

New Strategies To Improve Probationers' Compliance With Economic  
Sanctions: A Field Study in Performance Feedback

BY

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## ABSTRACT

The development of strategies that facilitate client compliance with economic sanctions is of great concern to jurisdictions dependent on fees to support local programs. Also of concern in this age of information is the effect of the vast amount of information available to employees through advances in technology such as computer monitoring, recording, and feedback. In an effort to study these two concerns simultaneously, the Harris County Adult Probation Department undertook a one year field study of the effects of computer-generated performance feedback on fee collections. It was hypothesized that an enhanced feedback procedure, which provided greater and more specific information, would lead to improved performance (measured in terms of supervision fee collections, revenue recovery rates, and client delinquency rates). It was also proposed that a training program would magnify the positive effects of enhanced feedback, leading to even greater improvement in performance. Results indicated that enhanced feedback positively affected performance in terms of supervision fee payments. Additionally, the training given to probation officers did not seem to increase the benefits of the enhanced feedback procedure, but several noteworthy patterns were found. Other factors and considerations are presented, and the policy implications for economic sanctions collection specific to computer-generated feedback are discussed.

## New Strategies To Improve Probationers' Compliance With Economic Sanctions: A Field Study in Performance Feedback

### INTRODUCTION

The imposition of economic sanctions such as fines, court costs, and restitution payments has become a widely used practice in the United States (Mullaney, 1988; Hillsman, Sichel, & Mahoney, 1984). In the last 25 years, nearly half the states have mandated probation service fees (Baird, Holien, and Bakke, 1986), or significantly increased the rate of fees charged for supervision (Wheeler, Macan, Hissong, & Slusher, 1989). Since many jurisdictions are dependent on a variety of fees to support local programs, the development of fair and effective strategies to assess and collect fees from clients is of great interest to the criminal justice community.

Of equal importance, however, is the organizational need to identify those strategies that facilitate client compliance with economic sanctions. This challenge seems to have two aspects: procedures developed from a client perspective, and those developed from the perspective of the probation officer. Revised and flexible payment plans and modified enforcement procedures would have a direct effect on the client population. Performance feedback and training in enforcement procedures and financial counseling are several strategies that might serve to facilitate client compliance indirectly, through the probation officer.

The Harris County Adult Probation Department, with the assistance of a grant from the National Institute of Corrections, undertook a one year field experiment in performance feedback. The use of computer-generated fee collection reports containing feedback about probation officers' fee collections was examined here. The study investigated the effects of presenting probation officers with written and oral feedback regarding probationers' payments, probation officers' total fee collections, and client delinquency rates on performance (measured in terms of supervision fee collections, recovery rates, and delinquency rates). The

policy implications for economic sanction collection procedures specific to computer-generated feedback are discussed.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

### Theory and Dimensions of Performance Feedback

As previously stated, performance feedback is an integral part of many organizations. It is one means by which worker performance is monitored, and employees gain information regarding their performance. Although there are various concepts and definitions of feedback, in its simplest form feedback is ". . . information return related to an output" (Murrell, 1975). Typically, feedback is used to maintain or enhance worker performance by relaying information relative to a specific worker's role (Ford, 1980). Peterson (1982) states that although feedback seems to be an effective means of changing, improving, and/or modifying human performance, ". . . why it works is not at all clear in many cases..." (p. 92).

In an effort to clarify the causes underlying the effects of feedback on performance, several theories have been offered. Researchers attempting to provide support for these theories have examined characteristics of feedback systems such as source of information, mode of transmission, and aspects of the message (Duncan & Bruwelheide, 1986).

Source of information refers to the element from which feedback about one's performance is received. Duncan and Bruwelheide (1986) outline three facets of the "source" element of feedback: credibility, power, and a dimension referred to as "self vs. other monitoring". Credibility is defined as the amount of value placed on the feedback as a true reflection of an individual's work, based on the experience and knowledge of the feedback source. Duncan and Bruwelheide (1986) reference the work of Tuckman and Oliver, 1968, to illustrate this point. They found that feedback received from supervisors decreased the classroom performance of teachers, while the feedback received from students led to better performance. It was hypothesized that the student feedback was valued above supervisor feedback because the student sources were closer to the situation and, therefore, more credible.

The second element of feedback source, power, can be illustrated by the same example. The supervisor would probably have more direct means by

which to punish or reward the teacher than would students, Several researchers suggest that feedback effectiveness increases as **power** increases (Prue & Fairbank, 1981 and Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor, 1979).

The element called “self vs. other monitoring” refers to who or what is monitoring performance, and thus responsible for giving feedback. This is the third element of feedback source.

A second characteristic of feedback systems is the mode of transmission. Factors such as written vs. oral and graphic vs. tabular are examples of different modes of transmission (Ilgen et al., 1979).

Accuracy, information sign, specificity, information amount, and temporal elements are important aspects of the multidimensional feedback message. These comprise the third dimension of feedback, the message itself. Information sign refers to the positive or negative nature of the information acting as either reward or punishment. Accuracy, or correctness of the feedback, is the amount of agreement between the report of performance (feedback) and the actual performance. Another element of the message, specificity, is the scope of the feedback information. That is, “. . . the degree to which information contained in the feedback message relates to actual performance on various segments of the task being evaluated” (Duncan & Bruwelheide, 1986, p. 105). Specificity is independent of the number of feedback messages contained in one feedback session, which is the “amount of information” facet of the message. Frequency, how often feedback is given, and timing, how much time elapses between performance of a task and feedback, are two aspects of the temporal dimension of feedback.

### Research

Several dimensions of feedback have been manipulated in both field and laboratory settings. Prue, Krapfl, Noah, Cannon, and Marley (1980) in a study with state mental health hospital workers, found that the amount of treatment time increased by 76% after weekly summaries of performance were sent to unit managers. Positive results were also seen in the initial baseline period when the employees were self-monitoring their behavior to report for computer recording.

Feedback dimensions source and specificity were manipulated in a study by Earley (1988) in which subjects were selling magazine

subscriptions by phone. Subjects were given weekly work goals, and feedback specificity (global statements vs. numerical information) and source (supervisor vs. computer-generated) were manipulated. The best performance was found when employees generated the information through the computer, the direct feedback condition. There was also a specificity effect: subjects given numerical information outperformed those given vague, unspecific feedback. The amount of deliberate and detailed planning done by employees increased in the specific feedback condition, and individuals receiving feedback directly from the computer reported higher self-efficacy expectations.

In an effort to explain these results, the authors hypothesized that while computer-generated feedback was not an evaluative source, the supervisor may have been seen as very evaluative. The study supports the goal setting hypothesis of the feedback process: specific information increases task planning toward a goal.

The use of information systems within criminal justice has produced at least one article describing research in the area of probation administration and law enforcement. Completed in a law enforcement setting in California (Jensen & Foote, 1983), this study examined and reported data relevant to several dimensions of feedback: mode of transmission, information sign, accuracy, frequency, and source credibility. A statistical recording system was introduced to increase police officer productivity. The officers used a digital information form to record their daily activities, which were then entered into a computer system. The officers were given monthly activity and productivity summaries comprised of performance and productivity information grouped by team, watch, and individual. Additional information was available upon request. Results showed increases in individual and team productivity. The system was highly accepted by officers, and seemed to increase employee motivation and reduce the number of hours spent recording activities.

In an age in which performance information is available on demand, the influence of that information on employee behavior merits attention. The influx of information may create confusion as people attempt to adjust to the rapidly changing environment which these advances in technology have

brought (Boyd, 1989). Although it is clear that computer-generated performance information is increasingly accessible, abundant, and necessary in many organizations, there are few practical examinations of this recent growth's effect on actual performance and behavior. The feedback and human performance literatures suggest several predictions; however, this brief review indicates that many feedback dimensions have yet to be adequately explored in field settings. Several questions remain.

First, the vast amount of data that becomes available with the advent of computer processing is staggering. People are limited in their capacity to process information. Situations in which a large amount of information is presented create conditions of cognitive overload (Norman & Bobrow, 1975). Although training may decrease this overload (Kerr, 1987), attention division and attention withdrawal may result. It is unknown how much data is too much data, particularly within the realm of computer-generated feedback. Additionally, previous research suggests that more specific information results in improved performance (Earley, 1988); however, is there a point at which information is too specific, resulting in the cognitive overload referenced earlier? This possibility warrants investigation.

Second, the social impact of computer monitoring systems is unknown. One phenomenon that has been cited in the computer feedback literature is rigid bureaucratic behavior. Employees perform in ways that are appropriate to the computer accounting system, but which may not be beneficial to organizational goals. An example of this is the computer operator who tries to answer as many calls as possible, but who actually solves the problem of very few callers. Furthermore, there is often a strong resistance by employees to computer monitoring systems. It has been suggested that an integration of training and feedback is necessary for optimal effect (Kerr, 1987). By ". . . utilizing feedback and scientific approaches, the technologist can lay the basis for improved productivity by providing information that points to solutions and reduces measured performance deficiencies..." (Kerr, 1987, p. 18).

It was thought that an enhanced feedback procedure (termed revenue enhancement procedure), which provided greater and more specific information, would lead to improved performance. Additionally, it was proposed that a training program such as that alluded to by Kerr (1987)



would magnify the benefits of the enhanced feedback system. Therefore, two hypotheses guided this research:

1. *Regions subjected to the revenue enhancement procedure outperform those regions not subjected to the procedure.*
2. *The revenue enhancement procedure combined with training will lead to performance improvements over and above the revenue enhancement procedure alone.*

## METHOD

### Setting

The Harris County Adult Probation Department is the largest probation department in Texas. Located in Houston, the agency is responsible for the supervision of 27,000 felony and misdemeanor offenders. Harris County has traditionally charged a probation fee. The maximum monthly fee was raised to \$40 per month in 1985 (Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 42.12: 42.13). Probation supervision fees are appropriated to the local county probation departments responsible for collecting the fees. The courts also order the payment of fines, restitution for victims, and court costs. Probationers make monthly installment payments directly to the probation department, which in turn distributes restitution fees to victims and other fees to the county treasury. These payments are mailed in or deposited by the probationer in the business division of each branch office. Partial payments are distributed evenly across fees, unless otherwise instructed by the court. In this jurisdiction, there is no statutory preference for type of payment. Probation officers are responsible for notifying clients in arrears by mail, telephone, and direct contact. During fiscal 1988, the probationers paid \$6.8 million in supervision fees, \$3.5 million in restitution fees, \$4.6 million in fines, and \$358,000 in court costs and attorney fees. Approximately fifty percent of the agency's total operating budget, excluding state grants for special diversion programs, is derived from supervision fees.

## Subjects

The Harris County Adult Probation Department is divided into five regions: North, South, East, West, and Central. All probation officers within each region participated in the study, and information was included from all probationers about whom information was available. Regional demographic information is provided in Table 1. Table 1 shows that all regions were similar with regard to sex and probationer age, and to a lesser degree, percent of total probationer population and percent of total “driving while intoxicated” cases. Regions differ considerably, however, with regard to race and case type compositions. The East and West regions tended to be composed of white, misdemeanor offenders, whereas the North, South, and Central regions had a higher percentage of blacks, Hispanics, and felony offenders.

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Insert Table 1 about here

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In that this was a field study, these variations were unavoidable. All interpretations must take this into account. This point will be discussed in more detail.

## Independent Variable

The independent variable feedback type was manipulated. This manipulation resulted in three conditions: standard feedback, enhanced feedback (revenue enhancement procedure), and enhanced feedback plus training.

Subjects in the standard feedback condition received reports listing probation officers’ ranking in collection of supervision fees and all clients delinquent in fees (see Figure 1).

Subjects in the enhanced feedback condition received the standard feedback reports, as well. They also received two additional reports (see Figures 2 and 3). These contained data on total collections for each officer by type of economic sanction and a monthly breakdown of supervision fee recovery rates by level of supervision of all cases

assigned to an officer's region. These enhanced reports were designed to increase the amount, and specificity of feedback information.

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Insert Figures 1, 2 and 3 about here  
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Subjects in the enhanced feedback plus training condition received all reports described above. They also received monthly training in the form of group and individual meetings with the project director. The director was not in a supervisory position in any regions; probation officers were told that the purpose of this training was to provide additional information and aid in interpretation. They were encouraged to ask questions regarding the feedback they were given.

#### Dependent Measures

Three measures of performance were used: supervision fee payments, revenue recovery rates, and client delinquency rates. Supervision fee payment is the mean supervision fee payment made by probationers who paid fees. The revenue recovery rate represents the percentage of average supervision fee collected per case of the average fee set per case. Client delinquency rate refers to the percentage of probationers who had not made any type of fee payment within a 90 day period.

#### Procedure

Three regions of the department, East, West, and North were assigned to the standard feedback condition, the Central region was assigned to the enhanced feedback condition, and the South region was assigned to the enhanced feedback plus training condition.

Probation officers received monthly feedback from January to December of 1988. It is important to note that all regions had been receiving the standard feedback for approximately one year before the study period (January to December of 1987). Therefore, any effects resulting from the enhanced feedback can be attributed with more certainty to the *additional and more specific information* (and training), rather than the introduction of a feedback process alone.

## RESULTS

### Analysis

The analyses compared performance among the regions for the year preceding the implementation of the enhanced feedback procedures (1987) to the year the procedures were introduced (1988). Due to the differences among regions on demographic variables race and case type, the statistical examination was limited to descriptive information.

### Performance and Enhanced Feedback

The East, West and North regions (standard feedback) were compared to the South and Central regions (enhanced feedback) on the three measures of performance described earlier. Each measure was analyzed separately.

Supervision fee payment. The average supervision fee payment made by probationers each month was compared for the year preceding implementation (1987) and the year the implementation was introduced (1988). These comparisons are shown in Table 2.

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Insert Table 2 about here  
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Although all regions experienced increases in supervision fee payment, the greatest percentage increases were found in the Central and South regions. The South region showed the greatest increase in average monthly supervision payments (19%). The smallest increase was observed in the North region (13%).

Revenue recovery rate. Although this measure of performance is directly dependent upon the supervision fee payment measure, the average monthly percentage of supervision fees paid of the amount set for felony and misdemeanor cases was calculated for all regions. The value for the quarter preceding implementation (October to December, 1987) was compared to the year the implementation was introduced (January to December, 1988). These data appear in Table 3.

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Insert Table 3 about here  
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The misdemeanor and felony cases represent two distinct populations and the study groups differed with regard to the percentage of each case type present in their regions (interstate compact cases were not considered). Therefore, recovery rates for the two offense types were examined separately. Table 3 shows that little change was found in any of the regions, and the regions receiving enhanced feedback did not outperform those receiving standard feedback.

Client delinquency rate. The average monthly number of **persons behind in one** or more types of payment for 90 days or longer was calculated for all regions as the third measure of performance. Results showed that client delinquency rates rose in all regions (see Table 4). The lowest increase appeared in the region receiving enhanced feedback, Central (1.9%). The greatest increase, however, was found in the region receiving enhanced feedback plus training, South (3.5%).

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Insert Table 4 about here  
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In summary, enhanced feedback may have positively affected performance in terms of supervision fee payments, but revenue recovery rates and client delinquency rates were not affected by the enhanced feedback in the hypothesized manner. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was weakly supported.

#### Performance and Enhanced Feedback Plus Training

Supervision fee payments, revenue recovery rates, and client delinquency rates of the region in the enhanced feedback condition (Central) were compared to the region in the enhanced feedback plus training condition (South). Data referenced in the discussion of these comparisons are drawn from Tables 2, 3 and 4.

Supervision fee payment. The Central and South regions were very similar with regard to average supervision fee payments made during the study period. The training did not seem to magnify the effects of the enhanced feedback procedure. However, the South region advanced from fourth place in 1987 to third place in 1988 in a ranking of regions by average supervision fee payments (1987 mean = \$27.70; 1988 mean = \$32.99).

Revenue recovery rate. Again, little difference was observed between the enhanced feedback and enhanced feedback plus training conditions, but an interesting pattern was found in the South region. This region had consistently higher recovery rates after the first quarter for both misdemeanor and felony cases. This is not true of any other region. It is noteworthy that the South region ranked fifth in misdemeanor recovery rate before the introduction of the project and third at the end of the study period (1987 = 84.0%; 1988 = 85.7%). With regard to felony cases, the South region moved from fourth to third position by the last quarter of 1988 (1987 = 66.2%; 1988 = 68.3%).

Client delinquency rate. As was mentioned earlier, client delinquency rates increased in all regions during the study period. The highest delinquency rate was found in the South region, whereas the lowest was found in the Central region.

In summary, Hypothesis 2 was not supported. Although the South region advanced considerably in regional ranking of supervision fee payments and recovery rates, the additional training given to probation officers in this region did not seem to magnify the benefits of enhanced feedback as expected.

## DISCUSSION

It was hypothesized that the enhanced feedback procedure would result in higher levels of performance, and that the benefits of the enhancement would be magnified by additional training. While the results offer support for a feedback procedure, there is limited support for the specific hypotheses proposed at the outset of this study.

### Did Enhanced Feedback Improve the Performance of Probation Officers?

The regions subjected to enhanced feedback showed a higher increase in average monthly supervision fee payments than the control regions. However, revenue recovery rates and delinquency rates were not affected by the enhanced feedback as hypothesized. Previous research suggests that more specific information leads to increased performance. It is possible that the information provided to probation officers in the enhanced condition was too specific, and officers were unable to adequately utilize all the information. Therefore, only the information most directly relevant to their fee collections was attended to. This is, however, speculation. Officers were not asked which information they used.

Training did not affect the performance of probation officers as expected. It has been suggested that resistance to computer monitoring systems can be overcome through an integration of training and feedback (Kerr, 1987). Although the training was designed to provide solutions to the specific problems encountered by individual probation officers, it did not seem to magnify the effects of the feedback system. In that a computer-generated feedback system had been in place for several years prior to the study, it may be that employees no longer resisted the system.

It must not be overlooked, however, that the feedback procedure had a subtle effect on probation officers' performance, although not as predicted. Several interesting patterns emerged. The South region, which experienced a combination of enhanced feedback and training, showed the highest increase in average monthly supervision fee payments, rising from \$27.20 to \$32.99 (19%). A similar pattern emerged when examining the percent of average supervision fees paid per client per month to that set or ordered by the court (recovery rate). The South region showed an increase of 2.4% among misdemeanor cases and an increase of 3.2% among felony cases. These results are also of interest because the South region, demographically, had the highest (42.5%) percent of minority probationers and nearly the highest percentage of felony probationers (50.3%). This is the population which had a history of difficulty in complying with economic sanctions due to employment

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problems. While this difference was not statistically significant, it does represent hundreds of dollars in the affected regions.

### Other Considerations

There are several variables within the study and within the study organization itself which may account for some of the results presented here. Table 1 showed the regional differences across the study groups on variables such as age, sex, race, and case type. The study groups were markedly different in terms of race and case type composition. Not only did this limit the statistical relationships that could be drawn, these differences may have confounded the feedback manipulation. Also, Tables 2 and 3 showed that the regions subjected to enhanced feedback had the lowest average monthly supervision fees and recovery rates among the regions before the study.

Performance was defined in monetary terms: supervision fee payments, revenue recovery rates, and client delinquency rates. While this is certainly an important aspect of probation officer performance, these measures might have been inadequate reflections of the performance of probation officers. The enhanced information may have encouraged probation officers to become more involved in financial counseling, for example, an improvement in performance not examined in this study. Therefore, although it was not evidenced in actual dollar amounts, the performance of probation officers may have improved.

In that this study took place in a field setting, it is not surprising that the effects of organizational changes must be addressed. An examination of chronic delinquency rates seemed to show no effect for enhanced feedback: the percentage of probationers in arrears over 90 days increased in all regions. It is important to note, however, that supervision fees gradually increased during the study period. For example, the average monthly misdemeanor supervision fee increased from \$19.60 in 1987 to \$23.74 in 1988, an increase of 21%. The average monthly felony supervision fee increased from \$23.96 in 1987 to \$27.17 in 1988, an increase of 13%. Given the rise in set fees and the sluggish Houston economy, it might be that more probationers were unable to meet their court ordered financial obligations within the expected time frame, independent of probation officers' interventions.



## POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Today, computer technology can generate information instantaneously on nearly every aspect of services or client behavior to all levels of decision makers involved in the administration of justice. The style, content, method, and frequency of delivery of information to such actors as judges, probation officers, and administrators will continue to determine the effectiveness of feedback in achieving the goals of retribution and rehabilitation. Unfortunately, many criminal justice jurisdictions have not taken advantage of automation or fail to fully understand its application when they make the investment. In order to understand the relationship of high technology and feedback to work efficiency and accountability, studies examining such factors as differences in work environment and organizational atmosphere, user experience, and workflow warrant study. It may well be that information which is accessible on a computer terminal on an officer's or judge's desk will be retrieved more often than similar data contained in computer-generated printout reports. The way in which individuals interact with technology and feedback also depends on their training and orientation. Another important question is to what extent entering information in a terminal for later retrieval and analysis, as opposed to written documentation, improves efficiency and the quality of service. These and other issues must be addressed in jurisdictions confronting the information age in a period of rapid technological change.

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Table 1. Demographic Summary of Active Regional Probationers:  
July, 1988\*

Variable	Region				
	North	South	East	West	Central
Population	7041 (22.7%)	6452 (20.8%)	4565 (14.7%)	6574 (21.2%)	6373 (20.6%)
D.W.I. cases	1591 (22.6%)	1503 (23.3%)	1230 (26.9%)	2011 (30.6%)	1747 (27.4%)
Case type					
Felony	3441 (48.9%)	3245 (50.3%)	1775 (38.9%)	2553 (38.8%)	3299 (51.8%)
Misdemeanor	2657 (37.7%)	2353 (36.5%)	2065 (45.2%)	3058 (46.5%)	2342 (36.7%)
Interstate	943 (13.4%)	854 (13.2%)	725 (15.9%)	963 (14.6%)	732 (11.5%)
Sex					
Male	5532 (78.6%)	4981 (77.2%)	3635 (79.6%)	5082 (77.3%)	5126 (80.4%)
Female	1437 (20.4%)	1411 (21.9%)	892 (19.5%)	1422 (21.6%)	1187 (18.6%)
Race					
White	3877 (55.1%)	2948 (45.7%)	3582 (78.5%)	5069 (77.1%)	2854 (44.8%)
Black	2366 (33.6%)	2744 (42.5%)	352 (7.7%)	795 (12.1%)	2106 (33.0%)
Hispanic	676 (9.6%)	621 (9.6%)	571 (12.5%)	535 (8.1%)	1272 (20.0%)
Other/Not reported	122 (1.7%)	139 (2.2%)	60 (1.3%)	175 (2.6%)	141 (2.2%)
Age					
Mean	32.0	31.5	31.6	31.5	32.8
Std Dev	10.6	10.2	10.0	9.6	10.9

\* The percent is the percent of total within a region.

Table 2. Average Supervision Fee Payments Per Client'. 1987 vs. 1988 by Region.

Region	1987 (N=16051)	1988 (N=14988)	% Change
<b>Experimental</b>			
South	\$27.20	\$32.99	19.0%
Central	\$27.01	\$31.77	18.0%
<b>Control</b>			
East	\$28.81	\$33.19	15.0%
West	\$28.67	\$33.58	17.0%
North	\$28.52	\$32.50	13.0%

\*Includes only clients who paid supervision fees.

Table 3. Supervision Fee Average Monthly Recovery Rate, October 1987 through December 1988 (by quarter).

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Misdemeanor Cases (N=11816)						
Region	Quarter Average (%)					Total
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	
Experimental						
South	84.0	87.7	87.0	87.7	85.7	86.4
Central	85.3	87.3	86.3	82.7	82.3	84.8
Control						
East	90.7	92.3	91.0	88.3	86.7	89.8
West	89.4	89.6	91.7	88.2	87.7	89.3
North	87.6	85.1	87.4	86.4	81.8	85.7

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Felony Cases (N=12154)						
Region	Quarter Average (%)					Total
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	
Experimental						
South	66.2	70.5	70.4	71.5	68.3	69.4
Central	64.3	65.8	65.8	63.9	60.9	64.2
Control						
East	78.1	82.2	82.1	79.5	74.7	79.3
West	76.4	80.9	82.5	79.9	76.2	79.2
North	70.0	69.8	71.5	67.4	65.8	68.9

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Table 4. Ninety Day or More Average Monthly Delinquency Rate, 1987 vs. 1988 by Region.

Region	1987 (N=27198)	1988 (N=25154)	Difference
<b>Experimental</b>			
South	24.8%	28.3%	3.5%
Central	28.4%	29.8%	1.4%
<b>Control</b>			
East	17.1%	19.0%	1.9%
West	16.7%	19.9%	3.2%
North	24.5%	27.7%	3.2%

Table 5. Average Monthly Technical Revocation Rates, 1987 vs. 1988 by Region.

Region	1987 (N=747)	1988 (N=702)	% Change
<b>Experimental</b>			
South	67.6%	66.5%	-1.1%
Central	64.1%	68.5%	4.4%
<b>Control</b>			
East	68.4%	60.2%	-8.2%
West	68.0%	66.4%	-1.6%
North	62.6%	63.7%	1.1%



Figure 1. Standard ReportRegional Supervision Fee Collection Statistics

Officer	Total Clients	Paying Clients	Fraction Paid	Total Sup. Fee Collected
Smith, Ron	170	119	0.70	\$3,477.97
Taylor, Harriet	138	96	0.70	\$3,266.00
Doe, Harry	178	116	0.65	\$4,005.00
Carter, June	166	88	0.53	\$2,515.00
Fisher, Bob	172	70	0.41	\$2,070.00

Client Delinquency List

Region=Central, Officer=Smith, Ron			
Probationer	Case Number	Last Date Paid	Total Delinquencies
Carter, Harry	4778150101	05/31/88	\$445.00
Doe, June	3965560101	08/09/88	\$1,200.00
Smith, Harriet	4961490101	08/27/88	\$480.00
Taylor, Bob	4402650101	06/06/88	\$75.00
Fisher, Ron	9568870101	07/28/88	\$242.00

Figure 2. Experimental Report 1NIC Regional Economic Sanctions Summary


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Total Collections - October 31, 1988 by Officer  
Unit=Central, Officer=Smith, Ron

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Fee Type	Probationers Supervised	Probationers Assessed This Fee Type	Probationers Not Assessed This Fee Type	Collections
Restitution	186	41	145	\$ 680.00
Dependent support	186	0	186	
Pay- treatment	186	0	186	
Supervision fee	186	185	1	\$3258.00
Attorney fee	186	33	153	\$ 75.00
Fines	186	62	124	\$1418.00
Other	186	0	186	

Figure 3. Experimental Report 2

Supervision Fee Collection Rates, September 1987-December 1988,  
Central Region

Month	Level of Supervision							
	Maximum				Minimum			
	N	Mean Set	Mean Coll	% Coll	N	Mean Set	Mean Coll	% Coll
Sep 1987	158	\$30.51	\$16.46	53.9	1007	\$26.80	\$12.82	47.9
Oct 1987	150	\$29.77	\$17.09	57.4	1028	\$27.27	\$15.55	57.0
Nov 1987	141	\$30.35	\$15.82	52.1	1016	\$27.38	\$14.90	54.4
Dec 1987	134	\$29.66	\$18.78	63.3	1011	\$28.01	\$13.97	49.9
Jan 1988	133	\$29.44	\$17.58	59.7	986	\$28.26	\$13.84	49.0
Feb 1988	134	\$29.33	\$13.87	47.3	958	\$28.58	\$15.72	55.0
Mar 1988	117	\$30.30	\$22.89	75.5	968	\$28.71	\$15.35	53.5
Apr 1988	118	\$30.42	\$14.75	48.5	970	\$28.81	\$15.02	52.1
May 1988	129	\$29.84	\$16.71	56.0	974	\$29.22	\$14.40	49.3
Jun 1988	139	\$31.08	\$19.03	61.2	961	\$29.39	\$13.75	46.8
Jul 1988	139	\$31.12	\$15.27	49.1	958	\$29.48	\$13.19	44.7
Aug 1988	148	\$31.45	\$16.06	51.1	968	\$29.36	\$14.31	48.7
Sep 1988	162	\$30.71	\$16.57	54.0	940	\$29.43	\$13.36	45.4
Oct 1988	157	\$30.83	\$18.76	60.8	923	\$29.54	\$14.96	50.6
Nov 1988	157	\$30.76	\$15.89	51.7	914	\$29.54	\$12.38	41.9
Dec 1988	148	\$30.81	\$18.41	59.8	941	\$29.58	\$11.64	39.3