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Escalated Enforcement Actions Issued to Reactor Licensees - P
- Palisades
- Palo Verde 1, 2 & 3
- Peach Bottom 2 & 3
- Perry 1
- Pilgrim 1
- Point Beach 1 & 2
- Prairie Island 1 & 2
Palisades - Docket No. 050-00255
| NRC Action Number(s) and Facility Name |
Action Type (Severity) & Civil Penalty (if any) |
Date Issued |
Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| EA-11-243 Palisades |
NOV (Yellow) |
02/14/2012 | On February 14, 2012, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Palisades Nuclear Plant for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings” that was categorized as a Yellow Significance Determination Process finding. The licensee failed to ensure that the work performed on Electrical Bus D11-2 was prescribed by documented instructions or procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and accomplished in accordance with the instructions or procedures. Specifically, on September 25, 2011, the work order instructions did not provide critical steps and also lacked proper step progression. The work order instructions also included action steps to, “Insulate or support load side bus bars to ensure they do not fault,” which were not implemented. Finally, the electricians performing work in the field attempted to remove a positive horizontal bus bar in Bus D11-2, which was not a prescribed step in the work order instructions. As a result, these performance deficiencies caused an electrical fault which caused the loss of the left train 125-Volt DC safety-related system and loss of both preferred AC sources associated with the left train DC system. |
| EA-11-241 Palisades |
NOV (White) |
02/14/2012 | On February 14, 2012, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Palisades Nuclear Plant for violations of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III “Design Control” and Criterion XVI “Corrective Action” that were categorized as one White Significance Determination Process finding. Specifically, in December 2007, the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of the safety related service water pump (SWP) coupling design to confirm that the coupling material was adequate for the environment and working conditions for which it would be subjected. As a result, the licensee failed to identify and evaluate a new failure mechanism which was introduced into the system in the form of intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC). In addition, on August 9, 2011, the licensee failed to preclude repetition of a significant condition adverse to quality when a coupling on a SWP failed due to IGSCC. |
| EA-11-214 Palisades |
ORDER | 01/25/2012 | On January 25, 2012, an immediately effective Confirmatory Order was issued to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy), to confirm commitments made as a result of an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mediation session held on December 12, 2011. This enforcement action is based on a Technical Specification apparent violation. An at-the-controls reactor operator left the at-the-controls area of the Control Room without providing a turnover to a qualified individual and without obtaining permission from the Control Room Supervisor. Although the operator left the Control Room, another qualified individual resumed the at-the-controls responsibility. During the ADR session, Entergy agreed to take the following actions: 1) development of a case study as related to the events that gave rise to the Confirmatory Order and present it to Entergy licensed reactor operators fleet wide, 2) a senior Entergy nuclear executive will send a letter fleet wide to each Entergy licensed reactor operator re-emphasizing the responsibilities of their position and associated safety responsibilities and obligations to the public, 3) a presentation at the appropriate industry forum(s) based on the facts and lessons learned from this event, 4) a review of the three Entergy procedures that are applicable to this event and address any relevant observations, findings, or recommendations in their Corrective Action Program, 5) conduct a safety culture assessment of the Palisades Operations Department, 6) perform a review of the planning for the next refueling outage, focusing on stressful or complex work evolutions to ensure that they are properly planned, and 7) inform the NRC, in writing, their plan to monitor and manage the reactor operator associated with event. In consideration of these commitments, and other corrective actions already completed by Entergy, the NRC agreed to refrain from proposing a civil penalty and issuing a Notice of Violation. |
| EA-11-227 Palisades |
NOV (White) |
01/03/2012 | On January 3, 2012, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. for a violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving Entergy’s failure to prescribe maintenance on the safety-related turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump, an activity affecting quality, by documented instructions of a type appropriate to the circumstances, as well as a failure to accomplish the maintenance in accordance with their procedure. Specifically, on October 17, 2010, procedure FWS-M-6, “Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Maintenance,” failed to prescribe inspections of wear conditions on the knife edge and latch plate, or to replace the trip spring, although these inspections and replacements had been identified as necessary by the turbine vendor. Palisades’ personnel also failed to perform a step in the surveillance procedure which required lubricating a pin and instead greased the knife edge of the mechanical overspeed/manual trip mechanism. These deficiencies resulted in the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump being inoperable from October 29, 2010 to May 11, 2011. |
| EA-09-269 Palisades |
NOV (White) |
01/20/2010 | On January 20, 2010, a Notice of Violation was issued to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Finding as a result of inspections at the Palisades Nuclear Plant. This White finding involved the licensee’s failure to meet the requirements of Technical Specification (TS) for fuel storage in the spent fuel pool (SFP). Specifically, the Region I spent fuel pool storage rack neutron absorber had deteriorated over the life of the plant and was less than required by TS. Corrective actions are currently in place for additional controls of the spent fuel pool. |
| EA-08-322 Palisades |
NOV (White) |
01/30/2009 | On January 30, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination finding involving a violation of 10 CFR 20.1501 which requires the performance of surveys (evaluations) necessary for the licensee to comply with the regulations in Part 20. The violation involved the failure to evaluate radiological hazards and assess dose to workers that handled tools used for reconstituting failed fuel during work on the refueling floor in October 2007, as required by 10 CFR 20.1501 to demonstrate compliance with the dose limits of 20.1201. |
| EA-01-223 Palisades |
NOV
(White) |
10/26/2001 | On October 26, 2001, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving smoke detectors in the cable spreading room. The violation cited the licensee's failure to properly locate and install the smoke detectors in accordance with requirements including the applicable National Fire Protection Association code. |
| EA-01-088 Palisades |
NOVCP (SL III) $ 55,000 |
06/27/2001 | On June 27, 2001, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $55,000 was issued for a Severity Level III violation. The action was based on the licensee's failure to provide complete and accurate information in letters to the NRC requesting enforcement discretion and an exigent Technical Specification change. |
| EA-98-433 Palisades |
NOV (SL III) |
12/11/1998 | Violation occurred when the HPSI system was made inoperable for approximately 90 minutes during a surveillance test. |
| EA-97-567 & EA-97-569 Palisades |
NOVCP (SL III) $ 55,000 |
04/02/1998 | Work control - operations. |
| EA-96-131 Palisades |
NOVCP (SL III) $ 50,000 |
08/13/1996 | Appendix R violations. |
Palo Verde 1, 2 &
3 - Docket Nos. 050-00528; 050-00529; 050-00530
| NRC Action Number(s) and Facility Name |
Action Type (Severity) & Civil Penalty (if any) |
Date Issued |
Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| EA-07-162 Palo Verde |
ORDER |
10/19/2007 | On October 19, 2007, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to Arizona Public Service Company (APS) to formalize commitments made as a result of a successful alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mediation session. The commitments were made by APS as part of a settlement agreement between APS and the NRC concerning the falsification, by a qualified senior reactor operator, at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS), of a record related to a steam generator blowdown. As part of the settlement agreement, APS agreed to take a number of actions. In recognition of these actions, and those corrective actions already completed by APS, the NRC is satisfied that its concerns will be addressed. |
| EA-06-296 Palo Verde |
NOV (White) |
02/21/2007 | On February 21, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a WHITE Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure to develop adequate instructions or procedures for corrective maintenance activities on the Unit 3, EDG A K-1 relay and the failure to identify and correct the cause of the erratic K-1 relay operation prior to installation of the relay. This resulted in the emergency diesel generator being inoperable for almost four weeks. The violation was cited against 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings" and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria XVI, "Corrective Action." |
| EA-05-037 Palo Verde |
06/27/2005 | On June 27, 2005, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q). Specifically, the licensee made an emergency plan change that decreased the plan’s effectiveness, and did so without prior NRC approval. This violation was assessed in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy because making this plan change without NRC approval impacted the regulatory process. | |
| EA-05-051 Palo Verde |
NOVCP |
04/08/2005 | On April 8, 2005, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of a Civil Penalty in the amount of $50,000 was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the licensee’s failure to perform a written safety evaluation and obtain Commission approval prior to making a procedural change which resulted in a change to the facility as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report that increased the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. |
| EA-04-221 Palo Verde |
04/08/2005 | On April 8, 2005, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a Yellow SDP finding involving a failure to maintain portions of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) filled with water in accordance with design control requirements. The violation cited the licensee’s failure to establish adequate design control measures to assure that the design basis for the ECCS was appropriately translated into specifications, procedures, and instructions. | |
| EA-95-192 Palo Verde 1, 2 & 3 |
NOV (SL III) |
01/08/1996 | The Atlantic Group, a contractor to the Arizona Public Service Company, discriminated against one of its employees at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station for raising safety concerns. |
Peach Bottom 2 &
3 - Docket Nos. 050-00277; 050-00278
| NRC Action Number(s) and Facility Name |
Action Type (Severity) & Civil Penalty (if any) |
Date Issued |
Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| EA-09-007; EA-09-059 Peach Bottom 2 & 3 |
ORDER | 12/1/2009 | On December 1, 2009, an immediately effective Confirmatory Order was issued to Exelon Generating Company, LLC (Exelon) to confirm commitments made as a result of an Alternative Dispute Resolution mediation session held on September 3, 2009. This enforcement action is based on two violations of NRC requirements at Exelon’s Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (Peach Bottom), including the deliberate failure of a former reactor operator to report an arrest in a timely manner and the deliberate failure of a former maintenance supervisor to provide complete and accurate information on a personal history questionnaire. Exelon agreed to take the following actions: (1) provide additional training on deliberate misconduct at Peach Bottom and other Exelon sites, for both employees and supervisors; (2) perform an assessment to verify the effectiveness of the deliberate misconduct training; (3) conduct training with licensed operators on the special obligations associated with holding an NRC license; (4) perform an assessment of Peach Bottom employee conduct, including trending; (5) conduct additional Exelon fleet-wide training on the Behavioral Observation Program, fitness for duty requirements, and the Employee Assistance Program; (6) submit a lessons-learned article to two professional organizations requesting publication in their respective newsletters; and (7) discuss with the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations the possibility of incorporating training on deliberate misconduct into its supervisor and operator development programs. In consideration of these commitments, and other actions already completed by Exelon, the NRC agreed to refrain from issuing a civil penalty or Notice of Violation for these violations. |
| EA-08-298 Peach Bottom 2 & 3 |
NOVCP (SL III) $ 65,000 |
01/06/2009 | On January 6, 2009, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $65,000 was issued for a Severity Level III problem involving inattentive security officers at Exelon’s Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station. An investigation conducted by the NRC Office of Investigations determined that multiple security officers at Peach Bottom were deliberately inattentive on multiple occasions. In addition, multiple security officers deliberately failed to report observations of inattentiveness to their supervision. These security officers put Exelon in violation of 10 CFR 73.55, which requires armed responders to maintain continuous communication with each alarm station and be available to immediately respond to threats, and Peach Bottom License Condition 2.C(3), which requires, in part, reporting of aberrant behavior. |
|
EA-03-224 |
NOV (White) |
02/03/2004 | On February 3, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving a performance problem associated with one of the emergency diesel generators. The violation cited the licensee’s failure to maintain adequate maintenance procedures and failure to take adequate corrective actions for a condition adverse to quality. |
|
EA-02-142 |
NOV
(White) |
11/26/2002 | On November 26, 2002, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation involving a white SDP finding involving the untimely declaration of an Alert during an actual event. The violation cited the failure of the operations crew to properly use the standard emergency classification and action level scheme. |
|
EA-01-188 |
NOV (SL III) |
10/23/2001 | On October 23, 2001, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III problem involving the willful creation of inaccurate and incomplete siren testing maintenance records by two former maintenance technicians and deficiencies with the ability to provide early notification to the populace surrounding the facility in the event of an emergency. |
| EA-01-148 Peach Bottom 2 & 3 |
NOV (White) |
08/22/2001 | On August 22, 2001, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding. The violation involved the licensee's failure to maintain adequate emergency facilities and equipment (public address and evacuation alarm system) required to support an emergency response. |
| EA-00-125 Peach Bottom 2 & 3 |
NOV (White) |
08/03/2000 | On August 3, 2000, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation that was assessed as a White SDP finding involving the improper classification of radioactive waste for shallow land burial. |
| EA-98-221; Peach Bottom 2 & 3 |
NOVCP (SL III) $ 55,000 |
06/11/1998 | Inoperable CS Pump. |
| EA-96-243 Peach Bottom 2 & 3 |
NOV (SL III) |
02/03/1997 | Secretary enter text file for entire physical security plan onto LAN. Failure to protect aperture cards containing safeguards information. |
| EA-96-370 Peach Bottom 2 & 3 |
NOV (SL III) |
01/03/1997 | The action was based a Maintenance Rule base-line inspection that determined PECO Nuclear was not adequately monitoring the performance of numerous systems and components against established goals, nor had PECO Nuclear demonstrated the effectiveness of preventive maintenance on these systems and components. Both of these deficiencies were requirements of the Maintenance Rule. |
Perry 1 - Docket No. 050-00440
| NRC Action Number(s) and Facility Name |
Action Type (Severity) & Civil Penalty (if any) |
Date Issued |
Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| EA-11-148 Perry 1 |
NOV (White) |
08/25/2011 | On August 25, 2011, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to First Energy Nuclear Operating Company for three violations associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving work activity during the retraction of a stuck source range monitor (SRM) from the reactor vessel. The first violation involved the failure to perform an evaluation of the potential radiological hazards associated with the work activity, as required by 10 CFR 20.1501. The second violation involved the failure to perform a complete radiological characterization of the SRM, as required by Technical Specification (T.S.) 5.7.1.b. The third violation involved the failure to establish a procedure that addressed the control of highly radioactive materials removed from the reactor vessel, as well as, the failure to implement a procedure to ensure that the licensee’s ALARA plan contained steps to ensure that the ambient radiation field in the work areas were being controlled and that the workers actions were in accordance with ALARA considerations, as required by T.S. 5.4.1. |
| EA-04-214 Perry 1 |
NOV (White) |
03/29/2005 | On March 29, 2005, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the failure to follow the requirements of the Perry Emergency Plan during an event that was classified at the Alert level. The violation cited the licensee’s failure to properly implement the required standard emergency classification and action level scheme. |
| EA-01-083 Perry 1 |
NOVCP (SL III) |
02/24/2005 | On February 24, 2005, the NRC issued a Severity Level III Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $55,000 for violation of NRC’s employee protection regulations by a licensee contractor, Williams Power Corporation, at the Perry site. |
| EA-03-208 Perry 1 |
NOV (SL III) |
04/01/2004 | On April 1, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the willful failure of two key maintenance personnel responsible for testing motor operated valves, a safety-related function, to follow Technical Specification overtime guidelines. |
| EA-04-020 Perry 1 |
NOV (White) |
03/12/2004 | On March 12, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the air binding of the common low pressure core spray and residual heat removal (RHR) 'A' water leg pump following a loss of offsite power event. The violation cited the failure to establish adequate written procedures to periodically vent the highest point on the discharge of the common low pressure core spray and RHR 'A' water leg pump. |
| EA-03-197 Perry 1 |
NOV (White) |
01/28/2004 | On January 28, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the failure of the Essential Service Water Pump A shaft on September 1, 2003 due to improper reassembly. The violation cited the licensee’s failure to have adequate procedures for assembly of the pump. |
| EA-03-194 Perry 1 |
NOV (White) |
01/23/2004 | On January 23, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving an undue delay in declaring an actual emergency condition on April 24, 200e, when the shift manager did not follow the emergency classification and action level scheme as required by the emergency plan when damage to irradiated fuel caused a high alarm in the fuel handling building ventilation exhaust gaseous radiation monitor. The violation cited the licensee’s failure to promptly declare the Alert as a violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). |
| EA-03-007 Perry 1 |
NOV
(White) |
03/04/2003 | On March 4, 2003, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the failure of the high pressure core spray system to start during routine surveillance testing. The violation cited the licensee's failure to implement procedures during the installation and inspection of the high pressure core spray pump breaker from 1994 through October 23, 2002. |
| EA-99-012 Perry 1 |
NOVCP (SL II) $110,000 |
05/20/1999 | Discriminated against a Radiation Protection Supervisor (RPS) as a result of the RPS engaging in protected activities. |
| CPORDER
$110,000 |
08/03/2000 | On August 3, 2000, an Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty in
the amount of $110,000 was issued. The action was based on a Notice
of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount
of $110,000 that was issued on May 20, 1999, for a violation
of the employee protection requirement. The Licensee's February
25, 2000, response denied the violation and requested that
the violation be withdrawn and the civil penalty rescinded. After considering the licensees response, the NRC concluded that the violation occurred as stated and that there was not an adequate basis for withdrawing the civil penalty. |
|
| EAs-96-482, 96-542, 97-047, and 97-430 Perry 1
|
NOVCP (SL III) $100,000 |
11/18/1997 | Inadequate corrective actions regarding repetitive reactivity excursions and failure to incorporate design aspects into plant construction and failure to identify USQ. |
| ORDERCP $ 50,000 |
04/09/1998 | ||
| EA-96-367 Perry 1 |
NOV (SL III) |
11/06/1996 | Criteria XVI - associated with cooling systems emergency closed cooling system and CRHVAC chillers. |
| EA-96-253 Perry 1 |
NOVCP (SL II) $160,000 |
10/09/1996 | Discrimination against 5 insulators who sued licensee after they were contaminated while working in plant. |
Pilgrim 1 - Docket No.
050-00293
| NRC Action Number(s) and Facility Name |
Action Type (Severity) & Civil Penalty (if any) |
Date Issued |
Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| EA-11-174 Pilgrim |
NOV (White) |
11/21/2011 | On November 21, 2011, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. for a violation of Technical Specification 5.4, “Procedures,” associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving multiple examples of Entergy’s failure to conduct safety-related activities as described in written procedures prior to and during a reactor startup operation. Specifically, on May 10, 2011, Pilgrim personnel failed to implement conduct of operations and reactivity control standards and procedures during a reactor startup which resulted in a reactor scram. |
| EA-05-039 Pilgrim |
NOVCP (SL III) $ 60,000 |
07/14/2005 | On July 14, 2005, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the base amount of $60,000 for a Severity Level III problem consisting of three violations was issued. The violations involved the failure of the Control Room Supervisor (CRS), the Reactor Operator (RO), and the Shift Manager (SM) to follow the requirements in 10 CFR 26.20 and procedures in Technical Specification 5.4.1. The violations cited: (1) the CRS being asleep, and therefore, not in a condition to respond to plant conditions or emergencies (Violation A); (2) the RO observing the CRS asleep, but failing to take immediate actions to awaken the CRS, inform appropriate site personnel, and initiate a CR (Violation B.1) and the SM failing to inform appropriate site personnel and initiate a CR (Violation B.2); and (3) the CRS not being relieved of duty and for-cause FFD tested (Violation C). |
| EA-98-191 Pilgrim 1 |
NOVCP (SL III) $ 55,000 |
05/19/1998 | Equipment failures associated with protected area assessment system. |
| EA-96-271 Pilgrim 1 |
NOV (SL III) |
10/21/1996 | Improper setpoints for 12 containment electrical penetration circuit breakers. |
Point Beach 1 &
2 - Docket Nos. 050-00266; 050-00301
| NRC Action Number(s) and Facility Name |
Action Type (Severity) & Civil Penalty (if any) |
Date Issued |
Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| EA-09-012 Point Beach 1 & 2 |
NOV SL III |
06/26/2009 | On June 26, 2009, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC for a Severity Level III problem involving the failure to implement: (1) 10 CFR 50.74(c) which requires that each licensee notify the appropriate NRC Regional Administrator within 30 days of a permanent disability or illness, as described in 10 CFR 55.25, of a licensed operator or a senior licensed operator; (2) 10 CFR 50.9 which requires, in part, that information provided to the Commission by an applicant for a license or by a licensee or information required by statute or by the Commission’s regulations, Orders, or license conditions to be maintained by the applicant or the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects; and (3) 10 CFR 55.23 requires, in part, that to certify the medical fitness of the applicant, an authorized representative of the facility licensee shall complete and sign NRC Form‑396, "Certification of Medical Examination by Facility Licensee." Specifically, the licensee was informed in February 1993 that the non-licensed operator was taking prescribed medication for hypertension, a permanent disability or illness. The non-licensed operator applied for an NRC operating license in May 1999. The NRC issued the operator a reactor operator license August 27, 1999 and a senior reactor operator license on February 22, 2002, with no restrictions. The licensee did not inform the NRC of the operator’s medical condition until October 20, 2008. Also, the licensee submitted an NRC Form 396 for renewal of a senior reactor operator’s license and the NRC Form 396 certified that the applicant met the medical requirements of ANSI/ANS 3.4 1996 with no restrictions. However, in February 1993, the operator was prescribed medication to adequately compensate for a disqualifying medical condition. The certification by the senior licensee facility representative was material to the NRC because the NRC relied upon this certification to renew the senior reactor operator’s license pursuant to 10 CFR Part 55 when the license should have been modified with a restriction that the senior reactor operator was required to take medication as prescribed to maintain his qualification. |
| EA-06-274 Point Beach 1 & 2 |
NOV
SL III |
01/29/2007 | On January 29, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation. The violation involved the licensee’s failure to update its FSAR in 1983 which, combined with the licensee’s continued failure to fully understand the facility’s licensing and design basis since that time, impacted the licensee’s ability in 2005 to understand the current Point Beach licensing and design basis, and resulted in a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency also impacted the NRC’s ability to perform its regulatory function. The licensee’s failure to update the FSAR and understand the facility’s licensing and design basis represented a challenge to the regulatory envelope upon which certain activities were licensed, such as reactor vessel head lift activities. |
| EA-06-178 Point Beach 1 & 2 |
ORDER |
01/03/2007 | On January 3, 2007, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to the Nuclear Management Company, LLC (NMC), documenting a number of actions the licensee has agreed to take as part of an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) settlement agreement. An ADR session was held at the licensee’s request to address the apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.7, "Employee protection." The actions the licensee has agreed to take include: (1) revising NMC’s policy on writing corrective action program reports; (2) training NMC supervisory employees on safety conscious work environment principles; (3) communicating NMC’s safety culture policy to its employees; and (4) conducting a safety culture survey at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant. As reflected in the Order, in response to these actions, the NRC agreed not to pursue further enforcement action on this issue. |
| EA-05-192 Point Beach 1 & 2 |
NOV (White) |
12/16/2005 | On December 16, 2005, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Process (SDP) finding. The violation of 10 CFR 50.47 associated with a White finding involved the licensee’s failure to self-identify the untimely declaration of an Alert classification during an August 2002 emergency preparedness (EP) drill. |
| EA-05-191 Point Beach 1 & 2 |
NOVCP (SL III) $60,000 |
12/16/2005 | On December 16, 2005, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $60,000 was issued for a Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 50.9 involving the licensee’s failure to provide accurate information to the NRC associated with a critique of an August 2002 Emergency Preparedness drill. |
| EA-03-181 Point Beach 1 & 2 |
NOVCP (SL III) $60,000 |
03/17/2004 | On March 17, 2004, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $60,000 was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving changes made to the Emergency Action Level scheme that reduced the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan without requesting and receiving prior NRC approval. |
| EA-03-057 Point Beach 1 & 2 |
NOV (Red) |
12/11/2003 | On December 11, 2003, a Notice of Violation for a violation associated with a Red SDP finding involving the potential common mode failure of all trains of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system. The violation cited the licensee’s failure to establish adequate measures to assure that the AFW system design bases were correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions (modification packages). . |
| EA-03-059 Point Beach 1 & 2 |
NOV
(Red) |
04/02/2003 | On April 2, 2003, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a previously identified Red SDP finding involving the potential common mode failure of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps due to inadequate operator response to a loss of instrument air. The violation cited the licensee's failure to implement corrective actions to preclude repetition of a significant condition adverse to quality associated with an AFW system potential common mode failure. |
| EA-02-031 Point Beach 1 & 2 |
NOV (Red) |
07/12/2002 | On July 12, 2002, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a Red SDP finding involving the potential common mode failure of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps during specific accident scenarios. The violation cited the licensee's failure to ensure that activities affecting quality were prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and failure from at least 1997 to 2001, to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality. |
| EA-02-090 Point Beach 2 |
NOV (White) |
06/13/2002 | On June 13, 2002, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the self-revealing failure of safety injection system pump 2P-15B due to nitrogen gas binding. The violation cited the licensee's failure to promptly identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality regarding leakage from the 2T-34A safety injection accumulator. |
| EA-99-002 Point Beach 1 & 2 |
NOV (SL III) |
04/28/1999 | Violation occurred because the on-shift crew, the operations support group, and the WEPCo site management team failed to acknowledge the validity of the temperature alarm and appreciate the significance of low temperature readings for the Unit 1 SI pumps' minimum flow line. |
| EA-97-075 Point Beach 1 & 2 |
NOV (SL III) |
08/08/1997 | Multiple violations associated with corrective action program and application of Technical Specification requirements. |
| EA-96-273 Point Beach 1 & 2 |
NOVCP |
12/03/1996 | The action was based on two inspections performed at the Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant. Three Severity Level III problems were cited for failing to adequately: 1) conduct control room activities; 2) maintain plant configuration control; and 3) conduct independent fuel dry cask storage activities. In addition, a single Severity Level III violation was cited for the licensee failing to take prompt corrective actions following the identification that the Technical Specifications for the safety-related service water system were non-conservative. |
Prairie Island 1
& 2 - Docket Nos. 050-00282; 050-00306
| NRC Action Number(s) and Facility Name |
Action Type (Severity) & Civil Penalty (if any) |
Date Issued |
Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| EA-11-110 Prairie Island 1 & 2 |
NOV (White) |
08/17/2011 | On August 17, 2011, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Northern States Power Company for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding. The violation involved the failure to maintain the direct current electrical power subsystems operable in Modes 1 through 4, as required by Technical Specification 3.8.4. Specifically, from December 21, 1994 to approximately October 22, 2010, all battery chargers in Unit 1 were susceptible to a common mode failure under design basis accident conditions. Under those conditions, the battery chargers would stop providing an output, or “lock-up,” when their alternating current input voltage dropped below their nameplate minimum voltage at the battery charger motor control center. |
| EA-09-193 Prairie Island 1 & 2 |
NOV (SL III) |
10/27/2009 | On October 27, 2009, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation for a Severity Level III violation to Northern States Power Company, Minnesota. The licensee violated 10 CFR 50.9 which requires, in part, that information provided to the Commission by an applicant shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. Specifically, on May 11, 2007, the licensee failed to report a medical condition, as required by 10 CFR 55.23 “Certification,” of a senior reactor operator (SRO) on a license renewal form. This resulted in the NRC renewing the SRO’s license without a restriction for the medical condition. |
| EA-09-167 Prairie Island 1 & 2 |
NOV (White) |
09/03/2009 | On September 3, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Northern States Power Company - Minnesota for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Finding involving a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, “Design Control” which requires, in part, that measures be established to assure that the design basis for safety related functions of structures, systems, and components are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Contrary to this requirement, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant failed to implement design control measures to ensure that the design basis for the component cooling water system was correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that the safety-related function of the component cooling water system was maintained following a high energy line break, seismic, or tornado events in the turbine building. |
| EA-08-349 Prairie Island 1 & 2 |
NOV (White) |
05/06/2009 | On May 6, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Northern States Power Company for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding at Prairie Island. Specifically, the licensee failed to meet the requirements of 49 CFR 173.441(a), which requires shipments of radioactive material to be packaged such that under conditions normally incident to transportation, dose rates on all external surfaces of the package are less than 200 mrem per hour, and 49 CFR 172.704, which requires training for personnel involved in packaging and shipping radioactive materials. Specifically, on October 31, 2008, a shipment of radioactive material sent from Prairie Island to a Westinghouse facility in Pennsylvania was found to have a dose rate on an external surface in excess of 200 mrem per hour. Subsequent investigation identified that a number of the personnel involved in preparing this shipment had not been properly trained, as required. |
| EA-08-272 Prairie Island 1 |
NOV (White) |
01/27/2009 | On January 27, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Northern States Power Company for a violation of Technical Specifications associated with a White Significance Determination finding at Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately control the position of a normally open pressure switch block valve for the Unit 1 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The valve was inadvertently left closed, causing the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump to fail to operate as required following a July 31, 2008, Unit 1 reactor trip. The pump was subsequently determined to have been inoperable for 138 days, a time period that significantly exceeded that allowed by the Technical Specifications. |
| EA-06-162 Prairie Island 1 & 2 |
NOV (SL III) |
09/28/2006 | On September 28, 2006, a Severity Level III Notice of Violation was issued to the Nuclear Management Company, Inc. (NMC), for a violation of 10 CFR 50.9, “Completeness and Accuracy of Information.” The violation is associated with information that NMC provided to the NRC on July 21, 2005, in two applications for reactor operator licenses at the licensee’s Prairie Island facility. Specifically, the facility licensee provided information on each application indicating the applicant performed reactivity control manipulations on the Prairie Island plant simulator on January 18, 2005, and that the simulator had a current core model that replicated the plant as verified by performance testing. However, the licensee failed to retain records for simulator performance testing associated with reactivity control manipulations that was conducted on the plant-referenced simulator. |
| EA-02-068 Prairie Island 1 & 2 |
NOVCP (SL III) $60,000 |
12/13/2002 | On December 13, 2002, Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $60,000 was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the failure to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC from April 13 to 16, 2001, regarding Prairie Island's request for a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) involving an emergency diesel generator (EDG). Although the normal civil penalty assessment process would have fully mitigated the civil penalty in this case, the NRC exercised discretion in accordance with Section VII.A.1.(c) of the Enforcement Policy and assessed a base civil penalty. Discretion was warranted based on Prairie Island's particularly poor performance leading up to and during the EDG degradation, during the request for an NOED, and during the time period the NOED was in effect. |
| EA-00-282 Prairie Island 1 & 2 |
NOV (White) |
02/20/2001 | On February 20, 2001, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the potential inability of the deep cooling water (service water) pumps to perform their intended safety function. The violation was based on the licensee's failure to ensure that design control measures would verify the adequacy of the design and would assure that appropriate quality standards were specified. |
| EA-97-290 Prairie Island 1 & 2 |
NOVCP (SL III) $ 50,000 |
10/14/1997 | Violations associated with AFW system. |
| EA-97-073 Prairie Island 1 & 2 |
NOV (SL III) |
04/30/1997 | Failure to follow procedures for control of heavy loads. |
| EA-96-402 Prairie Island 1 & 2 |
NOVCP (SL III) $ 50,000 |
01/23/1997 | Licensee was taking credit for manual operator actions to isolate cooling H20 loads |
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, March 30, 2012
