Copies of other NIOSH documents are available from
Publications Dissemination, EID
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
4676 Columbia Parkway
Cincinnati, OH 45226
Fax
number: (513) 533-8347
Telephone number: 1-800-CDC-INFO (1-800-232-4636)
E-mail: pubstaft@cdc.gov
To
receive other information about occupational safety and
health
problems, call 1-800-CDC-INFO
(1-800-232-4636), or visit the
NIOSH Web site at: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh
DHHS(NIOSH)
Publication No. 99-146
August 1999
Also
available in PDF 99-146.pdf
PREVENTING INJURIES AND
DEATHS OF FIRE FIGHTERS DUE TO STRUCTURAL COLLAPSE
|
WARNING!
Fire fighters are frequently injured
or killed when burning structures collapse
without warning.
|
|
Fire departments should
take the following steps to minimize the risk
of injury and death to fire fighters during structural
fire fighting:
- Implement and review occupational safety programs and standard operating procedures.
- Ensure that the incident commander conducts an initial size-up and risk assessment of the incident scene before beginning interior fire fighting.
- Ensure that the incident commander always maintains accountability for all personnel at a fire scene--both by location and function.
- Establish rapid intervention crews (RICs)--often called rapid intervention teams--and make sure they are positioned to respond immediately to emergencies.
- Ensure that at least four fire fighters are on the scene before beginning interior fire fighting at a structural fire (two fire fighters inside the structure and two outside).
- Equip fire fighters who enter hazardous areas (such as burning or suspected unsafe structures) to maintain two-way communications with the incident commander.
Please tear out and post.
Distribute copies to workers.
|
|
- Ensure that standard operating procedures and equipment are adequate and sufficient to support radio traffic at multiple-responder fire scenes.
- Provide all fire fighters with personal alert safety system (PASS) devices and make sure that they wear and activate them when they are involved in fire fighting, rescue, or other hazardous duties.
- Conduct prefire planning and inspections that cover all building materials and components of a structure.
- Transmit an audible tone or alert immediately when conditions become unsafe for fire fighters.
- Establish a collapse zone around buildings with parapet walls.
|
|
For additional information, see NIOSH Alert: Preventing Injuries and Deaths
of Fire Fighters due to Structural Collapse (DHHS [NIOSH] Publication No. 99-146). Single
copies of the Alert are available free
from the following:
Publications
Dissemination, EID
National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health
4676 Columbia Parkway
Cincinnati, OH 45226-1998
Fax
number: 1-513-533-8347
Phone number: 1-800-CDC-INFO (1-800-232-4636)
E-mail: pubstaff@cdc.gov
NIOSH Web site: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh |
|
|
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES
Public Health Service
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health |
|
|
Request for Assistance in Preventing
Injuries and Deaths
of Fire Fighters due to Structural Collapse
WARNING!
Fire fighters are frequently injured or killed when
burning structures collapse without warning. |
The National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health (NIOSH) requests assistance in preventing injuries
and deaths of U.S. fire fighters due to structural collapse
during fire-fighting operations. Structural collapse of
a building during fire fighting is a leading cause of death
of fire fighters. Such collapse is very difficult to predict
during fire fighting, and it usually occurs without warning.
Fire departments should implement and review
occupational safety programs and standard operating procedures
to prevent serious injuries and deaths of fire fighters.
NIOSH recommends that fire departments take 10 essential
steps to minimize the risk of injury and death to fire fighters
during structural fire fighting:
-
Ensure that the incident commander conducts
an initial size-up and risk assessment of the incident
scene before beginning interior fire fighting.
-
Ensure that the incident commander always
maintains accountability for all personnel at a fire
scene--both by location and function.
-
Establish rapid intervention crews (RICs)--often
called rapid intervention teams--and make sure they
are positioned to respond immediately to emergencies.
-
Ensure that at least four fire fighters
are on the scene before beginning interior fire fighting
at a structural fire (two fire fighters inside the structure
and two outside).
-
Equip fire fighters who enter hazardous
areas (such as burning or suspected unsafe structures)
to maintain two-way communications with the incident
commander.
-
Ensure that standard operating procedures
and equipment are adequate and sufficient to support
radio traffic at multiple-responder fire scenes.
-
Provide all fire fighters with personal
alert safety system (PASS) devices and make sure that
they wear and activate them when they are involved in
fire fighting, rescue, or other hazardous duties.
-
Conduct prefire planning and inspections
that cover all building materials and components of
a structure.
-
Transmit an audible tone or alert immediately
when conditions become unsafe for fire fighters.
-
Establish a collapse zone around buildings
with parapet walls.
NIOSH requests that the information in this
Alert be brought to the attention of all U.S. fire fighters--including
those in the largest metropolitan and the smallest rural
departments--by the following: fire chiefs and fire commissioners
and administrators, editors of trade journals and other
publications, safety and health officials, State fire marshals,
unions and labor organizations, fire-fighting agencies,
and insurance companies.
TheNational Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) reports that 968 firefighters died between
1989 and 1998 [NFPA 1999]. Nearly half of these deaths (443)
occurred on the fireground. Furthermore, structural collapse
caused 56 (18%) of the 316 fire fighter deaths at structure
fires. A structural collapse often results in multiple fire
fighter fatalities. For example, during this time period,
43 fire fighters were fatally injured by collapsing materials
at 11 fires.
As these statistics show, structural
collapse of any part of a building (floors, walls, ceilings,
roofs, or structural members) during fire fighting is a
leading cause of death of fire fighters. The potential for
structural collapse is one of the most difficult factors
to predict during initial size-up and ongoing fire fighting.
Structural collapse usually occurs without warning. For
example, the floor of a burning structure may suddenly collapse,
spilling fire fighters into a burning inferno. Or a sudden
roof collapse may trap fire fighters inside the structure.
After arrival at a fire scene, the incident commander must
consider numerous variables to determine the structural
integrity of a burning building [Dunn 1988]:
-
Fire size and location
-
Length of time the fire
has been burning
-
Conditions on arrival
-
Size of the building (single
or multistory, floor area, and height)
-
Age of the building (deterioration
of structural members, evidence of weathering, use of
lightweight materials in new construction)
-
Presence of combustible
materials
-
Occupancy
-
Renovations or modifications
to the building
-
Previous fires
-
Supported loads (such as
roof-top heating and cooling systems) that might affect
the integrity of the structure
-
Exposures that might pose
fire and smoke hazards to nearby people or buildings
-
Resources at the scene
for extinguishing the fire (number of apparatus, fire-fighting
personnel, water supply, and auxiliary appliances)
-
Other factors such as the
time of day (day or night) and weather conditions (extreme
heat or cold)
OSHA
State and local government
employees (such as fire fighters) are exempt from Federal
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards.
However, in the 25 States currently authorized by OSHA to
run an occupational safety and health program, all OSHA
regulations apply to both public and private employees.
Current OSHA regulations that
apply to fire fighters include 29 CFR* 1910.134 (Respiratory
protection) and 29 CFR 1910.156 (Fire brigades).
In 29 CFR 1910.134, employers are required to provide respirators
suitable for the purpose intended and to establish and maintain
a respirator protection program. The standard also states
that if fire fighters must enter an area that is immediately
dangerous to life and health (IDLH), at least two must enter
the area together and remain in visual or voice contact
with one another at all times. They must also conduct interior
fire fighting using self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
In addition, at least two properly equipped and trained
fire fighters must be
positioned outside
the IDLH atmosphere
account for the interior
team(s), and
remain capable of rapid
rescue of the interior team(s).
In 29 CFR 1910.156, OSHA lists
the requirements for organizing, training, and equipping
fire brigades established by the employer.
NFPA
The National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) recommends in NFPA 1500 that all fire
departments establish a policy of providing and operating
at "the highest possible levels of safety and health
for all members" [NFPA 1997a]. Several NFPA standards
apply to structural fire fighting operations:
-
NFPA 220, Standard on Types of Building
Construction, specifies methods of classifying types
of construction and fire resistance ratings [NFPA 1995a].
-
NFPA 1404, Standard for a Fire Department
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Program, specifies
the minimum requirements for a respiratory protection
training program in a fire department [NFPA 1996].
-
NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department
Occupational Safety and Health Program, specifies
(1) the minimum requirements for a fire department's
occupational safety and health program; (2) the safety
procedures for members involved in rescue, fire suppression,
and related activities; and (3) the integration of risk
management into regular functions of the incident commander
[NFPA 1997a].
-
NFPA 1561, Standard on Fire Department
Incident Management System, defines the essential
elements of an incident management system [NFPA 1995b].
-
Other relevant NFPA Standards include
the following:
NFPA 1971, Standard on Protective
Ensemble for Structural Fire Fighting, which includes
protective coat, pants, helmet, gloves, hood, and
footware [NFPA 1997b].
NFPA 1981, Standard on Open-Circuit
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for the Fire Service
[NFPA 1997c].
NFPA 1982, Standard on Personal Alert
Safety Systems (PASS) for Firefighters [NFPA 1998].
* Code of Federal Regulations. See CFR in references.
The following case reports
describe incidents involving fire fighter injuries and deaths
due to structural collapse. They were investigated by the
NIOSH Fire Fighter Investigation Team using the Fatality
Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) protocol.
Case 1--Commercial Structure Fire in California
On March 8, 1998, one male
fire fighter (a captain) died at a fire scene while trying
to exit from a commercial structure. The first unit on the
scene reported light smoke showing from a one-story commercial
building. A ventilation team proceeded to the roof of the
building and began ventilating. Another team began forcible
entry into the front of the building through two metal security
doors (which took 7 1/2 to 9 minutes to force open). While
fire companies waited for the front door to be opened, fire
conditions changed dramatically on the roof. Fire was coming
from the ventilation holes opened by the ventilation crew.
About the same time, three
engine crews advanced hand lines through the front door
to determine the origin of the fire. Approximately 15 feet
inside the front door, the fire fighters encountered heavy
smoke and near-zero visibility. The engine crews advanced
their lines 30 to 40 feet inside the building, but could
not locate the fire. Conditions continued to deteriorate
rapidly, so the officers on the engine crews ordered their
fire fighters to exit the building. During this time, the
victim became separated from his crew and remained in the
building. About 1 minute later, a partial roof collapse
blocked the front door. The rapid intervention team subsequently
located the victim. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation was performed
immediately and en route to the hospital, where the victim
was pronounced dead. The medical examiner listed smoke inhalation
and burns as the cause of death [NIOSH 1998a].
Applicable
Recommendations: Recommendations 1, 2, 4,
5, 6, and 9 in the Recommendations
section. |
CASE 2--Floor Collapse in a Single-Family Dwelling
in Kentucky
On February 17, 1997, one male
fire fighter died and another was injured in a fire in a
single-family dwelling. When the fire company arrived at
the fire scene, the district major reported that heavy smoke
was coming from the roof area of the dwelling. Two male
fire fighters pulled two 1 3/4-inch charged lines from their
assigned engine and proceeded toward the dwelling. After
knocking down a ceiling fire, they entered the dwelling,
apparently without the district major's knowledge. On entering
the front door, both fell through the floor into the basement.
The fire fighters landed at the fire's origin in extremely
hot water and heavy black smoke. Neither was equipped with
a radio, so an emergency transmission to the incident commander
was impossible. The fire fighters manually triggered their
PASS devices, but the pumps and engines operating on the
street made it impossible to hear the alarm. About 8 minutes
into the operation, the district major discovered that two
fire fighters were missing. A lieutenant noticed the hose
lines leading into the front door. He crawled along the
ground, following them to the front door, where he saw a
light shining up from the basement. A ladder was lowered.
One fire fighter grabbed the ladder and was pulled from
the basement. He stated that another fire fighter was still
in the basement. After numerous search efforts, the second
fire fighter was found (about 53 minutes into the operation).
Eight to ten minutes after the two fire fighters had entered
the structure, their SCBAs had run out of air and they had
tried to breathe entrained air from the water spray in their
lines. The first fire fighter was injured but survived.
The second fire fighter died from asphyxiation due to smoke
inhalation [NIOSH 1997].
Applicable recommendations:
Recommendations 2, 3, and 5 in the Recommendations
section |
CASE 3--Sudden Roof Collapse of a Burning Auto Parts
Store in Virginia
On March 18, 1996, two male
fire fighters died while fighting a fire in an auto parts
store. At 1129 hours, a 911 call to the fire dispatch reported
sparking in the fuse box at a local auto parts store. At
1135 hours, fire fighters arrived, not knowing that a power
company service truck had accidentally broken the neutral
line to the auto parts store. The store did not have adequate
electrical grounds; thus all electrical circuits in the
store superheated and started a series of fires above the
dropped ceiling. A lieutenant and a fire fighter from Engine
3 went into the auto parts store with a charged 1 3/4-inch
line to locate the origin of the fire (only light smoke
was showing inside). All employees had left the store and
all lights were out. At 1149 hours, the lieutenant inside
the store radioed that they were in trouble and could not
get out. However, because of heavy radio traffic, the battalion
chief did not understand the transmission. At 1150 hours,
the fire rapidly accelerated without warning and the entire
roof (containing 50-foot wood trusses supporting heavy heating
and cooling units) collapsed into the store. Both fire fighters
died from burns and smoke inhalation [NIOSH 1996].
Applicable recommendations:
Recommendations 2, 3, 6, and 8 in the Recommendations
section. |
CASE 4--Parapet Wall Collapse during a Warehouse
Fire in Vermont
On September 5, 1998, one fire
fighter died when a parapet wall collapsed on him during
a warehouse fire. Four fire departments were dispatched
to fight a fire in a warehouse that stored recycled paper.
The warehouse was built in the late 1800s of brick masonry frame with heavy wood truss construction. The first arriving
chief of an engine company saw smoke issuing from below
the eaves at the rear of the structure. He decided not to
enter the building but to "surround and drown"
it. When the Engine 3 crew arrived, they were ordered to
place their engine at the north end of the structure and
attack from the exterior. One of the fire fighters from
Engine 3 approached the structure to open the large, barn-like
doors and enable the fire fighters to attack from the exterior.
The fire fighter then returned to the hose line and discovered
that the doors had closed behind him (they were self closing).
He was returning to prop them open when, without warning,
the parapet wall above the doors suddenly collapsed on him.
He died as a result of multiple crushing injuries [NIOSH
1998b].
Applicable
recommendations: Recommendations 8 and 10
in the Recommendations section. |
|
Many complex factors are present
when fighting a structural fire. Conditions can deteriorate
rapidly at the fire scene, sometimes with little or no warning.
Fire departments need to be constantly aware of the potential
for a structural collapse, and take appropriate steps to
ensure the safety of fire fighters.
NIOSH recommends that fire
departments take the following steps to minimize the risk
of injury and death to fire fighters during structural fire-fighting
operations:
1. Ensure that the incident commander conducts
an initial size-up and risk assessment at the incident scene
before beginning interior fire fighting.
This size-up and risk assessment
should continue throughout the incident and should include
evaluation of the situation, fire-fighting strategy, tactical
planning, plan evaluation and revision, and operational
command and control. A primary concern is whether the scene
involves an imminent life-threatening situation that may
require rescue.
An initial size-up and assessment
of a fire should include an evaluation of the following
factors [Dunn 1988]:
-
Fire size and location
-
Length of time the fire
has been burning
-
Conditions on arrival
-
Size of the building (single
or multistory, floor area, and height)
-
Age of the building (deterioration
of structural members, evidence of weathering, use of
lightweight materials in new construction)
-
Presence of combustible
materials
-
Occupancy
-
Renovations or modifications
to the building
-
Previous fires
-
Supported loads (such as
roof-top heating and cooling systems) that might affect
the integrity of the structure
-
Exposures that might pose
fire and smoke hazards to nearby people or buildings
-
Resources at the scene
for extinguishing the fire (number of apparatus, fire-fighting
personnel, water supply, and auxiliary appliances)
-
Other factors such as the
time of day (day or night) and weather conditions (extreme
heat or cold)
2. Ensure that the incident commander always
maintains close accountability for all personnel at the
fire scene--both by location and function.
Accountability for all fire
fighters at a fire scene is essential and constitutes one
of the incident commander's most important duties. Personnel
accountability systems should be integrated into the incident
command policy and used to track locations and assignments
of companies operating at a fire scene. Personnel accountability
systems include accountability checks that require the incident
commander to communicate with officers at each level within
the incident command system.
3.
Ensure that at least four fire fighters
are on the scene before entering a structure and beginning
interior fire fighting at a structural fire (two fire fig
hters inside the structure and two outside).
The NFPA and the OSHA state
that at a minimum four persons (each with full protective
clothing and respiratory protection) are needed to assure
the safety of those working inside a burning structure.
Two fire fighters may be inside the structure, but two must
remain outside. The team members should be in visual, audible,
or electronic communication with each other to coordinate
all activities and determine whether emergency rescue is
needed.
4. Establish rapid intervention crews (RICs)
and make sure they are positioned to respond immediately
to emergencies.
The primary purpose for an
RIC is to provide a dedicated and specialized team of fire
fighters ready to rescue fire fighters who become trapped
in a burning structure. An RIC is vitally important at a
structure fire, as it provides the incident commander with
a designated emergency team and thereby eliminates the need
for reassigning other fire fighters to this duty during
a critical period. The RIC's primary duty is to respond
to emergencies in which fire fighters are trapped, lost,
or disoriented in a burning structure. Under optimum conditions,
an RIC should respond with the first alarm to eliminate
later response time. The RIC should be equipped with full
turnout gear, SCBAs, portable radios and lights, axes, forcible
entry tools, hooks, and other equipment needed for the rescue
effort. The RIC should report directly to the incident commander
and be nearby to await rescue commands. An RIC should consist
of at least two fire fighters, but the size and complexity
of the incident dictates the size of the RIC.
5. Equip fire fighters who enter hazardous
areas (such as burning or suspected unsafe structures) to
maintain two-way communications with the incident commander.
Lack of effective communications
on the fireground can result in tragic loss of life. Fire
fighters who enter burning structures must be able to communicate
with the incident commander about interior conditions, the
need for additional support, and emergencies that require
rescue or response teams. Effective communications are of
primary importance to the incident commander in decision
making, overall operations, and safety on the fireground.
6. Ensure that standard operating procedures
and equipment are adequate and sufficient to support radio
traffic at multiple-responder fire scenes.
Communications become ineffective
at the fire scene when radio traffic becomes so heavy that
messages cannot be understood. The ambient noise on the
fireground further hampers effective communication. Specified
channels should be used for the tactical channel and dispatch
to prevent competition for air time. Radio traffic can be
reduced if users
avoid unnecessary transmissions,
are brief but accurate,
speak clearly,
wait for the air channel
to clear, and
allow priority for
emergencies and rescues.
The standard operating procedures,
personnel, and communications equipment should be of sufficient
quality and quantity to support the volume of communications
encountered at various types of fire scenes. Fire department
communication policies should include a standard operating
procedure for the delivery and acknowledgment of "emergency
traffic" at the incident scene. Common terminology
must be readily identifiable by all personnel at the incident
scene and by the dispatcher or telecommunicator in all communications
centers.
7. Provide all fire fighters with PASS
devices and make sure that they wear and activate them when
they are involved in fire fighting, rescue, or other hazardous
duties.
PASS devices are designed to
set off an audible alarm when a fire fighter becomes motionless
for 30 seconds. However, a primary complaint about PASS
devices is that the alarm often sounds while fire fighters
are on standby or in a rest period. The alarm is manufactured
so that any movement by the fire fighter should reset the
alarm. Also, the fire fighter can manually activate the
PASS device alarm whenever assistance is required.
The PASS device should be worn
by fire fighters and activated whenever they operate in
a hazardous area. The devices are not designed to be heard
outside a building, but they are intended to alert nearby
fire fighters or officers that someone is missing, lost,
or trapped. An activated PASS alarm will also help an RIC
find lost or trapped fire fighters.
8. Conduct prefire planning and inspections
that cover all building materials and components of a structure.
Prefire inspections are an
excellent opportunity for fire departments to determine
the following:
-
Age of the structure
-
Structural integrity
-
Exposed interior insulation
materials
-
Type of roof structure
and supports (truss, bow, etc.)
-
Type of interior support
structures
-
Type of materials used
in the structure (such as wood, steel, plastics, foam,
or materials that produce toxic gases when subjected
to heat)
-
Storage of flammable or
toxic materials
-
Amount of load (for example,
heavy heating and cooling units) on roof structures
that could weaken the supports
-
Water supply
-
Automatic sprinkler systems
Truss roofs should be evaluated
for a minimum fire resistance rating of 1 hour. Each structure
in a multistructure (such as a strip mall) should receive
a prefire inspection to determine the interior design and
types of materials used in construction.
9. Transmit an audible tone or alert immediately
when conditions become unsafe for fire fighters
An emergency evacuation is
ordered when an extremely serious emergency has occurred
or is about to happen. Examples of such emergencies are missing
fire fighters, explosion, and structural collapse. Unlike
a withdrawal, an emergency evacuation requires that fire
fighters leave behind tools and hoses and that the incident
commander conduct a roll call or a head count. An emergency
evacuation is a rare event in fire fighting, and thus confusion
and delay usually occur when it is ordered. For this reason,
a prearranged audible signal should be sounded to alert
fire fighters of an emergency evacuation. Fire departments
should train their members to evacuate the building at the
sound of the signal.
10. Establish a collapse zone around buildings
with parapet walls.
A parapet wall is the continuation
of an exterior wall above the roof level. A parapet wall
has reduced stability because it has fewer connections to
the rest of the structure and is subject to collapse if
it suffers any movement, shock, or vibration during fire-fighting
operations. A collapse zone is the distance from the fire
building equal to the height of the wall. However, since
the falling wall may break apart and allow flying debris
to cover a greater distance than the height of the wall,
a safety margin should be considered when establishing a
collapse zone. Fire fighters should not be allowed to operate
inside a collapse zone. For example, they should not advance
attack lines or conduct staging or fire fighter rehabilitation
within this zone. In addition, hose streams, deck guns or
pipes, portable deluge nozzles, and aerial ladders with
fire fighters operating at the tip or inside buckets should
operate outside the collapse zone.
The principal contributors
to this Alert were Ted Pettit, Division of Safety Research,
NIOSH; Vincent Dunn, Deputy Chief (retired), New York City
Fire Department; and Greg Main, District Chief, Evansville
Indiana Fire Department. Rita Fahy, NFPA, provided the NFPA
data. Ted Pettit, Richard Braddee, and Frank Washenitz,
Fire Fighter Investigation Team, Division of Safety Research,
NIOSH, investigated the cases used. Kim Clough, Health Effects
Laboratory Division, NIOSH, created the document design
and layout. Jason Britton, Health Effects Laboratory Division,
NIOSH, created the web document.
Please direct any comments,
questions, or requests for additional information to the
following:
Dr. Nancy A. Stout,
Director
Division of Safety Research
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
1095 Willowdale Road
Morgantown, WV 26505-2888
Telephone: 304-285-5894;
or call
1-800-CDC-INFO (1-800-232-4636)
We greatly appreciate your
assistance in protecting the health of U.S. workers.
Linda Rosenstock, M.D., M.P.H.
Director, National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CFR. Code of Federal regulations.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Office
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burning buildings: a guide to fireground safety. Saddle
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NFPA [1995b]. NFPA 1561: standard
on fire department incident management system. Quincy, MA:
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for a fire department self-contained breathing apparatus
program. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.
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WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public
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National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Fatality
Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) Report 98-F07.
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Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Fatality
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Association.
Delivering
on the Nation's promise:
Safety and health at work
For all people
Through research and prevention
To receive other
information about occupational safety and
health problems, call NIOSH at
1-800-CDC-INFO
(1-800-232-4636)
Fax number: 1-513-533-8347
E-mail: pubstaft@cdc.gov
or visit the
NIOSH Web site at: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh
DHHS (NIOSH)
Publication No. 99-146
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