 1975.

Smyser recommended that Kissinger not authorize a conversation with the Indonesian Defense Attaché about Portuguese Timor.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 6, Indonesia (2). Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action. Kissinger initialed the approve option.

Document 121: Telegram 3570 From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, March 26, 1975, 0455Z.

The Embassy reported on the Law of the Sea Negotiations with Indonesia.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 6, Indonesia, State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE, NODIS (2). Secret; Immediate, Nodis; Stadis. Repeated immediate to the Geneva Mission.

Document 122: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford, Washington, May 7, 1975.

Kissinger recommended reallocating $25 million of financial aid to Indonesia and Morocco.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 6, Indonesia (2). Secret. Sent for action. Ford initialed the approve option on May 9. Tab A is attached but not published. On May 9, Davis informed Springsteen of the fund reallocation. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 6, Indonesia [2])

Document 123: National Intelligence Estimate 55–1–75, Washington, June 30, 1975.

The estimate examined the prospects for Indonesia over the next five years.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 122 (National Intelligence Council), Job 79R01012A, Box 498, NIE 55–1–75, Folder 5. Secret. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate except the representatives of the FBI and the Deputy Assistant Administrator for National Security, Energy Research and Development Administration. The intelligence sections of the Army, Navy, and Air Force also participation in the estimate.

Document 124: Memorandum of Conversation, Camp David, Maryland, July 5, 1975.

Kissinger spoke with Ford about his upcoming meeting with Suharto.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 13. Secret; Nodis.

Document 125: Memorandum of Conversation, Camp David, Maryland, July 5, 1975, 12:45–2 p.m.

Kissinger and Malik led a conversation about East Asia and economic issues.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 21, Visit of President Suharto of Indonesia, July 5, 1975 (2). Secret; Exdis.

Document 126: Memorandum of Conversation, Camp David, Maryland, July 5, 1975, 12:40–2 p.m.

Ford and Suharto discussed economic and foreign policy issues of mutual concern.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 13. Secret; Nodis.

Document 127: Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, August 12, 1975.

Habib and Kissinger discussed reports of a coup in Portuguese Timor.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 8. Secret.

Document 128: Telegram 194779 From the Department of State to the Embassies in Indonesia and Australia, August 16, 1975, 0028Z.

The Department gave its view on the situation in Portuguese Timor.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated for information to Lisbon. Drafted by Ingraham; cleared by Sisco; and approved by Zurhellen.

Document 129: Telegram 10044 From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, August 16, 1975, 0810Z.

The Embassy responded to the Department’s telegram on Portuguese Timor.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Canberra and Lisbon.

Document 130: Memorandum From John J. Taylor of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, August 25, 1975.

Taylor recommended that Kissinger direct the under Secretaries Committee to prepare a position paper on the organization of U.S.-Indonesian joint consultative machinery.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–61, NSDM 311, U.S.-Indonesian Consultative Arrangements. Confidential. Sent for action. On the first page of the memorandum, Kissinger wrote, “Change date.” Kissinger also crossed out the due date on the second page. Next to Kissinger’s marginalia on the first page, an unknown hand wrote, “Done—Oct 6, 1975.” Tab A is attached but not published.

Document 131: Telegram 209709 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia, September 3, 1975, 2339Z.

Habib and Nuryadin discussed Portuguese Timor.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Lisbon and Canberra. Drafted by Ingraham; cleared in S/S; and approved by Habib.

Document 132: Telegram 10849 From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, September 4, 1975, 0416Z.

Newsom and Mochtar discussed Portuguese Timor.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Exdis.

Document 133: Memorandum of Conversation, September 5, 1975.

Kissinger and Malik conversed about East Asia, East Timor, and other topics.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P–820123–1427. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Ingraham; cleared by Habib; and approved by Covey.

Document 134: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee (Ingersoll), Washington, September 15, 1975.

Kissinger asked the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee to prepare a position paper on the organization of U.S.-Indonesian joint consultations.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–72, NSC, U/SM–158, U.S. Indonesian Joint Consultative Group. Confidential. On October 15, Wreatham E. Gathright, the Staff Director of the Under Secretaries Committee, forwarded to the President the requested paper from Ingersoll, October 14, in which the Under Secretaries Committee recommended option 1; a joint consultative commission co-chaired by the Secretary of State and an Indonesian official, and including other relevant officials for a renewable two-year term.

Document 135: Telegram 225061 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia, September 20, 1975, 1913Z.

The Department reported Murdani’s comments on Timor.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Lisbon and Canberra. Drafted by Gleysteen; cleared in S/S and by Shackley of the CIA; approved by Habib.

Document 136: Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, October 8, 1975.

Habib and Kissinger discussed the situation in Portuguese Timor.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 8. Secret. At the 8 a.m. meeting on October 31, Robert H. Miller, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said, “The Indonesian Foreign Minister is expected to open talks tomorrow on Timor. The pro-Indonesian forces are gradually making progress on the ground.” Kissinger remarked, “It is going to wind up with Timor going to Indonesia.” Miller replied, “I think so. Maybe within a couple of months.” (Ibid., Box 9)

Document 137: Memorandum of Conversation, Camp David, Maryland, October 29, 1975, 4 p.m.

Scowcroft and Moertopo discussed East Asian affairs.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 16. Secret. The meeting was held in Scowcroft’s office. Scowcroft’s talking points are ibid., Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 6, Indonesia (3).

Document 138: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford, Washington, October 30, 1975.

Kissinger recommended that Ford approve the issuance of a NSDM proposing a single Joint U.S.-Indonesia Consultative Commission.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–61, NSDM 311: U.S.-Indonesian Consultative Arrangements. Confidential. Sent for action. Tab A is attached. Tab B, the recommendations from the Undersecretaries Committee, is described in the source note for Document 134. Ford initialed the “approve” option. A notation at the top of the first page reads, “Signed 10/31.”

Document 139: National Security Decision Memorandum 311, Washington, November 1, 1975.

Kissinger issued NSDM 311 concerning U.S.-Indonesia Consultative Arrangements.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–69, NSDM Originals (2 of 2) (1), NSDM 301–NSDM 315. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

Document 140: Memorandum From Kenneth Quinn of the National Security Council staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, December 4, 1975.

[text not declassified in time for publication]

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 6, Indonesia (4). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Scowcroft wrote “Thanks” near the top of the memorandum. Tab A (background information and talking points), Tab B (responses to journalistic questions), and Tab C (Telegram 285276 to the Secretary of State while traveling, December 4) are attached, but not published.

Document 141: Telegram 14946 From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, December 6, 1975, 1000Z.

Newsom sent Washington a memorandum of conversation from Ford’s meeting with Suharto.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 6, Indonesia, State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE, NODIS (3). Secret; Priority; Nodis. The President’s Daily Diary indicates that Ford and Suharto met from 8:05 until 9:30 on September 6. (Ford Library, Staff Secretary’s Office, President’s Daily Diary)

Document 142: Telegram 14947 From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, December 6, 1975, 1200Z.

Newsom sent Washington an account of Kissinger’s breakfast meeting with Malik.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 6, Indonesia, State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE, NODIS (3). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Kissinger and Malik met for breakfast before the 8:05 a.m. meeting between Kissinger and Suharto.

Document 143: Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, December 9, 1975

Barnes sent Scowcroft a memorandum recommending that the United States avoid involvement in the dispute over Portuguese Timor.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 6, Indonesia (5). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for urgent action. Scowcroft wrote “Is this true?” next to a statement on the first page that “The Indonesian intervention in Timor is attracting increasingly bitter attention at the UN and in the media.” On the last page, Scowcroft check marked his approval of the first recommendation and his disapproval of the second. Tab A, undated press guidance for Ron Nessen, is attached but not published. Tab B, telegram 288596 to the Secretary, December 7, is attached but not published. Tab C, undated suggested questions and answers for Ron Nessen, is also attached but not published.

Document 144: Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, December 12, 1975.

Barnes sent Scowcroft a memorandum on Indonesia’s future prospects in Portuguese Timor.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 6, Indonesia (6). Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Tab A is attached but not published. Scowcroft wrote “Thanks” and initialed the memorandum. The same day, Granger sent Scowcroft a memorandum on Indonesian use of MAP equipment in Timor. (Ibid.)

Document 145: Telegram 15438 From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, December 17, 1975, 0742Z.

The Embassy reported on U.S.-Indonesian relations.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated priority to USUN New York and for information to Canberra, Lisbon, Medan, Surabaya.

Document 146: Memorandum From Secretary of State Kissinger to the Under Secretary for Security Assistance (Maw), Washington, December 19, 1975

A memorandum from Kissinger asked Maw to suspend MAP grants and FMS sales to Indonesia.

Source: Library of Congress, Henry Kissinger Papers, Geopolitical File, CL 151, Indonesia, 1973–75, Folder 7. Secret.

Document 147: Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, December 23, 1975, 8:12 a.m.

Kissinger and his aides discussed the situation in East Timor.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 9. Secret. Habib referred to a letter from Gary Hart to Rumsfeld. The letter, December 16, asked whether U.S. weapons were used in the Indonesian invasion of East Timor and whether U.S. officials possessed foreknowledge of the Indonesian plans. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 6, Indonesia [6])

Document 148: Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, January 12, 1976, 8:11 a.m.

Kissinger and his aides discussed the situation in East Timor.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 9. Secret. The minutes are incorrectly dated January 12, 1975.

Document 149: Telegram 1151 From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, January 27, 1976, 0851Z.

The Embassy reported an Australian query regarding U.S. military assistance to Indonesia.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Cherokee; Nodis.

Document 150: Telegram 1239 From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, January 28, 1976, 0851Z.

The Embassy evaluated the situation in Timor and its implications for military assistance to Indonesia.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 6, Indonesia, State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE, NODIS (4). Secret; Cherokee; Nodis.

Document 151: Telegram 1250 From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, January 28, 1976, 0928Z.

Newsom described a meeting with Malik on Timor.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 6, Indonesia, State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE, NODIS (4). Secret; Cherokee; Nodis.

Document 152: Telegram 2098 From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, February 17, 1976, 0541Z.

The Embassy reported on military assistance to Indonesia.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 6, Indonesia, State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE, NODIS (4). Secret; Nodis.

Document 153: Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, February 18, 1976.

Barnes sent Scowcroft a memorandum on contingency planning for military supply to Indonesia.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 6, Indonesia (7). Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. Don McDonald of the NSC staff initialed his concurrence. At the bottom of the page, in response to Barnes’ statement about the dangers of a study, Scowcroft wrote, “Should it be turned off?” Tab A, telegram 2097 from Jakarta, February 17, is in the National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. On February 22, Scowcroft wrote a note to Barnes, “Tom—I do not believe a study is necessary but I hope some thought is being given to the question. Brent.” (Ibid.)

Document 154: Telegram 5606 From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, April 29, 1976, 0400Z.

The Embassy gave a brief overview on Indonesian use of U.S. arms in Timor.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Exdis. Telegram 101116 to the Secretary’s Delegation, April 30, provided the text of an April 14 letter from Senators Humphrey and Case stating that USG representations to the GOI had apparently been ignored.

Document 155: Telegram 6442 From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, May 17, 1976, 0235Z.

The Embassy warned that Indonesia would soon become aware of delays in MAP training.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

Document 156: Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, May 17, 1976.

Barnes sent Scowcroft a memorandum on military equipment deliveries to Indonesia.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 6, Indonesia (7). Secret; Sensitive. Urgent; sent for information. Scowcroft wrote on the memorandum, “Thanks. BS.” Jakarta Telegram 6442, March 17, is Document 155. Humphrey’s and Case’s April 28 letter is contained in Telegram 104735 to the Secretary’s delegation, May 1. (National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) On May 17, at 2005Z, telegram 120825 to Jakarta gave the Department’s reply to telegram 6442 from Jakarta. The telegram, drafted by Miller and approved by Maw, stated, “The training program you cite will proceed on schedule. You can inform Indonesians accordingly.” (Ibid.)

Document 157: Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, June 1, 1976, 8:10 a.m.

Kissinger and his aides discussed military aid to Indonesia.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 10. Secret.

Document 158: Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Hyland), Washington, June 2, 1976.

Barnes sent a memo to Hyland about upcoming negotiations with Indonesia.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 6, Indonesia (7). Secret. Hyland wrote, “good” near the top of the memorandum.

Document 159: Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, June 17, 1976, 8:18 a.m.

Kissinger and his aides discussed whether to send a diplomatic representative to accompany an Indonesian Parliamentary Delegation to East Timor.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 10. Secret.

Document 160: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 29, 1976.

Kissinger conferred about Indonesia with several Department of State officials.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P–820118–1488. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Ingraham and approved by Collums.

Document 161: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 29, 1976.

Kissinger, Malik, and other officials discussed U.S. aid to Indonesia at a U.S.-Indonesian Joint Consultation.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P–820118–1495. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Ingraham and approved by Collums.

Document 162: Memorandum of Conversation, WashingtonJune 29, 1976, 2:30 p.m.

Kissinger and Malik discussed East Asian affairs.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P–820118–1470. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Ingraham and approved by Collums. A more concise version of this conversation, under the heading, “Summary of U.S.-Indonesian Joint Consultations,” is available at the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 6, Indonesia (7).

Document 163: Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, August 25, 1976, 8 a.m.

Kissinger and his aides discussed whether to sell a missile system to Indonesia.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 11. Secret.

Document 164: Memorandum of Conversation, October 7, 1976, 5 p.m.

Ford and Malik discussed foreign aid and other matters.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 21. Secret; Nodis. Ford’s talking points from Scowcroft stated, “There are no major contentious issues in our relations with Indonesia.” The memorandum noted that the United States had increased Indonesia’s PL–480 commodity support by 200,000 extra tons of rice and its grant military aid by $9.8 million, adding, “The Indonesians have been informed of your decision and are very pleased by it.” (Ibid., Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 6, Indonesia [7]).

Document 165: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, January 4, 1973, 5:40 p.m.

Kissinger criticized the Japanese government’s Vietnam message and discussed the state of U.S.-Japanese relations with Ambassador Ushiba.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 538, Country Files, Far East, Japan, January–June 1973, vol. 9. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office. On January 3, John Holdridge provided talking points for Kissinger’s meeting with Ushiba and attached telegram 232944 to Tokyo, December 28, 1972, which contained the text of a message that Ushiba gave to U. Alexis Johnson on December 27, 1972, appealing to the United States to resume Vietnam peace negotiations as quickly as possible. (Ibid.)

Document 166: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, January 24, 1973.

Togo and Sneider discussed U.S.-Japan Security Relations and Sino-Japanese relations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 4 Japan-US. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Sneider.

Document 167: Conversation Between President Nixon and John B. Connally, Washington, January 31, 1973.

Nixon and Connally discussed Japanese politicians and relations between the United States and Japan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 845–11. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. The President’s Daily Diary indicates that this discussion occurred as part of a larger conversation between 4:52 and 6:13 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)

Document 168: Editorial Note

Document 169: National Security Study Memorandum 172, Washington, March 7, 1973.

Kissinger instructed the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Commerce, and the CIA to review U.S. policy toward Japan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–197, NSSM Files, NSSM 172 (2 of 3). Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs. NSSM 122, on policy toward Japan, is scheduled to be published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part II, Japan, 1969–1972.

Document 170: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 9, 1973, 1430–1500.

Richardson and Ushiba discussed relations between the United States and Japan, especially within the context of improving relations with the People’s Republic of China.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–76–117, Japan, 333, 1973 January, March 13, 1973. Secret. Prepared by Doolin and approved by Eagleburger. The conversation took place in Richardson’s office.

Document 171: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 27, 1973, 10:30 a.m..

Kissinger, Aichi, and Ushiba discussed trade and monetary issues. Nixon joined the conversation near the end.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Far East, Box 538, Japan, volume 9, January–June 1973. Secret; Nodis. The conversation took place in Kissinger’s office. In a briefing memorandum to Kissinger, March 26, Hormats described the “object of the meeting” as strengthening Aichi “at home” and expressing appreciation for recent Japanese measures to liberalize trade and revalue the yen. (Ibid.)

Document 172: Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, April 12, 1973.

Hormats summarized economic data on trade between the United States, the European Community, and Japan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 538, Country Files, Far East, Japan, volume 9, January–June 1973. No classification marking. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed this document. Peter Flanigan sent these trade statistics to Kissinger under a covering memorandum, March 8.

Document 173: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 21, 1973, noon.

Nixon and Ohira surveyed international developments, including the naming of a new U.S. Ambassador to Japan.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 4. Secret. The conversation took place in the Oval Office. The President’s Daily Diary indicates that the meeting lasted from 12:07 until 12:57 p.m. and included, in addition to the persons listed on the memorandum of conversation, Yasukawa, Okawara, Numata, and the Japanese and American interpreters, Sadaaki Numata and Manabu Fukada. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)

Document 174: Memorandum From John Froebe of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 6, 1973.

Froebe recommended that Kissinger approve a cable instructing Embassy Tokyo to broach a U.S.-Japan Environmental Agreement.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 538, Country Files, Far East, Japan, volume 9, January–June 1973. Confidential. Sent for action. Concurred in by Elliot and Fairbanks. Kissinger initialed his approval of the recommendation on June 11, and an NSC staff member notified the Department of State by telephone on June 12.

Document 175: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) to President Nixon, Washington, July 2, 1973.

Kissinger and Flanigan forwarded Secretary Rogers’s memorandum about the upcoming ministerial meeting with Japan. Nixon approved the proposed agenda.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 539, Country Files, Far East, Japan, July 1973–December 31, 1974 (sic), vol. 10. Confidential. Sent for action. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation. Rogers’s memorandum, June 22, is attached Tab A, but is not published.

Document 176: Memorandum From John Froebe of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 5, 1973.

Froebe recommended that Kissinger ask for an interim response to NSSM 172 focusing on Japan’s regional and global role.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–197, NSSM Files, NSSM 172 (2 of 3). Secret. Sent for action. Concurred in by Kennedy, Eagleburger, and Hormats. Both recommendations were marked approved with handwritten notes that read, “HAK per phone call from Jon Howe to RTK. 7/7/73.” In a memorandum to Kissinger, June 30, Froebe noted that the Department had delayed NSSM 172 by requesting Presidential affirmation of the primacy of the U.S.-Japanese alliance before considering other aspects of the study. Kissinger commented in the margin, “Stupid theological point.” (Ibid.) On July 12, Scowcroft sent a memorandum to Eliot asking the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia to prepare an interim study. (Ibid.) On July 27, Richard Sneider, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group for NSSM 172, submitted a paper titled “US-Japan Cooperation on Multilateral Problems of Mutual Concern” in response to Scowcroft’s memorandum. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 1056, NSC Institutional Materials, NSC Institutional Papers, July 1973 [1 of 3])

Document 177: Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 19, 1973.

Hormats described the recent ministerial talks held in Tokyo between the United States and Japan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 539, Country Files, Far East, Japan, July 1973–December 31, 1974 (sic), vol. 10. Confidential. Sent for information. Concurred in by Froebe. Kissinger initialed the memorandum on August 8.

Document 178: Memorandum From John Froebe of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 30, 1973.

Froebe asked Kissinger for guidance on conceptual aspects of the draft joint statement to be issued at the end of Tanaka’s visit.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 927, VIP Visits, Japan PM Tanaka’s Visit, July 31, 1973 [1 of 3]. Confidential. Sent for action. Concurred in by Hormats. A draft of the joint draft statement is attached as Tab A. Kissinger initialed his approval of all four recommendations on August 1.

Document 179: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 31, 1973, 11 a.m..

Nixon and Tanaka talked about an exchange of state visits, U.S.-Japan trade, nuclear capabilities, educational exchanges, Sino-Soviet relations, the Soviet-American summit, superpower security relations, the New Atlantic Charter, and press guidance.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 927, VIP Visits, Japan PM Tanaka’s Visit, July 31, 1973 [1 of 3]. Secret; Sensitive. During dinner conversation on July 31, Nixon and Tanaka briefly discussed the likelihood of an Imperial visit to Washington, U.S.-Japanese joint development of Siberia, Tanaka’s planned visit to Western Europe and the Soviet Union, and the prospects for getting the Japanese government’s legislative program through the current session of the Diet. (Memorandum of Conversation, July 31, 1973, 8 p.m.; ibid.) Nixon’s talking points for his meetings with Tanaka are ibid., [2 of 3].

Document 180: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 1, 1973, 9:30 a.m.

Nixon and Tanaka discussed the trade balance, Korean issues, Asia, Sino-Soviet relations, energy, U.S.-Japanese consultative organs, the Mutual Security Treaty, and development activities in Siberia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 927, VIP Visits, Japan PM Tanaka’s Visit, July 31, 1973 [1 of 3]. Secret; Sensitive.

Document 181: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 24, 1973, 5–5:30 p.m.

Kissinger and Ohira discussed the Declaration of Principles, future visits to Japan, technology transfers, and Japanese relations with China, the Soviet Union, and the Vietnams.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 539, Country Files, Far East, Japan, July 73–Dec. 31, 1974 (sic), Vol. 10. Secret. The meeting was held at the Waldorf Towers in New York City. During a meeting three weeks earlier, Yasukawa gave Kissinger a draft declaration of principles. Kissinger scanned it, noted that he wanted to study it more closely, but remarked, “My initial reaction, however, is that it is not concrete and not a very important document.” (Memorandum of conversation, September 4, 1973, 11:15 a.m.; ibid.)

Document 182: Editorial Note

Document 183: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, January 5, 1974.

Kissinger tasked the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Commerce, and the Central Intelligence Agency to complete the response to NSSM 172.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1061, NSC Institutional Materials, NSC Institutional Papers, January 1974 (2 of 2). Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs. Sent to Kissinger under a covering memorandum, December 21, 1973, from Froebe and Donald Stukel of the NSC staff, which stated, “In June a long and rather rambling draft was completed and a copy sent to the NSC Staff. At that point further work bogged down due to uncertainty among the drafters as to how current events were likely to impact on US/Japan long-term relations and due partly to our call in July for an IG special report on regional and global issues in support of Prime Minister Tanaka’s visit.” (Ibid.)

Document 184: Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, January 7, 1974.

Lord presented on U.S.-Japan planning talks. The discussion focused on energy policy and the trilateral declaration.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 2. Secret. In this meeting, Lord orally presented the contents of a paper that he had sent to Kissinger on December 22. Lord’s paper is ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Far East, Box 539, Japan, July 1973–December 31, 1974 (sic), vol. 10.

Document 185: Memorandum From the Director of Defense Program Analysis and Evaluation (Sullivan) to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, Washington, January 22, 1974.

Sullivan summarized an analysis of defense related balance of payments with Japan.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0011, Japan, 123, 1974 January 22. Confidential. The memorandum is stamped, “Sec Def has seen. 13 Aug 1974.” The analysis is attached but not published.

Document 186: Memorandum From W.R. Smyser of the National Security Council staff to the Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, February 8, 1974.

Smyser informed Kissinger that Japan basically supported the U.S. position on energy matters.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 539, Country Files, Far East, Japan, Vol. 11, 1 January 1974–. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for urgent information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum. On January 14, Smyser produced a similar memorandum, which Kissinger initialed, that stated, “the Japanese, though subject to some constraints, are prepared to react positively to our proposals for an Energy Action Group and for greater cooperation among the oil consuming nations. Their position arises from the general desire to work with us as well as from their awareness that they can be destroyed more quickly than anybody else if the oil producers get the upper hand.” (Smyser and Froebe to Kissinger, January 4; ibid.)

Document 187: Memorandum of Conversation, Paris, April 7, 1974, 10:15 a.m.

Nixon and Tanaka discussed trade issues, Siberian development, relations with China, and the role of the United States in Asia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1028, Presidential/HAK Memcons, 1 March 1974–8 May 1974 [2 of 4]. Secret; Sensitive. The conversation took place in the residence of the American Ambassador. A briefing memorandum for the meeting is in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft Daily Work Files, 1973–1977, Box 7, Chronological File A, April 5–7, 1974 (Paris Trip).

Document 188: Key Judgments from Research Study OPR-4 Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, May 1974.

A CIA study predicted continuity in Japanese policy during the next few years, but anticipated that more dramatic changes would be possible during the 1980s.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 539, Country Files, Far East, Japan, Vol. 11, 1 January 1974–. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. A notation on the correspondence profile, August 14, reads, “No further action necessary—will be incorporated into Japan trip briefing papers for Pres.” (Ibid.) In a letter to the President, dated May 17, Colby wrote that the study was a response to Nixon’s desire for a “look ahead” into the future of Japanese policy. ( Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 10, Job 80M01048A, Box 4, Fold. 1 )

Document 189: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 21, 1974, noon.

Nixon and Ohira discussed the U.S.-Japan alliance, the Middle East, Sino-Soviet relations, Siberian development, and India’s nuclear test.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1029, Presidential/HAK Memcons, 1 June 1974– [8 August 1974] [3 of 3]. Secret; Sensitive. The conversation took place in the Oval Office. On May 14, Yasukawa sent Nixon a memorandum stating the Government of Japan’s position regarding Siberian development. (Ibid., Box 1337, NSC Unfiled Material, 1974, 1 of 9) Springsteen suggested that no response to the Japanese memorandum was necessary, but recommended that Nixon refer to it during his May 21 meeting with Ohira. (Memorandum from Springsteen to Scowcroft, May 17; ibid.)

Document 190: Study Prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Washington, undated.

The NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia and Pacific Affairs prepared a paper, on U.S. policy toward Japan, in response to NSSM 172.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–197, NSSM Files, NSSM 172 (2 of 3). Secret; Noforn. Scowcroft received the study under a covering letter, June 26, from Springsteen. The annexes to the report, on Japanese domestic political constraints, the policy background, traditional problem areas in U.S.-Japanese relations, and Japanese economic trends, are attached, but not published. Davis forwarded the report to interested departments and agencies on June 29. (Ibid.)

Document 191: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 27, 1974, 1520–1530.

Hodgson and Ellsworth discussed military issues involving the United States and Japan. Schlesinger joined the meeting for the last ten minutes.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–77–0054, Japan, 333, July 5, 1974. Confidential. Prepared by Barrett and approved by Ellsworth. The conversation took place in Schlesinger’s office. Schlesinger’s talking points, dated June 26, are ibid.

Document 192: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 9, 1974, noon–12:25 p.m.

Hodgson met with Nixon before assuming the position of Ambassador to Japan.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 4, July–September 1974. Secret; Nodis. The conversation took place in the Oval Office.

Document 193: National Security Decision Memorandum 262, Washington, July 29, 1974.

Kissinger modified NSDM 251, relating to the use of U.S. bases in Japan in the event of aggression against South Korea.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, NSDMs, #145–264, 1972-1974. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to the Director of Central Intelligence and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Rush’s memorandum, April 27, offered three options: “1. Negotiate a new agreement as provided in NSDM 251. 2. Let the Korean Minute formally lapse and depend on the Nixon-Sato Communique. 3. Not raise the Korean Minute issue directly with the Japanese Government and seek to leave the issue in essence unresolved.” Rush recommended option three. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asia & Pacific Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 3, Japan 1974 [3])

Document 194: National Security Study Memorandum 210, Washington, September 11, 1974.

Kissinger instructed the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the CIA, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Departments of the Treasury, Defense, and State to review U.S. policy toward Japan in preparation for the President’s visit.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–13, Institutional Files, Meetings (IFM), SRG Meeting, Japan, November 11, 1974 (3). Secret; Exdis. Copies were also sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Counsellor to the President for Economic Policy, and the Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy. Smyser sent Kissinger the draft NSSM under a covering September 4 memorandum. (Ibid., Box H-32, NSSM 210, Review of Japan Policy for the President’s Visit to Japan [2])

Document 195: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 21, 1974.

Ford and Tanaka discussed U.S.-Japanese relations and Ford’s anticipated trip to Japan.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 6. Secret; Nodis. The conversation took place in the Oval Office. Drafted by Wickel. As a correction, on page 2, an unknown hand wrote “Kennerly” in the margin, a reference to David Hume Kennerly, Gerald Ford’s White House photographer. A less detailed version of the same conversation, prepared by Scowcroft, is ibid. Kissinger’s briefing memorandum with talking points for Ford is ibid., Presidential Briefing Material for VIP Visits, 1974–76, Box 1, 9/21/74, Japan, Prime Minister Tanaka.

Document 196: Memorandum From John Froebe and Robert Hormats of the NSC Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, November 9, 1974.

Froebe and Hormats summarized the response to NSSM 210 and laid out the issues for the upcoming Senior Review Group meeting on Japan.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–13, Institutional Files, Meetings (IFM), SRG Meeting, Japan, November 11, 1974 (1). Secret. Sent for action. Concurred in by Kennedy and Elliott. There are no markings indicating that Kissinger saw this memorandum. Talking points, an analytical summary of the NSSM response, and the NSSM itself are attached but not published.

Document 197: Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting, Washington, November 11, 1974, 11:06 a.m.–12:02 p.m.

The Group discussed the response to NSSM 210 and Kissinger asked the relevant departments to prepare briefing materials for the President’s upcoming trip to Japan.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–23, Institutional Files, Meetings (IFM), Meeting Minutes, SRG, Originals, November 1974–January 1975. Secret; Sensitive. The text of Colby’s briefing is attached but not published. The briefing material that the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury produced in response to Kissinger’s tasking is ibid., Box H–13, Institutional Files, Meetings (IFM), SRG Meeting, Japan, November 11, 1974 (3).

Document 198: Memorandum of Conversation, Tokyo, November 19, 1974, 11 a.m.

Ford and Tanaka discussed security issues, agricultural trade, aid to South Vietnam, energy, and the mutual security treaty.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 7. Secret. The conversation took place in the Guest House. Drafted by Wickel. For public remarks, toasts, and the joint communiqué issued during Ford’s trip, see The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXI, No. 1852, December 23.

Document 199: Memorandum of Conversation, Tokyo, November 20, 1974, 10 a.m.

Ford and Tanaka discussed Korea, South Vietnam, the Middle East, China, the Soviet Union, Siberian development, over-fishing, and the joint communiqué.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 7. Secret. The conversation took place in the Tokyo Guest House. Drafted by Wickel.

Document 200: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 25, 1975, 1415–1440.

[3 pages not declassified.]

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0058, Japan (000.1–293), 091.112, 8 Apr 75. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

Document 201: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 28, 1975.

Kissinger, Hodgson, and Habib discussed U.S. relations with Japan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P–820123–1082. Secret; Exdis. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office.

Document 202: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 29, 1975, 11 a.m.

Ford and Hodgson discussed U.S.-Japanese relations.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 10. Top Secret. The conversation took place in the Oval Office. The talking points that Ford received from Kissinger are ibid., Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 7, Country File, Japan [5].

Document 203: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 11, 1975.

Kissinger and Miyazawa discussed Vietnam, Japanese politics, the Middle East, and other issues touching on U.S. relations with Japan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P–820125–0547. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Sherman and approved by Covey. On May 27, Kissinger and Miyazawa met in Paris at the U.S. mission to the OECD and discussed Southeast Asia, China, and the Middle East. (Ibid., P–820125–0295)

Document 204: Memorandum From Peter Rodman of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, July 25, 1975.

Rodman informed Kissinger of a Japanese proposal for a new type of communiqué.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Advisor, Presidential Briefing Material for VIP Visits, Box 12, 8/8–9/75, Japan, Prime Minister Miki [4]. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. Kissinger initialed his approval on July 31, 1975.

Document 205: Memorandum From Secretary of State Kissinger to President Nixon, Washington, August 2, 1975.

Kissinger sent Ford a briefing paper for his meeting with Miki.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Advisor, Presidential Briefing Material for VIP Visits, 1974-76, Box 12, 8/8/75, Japan, Prime Minister Miki [8]. Secret. A note on the first page reads, “The President has seen.”

Document 206: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 5, 1975, 8:45 a.m.

Kissinger, Habib and Hodgson discuss the upcoming summit with Miki.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P–820123–1980. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Sherman and approved by Covey.

Document 207: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 5, 1975, 10 a.m.

Miki and Ford discussed the terrorist attack in Kuala Lumpur, the CSCE, arms control, Sino-Soviet relations, and Southeast Asia.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 14. Top Secret. Drafted by Wickel. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the conversation took place in the Oval Office from 10:05 until 11:25 a.m. (Ford Library, Staff Secretary’s Office, President’s Daily Diary)

Document 208: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 5, 1975, 7 p.m.

Ford and Miki discussed domestic politics, economic conditions, the French proposal for a five-power economic conference, and U.S.-Japan cooperation.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 14. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Wickel. The conversation took place in the White House. The next day, Ford told Kissinger and Scowcroft, “The private conversation wasn’t much. I think he wanted it mostly for prestige.” (Memorandum of Conversation, August 6, 9:50–10:05 a.m.; ibid.)

Document 209: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 6, 1975, 10 a.m.

Miki and Ford discussed the terrorist attack in Kuala Lumpur, the Five Power Economic Summit, Korea, energy, the Middle East, mutual defense, food, and press statements.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 14. Top Secret. Drafted by Wickel. The conversation took place in the Oval Office. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the conversation took place in the Oval Office from 10:06 until 11:35 a.m. (Ford Library, Staff Secretary’s Office, President’s Daily Diary)

Document 210: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 29, 1975, 11 a.m.

Schlesinger and Miki discussed the situation on the Korean peninsula.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0058, Japan, 091.112, 17 Sept 1975. Secret; Exdis. Prepared by Abramowitz. The conversation took place in the Prime Minister’s Office. A stamped message reads, “Dep. Sec. has seen.”

Document 211: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 30, 1975, 1145.

Schlesinger and Miyazawa discussed the situation on the Korean peninsula.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 7, Country File, Japan [9]. Secret; Exdis. The meeting was held at the Prime Minister’s residence.

Document 212: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford, Washington, September 19, 1975.

Kissinger recommended that Ford sign a NSDM governing U.S.-Japanese space cooperation.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–61, NSDM 306, U.S.-Japan Space Cooperation. Confidential. Sent for action. The President initialed the “Approve” option, and the recommendations became NSDM 306 on September 24. (ibid., Box H–69, NSDM Originals (2 of 2), NSDM 301-NSDM 315). The report of the Under Secretaries Committee is attached but not published. It arrived under a covering memorandum, May 5, by Ingersoll.

Document 213: Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford, Washington, October 19, 1975.

Scowcroft forwarded Kissinger’s report on his October 19 meeting with Miyazawa.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for HAK, Kissinger Trip File, Box 15, 10/19–23/75, People’s Republic of China, TOSEC (5). Secret. Ford initialed this memorandum. A memorandum of conversation of Kissinger’s meeting is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P-820123–2431. Kissinger stopped in Tokyo en route to a meeting with Mao in Beijing.

Document 214: Memorandum of Conversation, Tokyo, October 24, 1975, 8 a.m.

Kissinger met with Miki following his visit to the People’s Republic of China.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P–820123–2324. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held at the Prime Minister’s Official Residence. Drafted by Gleysteen and approved by Covey. On October 23, Kissinger met in Tokyo with Miyazawa, who primarily asked Kissinger questions about his trip to Beijing; a memorandum of conversation is ibid., P–820123–2455.

Document 215: Memorandum of Conversation, Tokyo, December 8, 1975, 8:30 a.m.

Kissinger briefed Miyazawa following Ford’s visit to the People’s Republic of China, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P–820123–0631. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Gleysteen and approved by Covey. The meeting was held at the Foreign Ministry Guest House.

Document 216: Memorandum of Conversation, Tokyo, December 8, 1975, 11 a.m.

Kissinger and Miki discussed the international scene.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P–820123–0771. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held at the Prime Minister’s Residence. Drafted by Gleysteen and approved by Covey.

Document 217: Letter From President Ford to Japanese Prime Minister Miki, Washington, January 15, 1976.

Ford replied to Miki’s letter about fisheries legislation in the United States.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 2, Japan, Prime Minister Miki (2). No classification marking. Miki’s November 4, 1975 letter expressed concern about Congressional legislation to unilaterally establish a 200-mile exclusive fishery zone. (Ibid.) The memoranda of conversation from the meetings, November 15–17, between the leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, are ibid., Memoranda of Conversation, Box 16.

Document 218: Letter From Japanese Prime Minister Miki to President Ford, Tokyo, February 24, 1976.

Miki asked for Ford’s assistance in disclosing the names of officials involved in the Lockheed scandal.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 2, Japan, Prime Minister Miki (2). No classification marking. The Subcommittee on Multi-National Corporations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had exposed alleged bribes by the Lockheed Corporation to high officials of the Japanese government.

Document 219: Letter From President Ford to Japanese Prime Minister Miki, Washington, March 11, 1976.

Ford replied to Miki’s letter about the Lockheed scandal and suggested that both governments work together to reduce corruption.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 2, Japan, Prime Minister Miki (2). No classification marking. Ford received this letter under a covering memorandum, March 10, from Scowcroft. (Ibid.) A Japanese diplomatic note, March 12, conveyed the Japanese cabinet’s decision to accept the President’s proposal for sharing information relating to the Lockheed scandal. (Decision of the Cabinet on March 12, 1976; ibid.)

Document 220: Memorandum From Peter Rodman of the NSC Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, April 6, 1976.

Rodman informed Kissinger of Miki’s desire for information on whether powerful Japanese politicians were implicated in the Lockheed scandal.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 7, Country File, Japan [10]. Secret. Sent for action. Kissinger did not mark either of the options.

Document 221: Talking Points for Peter Rodman of the NSC Staff, Washington, undated.

Rodman was instructed to tell Miki’s confidential adviser that Kissinger could not provide information to Miki about the Lockheed scandal outside the channel established via the Department of Justice.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 7, Country File, Japan [10]. Secret; Nodis. At the end of the talking points, Kissinger wrote, “The Department of State has no access to these records + could not obtain access without upsetting all established procedures.” Written notations by unknown hands at the top of the document indicate that Kissinger approved the talking points on April 10 and Rodman received them through Kissinger’s special assistant Paul E. Barbian. They were presented to Hirasawa at 4 p.m. on the same day.

Document 222: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 22, 1976.

Kissinger and Togo discussed the Lockheed scandal.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P – 820117 – 1955. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Sherman and approved by Collums.

Document 223: Telegram 6615 From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, May 6, 1976, 1015Z.

The embassy analyzed Japanese domestic politics.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to the Embassies in Moscow, Seoul, Taipei, to the Consulate in Hong Kong, to the Liaison Office in Beijing, to CINCPAC in Honolulu, and to COMUS Japan in Yokota.

Document 224: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 14, 1976.

Kissinger and Saito discussed the Lockheed scandal.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P – 820117 – 2339. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Sherman and approved by Collums.

Document 225: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 30, 1976, 10:30 a.m.

Miki and Ford discussed international affairs.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 20. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Wickel. The conversation took place in the Oval Office. Ford’s briefing information is ibid., Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 7, Country File, Japan [9]. Ford’s and Miki’s luncheon conversation concerned China and non-proliferation among other topics. (Ibid., Memoranda of Conversation, Box 20)

Document 226: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 1, 1976, 3:30 p.m.

Scowcroft and Hodgson discussed U.S.-Japanese relations.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 20. Confidential. Eugene V. McAuliffe, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, praised the Japanese Government’s Defense White Paper of June 4. (Memorandum from McAuliffe to the Secretary of Defense, June 22, 1976; Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–79–0049, Japan, 092, 1976 June 22)

Document 227: Telegram 11294 From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, July 27, 1976, 0910Z.

The Embassy reported on the arrest of former Prime Minister Tanaka.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated for information to COMUS Japan in Yokota, to CINCPAC in Honolulu, to the Embassies in Manila, Seoul, Taipei, The Hague, Rome, and to the Liaison Office in Beijing.

Document 228: Telegram 16298 From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, November 2, 1976, 0620Z.

The Embassy analyzed the handling of the defection of a Soviet pilot to Japan with his MiG-25.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential. Repeated for information to the Secretary of Defense in Washington, to the Embassy in Moscow, to COMUS Japan, and to CINCPAC in Honolulu. Also transmitted to CINCPAC for POLAD.

Document 229: Telegram 19002 From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, December 30, 1976, 0800Z.

The Embassy analyzed Japanese politics.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential. Repeated for information to the Embassies in Bangkok, Bonn, Canberra, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, London, Manila, Paris, Rangoon, Rome, Seoul, Taipei, Vientiane, to the Consulate in Hong Kong, to the Liaison Office in Beijing, to CINCPAC in Honolulu, and to COMUS Japan in Yokota.

Document 230: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, January 5, 1973, 2:30 p.m.

Nixon and Prime Minister Kim discussed Korean affairs.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1026, Presidential/HAK Memcons, January–March 1973. Secret; Nodis. The conversation took place in the Oval Office. Prime Minister Kim and Foreign Minister Kim visited Washington to represent the Republic of Korea at the memorial service for Harry Truman on January 5. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the memorandum of conversation lists an incorrect date for the meeting, which occurred on January 5, 1973, from 2:31 until 3. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)

Document 231: Memorandum From Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 16, 1973.

Kennedy recommended that Kissinger approve a cable informing Habib of U.S. policy toward Korean security and development issues.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 544, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Volume 6, January 1973–October 1973. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. A notation near the bottom reads, “John Holdridge concurs.” Kissinger initialed his approval of the recommendation. Habib’s proposed policy paper enclosed in A–432 from Seoul, December 10, 1972 and the draft backchannel telegram are attached but not published. Backchannel telegram 30190 from Kissinger to Habib, January 24, is ibid., Box 411, Backchannel Messages, Southeast Asia, vol. 1.

Document 232: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, February 24, 1973, 10:10 a.m.

Kissinger and Foreign Minister Kim discussed U.S.-ROK relations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Far East, Box 544, Korea, Volume 6, January 1973–October 1973. Secret; Sensitive. The conversation took place in Kissinger’s office.

Document 233: Memorandum From John Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, March 1, 1973.

Holdridge informed Kissinger about the Department of State’s discussions with South Korea.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Far East, Box 544, Korea, Volume 6, January 1973–October 1973. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum on March 20.

Document 234: Memorandum From John Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, March 15, 1973.

Holdridge recommended that Kissinger approve a backchannel message to Habib concerning UNCURK.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Far East, Box 544, Korea, Volume 6, January 1973–October 1973. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only; Entirely Outside System. In the top right hand corner Kissinger wrote, “Where is the extra paper by Rush?” A response in an unknown hand wrote “Tab C,” referring to the March 8 Department of State paper. At the top of the first page, an unknown hand indicated that the situation room received the telegram for dispatch on the morning of March 19, 1973. Attached but not published is Tab A, the draft backchannel telegram from Kissinger to Habib, which was sent as backchannel telegram 30768 to Habib, March 19. (ibid., Box 411, Backchannel Messages, Southeast Asia, Volume II, 1973, Part 1) Tab B, a February 24 memorandum of conversation, is Document 232. Tab C, a paper prepared in the Department of State, March 8, is attached but not published.

Document 235: Summary and Options From a Study Prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for East Asia and the Pacific, Washington, undated.

The Interdepartmental Group for East Asia and the Pacific prepared a paper on U.S. policy toward the Korean Peninsula in response to NSSM 154.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–191, NSSM 155 (sic) [1 of 2]. Secret. NSSM 154 is scheduled to be published in see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part I, Korea, 1969-1972. Richard Sneider, Acting Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group that prepared the NSSM 154 paper, sent it to Kissinger under a covering letter dated April 3. (Ibid.) On May 4, Davis forwarded the study to the Deputy Secretaries of the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury, to the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to the Director of Central Intelligence, and to the Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also received a copy. (Ibid.)

Document 236: Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Deputy Secretary of State Rush, Washington, April 9, 1973, 5:58 p.m.

Kissinger and Rush discussed whether UNCURK should be abolished.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 19–2 [March–April 1973]. No classification marking. Kissinger was in Washington. A transcript of Kissinger’s and Rush’s earlier conversation about UNCURK, April 7, is ibid.

Document 237: Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Porter) to President Nixon, Washington, June 15, 1973.

Porter reported on the recommendations of the Korea Force Modernization Steering Group.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–241, NSDMs, NSDM 227, folder 6. Secret; Norforn. Attached but not published are the December 27, 1972 memorandum of U. Alexis Johnson, Acting Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee; the February 7 memorandum from Kissinger to the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee; and the May 31 Report of the Korea Force Modernization Interagency Steering Group. The memorandum from Clements, 13 June, and the June 13 response of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the paper are ibid., H–68, SRG Meetings, NSSM 154, 6/15/73 [4 of 4].

Document 238: Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting, Washington, June 15, 1973, 3:03 p.m.–3:45 p.m.

The Senior Review Group gathered to discuss U.S. policy toward Korea.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–113, SRG Minutes (Originals) 1972–3 [2 of 4]. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. The June 18 meeting of the SRG was subsequently cancelled. On May 25, Habib reported that South Korea’s “new policy is acceptance of a two-Korea policy for an indefinite period while maintaining the ultimate objective of reunification.” (Telegram 3353 from Seoul; ibid., Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files.) Habib provided the Embassy’s recommendations on South Korea’s “Two Koreas” policy shift. (Telegram 3438 from Seoul, May 30; ibid.)

Document 239: National Intelligence Estimate 42/14.2–73, Washington, June 18, 1973.

The estimate assessed implications of South Korea’s diplomatic initiative.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 122 (National Intelligence Council), Job 79R01012A, Box 467, NIE 42/14.2–73, Folder 6. Secret. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate except the representatives of the FBI and the Department of Treasury, who abstained because the subject was outside of their jurisdiction. On June 18, Colby sent this NIE to Kissinger, as requested. Colby added, “The analysis in the NIE basically supports the approach advocated by State.” (Ibid.) [secret] On June 19, the Department sent instructions to Habib in telegram 118917 to Seoul. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Far East, Box 544, Korea, Volume 6, January 1973–October 1973.)

Document 240: Memorandum From Lawrence Eagleburger of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 13, 1973.

Eagleburger recommended that Kissinger issue Habib instructions relating to UNCURK.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 544, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Volume 6, January 1973–October 1973. Secret. Sent for action. Kissinger initialed his approval of the recommendation. Attached to the memorandum is a note from Scowcroft that reads, “Henry—I am inclined to think Larry is right. Brent.” Froebe gave Kissinger a memorandum, June 23, summarizing Park’s speech. (Ibid.) The backchannel telegram, 31859, from the White House to Habib, July 18, is ibid., Box 411, Backchannel Messages, Southeast Asia, vol. II, 1973, Part 1.

Document 241: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, Washington, July 18, 1973.

Kissinger conveyed interim guidance on U.S. policy toward the Korean Peninsula.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 544, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Volume 6, January 1973–October 1973. Secret. According to an attached undated note by Scowcroft to Kissinger, Rogers would probably ignore this guidance, but Clements might be more sympathetic. Scowcroft also believed there was “no need” to send this memorandum to Nixon.

Document 242: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, July 25, 1973.

Kissinger recommended that Nixon approve the issuance of a NSDM on Korean Force modernization.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–241, NSDMs, NSDM 227, Folder 6. Secret. Sent for action. Nixon initialed the “approve” option.

Document 243: National Security Decision Memorandum 227, Washington, July 27, 1973.

Kissinger issued NSDM 227 concerning the Korean Force Modernization Plan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–241, NSDMs, NSDM 227, Folder 6. Secret. Copies were sent to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Document 244: Telegram 5409 From the Embassy in the Republic of Korea to the Department of State, August 15, 1973, 0326Z.

The embassy analyzed the circumstances and consequences of the abduction of Kim Dae-jung.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated for information to Tokyo. On August 8, Republic of Korea intelligence agents kidnapped opposition politician Kim Dae-jung from a hotel in Tokyo, allegedly with plans to assassinate him.

Document 245: Backchannel Message 0818 From the Ambassador to the Republic of Korea (Habib) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Seoul, August 24, 1973, 0615Z.

Habib reported on a meeting with Park and a proposed meeting with North Korean officials in Beijing.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 527, Country Files, Far East, PRC, Volume 8, July 10, 1973–December 31, 1973. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Habib’s backchannel telegram was Tab C of a memorandum, August 24, from Richard Solomon to Kissinger. (Ibid.) The meeting between the North Korean Chargé and members of the USLO in Bejing is described ibid., HAK Office Files, Box 95, Country Files, Far East, Folder 4 [2 of 2], China Exchange, 7/10/73–10/31/73.

Document 246: Memorandum of Conversation, Seoul, November 16, 1973.

Kissinger and Park discussed U.S.-Korean relations and U.S. negotiations with China.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973 (TS Files), Box 24, Misc Refiles [No Folder Title], POL 7 US/Kissinger. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hummel. The meeting was held in the Blue House.

Document 247: Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, Washington, December 4, 1973, 10:40 a.m.–12:02 p.m.

A WSAG meeting considered North Korean maritime demands.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 24, WSAG Working Group, Dec. 4, 1973 [Korea]. Top Secret; Nodis. The minutes were attached to a covering memorandum, December 5, from Davis to Kissinger, explaining that the WSAG met “to discuss North Korea’s demand that UN Command naval and merchant ships obtain prior permission to navigate the waters contiguous to five UNC-controlled islands off the west coast of Korea.” On December 22, Scowcroft approved draft State-Defense cables to the Embassy in Seoul giving guidance for the upcoming Military Armistice Commission meeting and commenting on a South Korean memorandum on the island dispute. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 544, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Volume 7, November 1973–)

Document 248: National Security Study Memorandum 190, Washington, December 31, 1973.

Kissinger asked the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency to study potential diplomatic initiatives regarding security arrangements on the Korean peninsula.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–201, NSSMs, NSSM 190 (1 of 3). Top Secret; Nodis. Coped to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On December 20, Kissinger received a memorandum from Solomon and Froebe recommending that he sign a NSSM on diplomatic initiatives in Korea. On the first page of this memorandum, Kissinger wrote, “I want NSSM sent.” (Ibid.) The NSSM 190 issues were eventually referred to the President for decision without a prior meeting of the SRG.

Document 249: Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, January 25, 1974.

Habib and Kissinger led a discussion of U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 2. Secret; Nodis. In telegram 22538 to Seoul, February 2, Hummel informed Habib, “The Secretary has asked that we reiterate to you his disinclination to have us pressing the Koreans, either privately or publicly, on their domestic situation. You will recall his remarks on this subject during the discussion at your meeting January 25. This reiteration stems from that discussion, rather than from any new developments; we have not seen evidence of such pressing in your recent reporting.” (Ibid, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 544, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Volume 7, November 1973–)

Document 250: Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, February 1, 1974.

The authors predicted that Park’s regime would remain in power in the short run, but domestic opposition to it would grow.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 16 (Office of Current Intelligence), Job 79T00863A, Box 31, Folder 22, Intelligence Memorandum [unnumbered]. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. The Office of Current Intelligence at the CIA prepared this report in response to a January 19 request from Scowcroft, on behalf of Kissinger, that “an assessment be made of the current South Korean internal political situation, accompanied by a projection of the prospects for the next two to three months.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 544, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Volume 7, November 1973–)

Document 251: Memorandum From Richard Smyser and John Froebe of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, February 11, 1974.

Smyser and Froebe recommended that Kissinger ask Sisco to urge the British Ambassador to delay an expansion of relations with North Korea.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Far East, Box 544, Korea, Volume 7, November 1973–. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Concurred in by Soloman. Kissinger initialed his approval of the recommendation. Attached but not published is the table of states.

Document 252: Memorandum From Secretary of State Kissinger to President Nixon, Washington, March 25, 1974.

Kissinger presented his own and agency views about negotiations on terminating the UN Command in Korea, and recommended that Nixon approve the issuance of a NSDM on this subject.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–202, NSSMs, NSSM 190 [2 of 3]. Top Secret; Sensitive. The President approved the NSDM recommendation, and, next to section 4b, he wrote, “K—Vital to highlight this.” On February 7, Acting Chairman Hummel of the IG for East Asia and the Pacific sent Scowcroft its response to NSSM 190. (Ibid.) On February 24, Kissinger request comments from the Departments of Defense, State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, noting that there would be no SRG meeting on Korea before the President made decisions on issues in NSSM 190. (Ibid., Box H–311, Miscellaneous Institutional Files of the Nixon Administration, NSC Subject, [Korea] [1 of 2])

Document 253: National Security Decision Memorandum 251, Washington, March 29, 1974.

Kissinger issued NSDM 251 concerning the termination of the UN Command in Korea.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–246, NSDMs, NSDM 251. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Document 254: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 28, 1974, 2:05–3:05 p.m.

Habib briefed Clements on U.S. relations with Korea.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–77–0054, Korea, 333, 1974, June 20. Secret. Prepared by Vandegrift and approved by Jordan. The conversation took place in Clements’s office. Clements’s talking points for the meeting, dated May 28, are ibid.

Document 255: National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum 14.2–1–74, Washington, July 15, 1974.

The memorandum assessed North Korea’s military and strategic intentions.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 122 (National Intelligence Council), Job 79R01012A, Box 480, NIAM 14.2–1–74, Folder 3. Top Secret. The memorandum was prepared by the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, and the National Security Agency. Concurred in by members from the CIA, INR, DIA, NSA; representatives from the AEC, FBI, and the Department of Treasury abstained. Representatives of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force also participated.

Document 256: Memorandum From Richard Smyser of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, undated.

Smyser sent Kissinger a memorandum about informing the South Korean government of U.S. aid plans.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–241, NSDMs, NSDM 227, folder 6. Secret. Sent for urgent action. Concurred in by Kennedy. Attached but not published are Tab A the undated draft memorandum from Kissinger to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of State; and Tab B, the memorandum from Clements to Kissinger. Tab C, NSDM 227, is attached and published as Document 243. Kissinger did not sign Tab A. An attached note from Scowcroft indicates that the matter was instead handled by phone on September 23.

Document 257: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, Washington, October 8, 1974.

Kissinger asked the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the CIA to produce a study of the U.S. security assistance program to the Republic of Korea.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–32, NSSM 211, Review of U.S. Security Assistance to the Republic of Korea (2). Top Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Document 258: Memorandum of Conversation, Seoul, November 22, 1974, 3 p.m.

Park, Ford, and Kissinger discussed U.S. support for South Korea, the North Korean threat, North-South dialogue, Japan, the Soviet Union, China, and economic issues.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 7. Secret; Nodis. The conversation took place in the Blue House. Ford visited South Korea November 21–22; his arrival speech, dinner toast, and the joint communiqué he issued with Park are in The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXI, No. 1852, December 23, pp. 875–878.

Document 259: Memorandum of Conversation, Seoul, November 1974.

Park, Ford, and Kissinger briefly discussed issues in U.S.-South Korean relations.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 7. Secret; Nodis. The conversation took place in the Blue House. The exact date and time of this conversation is not indicated.

Document 260: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford, Washington, January 3, 1975.

Kissinger recommended that Ford approve the issuance of a NSDM on future U.S. military assistance to South Korea.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–57, NSDM 282, Review of ROK Air Defense Requirements (10). Top Secret; Nodis. Ford initialed the approve option. The response to NSSM 211, an undated IG paper, is ibid., Box H–32, NSSM 211, Review of U.S. Security Assistance to the Republic of Korea (1).

Document 261: Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, January 6, 1975, 8 a.m..

Habib and Kissinger discussed weapons sales to South Korea.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 5. Secret.

Document 262: National Security Decision Memorandum 282, Washington, January 9, 1975.

Kissinger issued NSDM 282 concerning the Korean force modernization plan.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–69, NSDM Originals (1 of 2), NSDM 281–NSDM 300. Top Secret; Nodis. Copies were sent to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Document 263: Key Judgments From an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum DCI/NIO 165–75, Washington, January 24, 1975.

[1 page not declassified.]

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 122 (National Intelligence Council), Job 79R01142A, Box 1, Folder 10. Secret.

Document 264: Memorandum From Richard Smyser and David Elliott of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, February 28, 1975.

Smyser and Elliott recommended that Kissinger approve a Department of State cable addressing the development of nuclear weapons in South Korea.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 9, Korea [4]. Secret; Sensitive. On behalf of Kissinger, Scowcroft initialed his approval of the draft State cable. Tab A is attached but not published. Tab B, not attached, is likely telegram 8023 from Seoul, referenced in Document 263. The Department sent the cable on March 4 as telegram 048673 to Seoul. (Ibid., Box 11, Korea, DOS Cables, NODIS from SECSTATE [3])

Document 265: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 27, 1975, 5 p.m.

Sneider informed Scowcroft about developments in U.S.-South Korean relations.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 10. Secret. The conversation took place in the White House. The March 26 talking points that Smyser gave Scowcroft, are ibid., Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 9, Korea [5].

Document 266: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 28, 1975, 11 a.m.

Kissinger and Foreign Minister Kim discussed South Korea’s international position.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820123–1061. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Smyser and approved by Gompert.

Document 267: Telegram 2685 From the Embassy in the Republic of Korea to the Department of State, April 18, 1975, 0933Z.

The Embassy analyzed the South Korean view of the U.S. security commitment in the light of developments in Indochina.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Exdis. The Embassy in Seoul sent a telegram of policy recommendations to bolster ROK security on April 22. (Telegram 2807 from Seoul; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 11, Korea, State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE, NODIS [5])

Document 268: National Security Study Memorandum 226, Washington, May 27, 1975.

Kissinger asked the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the CIA to review U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–36, NSSM 226, Review of U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula. Secret; Nodis. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Document 269: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 12, 1975, 4 p.m.

Kissinger and Habib discussed U.S.-ROK relations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820123–1364. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by O’Donohue and approved by Covey.

Document 270: Memorandum of Conversation, Seoul, August 27, 1975.

Park and Schlesinger discussed Japan, human rights, and anti-submarine warfare.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 9, Korea (11). Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The conversation took place in President Park’s Office. The discussion occurred before and during lunch. Howard Graves, Military Assistant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, sent this memcon to Scowcroft on September 9.

Document 271: Memorandum of Conversation, Seoul, August 27, 1975.

Park and Schlesinger discussed the North Korean threat, ROK force improvement, and the military situation on the Korean Peninsula.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 9, Korea (11). Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The conversation took place in President Park’s Office. Howard Graves, Military Assistant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, sent this memcon to Scowcroft on September 9.

Document 272: Memorandum of Conversation, Seoul, August 27, 1975.

Park and Schlesinger discussed nuclear matters, the U.S. commitment to Korea, and U.S. military commanders in South Korea.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 9, Korea (11). Secret; Nodis. The conversation took place in President Park’s Office. The meeting time is unrecorded. Howard Graves, Military Assistant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, sent this memcon to Scowcroft on September 9.

Document 273: Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, September 29, 1975.

Barnes recommended that Scowcroft investigate Schlesinger’s discussions in Korea and the proposal for a short-war strategy.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 9, Korea (12). Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum notes Granger’s concurrence, next to which is written “strongly concur.” Attached but not published are Tab A, undated comments on Schlesinger’s discussions in Seoul; Tab B, Schlesinger’s conversations with Park and Suh, which the NSC received under a covering memorandum, September 9, from Schlesinger’s Military Assistant Howard Graves to Scowcroft, and which are published as Documents 270–272; Tab C, an undated outline of Schlesinger’s anticipated discussions with Park. Tabs D and E are not attached, but refer to telegram 226183 to Seoul, September 23, and telegram 7547 from Seoul, September 25, both at the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. In response to telegram 7547, the Department sent telegram 234236 to Seoul, October 1; ibid. Scowcroft initialed his approval of the recommendation.

Document 274: Study Prepared by the Office of International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense, Washington, undated.

The Bureau of International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense examined the problems facing the United States in Korea.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–79–0049, Korea, 092, 1976, January 16. Secret. Amos Jordan sent the study to the Secretary of Defense under a covering memorandum, January 15, on which was noted: “Sec Def has seen. 19 Jan 1976.”

Document 275: Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense (Bergold) to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Washington, March 16, 1976.

Bergold warned that increasing repression by Park’s government was diminishing Congressional support for South Korea.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–79–0049, Korea, 092, 1976, 1976 March 16. Confidential; Eyes Only. A notation on the memorandum reads, “22 Mar 1976. Sec Def has seen.” For NSSM 235, see Document 23.

Document 276: Memorandum From Jeanne Davis of the National Security Council Staff to the Chairman of the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for East Asia (Habib), Washington, April 19, 1976.

Davis asked the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia to resume work on NSSM 226.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–36, NSSM 226, Review of U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula. Secret; Nodis.

Document 277: Memorandum from Jay Taylor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, April 22, 1976.

Taylor summarized a CIA report on possible North Korean initiatives during 1976.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 10, Korea (15). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Scowcroft initialed the memorandum and wrote, “Good idea.” Tab A, April 8, 1976, is not attached. It is in the Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 122 (National Intelligence Council), Job 91R00884R, Box 31, Intelligence Memorandum: Possible North Korean Initiatives During 1976, NIO M 76–010 C. The Defense papers on the vulnerabilities of the Northwest Islands to attack and on options for their defense are in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 10, Korea (17).

Document 278: Memorandum From Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affair Abramowitz to William Hyland of the NSC Staff, Washington, April 22, 1976.

Abramowitz asked that the request for NSSM 226 be withdrawn.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–36, NSSM 226, Review of U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula. Secret.

Document 279: Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, May 19, 1976.

Barnes asked Scowcroft to decide the future of the NSSM 226 study.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–36, NSSM 226, Review of U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for Action. The tabs are attached but not published. On the first page of the memorandum, Scowcroft wrote, “a mistake” next to the passage: “We originally issued NSSM 226 in May 1975 but delayed action pending the broad review of U.S. interests and security objectives in the Asia-Pacific area.” On the third page, Scowcroft underlined, “informally inform the departments concerned” and initialed his approval of option A. He also wrote, “Our basic mistake was stopping work on the NSSM last spring when we could have used it.”

Document 280: Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, May 28, 1976.

Barnes informed Scowcroft of North Korean threats and of accusations of South Korean provocations.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 10, Korea (16). Confidential. Sent for information. Concurred in by Granger. According to the correspondence profile, Scowcroft saw this document on June 1. (Ibid.) North Korean news accounts of enemy provocations are ibid.

Document 281: Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (Habib), Washington, August 18, 1976, 10:05 a.m.

Kissinger and Habib discussed a North Korean attack on South Korean and U.S. soldiers who were pruning a tree in the demilitarized zone.

Source: Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Transcripts of Kissinger Telephone Conversations. Unclassified.

Document 282: Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, Washington, August 18, 1976, 3:47–4:43 p.m.

WSAG received a CIA briefing on the DMZ attack and then discussed policy options.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 27, WSAG Meeting, Korean Incident, August 18, 1976. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

Document 283: Telegram 206084 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of Korea, August 19, 1976, 0110Z.

The Department sent instructions to the U.S. political and military representatives in Korea on the response to the North Korean attack in the DMZ.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 10, Korea, North Korean Tree Incident, August 18, 1976, Telegrams (1). Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Hurwitz and approved by Kissinger.

Document 284: Telegram 190720Z From the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command (Stillwell) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of State Kissinger, and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, August 19, 1976, 0720Z.

Stilwell described his meeting with Park on the response to the North Korean attack.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 10, Korea, North Korean Tree Incident, August 18, 1976, Telegrams (3). Secret.

Document 285: Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, Washington, August 19, 1976, 8:12-9:15 a.m.

WSAG discussed how to respond to the North Korean DMZ attack.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 27, WSAG Meeting, Korean Incident, August 18, 1976. Secret. The meeting occurred in the White House Situation Room. The briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence is attached but not published. Hyland’s draft telegram to Scowcroft, August 19, reported on proposed responses to the attack. (Ibid., Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 10, Korea, North Korean Tree Incident, August 18, 1976 [2]) On the morning of August 21, UNC forces felled the disputed tree.

Document 286: Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, Washington, August 25, 1976, 10:30 a.m..

WSAG met to discuss the Korean situation.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 27, WSAG Meeting, Korean Incident, August 18, 1976. Top Secret; Sensitive. The minutes contain handwritten revisions by Gleysteen. The meeting occurred in the White House Situation Room. Gleysteen sent these minutes to Hyland under an undated memorandum.

Document 287: Telegram 213541 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of Korea, August 27, 1976, 2010Z.

The Department of State sent Sneider instructions for his meeting with Park.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Director of the Korea desk Edward Hurwitz; cleared by Hummel, Habib, and Deputy Executive Secretary Peter Sebastian; and approved by Kissinger. On August 28, Sneider reported that he had met with Park and had carried out his instructions. (Telegram 6748 from Seoul; ibid.)

Document 288: Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Hyland) to President Ford, Washington, September 5, 1976.

Hyland informed Ford of a revision to the Korean DMZ agreement.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 10, Korea (19). Confidential. Ford initialed the first page of the memorandum.

Document 289: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 15, 1976, 2:30 p.m.

Scowcroft, Sneider, and Gleysteen discussed U.S. policy toward Korea.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 10, Korea (19). Secret; Sensitive. Gleysteen sent the memorandum of conversation to Scowcroft under a covering memorandum, September 17, recommending his approval, which Scowcroft initialed. The talking points that Gleysteen prepared for Scowcroft, September 14, are ibid.

Document 290: Telegram 9567 From Embassy in the Republic of Korea to the Department of State, December 3, 1976, 0835Z.

Sneider reported on the U.S.-South Korean relationship.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

Document 291: Memorandum From John Holdridge and Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, March 1, 1973.

Kissinger agreed with Holdridge’s and Kennedy’s recommendation that the U.S. Air Force continue directed procurement of air repair service in Singapore.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 559, Country Files, Far East, Singapore, 1972–. Secret. Sent for action. Tab A, the draft State/Defense cable on procurement policy, and Tab B, Kissinger’s memoranda of May 7 and June 28, 1971, are attached but not published. Kissinger initialed his approval of both recommendations on March 6.

Document 292: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 10, 1973, 10:30–11:03 a.m.

Kissinger and Lee discussed the international situation in East Asia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 938, VIP Visits, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, April 10, 1973. Secret; Sensitive. The conversation took place in Kissinger’s office in the White House. Holdridge’s talking points for Kissinger, April 9, are ibid.

Document 293: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 10, 1973, 11:13 a.m. –12:18 p.m.

Nixon and Lee discussed international affairs.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 938, VIP Visits, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, April 10, 1973. Secret. The conversation took place in the White House. Undated talking points from Kissinger to the President, which the President saw, are ibid.

Document 294: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 11, 1973, 9:50–10:20 a.m.

Kissinger and Lee discussed Southeast Asia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1027, Presidential/HAK memcons, Folder 5, April–November 1975. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The conversation took place in Kissinger’s Office. On August 4, 3:30–4:40 p.m., Lee and Kissinger met in a conference room at Kennedy International Airport in New York. A memorandum of conversation from their meeting, which mainly discussed affairs in Indochina, is ibid., folder 3.

Document 295: Memorandum From W.R. Smyser of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, January 30, 1975.

Smyser proposed a NSSM on U.S. military access to Singapore.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–34, NSSM 218, U.S. Policy Toward U.S. and Soviet Military Access to Singapore. Secret. Sent for action. Concurred in by Granger and Oakley. In the top right-hand corner of the first page, Kissinger wrote, “Give new date + then issue.” On the second page, an unknown hand crossed out “draft memorandum to the President at Tab I” and wrote, “NSSM at Tab A.” Attached but not printed is Tab A, NSSM 218. [Malaysia/Singapore, 1973–1976, NSSM 218, 3/3/75]

Document 296: National Security Study Memorandum 218, Washington, March 3, 1975.

Kissinger asked the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the CIA to review U.S. policy toward U.S. and Soviet military access to Singapore.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 10, Singapore, NSSM 218. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The NSSM 218 study was cancelled and did not result in a meeting.

Document 297: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 8, 1975, noon–1 p.m.

Ford, Lee, and Kissinger discussed the situation in East Asia after the fall of South Vietnam.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 11. Secret; Sensitive. The conversation took place in the Oval Office. Ford’s talking points from Kissinger, which the President saw, are available ibid., VIP Visits, Box 8.

Document 298: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 8, 1975.

Kissinger and Lee conferred on U.S. policy toward East Asia.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Secretary of State Kissinger, E5403, Box 23. Secret; Sensitive. The paper that Lee gave Kissinger is not further identified.

Document 299: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 9, 1975, 2:30–4 p.m.

Lee and Schlesinger conversed on the implications of the fall of South Vietnam.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–78–0038, Singapore, 333, 1975 May 30. Secret; Sensitive. The memorandum of conversation was prepared by Holmberg and approved by Ellsworth. The conversation took place in Schlesinger’s office. Ellsworth’s talking points for Schlesinger, May 8, are ibid. Scowcroft’s talking points for Schlesinger, May 9, are in Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 21, Visit of PM Lee of Singapore, May 8, 1975 (1).

Document 300: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 30, 1975.

Kissinger and Rithauddeen discussed U.S. relations with Malaysia.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P–820123–2578. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Sheppard and approved by Covey.

Document 301: Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, November 5, 1975.

Barnes recommended that Scowcroft request an NIE on “Prospects for Stability in Malaysia.”

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Agency File, Box 2, Central Intelligence Agency, 12/15/1975. Secret. Sent for action. Richard Ober, a staff member of the NSC involved in intelligence coordination, concurred in the memorandum. Tab A, telegram 250586, October 21, to Singapore; Tab B, telegram 250585, October 21, to Kuala Lumpur; Tab C, telegram 5840, October 1, from Kuala Lumpur; and D, telegram 4398, October 9, from Singapore, are attached but not published. Tab E is published as Document 297. Tab F, Lee’s warning to Kissinger, is not further identified. A handwritten note on the last page of the memorandum indicates that Scowcroft verbally approved the request for the NIE.

Document 302: National Intelligence Estimate 54–1–76, Washington, April 1, 1976.

The estimate assessed the likelihood of instability in Malaysia during the next few years.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 122 (National Intelligence Council), Job 91R00884R, Box 5, NIE 54–1–76, Folder 17. Secret. All members of the USIB concurred in the estimate except the representatives of the FBI and the Deputy Assistant Administrator for National Security, Energy Research and Development Administration. The intelligence organizations of the Army, Navy, and Air Force also participated in the estimate.

Document 303: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 2, 1973.

Kissinger reported on Laird’s views of the Micronesian status negotiations and noted that the negotiations have been postponed.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 568, Country Files, Far East, Trust Territories, Vol. III [1 of 2]. Secret. Sent for action. Holdridge initialed the memorandum on behalf of Kissinger. On the second page, Nixon highlighted the paragraph about OEO and the Peace Corps and wrote to Kissinger: “K—this had to be written by a Peace Corps advocate.” At the bottom of the page, the President initialed his approval of the recommendation and wrote, “K with strong reservation. Laird is totally right on the Peace Corps + Legal Services.” He also noted for Erlichman: “E—get both groups out of there discreetly because of need to cut both programs.” Tab A, Kissinger’s memorandum, January 25, to the Secretary of Defense, is attached but not published, as is Tab B, Laird’s memorandum, December 4, to Nixon, and Tab C, Ambassador Williams’s letter, October 27, to Nixon.

Document 304: Letter From the President’s Personal Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations (Williams) to President Nixon, Washington, January 5, 1973.

Williams reported on the status of negotiations with the Marianas and the other districts of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 568, Country Files, Far East, Trust Territories, Vol. III [1 of 2]. Confidential. On March 19, Williams sent a study to the Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee concerning the negotiations on the future political status of the Mariana Islands District of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–276, Under Secretaries Decision Memorandums, U/DM 98 [2 of 5])

Document 305: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, May 3, 1973.

Kissinger reported on the Under Secretaries Committee’s proposed instructions to Williams and asked Nixon to decide on the U.S. negotiating position toward Tinian.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1977, Box 36, Marianas (Working Files) [7]. Secret. Sent for action. The President initialed his approval of the first recommendation, which concerned the acquisition of Tinian, and the second recommendation, which approved the positions advocated by the USC. Tab A, draft instructions to Williams, is not attached. Tab B, the April 13 memorandum from Rush, the Chairman of the USC, to the President, is at National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-276, Under Secretaries Decision Memorandums, U/DM 98 [1 of 5]. Tab C, a report from the DOS Political Advisor in the TTPI, is not attached.

Document 306: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, November 9, 1973.

Kissinger asked Nixon whether the U.S. negotiator should be authorized to offer an independence option to Micronesia in addition to the option of Free Association.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–277, Under Secretaries Decision Memorandums, U/DM 98 [4 of 5]. Secret. Sent for action. Scowcroft initialed the memorandum on behalf of Kissinger. On page 2, Nixon underlined the phrase “I recommend that William’s authority to offer it be discretionary, to be used only if tactically necessary,” and wrote, “Very important.” On the last page, Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation. Attached but not published are Tab A, Kissinger’s instructions to Williams, November 14, and Tab B, a November 9 memorandum from Rush to Nixon.

Document 307: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, March 25, 1974.

Kissinger informed Nixon of progress in the Micronesian status negotiations and requested authorization to draft supplemental instructions for Williams.

Source: Library of Congress, Henry Kissinger Papers, CL 299, Memoranda to the President, March 1974. Secret. Sent for Action. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation. Tab A, the supplementary instructions, March 29, that Kissinger sent to Williams, is attached but not published. Tab B, Williams’s January 25 letter to Nixon, and Tab C, Williams’s November 28, 1973 letter to Nixon, are both attached but not published. Tab D, Rush’s memorandum, February 23, to Nixon is not attached but is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–277, Under Secretaries Decision Memorandums, U/DM 98 (5 of 5). Tab E, a memorandum from OMB, is not attached.

Document 308: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, July 8, 1974.

Kissinger reported on the Micronesian status negotiations and recommended that Nixon authorize draft instructions for Williams.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1977, Box 36, Marianas (Working Files) [6]. Secret. Sent for action. Scowcoft initialed the memorandum on behalf of Kissinger. The President initialed his approval of the recommendation. Tab A, a memorandum, July 10, from Kissinger to William, is not attached but is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–281, Folder 6, U/N 90–149. Tab B, an April 12 letter from Williams to the President, is attached but not published. Tabs C and D, recommendations from concerned departments and agencies, are not further identified, but these recommendations are described in an attached memorandum, May 24, from Rush to the President, which stated that the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Interior, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations endorsed Williams’s recommendations.

Document 309: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford, Washington, February 6, 1975.

Kissinger informed the President about the final stage of negotiations with the Northern Marianas and asked him to approve instructions for Williams.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Box 18, Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands (1). Confidential. Sent for action. Ford initialed his approval of the recommendation on the last page. Attached but not published is a signed copy, dated February 7, of Tab A, instructions from Kissinger to Williams. Tab B, a memorandum, January 25, from Ingersoll to Ford presenting the USC’s views of the Marianas’s future political status, is not attached but is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–277, Under Secretaries Decision Memorandums, U/DM 98 [5 of 5]. Tab C, from OMB, is not attached.

Document 310: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 19, 1975, 4:15 p.m.

Ford met with leaders from the Northern Marianas.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 10, 3/19/75. Top Secret. The conversation took place in the Oval Office. According to Ford’s talking points from Kissinger, the purpose of this meeting was “To demonstrate the importance we attach to the recently concluded Commonwealth Covenant with the Northern Marianas, and to Micronesia generally.” (Ibid.) A majority of the voters of the Northern Mariana Islands approved the Commonwealth Covenant in a plebiscite held on June 17, 1975.

Document 311: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford, Washington, July 24, 1975.

Kissinger recommended that Ford make Fiji eligible to make defense purchases from the U.S.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, Box 16, Presidential Determinations, FY 1976 (1). Confidential. Sent for action. Attached but not published is Tab A, a memorandum, August 5, from Ford to the Secretary of State making Fiji eligible to purchase defense articles and services. Tab B, Ingersoll’s June 24 memorandum to Ford, is attached but not published. Tab C, a memorandum, July 6, from James Lynn of the Office of Management and Budget to Ford, is also attached but not published.

Document 312: Memorandum From Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee Robinson to President Ford, Washington, May 24, 1976.

The Under Secretaries Committee asked Ford to approve instructions for Williams and discussed an interagency study on the future political status of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–277, Under Secretaries Decision Memorandums, U/DM 98 [5 of 5]. Secret. Tab 1, undated instructions for the President’s Personal Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations, is attached but not published. Tab 2, the Interagency Study is not attached. Tab 3, a memorandum, May 24, from Associate OMB Director Donald Ogilvie to Robinson, is attached but not published. Tab 4, a map of the TTPI, is attached but not published.

Document 313: Editorial Note

Document 314: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, January 5, 1973, 3:30 p.m.

Nixon and Romulo discussed affairs in the United States, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1026, Presidential/HAK Memcons, January–March 1973. Secret; Nodis. At the time Nixon and Romulo met, the Philippines had been under martial law since September 1972 and the Filipino army was fighting rebels in the Sula Archipelago.

Document 315: Telegram 0823 From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State, January 22, 1973, 1000Z.

The embassy analyzed events in the Philippines.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–192, NSSM 155 [2 of 2]. Secret; Exdis. Repeated Priority to DOD and CINCPAC.

Document 316: Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Eagleburger) to Secretary of Defense Richardson, Washington, March 15, 1973.

Eagleburger described the Muslim insurgency in the Philippines.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0001, Philippines, 091.3, 15 March 1973. Confidential; Noforn. The bottom of the memorandum is stamped, “Sec has seen. 17 Mar 1973.”

Document 317: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, March 16, 1973.

Kissinger described for Nixon the consensus that resulted from an SRG meeting regarding the Philippines and urged him to approve a NSDM to be released at a later date.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–192, NSSM 155 [2 of 2]. Secret. Sent for action. Tab A, an undated proposed NSDM on U.S. policy toward the Philippines, is attached but not published. The President initialed his approval of the draft NSDM, which was subsequently released. See Document 318. The Laurel-Langley Agreement, which governed U.S. tariffs on Philippine exports and the privileges of U.S. investors, expired on July 4, 1974.

Document 318: National Security Decision Memorandum 209, Washington, March 27, 1973.

Kissinger issued NSDM 209 concerning U.S. policy toward the Philippines.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–239, NSDMs, NSDM 209, Philippines. Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs. The text of NSSM 155 is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XX, Southeast Asia, 1969–1972, Document 254.

Document 319: Special National Intelligence Estimate 56–73, Washington, March 28, 1973.

The estimate examined the implications for the United States of the Muslim insurrection in the southern Philippines.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV, January 1972–December 31, 1973. Secret; Controlled Dissem. The CIA and the intelligence organizations of DOS, DOD, and the NSA participated in the preparation of the SNIE. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate except the representative of the FBI who abstained because the subject was outside of his jurisdiction. In a memorandum, March 20, Holdridge recommended that Scowcroft ask the CIA to produce a SNIE on the Muslim uprising in the southern Philippines. (Ibid.)

Document 320: Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Eagleburger) to Secretary of Defense Richardson, Washington, April 7, 1973.

Eagleburger sent Richardson a memorandum on the U.S. attitude toward the Philippine claim to Sabah.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0001, Philippines, 370.64, 7 April 1973. Confidential. Sent for information. Captain Robert Shaid, USN, prepared the memorandum. At the top of the first page of the memorandum, Richardson wrote, “Noted. Sounds right. ELR 4/12.” Attached but not published is an undated background sheet on the “Sabah Claim Issue.” Eagleburger sent the memorandum in response to a comment, attached but not published, that Richardson wrote on SNIE 56–73; see Document 319.

Document 321: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 17, 1973.

Kissinger recommended that the President approve a NSSM to examine the insurrection in the southern Philippines.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H –199, NSSMs, NSSM 180. Secret. Sent for action. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation. Tab A, the proposed NSSM, is attached. A signed version is published as Document 323.

Document 322: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 18, 1973.

Kissinger recommended that the President authorize him to approve an AID program to assist in the reorganization of the Manila police administration.

Source: Library of Congress, Henry Kissinger Papers, CL 297, Memoranda to the President, April 1973. Secret. Sent for action. Concurred in by Timmons. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation that AID assist in the reorganization of the Manila police administration. Attached but not published is Tab A, the memorandum from Kissinger to Rogers, April 26, as sent.

Document 323: National Security Study Memorandum 180, Washington, May 1, 1973.

Kissinger asked the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the CIA to study how the insurrection in the southern Philippines affects U.S. policy in Southeast Asia.

Source: Library of Congress, Henry Kissinger Papers, CL 316, National Security Study Memoranda, October 1971–May 1973. Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On July 26, Hummel, the Acting Chairman of the East Asian and Pacific Interdepartmental Group, sent a study to the NSC Review Group in response to NSSM 180. The study provided options in response to four questions: how the U.S. should react to GOP requests for increased security assistance to help end the insurgency; whether the U.S. should use economic assistance to encourage the GOP to be more responsive to the needs of Philippine Muslims; whether the U.S. should encourage other countries in the region to help stabilize the situation; how the U.S. should treat the Philippine claim to Sabah. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files [H-Files], Box H–199, NSSMs, NSSM 180)

Document 324: Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (William Colby) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Godley), Washington, July 6, 1973.

The CIA assessed the political and economic situation in the Philippines.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–192, Folder 1, NSSM 155 [2 of 2]. Secret; Sensitive. Richard Kennedy also received a copy. Theodore Shackley, the Chief of the Far East Division, Directorate of Operations, CIA, sent this memorandum on behalf of Colby.

Document 325: Telegram 998 From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State, January 26, 1974, 0540Z.

The Embassy reported on the Philippine position regarding the Spratly Islands.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated for information to Saigon, Peking, Taipei, and CINCPAC. The Spratly Islands consist of more than 100 islands or reefs in the South China Sea surrounded by rich fishing grounds and, potentially, by gas and oil deposits.

Document 326: Telegram 020401 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines, January 31, 1974, 0311Z.

The Department conveyed the U.S. position regarding the Spratly Islands.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 558, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, 1 January 1974. Secret; Cherokee; Priority; Nodis; Eyes Only Ambassador. Drafted by Hummel; cleared by Lord and Scowcroft; and approved by Kissinger.

Document 327: Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, January 31, 1974, 3:08 p.m..

Kissinger and his staff discussed the Spratly Island dispute.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 2. Secret. According to the summary of decisions that proceeds these minutes, Kissinger decided at this meeting “That we do not want to do anything re the Spratly Islands that would encourage the PRC to believe it has a free hand to take military action or lead our allies to believe we are needlessly alarmed at the prospect of such action.”

Document 328: Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, March 13, 1974, 4 p.m..

Kissinger and his staff discussed the insurgency in the southern Philippines.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 2. Secret.

Document 329: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 24, 1974, 1610–1640.

Sullivan and Schlesinger discussed U.S. relations with the Philippines.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–77–0054, Philippines, 333, 13 May 1974. Confidential. Drafted by Bigley and approved by Peet.

Document 330: Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, May 9, 1974, 8 a.m..

Kissinger and his staff discussed Philippine claims to the Paracel Islands.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 3. Secret. According to the summary outline that precedes the minutes, “Secretary wants to be advised before we discuss application of defense treaty with Philippine Government. Amb. Sullivan should not raise this subject.”

Document 331: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Springsteen) to the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, July 3, 1974.

Springsteen reported on bilateral economic and security negotiations with the Philippines.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–239, NSDMs, NSDM 209, Philippines. Confidential. On April 17, 1975, the NSC staff logged this memorandum and marked it OBE.

Document 332: Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford, Washington, November 7, 1974.

Scowcroft asked the President whether Mrs. Ford should meet with Imelda Marcos.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 15, Philippines (1). Secret. Sent for action. Ford initialed his disapproval of a meeting between his wife and Mrs. Marcos.

Document 333: Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, February 6, 1975, 8 a.m..

Kissinger and Habib discussed the Philippines’ request for weapons to combat the insurgency.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 6. Secret. Telegram 1667, February 6, from Manila describes GOP weapons requests. (National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) Telegram 2806, March 5, from Manila reports on the successful fulfillment of most of the GOP requests. (Ibid.)

Document 334: Telegram 4661 From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State, April 14, 1975, 0842Z.

The Embassy warned that the Philippines was reassessing its security arrangements with the United States.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated for information to Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Seoul, Singapore, Tokyo, CINCPAC.

Document 335: Backchannel Message 170 From the Ambassador to the Philippines (Sullivan) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Manila, April 16, 1975, 0321Z.

Sullivan alerted Scowcroft to the Philippine reassessment of security relations with the United States.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Backchannel Messages, Box 7, Southeast Asia, 4/75, Incoming. Confidential; Eyes Only.

Document 336: Memorandum From W.R. Smyser of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, April 21, 1975.

Smyser recommended that the United States reassure Marcos.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 15, Philippines (2). Secret. Sent for immediate action. Although neither recommendation was initialed, a handwritten notation on the first page reads, “Taken care of per Gen S.” Attached but not published are Tab A, the draft backchannel telegram from the White House to Simon; Tab B, telegram 2681, April 18, from the Department of Treasury to the Department of State; and Tab C, telegram 090638, April 20, to Manila.

Document 337: Memorandum From Jan Lodal of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, May 7, 1975.

[1 page not declassified.]

Source: Library of Congress, Henry Kissinger Papers, Chronological File, 1969–1975, TS 9, May 1975. Top Secret; Sensitive.

Document 338: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 10, 1975, 10:30 a.m.

Scowcroft and Sullivan discussed relations between the United States and the Philippines.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 15, Philippines (3). Secret; Sensitive. Scowcroft’s talking points, July 9, from Smyser are in the Library of Congress, Henry Kissinger Papers, Chronological File, 1969–1975, TS 10, July 1975.

Document 339: Memorandum From John Froebe of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, August 8, 1975.

Froebe recommended that Scowcroft refuse a short notice meeting between Mrs. Marcos and Mrs. Ford.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 15, Philippines (3). Secret. Sent for action. Scowcroft initialed his approval of the sending of a draft State cable to Sullivan. Attached but not published are Tab A, the draft cable to Sullivan, and Tab B, the August 7 backchannel telegram from Sullivan. A handwritten notation on the first page indicates that at 10:30 p.m. on August 8, the NSC staff directed the Department of State to send the telegram.

Document 340: Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, September 22, 1975, 8 a.m..

Habib told Kissinger about a cut in U.S. aid for the Philippines that the White House had approved.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 8. Secret.

Document 341: Editorial Note.

Document 342: Editorial Note.

Document 343: Telegram 81789 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines, April 5, 1976, 2357Z.

The Department of State reported on a meeting between Habib and Virata that covered economic aspects of the U.S.-Philippines relationship.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to the MTN Delegation in Geneva and to CINCPAC in Honolulu. Drafted by Willner, Country Officer for the Philippines; cleared by Edmond; and approved by Habib. The memorandum of conversation is in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 10.

Document 344: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 10, 1976, 11 a.m.

Kissinger, Habib, and Sullivan discussed the U.S. base negotiations with the Philippines.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Secretary of State Kissinger’s Lot File, E5403, Box 16. Top Secret; Nodis. Fleck drafted the memorandum. The meeting occurred in Kissinger’s office.

Document 345: Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, April 12, 1976..

Barnes described the opening session of the U.S.-Philippine base negotiations.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 15, Philippines (4). Confidential. Urgent; Sent for information. Attached but not published are Tab A, an undated briefing memorandum from Habib to Kissinger providing a list of participants at the session, and Tab B, the undated statement of Romulo. Tab C, the press statement, is not attached.

Document 346: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 13, 1976, 11:08–11:30 a.m.

Ford, Romulo, and Kissinger discussed U.S. politics and the base negotiations.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, April 13, 1976. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. Ford’s talking points from Scowcroft, which the President saw, assert that the meeting “is meant as a courtesy call to welcome Secretary Romulo to the United States and to underline the importance you attach to our military base negotiations which began on April 12, as well as our bilateral economic negotiations which started March 29.”

Document 347: Telegram 9671 From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State, July 3, 1976, 0628Z.

The Embassy in Manila reported on the base negotiations between the United States and the Philippines.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Exdis; Stadis; Eyes Only.

Document 348: Telegram 169597 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines, July 8, 1976, 2313Z.

The Department responded to Sullivan’s telegram about the Philippine base negotiations and emphasized that the United States Government was not wedded to a particular negotiating schedule.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Priority; Exdis; Stadis. Drafted by O’Donohue; cleared by Vortiz and Gleysteen; and approved by Habib. Telegram 10024 from Manila, July 10, contains Sullivan’s expectations and scenario on the upcoming negotiations and includes his view that any agreement will be expensive for the United States.

Document 349: Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, August 6, 1976..

Barnes described the Marcos-Robinson meeting of August 6 and speculated on Philippine negotiating strategy for the base negotiations.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 15, Philippines (5). Secret. Sent for urgent information. Scowcroft initialed the memorandum. At Tab A was telegram 11763 from Manila, August 6, describing Robinson’s meeting with Marcos. At Tab B was telegram 11733 from Manila, August 6, describing Marcos’ earlier meeting with Robinson and Sullivan. At Tab C was the aide memoire from Marcos contained in telegram 11734 from Manila, August 6. At Tab D was Romulo’s August 3 interview with the London Times.

Document 350: Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, August 16, 1976, 8:10 a.m..

Kissinger and his staff discussed the base negotiations with Marcos.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 11. Secret. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s conference room of the Department of State.

Document 351: Memorandum From William Gleysteen of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, September 2, 1976.

Gleysteen gave Scowcroft an account of the Philippine base negotiations

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Convenience File, Box 31, Next Steps in the Philippine Base Negotiations. Secret. Hyland initialed the approve option on behalf of Scowcroft. At the end of the document, after the phrase “hold off any specific,” Hyland wrote, “or a memo to President first.” An NSC meeting to discuss both the Philippine base negotiations and assistance to Zaire was scheduled, but then cancelled and not rescheduled. (Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–25, NSC Meetings)

Document 352: Letter From Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, September 13, 1976.

Rumsfeld expressed his views on the base negotiations and indicated he was willing to meet Romulo later in the month.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–79–0037, Philippines, 680.1–, August–December 1976. Secret.

Document 353: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford, Washington, undated.

Scowcroft presented Ford with key issues in our base negotiations with the Philippines.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–40, NSSM 235, U.S. Interests and Objectives in the Asia-Pacific Region (2 of 2) (10). Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum was probably written shortly before Kissinger’s October 6 meeting with Romulo. Ford initialed his approval of the recommendations concerning the Reed Bank, option one concerning compensation, and timing. Tab B, presenting Marcos’s request, and Tab F, the maps, are not attached.

Document 354: Telegram 250861 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines, October 8, 1976, 1609Z.

The Department reported on Kissinger’s discussion with Romulo.

Source: Library of Congress, Henry Kissinger Papers, CL 205, Philippines, 1974–76. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Fleck drafted, David Passage of S cleared, and Hummel approved the telegram.

Document 355: Memorandum From Kenneth M. Quinn of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, October 8, 1976.

[text not declassified in time for publication]

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 15, Philippines (5). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Scowcroft initialed the upper right hand corner of the document. Theodore Shackley, the Associate Deputy Director for Operations at the CIA, produced a memorandum for the record, October 4, describing the meeting between Romulo and Bush. ( Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 10 [Executive Registry], Job 79M00467A, Box 23, Folder Number 15, P – 9: Philippines [426])

Document 356: Telegram 267549 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines, November 24, 1976, 0015Z.

The Department reported on Kissinger’s November 23 meeting with Romulo.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 16, Philippines, State Department Telegrams From SECSTATE-NODIS. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Fleck; cleared by Hummel and Sebastian; approved by Habib. Telegram 287342 to Manila, November 23, provides the verbatim text of the aide-memoire that Romulo gave to Kissinger. (National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

Document 357: Telegram 18586 From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State, November 29, 1976, 0824Z.

The Embassy in Manila analyzed the negotiations between the United States and the Philippines.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 16, Philippines, State Department Telegrams To SECSTATE–NODIS (2). Secret; Nodis.

Document 358: Telegram 293490 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines, December 2, 1976, 0118Z.

The Department reported on Kissinger’s December 1 discussion with Romulo.

Source: Library of Congress, Henry Kissinger Papers, CL 277, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File, December 1976. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Habib. At a 9:59 a.m. meeting with Ford and Scowcroft on December 3, Kissinger said, “We will announce agreement in principle with the Philippines Saturday. We offered them $1 billion and they asked for $2 billion. I said okay, deal with Carter. Then I told Romulo he was crazy; Carter would badger them on human rights, etc. He bought our proposals in Mexico City totally.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 21)

Document 359: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford, Washington, December 3, 1976.

Scowcroft presented Ford with information on the Philippine base negotiations.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Convenience File, Box 31, Breakthrough in Philippine Base Negotiations. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Ford initialed the memorandum. The draft of the joint U.S.-Philippine statement is ibid., Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 15, Philippines (5)

Document 360: Telegram 295628 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines, December 4, 1976, 0159Z.

Habib transmitted to Sullivan an account of the collapse of negotiations.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Niact; Immediate. Drafted and approved by Habib; cleared in S/S.

Document 361: Telegram 19864 From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State, December 23, 1976, 0900Z.

The Embassy in Manila reported the Philippine negotiating position and recommended that the new U.S. administration consider paying rental for bases in the Philippines.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Nodis.

Document 362: Letter From Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, December 29, 1976.

Rumsfeld recommended that Kissinger direct Sullivan to inform Marcos that the United States is unwilling to pay rent for its bases in the Philippines.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–79–0049, Philippines, 323.3, 29 December 1976. Secret.

Document 363: Memorandum From the Military Assistant to the President (Scowcroft) to President Nixon, Washington, February 11, 1973.

Scowcroft conveyed Kissinger’s report of his meeting in Bangkok.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 29, HAK Bangkok, Vientiane, Hanoi, Hong Kong, Peking, Tokyo Trip, February 7-20, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A notation on the first page reads, “The President has seen.” The full memorandum of conversation from Kissinger’s meeting with Chartchai on February 9 is ibid., Box 1026, Presidential/HAK Memcons, January–March 1973, Folder 23.

Document 364: Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, March 7, 1973.

Kennedy recommended that Kissinger tell Clements to prepare additional military assistance for Thailand.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 565, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Volume 10, 1973–. Secret. Sent for urgent action. Kissinger initialed the “approve” option, and a notation from Scowcroft indicates that Kissinger followed up by calling Clements. A notation on the first page indicates that Tab B, attached, the proposed telegram to Unger, was given to the situation room for dispatch on March 9. Tab A, a telephone conversation between Kissinger and Clements from March 5, is attached but not published. Tab C, telegram 3675 from Bangkok, March 7, is attached but not published. On March 16, Kissinger asked Richardson to make twelve 105 mm howitzers available for Thailand in addition to the eight C–123 aircraft. (Memorandum from Kissinger to Secretary of Defense; ibid.)

Document 365: Telegram 4623 From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State, March 22, 1973, 1236Z.

The Embassy in Bangkok recommended a reduction in U.S. forces stationed in Thailand.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 565, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Volume 10, 1973–. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

Document 366: Letter From Secretary of Defense Richardson to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, April 3, 1973.

Richardson provided figures quantifying U.S. Department of Defense spending in Thailand and suggested that they be shared with the Thai leadership.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–76–117, Thailand 121, 1973 April 3. Secret. On April 12, Rogers replied, “the tendency of Thai leaders to view bilateral assistance levels as perhaps the primary indicator of U.S. interest in Thailand’s security has long posed problems in our mutual discussions. Although we may never be able to eliminate this tendency completely, I am sure Ambassador Unger and his staff will appreciate and make good use of the newly-developed figures, which we are cabling out to Bangkok today. (Rogers to Richardson; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 19 US–THAI)

Document 367: Executive Summary of an Intelligence Memorandum, Washington, April, 1973.

The memorandum examined Chinese support for Southeast Asian insurgencies and attributed this policy to the Mao.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 16 (Office of Current Intelligence), Job 80T00039A, Box 4, Item Number 13. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Background use only.

Document 368: Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, April 19, 1973.

Nixon announced the appointment of Ambassadors to Thailand and Cambodia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 286, Agency Files, State, Vol. 18. Confidential.

Document 369: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Richardson, Washington, May 3, 1973.

Kissinger endorsed the Department of Defense’s request to maintain Thai Special Guerrilla Units after their withdrawal from Laos.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 565, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Volume 10, 1973–. Secret; Sensitive. Richards’s memorandum of April 6 is attached but not published.

Document 370: Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Richardson to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, May 10, 1973.

Richardson informed Kissinger about difficulties in funding the Thai Special Guerrilla Units.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 565, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Volume 10, 1973–. Secret; Sensitive. In an attached memorandum, May 14, to Kissinger, Schlesinger stated that the 30 battalions must be retained through FY 1974, and provided options for doing so.

Document 371: Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Rush to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, May 18, 1973.

Rush submitted the study on U.S. counterinsurgency support for Thailand written in response to NSSM 159.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–193, NSSM 159. Secret; Nodis. The paper, dated March 30, is attached but not published. For NSSM 159, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Vol. XX, Southeast Asia, 1969–1972, Document 174.

Document 372: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Acting Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence (Schlesinger), Washington, June 18, 1973.

Kissinger directed the DOD to fund the Thai Special Guerrilla Units during the 1974 fiscal year.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 565, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Volume 10, 1973–. Secret; Sensitive. The Secretary of State also received a copy of this memorandum.

Document 373: Memorandum From John A. Froebe and William L. Stearman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 20, 1973.

Froebe and Stearman reported to Kissinger on the Thai Government’s requests for a reduced U.S. military presence, and they recommended that Kissinger authorize a Department of State telegram in response.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 565, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Volume 10, 1973–. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. Concurred in by Eagleburger and Pinckney. Kissinger initialed the “approve” option. The Department of State sent Tab A, attached but not published, to the Embassy in Bangkok as telegram 144716, dated July 23. Tab B, July 18, is also attached but not published.

Document 374: Memorandum of Conversation, New York, September 26, 1973, 10 a.m.

Kissinger and Chatchai discussed Cambodia, U.S. forces in Thailand, U.S. aid, and relations with Hanoi.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 565, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Volume 10, 1973–. Secret; Exdis. The meeting occurred at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. Drafted by Bergesen; cleared by Hummel and Unger; and approved in S.

Document 375: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, October 15, 1973.

Kissinger informed Nixon of the change of government in Thailand and its likely effect on U.S. interests.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 566, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Volume 11, October 1973–. Secret. Urgent; Sent for information. Scowcroft initialed the memorandum on behalf of Kissinger. Near the top of the first page, Nixon wrote, “K—Maybe not so bad as we first thought.”

Document 376: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Rush), Washington, October 15, 1973

Kissinger authorized a schedule for withdrawing Thai forces from Laos.

Source: [text not declassified]. Secret; Sensitive. Kissinger received this memorandum under a covering memorandum, October 10, from William Stearman of the NSC staff.

Document 377: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, October 29, 1973.

Kissinger offered Nixon a reappraisal of the change of government in Thailand.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 566, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Volume 11, October 1973–. Secret. Sent for information. Scowcroft initialed the memorandum on behalf of Kissinger. A notation on the memorandum indicates, “The President has seen.”

Document 378: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of State (Pickering) to the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, November 29, 1973.

Pickering transmitted the Department of State’s view on U.S. deployments in Thailand.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Subject-Numeric Central Files, Top Secret Files, Box 4, DEF 1–1 US, 1970–1973. Secret. Barnes signed the memorandum for Pickering. Drafted by Dexter. Concurred in by Rush, Sneider, PM, and EA/RA. The DOD analysis of U.S. Deployments in Thailand, transmitted under Clements memorandum of October 13, is attached but not published. Kissinger requested this DOD study in a memorandum, attached but not published, from August 28. For NSSM 171, see Document 2.

Document 379: Telegram 1667 From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State, January 30, 1974, 1248Z.

The embassy assessed developments in Thailand.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Paris, Phnom Penh, Rangoon, Saigon, Singapore, Vientiane, the Consulates of Chiang Mai and Udorn, USSAG at Nakhon Khanom Royal Thai air force base, the 13th Advanced Echelon at Udorn, CINCPAC, and DIA.

Document 380: Memorandum From the National Intelligence Officer for South and Southeast Asia at the Central Intelligence Agency (Christison) to the Director of Central Intelligence (Colby), Washington, March 8, 1974.

Christison forwarded guidelines for responding to a military coup in Thailand.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 122 (National Intelligence Council), Job 79R01099A, Box 11, Folder 7, Contingency Planning for a Possible Military Coup in Thailand. Secret. On the routing slip attached to the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote, “Excellent memo. Let’s hold it for possible use at a WSAG or elsewhere.”

Document 381: Memorandum From Deputy Secretary of State Rush to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, March 14, 1974.

Rush submitted State’s response to Department of Defense proposals concerning U.S. deployment and equipment turnover in Thailand.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 566, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Volume 11, October 1973–. Secret. Davis’s memorandum of March 9, on U.S. deployments in Thailand, and March 12, on U.S. force reductions in Thailand, and their accompanying DOD attachments are attached but not published.

Document 382: National Security Decision Memorandum 249, Washington, March 23, 1974.

Kissinger issued NSDM 249 concerning U.S. deployments in Thailand.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 16, Thailand (2). Secret. Copies were sent to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Attached to a Defense copy of NSDM 249 is a message written in red pencil by an unknown hand on OSD letterhead: “Sec Def said, `not sure I’ll do anything about this one.’ `More crap just to keep us busy.’ Suggest we tell Doolin to go slow + check with us at each step. T.” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-78-0011, Thailand, 370.02)

Document 383: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 22, 1974, 10 a.m.

Scowcroft and Kintner discussed U.S.-Thai relations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 566, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Volume 11, October 1973–. Secret. Drafted by Smyser. Froebe’s talking points for Scowcroft, May 21, are ibid.

Document 384: Memorandum From the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Colby) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, May 23, 1974.

[1 page not declassified.]

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger and Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 2, Folder 16, Central Intelligence Agency, Communications, 3/8/74–5/31/74. Secret.

Document 385: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 24, 1974, 10:30–11 a.m.

Schlesinger and Kintner discussed military assistance to Thailand, U.S. force reductions, Indian Ocean Surveillance, and OV–10 Aircraft.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0011, Thailand, 091.112, 30 May 1974. Secret. Drafter by Kelly and approved by Peet. Schlesinger’s talking points from Kelly, May 23, are ibid.

Document 386: Telegram 9350 From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State, June 7, 1974, 1156Z.

Kintner complained about U.S. policy toward Thailand.

Source: Library of Congress, Henry Kissinger Papers, Geopolitical File, Container CL 238, Thailand, 1974–1976. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. An unknown person marked up the telegram and sent an attached note about it to Eagleburger: “LSE A rough message which you should read. Kintner’s pulled out all the stops—and in the process overstated his case. One point—a key one—he seems to forget: our expenditures in Indochina are as much in Thailand’s interest as they are in our own. Kintner does make a valid point, however: can’t we do something more for the Thais on such aspects as sugar quotas, textiles, etc.?”

Document 387: Memorandum From W.R. Smyser of the NSC Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, August 16, 1974.

Smyser asked Kissinger to approve a Department of State cable regarding renewed economic assistance to Burma.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Country Files, Box 2, Far East, Burma. Confidential. Sent for action. Scowcroft initialed his approval of the State cable as drafted. Concurred in by Ellerman. Tab A, the attached draft telegram, was sent to Rangoon as telegram 181158, August 18. (National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) On August 17, Smyser sent Scowcroft another memorandum arguing for the superiority of working through an international aid consortium rather than giving bilateral aid to Burma. (Ibid.)

Document 388: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 12, 1974, 4 p.m.

Kissinger and Anand discussed U.S. force levels in Thailand and economic aid.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P–770087–0333. Secret; Exdis.

Document 389: Memorandum From Richard Kennedy and W.R. Smyser of the NSC Staff to the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, September 28, 1974.

Kennedy and Smyser asked Scowcroft to call DOD’s attention to the request in NSDM 249 for Thai force level options.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–245, NSDM 249, Folder 4. Secret. A handwritten notation from Scowcroft indicates that he handled the matter by phone. Tab A to Wickham was not found. In a memorandum to Scowcroft from September 30, Froebe wrote, “I understand that you have asked Defense (General Wickham) to forward the options study of our residual force presence in Thailand requested by NSDM 249 to the NSC staff by October 4.” (Ibid.)

Document 390: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 9, 1974, 4:30 p.m.

Kintner and Scowcroft described the situation in Thailand, U.S. force levels, and foreign aid.

Source: Library of Congress, Memoranda of Conversations, Container CL 284, Staff and Others, 1974. Secret; Sensitive. On September 27, in telegram 15626 from Bangkok, Kintner expostulated on “Southeast Asia in a Global Context.” (National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

Document 391: Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, November 14, 1974, 8:11 a.m.

Kissinger and his staff discussed Thanom’s activities and the political situation in Thailand.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 5. Secret.

Document 392: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, Washington, November 14, 1974.

Kissinger directed the DOD to produce an alternative scenario for U.S. military force levels in Thailand.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–245, NSDM 249, Folder 4. Secret. Kissinger received this memorandum to sign under a covering memorandum, November 1, from Kennedy, which stated, “It is apparent that a basic difference of opinion exists between Defense and State, on one hand, and the CIA and ourselves on the other, concerning the ability of US combat air units in Thailand to exert any meaningful influence vis-à-vis the Hanoi leadership.” Schlesinger’s October 11 memorandum to Kissinger on “Long-Term US Military force Levels in Thailand (FY 1976 and Beyond),” is attached but not published.

Document 393: National Intelligence Estimate 52–1–75, Washington, January 9, 1975.

The estimate assessed the implications for the United States in light of the political situation in Thailand.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 122 (National Intelligence Council), Job 79R01012A, Box 497, Folder 6, NIE 52–1–75. Secret. Concurred in by all members of the U.S. Intelligence Board except the FBI, who abstained. Thailand’s election occurred on January 26.

Document 394: Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy of the NSC Staff to the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, January 15, 1975.

Kennedy asked Scowcroft to direct the DOD to produce an alternative policy option for the level of U.S. forces in Thailand.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–245, NSDM 249, Folder 4. Secret. Sent for action. Concurred in by Smyser. Scowcroft wrote, “Done,” near the bottom of the page, indicating that he handled the matter by phone. The attached memorandum to Wickham on “Long Term U.S. Military Force Levels in Thailand” is not published.

Document 395: Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, February 6, 1975, 8 a.m.

Kissinger and his staff discussed the situations in Thailand and Burma.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 6. Secret.

Document 396: Memorandum From the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford, Washington, February 6, 1975.

Kissinger asked Ford to determine long-term U.S. military force levels in Thailand.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–57, NSDMs, NSDM 286, Long-Term U.S. Military Force Levels in Thailand (2). Secret. Sent for Action. Ford initialed his approval of Tab A, not attached, which became NSDM 286. Tab B apparently refers to two memoranda from Schlesinger to Kissinger on “Long-Term US Military Force Levels in Thailand (FY 76 and Beyond),” the first, which presented four options, dated October 11, 1974 and the second, presenting a fifth option, dated January 18, 1975. Both are attached but not published. Tab C, not attached, is apparently a reference to Colby’s Memorandum to Thomas Bigley, then Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, of July 9, 1974 providing comments on Defense’s memorandum entitled “Long-Term U.S. Military Force Levels in Thailand (FY 1976 and Beyond).” (Ibid., Box 245, Folder 4, NSDM 249)

Document 397: National Security Decision Memorandum 286, Washington, February 7, 1975.

Kissinger issued NSDM 286 concerning long-term U.S. military force levels in Thailand.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Decision Memoranda and Study Memoranda, Box 1. Secret. Copies were sent to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Document 398: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 25, 1975, 4:30 p.m.

[not declassified in time for publication]

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 11. Secret.

Document 399: Telegram 8690 From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State, May 13, 1975, 1315Z.

The Embassy in Bangkok complained about the lack of information on the use of U.S. forces stationed in Thailand during the Mayaguez incident.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Country Files, Box 18, Far East, Thailand, State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE, NODIS (1). Secret; Flash; Nodis. The same day, at 1454Z, Zurhellen replied, “Regret fast moving situation here has made it impossible to keep you fully informed as we would otherwise intend. Matters you raise are currently under discussion and we hope to have word for you soon. Meantime, please do not, repeat not, raise this matter further with Thais.” (Telegram 110792 to Bangkok; National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) Earlier in the month, Masters sent a telegram to Washington warning that the “often secret agreements we have with the RTG relating to our military presence here is coming unraveled because of Thai nationalistic sentiment, Thai popular mistrust of the old military governments that concluded the agreements with us, and a deep concern over the effectiveness of the U.S. military presence.” (Telegram 7857 from Bangkok, May 1; ibid.)

Document 400: Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, May 16, 1975, 8:08 a.m.

Kissinger and his staff discussed force levels in Thailand, the aftermath of the Mayaguez incident, and the basis for the U.S. military presence in Thailand.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 6. Secret. An undated paper on “Secret Agreements with Thailand Relating to the U.S. Military Presence in Thailand” is at the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 17, Thailand, Senator Mansfield’s Request for Agreements with Thailand (1). On May 19, Masters delivered a note, which the Thai government took as an apology, stating “The United States regrets the misunderstandings that have arisen between Thailand and the United States in regard to the temporary placement of Marines at Utapao to assist in the recovery of the SS Mayaguez.” Telegrams 115952 to Bangkok, May 18, and 4359 from Bangkok, May 19; ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files)

Document 401: National Security Study Memorandum 225, Washington, May 27, 1975.

NSSM 225 directed the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense to review U.S. policy toward Thailand.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Decision Memoranda and Study Memoranda, Box 2. Secret; Nodis. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Document 402: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Deputy Secretary of State Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements, and Director of Central Intelligence Colby, Washington, July 1, 1975.

Kissinger asked DOD, DOS, and CIA to make recommendations on U.S. force reductions in Thailand.

Source: Library of Congress, James Schlesinger Papers, Box 22. Secret; Nodis. Scowcroft signed the memorandum for Kissinger. In response to this memorandum, the USIB approved a memorandum, July 31, on the “Future of US Military Intelligence Installations and Units in Thailand,“ which was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for South and Southeast Asia, and reflected the views of CIA, DIA, INR, and NSA. (Library of Congress, Henry Kissinger Papers, TS 10, 8/75) Scowcroft received this memorandum under a covering memorandum, August 7, from Quinn. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 17, Thailand [12])

Document 403: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, Deputy Secretary of State Ingersoll, and Director of Central Intelligence Colby, Washington, August 5, 1975.

Kissinger asked the Departments of Defense and State, and the CIA to develop a plan for the permanent resettlement of the Meo refugees in Thailand.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 17, Thailand [12]. Secret. Sent for action. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Office for Management and Budget.

Document 404: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford, Washington, September 22, 1975.

Kissinger recommended that Ford approve the signing of a memorandum to implement a plan to resettle Meo refugees in Thailand.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, 1974–1977, Box 16, Presidential Determinations, FY 1976 (1), August-October 1975. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. Scowcroft initialed the memorandum for Kissinger. Ford initialed his approval of Kissinger’s recommendation. Tab A, a Determination transferring $6.8 million to finance the plan, was not attached. Tab B, the memorandum from Kissinger directing implementation of the plan, is attached and published as Document 406.

Document 405: Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Schlesinger to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, September 23, 1975.

Schlesinger presented Kissinger with options for U.S. force reduction in Thailand.

Source: Library of Congress, James Schlesinger Papers, Box 22. Top Secret. Tabs A, B, and C, the withdrawal rate schedules for options I, II, and III, are attached but not published. Schlesinger received this memorandum, with a recommendation that he sign it, under a covering memorandum, September 2, from Ellsworth.

Document 406: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, Deputy Secretary of State Ingersoll, and Director of Central Intelligence Colby, Washington, September 24, 1975.

Kissinger informed DOD, DOS, and CIA about the President’s decision regarding Meo refugees in Thailand.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, 1974–1977, Box 16, Presidential Determinations, FY 1976 (1), August-October 1975. Secret; Nodis. Scowcroft signed the memorandum on behalf of Kissinger. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Office for Management and Budget.

Document 407: Note from the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, October 4, 1975.

Scowcroft criticized a paper on force levels in Thailand and recommended that Kissinger convene an SRG meeting on this subject.

Source: Library of Congress, Henry Kissinger Papers, Geopolitical File, Container CL 238, Thailand, 1974–1976. No classification marking. Kissinger checked the option to hold an SRG meeting. Scowcroft’s note was probably in reference to Schlesinger’s memorandum to Kissinger of September 23 (Document 405).

Document 408: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 4, 1975, 2:40 p.m.

[not declassified in time for publication]

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P–820123–2306. Secret; Nodis.

Document 409: Paper Prepared by the NSSM 225 Working Group, Washington, undated.

The NSSM 225 Working Group summarized its review of U.S. policy toward Thailand.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–15, Senior Review Group Meeting, U.S. Force Reductions in Thailand, October 17, 1975 [1]. Secret. Habib sent the summary and the paper with three annexes to Kissinger under his covering memorandum of October 8. The paper is attached, but not published. (Ibid.)

Document 410: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 17, 1975, 11:21–11:40 a.m.

The Senior Review Group met to discuss force reductions in Thailand.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–24, Meeting Minutes, SRG, June–October 1975. Top Secret. The text of Colby’s briefing on the situation in Thailand, October 16, is attached but not published. A message from Scowcroft to Kissinger, October 20, contains the response to Kissinger’s request to Colby for an analysis of the likely Thai reaction to a continued U.S. combat presence. Colby estimated that Thailand would reject a U.S. combat presence beyond March 1976. (Backchannel telegram 51999, October 21, from Scowcroft to Kissinger; ibid., National Security Adviser, Trip briefing Books and Cables for HAK, Kissinger Trip File, Box 15, October 19–23, 1975, People’s Republic of China, TOSEC [5])

Document 411: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, Deputy Secretary of State Ingersoll, and Director of Central Intelligence Colby, Washington, October 24, 1975.

Kissinger outlined the U.S. position for negotiations on U.S. force reductions in Thailand.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–36, NSSMs, NSSM 225 (2), Review of U.S. Policy toward Thailand (2). Top Secret; Sensitive. The Chairman of the JCS and the Director of OMB also received copies. Scowcroft signed the memorandum for Kissinger.

Document 412: Telegram 282411 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand, November 29, 1975, 0120Z.

The Department of State reported on Kissinger’s lunch with Chatchai.

Source: Library of Congress, Henry Kissinger Papers, Geopolitical File, Container CL 238, Thailand, June 1974–February 1976. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

Document 413: Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, February 5, 1976.

[3 pages not declassified.]

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 17, Thailand (16). Secret; Nodis; Sensitive.

Document 414: Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, February 20, 1976.

Barnes described political events in Thailand.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 17, Thailand (17). Secret. Sent for information. Scowcroft initialed the memorandum. Attached but not published are Tab A, an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, February 1976, on “The Thai Election and Its Implications for the US,” and Tab B, a covering memorandum, February 4, from Bush to Scowcroft.

Document 415: Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, March 4, 1976.

Barnes reported Whitehouse’s claim that the Thai government has withdrawn its support for a significant U.S. military presence in Thailand.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 17, Thailand (18). Secret. Sent for urgent information. At the end of the memorandum, Scowcroft wrote, “Whitehouse’s position doesn’t surprise me at all. What is present status?” Attached but not published is Tab A, telegram 5023 from Bangkok, March 4, in which Whitehouse analyzed opinion within the Thai government toward U.S. residual forces. Also attached but not published is Tab B, Intelligence Information Cable DB-315/02282–76 from March 4.

Document 416: Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, March 5, 1976, 8:05 a.m.

Kissinger and his staff discussed residual military force levels in Thailand.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 9. Secret.

Document 417: Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, March 20, 1976.

Barnes outlined the consensus U.S. government view on how to respond to Thailand’s request to withdraw U.S. forces.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 17, Thailand (19). Confidential. Urgent; Sent for information. According to the correspondence profile, Scowcroft saw this memorandum on March 22. Tab A, the questions and answers from EA, was not attached.

Document 418: Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, April 2, 1976, 8:09 a.m.

Kissinger and his staff discussed residual military force levels in Thailand.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 9. Secret.

Document 419: National Security Study Memorandum 240, Washington, April 9, 1976.

Scowcroft asked the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the CIA to examine alternative locations for U.S. activities formerly conducted in Thailand.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Decision Memoranda and Study Memoranda, Box 2. Confidential. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Document 420: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford, Washington, April 20, 1976.

In response to NSSM 225, Scowcroft recommended that Ford approve a memorandum setting U.S. policy toward Thailand.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–65, NSDMs, NSDM 327, U.S. Policy Toward Thailand (1). Secret. Sent for action. Ford initialed his approval of Tab A, not attached, which, once signed, became NSDM 327. (See Document 421) Not published are Tab B, attached, the undated NSSM 225 paper, which is summarized in Document 409; and Tab C, not attached, which is likely Kissinger’s memorandum of October 24, 1975 on force reductions in Thailand, printed as Document 411. Not published are Tab D, attached, a memorandum from Colby to Kissinger of October 23; Tab E, attached, a memorandum from Ingersoll to Kissinger of October 27; and Tab F, not attached, a memorandum from Clements to Scowcroft of November 4. (Ibid., Box 36, NSSMs, NSSM 225, Review of U.S. Policy Toward Thailand [3])

Document 421: National Security Decision Memorandum 327, Washington, April 21, 1976.

Scowcroft issued NSDM 327 outlining U.S. policy toward Thailand.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Decision Memoranda and Study Memoranda, Box 1. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Document 422: Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford, Washington, May 3, 1976.

In response to NSSM 240, Scowcroft recommended that Ford approve a memorandum on alternative locations for US activities based in Thailand.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–65, NSDMs, NSDM 329, U.S. Political Operations and Intelligence Activities Based in Thailand [2 of 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Umbra. Sent for Action. Ford initialed his approval of Tab A, not attached, which, once signed, became NSDM 329 (Document 423). Tab B, not attached, is the undated interagency paper prepared in response to NSSM 240, which the NSC staff sent out under a covering memorandum, April 21, from Davis to DOS, DOD, and CIA. (Ibid.) Tab C, attached, is a memorandum, April 24, from Springsteen to Scowcroft. Tab D, attached, is a memorandum, April 24, from Ellsworth to Scowcroft. Tab E, attached, is a memorandum, April 23, from Bush to Scowcroft.

Document 423: National Security Decision Memorandum 329, Washington, May 5, 1976.

Scowcroft issued NSDM 329 outlining military and intelligence activities that the United States seeks to continue in Thailand.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-69, NSDM originals [2 of 2], NSDM 316–NSDM 330. Top Secret; Sensitive. A copy was also sent to the Chairman of the JCS.

Document 424: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 16, 1976, 3:30 p.m.

Scowcroft and Whitehouse discussed US-Thai relations and Thailand’s prospects.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 21. Secret; Sensitive. Scowcroft saw a briefing memorandum, September 15, from Gleysteen before this meeting. (Ibid., Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 17, Thailand [19])

Document 425: Telegram 28513 From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State, October 14, 1976, 1117Z.

The Embassy analyzed Thai politics.

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential. Repeated for information to Hong Kong, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Rangoon, Tokyo, Singapore, CINCPAC Honolulu, Beijing, Vientiane, and CINCPAC for Polad.