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> EA-98-141
EA-98-141- Limerick 1 & 2 (PECO Nuclear)
July 7, 1998
EA No. 98-141
Mr. G. Rainey, President
PECO Nuclear
Nuclear Group Headquarters
Post Office Box 195
Wayne, Pennsylvania 19087-0195
SUBJECT: |
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL
PENALTY - $55,000 (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-353/97-09; 50-352/98-02
and 50-353/98-02) |
Dear Mr. Rainey:
This letter refers to the two NRC inspections conducted between October 20, 1997,
and March 16, 1998, for which exit meetings were held on January 16, 1998,
and March 25, 1998. During the inspections, the reports of which
were sent to you on March 11, 1998, and May 11, 1998, apparent
violations of NRC requirements were identified. On June 10, 1998,
a Predecisional Enforcement Conference was conducted with you and members
of your staff, to discuss the violations, their causes, and your corrective
actions. Based on the information developed during the inspections, and
the information provided during the enforcement conference, three violations
of NRC requirements are being cited and are described in the enclosed
Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice).
The three violations involve failures to identify and correct conditions
adverse to quality at the facility; this includes instances where inoperability
of safety-related equipment were not recognized.
The two most significant violations are described in Section I of the
enclosed Notice. The first violation involves the failure to identify
and correct a condition adverse to quality that caused the high pressure
coolant injection (HPCI) turbine exhaust valve to be inoperable. Specifically,
on January 8, 1998, the valve, which is a primary containment isolation
valve (PCIV), failed to close on the first attempt during surveillance
testing, thereby not meeting the technical specifications which require
that the valve close within 120 seconds. Nonetheless, the valve was returned
to an operable status, based on the fact that it closed on a subsequent
attempt, even though data existed that indicated that the valve had internal
binding. On January 28, 1998, the valve again failed to close during surveillance
testing. The failure to promptly resolve the degraded valve performance
led to an inoperable primary containment isolation function of the HPCI
exhaust valve for extended periods of time, as failures of the HPCI turbine
exhaust valve actually occurred on five occasions between March 1994 and
January 1998.
Although the valve does not have an automatic isolation function, it is
necessary to isolate the HPCI system in the event of HPCI system leakage
and is considered an extension of the containment boundary. In each of
the first 4 occurrences, root cause analyses were not adequate to detect
the root cause of the problem. Of particular concern is the fact that
after the fifth failure on January 8, 1998, the valve was not declared
inoperable even though subsequent data revealed internal binding of the
valve. Rather, the frequency of the valve tests was increased to weekly.
The valve was not declared inoperable until it again would not close during
an initial attempt when tested on January 28, 1998.
The NRC is concerned with the inadequacies of the associated engineering
assessment and safety evaluation which found it acceptable to postpone
further valve troubleshooting and repairs based on an operability determination
that was flawed. The engineering assessment, in considering operability,
discounted the need for the valve to close the first time to meet the
closure time required by technical specifications. Also, the plant operations
review committee (PORC) approved the safety evaluation without evaluating
and challenging the short term corrective actions to ensure near term
reliability of the valve, including its ability to meet the required closure
time.
The second violation involved the failure to correct a condition adverse
to quality that caused several modes of residual heat removal (RHR) to
be inoperable. Specifically, the 1B RHR minimum flow valve, which is required
to open when an RHR pump is in operation with system flow less than 1500
gallons per minute (gpm), was not declared inoperable even though it was
found closed four times in a five month period between September 1997
and January 1998 while flow was less than 1500 gpm. Although the valve,
which provides minimum flow protection for the RHR pump, should have been
declared inoperable, the operators simply reopened the valve without identifying
the root cause of the problem until after the fourth occurrence. Afterwards,
your staff determined that the valve had a faulty flow control circuit
which caused the system to be inoperable, contrary to the technical specifications.
The NRC considers this violation significant since pump damage could occur
under no flow conditions in as little as three minutes. The NRC is particularly
concerned that similar to the issue concerning the HPCI turbine exhaust
valve, this problem revealed a lack of comprehensive troubleshooting by
the engineering staff, as well as improper acceptance by the operators
that the pump was operable even though the cause of the problem was not
identified.
These two violations indicate a significant lack of attention to licensed
responsibilities. Therefore, the violations are classified in the aggregate
as a Severity Level III problem in accordance with the "General Statement
of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600 (Enforcement
Policy).
A base civil penalty in the amount of $55,000 is considered for this Severity
Level III problem. Because Limerick has been the subject of escalated
enforcement actions within the last 2 years,(1)
the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification
and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment
process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit for identification
is not warranted in either case. Although your staff identified all of
the examples of the failure to the HPCI exhaust valve to close, as well
as the RHR minimum flow valve being in the wrong position, the NRC identified
the conditions adverse to quality that these findings represented, namely
the inoperability of the valves contrary to the technical specifications,
as well as the failure to promptly address the root cause of these failures.
Credit for your corrective actions is warranted because at the time of
the enforcement conference, your actions were considered prompt and comprehensive.
These actions included, but were not limited to, (1) a programmatic evaluation
of the operability process; (2) implementation of improved procedural
guidance for operability determinations; (3) enhancement of the troubleshooting
process; and (4) training of staff on the enhanced guidance. The NRC plans
to continue to follow your actions closely to determine the effectiveness
of your actions in precluding future problems.
To emphasize the importance of appropriate evaluations of problems at
your facility, as well as prompt determination of operability of equipment,
as well as prompt development of appropriate corrective action, I have
been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement,
to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil
Penalty in the amount of $55,000 for these violations.
The third violation involves the failure to promptly identify and correct
a condition adverse to quality regarding the improper installation of
a connecting rod bearing for one of the eight Emergency Diesel Generators
(EDG). This violation has been classified at Severity Level IV and is
described in Section II of the enclosed Notice.
You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions
specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC
will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement
action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy
of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the
NRC Public Document Room (PDR).
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Sincerely, |
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original signed by Hubert J. Miller |
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Hubert J. Miller
Regional Administrator |
Docket No. 50-352; 50-353
License No. NPF-39; NPF-85
Enclosure: Notice of Violation Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties
NOTICE OF VIOLATION
AND
PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES
PECO Nuclear
Limerick Nuclear Generating Stations Units 1 and 2 |
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Docket Nos.: 50-352; 50-353
License Nos: NPF-39; NPF-85
EA No. 98-141 |
During NRC inspections conducted between October 20, 1997,
and March 16, 1998, for which exit meetings were held on January
16, 1998 and March 25, 1998, violations of NRC requirements were identified.
In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for
NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205.
The particular violations and associated civil penalty are set forth below:
I. |
VIOLATIONS ASSESSED A CIVIL PENALTY
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action", requires,
in part, that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse
to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, and deficiencies are promptly
identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse
to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition
is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition.
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a. |
Contrary to the above, between January 8,
1998 and January 28, 1998, a condition adverse to quality existed,
namely potential inoperability of HPCI exhaust valve due to internal
binding, and although indications of this inoperability were provided
when the valve failed to close on its first attempt on January 8,
1998, and subsequent data provided indications of such internal binding,
measures were not established to assure that this significant condition
adverse to quality was promptly corrected until the valve again failed
on its first attempt when tested on January 28, 1998. As a result,
between January 8, 1998, and January 28, 1998, the HPCI turbine exhaust
valve, a primary containment isolation valve (outboard) was not maintained
operable with a closing time less than or equal to 120 seconds. This
is contrary to Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.6.3, "Primary Containment
Isolation Valves", which requires, in part, that the primary containment
isolation valves shown in Table 3.6.3-1 shall be operable with isolation
times less than or equal to those shown in Table 3.6.3-1. The HPCI
turbine exhaust valve is listed as an outboard isolation barrier,
with a maximum isolation time of 120 seconds. (01013)
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b. |
Contrary to the above, between September 1, 1997,
and January 21, 1998, a condition adverse to quality existed
involving the inoperability of the 1B residual heat removal (RHR)
minimum flow valve (HV-051-FOO7B) after it was found closed on four
occasions, and during that period, adequate corrective actions were
not taken to correct this condition adverse to quality in that although
an equipment trouble tag was initiated in each case to address the
anomalous valve operation, the system was considered operable with
no basis for doing so. As a result, between September 1, 1997,
and January 21, 1998, the malfunctioning minimum flow valve
caused the RHR pump to be inoperable and resulted in technical specifications
being violated, namely:
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1. |
during this period, the suppression pool cooling mode
of the "B" RHR system was not operable; this was contrary to Technical
Specification 3.6.2.3 which requires, in part, that the suppression
pool cooling mode of the RHR system shall be operable with two independent
loops, each loop consisting of one operable RHR pump, and with one
suppression pool cooling loop inoperable, the inoperable loop must
be restored to operable status within 72 hours.
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2. |
the suppression pool spray mode of the "B" RHR system was not operable;
this was contrary to Technical Specification 3.6.2.2. which requires,
in part, that the suppression pool spray mode of the RHR system shall
be operable with two independent loops, each loop consisting of one
operable RHR pump, and with one suppression pool spray loop inoperable,
the inoperable loop must be restored to operable status within seven
days.
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3. |
the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) mode of the "B" RHR system
removal system was not operable; this was contrary to Technical Specification
3.5.1.b which requires, in part, that the LPCI system of the RHR system
be operable consisting of four subsystems with each subsystem comprised
of one operable LPCI pump, and with one LPCI subsystem inoperable,
the inoperable LPCI pump must be restored to an operable status within
30 days. (01023)
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These violations represent a Severity Level III problem
(Supplement I).
Civil Penalty - $55,000.
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II. |
VIOLATION NOT ASSESSED A CIVIL PENALTY
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action", requires,
in part, that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse
to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, and deficiencies are promptly
identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse
to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition
is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition.
Contrary to the above, between August 1994 and October 7, 1997, a
condition adverse to quality existed, namely a reversed bearing on
the D21 emergency diesel generator, and this condition adverse to
quality was not promptly identified and corrected despite an opportunity
to do so because of a previous reversed bearing on the D22 EDG at
Limerick between December 1995 and May 1996. (03013)
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I)
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Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, PECO Nuclear (Licensee) is
hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director,
Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days
of the receipt of this Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of
Civil Penalties (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply
to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation:
(1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons
for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the
corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the
corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5)
the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is
not received within the time specified in this Notice, an Order or a Demand
for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified,
suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should
not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time
for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42
U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation.
Within the same time as provided for the response required above under
10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalties by letter
addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable
to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalties
proposed above, or may protest imposition of the civil penalties, in whole
or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer
within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalties will
be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with
10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalties, in whole or in part, such
answer should be clearly marked as an "Answer to a Notice of Violation"
and may: (1) deny the violations listed in this Notice, in whole or in
part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in
this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalties should not be
imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalties in whole or in
part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalties.
In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalties, the factors addressed
in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written
answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately
from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but
may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference
(e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention
of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding
the procedure for imposing a civil penalty.
Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due that subsequently has been determined
in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter
may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless compromised,
remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section
234c of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2282c.
The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment
of civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed
to: James Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD
20852-2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Region I, and a copy to the NRC Senior Resident Inspector
at the facility that is the subject of this Notice.
Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR),
to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary,
or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without
redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary
to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy
of your response that identifies the information that should be protected
and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If
you request withholding of such material, you must specifically
identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld
and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain
why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b)
to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial
information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable
response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania
this 7th day of July 1998
1. e.g., a Notice of Violation and Proposed
Imposition of Civil Penalty was issued on August 5, 1997 for a Severity
Level II violation related to the failure to maintain complete and accurate
records at the facility. (Reference: EA 97-050; 97-115).
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