For Marines, a power struggle around dam in Afghanistan
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KAJAKI, Afghanistan — The improvised bombs are everywhere. On footpaths, in the weeds, underneath fruit trees. They’re just waiting for somebody — ideally a U.S. Marine — to step on them.
The hidden explosives planted near the handful of U.S. Marine outposts here show how important this once-bustling agricultural sprawl is to the Taliban, even though the coalition views Kajaki district as one of the least important parts of Afghanistan’s Helmand province.
Because there are so few residents left after nearly a decade of fighting, Kajaki doesn’t rate a large troop presence to carry out the kind of hearts and minds campaign going on in more populated areas. But there is a reason for coalition forces to be here: to protect a dam and the limping power station that Afghan and coalition leaders hope will bring long-term stability and development to the region.
The U.S. Air Force bombed the Taliban-controlled power station in October 2001, during the initial invasion. It wasn’t until February 2007 that 300 International Security Assistance Force ground troops, supported by the Afghan National Army, pushed out militants during Operation Kryptonite to take control of the dam.
Battery E, 1st Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment is now tasked with protecting the dam, though the power it generates is yet another problem — the Taliban are levying a “tax” on the electricity as part of a general intimidation strategy.
The Marines are a small force, and not as well-outfitted as U.S. troops fighting insurgents elsewhere. They don’t have an intelligence officer or mine rollers or big armored trucks like units in higher-priority areas.
Nonetheless, the Marines here face off against the Taliban more frequently than troops in some hotly contested districts in the province.
“We don’t take it personal,” said Capt. Matt Ritchie, Battery E’s commander. “But at the same time, we take pride in that.”
Battery E Marines have been mortared, shot at and blown up. In the first week of June alone, they found, or were found by, six improvised explosive devices within three miles of their headquarters at Forward Operating Base Zeebrugge.
One of those blasts wounded five Marines — two critically — on June 4. They were the battery’s first casualties since arriving in late April. All were expected to make a full recovery.
Another Battery E Marine, Pfc. Josue Ibarra, died in a similar explosion while on patrol Sunday. Ibarra, 21, a provisional infantryman from Midland, Texas, joined the Corps in June 2010.
“You don’t know — every single day you go out — whether you’re gonna get blown up or you’re gonna come back in one piece alive,” said Lance Cpl. Kyle Delaney, 20, a motor transport operator from Detroit serving as a squad-designated marksman.
But, he added, the Marines have to keep pushing out to the edges of their small security bubble to let the Taliban know they’re not giving up. “Otherwise, they’re just going to try to run you over.”
During a June 6 patrol, the battery spotted an insurgent running wire for a command-detonated bomb not far from Zeebrugge. When the bomber ducked into an abandoned building, the battery dropped seven mortars on it.
There is little fear of causing civilian casualties here. Whole villages, including a bazaar that once boasted 400 shop stalls, are deserted.
“You see farmers every now and then” inside the security bubble, said Capt. Tim Linville, 32, a joint terminal air controller from Cynthiana, Ky., who often spends hours monitoring video feeds of the countryside beamed down from aircraft. “But the compounds — they’re livable, but there’s just nobody in them.”
There are far more people living outside the bubble, he said. “Those are your suspected Taliban people out there.”
Battery E isn’t authorized to push into those areas. They patrol through the fields to meet with the few remaining farmers “to get intelligence and win the hearts and minds,” Delaney said.
“Obviously, the more people you talk to, the more you find out where the Taliban is.”
During these patrols, most of the farmers are willing, some even eager, to speak with the Marines. Ritchie attributes that to the concern his Marines have shown during their patrols, and to the Taliban’s campaign of violence and intimidation.
Insurgents regularly stop, search and interrogate locals, and put their lives at risk by seeding the area with IEDs. Earlier this spring, one farmer was killed by an IED; insurgents killed another with a gunshot to the head.
“The locals have not taken very kindly to that,” Ritchie said. “That’s kind of been a recent development, and that’s really allowed us to come in and say, ‘Hey, look, we’re a viable option. We haven’t killed any of your people. In fact, we want to help you, but we need you to help us as well.’ ”
There are indications that they might take the Marines up on the offer.
During a meeting believed to have occurred June 1, local leaders reportedly told the Taliban to leave Kajaki, according to Ritchie, who gets much of his intelligence from the Afghan police, most of whom are from the district and work closely with the Marines.
“We try to make manageable expectations and at the same time realizing, unfortunately, the military necessity is greater elsewhere,” Ritchie said. “But at the same time, [we’re] still trying to offer the people some hope and trying to encourage them to take ownership of their own security — with our help.”
As Marines, he said, there is “a certain morbid appeal to being stuck in a hard situation with a difficult task.”
