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EA-98-208 - Catawba 1 & 2 (Duke Energy
Corporation)
June 11, 1998
EA 98-208
Duke Energy Corporation
ATTN: Mr. G. R. Peterson
Site Vice President
Catawba Nuclear Station
4800 Concord Road
York, South Carolina 29745
SUBJECT: |
SUBJECT: NOTICE OF VIOLATION
(NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-413/98-03 AND 50-414/98-03) |
Dear Mr. Peterson:
This refers to the inspection conducted on February 22, 1998, through
April 11, 1998, at your Catawba Nuclear Station. The inspection included
a review of surveillance testing of the Unit 2 auxiliary building filtered
exhaust (VA) system. The results of the inspection were discussed with
members of your staff at the exit meeting conducted on April 21, 1998,
and formally transmitted to you by letter dated April 30, 1998. An open,
predecisional enforcement conference was conducted in the Region II office
on May 14, 1998, with you and members of your staff to discuss the apparent
violations, the root causes, and corrective actions to preclude recurrence.
A list of conference attendees, copies of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
(NRC) slides, and presentation material provided by Duke Energy Corporation
(DEC) are enclosed.
Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information
you provided during the conference, the NRC has determined that violations
of regulatory requirements occurred. The violations are cited in the enclosed
Notice of Violation (Notice), and the circumstances surrounding them are
described in detail in the subject inspection report.
The violations involve: (1) failure to implement the seven-day restoration
actions of TS 3.7.7 following a failure to satisfy Technical Specification
(TS) surveillance requirement 4.7.7.b.3 for the Unit 2 "A" train VA system;
(2) failure to take prompt corrective action in accordance with 10 CFR
50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, associated with a low flow condition on
the Unit 2 "A" train VA system; (3) failure to follow procedures
for system operability determinations following surveillance testing of
the Unit 2 A-train VA system; (4) failure to verify, as required by procedure,
that all activities described by Minor Modification CNCE-7901 had been
implemented in the field before closing the modification; and (5) failure
to ensure that adequate prerequisites for surveillance testing of the
VA system were established as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion
XI.
The violations can be attributed to the following root causes. DEC failed
to thoroughly examine potential degradation of the VA system when a low
flow condition was identified on the "A" train of the VA system in February
1998. In March 1998, during a required surveillance test of the VA
system, the "A" train failed to meet the TS acceptance criteria; however,
established procedures for determining TS operability were not followed.
When the failure to meet the TS acceptance criteria was identified and
discussed with DEC management, DEC management failed to promptly declare
the system inoperable. In addition, inadequacies in the surveillance procedure
description of the required initial test conditions contributed to engineering
decisions which delayed restoration of the system to an operable status.
DEC management and staff determined that the system was operable because
they believed the initial test conditions were inadequate, but did not
promptly identify that appropriate initial test conditions were not specified
in the surveillance test.
Although the actual safety consequence associated with these violations
was minimal, the failure of management to ensure adherence to TS requirements
for operability and testing of equipment is a significant regulatory concern.
In particular, the NRC is concerned that management decisions with regard
to the operability of the VA system were non-conservative and resulted
in failure to meet the TS restoration requirements. The failure of multiple
barriers involving TS adherence, surveillance testing procedures, administrative
procedures, and management oversight is a significant regulatory concern.
Therefore, these violations have been classified in the aggregate in accordance
with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement
Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, as a Severity Level III problem.
In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the
amount of $55,000 is considered for a Severity Level III problem. Because
your facility has not been the subject of escalated enforcement action
within the last two years or two inspections, the NRC considered whether
credit was warranted for Corrective Action in accordance with the
civil penalty assessment process described in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement
Policy. Your corrective actions were prompt and comprehensive and included
the return of the VA system to operable status; the establishment of a
surveillance test working group; review and revision, as needed, of heating/ventilation
and air conditioning (HVAC) procedures; clarification of management expectations
regarding TS requirements; review of other HVAC modifications for closeout
issues and expansion to this review to modifications other than HVAC modifications;
and reinforcement of modification requirements with engineering personnel.
Based on these actions, the NRC concluded that credit is warranted for
Corrective Action.
Therefore, to encourage prompt and comprehensive correction of violations
and in recognition of the absence of previous escalated enforcement, I
have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of
Enforcement, not to propose a civil penalty in this case. However, significant
violations in the future could result in a civil penalty.
In addition, as discussed at the conference, NRC Integrated Inspection
Report 50-413,414/98-03 also identified an apparent violation for failure
to update the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) following 1996 modifications
to the VA system. This modification changed routine operation of the VA
system from the alignment described in the FSAR, i.e., flow bypassing
the HEPA and carbon filters, to operation in the filtered mode. As described
in the Notice, this violation has been characterized at Severity Level
IV.
During the predecisional enforcement conference, you indicated that the
March 23, 1998, date used in the second paragraph on page 14 of Inspection
Report 50-413,414/98-03 was in error. You clarified that the correct date
when DEC engineering personnel began to question the basis of the conclusion
that the VA system was inoperable was March 24, 1998. The NRC accepts
this clarification, and this letter serves to correct the record in this
regard.
You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions
specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In your
response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional
actions you plan to prevent recurrence. After reviewing your response
to this Notice, including your proposed corrective actions and the results
of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement
action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy
of this letter, its enclosures, and any response will be placed in the
NRC Public Document Room (PDR). To the extent possible, your response
should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information
so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction.
If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact Loren
Plisco, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, at (404) 562-4501.
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Sincerely, |
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ORIGINAL SIGNED BY JRJ |
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Luis A. Reyes
Regional Administrator |
Docket Nos. 50-413, 50-414
License Nos. NPF-35, NPF-52
Enclosures: |
1. Notice of Violation
2. List of Conference Attendees
3. NRC Presentation Material
4. DEC Presentation Material |
cc w/encls:
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NOTICE OF VIOLATION |
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Duke Energy Corporation
Catawba Nuclear Station |
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Docket Nos. 50-413, 50-414
License Nos. NPF-35, NPF-52
EA 98-208 |
During an NRC inspection conducted on February 22, 1998, through April
11, 1998, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance
with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement
Actions," NUREG-1600, the violations are listed below:
A. |
Technical Specification 3.7.7, Auxiliary
Building Filtered Exhaust System, requires that two trains of the
Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust (VA) system shall be operable
during Modes 1-4. With one train of the VA system inoperable, the
inoperable train shall be restored to operable status within 7 days
or the reactor shall be placed in at least hot standby within the
next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.
Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.7.7.b.3 states
that each train of the VA system shall be demonstrated operable by
verifying a system flow rate of 30,000 cubic feet per minute (cfm)
+/- 10% during system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI
N510-1980.
Contrary to the above, on March 16, 1998, the Unit 2 A-train VA
system was inoperable in that the system flow rate was 26,129 cfm
during surveillance testing in accordance with ANSI N510-1980; however,
the licensee failed to implement the seven-day restoration actions
of Technical Specification 3.7.7 until March 25, 1998. As a result,
Unit 2 remained in Mode 1 with the A-train VA system inoperable
for nine days. (01013)
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B. |
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, as implemented
by Duke Power Company Topical Quality Assurance Program (Duke-1-A),
requires, in part, that measures be established to ensure that conditions
adverse to quality, such as failures and nonconformances, are promptly
identified and corrected.
Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements 4.7.7.b.3, 4.7.7.e,
and 4.7.7.f address system testing requirements in accordance with
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard N510-1980, Testing
of Nuclear Air Cleaning Systems.
ANSI N510-1980, Testing of Nuclear Air Cleaning Systems, states
that testing of the air cleaning system is an integral part of the
licensee's Quality Assurance Program, and that surveillance tests
are used to monitor the condition of associated systems. The ANSI
standard also provides that an airflow capacity test acceptance
criterion shall be within +/- 10% of system design flow.
Contrary to the above, on February 9, 1998, during surveillance
testing of the Unit 2 B-train VA system, the licensee identified
a low airflow condition associated with the Unit 2 A-train VA system,
but failed to promptly correct the low flow condition. Consequently,
on March 16, 1998, the Unit 2 A-train VA system failed to meet an
airflow acceptance criterion of 30,000 cubic feet er minute (cfm)
+/- 10% during an 18-month surveillance test required by TS 4.7.7.
(01023)
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C. |
Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires that written
procedures be established, implemented and maintained covering the
activities recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision
2. As referenced, this includes administrative and surveillance procedures.
Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 203, Operability, Revision 10, Appendix
A. 203, Operability Policy for Previously Identified Items, defines
the licensee's policy governing failed TS surveillance tests as follows:
"Upon initial discovery of a failed surveillance, the affected system,
subsystem, train, component or device shall be declared inoperable
and the applicable TS action statement entered."
Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 203, Operability, Revision 10, Section
203.9.1, General Requirements, states that notification to Operations
(Operations Shift Manager) shall be accomplished by completion of
Appendix E, Operability Notification Form, as described by this directive.
Surveillance procedure PT/0/A/4450/01C, Auxiliary Building Filtered
Exhaust Filter Train Performance Test, approved May 5, 1986, Step
12.2.1.4.2, applies to surveillance tests of the auxiliary building
filtered exhaust (VA) system whereby acceptance criteria have not
been met and states, "Notify the Shift Supervisor, Performance Engineer
and the Licensing Engineer, and have the system (equipment) declared
inoperable in accordance with its LCO in Tech. Specs."
Contrary to the above, administrative and surveillance procedures
were not implemented as evidenced by the following examples:
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1. |
On March 16, 1998, the Unit 2 A-train VA system was
not declared inoperable following a surveillance test during which
system performance failed to meet TS surveillance acceptance criteria;
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2. |
On March 16, 1998, a formal, documented operability notification
was not provided to the Operations Shift Manager following the March
16, 1998, VA system surveillance test failure. (01033)
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D. |
Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires that written
procedures be established, implemented and maintained covering the
activities recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision
2. As referenced, this includes general procedures for the control
of modification work.
Catawba Nuclear Station Modification Manual, Revision 15, Section
5.6.2, states, that prior to returning the Minor Modification (MM)
Work Orders to the Operational Control Group for Return-To-Service,
the Implementation Accountable or MM Originator shall verify that
all activities as described by the MM have been implemented in the
field or a Variation Notice written to revise the MM's scope accordingly.
Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to verify that all activities
described by Minor Modification CNCE-7901 (Resolution of System VA
Filtered Exhaust Low Air Flow Concerns) had been implemented in the
field before closing the modification on December 23, 1996. As a result,
three flow straighteners in the Unit 2 A-train auxiliary building
filtered exhaust (VA) system that should have been removed by CNCE-7901
were left installed until removed on March 25, 1998. (01043)
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E. |
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control,
as implemented by Duke Power Company Topical Quality Assurance Program
(Duke-1-A), states that a test program shall be established to ensure
that all testing required to demonstrate that structures, systems
and components will perform satisfactorily in service. Test procedures
shall include provisions for assuring, in part, that all prerequisites
for the given test have been met.
As referenced in Technical Specification 4.7.7, American National
Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard N510-1980, Section 4.2, Test
Procedures, states that test procedures shall identify, among other
things, the arrangement or clearances that have to be made prior
to the test and the prerequisites that have to be met.
Contrary to the above, surveillance test procedure PT/0/A/4450/01C,
Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust Filter Train Performance Test,
approved May 5, 1986, did not establish a prerequisite controlling
system configuration (pertaining to the status or position of various
interfacing systems and components) for performance of the test.
As a result, a consistent, repeatable test methodology had not been
established to ensure that system performance trends were reliable
indicators of flow degradation. (01053)
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These violations represent a Severity Level III problem
(Supplement I). |
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F. |
10 CFR Part 50.71(e) states that each person licensed
to operate a nuclear power reactor shall periodically update the Final
Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) to ensure that the information included
in the FSAR contains the latest material developed. The updated FSAR
shall be revised to include the effects of, in part, all changes made
in the facility as described in the FSAR.
Contrary to the above, as of April 9, 1998, the licensee failed
to ensure that changes made during 1996 modifications CNCE-61117
and CNCE-61118 to the auxiliary building filtered exhaust (VA) system
to routinely operate the VA system in the filtered mode were reflected
in revisions to the applicable sections (7.6.12.1 and 7.3.1.1.1)
of the updated FSAR. (02014)
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This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Duke Energy Corporation (Licensee)
is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington,
D.C. 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and
a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at Catawba, within 30 days of the
date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This
reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and
should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or,
if contested, the basis for disputing the violation or severity level,
(2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved,
(3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations,
and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response
may reference or include previously docketed correspondence, if the correspondence
adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not
received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand
for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified,
suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should
not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to
extending the response time.
If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy
of your response to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response
shall be submitted under oath or affirmation.
Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room
(PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy,
proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the
PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information
is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a
bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should
be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information.
If you request withholding of such material, you must specifically
identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld
and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain
why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b)
to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial
information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable
response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
Dated at Atlanta, Georgia
this 11th day of June 1998
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