



JAPAN LESSONS-LEARNED PROJECT DIRECTORATE

JLD-ISG-2012-02

**Compliance with Order EA-12-050,
Reliable Hardened Containment Vents**

Interim Staff Guidance
Revision 0



U.S. NRC

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Protecting People and the Environment

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**INTERIM STAFF GUIDANCE (ISG)
JAPAN LESSONS-LEARNED PROJECT DIRECTORATE (JLD)**

**COMPLIANCE WITH ORDER EA-12-050, ORDER MODIFYING LICENSES
WITH REGARD TO RELIABLE HARDENED CONTAINMENT VENTS
JLD-ISG-2012-02**

PURPOSE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, or Commission) staff is providing this interim staff guidance (ISG) to assist nuclear power reactor licensees with the identification of measures needed to comply with requirements to mitigate challenges to key safety functions. These requirements are contained in Order EA-12-050, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents." This ISG is applicable to all operating boiling water reactor (BWR) licensees with Mark I and Mark II containments issued under Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR), Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities." This ISG provides an acceptable method for satisfying those requirements. Licensees may propose other methods for satisfying these requirements. The NRC staff will review such methods and determine their acceptability on a case-by-case basis.

BACKGROUND

Following the events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant on March 11, 2011, the NRC established a senior-level agency task force referred to as the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF). The NTTF was tasked with conducting a systematic and methodical review of the NRC regulations and processes and determining if the agency should make additional improvements to these programs in light of the events at Fukushima Dai-ichi. As a result of this review, the NTTF developed a comprehensive set of recommendations, documented in SECY-11-0093, "Near-Term Report and Recommendations for Agency Actions Following the Events in Japan," dated July 12, 2011 [Reference 1]. These recommendations were enhanced by the NRC staff following interactions with stakeholders. Documentation of the staff's efforts is contained in SECY-11-0124, "Recommended Actions To Be Taken Without Delay From the Near-Term Task Force Report," dated September 9, 2011 [Reference 2], and SECY-11-0137, "Prioritization of Recommended Actions To Be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned," dated October 3, 2011 [Reference 3].

As directed by the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-11-0093 [Reference 4], the NRC staff reviewed the NTTF recommendations within the context of the NRC's existing regulatory framework and considered the various regulatory vehicles available to the NRC to implement the recommendations. SECY-11-0124 and SECY-11-0137 established the staff's prioritization of the recommendations.

The importance of reliable operation of hardened vents during conditions involving loss of containment heat removal capability was already well established and this understanding has been reinforced by the clear lessons of Fukushima. Hardened vents have been in place in U.S. plants with BWR Mark I containments for many years but a wide variance exists with regard to the reliability of the vents. BWR Mark II containments are only slightly larger than Mark I containments, and Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) for BWR Mark I and Mark II

containments contain provisions for venting. Therefore, reliable hardened venting systems in BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments are needed to ensure that adequate protection of public health and safety is maintained.

On February 17, 2012, the NRC staff submitted SECY-12-0025, "Proposed Orders and Requests for Information in Response to Lessons Learned from Japan's March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami" [Reference 5], to the Commission, including the proposed Order to implement requirements relating to reliable hardened venting systems at BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containment designs. As directed by SRM-SECY-12-0025 [Reference 6], the NRC staff issued Order EA-12-050, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents" [Reference 7].

RATIONALE

1. Order EA-12-050 requires that licensees of BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containment designs shall ensure that these facilities have a containment venting system that meets certain requirements relating to reliable and dependable operation in order to be able to implement strategies relating to the prevention of core damage.
2. The installed venting system must meet prescribed quality standards. Generally, the system must be of a "seismically rugged design" and meet the plant's existing design basis if more stringent requirements are necessary.
3. The Order requires that licensees develop the necessary procedures and conduct appropriate training of personnel who may be required to operate the system.

APPLICABILITY

This ISG shall remain in effect until it has been superseded, withdrawn, or incorporated into a regulatory guide or the Standard Review Plan (SRP).

PROPOSED GUIDANCE

As discussed above, this ISG is applicable to all operating BWR licensees with Mark I and Mark II containment designs. The NRC staff considers that the implementation of the methods described in Attachment 1 to this ISG is an acceptable means of meeting the requirements of Order EA-12-050.

IMPLEMENTATION

Except in those cases in which a licensee proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with Order EA-12-050, the NRC staff will use the methods described in this ISG to evaluate licensee compliance as presented in submittals required in Order EA-12-050.

BACKFITTING DISCUSSION

Licensees may use the guidance in this document to demonstrate compliance with Order EA-12-050. Accordingly, the NRC staff issuance of this ISG is not considered backfitting, as defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(1), nor is it deemed to be in conflict with any of the issue finality provisions in 10 CFR Part 52.

FINAL RESOLUTION

The contents of this ISG may subsequently be incorporated into the SRP, and/or other guidance documents, as appropriate.

ATTACHMENT

1. Guidance for Reliable Hardened Containment Venting Systems at Boiling Water Reactor Facilities with Mark I and Mark II Containment Designs

REFERENCES

1. SECY-11-0093, "Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century, the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," July 12, 2011 (NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML11186A950).
2. SECY-11-0124, "Recommended Actions to be Taken without Delay from the Near-Term Task Force Report," September 9, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11245A158).
3. SECY-11-0137, "Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned," October 3, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11272A111).
4. SRM-SECY-11-0093, "Staff Requirements – SECY-11-0093 – Near-Term Report and Recommendations for Agency Actions following the Events in Japan," August 19, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML112310021).
5. SECY-12-0025, "Proposed Orders and Requests for Information in Response to Lessons Learned from Japan's March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami," February 17, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12039A103).
6. SRM- SECY-12-0025, "Staff Requirements – SECY-12-0025 - Proposed Orders and Requests for Information in Response to Lessons Learned from Japan's March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami," March 9, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML120690347).
7. Order EA-12-050, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents," March 9, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A696).

Public Meetings

1. May 23, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12132A372)
2. June 19, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12160A163)

Guidance for Reliable Hardened Containment Venting Systems at Boiling Water Reactor Facilities with Mark I and Mark II Containment Designs

1.0 Introduction

Order EA-12-050 requires that all boiling water reactor (BWR) Mark I and Mark II containments shall have a reliable hardened vent to remove decay heat from the containment and maintain control of containment pressure within acceptable limits following events that result in the loss of active containment heat removal capability or prolonged station blackout (SBO). The order did not include explicit requirements relating to severe accident service for the hardened containment vent system (HCVS); rather, the focus of the HCVS was to support strategies related to the prevention of core damage under a wide range of plant conditions. If core cooling were to fail, closure of the vent valves may be necessary prior to the onset of core damage because the HCVS may not necessarily be capable of operating under severe accident conditions. Any reference to radiological consequences, airborne radioactivity leakage, and hydrogen leakage in this guidance document are intended to convey the challenges that the operators could face in performing actions to close the vent valves, if the valves were not already closed prior to the onset of core damage.

The following guidance provides the NRC staff's technical position on the requirements outlined in EA-12-050.

Definitions

“Seismically rugged design” – A term used to describe the design of components beyond the second containment isolation barrier to ensure that the HCVS is able to remain functional following a design basis seismic event. While the design and construction must meet the plant's design basis earthquake seismic requirements, licensees may use commercial grade components and materials beyond the second containment isolation barrier. Thus, licensees are not required to qualify piping, supports and other related components in accordance with NRC requirements for safety related structures, systems, and components, including Appendix B, “Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants,” for this portion of the system.

“Reliable Hardened Containment Vent System” – A term used to describe a containment vent system that can be initiated and operated with a high degree of certainty during a prolonged SBO event. The HCVS shall be designed to be operated from switches or push buttons on readily accessible control panels and shall be capable of operating in this mode with no additional operator actions until such time that manual operator actions to supplement the HCVS operation by portable equipment can be credited. The NRC staff's determination of whether a licensee has a reliable hardened vent will be based on conformance to the requirements of order EA-12-050, as further defined and elaborated in this interim staff guidance (ISG).

2.0 Administrative Requirements

Section IV.A. Licensees shall promptly start implementation of the requirements in Attachment 2 to the Order and shall complete full implementation no later than two refueling cycles following the submittal of the overall integrated

plan, as required in Condition C.1. (due no later than February 28, 2013), or December 31, 2016, whichever comes first.

Staff Position: The implementation schedule specified in the Orders conforms to Commission direction to the staff to implement the lessons learned from Fukushima within five years. Additionally, the schedule incorporated feedback received from stakeholders, including the nuclear industry, during several public meetings. Specifically, the industry stated that at least two maintenance periods would be required during regularly scheduled refueling outages to perform necessary inspections and measurements, and to implement the hardware changes. Therefore, in accordance with Commission direction, and with appropriate consideration of stakeholder feedback, the proper interpretation of “two refueling cycles” is that full implementation shall be completed prior to commencement of plant start-up (control rod withdrawal) from the second scheduled refueling outage after submittal of the overall integrated plan required by the Orders. Under this schedule, all operating BWRs with Mark I and Mark II containments are expected to complete full implementation prior to December 31, 2016. For example, a reactor on an 18-month operating cycle and for whom its first scheduled refueling outage after February 28, 2013, occurs in the spring of 2013, will be required to achieve full implementation prior to commencing control rod withdrawal following its scheduled fall of 2014 refueling outage. This affords that licensee two full refueling cycles to plan and implement the necessary plant modifications.

Should a licensee encounter significant hardship in meeting the schedule required by the Order, it may, with demonstration of good cause, request relief from the Order. Each such request will be reviewed by the staff on a case-by-case basis.

3.0 HCVS Requirements

Requirement 1.1.1 The HCVS shall be designed to minimize the reliance on operator actions.

Staff Position: During events that significantly challenge plant operations, individual operators are more prone to human error. In addition, the plant operations staff may be required to implement strategies and/or take many concurrent actions that further places a burden on its personnel. During the prolonged SBO condition at the Fukushima Dai-ichi units, operators faced many significant challenges while attempting to restore numerous plant systems that were necessary to cool the reactor core, including the containment venting systems. The difficulties faced by the operators related to the location of the HCVS valves, ambient temperatures and radiological conditions, loss of all alternating current electrical power, loss of motive force to open the vent valves, and exhausting dc battery power. The NRC staff recognizes that operator actions will be needed to operate the HCVS valves; however, the licensees shall consider design features for the system that will minimize

the need and reliance on operator actions to the extent possible during a variety of plant conditions, as further discussed in this ISG.

The HCVS shall be designed to be operated from a control panel located in the main control room or a remote but readily accessible location. The HCVS shall be designed to be fully functional and self sufficient with permanently installed equipment in the plant, without the need for portable equipment or connecting thereto, until such time that additional on-site or off-site personnel and portable equipment become available. The HCVS shall be capable of operating in this mode (i.e., relying on permanently installed equipment) for at least 24 hours during the prolonged SBO, unless a shorter period is justified by the licensee. The HCVS operation in this mode depends on a variety of conditions, such as the cause for the SBO (e.g., seismic event, flood, tornado, high winds), severity of the event, and time required for additional help to reach the plant, move portable equipment into place, and make connections to the HCVS.

When evaluating licensee justification for periods less than 24 hours, the NRC staff will consider the number of actions and the cumulative demand on personnel resources that are needed to maintain HCVS functionality (e.g., installation of portable equipment during the first 24 hours to restore power to the HCVS controls and/or instrumentation) as a result of design limitations. For example, the use of supplemental portable power sources may be acceptable if the supplemental power was readily available, could be quickly and easily moved into place, and installed through the use of pre-engineered quick disconnects, and the necessary human actions were identified along with the time needed to complete those actions. Conversely, supplemental power sources located in an unattended warehouse that require a qualified electrician to temporarily wire into the panel would not be considered acceptable by the staff because its installation requires a series of complex, time-consuming actions in order to achieve a successful outcome. There are similar examples that could apply to mechanical systems, such as pneumatic/compressed air systems.

Requirement 1.1.2 The HCVS shall be designed to minimize plant operators' exposure to occupational hazards, such as extreme heat stress, while operating the HCVS system.

Staff Position: During a prolonged SBO, the drywell, wetwell (torus), and nearby areas in the plant where HCVS components are expected to be located will likely experience an excursion in temperatures due to inadequate containment cooling combined with loss of normal and emergency building ventilation systems. In addition, installed normal and emergency lighting in the plant may not be available. Licensees should take into consideration plant conditions expected to be experienced during applicable beyond design basis external events when locating valves, instrument air supplies, and other components that will be required to safely operate the HCVS system. Components required for manual operation should be placed in

areas that are readily accessible to plant operators, and not require additional actions, such as the installation of ladders or temporary scaffolding, to operate the system.

When developing a design strategy, the NRC staff expects licensees to analyze potential plant conditions and use its acquired knowledge of these areas, in terms of how temperatures would react to extended SBO conditions and the lighting that would be available during beyond design basis external events. This knowledge also provides an input to system operating procedures, training, the choice of protective clothing, required tools and equipment, and portable lighting.

Requirement 1.1.3 The HCVS shall also be designed to minimize radiological consequences that would impede personnel actions needed for event response.

Staff Position: The design of the HCVS should take into consideration the radiological consequences resulting from the event that could negatively impact event response. During the Fukushima event, personnel actions to manually operate the vent valves were impeded due to the location of the valves in the torus rooms. The HCVS shall be designed to be placed in operation by operator actions at a control panel, located in the main control room or in a remote location. The system shall be designed to function in this mode with permanently installed equipment providing electrical power (e.g., dc power batteries) and valve motive force (e.g., N₂/air cylinders). The system shall be designed to function in this mode for a minimum duration of 24 hours with no operator actions required or credited, other than the system initiating actions at the control panel. Durations of less than 24 hours will be considered if justified by adequate supporting information from the licensee. To ensure continued operation of the HCVS beyond 24 hours, licensees may credit manual actions, such as moving portable equipment to supplement electrical power and valve motive power sources.

In response to Generic Letter (GL) 89-16, a number of facilities with Mark I containments installed vent valves in the torus room, near the drywell, or both. Licensees can continue to use these venting locations or select new locations, provided the requirements of this guidance document are satisfied. The HCVS improves the chances of core cooling by removing heat from containment and lowering containment pressure, when core cooling is provided by other systems. If core cooling were to fail and result in the onset core damage, closure of the vent valves may become necessary if the system was not designed for severe accident service. In addition, leakage from the HCVS within the plant and the location of the external release from the HCVS could impact the event response from on-site operators and off-site help arriving at the plant. An adequate strategy to minimize radiological consequences that could impede personnel actions should include the following:

1. Licensees shall provide permanent radiation shielding where necessary to facilitate personnel access to valves and allow manual

operation of the valves locally. Licensee may use alternatives such as providing features to facilitate manual operation of valves from remote locations, as discussed further in this guidance under Requirement 1.2.2, or relocate the vent valves to areas that are significantly less challenging to operator access/actions.

2. In accordance with Requirement 1.2.8, the HCVS shall be designed for pressures that are consistent with the higher of the primary containment design pressure and the primary containment pressure limit (PCPL), as well as including dynamic loading resulting from system actuation. In addition, the system shall be leak-tight. As such, ventilation duct work (i.e., sheet metal) shall not be utilized in the design of the HCVS. Licensees should perform appropriate testing, such as hydrostatic or pneumatic testing, to establish the leak-tightness of the HCVS.
3. The HCVS release to outside atmosphere shall be at an elevation higher than adjacent plant structures. Release through existing plant stacks is considered acceptable, provided the guidance under Requirement 1.2.6 is satisfied. If the release from HCVS is through a vent stack different than the plant stack, the elevation of the stack should be higher than the nearest building or structure.

Requirement 1.2.1 The HCVS shall have the capacity to vent the steam/energy equivalent of 1 percent of licensed/rated thermal power (unless a lower value is justified by analyses), and be able to maintain containment pressure below the primary containment design pressure.

Staff Position: Beyond design basis external events such as a prolonged SBO could result in the loss of active containment heat removal capability. The primary design objective of the HCVS is to provide sufficient venting capacity to prevent a long-term overpressure failure of the containment by keeping the containment pressure below the primary containment design pressure and the PCPL. The PCPL may be dictated by other factors, such as the maximum containment pressure at which the safety relief valves (SRVs) and the HCVS valves can be opened and closed.

The NRC staff has determined that, for a vent sized under conditions of constant heat input at a rate equal to 1 percent of rated thermal power and containment pressure equal to the lower of the primary containment design pressure and the PCPL, the exhaust-flow through the vent would be sufficient to prevent the containment pressure from increasing. This determination is based on studies that have shown that the torus suppression capacity is typically sufficient to absorb the decay heat generated during at least the first three hours following the shutdown of the reactor with suppression pool as the source of injection, that decay heat is typically less than 1 percent of rated thermal power three hours following shutdown of the reactor, and that decay heat continues to decrease to well under 1 percent, thereafter. Licensees shall have an auditable engineering basis for the decay heat absorbing capacity of their

suppression pools, selection of venting pressure such that the HCVS will have sufficient venting capacity under such conditions to maintain containment pressure at or below the primary containment design pressure and the PCPL. If required, venting capacity shall be increased to an appropriate level commensurate with the licensee's venting strategy. Licensees may also use a venting capacity sized under conditions of constant heat input at a rate lower than 1 percent of thermal power if it can be justified by analysis that primary containment design pressure and the PCPL would not be exceeded. In cases where plants were granted, have applied, or plan to apply for power uprates, the licensees shall use 1 percent thermal power corresponding to the uprated thermal power. The basis for the venting capacity shall give appropriate consideration of where venting is being performed from (i.e., wetwell or drywell) and the difference in pressure between the drywell and the suppression chamber. Vent sizing for multi-unit sites must take into consideration simultaneous venting from all the units, and ensure that venting on one unit does not negatively impact the ability to vent on the other units.

Requirement 1.2.2 The HCVS shall be accessible to plant operators and be capable of remote operation and control, or manual operation, during sustained operations.

Staff Position: The preferred location for remote operation and control of the HCVS is from the main control room. However, alternate locations to the control room are also acceptable, provided the licensees take into consideration the following:

1. Sustained operations mean the ability to open/close the valves multiple times during the event. Licensees shall determine the number of open/close cycles necessary during the first 24 hours of operation and provide supporting basis consistent with the plant-specific containment venting strategy.
2. An assessment of temperature and radiological conditions that operating personnel may encounter both in transit and locally at the controls. Licensee may use alternatives such as providing features to facilitate manual operation of valves from remote locations or relocating/reorienting the valves.
3. All permanently installed HCVS equipment, including any connections required to supplement the HCVS operation during a prolonged SBO (electric power, N₂/air) shall be located above the maximum design basis external flood level or protected from the design basis external flood.
4. During a prolonged SBO, manual operation/action may become necessary to operate the HCVS. As demonstrated during the Fukushima event, the valves lost motive force including electric power and pneumatic air supply to the valve operators, and control power to

solenoid valves. If direct access and local operation of the valves is not feasible due to temperature or radiological hazards, licensees should include design features to facilitate remote manual operation of the HCVS valves by means such as reach rods, chain links, hand wheels, and portable equipment to provide motive force (e.g., air/N₂ bottles, diesel powered compressors, and dc batteries). The connections between the valves and portable equipment should be designed for quick deployment. If a portable motive force (e.g., air or N₂ bottles, dc power supplies) is used in the design strategy, licensees shall provide reasonable protection of that equipment consistent with the staff's guidance delineated in JLD-ISG-2012-01 for Order EA-12-049.

5. The design shall preclude the need for operators to move temporary ladders or operate from atop scaffolding to access the HCVS valves or remote operating locations.

Requirement 1.2.3 The HCVS shall include a means to prevent inadvertent actuation.

Staff Position: The design of the HCVS shall incorporate features, such as control panel key-locked switches, locking systems, rupture discs, or administrative controls to prevent the inadvertent use of the vent valves. The system shall be designed to preclude inadvertent actuation of the HCVS due to any single active failure. The design should consider general guidelines such as single point vulnerability and spurious operations of any plant installed equipment associated with HCVS.

The objective of the HCVS is to provide sufficient venting of containment and prevent long-term overpressure failure of containment following the loss of active containment heat removal capability or prolonged SBO. However, inadvertent actuation of HCVS due to a design error, equipment malfunction, or operator error during a design basis loss-of-coolant accident (DBLOCA) could have an undesirable effect on the containment accident pressure (CAP) to provide adequate net positive suction head to the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pumps. Therefore, prevention of inadvertent actuation, while important for all plants, is essential for plants relying on CAP. The licensee submittals on HCVS shall specifically include details on how this issue will be addressed on their individual plants for all situations when CAP credit is required.

Requirement 1.2.4 The HCVS shall include a means to monitor the status of the vent system (e.g., valve position indication) from the control room or other location(s). The monitoring system shall be designed for sustained operation during a prolonged SBO.

Staff Position: Plant operators must be able to readily monitor the status of the HCVS at all times, including being able to understand whether or not containment pressure/energy is being vented through the HCVS, and whether or not containment integrity has been restored following venting operations. Licensees shall provide a means to allow plant operators to readily

determine, or have knowledge of, the following system parameters: (1) HCVS vent valves' position (open or closed), (2) system pressure, and (3) effluent temperature. Other important information includes the status of supporting systems, such as availability of electrical power and pneumatic supply pressure. Monitoring by means of permanently installed gauges that are at, or nearby, the HCVS control panel is acceptable. The staff will consider alternative approaches for system status instrumentation; however, licensees must provide sufficient information and justification for alternative approaches.

The means to monitor system status shall support sustained operations during a prolonged SBO, and be designed to operate under potentially harsh environmental conditions that would be expected following a loss of containment heat removal capability and SBO. Power supplies to all instruments, controls, and indications shall be from the same power sources supporting the HCVS operation. "Sustained operations" may include the use of portable equipment to provide an alternate source of power to components used to monitor HCVS status.

Licensees shall demonstrate instrument reliability via an appropriate combination of design, analyses, operating experience, and/or testing of channel components for the following sets of parameters:

- radiological conditions that the instruments may encounter under normal plant conditions, and during and after a prolonged SBO event.
- temperatures and pressure conditions as described under requirement 1.2.8, including dynamic loading from system operation.
- humidity based on instrument location and effluent conditions in the HCVS.

Requirement 1.2.5 The HCVS shall include a means to monitor the effluent discharge for radioactivity that may be released from operation of the HCVS. The monitoring system shall provide indication in the control room or other location(s), and shall be designed for sustained operation during a prolonged SBO.

Staff Position: Licensees shall provide an independent means to monitor overall radioactivity that may be released from the HCVS discharge. The radiation monitor does not need to meet the requirements of NUREG 0737 for monitored releases, nor does it need to be able monitor releases quantitatively to ensure compliance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Part 100 or 10 CFR Section 50.67. A wide-range monitoring system to monitor the overall activity in the release providing indication that effluent from the containment environment that is passing by the monitor is acceptable. The use of other existing radiation monitoring capability in lieu of an independent HCVS radiation monitor is not acceptable because plant operators need accurate information about releases coming from the containment via the HCVS in order to make informed decisions on operation of the reliable hardened venting system.

The monitoring system shall provide indication in the control room or a remote location (i.e., HCVS control panel) for the first 24 hours of an extended SBO with electric power provided by permanent DC battery sources, and supplemented by portable power sources for sustained operations. Monitoring radiation levels is required only during the events that necessitate operation of the HCVS. The reliability of the effluent monitoring system under the applicable environmental conditions shall be demonstrated by methods described under Requirement 1.2.4.

Requirement 1.2.6 The HCVS shall include design features to minimize unintended cross flow of vented fluids within a unit and between units on the site.

Staff Position: At Fukushima, an explosion occurred in Unit 4, which was in a maintenance outage at the time of the event. Although the facts have not been fully established, a likely cause of the explosion in Unit 4 is that hydrogen leaked from Unit 3 to Unit 4 through a common venting system. System cross-connections present a potential for steam, hydrogen, and airborne radioactivity leakage to other areas of the plant and to adjacent units at multi-unit sites if the units are equipped with common vent piping. In this context, a design that is free of physical and control interfaces with other systems eliminates the potential for any cross-flow and is one way to satisfy this requirement. Regardless, system design shall provide design features to prevent the cross flow of vented fluids and migration to other areas within the plant or to adjacent units at multi-unit sites.

The current design of the hardened vent at several plants in the U.S. includes cross connections with the standby gas treatment system, which contains sheet metal ducts and filter and fan housings that are not as leak tight as hard pipes. In addition, dual unit plant sites are often equipped with a common plant stack. Examples of acceptable means for prevention of cross flow is by valves, leak-tight dampers, and check valves, which shall be designed to automatically close upon the initiation of the HCVS and shall remain closed for as long as the HCVS is in operation. Licensee's shall evaluate the environmental conditions (e.g. pressure, temperature) at the damper locations during venting operations to ensure that the dampers will remain functional and sufficiently leak-tight, and if necessary, replace the dampers with other suitable equipment such as valves. If power is required for the interfacing valves to move to isolation position, it shall be from the same power sources as the vent valves. Leak tightness of any such barriers shall be periodically verified by testing as described under Requirement 1.2.7.

Requirement 1.2.7 The HCVS shall include features and provision for the operation, testing, inspection and maintenance adequate to ensure that reliable function and capability are maintained.

Staff Position: The HCVS piping run shall be designed to eliminate the potential for condensation accumulation, as subsequent water hammer could complicate system operation during intermittent venting or to withstand the potential for water hammer without compromising the functionality of

the system. Licensees shall provide a means (e.g., drain valves, pressure and temperature gauge connections) to periodically test system components, including exercising (opening and closing) the vent valve(s). In situations where total elimination of condensation is not feasible, HCVS shall be designed to accommodate condensation, including applicable water hammer loads.

The HCVS outboard of the containment boundary shall be tested to ensure that vent flow is released to the outside with minimal leakage, if any, through the interfacing boundaries with other systems or units. Licensees have the option of individually leak testing interfacing valves or testing the overall leakage of the HCVS volume by conventional leak rate testing methods. The test volume shall envelope the HCVS between the outer primary containment isolation barrier and the vent exiting the plant buildings, including the volume up to the interfacing valves. The test pressure shall be based on the HCVS design pressure. Permissible leakage rates for the interfacing valves shall be within the requirements of American Society of Mechanical Engineers Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants Code (ASME OM) – 2009, Subsection ISTC – 3630 (e) (2), or later edition of the ASME OM Code. When testing the HCVS volume, allowed leakage shall not exceed the sum of the interfacing valve leakages as determined from the ASME OM Code. The NRC staff will consider a higher leakage acceptance values if licensees provide acceptable justification. When reviewing such requests, the NRC staff will consider the impact of the leakage on the habitability of the rooms and areas within the building and operability of equipment in these areas during the event response and subsequent recovery periods.

Licensees shall implement the following operation, testing and inspection requirements for the HCVS to ensure reliable operation of the system.

Testing and Inspection Requirements

Description	Frequency
Cycle the HCVS valves and the interfacing system valves not used to maintain containment integrity during operations.	Once per year
Perform visual inspections and a walkdown of HCVS components.	Once per operating cycle
Test and calibrate the HCVS radiation monitors.	Once per operating cycle
Leak test the HCVS.	(1) Prior to first declaring the system functional; (2) Once every five years thereafter; and (3) After restoration of any breach of system boundary within the buildings.

Description	Frequency
Validate the HCVS operating procedures by conducting an open/close test of the HCVS control logic from its control panel and ensuring that all interfacing system valves move to their proper (intended) positions.	Once per every other operating cycle

Requirement 1.2.8 The HCVS shall be designed for pressures that are consistent with maximum containment design pressures, as well as, dynamic loading resulting from system actuation.

Staff Position: The vent system shall be designed for the higher of the primary containment design pressure or PCPL, and a saturation temperature corresponding to the HCVS design pressure. However, if the venting location is from the drywell, an additional margin of 50 °F shall be added to the design temperature because of the potential for superheated conditions in the drywell. The piping, valves, and the valve actuators shall be designed to withstand the dynamic loading resulting from the actuation of the system, including piping reaction loads from valve opening, concurrent hydrodynamic loads from SRV discharges to the suppression pool, and potential for water hammer from accumulation of steam condensation during multiple venting cycles.

Requirement 1.2.9 The HCVS shall discharge the effluent to a release point above main plant structures.

Staff Position: The HCVS release to outside atmosphere shall be at an elevation higher than adjacent plant structures. Release through existing plant stacks is considered acceptable, provided the guidance under Requirement 1.2.6 is satisfied. If the release from HCVS is through a stack different than the plant stack, the elevation of the stack should be higher than the nearest building or structure. The release point should be situated away from ventilation system intake and exhaust openings, and emergency response facilities. The release stack or structure exposed to outside shall be designed or protected to withstand missiles that could be generated by the external events causing the prolonged SBO (e.g., tornadoes, high winds).

Requirement 2.1 The HCVS vent path up to and including the second containment isolation barrier shall be designed consistent with the design basis of the plant. These items include piping, piping supports, containment isolation valves, containment isolation valve actuators and containment isolation valve position indication components.

Staff Position: The HCVS design, out to and including the second containment isolation barrier, shall meet safety-related requirements consistent with the design basis of the plant. The staff notes that in response to GL 89-16, in many cases, the HCVS vent line connections were made to existing systems.

In some cases, the connection was made in between two existing containment isolation valves and in others to the vacuum breaker line. The HCVS system design shall not preclude the containment isolation valves, including the vent valve from performing their intended containment isolation function consistent with the design basis for the plant. The design shall include all necessary overrides of containment isolation signals and other interface system signals to enable the vent valves to open upon initiation of the HCVS from its control panel.

Requirement 2.2 All other HCVS components shall be designed for reliable and rugged performance that is capable of ensuring HCVS functionality following a seismic event. These items include electrical power supply, valve actuator pneumatic supply, and instrumentation (local and remote) components.

Staff Position: All components of the HCVS beyond the second containment isolation barrier shall be designed to ensure HCVS functionality following the plant's design basis seismic event. These components include, in addition to the hardened vent pipe, electric power supply, pneumatic supply and instrumentation. The design of power and pneumatic supply lines between the HCVS valves and remote locations (if portable sources were to be employed) shall also be designed to ensure HCVS functionality. Licensees shall ensure that the HCVS will not impact other safety-related structures and components and that the HCVS will not be impacted by non-seismic components. The staff prefers that the HCVS components, including the piping run, be located in seismically qualified structures. However, short runs of HCVS piping in non-seismic structures are acceptable if the licensee provides adequate justification on the seismic ruggedness of these structures. The hardened vent shall be designed to conform to the requirements consistent with the applicable design codes for the plant, such as the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and the applicable Specifications, Codes and Standards of the American Institute of Steel Construction.

To ensure the functionality of instruments following a seismic event, the NRC staff considers any of the following as acceptable methods:

- Use of instruments and supporting components with known operating principles that are supplied by manufacturers with commercial quality assurance programs, such as ISO9001. The procurement specifications shall include the seismic requirements and/or instrument design requirements, and specify the need for commercial design standards and testing under seismic loadings consistent with design basis values at the instrument locations.
- Demonstration of the seismic reliability of the instrumentation through methods that predict performance by analysis, qualification testing under simulated seismic conditions, a combination of testing and analysis, or the use of experience data. Guidance for these is based

on sections 7, 8, 9, and 10 of IEEE Standard 344-2004, "IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," or a substantially similar industrial standard could be used.

- Demonstration that the instrumentation is substantially similar in design to instrumentation that has been previously tested to seismic loading levels in accordance with the plant design basis at the location where the instrument is to be installed (g-levels and frequency ranges). Such testing and analysis should be similar to that performed for the plant licensing basis.

Requirement 3.1 Licensees shall develop, implement, and maintain procedures necessary for the safe operation of the HCVS. Procedures shall be established for system operations when normal and backup power is available, and during SBO conditions.

Staff Position: Procedures shall be developed describing when and how to place the HCVS in operation, the location of system components, instrumentation available, normal and backup power supplies, directions for sustained operation, including the storage location of portable equipment, training on operating the portable equipment, and testing of equipment. The procedures shall identify appropriate conditions and criteria for use of the HCVS. The procedures shall clearly state the nexus between CAP and ECCS pumps during a DBLOCA and how an inadvertent opening of the vent valve could have an adverse impact on this nexus. The HCVS procedures shall be developed and implemented in the same manner as other plant procedures necessary to support the execution of the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs).

Licensees shall establish provisions for out-of-service requirements of the HCVS and compensatory measures. These provisions shall be documented in the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) or similar document. The allowed unavailability time for the HCVS shall not exceed 30 days during modes 1, 2, and 3. If the unavailability time exceeds 30 days, the TRM shall direct licensees to perform a cause assessment and take the necessary actions to restore HCVS availability in a timely manner, consistent with plant procedures and prevent future unavailability for similar causes.

Requirement 3.2 Licensee shall train appropriate personnel in the use of the HCVS. The training curricula shall include system operations when normal and backup power is available, and during SBO conditions.

Staff Position: All personnel expected to operate the HVCS shall receive training in the use of plant procedures developed for system operations when normal and backup power is available, and during SBO conditions consistent with the plants systematic approach to training. The training shall be refreshed on a periodic basis and as any changes occur to the HCVS.

4.0 Reporting Requirements

Section IV.C. 1. All licensees shall, by February 28, 2013, submit to the Commission for review an overall integrated plan including a description of how compliance with the requirements described in Attachment 2 will be achieved.

Staff Position: The February 28, 2013, submittal shall contain information with the necessary detail to demonstrate compliance with the requirements described in Attachment 2 of EA-12-050. Licensees shall provide a complete description of the system, including important operational characteristics. The level of detail generally considered adequate is consistent with the level of detail contained in the licensee's Final Safety Analysis Report. In addition, the staff expects the licensee's submittal will provide the following information:

- A description of how the design objectives contained in Attachment 2, Requirements 1.1.1, 1.1.2, and 1.1.3, are met.
- Description of major system components, including applicable quality requirements.
- Operational characteristics and a description of how each of the Order's technical requirements are being met.
- A piping and instrumentation diagram or a similar diagram that shows system components and interfaces with plant systems and structures is acceptable.

The February 28, 2013, submittal shall also include an update of implementation schedule milestones.

Section IV.C.2. All licensees shall provide an initial status report 60 days following issuance of the final ISG, and at 6-month intervals following submittal of the overall integrated plan, as required in Condition C.1, which delineates progress made in implementing the requirements of this Order.

Staff Position: The 60-day and 6-month status reports shall be addressed to the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, and include the following information:

- Major activities completed during the previous reporting period (i.e., the preceding 60 days or six-month period)
- Planned activities for the next six months
- Technical difficulties encountered, including potential changes that could materially change the information provided in the licensee's February 28, 2013, submittal

- Project milestones schedule through completion of HCVS installation and testing

Section IV.C.3 All licensees shall report to the Commission when full compliance with the requirements described in Attachment 2 is achieved.

Staff Position: The report shall be addressed to the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, and certify that the licensee has completed all physical work, including system testing and commissioning, and that the licensee has achieved full compliance with the Order.