ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS

BILLY E. MARTIN

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STATUS OF INTERVIEWS:
OPEN FOR RESEARCH

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Interviews Conducted and Edited by:
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Senior Historian
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1. In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms, conditions, and restrictions set forth in this instrument, I, Bill E. Martin, (hereinafter referred to as "the Donor"), of Sacramento, California, do hereby give, donate, and convey to the National Archives and Records Administration (hereinafter referred to as "the National Archives), acting for and on behalf of the United States of America, all of my rights and title to, and interest in the information and responses (hereinafter referred to as "the Donated Materials") provided during the interviews conducted on March 7, 1994, September 1, 1994, October 25, 1995, and March 19, 1996, in Sacramento, California, and prepared for deposit with the National Archives and Records Administration in the following format: cassette tape recordings and transcripts. This donation includes, but is not limited to, all copyright interests I now possess in the Donated Materials.

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Date: 3/19/96

Signed: Bill E. Martin
Bill E. Martin

INTERVIEWER:_____
Brit Allan Storey

Having determined that the materials donated above by Bill E. Martinare appropriate for preservation as evidence of the United States Government's organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, and transactions, and considering it to be in the public interest to accept these materials for deposit with the National Archives and Records Administration, I accept this gift on behalf of the United States of America, subject to the terms, conditions, and restrictions set forth in the above instrument.

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Introduction

In 1988, Reclamation began to create a history program. While headquartered in Denver, the history program was developed as a bureau-wide program.

One component of Reclamation's history program is its oral history activity. The primary objectives of Reclamation's oral history activities are: preservation of historical data not normally available through Reclamation records (supplementing already available data on the whole range of Reclamation's history); making the preserved data available to researchers inside and outside Reclamation.

The senior historian of the Bureau of Reclamation developed and directs the oral history program. Questions, comments, and suggestions may be addressed to the senior historian.

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For more information about Reclamation's history program see:
www.usbr.gov/history

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Brief Chronology of Career

1933–Born in Springfield, Arkansas

Attended Arkansas Polytechnic Institute, Russellville

Served in U.S. Army

Attended University of Arkansas, graduating with B.A. and M.A. in ag economics

February 1962–Started as an ag economist with Reclamation in Grand Island, Nebraska

October 1962–Moved to Denver to work in the region

March 1964–Transferred to the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project Office in Pueblo, Colorado

January 1, 1967–Moved to the Reports Branch in the Planning Division in Washington, D.C., as a reports coordinator for Region 7.

Chief of the Reports Coordination Branch

Assistant chief of the Planning Division

1974-1980–Regional director in the Mid-Pacific Region (formerly Region 2) of Reclamation in Sacramento.

1980-1985–Regional director in the Lower Missouri Region (formerly Region 7) of Reclamation in Denver.

1985-1988–Regional director in the Missouri Basin Region (formerly Region 6 and the Upper Missouri Region) of Reclamation in Billings.

1988-1990–Assistant Commissioner–Resources Management (ACRM) in Denver

1990–Retired from Reclamation

1990-1995–Worked for a consortium of several water entities in the Central Valley of California representing their interests in various public arenas

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Oral History Interviews
Bill E. Martin

This is Brit Allan Storey, senior historian of the Bureau of Reclamation, interviewing Billy E. Martin, formerly of the Bureau of Reclamation, on March the 17th, 1994, at about nine o'clock in the morning at the Bureau of Reclamation's regional office in Sacramento, California. This is Tape 1.

Storey: Well, Mr. Martin, I'm wondering where you were born and raised and educated, and how you eventually came to Reclamation.

Born in Springfield, Arkansas

Martin: Well, I was born in the little community of Springfield, Arkansas, which is in the central part of the state, about sixty miles west of Little Rock. I grew up on a farm. Our principal cash crops were cotton and soybeans. I was educated at two or three different schools in Arkansas. Where I spent most of my time was at Plumerville, Arkansas, Elementary and High School. That's very near to the little community of Springfield.

Attended Arkansas Polytechnic College and the University of Arkansas Studying Agricultural Economics

And then I attended the Arkansas Polytechnic College in Russellville, Arkansas, after I graduated from high school. Then spent a couple of years in the Army and went to the University of Arkansas after I was discharged from the Army, where I received my bachelor and master's degree in agricultural economics. It was during my time in graduate school that I was getting my master's degree in agricultural economics, I was on what's called a research assistantship. I worked part-time and went to school part-time.

And nearing the end of my master's program, there was a Federal Careers Day on the campus of the university, and I had been to those before and about the only job I'd every been offered was a GS-5 in Washington, D.C. or Spartanburg, South Carolina, so I wasn't too interested in those. But my major professor and advisor in grad. school told me that there was someone there from the Bureau of Reclamation that was looking for someone with an agricultural economics background, and that I might want to go over and talk to him. Well, I'd never heard of the Bureau of Reclamation, but I did go over and talk with him, and it was Hank Halliday from the–Denver office. So I visited with him, he asked me to send in a standard form– I don't remember what it was called at that time–171, I think, is what it's called at the present time–and I did. And in about six weeks I had a job offer from the Bureau of Reclamation in Grand Island, Nebraska, as a GS-9 ag economist with a salary of $6,435. And I thought that sounded pretty good, although the thought of leaving Arkansas and heading to Nebraska in the wintertime didn't sound too swift! But anyway, I

made the move, and it was after I had been working there for a while that I met Aldon Nielsen who was an ag economist, and had been in Grand Island and had moved to Denver, and I learned that he had told Hank Halliday when he started out on that recruiting trip, that if he ran across a *good* ag economist, "Hire him!" So Al Nielsen, I guess, is responsible for my being with the Bureau of Reclamation.

Storey: When was this?

Martin: This was in 1962.

Storey: And may I ask when you were born?

Martin: I was born in 1933.

Storey: In Springfield?

Martin: In Springfield, Arkansas.

Storey: What was the Office like in Grand Island when you moved there?

Moved to Reclamation in Grand Island, Nebraska, in February of 1962

Martin: Well, it was located out near the airport in Grand Island.

"It was an old military hospital . . . converted to office space. . . . and we shared it with the termites. . . . We had several instances where we either had to go home early, or we couldn't get to work because of snow drifts between the office and town. . . . typical military building, in somewhat of a dilapidated form. . . ."

It was an old military hospital that'd been converted to office space. It was some of the temporary military buildings, and we shared it with the termites. It was, of course, located outside of town. We had several instances where we either had to go home early, or we couldn't get to work because of snow drifts between the office and town. It was just kind of a typical military building, in somewhat of a dilapidated form. But I guess the rent was *cheap*.

Storey: How many people were in the office at that time?

Martin: To the best of my knowledge, there were probably about 200-, 225, something on that order. It was a fairly large project office. There was quite a bit of study activity going on in Nebraska at that time, on the North Loup Project, the O'Neill Unit of the Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Project, and a number of other projects that were under investigation to determine whether or not they were feasible for construction.

Storey: So this was largely a planning office.

Martin: It was primarily a planning office, doing both planning at all levels–reconnaissance, feasibility, definite plan–as well as collecting design data for a couple of the projects that were authorized.

Storey: Who was the head of the project office?

Worked in the Economics Branch

Martin: Paul Harley [phonetic spelling] was the project manager at that time. And John Maine [phonetic spelling] headed up the division that I was in, the Planning Division. And Frank Ellis was head of the Economics Branch, which is where I went to work. So Frank Ellis was my *first* supervisor with the Bureau of Reclamation.

Storey: And what does an ag economist do in the Bureau of Reclamation?

What He Did as an Ag Economist

Martin: Well, an ag economist in the Bureau, really, there's quite a variety of things that we do. There in Nebraska, what we spent most of our time doing was out collecting data from farmers or from county records, that we could prepare input-output budgets to determine whether a project was economically feasible to build, what the farmers' ability to repay the cost of water would be, and to determine the economic impacts of a project that might be built in an area.

Storey: So some of this was cost-benefit analyses and that sort of thing?

Martin: Yes, much of it was cost-benefit analysis.

Storey: Thinking back, if you can, to when you first came to Reclamation, what did you think of the way Reclamation figured cost-benefit analysis?

Benefit-Cost Analysis at Reclamation

Martin: Well, when I got out of college, and for my master's thesis, I had done some benefit-cost analysis, or input-output analysis for six or seven farms in northwest Arkansas: given a set of resources, both financial, land, labor, capital, to determine what the family income might be for that farm and what farming enterprises they might enter into in order to maximize their returns to their most limiting resource, which in most cases is capital. And I used an old IBM 650 computer to do that, and a program that had been prepared by someone down in North Carolina that had done a similar study for the Piedmont Area in North Carolina. And so when I got to the Bureau, I was really doing somewhat the same type of analysis. They were using somewhat the same procedures that I had used, except we were punching it in on a calculator rather than running it through the computer. So that was basically the difference. But other than that, there were a lot of similarities

in the process, the procedure, and the data that we used in the two instances.

"So I thought it was not a bad process, although I did understand that it's a *tool*, and it's not a precise science. . . ."

So I thought it was not a bad process, although I did understand that it's a *tool*, and it's not a precise science.

Storey: One of the issues that keeps coming up as I talk to people about cost-benefit analyses is that there's a lot of sentiment outside Reclamation that we "cook" our figures, or that we . . . . How should I say this? That Reclamation tends to manipulate its figures. Did you run into anything like that? *Premises*, for instance, that were not supportable or anything like that, from your point of view?

"I've heard some of the reactions from some of the folks over on the contracts and repayments side, is that we can never negotiate a contract for that kind of repayment, that farmers or the district is just not going to *agree* that they can pay that kind of money for water. . . ."

Martin: Well, I did run into some of it, where we would work through some numbers and come up with what we considered a good effort at determining what a payment capacity might be–repayment ability of a farmer to pay. And I've heard some of the reactions from some of the folks over on the contracts and repayments side, is that we can never negotiate a contract for that kind of repayment, that farmers or the district is just not going to *agree* that they can pay that kind of money for water. And probably in any of the analysis, there were times when the numbers, you could have gone one way or another, and you would probably tend to go with it so it made it look a little better.

Storey: Or reduce the cost to the farmers . . .?

Martin: Or reduce the cost to the farmers, yes.

Storey: Of course repayment now is just becoming a *real* issue, (Martin: Right.) as I know you're aware.

Before I forget to ask you, Why didn't you go back to the farm?

". . . during my farming years–I . . . 'sharecropped with the boll weevils,' and some of the other vagaries of nature, and I decided that there *should* be a better way to make a living. I decided that I would go to school. . . ."

Martin: Well, during my farming years–I, what I term "sharecropped with the boll weevils," and some of the other vagaries of nature, and I decided that there *should* be a better way to make a living. I decided that I would go to school. I knew that I knew *how* to farm–I would go to school, finish my college degree, then if I did want to go into farming, I maybe would have a little

better feel for managing the operation, managing the resources that we had.

"I did really think that there must be a better way, an easier way to make a living. And I had explored opportunities within the state of Arkansas . . . but the opportunity with the Bureau just sounded like it fit *more* my interest. . . . something that really intrigued my interest, and that I thought I would enjoy doing for a career. . . ."

But I did really think that there must be a better way, an easier way to make a living. And I had explored opportunities within the state of Arkansas and with other agencies, private industry outside of Arkansas, so I knew there were a lot of opportunities there, but the opportunity with the Bureau just sounded like it fit *more* my interest. And after I looked into the mission of the Bureau, it just sounded to me like something that really intrigued my interest, and that I thought I would enjoy doing for a career. And I got into it, and I wasn't disappointed.

Storey: How long were you in Grand Island?

Asked to Move to Denver to Work in the Economics Branch of the Planning Division in 1962

Martin: I was in Grand Island about nine months. I started to work for the Bureau February 1 of 1962. I believe it was in either July or August of '62 that I was asked to come to Denver, into the regional office, for a thirty-day training program that they had started for new employees with an ag economics background. So I went into the regional office and worked with Harold Davis and Al Neilsen, who were working in [the region in][8] Denver at the time. Harold was the chief of the Economics Branch in the Planning Division, and then I spent some time over in what was called the chief engineer's office at the time, working with Ira Watson and Ed Barbour and Bob Strouthers and Bob Berger [all phonetic spellings], who were all economists or ag economists. And it was while I was in the regional office that Harold Davis asked me if I would make the move from Grand Island to Denver to start working for *him* in the Economics Branch in the Planning Division in Denver, in the regional office. And I agreed to that move, so I made the move from Grand Island to Denver–I believe it was about October 1, 1962.

Storey: Did you meet the chief engineer at that time?

8. Note that in the text of these interviews, as opposed to headings, information in parentheses, ( ), is actually on the tape. Information in brackets, [ ], has been added to the tape either by the editor to clarify meaning or at the request of the interviewee in order to correct, enlarge, or clarify the interview as it was originally spoken. Words have sometimes been struck out by editor or interviewee in order to clarify meaning or eliminate repetition. In the case of strikeouts, that material has been printed at 50% density to aid in reading the interviews but assuring that the struckout material is readable.

The transcriber and editor also have removed some extraneous words such as false starts and repetitions without indicating their removal. The meaning of the interview has not been changed by this editing.

Barney Bellport

Martin: Yes. That was at the time . . . I can't remember, I think it was Barney Bellport.

Storey: What was he like?

Martin: Well, I didn't know Barney very well at the time, and I had just met him that one time. Of course I knew him by reputation as being a hard, tough, hard-line taskmaster that was results-oriented. After I came out to California, I got to know Barney much more intimately. This was after he had retired. And I found Barney to be a very interesting person, one that was really committed to the Reclamation cause, and thought that the Bureau program was maybe about the Ninth Wonder of the World. But he was a very dedicated public servant, and really thought that the Reclamation program was a real value to the country.

Storey: How did he deal with people?

"Barney . . . probably really wasn't a 'people person.'. . ."

Martin: Well, from what little I saw of Barney when he was with the Bureau, that he was probably a little intolerant and impatient with people, and wanted to get on [with] getting a job done, and maybe took some shortcuts in dealing with people, and probably really wasn't a "people person."

Storey: How would you describe the way the people in the office related to the chief engineer? Nowadays, of course, if I need to talk to the assistant commissioner, I'll go over and make an appointment or something. Did it operate that way in those days?

"Mahogany Row"

Martin: No, from what I saw, of course they had what was known as "Mahogany Row" in the chief engineer's office. It seemed like when you turned down that hallway, there was just a different atmosphere, different aura, and it was treated and looked upon with a great deal of deference, and maybe–I started to say "*reverence*"–to the position. Maybe it wasn't *reverence*, but at least it was one that was . . . You were in another world, and you didn't just walk in and–it didn't give the appearance that you'd just walk in and make an appointment to see the chief engineer.

Storey: Was it a physically different hallway? You say "Mahogany Row," you know at the National Archives, it *is* mahogany! (chuckles)

Martin: As I recall, it wasn't actually mahogany. I think it was probably paneled, but that people just referred to it as "Mahogany Row," and I think that was because down that row is where the chief engineer and all of his first

lieutenants were housed, and people probably tended to see it differently than it really was. It was just known as "Mahogany Row."

Storey: Do you remember any of the assistants to the chief engineer?

Martin: At the present time their names kind of escape me as to just what their positions might be, but Harold Arthur[9] was around at the time. Jack Hilf was there at the time. I was trying to remember one of the other folks, but his name escapes me.

Storey: Am I correct in thinking that you didn't have much contact, even at that level, then?

Martin: No, because at that time, when I was over in the chief engineer's office, I was there strictly on a training program, so I spent most of my time, which was only a couple-, three- weeks with Ira Watson, Ed Barbour, and folks in the Economics Branch. And I only got into the offices down there, Barney Bellport's and others, just to meet them.

Storey: How about the regional director at that time? Who was that?

Pat Dugan as Regional Director

Martin: At that time the regional director was [John N.] Spencer, and he retired not too long after I made the move to Denver. The seat was vacant for a while, and then Pat [Hugh P.] Dugan came to Denver as the regional director.

Storey: Am I correct in thinking Dugan was also here as the regional director?

Martin: Dugan was here as the regional director and made the move from Sacramento to Denver as the regional director. I believe that was probably in about 1963 when he made the move.

Storey: Did you get to know him?

Transferred from Denver to the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project in Pueblo, Colorado

Martin: Yes, I did get to know Pat quite well–not when I was in the Denver Office, but I believe it was in 1964, March of '64, I transferred from the regional office down to Pueblo, Colorado, to the Fryingpan-Arkansas, Project Office. The Fryingpan-Arkansas Project had been approved by Congress, and had finally gotten funded for construction in the early 60s. And Jim Oggleby [phonetic spelling] was looking for an ag economist on the project office. So I decided like that sounded like it would be a good career move to go down to the project office and work down there.

9. Interviews of Harold Arthur are included in Reclamation's oral history program.

". . . while I was working in the project office . . . I really developed a good relationship with Pat Dugan. . . ."

And it was while I was working in the project office that I really developed a good relationship with Pat Dugan. The Fryingpan-Arkansas Project of course was a transbasin project, bringing water from the Fryingpan on the West Slope, to the Arkansas on the East Slope.

". . . there was a powerplant, or series of powerplants–about seven of them–strung down the east side along the Arkansas. . . . we were looking to those powerplants to provide the primary source of funds to repay the project costs. . . . we were having difficulty showing them to be economical. But we took a look . . . and we came up with the notion of a pump-back storage unit for the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project. When we got the study put together, Pat Dugan came down, and we made a presentation to him on how we thought the project should be changed, the power system should be changed . . ."

And there was a powerplant, or series of powerplants–about seven of them–strung down the east side along the Arkansas. We were *struggling* with those, because we were looking to those powerplants to provide the primary source of funds to repay the project costs. And those were small, kind of run-of-the-river type plants, and we were having difficulty showing them to be economical. But we took a look at the power system to see if we could come up with a better system that would be [a] more financially lucrative project, and Jim Parker was the electrical engineer on the project, headed up the division, or the branch. I forget now what they call it–the electrical maintenance branch or something of that nature. And Dick Nash was also in the project office at the time, and he just kind of headed up one of the office engineering groups, and we all worked for Art Sodderberg [phonetic spelling]. So we were looking for a better power system, and we came up with the notion of a pump-back storage unit for the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project. When we got the study put together, Pat Dugan came down, and we made a presentation to him on how we thought the project should be changed, the power system should be changed, and we, I guess, I must have made a fairly favorable impression on him. Then he left, a few weeks passed, and he came back to Pueblo, and he brought [Newcomb B.] "Buzz" Bennett, the assistant commissioner for [engineering and] power, out of Washington. So we made the same presentation to Pat and to Buzz at that time, and Buzz was also convinced that that would be a good change. Of course the change in the project would need to go to the Congress for consideration, for the change in the design.

Jim Casey Was Assistant Chief of the Planning Division in Washington

This was, I don't know, I guess it was about 1966, and Jim Casey in the commissioner's office, he was assistant chief of the Planning Division in Washington, had been visiting around, and I suppose he and Buzz Bennett talked, and he and Pat Dugan had talked, so Casey decided that I should

come to work in the commissioner's office in Washington.

Jim Casey Convinced Him to Move Back to the Washington, D.C., Office to Work in the Reports Branch in the Planning Division

So he made a trip out to Pueblo and we sat down and talked. He detailed me back to Washington for a couple of weeks so I could look the place over and they could look me over, and he just continued to hound me, wanting me to come back to Washington, which I was not totally enamored with the thought of moving to Washington, but I went.

Just prior to that, we had written up the proposal on making the change in the power system and sent it back to the commissioner's office for approval. When I got back to the commissioner's office, I was the resident expert on the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project and on the change in the power system. So Buzz Bennett drew the assignment of going up to The Hill and talking to Congressman Wayne Aspinall, who was the Chairman of the . . . .[10] I can't remember right now the name of his committee at that time. It's been changed.

Storey: Was it the House Ways and Means Committee?

Martin: No, it was . . .

Storey: Well, that's something I can look up.

Buzz Bennett Took Him along to Talk to Congressman Wayne Aspinall about the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project

Martin: I can't remember what it was, but anyway, he drew the assignment of going up and talking to Mr. Aspinall, and he was a little nervous over that, because sometimes Mr. Aspinall could be very short and curt with you, especially if it involved some *change* over what the committee had heard before–and especially after it was already authorized. So Assistant Commissioner Bennett took me with him, and we walked up to Aspinall's office–or, it wasn't Aspinall's office. As we were going in, Mr. Bennett said, "Well, you never know what mood you're going to catch him in. I really *dread* this." We walked in, laid it out for him, explained it to him, and he said, "Well, you folks are the experts. If that's what you think is needed, then let's go with it." And Buzz kind of breathed a sigh of relief as we left, and the changes were made and the project was built with the . . .

END SIDE 1, TAPE 1. MARCH 17, 1994.
BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE 1. MARCH 17, 1994.

10. Wayne Aspinall was chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1959 to 1973, during the Eighty-sixth to the Ninety-second Congresses.

Storey: . . . next door . . .

Martin: Mount Elbert, pump-back storage.

Storey: Okay. What was Wayne Aspinall like?

Wayne Aspinall "was referred to by people as 'Little Napoleon.'"

Martin: Well, he was referred to by people as "Little Napoleon." But I always found him to be fair. He was a good chairman, he kept things focused. He was development-oriented, and he looked for ways to develop resources, to improve economic conditions, living conditions for people. And he was also an astute politician: he saw ways to get things for Colorado, and he used his position to do that, which is not too dissimilar to what happens all the time. But he could be very impatient with people. If someone got on the stand and started taking too long, or trying to present their story in a way that he thought was nonsense, then he would just cut them off and say so.

"I remember one instance, some folks . . . testifying for a project that they wanted to have authorized, and they started out taking the position that the opposition to the project was going to . . . give him this kind of information . . . and they started telling him how he should consider that information. And he stopped them . . . 'I will listen to the other side and I will form my own opinions of what they say, and your project is probably going to be reported out of this committee, unless you mess it up with your testimony.' So they ended their testimony fairly quickly. . ."

I remember one instance, some folks from Nebraska were on the stand testifying for a project that they wanted to have authorized, and they started out taking the position that the opposition to the project was going to come up and give him this kind of information, which was detrimental to the project, and they started telling him how he should consider that information. And he stopped them and he said, "I will listen to the other side and I will form my own opinions of what they say, and your project is probably going to be reported out of this committee, unless you mess it up with your testimony." So they ended their testimony fairly quickly and let him get on with the hearing. (Storey laughs)

How His Work Changed as He Moved Grand Island to Denver to Pueblo

Storey: How did things change in *your* work between Grand Island and Denver, and then Denver to Pueblo?

Martin: Well, there was quite a change, because in Grand Island I was working primarily on benefit-cost analysis, repayment capability for projects dealing primarily with the irrigated agricultural side. In the regional office, of course that was dealing a little more with the policy side, reviewing projects and reports from the standpoint of "How does it comply with policy?;"

"How does it comply with the law that's been passed, or with the guidelines that we have for planning projects?" As well as *helping* develop some of the regional policies that would be used in project economic evaluation.

". . . it put me in a much better position to work back at the project level, because I had a better feel for . . . some of those *dumb* things they asked us to do–I had a little better feel for why they asked some of those questions. . . ."

Then when I went from the regional office back to the project office in Pueblo, that was quite a change there too, and I thought it was very helpful that I had had some experience in the regional office when I went back to the project office. I thought it put me in a much better position to work back at the project level, because I had a better feel for some of the things that the regional office asked us to do–some of those *dumb* things they asked us to do–I had a little better feel for why they asked some of those questions. Because at the regional level it had given me an opportunity to work a little closer with the folks in Washington. I'd been detailed back to Washington once while I was in Denver.

Working on the Fryingpan- Arkansas Project Gave Him Different Perspectives

At the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project, which was an authorized Project and we were constructing it and we were trying to come up with the best system for the money, so it gave me an opportunity to work a little more intently on the power, from the power side, from the municipal water standpoint, and from water-oriented recreation. So it gave me some different perspectives of the Reclamation program, than I had gotten in both Grand Island and Denver.

Storey: And then you went to Washington.

Martin: And then I went to Washington.

Storey: What kind of change was *that*?

Moving to the Reports Branch of the Planning Division in Washington, D.C., Was a Culture Shock

Martin: Of course it was culture shock, going from Pueblo, Colorado, to Washington, D.C. (Storey: Yeah.) That was quite a change for the family and myself, just making the move, and living conditions in Pueblo versus Washington–Pueblo being almost a rural area, by comparison to Washington. And then the work itself was just totally different. I went into the Reports Branch of the Planning Division in Washington, and Leon Mesa [phonetic spelling] was the Chief of that Branch. Jim Casey was the assistant chief of the division, and Dan McCarthy was chief of the Planning Division. And in the Reports Branch we took the planning reports that had been prepared out in the field and submitted by the regional offices to the

commissioner's office, and these were reports of different levels of investigation: reconnaissance, feasibility, definite plan. We would send those reports out to the various agencies for review and comment and then we would prepare–those that we decided to proceed further with the investigation–we would prepare whatever documentation was needed to move it to the next step. In the case, for example, of a feasibility study that had been prepared to support authorization of a project, we then would prepare what was called the "commissioner's report," which was just taking the regional director's feasibility report, summarizing it down into maybe a dozen pages, and stapling that to the outside cover of the report, sending that forward to all of the agencies that we were required to send it to, which included the Corps of Engineers, Department of Agriculture, and several others.

Storey: Now, we're talking pre-NEPA [National Environmental Policy Act] here?

Martin: Yes, this was pre-NEPA.

Storey: So these are things that we did as a courtesy, or because . . .

". . . under the Flood Control Act of 1944. We were required to coordinate these studies with all of the affected states . . . as well as the Federal agencies that had responsibilities *in* some of those areas like Department of Agriculture . . . Corps of Engineers . . . and then within the Department of Interior. . . ."

Martin: No, it was required under the Flood Control Act of 1944.[11] We were required to coordinate these studies with all of the affected states, all of the states that would be affected by that project, as well as the Federal agencies that had responsibilities *in* some of those areas like Department of Agriculture in their agricultural programs, the Corps of Engineers from a flood control standpoint, and then within the Department of the Interior. And at that time there was the Federal Water Pollution Control that was housed within the Department of the Interior.[12] And they also reviewed it.

11. The Flood Control Act of 1944, an Act of December 22, 1944, ch. 665, 58 Stat. 887. Among other things the act established a policy of Federal-state cooperation in project planning; approved comprehensive development of the Missouri River Basin ,subsequently called the Pick-Sloan Missiouri Basin Program, and authorized its early projects; specified conditions under which the Department of the Interior would market surplus U.S. Army Corps of Engineers electricity, resulting in establishment of the Southwestern Power Administration and the Southeastern Power Administration within Interior–Congress having already established the Bonneville Power Administration in 1937 to market the surplus hydropower of both the Corps of Engineers and Reclamation in the Pacific Northwest; approved the use of water from Corps of Engineers projects for use for irrigation purposes under certain conditions; and authorized flood control work on the Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers in the Central Valley of California.

12. "Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act) (33 U.S.C. 1251 - 1376; Chapter 758; P.L. 845, June 30, 1948; 62 Stat. 1155). As amended . . .

Major amendments were enacted in 1961, 1966, 1970, 1972, 1977, and 1987. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961 (P.L. 87-88) stipulated that Federal agencies consider during the planning for any reservoir, storage to regulate streamflow for the purpose of water quality control (33 U.S.C. 1252). . . .

(continued...)

And then it had fairly extensive review within Interior from the Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, within our own shop there in the Bureau.

Processing the Commissioner's Report and Secretary's Report on Reclamation Project Studies

And when we got all those comments back and we got all of them worked out, all the problems worked out with it, incorporating, we would package it and produce what we called the "secretary's report," and just staple it right on top of the "commissioner's report," and sent that to OMB [Office of Management and Budget].

Bureau of the Budget/Office of Management and Budget Review of Project Reports

At that time it was the Bureau of the Budget, and we asked them to review it and approve it as an administration proposal.

Sending Reports to the Hill Requesting Authorization of a Project

And once it cleared OMB, *if* it cleared OMB, and when it did, then we would send it up to The Hill to the Congress, to both the Senate and the House, and ask them to consider it for authorization. And then they would hold hearings on it. Sometimes they approved them, and sometimes they didn't.

Storey: That kind of thing would just go to the committee, the applicable committee? or did we go to specific congressmen and senators and ask them to sponsor? How does that work, the network?

". . . we sent it up to the committees, and we would also send along proposed legislation that would be used, then, to authorize those bills . . ."

Martin: Well, we sent it up to the committees, and we would also send along proposed legislation that would be used, then, to authorize those bills. And then the committee chairmen, in some cases, or most cases probably, would introduce those bills. If they *didn't* introduce them, or sometimes just as a matter of courtesy, the senators from the state in which the project was located, *and* the representative over on the House side from the district where that project was located, would introduce the bills as *their* bills. It

12. (...continued)
The 1966 amendments (P.L. 89-753), entitled the Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, authorized the Secretary of Interior, in cooperation with the Secretary of Agriculture and the Water Resources Council, to conduct a comprehensive study of the effects of pollution, including sedimentation, in the estuaries and estuarine zones of the U.S. on fish and wildlife, sport and commercial fishing, recreation, water supply and power, and other specified uses (33 U.S.C. 466). . . ."
Source: http://www.fws.gov/laws/lawsdigest/fwatrpo.html accessed June 5, 2010, about 9:10 A.M.

happened like that probably *most* of the time.

Coordination Prior to the National Environmental Policy Act

Storey: I'm fascinated with this coordination issue. Before NEPA, when there were legal responsibilities beginning to be imposed, I presume that–correct me if I'm wrong–that coordination with all of the Interior agencies was just simply because we were in Interior? This was not mandated by the 1944 Act or anything?

Martin: That's right.

Storey: But, we all work for the secretary, and the secretary said, "You guys are going to talk to one another!" (chuckles) What does "coordination" *mean*? Does it mean that if they had a problem, we tried to fix the problem? Does it mean they were allowed the opportunity to comment, and if we didn't like their comments we ignored them? How did that work?

". . . OMB is *always* looking for some reason to not send something forward, because their *role* is to cut back on spending. We all hate them, but if we didn't have them we'd probably have to invent it. . . ."

Martin: Well, it was probably a combination of those things. We always tried to coordinate and solve the problem and resolve the issue. If we were not successful in resolving the issue, which we *weren't* in all cases, then sometimes we just ignored it and moved forward with it. And it would get to OMB . . . And of course when it got to OMB, they would send the report out to the agencies, to the departments that had some responsibility for some aspects of that project. Then they probably would get the same comment back. They would either get a comment back that says, "Yeah, we're okay with it as it has been prepared now, or has been changed," or "No, we still have a problem with it, because our issue hasn't been resolved." And OMB is *always* looking for some reason to not send something forward, because their *role* is to cut back on spending. We all hate them, but if we didn't have them we'd probably have to invent it. (Storey: Uh-huh.) So they would kind of *force* the issue to try to resolve the problem. And they usually didn't send anything forward that had a problem within the administration. So then they go talk to the congressman or the senator from that state or district in which the project was located, and he probably would just go ahead and introduce the bill anyway.

"In a lot of cases, the projects were authorized *in spite of* the position that the administration took. And some were authorized without a report being sent up to the Congress, although *most* of them, the report actually got up there. . . ."

In a lot of cases, the projects were authorized *in spite of* the position that the administration took. And some were authorized without a report being sent up to the Congress, although *most* of them, the report actually got up there.

But a lot of them were authorized in spite of the position that the administration took.

Storey: Let me make sure I'm understanding. Say Reclamation would prepare a bill, it would go through the hierarchy in Interior, then Interior would forward it to OMB? (Martin: Yes.) Once OMB had said "yea or nay" then it would be forward to the committee? (Martin: Uh-huh, to the committee.) But what happens if . . . What I'm doing is pursuing your last comment here that sometimes things were passed even though the administration didn't support them. How did it get through OMB to the committee if OMB said "no"?

"OMB would just send it back, without approval, because it had some unresolved issues. But then the local congressman or senator from the state would just introduce a bill, and in many cases it was a Reclamation-provided bill that was either bootlegged to him, or he asked for drafting service, and a bill would be drafted and sent up to him, and he would introduce the bill for authorization of the project. . . . it was fairly common. . . ."

Martin: It didn't. OMB would just send it back, without approval, because it had some unresolved issues. But then the local congressman or senator from the state would just introduce a bill, and in many cases it was a Reclamation-provided bill that was either bootlegged to him, or he asked for drafting service, and a bill would be drafted and sent up to him, and he would introduce the bill for authorization of the project.

Storey: Is that common?

"Of course there were a lot of projects that had planning reports done, and legislation was introduced by one means or another, that *didn't* get authorized. . . ."

Martin: Yes, it was fairly common. Of course there were a lot of projects that had planning reports done, and legislation was introduced by one means or another, that *didn't* get authorized. But that was a fairly common occurrence.

Storey: The other side of the coin, yeah. (Martin: Yes.) Are there a lot of contacts, say, between Reclamation staff with congressmen, senators, . . .?

Martin: There was at that time. There was a lot of contact between the congressional offices and the staff in the Washington office of the Bureau.

Storey: What about like regional directors and things?

Martin: Yes, there was a *lot* of contact at the regional director level with either the congressional people themselves, the principals, or their top staff.

Storey: I guess I'm jumping ahead a little bit, but did congressmen tend to keep up

with what Reclamation was doing?

". . . key ones [members of congress] did–those where Reclamation activity played a vital role in their district, or in their state. They were *very much* abreast of what was going on in Reclamation. . . ."

Martin: Yes, key ones did–those where Reclamation activity played a vital role in their district, or in their state. They were *very much* abreast of what was going on in Reclamation.

Storey: And in studies, then, for instance. (Martin: And in studies.) So they would know that Reclamation was studying "X," "Y," or "Z" project, (Martin: Yes.) and they'd maybe come back and say, "Hey, what happened to 'X?'" you know?

In Many Instances, Members of Congress Got Studies Authorized and Then Followed the Study Closely Because Their Constituents Were Interested

Martin: And in many cases, they actually got the study authorized: they introduced a bill or they included their study in a feasibility study bill, or some other level of study for authority for *that* project to be studied, and a report prepared on it. And they followed it closely, because their constituents were following it closely and kept in constant contact with them.

Storey: Okay. That's interesting. Were there any particular congressmen that you were aware of while you were in Washington at this time, who were particularly interested in Reclamation?

Martin: Yes, there were many of them at the time. Congressman Aspinall and Senator [Carl] Hayden over on the Senate side.

Storey: From Arizona?

Many Members of Congress Were Very Interested in Reclamation Activities

Martin: From Arizona. He was the chairman of the Senate committee, and Aspinall was chairman of the House committee. So both of those were very important. Senator Gordon Allott of Colorado, there were probably . . . I can't name them all. (Storey: California, by chance?) California, the senators there were very much interested in Reclamation activities. [Harold T.] "Bizz" Johnson of California, [Bernice Frederic] Bernie Sisk, John McFall were all very interested. There were several from the Midwest states: Nebraska, the Dakotas, Montana. And of course the Northwest: Senator [Henry "Scoop"] Jackson.

Storey: Let's see, was [Frank] Church in then?, I've forgotten.

Martin: Yes, he was in. I don't remember just what year he was in, or the years that

he was in and most noticeable by his involvement, but yes, he was very interested. From Utah, of course all of the delegation from Utah was very interested in Reclamation.

Storey: That would be about the time CUP [Central Utah Project] was . . . . (Martin: Yes.) Maybe it'd been already authorized, I'm not sure.

Martin: It had been authorized, and that was about the time that the CAP [Central Arizona Project] was authorized.

Storey: So Hayden . . . .

Martin: Yes. And [Senator Barry] Goldwater was very interested in it. There was . . . . I was trying to remember his name, from Pennsylvania, on the House Committee. I believe he was the ranking minority member, John Saylor. I believe it was Saylor.

Storey: S-A-Y?

Martin: Yeah. It was something similar to that. It think it was Saylor, John Saylor.

Storey: Well, it sounds to me like things changed quite a bit. You started in '62 with an M.A. in ag economics, and, what, in about four years you were in Washington?

Moved to the Reports Branch in D.C. in January of 1967

Martin: Yes, I started in February of '62 in Grand Island, in December of '66 I made the move to Washington. The commissioner's office picked me up on their rolls January 1 of '67.

Storey: Were you doing *any* ag economics *at all* in Washington?

The Work in Washington, D.C.

Martin: In Washington I did, in that first job that I had there in the reports coordination, no, I wasn't. Well, I guess in a sense that I was, kind of in a peripheral way, but more than anything else, I was working in reviewing, preparing, reports to be sent to Congress, testimony that the commissioner would use when he went up and testified on those projects for authorization, supporting authorization of the projects, and then just *dealing* with answering constituency mail, which we had tons of at that time, because there was a lot of reaction to the Central Arizona Project, both pro and con. The mail load, correspondence, load, was very heavy so we responded to much of the correspondence, particularly where it pertained to the projects in our particular region that had been assigned to us. And then we had just daily contacts from different members of the Congress, from their staffs, wanting to know the status of projects or the status of reports.

". . . it was not uncommon to spend a day of not spending more than five to ten minutes on any particular item, any particular issue in the commissioner's office. It was a very fast pace, and when you went to work, you really didn't know what you were going to be doing that day. . . ."

> And it was not uncommon to spend a day of not spending more than five to ten minutes on any particular item, any particular issue in the commissioner's office. It was a very fast pace, and when you went to work, you really didn't know what you were going to be doing that day.

Storey: Had you made a conscious decision to evolve your career this way, or did it just happen?

"It just happened. . . . people talk about they've laid out a career *plan* . . . I never did that, I just went to work, . . . and I worked hard, and I think I did a good job. And most of the things that happened to me after I started *work* for the Bureau was because someone else, I guess, became aware of what I was doing, and decided that they would like to have me come to work for them. . . . it just happened. . . ."

Martin: It just happened. And I've kind of reflected on that and looked back on it, and I thought about it at the time too. I would hear these people talk about they've laid out a career *plan* that on such-and-such a time they're going to be in this job. I never did that, I just went to work, and I worked, and I worked hard, and I think I did a good job. And most of the things that happened to me after I started *work* for the Bureau was because someone else, I guess, became aware of what I was doing, and decided that they would like to have me come to work for them. And that's kind of the way my career with the Bureau progressed. I really didn't try to sit down and plan it out–it just happened.

Storey: Was it one person, or was it a series of people, or two or three people, or what?

". . . there were several people that were involved in moving me through my career with the Bureau. . . ."

Martin: It was several people. Of course the first one was when I made the move from Grand Island to Denver, that was because Harold Davis, I guess, was pleased with the work that I did for him that month that I was in the Denver Office, and just based on the work that I had done that he had reviewed. And then Jim Oggleby who was the project manager down on the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project became aware of what I was doing in the regional office, because while there I was doing some work related to the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project. And Jim had been in the Denver Office as an assistant director–he was assistant director when I *moved* to Denver. He asked me to come to work for him in Pueblo, and then in Pueblo, as I mentioned, Jim Casey became aware of me through probably Buzz Bennett

and Pat Dugan and some of the other folks. And he just insisted that I come to work in Washington. While I was there, then I worked with Floyd Dominy[13] [who] was the commissioner at the time. Gil Stamm who *later* became commissioner, was the commissioner when he asked me to come out here as the regional director. And he'd offered me a couple of other options along with this one, so there were several people that were involved in moving me through my career with the Bureau.

Storey: What did your family think of all these moves in the early years? Did you have any kids then?

". . . we had two kids, and I'm sure they would have preferred to just stay in one school . . . but it actually worked out pretty well, and kids are pretty flexible–they adjust faster than adults do most of the time. . . ."

Martin: Yes, we had two kids, and I'm sure they would have preferred to just stay in one school and stayed there through their school years, but it actually worked out pretty well, and kids are pretty flexible–they adjust faster than adults do most of the time.

Storey: They don't think they're going to, but when it comes down to it . . .

Martin: They do. Most of these moves, we were fairly fortunate in that they were timed so it was a fairly good time. If you were going to move or make a change, to make the change–like going from one school year into the next, or kind of from junior high to senior high, or elementary to junior high. So that worked out pretty good. They made the adjustments with no problems. Didn't take long for them to develop new friends. I think as they look back now, they kind of treasure that, because it was an education just in moving around. In Washington they had an opportunity to study some of the historical events from a totally different perspective than what they would have gotten in Colorado.

END SIDE 2, TAPE 1. MARCH 17, 1994.
BEGIN SIDE 1, TAPE 2. MARCH 17, 1994.

Storey: This is Tape 2 of an interview by Brit Storey with Bill E. Martin on March the 17th, 1994.

It was an emotional and traumatic event, I suppose?

Martin: Yes, it was, initially, but it didn't take them long to make the change and to recover from the initial shock.

Storey: When you moved to Washington, did you actually live in Washington?

13. Two interviews of Floyd Dominy are included in Reclamation's oral history program.

Joined a Car Pool in Washington, D.C.

Martin: We lived in Kensington, Maryland, which is about twelve miles from downtown Washington. So I made the commute every day. And that turned out to be a rather interesting experience at times. I was in a car pool, and we usually just drove down Connecticut Avenue to downtown. And that took us about forty-five to fifty minutes on what we termed a "good day."

". . . one time, I think that was about March of '67, shortly after I went back there, one Sunday night it snowed about a foot or more, and it took us three hours to get to work that morning; got to work, we stayed there an hour, and they dismissed us so we could get home, and it took us three hours to get back home! . . ."

If it snowed a little bit or rained, the commute time just went up from there. I remember one time, I think that was about March of '67, shortly after I went back there, one Sunday night it snowed about a foot or more, and it took us three hours to get to work that morning; got to work, we stayed there an hour, and they dismissed us so we could get home, and it took us three hours to get back home! So of the eight-hour day, I spent about six of it on the road.

Storey: Who were you commuting with?

Martin: I was commuting with Harold Byrd [phonetic spelling] who was the chief of the General Services Division in the commissioner's office, and Jack Gynan [phonetic spelling] who was the public affairs officer for the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries at the time. There was a fellow in the Public Affairs Office of the Bureau, and his name escapes me at the present time. But we were in a car pool together. Harold retired, and then Bob White, works for the Bureau back in the commissioner's office, joined the car pool. Then some of the other people retired, our car pool kind of broke up, and we rode the bus for a while, and then just drove alone for a while.

Storey: Do you remember the considerations that went into choosing Kensington, Maryland?

Why They Chose to Live in Kensington, Maryland

Martin: Yes, the primary reason that we located out there was our son had a hearing impairment, so we looked around at the school systems back there, and we had some friends that lived over on the Maryland side, and we were told, and as we looked into it, we discovered too that the Montgomery County School System had programs that if he *needed* them, they would be available to him. And that was the primary reason that we located there. When we got back there, we found that other school systems in the area had some of the same programs. But that was the primary reason that we located out in Montgomery County, and Kensington, we just happened to locate

there because that was where we found the kind of housing that we were looking for.

Storey: And how long did the process take you? You knew you were coming to Washington. Had you picked out a location before you actually started work? Was that after you started work?

Martin: We knew that we wanted to be in Montgomery County, but we had not picked a location. We made the move back, didn't go on a house-hunting trip, made the move back, moved into a motel, and started looking for a house. And it took us a couple-, three days to find a house. We just *rented* at first, and moved into the rental. And then we looked around for a place to buy. We bought a place within a mile-and-half of where we were renting. But, we rented that place for a couple of years before we bought.

Storey: So you had some time to look around, (Martin: Yes.) get used to the neighborhood and all those kinds of things. Moving is *so disruptive* to people. And all of the things you do in order to move: you sort through your things, you throw out things, you do garage sales or whatever.

Did you stay in the same position in Washington, doing reports?

Held Several Different Positions in the Planning Division, Including Chief of the Reports Coordination Branch and Assistant Chief of the Planning Division

Martin: No, I had several different jobs in the Planning Division. I started out as the reports coordinator for the [Pick-Sloan] Missouri River Basin Program. And at that time, the regions were numbered, and so I was the program coordinator for Regions 6 and 7, the Missouri Basin Project. I worked in that area for a couple of years, and then one of the other people left. At that point I became the coordinator for Region 5 which was headquartered in Amarillo, Texas, *and* for Region 4 which was in Salt Lake City. And then I worked in that for a while and then became the chief of the Reports Coordination Branch when Leon Mesa retired, and I held that position for about two or three years, and then I became the assistant chief of the Planning Division. Jim O'Brien was the chief of the division, and I was the assistant chief of the division until I came to Sacramento as the regional director. (Storey: In?) In 1974.

Storey: Okay, so in that time period, when you were in the Planning Division and moving through the Reports Branch and the rest of the Division, that's the period when we have all the environmental laws beginning to come in, (Martin: Right.) in the United States: National Historic Preservation Act in '66, NEPA in '69, I think the Clean Water Act and various other acts were in that same time period. What did that mean to the Reports Branch and the way they did business?

How Environmental Laws Affected the Work of the Reports Branch and the

Martin: Well, it changed it considerably, because we had more agencies to coordinate with. It was different procedures, planning procedures, different criteria that made it a lot tougher to get things pushed along as the EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] requirements, Clean Water Act requirements, the CEQ, Council on Environmental Quality, things that we had to do to meet the requirements of those different laws, in other words, the environmental laws. It really complicated the planning process from our standpoint, because it just meant that you had a lot more hoops that you had to jump through, and some of them were tough to get through–some of them you *didn't* get through, because the times were changing, and it was just impossible to satisfy some of the criteria or some of the people that were charged with implementing those other agencies, the programs of the other agencies. It was just impossible to meet some of the criteria that they laid out for you.

Storey: When you get into that kind of situation, of course managers make decisions in order to deal with what's in front of them. Were they making decisions to ignore them? Were they just simply ignorant of what was required, and so they got tangled up in them? Or were they saying, "No, we're going to do it," not realizing what was going on? Or were they saying, "Yeah, we're going to do it, *and* we realize . . . ."? You know, what was going on?

"*. . . sometimes* it just takes retirements and funerals in order to bring about some change. There were some people that just couldn't *accept* some of the consequences of the new requirements that we, that they had to meet. But it did certainly complicate things, and it's just made it very difficult at times to try to move things along . . ."

Martin: Well, I think there was probably a combination of a bunch of things–and probably the full range of things from just maybe ignorance of the law, not *liking* the *law*, and being adverse to the change, and just really not being sensitive to the fact that change was needed and was going to be required in order to move a project along. In some instances, it took some training and time–and as I've said on a number of occasions, *sometimes* it just takes retirements and funerals in order to bring about some change. There were some people that just couldn't *accept* some of the consequences of the new requirements that we, that they had to meet. But it did certainly complicate things, and it's just made it very difficult at times to try to move things along, because you have some interest groups that had a lot more muscle. Some of those folks, of course, could influence a lot of voters, which influences politicians, which can complicate the process for you, if you don't try to work through it kind of systematically and try to find ways to accommodate all those different interests.

Storey: Would I be correct in thinking that we had false starts? (Martin: We did.) Thought we were doing what was appropriate, but it really wasn't the right

way to do the thing?

Martin: We did have some of those.

Storey: And I imagine we also had situations where some manager said, "I'm not going to do that."

Martin: We had some of that too.

Storey: Did we get in trouble because of that?

". . . I think some of the problems that we had later came about, and the problems were exacerbated, by some of the attitudes and the actions of some of the people *earlier* that said that they weren't going to do it, and just, 'Run over 'em with a bulldozer, and let's go ahead and build the project.' . . ."

Martin: Some of it, we did. I think some of the problems that we had later came about, and the problems were exacerbated, by some of the attitudes and the actions of some of the people *earlier* that said that they weren't going to do it, and just, "Run over 'em with a bulldozer, and let's go ahead and build the project."

Storey: Are there any specific examples you would be willing to share of that kind of thing?

"I think of Commissioner Dominy . . . had some problems accepting the change. And I saw him on a number of occasions before committees or there around the building when . . . changes were being made . . . that he didn't like . . . And he didn't want to give up on those. And of course he was very strong-willed. But some of the . . . actions that he took, probably were not very helpful to us later on as we were trying to move some aspects of the program . . . because some people didn't trust us. . . ."

Martin: I think of Commissioner Dominy, who I think was an able administrator and a master at getting things done, and handled himself extremely well with political people in hearings and what-have-you–but he had some problems accepting the change. And I saw him on a number of occasions before committees or there around the building when things were happening, changes were being made in the Central Arizona Project that he didn't like, like Marble Canyon and some of the other parts of the project that he thought should be built. And he didn't want to give up on those. And of course he was very strong-willed. But some of the things he did, some of the actions that he took, probably were not very helpful to us later on as we were trying to move some aspects of the program–just make it harder, because some people didn't trust us.

Reclamation Evolved to Deal with Environmental Issues

Storey: Now, how did Reclamation evolve in terms of dealing with the NEPA requirements and so on? Did we eventually have to move people aside in order to get on with business? Or did we go *around* them? How did they tend to deal with that kind of a situation?

"And then, too . . . some members of Congress . . . continued to want projects in their districts . . . and sometimes *those* were maybe a little contrary to what some of the other special interest groups wanted. . . . the O'Neill Unit is probably a good example of that, where the local folks wanted it, the politicians wanted it, but some of the environmental interests did *not* want it, and by that time they were able to muster enough influence in the Congress that they just kind of kept it held at bay until it got to the point where it just cost too much to build . . . it was just not economically feasible. . . ."

Martin: Well, I think some of them were moved aside or were gone around. We, I think, started to bring some people in that had an environmental orientation or environmental background that started to, I think, bring some credibility to the process and to the system. That helped. But then we also had to work around some people or replace some people. And then, too, there were some members of Congress, of course, that continued to want projects in their districts built and pushed, and sometimes *those* were maybe a little contrary to what some of the other special interest groups wanted. One of the projects in Nebraska, the O'Neill Unit is probably a good example of that, where the local folks wanted it, the politicians wanted it, but some of the environmental interests did *not* want it, and by that time they were able to muster enough influence in the Congress that they just kind of kept it held at bay until it got to the point where it just cost too much to build, and it just *died* because it was just not economically feasible.

Storey: One of the characteristics of Reclamation projects is, they take a long time to do. We have the investigation stages, and the planning stages, and then *finally* you get into the *construction* phases. Do you think that caused any particular problems in terms of the environmental movement and that kind of thing?

Martin: It did. Because when you get a project, you plan it, and maybe you get it authorized ten years later, and then you get into construction twenty years later, and the conditions have totally changed from the time the project was conceived until you get around to starting to build the project, and public perception has changed and in some cases, maybe even the public has changed, and the attitudes of the public has changed. So if you could get it authorized and built within ten years, then you're still dealing with the same public that you started out with when you first started planning the project, conceived the project and planned it. But with that much of a time span, things do change: the public changes, attitudes change to a point where (Storey: Public attitudes evolve.) it does really complicate the process.

Storey: Yeah. Let me go back to the planning and reports again. Am I understanding correctly that your branch was actually writing the reports?

Reports Branch Processing of the Reports Prepared in the Field and Forwarded by Regional Offices

Martin: No, in the Reports Branch, we took the reports that had been prepared out in the field . . . Those planning reports are prepared at the field office, sent to the regional office for review and preparation and approval at the regional level. And then the regional director submits that report to the commissioner's office. And at *that* point it came into the Reports Coordination Office in Washington, and then we handled the Washington-level review of the report, and prepared what was known as the "commissioner's report," which was really just a summary of the major aspects of the regional director's report, and then we sent that out for review at the Washington level, and got the comments on it, prepared it then, as a draft of the "secretary's report." That's what we sent out then to the other departments and to the states under the '44 Flood Control Act, for review and comment. And then when we got all those comments back, then we prepared it as the "secretary's final report," sent it to OMB for approval as an administration report, for submittal to the Congress.

Storey: Where does the chief engineer's office fit into all of this?

Reviews of Reports in the Chief Engineer's Office

Martin: They reviewed it at the same time that we sent it out to other offices within the department.

Storey: So they were not between the region and the commissioner's office?

Martin: They did review it before the regional director sent it in.

Storey: Oh, so the regional director provided a review to them, I see.

Martin: Yes, he gave them an opportunity to review, and then we gave them another look at it when we sent it out within the department for review.

Storey: So then once you have comments back from the other agencies, and from within the department, did the Washington office make the changes? or was it sent back to the project office for *them* to make the changes?

Martin: The Washington Office made the changes, and those changes were made by that reports coordinator. We took all the comments that we got, we didn't make changes within the regional director's report, but we had that ten- or twelve-page commissioner's report or the secretary's report that we just laid right on top and stapled to the outside cover of the regional director's report and that's where we made the changes. We would send it out within the

Reclamation office there in the commissioner's office as the commissioner's *draft* report, and we'd get comments back on that. Then we'd put it together as the commissioner's *final* report, and then prepare and lay on top of that a draft of the secretary's report, and send that to all the offices, the agencies within the department. And we also sent it to the other departments that had responsibility for it, as well as the states. And then when we got those comments back we put together the *final* secretary's report and sent that to OMB.

Storey: So really, what we have is a document with about three distinct sections in it.

Martin: Right, two of them stapled on top.

Storey: Right. Okay. And I presume then that a reports coordinator was contacting the project office, contacting the regional office saying, "These are the comments, these are the kinds of changes we think we need to make," making sure that those were going to fly at those levels–is that right?

Martin: When we got those comments back, we did send them out to the regions and let them take a look at them, and they would give us their reaction to it. And some of them, if it was warranted, we would have some of the folks from the project office or the regional office come in, and we would sit down with the people that had made the comments and work through them if they were significant enough. Some of them, if they were really not significant, didn't have any real impact on the project, we'd just *ignore* it and not include it. But most of the comments we did try to accommodate, work in, and incorporate into the report.

Storey: Okay. Well, that's interesting how these things are coordinated in a hierarchical organization.

One of the things that Reclamation is trying to work on now is having fewer reviews. Some things go through ten different reviews, I'm told. How did these reports get reviewed to assure that they met policy and law and so on? Was that initially a responsibility at the project level, which was *checked* at the region and at the commissioner's office, or how did that work?

Martin: When the report is prepared, it's prepared with a set of procedures that have been developed, based on interpretations of the reclamation law and the policies that have been developed by the administration. And hopefully, the project has followed those procedures to the point where the project has been studied, the report's been prepared, in compliance with the law and the policies. And then the regional office will review it from that standpoint–or they *did* review it from that standpoint. The chief's [chief engineer's] office also reviewed it from a technical standpoint, as well as from–they were supposed to just confine themselves to technical review. A lot of times, they

didn't, they also got into policy from the legal review. And then at the commissioner's office and the Washington office, it was reviewed more carefully there, and primarily from a policy and a legal standpoint. But there was some overlap in the review.

Storey: One of the things I'm interested in, if you can give me any idea of it–I don't know whether it varies so much that you can't do that–is the amount of time it took to prepare reports from the project level so that they came into the commissioner's office. And then more specifically to your *experience*, the amount of time it actually took for the commissioner's office to process a report once it came into the Reports Branch.

The Amount of Time Required to Process a Report

Martin: Well, most of the reports, the time depended to a very large extent on the political appeal of the project. If there was a lot of political interest in it, or depending on the politician that was interested in it, it could move fairly quickly. But probably just in general terms, when a report came in and it would take, oh, we'd have about a thirty-day review within the Washington office. When the report was prepared, say, would take a week or two to sift through the report, prepare the commissioner's draft report, and then we would send that out within the Bureau for about a thirty-day review. We would get that back, prepare the commissioner's final report–that might take a couple of weeks to sift through the comments and get things worked out, on the average two to three weeks. And then prepare the secretary's draft report, send that out within the department, and that probably normally would take about sixty days to do that, get all the comments back. And then when we prepared the secretary's report and sent that out to the states and the other Federal agencies, I believe under the Flood Control Act of '44 that a ninety-day period was required for that, or allowed for that. And then say that ninety-day period usually turned out to be probably more like 120 days by the time we got all the comments back. And we didn't move anything until we at least had the comments from the state in which the project was going to be located. And we then would work through those. Working through those might take, in some cases, maybe a couple or three months to get worked through, to get to OMB. Probably at OMB, as a rule, it'd take about sixty days to get anything back from them.

END SIDE 1, TAPE 2. MARCH 17, 1994.
BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE 2. MARCH 17, 1994.

Storey: . . . OMB about sixty days, I think you said?

Martin: About sixty days at OMB, and then maybe another thirty to forty-five days once we got it back from OMB to get it processed and run it through the secretary's office for signature to send it up to the Congress for consideration. I didn't keep very close track of those times.

Storey: Well, they're getting well over 300 days! (laughs)

Martin: Right. I thought it was probably approaching a year.

Storey: Yeah, right around a year, it sounds like.

"There was at least one time that I can remember on a change of administration, we took a shopping cart down to the assistant secretary's office and pulled out *all* of the planning reports that he had just stuffed in a closet when they came down to him and . . . brought them back. We had to make two trips with a shopping cart to move them all back upstairs. And most of these were for political reasons . . ."

Martin: And that's if things moved along, if there weren't a lot of problems with it. There were a lot of project reports that would get maybe to the assistant secretary's office, and for one reason or another, probably more political than anything else, it would be held up and just not sent forward. There was at least one time that I can remember on a change of administration, we took a shopping cart down to the assistant secretary's office and pulled out *all* of the planning reports that he had just stuffed in a closet when they came down to him and didn't move and brought them back. We had to make two trips with a shopping cart to move them all back upstairs. And most of these were for political reasons, for one reason or another, mostly politically-based.

Storey: Do you happen to remember any specific projects that came through where you coordinated the report? Especially maybe an easy one that went through well, and maybe an example of one where there were difficulties.

Oahe Project in South Dakota

Martin: Well, I remember several of them that went through, but one that I probably remember more clearly, or it comes immediately to mind, is the Oahe Project in South Dakota. Ken Holum was the assistant secretary at the time, and he happened to *be* from South Dakota. That was a fairly *major* project, *large* project, that took water out of the Missouri River to irrigate, as I recall, about a half-million acres of land in South Dakota. I believe at the time Stewart Udall was the secretary, and Floyd Dominy was the commissioner. The reports on that project moved very smoothly, very quickly through the administration process because, of course, Dominy was a real advocate of Reclamation and he moved things along. Holum, of course being from South Dakota, wanted to move the project along, he didn't want anything held up on it. So it moved very quickly through the department. We had a very quick turnaround from the states in the review under the '44 Act; got to OMB and there we saw a lot of pressure put on OMB by the folks in the department to get that review completed so we could get the report prepared and up to the Hill. So that one moved very quickly, and with very few problems, until it got to the Hill, and then that's where you also get into a lot

of the issues, a lot of problems, kind of depending on the political people that are involved.

Storey: During your period in Washington, let's see, about seven or eight years, I think, (Martin: Right.) you must have known a number of different assistant secretaries. Was it for water and power at that time?

Martin: Yes, it was for water and power at that time.

Storey: Who were they? What were they like?

Ken Holum as Assistant Secretary for Water and Power

Martin: Well, when I went back there, Lyndon Johnson was President. Ken Holum was the assistant secretary for water and power, and Ken was an advocate of Reclamation, particularly in South Dakota, and had some good contacts on the Hill and was a pretty effective assistant secretary. He also played the political game pretty well. He was the one that we carted all those reports back from when he left office.

Jim Smith as Assistant Secretary

Jim Smith was the assistant secretary in [President Richard M.] Nixon's first term.

Jim Watt Was Deputy Assistant Secretary

And Jim Watt was his deputy. Although I had a good personal relationship with Jim Smith and liked him very much, the general feeling was that Jim Watt was really the assistant secretary for water and power, and Jim Smith was in the job because some political folks wanted him in there and didn't want Jim Watt in the job. But it was kind of the general feeling that Jim Watt *was* the assistant secretary for water and Power.

Jack Horton as Assistant Secretary

Following Jim Watt, Jack . . . From Saddlestring, Wyoming–his last name escapes me right now–but he was a young Rhodes Scholar type, he kind of had a playboy reputation, and spent most of his weekends back in Wyoming.[14] He seemed to kind of be looking for a reason to get out of Washington, back out West. And he was a very personable person, and was well-liked. He and I got along extremely well, and I would consider him a friend. But I don't know that he was all that effective, really, as an assistant secretary for water and power.

Guy Martin as Assistant Secretary and His Deputy Dan Beard

14. Jack Horton.

And then when the Carter Administration came in, Guy Martin was the assistant secretary, and Dan Beard[15] was his deputy.

". . . it was during that administration where things really started to take a real noticeable turn [to] more the environmental orientation standpoint with some of the folks that were appointed at the White House and in the department. . . ."

And it was during that administration where things really started to take a real noticeable turn [to] more the environmental orientation standpoint with some of the folks that were appointed at the White House and in the department.

"Guy Martin seemed to be of the type that was *not* a friend of Reclamation and maybe looked for ways to try to either not build things or to change the purposes of projects that were authorized. . . ."

Guy Martin seemed to be of the type that was *not* a friend of Reclamation and maybe looked for ways to try to either not build things or to change the purposes of projects that were authorized.

Garrey Carruthers as Assistant Secretary

And then following Guy in the ~~Nixon~~ administration where Jim Watt came in as secretary . . . . (Storey: The Reagan administration?) In the *Reagan* administration, Jim Watt came in as secretary. I was trying to remember who came in first as the assistant secretary. I guess it was Garrey Carruthers from New Mexico. And of course Garrey was a gregarious person, very friendly, very easy to work with, very bright, and had a way of dealing with people that even if you didn't agree with him, you felt pretty good about having dealt with him. And I thought he did some things that I thought were constructive. In some respects, you kind of felt that he was in that position waiting until he could go run for ~~the~~ governor of New Mexico, which he did, and won.

John Sayre as Assistant Secretary

And then following Gary, John Sayre came in as the assistant secretary. And I had known John for several years when he was in the law firm in Denver and was very active in the National Water Resources Association activities.

Jim Ziegler as Assistant Secretary

By the way, I should back up a little bit. Jim Ziegler was in as

15. Interviews of Dan Beard are included in Reclamation's oral history program.

assistant secretary before John was in. And Jim came in from the financial banking world, and very personable, very astute politician, and, I thought, pushed the administration's positions very effectively, and was instrumental in bringing about some change that I thought was helpful.

Then John Sayre followed Jim in the job. John I had known, of course, several years. He was active in the National Water Resources Association activities. He was also a lawyer in a Denver firm. They represented the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District and other districts, so he was a good water lawyer, understood water law, understood the benefits of Reclamation. I kind of had the feeling, though, that maybe John maybe was not really, from a health standpoint as much as anything else, maybe was not totally into the job as much as he would have been if he hadn't had some of the health problems. I thought he did make a good effort carrying out the responsibilities of the job. And from a personal standpoint, I had a very high regard for him, a lot of respect for John personally, as well as for his knowledge of water and Reclamation.

Storey: One person you sort of skipped over was Jim Watt. Could I get you to characterize the way he dealt with people and managed programs and things?

Jim Watt as Secretary of the Interior

Martin: Well, Jim–there again, I think Jim was very bright, a very bright man. I didn't think he dealt with people extremely well. He had some very *definite* ideas on what needed to be done, or what should be done, or what *shouldn't* be done. And once he had his mind made up, it was very difficult to turn him around, to change his mind.

Storey: Did he listen to advice in making his decisions?

"I kind of gathered that he [Jim Watt] probably made up his own mind and didn't listen too well. Sometimes it appeared to me he came into a situation with his mind already made up, before he heard all the facts. . . ."

Martin: I kind of gathered that he probably made up his own mind and didn't listen too well. Sometimes it appeared to me he came into a situation with his mind already made up, before he heard all the facts.

Storey: Well, we're really at the end of our time. You've done this for almost two hours now, and I really appreciate it. I'd like to ask you whether you're willing for the cassette tapes and the transcripts from this interview to be used by Reclamation researchers and by researchers from outside of Reclamation.

Martin: Yes, I'm willing to do that.

Storey: Good, I appreciate it. Thank you very much!

END SIDE 2, TAPE 2. MARCH 17, 1994.
BEGIN SIDE 1, TAPE 1. SEPTEMBER 1, 1994.

Storey: This is Brit Allan Storey, senior historian of the Bureau of Reclamation interviewing Bill E. Martin in the regional offices of the Mid-Pacific Region on September the 1st, 1994, at about 8:30 in the morning. This is tape 1.

Moved into the Reports Coordination Branch in Washington in 1967

As I recall, you moved to Washington in 1967 as a regional representative, was that it?

Coordinated Reports from the Missouri River Basin

Martin: Yeah, we had a group called the Reports Coordination Branch within the Division of Planning in the commissioner's office. And that Reports Coordination Branch–I suppose they just couldn't think of anything else to call it, so they called it that. It really turned out to be a lot of things. But when planning reports would come in from the regional offices there was a reports coordinator assigned to each of the seven regions, and my area of responsibility was the Missouri River Basin which was then made up of Regions 6 and 7. Later called the Upper and Lower Missouri Regions and we coordinated those reports through the Federal agencies with the affected states so that we were sure that we had all of the interested states or the affected Federal agencies had an opportunity to comment on those reports *before* they were sent to Congress as to whether or not the supported the project or if there were problems that we hadn't uncovered in the planning process.

Testifying on Bills Before the Congress

Then once the report was processed through the department, through OMB, and then up to the Congress, then someone would introduce a bill to authorize the project for construction if it hadn't already been introduced. And we would develop the testimony that would be used by the commissioner or whoever was representing him or the secretary or assistant secretary when they went up and appeared before the committee to testify on behalf of that project. We would coordinate the development of all the testimony and then went along to kind of sit behind the commissioner, and we had a witness book as the committee members would ask questions, we would kind of flip through the book, find the subject with an answer to questions if we had anticipated correctly and pull the page out of the book and hand it up to the commissioner for him to use in answering the questions. That was kind of one of the major roles of a reports coordinator within the Planning Division.

Storey: And at that time the commissioner would have been Floyd Dominy?

Floyd Dominy as Commissioner

Martin: Floyd Dominy, um-hmm.

Storey: What was he like to work with?

"My experience with Floyd was very good. Of course, he was very articulate. He was a quick study. Somebody could ask him a question. He would start filibustering if he didn't know the answer, and a lot of times he did because he just had had a lot of exposure. . . . if he didn't, he would just start talking, [we'd] flick through the book, hand him up a page with some information on it, and he would just slide from his filibustering right into the answer to the question. And you'd never knew when he made the transition. . . ."

Martin: Well, it probably would depend–you'd probably get as many answers as you asked people. My experience with Floyd was very good. Of course, he was very articulate. He was a quick study. Somebody could ask him a question. He would start filibustering if he didn't know the answer, and a lot of times he did because he just had had a lot of exposure. But if he didn't, he would just start talking, [we'd] flick through the book, hand him up a page with some information on it, and he would just slide from his filibustering right into the answer to the question. And you'd never knew when he made the transition.

". . . I never saw him when he was really agitated or mad, and some people did. They said he could really throw a tantrum, but I never saw that happen. . . ."

And I found him very enjoyable to work with because he was a very bright man, and he was very dedicated to the cause. And I never saw him when he was really agitated or mad, and some people did. They said he could really throw a tantrum, but I never saw that happen.

". . . we were preparing for a hearing on the Oahe Project . . . We had all the materials, maps, and everything set up in Dominy's office . . . and Holum called and Dominy got on the phone with him . . . Holum evidently had said, 'Well, why don't you come down to my office, and let's have the briefing here,' because he wanted to sit in on it. And Dominy said, 'No, we're set up here. Come on up,' and just hung up. And turned around and said 'Who's he think he is the commissioner of Reclamation?' . . ."

I remember one time, though, that we were preparing for a hearing on the Oahe Project that was in South Dakota, and Holum was the assistant secretary for water and power. He was from South Dakota. We had all the materials, maps, and everything set up in Dominy's office to brief the commissioner prior to the hearing the next day, and Holum called and Dominy got on the phone with him, of course I heard one side of it, and

Holum evidently had said, "Well, why don't you come down to my office, and let's have the briefing here," because he wanted to sit in on it. And Dominy said, "No, we're set up here. Come on up," and just hung up. And turned around and said "Who's he think he is the commissioner of Reclamation?" (Storey: Just a Congressman, huh?) No assistant secretary.

Storey: OK. I lost him. So you didn't find him particularly difficult to work with?

"He was demanding. He wanted the job done right. But, I didn't find him difficult to work for. Now some people did. And some people were just frightened to death of him. . . ."

Martin: No, I didn't. He was demanding. He wanted the job done right. But, I didn't find him difficult to work for. Now some people did. And some people were just frightened to death of him. They just were almost afraid to breathe in his presence it seemed, but I never saw that side of him.

Storey: What do you think he was looking for in staffers.

Martin: Oh, I think he was looking for people that would–think he really found it refreshing to find someone that would maybe challenge him on some things and had some ideas of their own and weren't afraid to present them.

Storey: An interesting person in Reclamation's history. Were you for instance, let's see Missouri River–you wouldn't have been involved in Glen Canyon. (Martin: No.) Were there any other big issues in your area that you were involved in?

Worked on Oahe, Garrison, North Loup, Narrows Unit, and Fryingpan-Arkansas Projects

Martin: Well, the ones that I was involved with in the Missouri at the time was Oahe, Garrison, the North Loup out in Nebraska, we were also working on the Narrows Unit in Colorado. And then we continued to have things going on the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project although it was already under construction. We were trying to make some changes in the plan. Shifting from seven run of the river powerplants to one big pump-back storage unit. Putting all the capacity in one plant. (Storey: On the Fry-Ark.[16]) On the Fry-Ark. And that was rather interesting, and we had a lot of planning going on at the time. I really don't recall how many different planning programs we had projects under in the planning process. Anywhere from the recon level all the way up to advanced planning.

Storey: Did you do lots of traveling?

Did Very Little Travel While Working in Washington, D.C.

16. Fry-Ark is Reclamation-speak for the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project in Colorado.

Martin: No, I didn't. As a matter of fact, I did very little back there. Most of what we were supposed to do was right there in Washington. They did send us out, oh, maybe about once a year, once every two years, so we could get out and take a look at some of the area first hand so we had a little better idea as to what we were talking about or writing about when we were sitting back in Washington. (Storey: Um-hmm.) But the preponderance of the time was right there in the office or in and around town.

Storey: Well, how did . . . I don't know if this is the right way to say it, but how did reports develop. Where did the *need* to do a report come from, and what were the steps that that report went through in order to find its way to you and to ultimately wherever it went to?

Levels of Reclamation Planning Reports and How They Originated

". . . the Bureau had general authority to reconnaissance level, or sub-feasibility studies, and we had a line item in our budget for general planning activities. . . ."

Martin: Well the way they came into being, either the Bureau had general authority to reconnaissance level, or sub-feasibility studies, and we had a line item in our budget for general planning activities. We could do studies under that line item. And usually they came from some local organization, local irrigation district or local community or the state asking us to come in and do a study–take a look at it, see if it would warrant or meet Federal criteria as a Federal project. And then sometimes the congressional member would ask that–the local folks would go through their congressman thinking that would give it a little more pizzazz or a get a little more attention–which it usually did.

After a Reconnaissance Study Reclamation Might Be Tasked to Do a Feasibility Study

Then we would do a reconnaissance study, and if we found that it *met* showed enough feasiblity that it warranted further study, then the congressman, or sometimes the administration, would ask that a project be put into a feasibility study bill. Or if the administration didn't ask for it, the congressman in most instances would just add it in.

Preparing and Processing Planning Reports

Then Congress would authorize those projects for feasibility study, and then we would put those in our budget. Or, if we didn't put them in, Congress would add it on, and then our folks out in the field would do the feasibility study, and as part of the process of preparing those studies they worked both at the reconnaissance and at the feasibility level quite closely with the local

folks and with the state in which the project was located. And they would coordinate locally, get local reviews of the report, and then it would be processed through Denver, through, at that time, the chief engineer's office, later the Engineering Research Center, and they would look at it from a technical sufficiency standpoint. Does it meet the technical requirements of the Bureau? Does it meet the procedures that have been laid out? And then it would be sent back to the commissioner's office for processing, and there it was reviewed from the legal standpoint–does it meet the legal requirements of a project and then would be coordinated with all of the Interior agencies first to see whether or not there was a problem with Fish and Wildlife or if one of the other Interior agencies. And if it passed that little test, then we would send it out to *all* the Federal agencies *and* to the affected states at the same time and ask them to review and get comments on it. Then we would, when we got all those comments back, we would prepare what we called a "commissioner's report" and just really do a summary of the planning report itself. And we'd try to hold it to about eight to ten pages and just lay that on top of the planning report. And then after we got the comments back from the states and Federal agencies, then we did what we called the "secretary's report," and that was just a further summarization of the commissioner's report, and maybe three pages, and we'd lay that right on top of that.

". . . then we'd send it to OMB and ask for approval to send it to the Hill . . . Sometimes they made it through OMB; sometimes they just got over there and just died; and sometimes they'd get over to OMB and try to die and the congressman would intervene and get it pried out so it could be sent up. Or, they would ask that we would send them a copy of the report that had not been approved by OMB, and they would on the basis of that report introduce a bill to authorize the project. . . ."

And then we'd send it to OMB and ask for approval to send it to the Hill for consideration for authorization. Sometimes they made it through OMB; sometimes they just got over there and just died; and sometimes they'd get over to OMB and try to die and the congressman would intervene and get it pried out so it could be sent up. Or, they would ask that we would send them a copy of the report that had not been approved by OMB, and they would on the basis of that report introduce a bill to authorize the project. And there were some projects that were authorized in spite of the administration's position, but most of the time they pretty well went through that process. But sometimes there were some that were short circuited.

Storey: Tell me about a short circuiting–do you happen to remember one in particular?

McGee Creek in Oklahoma

Martin: Well, now, this one, having to go through the process, it was just a short timeframe, but there was a project, I believe it was called McGee Creek in

Oklahoma, and Carl Albert was the speaker of the house, and that one–the process was shortened immensely. The report was processed, authorized, and funded, I believe, in one year, which normally takes many years to go through that gauntlet. I don't remember a specific project where the process was short circuited, but it happened–well, it wasn't unusual.

Storey: Yeah, it gets speeded up for political reasons mostly, I guess. One of the things I'm interested in trying to explore is how the different components of Reclamation interacted with one another and how different components knew the boundaries of their responsibilities and how they interacted and all that kind of stuff. I'd like to go back and go over the report process a little bit. Prior to the feasibility report was all of that done at the regional office or at the local project office? Where was that done?

". . . most of the actual planning work was done out in the project offices, out at the field level. . . ."

Martin: In the early days, well, back in the 60s and early in the 70s most of the actual planning work was done out in the project offices, out at the field level. Then there were some cases where their program was such that they operated more at the regional level, but for the most part the actual planning work was done at the project level.

Reviews of Draft Reconnaissance Reports Occurred at the Region and Engineering and Research Center Before the Reports Came to Washington, D.C., for Distribution and Review Outside Reclamation

And then a draft of the report would be sent from the project to the regional office where it would receive a review by the regional office. And there they reviewed it from a technical *and* from the legal standpoint–whether or not it had been done according to the procedures and the law. And then from there it would go on to the chief's office, or the Engineering Research Center later, where they gave it strictly a technical review. Were the assumptions that they made, say, from an economic standpoint were they realistic; did they follow the procedures that had been laid out by the Water Resources Council or other organizations that might have been developing procedures for the Government-wide at that time. And then after it made those reviews at the, kind of the local level, then it would be sent by the regional director to the commissioner for review and processing in Washington

Storey: So did the project offices then have planning staffs that were qualified to do this kind of thing.

Martin: Yes. But when I started with the Bureau in '62, I started in Grand Island as an ag economist and we were–that's all we did was work on planning reports for different projects. Going out and doing the fieldwork and collecting the data that was needed then to prepare the report.

Storey: Did the reports get changed as they went through these reviews?

". . . we talked one time about how the numbers are developed, and I have heard on occasion from the contracting people in talking to the planners 'We can't negotiate a repayment number that high. Add another tractor to your farm budget so you'll hold the repayment capability down.' And so those might have been cooked a little bit. . . ."

Martin: They would get changed occasionally. For the most part, though, the changes were not to significant in a lot of cases. Sometimes there would be some fairly significant changes. I think we talked one time about how the numbers are developed, and I have heard on occasion from the contracting people in talking to the planners "We can't negotiate a repayment number that high. Add another tractor to your farm budget so you'll hold the repayment capability down." And so those might have been cooked a little bit. (Storey: Um-hmm.)

Storey: So far, right, we've been talking about the pre-feasibility study? (Martin: Um-hmm.) Okay. Did the nature of where the work was done change when you got to the feasibility study?

"The feasibility study was still done at the project level and followed essentially the same process internally as the reconnaissance study. . . ."

Martin: No. The feasibility study was still done at the project level and followed essentially the same process internally as the reconnaissance study. It would be prepared in draft from at the project level, sent in to the region for review, to the chief's office for review, and then once it was approved at the regional level, then it was called the "regional director's report."

". . . then that was sent to the commissioner's office as the regional director's report. And it was processed . . . as the commissioner's report, and at the commissioner level is where it made all of the Interior agencies for review. Then if it passed that review process, then it would be processed as a draft of the secretary's report, and that was when it was sent to all the other Federal agencies *and* to the affected states. . . ."

And then that was sent to the commissioner's office as the regional director's report. And it was processed back there, then, as the commissioner's report, and at the commissioner level is where it made all of the Interior agencies for review. Then if it passed that review process, then it would be processed as a draft of the secretary's report, and that was when it was sent to all the other Federal agencies *and* to the affected states.

Storey: And then, maybe ultimately, to Congress after OMB got done with it.

Martin: And after we got all the comments back from the Federal agencies and the states and we put the report together in the form as the secretary's report,

then it went to OMB for review with a request for their approval to send it to Congress for consideration of authorization.

Storey: And then it would be authorized and maybe appropriated. Do you have any sense of how many things went to the Congress for authorization and appropriation–how many actually were? Was it a high percentage, low percentage, a hundred percent, what?

" . . . I would imagine of the things that were conceived, I would guess maybe probably less than ten percent got to the Hill. . . .

Martin: No, there was probably, I would imagine of the things that were conceived, I would guess maybe probably less than ten percent got to the Hill.

Storey: So they were sifted out at either the project, regional, or commissioner, or assistant secretary level

Martin: . . . assistant secretary or OMB, um-hmm.

after authorization

Storey Now once something was authorized *and* appropriated, Reclamation was moving forward with it. Then where did the work center in terms of design and development of the project as a reality.

". . . the activity still was focused . . . for a while, at the project level, because . . . They were getting into the collection of data to design the project, and that was still done at the project level, but . . . the E&R Center, the chief's office, was getting more involved in it, and in some instances there would be a construction office set up, and they would kind of ride herd on collecting that design information. And, of course, a lot of times, too, the project office would continue to be involved until that advanced planning report was done and . . . They really started to turn dirt. . . ."

Martin: Well, at that point the activity still was focused, at least for a while, at the project level, because they were what we called advanced planning–or kind of pre-design. They were getting into the collection of data to design the project, and that was still done at the project level, but Denver was getting more . . . the E&R Center, the chief's office, was getting more involved in it, and in some instances there would be a construction office set up, and they would kind of ride herd on collecting that design information. And, of course, a lot of times, too, the project office would continue to be involved until that advanced planning report was done and the project actually into the construction phase. They really started to turn dirt. But the focal point was still at the local level with, probably, more involvement in the way of people coming out to the site from Denver.

Storey: So the construction office would be part of a projects office?

Martin: In some cases it was. In some cases it was just a separate office reporting to the folks in Denver or in the folks to the regional office. Probably in most instances, probably through the regional director. But there was a lot of direct contact between Denver and the construction office.

Storey: Now at that time, when you went to Washington, during the '60s, '70s, how did the chief engineer relate to the commissioner, relate to the projects, and so on?

Interactions among Reclamation's Executives

Martin: At that time I don't remember whether the title was "chief engineer and assistant commissioner" or whether that came a little later. I don't remember the timing on that.[17] But there was the commissioner and the regional directors and the chief engineer were the key folks involved in the process from a Bureau standpoint. And I think from a *planning* and an operations standpoint, or a project operational standpoint, the commissioner looked for input and had a strong relationship with the regional directors. When it came to construction then I think the commissioner and the chief engineer had more direct contact, I believe. I think the construction issues tended that had to go up to that level tended to be between the commissioner and the chief engineer rather than coming through the regional directors.

Storey: But, for instance, the chief engineer did not control the construction at all? (Martin: No.) Or anything like that?

Martin: Not technically. But I think there was a lot of coordination, liaison between the construction engineer and the folks in the chief engineer's office. So that technically the construction was managed through the regional office.

Storey: I'm hearing that the commissioner's level, I think, reports were sent out for review by other Interior agencies. And, of course, a couple of other major Interior agencies were Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service. Now at the time you were there NEPA had not been passed, National Environmental Policy Act.

Martin: It was passed while I was there.

Storey: *Before* NEPA were environmental concerns being taken into account in Reclamation planning.

Environmental Concerns and the Effect of NEPA on Them

Martin: They were, not to the extent that they were later on, and in some cases they probably were just ignored, but they, even when I got there in '67, the late '60s, there was an office within Interior that was called "water quality

17. See footnote on page 181.

control," I believe, and that later was pulled out, and, I think, eventually it was what ended up as EPA. And then, of course, with the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Park Service or the National Marine Fisheries, those agencies made us aware of some of the environmental issues, or the Forest Service outside the Department of the Interior. But there certainly was not the sensitivity to it that there is today, but the

END SIDE 1, TAPE 1. SEPTEMBER 1, 1994.
BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE 2. SEPTEMBER 1, 1994.

Storey: So environmental issues were being considered to a certain extent.

Environmental Issues at the State Level and the Peripheral Canal in California

Martin: To some extent. And they were to some extent at the state level.

". . .the Peripheral Canal, for example. . . . if you didn't have a good solid state support for a project, then it just wouldn't get the time of day in Washington. The Congress just wouldn't even consider it, and if the administration had any inkling that Congress was not going to support it or that it would be dead when it arrived, then they had other things that they could do. There was no limit to the demand for money for project development. So, they tried to not spend a lot of time . . . where they knew that one would be dead when it got there. . . ."

We had an instance or two of a project here in California–the Peripheral Canal, for example. And there was not unanimity of thought at state level, and if you didn't have a good solid state support for a project, then it just wouldn't get the time of day in Washington. The Congress just wouldn't even consider it, and if the administration had any inkling that Congress was not going to support it or that it would be dead when it arrived, then they had other things that they could do. There was no limit to the demand for money for project development. So, they tried to not spend a lot of time on those [projects], or just waste time, where they knew that one would be dead when it got there.

Storey: That's interesting. Do you remember any issues where environmental issues actually substantially shaped the project for instance?

". . . the Central Arizona Project . . . there were a lot of other facilities that the commissioners and some of the local folks would have liked to have built . . . including the Marble Canyon Dam and I think there were a couple of others that they were looking at to build. And those were eliminated because of environmental issues. . . ."

Martin: Let's see. I don't remember one when I was in Washington that I was directly involved in. But the Central Arizona Project was to some extent, because there were a lot of other facilities that the commissioners and some

of the local folks would have liked to have built along with that Central Arizona Project, including the Marble Canyon Dam and I think there were a couple of others that they were looking at to build. And those were eliminated because of environmental issues.

Storey: How long were you in Washington?

Martin: Seven years. I was there from '67–I left in about April of '74.

Storey: Uh-huh, and were you working on reports coordination all of that time?

" . . . I think I had about every job in the Planning Division while I was back there–or a good many of them. . . ."

Martin: No, I think I had about every job in the Planning Division while I was back there–or a good many of them. I started out as the reports coordinator for the Missouri River Basin. Then after I'd done that for awhile then I rotated over and coordinated the reports for the Texas area, the Southwest Region. And the Salt Lake region and the Lower Colorado Region. Then I moved from there to chief of the Reports Coordination Branch, and then I was in that job for a couple of years, or less, something on that order. Then I moved up to the assistant chief of the Planning Division. Jim O'Brien was the chief of the Planning Division.

". . . some vacancies were occurring. There was a vacancy at the assistant commissioner's level . . . and Gil Stamm was the commissioner. He wanted Jim O'Brien to be the assistant commissioner so Jim was up acting assistant commissioner , and I was acting chief of the Planning Division. Then it was at that time that Jim was finally made the assistant commissioner, and I came out here as the regional director in 1974. . . ."

That was about the time there were some vacancies were occurring. There was a vacancy at the assistant commissioner's level, Warren Fairchild,[18] who had been the assistant commissioner, left, went to the World Bank, and Gil Stamm was the commissioner. He wanted Jim O'Brien to be the assistant commissioner so Jim was up acting assistant commissioner , and I was acting chief of the Planning Division. Then it was at that time that Jim was finally made the assistant commissioner, and I came out here as the regional director in 1974.[19]

Storey: So you were in the reports coordination, basically, for seven years (Martin: Right.) though you moved through different positions within it. Did you see any effects of the National Environmental Policy Act in those early years? It would have been about five years, I guess.

18. Interviews of Warren Fairchild are included in Reclamation's oral history program.
19. Referring to the Mid-Pacific Region in Sacramento.

Martin: I did, well, about the time the act was passes there was some minor amount before that, but you really didn't notice it that much until after the act was passed. There was a lot of letters or cards or mail-ins, things like that, from some of the environmental groups, but most of those at that time were coupons or little forms that had been printed in some of the environmental groups' magazines, and you could just clip them out, paste them on a postcard, or stick them in an envelope, and send them in. And I believe in connection with the Central Arizona Project and the things that were being suggested to be done to the Grand Canyon prompted five or six thousand of those cards and letters with that little coupon or that little form clipped out and pasted on, that were opposing that type of thing. That's where I saw most of that kind of activity. Then after the NEPA was passed, we saw change start to take place in the process that we had to go through, and some of those early impact statements that we did were pretty cursory by comparison to the product today.

Storey: In between Stamm and Dominy, there was Ellis Armstrong in there. Did you work with him?

Liked Ellis Armstrong but Didn't Think Him a Strong Commissioner

Martin: I did. I worked with Ellis and sometimes very closely. We did have a few projects that we got reports that were up on the Hill so we had to go up and testify on those, and so on several occasions I worked with him kind of elbow to elbow.

Storey: Was he a lot different than Dominy.

Martin: He was totally different to Dominy although he was one of those that had a very strong development orientation. He was not the politician that Floyd was. He was not as smooth as Floyd. Yeah, he was just totally different.

Storey: How did you like working with him?

Martin: Oh, I enjoyed working with him. I didn't find him–he wasn't very effective as a commissioner, but I didn't mind–I didn't have any problem working with him.

Storey: Did you get any insights on why Dominy left?

Floyd Dominy as Commissioner

Martin: Well, I really didn't have any personal knowledge, but kind of what you heard was that it got to the point where it was embarrassing to his support in Congress to continue supporting him because of his morals or because of his conduct with women. (Storey: Oh yeah, there are a lot of stories about that in Reclamation about that.) Right. And I don't know that to be the fact. The was just some of the stories that were going around.

Storey: Dominy was, I'd think you'd feel safe in describing him as a very strong personality? (Martin: Oh yes, he was very strong.) Now I've heard stories in Reclamation that he was sort of a poker playing, drinking buddy of key congressmen and senators. Do you know anything about that?

Martin: Well, I don't have personal knowledge that he was the poker playing, drinking buddies with them. I guess I wouldn't be surprised. I would be more surprised if he wasn't because he was a very gregarious individual, and he liked to drink, and I would imagine he liked to play poker. And I *know* that he liked to work very closely with members of Congress and court them and try to keep them in his arena–in his corner. And I *have* seen him when he would go up to pay a visit to Wayne Aspinall or one of the other who was the ranking member on the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee and was chairman of that committee.

". . . I've seen him when he would go up to pay a visit to Wayne [Aspinall] he would have a paperweight or a little pen and pencil set that the base had been made out of a concrete boring from one of the dams or something in Wayne's area, and he would give it to him. So he knew how to deal with politicians, and he was very good at it, and he used it very effectively. . . ."

And I've seen him when he would go up to pay a visit to Wayne he would have a paperweight or a little pen and pencil set that the base had been made out of a concrete boring from one of the dams or something in Wayne's area, and he would give it to him. So he knew how to deal with politicians, and he was very good at it, and he used it very effectively. And I guess I wouldn't be surprised if he didn't also drink and play poker with them.

Storey: So you saw him outside the formal committee settings? (Martin: Um-hmm.) Was he on a first name basis with these folks. (Martin: Um-hmm, yes.) Okay. Good, that's interesting. After Armstrong came Straus, how was Straus as a commissioner. (Martin: You mean Stamm.) I'm sorry, yeah. Straus was a little bit different.

Gil Stamm as Commissioner

Martin: And here's a–Stamm was different, too, than Armstrong. Of course, Gil grew up with the organization. He'd been at the regional level had several jobs there in the commissioner's office there in Washington, and he was very highly thought of, very highly regarded by a lot of people. He was just a likeable person. He was not the strong personality that Dominy was, but he had his act together a little more than Ellis did.

". . . was kind of known by some folks, or visualized by some folks, as being a precedent-type commissioner. If it had been done before, it was doable again. If it hadn't been done before, then there probably wasn't any use trying it. . . ."

He was kind of known by some folks, or visualized by some folks, as being

a precedent-type commissioner. If it had been done before, it was doable again. If it hadn't been done before, then there probably wasn't any use trying it. So he probably wasn't that innovative, but I think he was an effective commissioner. Of course, the big problem was Teton Dam, and a change of administration.

"If it hadn't been for Teton, I don't know what would have happened with him when the Carter Administration came in. . . . suspect that he probably still would have been replaced because by that time I think the organization was much more political because of the Civil Service Reform Act and other things. . . ."

If it hadn't been for Teton, I don't know what would have happened with him when the Carter Administration came in. But I would suspect that he probably still would have been replaced because by that time I think the organization was much more political because of the Civil Service Reform Act and other things. So, I'm not sure that you would ever have anyone survive as many administrations as Dominy did.

Storey: Um-hmm. He has a very interesting version of how that happened. Going from the Washington office to the regional office, and you came here to the Mid-Pacific at that time, in '74 was it? (Martin: Yes, in '74.) How should I put this. How did your work in Washington and your background prepare you to be the regional director here.

"In some respects I was not prepared for the job. There were a lot of things to it that weren't apparent sitting in Washington. . . ." However, the experience in Washington was very valuable.

Martin: In some respects I was not prepared for the job. There were a lot of things to it that weren't apparent sitting in Washington. I think the thing that was very helpful was, of course, understanding, having had an opportunity to understand quite clearly how Washington works. And making the contacts on the Hill with the congressional folks, making contacts in OMB, in the Department of Interior, working very closely with people there at the assistant secretary's levels or at the secretary's level, being on a first name basis with the secretary of the interior, and it was in some of the positions that I had there we got in on some of the activity, even, that involved the secretary directly. So we had some first hand, or just face to face experience with the secretary of the interior and with some of the upper echelon people in the other departments, just from our coordinating the reports and coordinating our planning activity with all those Federal agencies, and I had also had a lot of contact with the folks at the state level. So everybody comes to Washington, and when they did, they usually came through the Department of the Interior, and they ended up in the commissioner's office or the assistant secretary's office to talk about *their* project. And usually with their congressman in tow, and I always ended up in those meetings just because they wanted someone there that had enough exposure to the project

that we could talk about it intelligently and knew where the report was in the processing procedures.

"So, I think . . . the Washington experience was invaluable, and I always thought maybe that should be a prerequisite to being a regional director was to have spent considerable time in Washington. There were a lot of things, of course, that I wasn't prepared for when I came into this job . . ."

So, I think from *that* standpoint I think the Washington experience was invaluable, and I always thought maybe that should be a prerequisite to being a regional director was to have spent considerable time in Washington. There were a lot of things, of course, that I wasn't prepared for when I came into this job, and I suppose maybe some time as an assistant regional director in a training process maybe would have been helpful. But, the timing just and the opportunities I guess just didn't present itself for that so . . .

Storey: How did this happen? Did you plan to become a regional director?

"No, I didn't have a career plan. I *never* had a career plan. I just started out, and I figured if I *worked*, if I did a good job, then my career would take care of itself, and I didn't plan out anything . . ."

Martin: No, I didn't have a career plan. I *never* had a career plan. I just started out, and I figured if I *worked*, if I did a good job, then my career would take care of itself, and I didn't plan out anything, I didn't say that I want to spend "x" number of years at the project level, and then I want to go to the regional office, and then I want to go *back* to the project office, then I want to go to Washington. It just happened. When I was in Pueblo, we were working very actively on trying to change the power system from a seven plant baseload run of the river type plant to that one big plant at Mt. Elbert, and there were about three of us that were really working on that Dick Nash, who headed up the office engineering in the project office, and Jim Parker who was our electrical engineer, and I worked on that thing and changing it from the seven plant baseload over to the pump back with them doing the engineering and the electrical and me doing the economic analysis of it. And as a result of that, I had a lot of exposure to Pat Dugan who was the regional director, and also to Buzz Bennett who was the assistant commissioner for power back in Washington.

". . . Jim Casey . . . became aware of me and interested in me, in my coming to Washington, and he paid me a couple of visits in Pueblo trying to recruit me and convince me I should go to Washington. And I resisted for awhile, and he finally conned me into coming back on a two week detail to kind of look the place over, . . . and then I finally agreed to go back . . ."

In that process, Jim Casey, who was the assistant chief of the Planning Division, became aware of me and interested in me, in my coming to

Washington, and he paid me a couple of visits in Pueblo trying to recruit me and convince me I should go to Washington. And I resisted for awhile, and he finally conned me into coming back on a two week detail to kind of look the place over, and I went and then I finally agreed to go back, and so I went back in '67.

There Were Several Vacancies in Reclamation When Commissioner Stamm Offered Him the Assistant Regional Director's Job in Denver

And then when Bob Pafford[20] had retired from the Bureau so there was a vacancy here, Ed Horton was acting in the job, and it had been vacant for several months. Gil was the commissioner. I believe there was a vacancy in Billings–Harold Aldrich has retired. There was also an assistant [regional director] ~~commissioner~~ position open in Denver–Jim Ingles was the regional director, but there was an assistant regional director position open. And, of course, I had worked very closely with Gil Stamm, and he, I think, had very high regard for me, as did Warren Fairchild and Jim O'Brien. So Gil called me up to his office one day and asked me if I wanted to come out to Denver as assistant regional director.

Told Commissioner Stamm He'd like to Be Regional Director in Billings

And I said yes, and then I–of course Jim Casey and I were very good friends, and I always saw him as my mentor in Washington. We developed a very good relationship. So I called him, and told him of my conversation with Gil, and he said, "Well, you know, there's a regional director's job open in Billings, why don't you go up there and tell him you want that job. You're as qualified for it as anyone else that they're considering." So I did. I went up, and I told Gil that I'd like to have that regional director's job in Billings.

Commissioner Stamm Offered Him the Jobs of Regional Director in Billings, Denver, or Sacramento or Chief of the Planning Division in Washington, D.C.

So he said, "Well," he said, "I've got a regional director's job open in Sacramento, there's a regional director's job open in Billings, and there's assistant regional director's job open in Denver. And there's the chief of the planning here in Washington that will be open because O'Brien is going to be my assistant commissioner. Which of those four jobs do you want? The one in Sacramento, of course, that was offered a grade raise, and I said, "I want the one in Sacramento." And that's the way it happened.

Storey: Nice to be well-regarded, isn't it.

Martin: It is. I felt very fortunate to have had the acquaintance of those people, but I also think I earned it. Of course, I did a good job for them, and I think they appreciated it.

20. An interviews of Bob Pafford is included in Reclamation's oral history program.

Storey: And obviously you felt as if Stamm was approachable. (Martin: Um-hmm.) Did you feel that same way about Armstrong and Dominy?

". . . Jim Casey always told me that being a reports coordinator gave you a license to meddle in everybody's business. . . . but how you do it was going to determine how successful you are at pulling it off. And so he was very helpful in getting you off on the right track. . . ."

Martin: With Dominy I was still very low on the totem pole in Washington. You don't get much lower, probably, than a reports coordinator–although you do make a lot of contacts. But, like Jim Casey always told me that [being] a reports coordinator gave you a license to meddle in everybody's business. (Storey: He was the head of reports, of course.) Well, he had come up through that office, but he at that time he was assistant chief of the division. And he said the title of reports coordinator gives you the license to meddle in everybody's business, but how you do it was going to determine how successful you are at pulling it off. And so he was very helpful in getting you off on the right track. So I didn't have as close a contact with Dominy as I did with Armstrong or with Stamm. And, of course, they were just totally different people, but I didn't ever walk into Dominy's office and *tell* him how I thought something should be done. While he was there, I wasn't in a position that really allowed me to do that. I think I would have *done* it, but I didn't have that opportunity. I did with Ellis or with Gil.

Storey: So how old would you have been in '74?

Martin: I believe I was probably about 39. Maybe I'd just turned 40.

Storey: Maybe one of the youngest regional directors.

Martin: I think Rod Vissia[21] was made regional director about a month or so before I was, and I think he might have been maybe a few months younger than I was. But Rod and I were the two youngest.

Storey: And how did you like it?

"It was very demanding; it was tough; at times agonizing, but I enjoyed it. I think the regional director's job is probably . . . the best job in the Bureau because you have a lot of opportunity to interface with the . . . local folks . . ."

Martin: Oh, I thoroughly enjoyed it. It was very demanding; it was tough; at times agonizing, but I enjoyed it. I think the regional director's job is probably one of–probably the best job in the Bureau because you have a lot of opportunity to interface with the farmers, with the local folks, whether they be farmers or they be representatives of the environmental organizations. And the irrigation districts.

21. Interviews of Rod Vissia are included in Reclamation's oral history program.

". . . Bizz Johnson was out here, I could just about bet that I was not ever going to have a long weekend because he would come out on all those . . . holiday weekends, and he wanted to see the constituents, and he nearly always had a water issue he wanted to talk about. . . ."

You also operate just daily with the kind of face to face people at the state level. And you also work very closely with some of the members of Congress–in my case Bizz Johnson was out here, I could just about bet that I was not ever going to have a long weekend because he would come out on all those long weekend occasions, those holiday weekends, and he wanted to see the constituents, and he nearly always had a water issue he wanted to talk about. I just know, that I pretty well plan my weekends around his schedule some times. And then we also had a lot of contact with the other Federal agencies and with a lot of the Interior agencies, particularly at the field level. And to some extent even at the Washington level.

". . . the regional director job was just thoroughly enjoyable. . . ."

So it was–I think the regional director job was just thoroughly enjoyable.

Storey: I've forgotten whether you mentioned this earlier–where did you need to pick up *fast* on things when you came into the regional directorship?

Had to Learn the Local Players Quickly When He Arrived in Sacramento

Martin: I think probably the familiarity with the *local* players. I had a pretty good ideal on the issues, but there were some of the local players, both at the local and state level that in Washington I had not had the opportunity to spend that much time with. So I had to develop a relationship with the state and local folks.

Storey: And I believe Catino had just left, right? (Martin: No, Catino . . .) Catino was after you, I'm sorry. I lost my list somewhere.

Martin: Bob Pafford had been gone about nine months when I came out as the director, and Ed Horton was one of the assistants, and Bob . . . I can't remember the . . .

Storey: I don't know the really diplomatic way to ask this. Pafford, of course, came to Reclamation . . .

END SIDE 2, TAPE 1. SEPTEMBER 1, 1994.
BEGIN SIDE 1, TAPE 2. SEPTEMBER 1, 1994.

Storey: This is tape 2 of an interview by Brit Allan Storey with Bill E. Martin on September the 1st, 1994.

What kind of condition did [Robert J.] Pafford leave the region in for

you?

There Were a Few Management Issues That Had to Be Dealt with in the Region

Martin: Well, Pafford had been gone, of course, for nine months when I got here, so I don't know how much of that was his doing, and how much of it happened after he left, but there were a lot of problems out here–there were some internal problems out here when I came out. They had what they called the . . . I was trying to remember now what they called part of their O-D, organizational development, team. I was trying to remember what they called the little group that they had, but it kind of appeared to me that the region was kind of run by committee, and at times it sounded like they could maybe cause more problems than they solved by even some personal attacks on people. And we had some work to do to get that straightened out. And it did cause a few heartaches, I think. But I think it worked out well.

Storey: What did you do?

Martin: Well, basically, abolished that group. And said that the regional director is going to run this show. There were some people that didn't like that.

Bob Hammond was the name of the person I was trying to think of, he was the other assistant regional director.

Storey: You mentioned that there were issues that you were familiar with. What were the major issues when you came to the region?

Issues on the Projects

Delta Issues

Martin: Of course the Delta[22], it's been an issue forever, and continues to be.

Competition among the Many Interests for How Water Will Be Used

There was also the need for more water, and there was the competition among all of the different interests for the use of the water. The flatwater recreation folks want the water left behind the dam, so they want that lake high so they could use it. The power folks want the water run through the powerplant. The irrigators want the water so that they can irrigate with it, the fishery folks and some of the whitewater enthusiasts want the water in the river for fish or for rafting or whatever.

". . . you can't have *all* of those things. . . . that was a tremendous issue here . . ."

22. The Sacramento River-San Joaquin River Delta on the east side of San Francisco Bay.

And all of those things–you can't have *all* of those things. And that was a tremendous issue here, because of the American River issues, the people wanting the higher flows in the Lower American River; the recreationists wanting the water left behind Folsom so they could run their boats. And then the irrigators or water users wanting the Folsom South Canal completed so they could take that water out and put it to use. The other interests didn't want the water taken out of the river, they wanted it left either in the reservoir or in the river.

"So there was a tremendous amount of tension and tugging and pulling on *us* by all those different interests, and a lot of beating and pounding on us to try to get us to see their point of view. . . ."

So there was a tremendous amount of tension and tugging and pulling on *us* by all those different interests, and a lot of beating and pounding on us to try to get us to see their point of view.

". . . Auburn Dam was also embroiled in that, and things were rocking along pretty good on that finally, until . . . the Oroville earthquake in '75, and then that kind of threw that into a cocked hat, and we had a lot of dissension and a lot of meetings and spent a lot of money on that. . . ."

And then Auburn Dam was also embroiled in that, and things were rocking along pretty good on that finally, until after I came out here, until the Oroville earthquake in '75, and then that kind of threw that into a cocked hat, and we had a lot of dissension and a lot of meetings and spent a lot of money on that.

Various Issues That Occupied Reclamation's Time

And then there was a lot of the local state issues such as the south versus the north, with a big growing population down in southern California and not enough water to take care of them, and so they were constantly looking north to get water to export. And then there was the conflict with the folks over in Trinity County because of the water that we were taking, and the Engles Dam on the Trinity River[23] and the water that we were taking out of the Trinity and bringing over into the Sacramento and the impact that that was having on the fish population in the Trinity River. Along the Sacramento River, the year I came out here, there were some fairly high flows in the Sacramento. There was a lot of bank erosion, and we were getting a lot of flack from the farmers along the Sacramento River because their walnut trees were falling into the river, and they thought we were running the Sacramento River kind of like a canal, and not as a river.

". . . there was at least one of every kind of interest out here . . . power users/water users–either municipal or ag–and then the environmental. And . .

23. The original name of Trinity Lake was the Clair Engle Lake.

. it wasn't uncommon for *those* wants and needs to conflict for the water in reservoirs and rivers or down in the Delta. And then you had the conflict among species . . . the critters that one group was supporting versus what another group was supporting . . ."

So the issues were just endless. And then there was at least one of every kind of interest out here, I think from the power users/water users–either municipal or ag–and then the environmental. And usually it wasn't uncommon for *those* wants and needs to conflict for the water in reservoirs and rivers or down in the Delta. And then you had the conflict among species, or the critters that one group was supporting versus what another group [was] supporting . . . So there were a lot of issues and a lot of different interest groups that were involved in those issues.

Storey: And was one of the issues acreage limitation?

Acreage Limitation, Land for People, and George Ballis

Martin: It was, and that became a very . . . It was a *primary* issue at the time, with a lot of people.

". . . they thought that the San Joaquin Valley should be subdivided and each of them have an opportunity to get a plot of land, basically, is where they were coming from. . . ."

There was an organization called "Land for People," I believe it was, that was headed up by George Ballis, and he had a number of followers that–they thought that the San Joaquin Valley should be subdivided and each of them have an opportunity to get a plot of land, basically, is where they were coming from. They were a real land reform oriented organization. And they wanted those farmers down there, or the big landowners that had signed on to divest themselves of a lot of this excess land within that ten-year period. First they objected to the ten-year period they were given to divest. And then they objected to the way that the land was disposed of. I think they really thought that they should have more of an opportunity to buy the land, rather than the landowner decide who he was going to sell it to. And so there were a lot of issues, a lot of heartburn, and a lot of time spent on the implementation of the excess lands provision of Reclamation law, that got a lot of attention.

Storey: And of course there are a lot of people, I think, who argue that the landowners "circumvented," in quotes, the law, circumvented the regulations and so on. What's your perspective on that?

". . . I believe that for the most part . . . the landowners complied *with the law* as it was interpreted, and as it was spelled out in the agreements that we had with them for disposal of that excess land. Now that was not the way that the land reformers wanted it done . . ."

Martin: (sigh) Well, I think that certainly I'm sure there was some abuse. But I believe that for the most part, that the landowners complied *with the law* as it was interpreted, and as it was spelled out in the agreements that we had with them for disposal of that excess land. Now that was not the way that the land reformers wanted it done, but I believe for the most part, the landowners complied with the interpretation of the law, and the conditions for disposal that was laid out in the agreements.

Storey: Are we talking technical compliance, or are we talking compliance with the spirit of the law?

Martin: Well, I think the interpretation of the law at the time, I think I would think it was probably both the spirit *and* the intent. I think that was our objective. A lot of people didn't agree that that's what we did, or even that that was our objective, but I think *we* tried and we *thought* that we were complying with both the spirit and the intent of the law. I'm sure that there were violations of that, deviations from it. But I think for the most part, it was done within the spirit and the intent. And of course, you can get about as many interpretations of the law as you have people read it, because sometimes the law is pretty vague, and there's a lot of latitude for interpretation. I think Congress does that on purpose.

Storey: Let's go back to all of this *complex* of issues and this *complex* of interest groups, where you as regional director are placed in a situation which is basically not resolvable to everybody's satisfaction. Let's start out with the general: What was your approach, your sort of philosophical approach to how to deal with this. And second of all, could you give a couple or three concrete examples maybe, of situations that developed?

Attitude about How Decisions Should Be Made

Martin: Well, my philosophical approach was that we needed to delegate to the lowest competent level on getting a job done. So I tried to push things back, out to the field offices, where they could be pushed back out, where I thought the best decisions could be made out there closer to the origin of the issues, and wanted the project managers, the construction engineers, to try to deal with those to the maximum extent they could, and then we get involved when we needed to, and then provide them with the assistance that they needed to do the job. We did have a centralized planning function here in the region and all the planning was done out of the regional office, and plan a fairly active planning program. The Delta, of course, always gets a lot of attention. I thought we needed to work with as many of those interests as we could, to try to come up with solutions. Some of them, at that point in time, you just couldn't really do much with, because they were locked over here and we were over here, and there was quite a distance between us. I think we did close the distance to some extent–not totally, but to some extent. And we did better on some issues than others. And not too long after I came

back here, Jerry Brown came in as governor and brought a bunch of people, some of them with different ways of thinking than we in Reclamation had become accustomed to. So that was kind of interesting and a challenge.

Drainage in the San Joaquin Valley Was a Major Issue

But in trying to deal with one of the major issues and it has become even more of an issue after I left, was the drainage in the San Joaquin Valley. And how do you dispose of that drainage water. We had Kesterson built, with one piece of the drainage that was south of Kesterson, so had drainage water coming in. But they wouldn't let us build the northern part of the canal to get it out into the Bay or to the Delta. (Storey: Who wouldn't?) The Congress was one that really put the block on it, because in the appropriation bill they would always say that none of this money can be spent to extend the San Joaquin Valley drainage canal north of Kesterson Reservoir. I think the environmental interests and the folks that proclaimed to be the protectors of the Bay-Delta were, I think, prompting Congress to do that. So we needed a solution to that, and Ron Robie, who was Brown's Director of the Department of Water Resources, and I guess Don Mullen (phonetic) at the time was the chairman of the State Water Resources Control Board, and I put together a working group, kind of a coordinating group. We each contributed *money* and *people* to that, to try to come up with a solution to the disposal of the bad drainage. And we put together, or did a study with some recommendations on *where* that should be disposed of, or some alternatives as to where that could be disposed of out into the Bay, with the hope that that would then let us build that canal north of Kesterson and dump the stuff out into the Bay. So I think that's kind of one of the examples of one of the approaches that we used to try to deal with the opposition to a solution to a major problem. It didn't work out, so we . . .

Storey: What problems had people identified with the drainage water?

Martin: I think most of them, in my view, I think most of them were more emotional than real. But they said their concern was the contamination of the Bay-Delta with that ag drainage water.

Storey: What was in the water that they were concerned about?

Martin: I can't remember what was in it that they were primarily concerned about at the time–of course, selenium came to be the major element later on–but I can't remember the exact constituent that was in the water that was the primary concern to them.

Storey: And this was draining Westlands?

Martin: It was actually draining the San Joaquin Valley, so it would have been Westlands and the San Luis Unit and the state would also, at some of the land, the State Water Project, would have also had the opportunity of adding

drainage facilities to dump into the system.

Storey: Did you have public meetings back in those days? How did you interact with these people?

Martin: We had public meetings, we had advisory committees that were made up of the different interest groups. It wasn't to the extent that it is today, but we did have a lot of public meetings, we had advisory committees on many different issues that we had working, that we were working on, including that ag drainage.

Storey: How long were you at Mid-Pacific?

Martin: I'm at six-and-a-half years.

Storey: So that would have been until?

Martin: Until June of 1980.

The "Hit List"

Storey: So you were here with Keith Higginson[24] and Bob Broadbent? (Martin: No.) No, just Keith Higginson. (Martin: Keith Higginson, yeah.) And of course under his term, the famous "hit list" suddenly appeared on the horizon. Did that affect the region at all?

Martin: Well it *did*, because there were things on the hit list that affected the operation of the region, or that affected the region, because it slowed down a lot of activity. Some of the funding that was made available during that time came through Congress–rather than the administration requesting the money, Congress added it on, and directed us to use it for one purpose or another. And that's where much of our program was funded.

Storey: Was there anything that was just outright canceled, that you remember?

Some Planning Studies Were Stopped During the "Hit List" Era

Martin: I don't recall there was anything that was just outright canceled. And that was probably done for political reasons. But there were things where the work just slowed down, the money slowed down. It was more difficult to get money into the budget, or there was a tendency to not put money into the budget.

Storey: Do you remember any specific examples?

Martin: A lot of the planning, we had a lot of planning programs going on at the

24. Interviews of Keith Higginson are included in Reclamation's oral history program.

time– some of them along the . . . over in Santa Barbara County. We were looking at a program to inject treated sewage effluent as a saltwater barrier. That one actually was stopped. We just didn't do any more on it. The small loan program, Small Reclamation Project Loan Program, was cut way back. And there Congress funded it more from their side. We had several planning programs going: in Calaveras County there was one. (pause) I'm having a little trouble pulling those out of memory, but there were a lot of planning activities that were really stopped.

Keith Higginson as Commissioner

Storey: Tell me about your perceptions of Keith Higginson as commissioner.

". . . the Bureau was run by Guy Martin . . . out of the assistant secretary's office, and Keith was never really the commissioner. . . ."

Martin: Well, I don't think–Keith was never the commissioner. I don't know how he would have been . . . Well, in name, he was. (Storey: Okay. [chuckles]).

Guy Martin

But the Bureau was run by Guy Martin, was run out of the assistant secretary's office, and Keith was never really the commissioner. I don't know what kind of a commissioner he would have been if he had been allowed to be commissioner.

Storey: So Guy Martin was ~~the~~ acting [as] commissioner?

Martin: Right.

Storey: What was *he* like?

"He came in with a mission to try to . . . either *kill* the Bureau of Reclamation or at least change its program *drastically*. And he was a very strong, determined individual, and he made a concerted effort to do that. . . ."

Martin: Well, he had a strong environmental bent. He came in with a mission to try to make the Bureau of Reclamation–either *kill* the Bureau of Reclamation or at least change its program *drastically*. And he was a very strong, determined individual, and he made a concerted effort to do that.

Storey: Did he become involved in anything, in your region?

Guy Martin and New Melones Dam

Martin: Yeah, New Melones Dam, of course was built by the Corps of Engineers, but it was to be operated by the Bureau as part of the CVP [Central Valley Project]. And there was a lot of *contention* and a lot of *resistance* to the

building of the dam. And then once it was built, the environmental interests didn't want it filled. They didn't want water in it. And Guy Martin didn't want water in it–he didn't want that white water stretch of the river inundated. And so after the dam was built . . . And I believe it was the '79-'80 water year, and we had a wet year, and down on Stanislaus River there was the real potential for flooding, and Martin didn't want us storing water in New Melones, he wanted just to let it run on through and flood the folks down below without regard to what the impact would be on them.

Joe Nagel

And of course *they* wanted the water stopped and stored, and Guy was basically trying to operate New Melones Reservoir. It was about that time that the secretary sent a representative out here, Joe Nagel, to be the coordinator or the liaison between the State of California and his office. So Joe intervened in there. We *were* able to at least operate the project in a way that didn't do so much harm to the folks downstream. We stored water behind it, and released it on a more realistic schedule. But Guy was very involved in that New Melones operation.

Guy Martin and the San Luis Task Force

And then of course he was also very involved in that San Luis Task Force that was named by Congress, that was directed by Congress to investigate the irregularities in the implementation and development of the San Luis Unit. And this came about, *in part*, because of the excess land issues–implementation of the excess lands provisions of the Reclamation Act.

Storey: Where was Guy Martin from, do you happen to know?

Martin: He came to the Carter administration from Alaska. He was the secretary or director of their Natural resources group for the state. And I don't know where he came from, from there.

Contacts with Political Figures While Regional Director

Storey: You mentioned Bizz Johnson a little while ago. What was the *nature* of your contacts as the regional director with the political figures like that? Were they trying to get you to do something, were they just keeping up? What's going on there?

Martin: Well, some of both. They wanted us to do some things, and some they were just wanting to find out *what* was going on; *where* we were; *what*, if anything, they could do to move things along–just kind of staying up-to-speed on what was going on from *our* standpoint, or with *us*, and the Project . . .

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Storey: They were just keeping up, and maybe wanting you to do some kinds of things. What kinds of things might Bizz Johnson have talked to you about?

Martin: Oh, I guess one of his constituents would come up with an idea for him, like building a little dam or wanting a project extended, wanting a canal extended, to extend the project down a little bit further. So Bizz would want to know, "Does that make any sense?" or "Is that something that you think should happen?" or "What does it cost? and "What would be the benefit of doing it?" "What would be the impact on the water supply?" Those kinds of things.

Storey: And did you ever do any of those kinds of things?

Martin: Uh-hmm, we did.

Storey: You'd look at it, and it would prove feasible?

Martin: In some cases. Or if it didn't make sense, why, we'd tell him that it just didn't look like it was worth doing. Sometimes he gave up on it, sometimes he didn't –kind of depending on who was making the request of him.

John McFall, Tony Coelho, and Leo Ryan

Storey: What about other political figures?

Martin: Well, there were a lot of people that I had contact with: John McFall from out here; Tony Coelho. Just about all of the members of the House and the Senate–all of the members of the House that were involved in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Valley issues. I had a lot of contact with them. One of them that was, I guess, *not* such a *good* relationship with was Leo Ryan. He was the congressman that was killed in Jonestown [Guyana, November 18, 1978,] when he went over there to look into that.

Issues with Concessionaires at Lake Berryessa and Member of Congress Leo Ryan

But we had . . . I guess by comparison it's relatively minor, but it was a major issue locally, up at Lake Berryessa. We had about seven concessionaires up there that some of them didn't want to clean their places up, or operate them the way that we thought they should be operated, so we were trying in some cases to close some of them down and move them out. And there were a lot of folks from the Bay Area, they'd go up to Lake Berryessa on weekends or they had mobile homes up there that they lived in on weekends, and a lot of them were Leo Ryan's constituents, and he got involved on *their* behalf, and got a little exercised at what we were trying to do. So we had some interesting conversations.

But I had personal contact, frequently with a lot of the members of Congress from here, as well as from Nevada and Oregon, because the Mid-Pacific Region goes up into those two states, to some extent.

Storey: What was the nature of how the contacts were made? Did you make them, or did they make them? How did that work? Was it a combination?

Martin: It was a combination. We just called each other when we had something that needed to be talked about.

Storey: What was the thing you liked best about being regional director here?

". . . the thing that I liked most about it was the opportunity of working at the different levels, with different aspects of the issue, because you could work it with the local folks, the state people, as well as folks at the national level. I enjoyed that. There was such a variety of issues and people . . . that there was no opportunity to get bored. . . ."

Martin: Oh, I think the thing that I liked most about it was the opportunity of working at the different levels, with different aspects of the issue, because you could work it with the local folks, the state people, as well as folks at the national level. I enjoyed that. There was such a variety of issues and people that you're working with, that there was no opportunity to get bored. It was a fast-paced position–there was something going *all* the time.

Storey: I've found that the boredom factor is very important in my job too–I don't want it! (laughs) (Martin: Right.)

Why did you decide to move from Mid-Pacific?

". . . I was *invited* to move. . . . someone had evidently got to some of the folks and convinced them that maybe they needed someone here with more of an environmental bent . . ."

Martin: Well, I was *invited* to move. I was under the Civil Service Reform Act, and we went into the Senior Executive Service.

Storey: That was during the Carter administration?

Martin: That was during the Carter administration. They said that they would like me to go to Boise to be regional director in Boise. I think they wanted to–and I don't know who was suggesting this–but someone had evidently got to some of the folks and convinced them that maybe they needed someone here with more of an environmental bent, and that I maybe could serve my country someplace else.

Storey: Who specifically approached you, do you remember?

Martin: Well, Keith Higginson was one that approached me, that called me, as he was headed out of the country for a couple of weeks. I think he may have called me from the airport, and just asked me what my reaction would be to a reassignment from Sacramento to Boise.

Storey: And?

Martin: And I told him I'd resist it.

Storey: (laughs) You liked Sacramento, I take it.

Martin: Well, I did, but it was more of some personal reasons involving my wife and family, that I thought the timing wasn't real good. But they didn't want to talk about the timing–they wanted to go ahead and do it. So I resisted and we did postpone it several months.

Storey: This would have been when?

Martin: That was in 1980. Actually, I moved in June of 1980, but it actually started kind of early 1980, probably about January or February was when I think I heard about it the first time.

Storey: And so then in mid '80 you moved to Boise?

". . . they decided that . . . Joe Hall who was the regional director in Denver and I would trade places. I agreed to go to Denver. And Joe decided to leave the Bureau and go with Western Area Power Administration. . . ."

Martin: No, I told them that I didn't want to go to Boise. So they decided that they were going to–that Joe Hall[25] who was the regional director in Denver and I would trade places. I agreed to go to Denver. And Joe decided to leave the Bureau and go with Western Area Power Administration. He didn't want to leave Denver, so he went with Western Area Power Administration, so I went to Denver as the regional director in June of 1980.

Storey: And that region was . . . .

Martin: That was the Lower Missouri.

Storey: So what kinds of issues did you find there?

In the Lower Missouri Region ". . . they were some of the similar issues–just not the same magnitude. . . ."

25. Interviews of Joe Hall are included in Reclamation's oral history program.

Martin: Well, they were some of the similar issues–just not the same magnitude.

Fryingpan-Arkansas Project, the Narrows Unit, and the North Loup Project

The Fryingpan-Arkansas Project they were still trying to kind of complete construction, finish *it* up. Get the Narrows Unit, in Colorado, under construction–it had been authorized and Congress had given us a directive to ready the project for construction, and we were trying to get the North Loup Unit under construction, and we also had Colorado-Big Thompson Project issues.

Trying to Market Water out of Green Mountain Reservoir

We had Green Mountain Reservoir over on the west slope. We were trying to market some water out of that, trying to get the water marketed, and we hadn't had any success, so that was a little issue–they were trying to get that one worked out. There was some interest in buying water–some of the local folks had a little problem with who was wanting to buy it, and how long they were going to have a contract, and *how* much money they were going to pay.

O'Neill Unit

Down in Nebraska, there was the O'Neill Unit that was authorized and we were trying to get it under construction. There were environmental issues there, and in Central Nebraska, down around Grand Island, there were folks down there that continued to want to build a project that was called Mid-State. And that, according to some of the environmental groups, had potential for having some major impacts on species such as the whooping crane, and some of the other birds that used the river.

The "Silt Run" on the North Platte River

And then one that was a–here, again, it was minor by comparison, but it was a knotty little local one, and was something called the "silt run," up on the North Platte. (Storey: S-I-L-T?) S-I-L-T. There was a few projects up there, *old* projects that had unlined canals, and they historically had relied on muddy water to *seal* their canals so they could operate, get water to their crops. And when we built Guernsey Dam, which was the lowest one down on the river, stored water in there, all the silt fell out in the Guernsey Reservoir, so when we released water out of Guernsey, it was clear, and instead of sealing their canals, it tended to *erode* them with the clear water picking up the materials out of the bottom of the canal. So they wanted that muddy water. And we had been operating to give them a silt run. We would just kind of shut the Guernsey down, open the gates and pull it down, and for about a two- or three-week period, we'd flush silt out of the reservoir into the river. They would divert it into their canals to seal them. Then EPA got into the act, and some of the environmental organizations were in on the act to try to stop that. They finally backed off, but *we* were

resisting it because it added cost. We lost power production and it added some cost to the operating the facilities.

Storey: The silt run did, you mean?

Martin: Uh-huh, because we had to shut the reservoir down, shut that powerplant down and drain the reservoir, open the gates and flush it out, which added to the cost and power loss. So we were trying to negotiate with them to get where they would pay us for the silt run. And, of course, they got their congressman involved, Dick Cheney from Wyoming. So we had a lot of interesting sessions with them, a lot of them in Washington with Dick Cheney sitting in. We finally got it resolved, but that was just, I thought, one of the more little colorful events that we had going. But they were a lot of the same issues as we had out here–it's just the magnitude was a little different.

Storey: How did you resolve the silt run issue?, if you remember.

Martin: Yeah, we ended up working out an arrangement where they *paid* us to pull the reservoir down and flush that silt out of Guernsey. They paid us to do it, I believe it was fifteen or sixteen days. (Storey: That's interesting.) That's the way we resolved that one.

Storey: Let's see, I believe you were at Denver when the Windy Gap Project was devleoped.

Windy Gap Project

Martin: I was, and that was another little interesting one, but yes, I was there during Windy Gap.

Storey: What was that all about?

Martin: Well, when the Northern [Colorado] ~~California~~ Water Conservation District was putting in a pipeline to move some water from one area to another–I can't remember exactly how it was going to work, they were picking it up and moving it up into their distribution system. And when they were excavating to lay the pipeline, the equipment operator noticed that he had *plowed* through an area that looked like there'd been some development on it prior–I guess because of the different colors or something. So the archaeologists got involved, and they found it was a site of an old Indian development, and they found the presence of what they called "wattle and daub,"[26] so they wanted to shut the project down until they could go in and explore it. The district was bound and determined that that was not going to happen–they wanted that project completed. So we had to take some fairly

26. A form of wall construction consisting of upright posts or stakes interwoven with twigs or tree branches and plastered with a mixture of clay and straw (*Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language*, ©1989 by Dilithium Press, Ltd.)

heavy-handed measures with the district there for a few hours to get them to stop until we could get it worked out. The secretary, Don [Donald P.] Hodel was–or no, he was the undersecretary at the time, Jim Watt was still secretary at that time. Don came out and Bob Broadbent was the commissioner at the time, and so Bob called me late one night and said, "We've got this problem. Can you do anything about it?" I don't think he said *can* you do anything about it, I think he said "it needs to be taken care of." So I contacted the district and the lawyers for the district and they finally agreed to not disturb it any more until we could get it resolved, which we did. It was a fairly *thorny* issue there for several days.

Storey: As I recall, it was pretty complicated because of the secretary's position that Reclamation wasn't to spend any money on that.

Martin: That's right. We didn't have any money to spend on it, and the district said that if it's important from the national standpoint, then there should be some Federal money involved. And we were searching for private money that could be made available and go into it. I think we did finally . . . I don't remember now how much money we actually finally made available, but there was some money finally made available. But the district, I think, finally picked up the lion's share of it.

Storey: Who were your assistant regional directors there?

Gordon Wendler and Jim Malila

Martin: Gordon Wendler and Jim Malila.[27]

Storey: How did they function?

Martin: Oh, they were great people. I have a *very high* regard for both of them. I'd known them for a long time. When I was in Grand Island, starting with the Bureau, Gordon Wendler worked in the Grand Island Office–he and I were in the same carpool. And then Jim Malila and I worked together on Fryingpan-Arkansas Project–he was just a young rotation engineer when he came down there, and very bright, very energetic. I have a very high personal and professional regard for both of them. They did a very good job.

Ray Willms

Storey: Now let's see, if I'm recalling [correctly] Ray Willms[28] came to the operations office here in Sacramento. Did you happen to hire him for that position?

27. Interviews of Jim Malila are included in Reclamation's oral history program.
28. Interviews of Ray Willms are included in Reclamation's oral history program.

Martin: I think *he* was already here when I came. He was in that operation someplace, I'm really not sure where. No, I didn't hire him for that one. I did hire him to go up to Klamath Falls as project manager. Then I hired him to come back down to Sacramento into the Central Valley Project Operations Office from up there. And then when I was in Denver, I hired him to be the project manager on the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project. And then when we *consolidated* the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project operation and the Eastern Colorado . . . I can't remember now what the name of that office was.

Storey: It became the Eastern Colorado Projects Office.

Martin: It became the Eastern Colorado Projects Office. And I moved Ray into that job. And then I hired him to be my deputy when I became assistant commissioner for resources management.

Storey: I have the sense that you liked the way he worked.

Martin: I did. I thought he was very capable. He could get things done. And when he told you something, you knew that that was the way it was. If he said he needed five people and $3 million to do the job, you knew that he hadn't padded the numbers, that that's what it took. And he was very dedicated to getting a job done.

Storey: Do you happen to remember the way he first came to your attention?

Martin: I think probably the first time he came to my attention–I was aware that he was here–was when he applied for the Klamath Falls job. He applied for it, and just in the interview process–I don't remember who else applied–but I was more impressed with him than with the other candidates, just based on the interview and what he had given in his 171. So I hired him on that basis. And then he handled some very sensitive and very tough situations up in Klamath Falls. We had some people up there that were a challenge to deal with, and Ray did an exceptionally good job dealing with them, and took on some issues that had been ignored for a long time that needed to be cleaned up and taken care of.

Storey: Well, speaking of issues, I'd like to keep going, but my time is up!

Martin: All right.

Storey: I really appreciate your agreeing to come in to talk to me.

Martin: Glad to do it–I've enjoyed it.

Storey: Especially the short notice that I gave! You know, last Thursday, a week ago, I didn't know I was coming to Sacramento!

Once again, I'd like to ask if researchers from within Reclamation and from outside Reclamation can use the cassettes and the transcripts from the cassettes for research purposes.

Martin: Yes.

Storey: Thank you.

END SIDE 2, TAPE 2. SEPTEMBER 1, 1994.
BEGIN SIDE 1, TAPE 1. OCTOBER 25, 1995.

Storey: This is Brit Allan Storey, senior historian of the Bureau of Reclamation, interviewing Bill E. Martin, former employee of the Bureau of Reclamation in the regional offices of the Bureau of Reclamation in Sacramento, California, on October the 25th, 1995, at about eight o'clock in the morning. This is tape one.

I'd like to backtrack a little this time, Mr. Martin, and talk about the kinds of issues that reached you as regional director when you came here to Sacramento and what the focus of those issues were, what the big ones were, that sort of thing.

Environmental Issues While Regional Director in Sacramento

San Joaquin River-Sacramento River Delta

Martin: Well, when I came, and it was in a period where the environmental issues had emerged and were really at the forefront of all of the water resource development and management use issues, and so here in California there were issues related to the Delta, to the way both the Federal and state water projects were operated and the impact it has on the Delta, some of the diversion of water from the north end of the state to the south, and the impact of some of the drainage issues down in the San Joaquin Valley, that we were importing water into the San Joaquin Valley and then were not being able to take the drainage water back out, so the impact was salt buildup in the soil and the impact of that was having.

Trinity River

So there were many environmental issues in California primarily related to the Delta and the impact on the Delta species. The stripped bass was getting a lot of attention at that time. Also the Trinity River was getting a lot of attention. A lot of folks over in Trinity County was very upset and opposed to water being diverted, so much water being diverted, out of Trinity County over into the Sacramento River basin. A lot of attention was focused on that. Those issues got to my desk.

Indian Issues at Pyramid Lake and Other Newlands Project Issues

Also in Nevada with the Truckee-Carson project, there were Pyramid Indian issues that got to my desk a lot, many times. Also Reno/Sparks was looking for municipal water supply and they were not entitled to water from the Federal projects, and they wanted water supply from the Federal projects. So that commanded some attention. And then the impacts of all of these on the [Newlands Project] ~~Truckee-Carson project~~[29] and we were trying to work with the Truckee-Carson people on their diversions of water from the Truckee River over into the Carson Basin, and they were very politically sensitive issues both at the local and the state *and* the national level. So there were a lot of attention being focused on it, although at first glance it appeared fairly minor, but it created some major issues for the folks that were involved, one of them being Indian issues that, I think, just exacerbated the problem. It caused a great deal more attention to be focused on it, because there were Indian issues, fish and wildlife issues, and water use issues, all of which came under the Department of the Interior. So it created some fairly sensitive issues to try to deal with.

". . . there was a great deal of pressure being put on to contract with new entities for delivery of water supply, and at the same time a lot of pressure being put on to use that water for environmental or recreational uses. . . ."

And then, too, coupled with those environmental and Indian water right issues was the desire and the need for additional water for consumptive use by agriculture and municipalities here in the Central Valley. So there was a great deal of pressure being put on to contract with new entities for delivery of water supply, and at the same time a lot of pressure being put on to use that water for environmental or recreational uses.

Storey: How did that play out from the Secretary of the Interior's office, for instance? Were you getting pressure?

Martin: In some cases we were, and in some cases, it didn't seem to be. They appeared to trying to avoid making a decision and that probably just made the job here a little bit tougher, because you're trying to dance to about three different tunes at the same time and that made it a little tougher to deal with. Rather than just face the issues head on, make a decision, and get on with it, it appeared that at times we were trying to avoid making a decision.

Storey: Somebody's going to get hurt.

Martin: Um-hmm.

Storey: All of these issues, I suppose. Who were the major players in the Truckee-Carson issues, do you remember?

29. Originally known as the Truckee-Carson Project, the Newlands Project is operated by the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District (TCID).

Interested Parties on the Newlands Project

Martin: Of course, the district was one of the major players, and there was a state senator that, I guess, happened to represent that area, Senator [Carl] Dodge. I don't remember his first name. And then some of the people at the department level. This was shortly after I came out here, after the [Jimmy] Carter administration came in. Barbara Heller, who was the under secretary, I believe, or at least either the under secretary or some kind of a deputy under secretary, was involved in it, in the Truckee-Carson issue. Then the state engineer for Nevada–and just offhand his name escapes me–the state was good to work with. I enjoyed working with them, and they tried to be helpful. Of course, there's some politics involved even at the state level as well, but for the most part, they did try to be helpful. Those are the ones that I remember primarily. And then, of course, we did have–although it was kind of peripherally related, at the same time we had the folks from Sierra Pacific Power Company involved as well as Reno/Sparks, the cities of Reno and Sparks.

Storey: How about Indian groups?

Martin: The Pyramid Lake Indians were involved. We didn't have so much direct contact with them at that stage of the game. I think later on they became a little more prominent and a little more visible. We were working with some of the attorneys that were representing them, but they were not that visible at the time, although we were aware of their presence and the issues.

Storey: Were they trying to put pressure on Reclamation and you, I presume?

Martin: Yes, they were, because they wanted more water to get into Pyramid Lake, less water diverted over into the Carson Valley at Derby Dam and more water to stay in the Truckee River to get into Pyramid Lake.

Storey: What kind of options did you have in dealing with these folks?

Martin: Very little, because the water could either be diverted into Carson Valley where it was consumptively used or it could stay in the Truckee River and go down to Pyramid Lake. Those were the options.

"The court had determined how much water the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District (TCID) could divert, and we were trying to implement that, with some success and some failures as well. So it was really tough because they didn't think they were getting enough water. . . . And the Indians felt the farmers were getting too much. . . ."

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were getting–

Storey: And the farmers didn't think they were getting enough water.

Martin: And the Indians felt the farmers were getting too much. And we did have a watermaster on the river, so that helped to some degree, but the issues were very sensitive and very tough to try to deal with because the options were limited.

Storey: You said we were *trying* to deal with a court decision?

Martin: Um-hmm.

Storey: And we were sometimes successful and sometimes not, is what I heard.

". . . trying to work out all of the issues to fully implement the court decision . . . presented some challenges. Of course, we did have some flexibility in coming up with that solution to meet the court order and trying to get the water users to come around to see that . . . was an equitable way to do it under the court order . . . We had some success and some failures in doing that. . . ."

Martin: In trying to work out all of the issues to fully implement the court decision, trying to bring the Irrigation District or the water users on board with those decisions–that presented some challenges. Of course, we did have some flexibility in coming up with that solution to meet the court order and trying to get the water users to come around to see that what we were proposing, the way we were proposing that the water be divided, was an equitable way to do it under the court order, and that presented a challenge. We had some success and some failures in doing that. So, consequently, it took a long time to finally get it resolved, and it wasn't resolved. When I left, we were still working on it.

Storey: I think this is one of the issues I'm sort of interested in, is how Reclamation relates to the water users. One school of thought might argue that it's our project, we tell them what to do, and I guess the other end of the spectrum would be it's their water, they tell *us* what to do. (laughter) And a lot of people think we do that too much, perhaps. What's your perspective on this relationship with the water district on the Truckee-Carson and Reclamation? Why did it take so long to negotiate out something?

". . . when the project was built and when most of the Reclamation projects were built, the demand for water wasn't that great. . . . it had impacts that maybe weren't really visualized at the time . . . It didn't have that much of an impact if you contracted for a lot of water. You kind of had to go out and hunt for people to buy the water from the project. . . . as time progressed and population density increased and the interest of people changed to the point–their emphasis changed where they looked more at a lot of the environmental issues, the recreational opportunities, and it started to cause

the demand for the way a project is operated to shift. . . ."

Martin: Well, I think probably the reason for it–and it could have happened on just about any project if the conditions had been similar to Truckee-Carson–but when the project was built and when most of the Reclamation projects were built, the demand for water wasn't that great. The impacts on the other resources was, to some extent, unknown, although we had done studies and come up with our best guess and assumption as to what would happen. It probably didn't always pan out *exactly* the way we had projected that it would. So it had impacts that maybe weren't really visualized at the time, or the masses of people were such that it didn't matter. It didn't have that much of an impact if you contracted for a lot of water. You kind of had to go out and hunt for people to buy the water from the project.

But as time progressed and population density increased and the interest of people changed to the point–their emphasis changed where they looked more at a lot of the environmental issues, the recreational opportunities, and it started to cause the demand for the way a project is operated to shift. So then we started dealing with multi-facets of the uses of water, that same block of water. We had farmers saying, "Well, you're not giving enough. We need more water to operate."

"Initially, the farmers were our only . . . clientele. With time, that shifted on the Truckee-Carson as well as other projects. So we had developed a relationship with the farmers. They probably kind of visualized us as working for them . . . So then as things changed and shifted and other interests came into play, then the farmers kind of thought they saw us abandoning them and catering too much to other interests, and so that caused some rift there within the agricultural community. . . ."

Initially, the farmers were our only concern, our only customer, really our only clientele. With time, that shifted on the Truckee-Carson as well as other projects. So we had developed a relationship with the farmers. They probably kind of visualized us as working for them, and whatever they wanted, we tried to get for them, and to some extent we did and were successful at it. So then as things changed and shifted and other interests came into play, then the farmers kind of thought they saw us abandoning them and catering too much to other interests, and so that caused some rift there within the agricultural community.

"On the other side of the coin, some of those folks in the environmental community saw us as being in the farmers' pocket, . . . that we've catered to the farmers, that we were pawns for the farmers, for agricultural uses. . . . The farmers got accustomed to using a certain block of water, and then when they were asked to become more efficient in their use of the water so they can give up some of that water and it be used for other purposes, then that created some problems. . . ."

On the other side of the coin, some of those folks in the environmental community saw us as being in the farmers' pocket, and they never gave up on the argument. They may see it differently, but they continue to argue that we've catered to the farmers, that we were pawns for the farmers, for agricultural uses. I think that is probably the thing that has created much of the dissension and the problem in trying to resolve some of the issues. The farmers got accustomed to using a certain block of water, and then when they were asked to become more efficient in their use of the water so they can give up some of that water and it be used for other purposes, then that created some problems.

Storey: Do you remember any of the specific discussions that went on as you tried to work out the issue with the water district on the Truckee-Carson?

". . . some of the issues centered around trying to get them to apply water in a more conservation-minded way so that you didn't have . . . to apply so much water . . ."

Martin: The ones that I remember most, and I don't have total recall of them, was some of that land up there is pretty porous and you have to put on a lot of water. So some of the issues centered around trying to get them to apply water in a more conservation-minded way so that you didn't have so much runoff and you didn't have ~~so much water, you didn't have~~ to apply so much water to get it down to the end of the row, so to speak. I think that was kind of the gut issue.

"They felt that they were entitled to the water, that they had been using it all this years, they were entitled to it, and it was just not right to take it away from them . . . That was kind of the root of the issue was the manner in which they used the water, the amount of water that they used . . ."

And then we talked about a lot of things in that process, primarily their entitlement. They felt that they were entitled to the water, that they had been using it all this years, they were entitled to it, and it was just not right to take it away from them, to take it back. That was kind of the root of the issue was the manner in which they used the water, the amount of water that they used, and the result down at the end of the project when that water ran off.

Storey: The idea being that if they could conserve water, than there would be water free to go to environmental purposes at Pyramid Lake?

Martin: Um-hmm. For primarily the Indian use.

Storey: Do you remember how the water users reacted to conservation proposals, I guess it would be called?

"They were very much in opposition to making any major changes in the way the project operated. They had been operating that way for all those years,

and they were very reluctant to change. . . .I think there are probably a couple of reasons. Certainly it would cost some money to make some changes, and then, too, and maybe the primary one, they had just been accustomed to operating that way over the years . . ."

Martin: They were very much in opposition to making any major changes in the way the project operated. They had been operating that way for all those years, and they were very reluctant to change.

Storey: Were there any specific reasons? Was it just that they were *used* to doing it that way?

Martin: I think there are probably a couple of reasons. Certainly it would cost some money to make some changes, and then, too, and maybe the primary one, they had just been accustomed to operating that way over the years and they were just reluctant to change.

Storey: That's interesting. Actually, Don Seney, this man who's working for me on Truckee-Carson, is very up on these issues. I'm not so familiar with them. You mentioned there were fish and wildlife issues on the Truckee-Carson. What were those about, besides Pyramid Lake?

The Indians and the Cui-ui

Martin: The fish and wildlife issue, it was an Indian-related issue. There was the cui-ui, the fish, it's a sucker-type fish, but I guess it was kind of a staple in the Indians' diet.

Storey: Really?

Martin: And it spawned. It came up out of Pyramid Lake and spawned in the Truckee River, and at times–well, even most of the time–the flows from Truckee River into Pyramid Lake during the spawning season was such that the fish couldn't get out of the lake back up into the river. There was, I guess, a delta there where the river flowed into the lake, and the main stream would separate into several little fingerlets and trickle into the lake, and there was not sufficient water in any one of them for the–I think it was called cui-ui.

Storey: Yeah, cui-ui.

Martin: To get out of the lake back up into the river. So we built a dam at Pyramid Lake and we put a fish elevator on it so the cui-ui could collect there, we'd lift them up, put them in the river, and then they would spawn. But they were trying to get enough water left in the river to create spawning grounds and spawning access for the fish. That was the principal fish and wildlife issue.

Storey: Sounds to me like spawning maybe took place during high irrigation season or something.

Martin: As I recall, it was in the–I can't remember. But, yeah, it was during the time that water was being diverted, and I don't remember whether it was spring or summer.

Storey: You mentioned the Trinity River and the issue of diverting water. I believe that's a tunnel that carries the water over into Shasta?

Salmon in the Trinity River

Martin: Correct. Into the Sacramento River below Shasta.

Storey: Oh, is it? Okay.

Martin: Um-hmm. Through Whiskeytown.

Storey: Good. Do you remember anything about those issues in particular, who the groups were, how the issues played out, that sort of thing?

Martin: I don't remember and I don't know that the groups had a name. They may have. But the folks in Weaverville–that's in Trinity, a little town in Trinity County, that's just downstream of the dam and reservoir. I was trying to remember the name of it. But, anyway, it's just downstream of the dam that was built to store water for diversion over into the Sacramento River.

At the time the project was built, there were some minimum flows decided on for the Trinity River below the dam. There's some decomposed granite in that area. There are a lot of timber, lumbering operations going on, a lot of timber-cutting. And, of course, the Trinity River, that was spawning grounds for fish, salmon, and trout coming up to spawn. Prior to the project, I guess the flows were such during the high flow season that it would flush out much of that decomposed granite and keep the spawning gravels open.

After the project was built, the contention was that that decomposed granite, of course, came off of the mountains down into the stream and filled in the spawning gravels, and then there was not sufficient flow to flush it out. So they wanted higher flows, higher minimum flows, and wanted them delivered on a regimen that would allow flushing flows to flush that decomposed granite out.

And there were a number of operations tried. We had a Trinity River Task Force that was made up of the state and the Federal agencies–the Fish and Wildlife, the Bureau, the Department of Fish and Game, the Department of Water Resources, and I believe the Water Resources Control Board had a representative on it, to try to come up with some solutions to those

problems, to that problem. And we tried pumping, going in and just pumping out the decomposed granite in some areas to test it out. We ended up studying and finally building what was called, I believe, the Grass Valley Debris Dam that catches–it's a catchment [basin] ~~basement~~ for some of that decomposed granite as it comes down off the mountains to prevent it from getting into the river, and then that's cleaned out periodically.

Those were the primary issues. The folks there, I think they didn't want that dam built. Some of them didn't want the dam built in the first place, and after it was built, then they didn't like the way it as operated. They weren't satisfied with the flow level that was maintained in the river below the dam.

Storey: I suppose any time you take water out of northern California that might be going to southern California, folks get upset up in that country.

Martin: Yeah.

Storey: While you were regional director, were you having a lot of discussion of salmon-spawning issues?

"Salmon wasn't being discussed so much at that time. Striped bass was probably the key fish species that was being discussed at the time. That was, of course, in the Delta. . . ."

Martin: We were not having that many [discussions]. Salmon wasn't being discussed so much at that time. Striped bass was probably the key fish species that was being discussed at the time. That was, of course, in the Delta. The spawning issues and the impact on the fish, the salmon, in the river, yeah, it was being discussed and got some attention. We changed the operation of the projects some to manipulate the temperature of the water during spawning season for the salmon. But it wasn't as much of an issue then, of course, as it is now. It was approaching or building up to this, I guess, but it had not festered to the point where it is now. [Tape Interruption. Tape recorder turned off.]

Storey: If I'm recalling, you were regional director here in Sacramento from '74 to '80 or '81?

Martin: '80.

Storey: To '80.

Martin: Uh-huh.

Storey: Okay. So salmon weren't that big a problem, but the striped bass in the Delta were.

Martin: The striped bass got a *lot* of attention. The salmon, it got attention. There was discussion on it and we had questions on it, and we changed the operation of the project some to address the salmon-spawning issues, but it–

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Storey: You were saying striped bass were the major issue and salmon wasn't.

Martin: That was the major fish issue at the time.

Storey: What was causing that issue to be an issue for Reclamation?

Martin: The diversion of the water from the Delta and the quality of water that was being maintained in the Delta. They felt that there was the impact on the food supply for the striped bass and also the diversion of the small fish and eggs out of the Delta through the pumping plants down into the canals and waterways down south.

Storey: Uh-huh. Who was raising the issue?

Martin: There was the state Fish and Game, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and then there was an organization called Striped Bass Association, I believe. I don't remember the full title, but it was an association of striped-bass enthusiasts. Those were the ones that were probably primarily involved. And there were a number of the environmental organizations that were also involved–the Sierra Club. Some of them have escaped me. The name of some of them have escaped me.

Storey: What did they want Reclamation to do?

Martin: They wanted more water released from the project to maintain better water quality in the Delta, and they were opposed to the diversion, the pumping, of the water out of the Delta.

Storey: Into Delta-Mendota [Canal]?

Martin: Uh-huh.

Storey: And, I guess, Contra Costa [Canal].

Martin: Yeah. You didn't hear so much about the state water project because of the difference in the way it operates in the Delta, where it has a forebay, takes water into the forebay, and then pumps out of the forebay, where the Federal project pumped directly from some of the channels into the Delta-Mendota Canal. So the state project, of course, got some attention on it, but there was more attention focused at that time on the Federal project primarily because of just the difference in their diversion facility at the Delta.

Storey: Did we believe that was a legitimate focus of attention?

Martin: No, we didn't. Of course, we recognized that there are differences in operation, that there was a difference there in the diversion facilities, but we really didn't see that as a reason for a major difference in the impact on fish and wildlife.

Storey: Did that mean that we had discussions with the state water project about dealing with the issues?

The Peripheral Canal

Martin: At about that same time, or during that same period, we were looking at a "Peripheral Canal," we were looking at fish screens to go onto a Peripheral Canal, and we were doing testing on fish screens, and we were doing all of that in conjunction with the state. So, yeah, we were having discussions with Fish and Game. They were directly involved with us in those fish-screen testing operations. So the Department of Fish and Game, Water Resources, and Water Resource Control Board all had staff working with us on that issue.

Storey: Tell me about your involvement with the Peripheral Canal.

"We had completed a . . . planning report, on the Peripheral Canal, and it had been sent . . . up to the Congress for consideration for authorization as a Federal project, but there was not enough support for the project at the time. . . . there was enough opposition of the project at the time that it didn't go anywhere. . . ."

Martin: I guess my first involvement with the Peripheral Canal came when I was in the commissioner's office in Washington. We had completed a report, a planning report, on the Peripheral Canal, and it had been sent back to be sent up to the Congress for consideration for authorization as a Federal project, but there was not enough support for the project at the time. Well, there was enough opposition of the project at the time that it didn't go anywhere.

"It was obvious that there was not enough political support for the project to become authorized in reality. . . ."

We just laid the report aside and didn't try to push it after–well, even the state had some problems with it as well as some of the environmental organizations and others. So we just didn't do anything with it. It was obvious that there was not enough political support for the project to become authorized in reality.

Then when I came out here as regional director, the Peripheral Canal issue, of course, was not dead; it continued to have a life. And I believe when I came, there were studies going on. We were looking at locations

where a canal maybe could be located. We were looking at and testing fish-screen concepts that would prevent the eggs from being diverted and some of the small fish from being diverted. So we spent a lot of time and a lot of money at a facility down in the Delta down around Hood, down on the Sacramento River, just south of Sacramento, looking at the effectiveness of different screen designs on screening out the fish, the small fish and eggs. We spent a lot of time and a lot of money on trying to develop a screen that would be satisfactory to the Fish and Wildlife folks. The state Fish and Game people and Fish and Wildlife, we all worked quite well together on it, I think. They were hard to sell on anything, but they did work with us on it.

Storey: What was the concept of the Peripheral Canal? How was it supposed to work?

How the Peripheral Canal Would Have Worked

Martin: Well, it was supposed to divert water out of the river, out of the Sacramento River, *before* the water got into the Delta, and it was going to take water out at Hood, that little place just south of Sacramento, take water around the edge or the periphery of the Delta, and then back into the pumping plants and the Clifton Court forebay on the south side of the Delta. Then the water would be lifted out of there or delivered to the pumps by the Peripheral Canal where it would be taken south. And then as you follow the canal around the channels, the Delta channels that it crossed or was near, water would be released in some of those key places to maintain water quality in the Delta.

"It was felt that you could maintain the Delta water quality that was needed and save about a million acre-feet of water over what was being used to just keep the salt line pushed back out. . . ."

It was felt that you could maintain the Delta water quality that was needed and save about a million acre-feet of water over what was being used to just keep the salt line pushed back out.

Storey: In the Delta.

Martin: In the Delta.

Storey: So the water would no longer enter the Delta system before it was pumped.

Martin: Right. It was diverted *around* the Delta. It kept it out of the Delta. That provided better quality of water to export as well as take less water to maintain a quality in the Delta that at least some people agreed was needed.

Storey: And did it look like that might be authorized while you were regional director?

"There was a lot of opposition to it. . . . and there may have been even more support than opposition, but . . . There was enough opposition to prevent it from happening. . . ."

Martin: No. There was a lot of opposition to it. There was a lot of support for it, too, and there may have been even more support than opposition, but the opposition was such that it could not become reality. There was enough opposition to prevent it from happening.

Storey: Well, I don't understand the opposition. Was more water going to go south than before?

More Water Would Go South than Before

The State Water Project Contracted More Water than it Could Deliver

Martin: More would go south than before, and then because, see, the state water project has contracts–they had contracted for about double what the state water project could deliver, and so they were looking for new water sources to be able to fulfill contractual commitments that they had already made with some of the farmers down in the San Joaquin Valley as well as people down in L.A. and in that area. And then, too, the Federal project water users down in San Joaquin Valley was looking for additional water supply, and there were new projects down there that was looking for a water supply. So, yeah, there was more water expected to be diverted.

Some Opponents of the Peripheral Canal Didn't Trust the Operators and Felt Better Water Quality Would Be Maintained If the Water Had to Pass Through the Delta

And then there was also the opposition stated reasons, some of their stated reasons, was that they didn't trust the operators. They didn't trust us to operate the project the way we said it would be operated, that once we got water into the canal, we might not release it back into the Delta to maintain that quality. And as long as it has to come through the Delta, than we know that you're going to do a better job maintaining quality.

Storey: Who was designing, or did anybody design, the Peripheral Canal?

"There was not a design, *per se*. There was a concept and probably a feasibility design or a design concept, and that was done by the Bureau. I'm not sure how much, if any, design work the state did. . . ."

Martin: There was not a design, *per se*. There was a concept and probably a feasibility design or a design concept, and that was done by the Bureau. I'm not sure how much, if any, design work the state did. Now, they did a lot of study. They may have done some design work either at the recon or the feasibility level. There was never a *final* design completed.

Storey: Who was the head of the state water project when you were there?

John Teerink, Ron Robie, and Bill Gianelli as Directors of the Department of Water Resources

Martin: When I first came, of course, Ronald Reagan was governor in '74 when I came out here, and John Teerink was the director of Department of Water Resources. That was in '74. Then in '76, I guess, it was when Jerry Brown was elected. No, Brown was elected in '74, in the fall of '74, as governor of California, and Ron Robie was the director of the Department of Water Resources under Brown.

Storey: What was he like to work with?

Martin: He was a bright young man. He was a lawyer by training. He had worked in the state legislature as a staff director. He had been on the Water Resources Control Board. He was one of the board members before he was appointed as director of the Department of Water Resources, so he was environmentally oriented. Of course, the Brown administration was environmentally oriented, so he didn't go about doing business in the kind of traditional way. He didn't necessarily look to try to develop more water, and conservation was a big issue with them. I think they felt that a good many of the state's water problems could be satisfied strictly with conservation. So it was not the traditional operation, or it didn't operate in the traditional manner, so it was contrary to the way that the Federal project was authorized and authorized to be operated. So we had a lot of gut-wrenching discussions.

Storey: His name again?

Martin: Ron Robie.

Storey: Now, where did Bill Gianelli fit into all of this?

Martin: Well, Bill Gianelli[30] was the director of Department of Water Resources before John Teerink. So when I came out here, Gianelli was a consultant. He was doing consulting work, and he was very outspoken. He's a very knowledgeable and personable person. He was very outspoken *against* Jerry Brown and the manner in which the state water project was operated and the manner in which the Department of Water Resources viewed issues and tried to deal with the problems at the time.

Storey: Sort of an old-line water manager, western water manager. (chuckles) This would have been a few years after the environmental laws were beginning to be passed.

30. An interviews of Bill Gianelli is included in Reclamation's oral history program.

Martin: Right.

Storey: I think the Wilderness Act was ‘64. The National Historic Preservation Act, ‘66. NEPA in ‘69 and so on. Was that causing problems for Reclamation in adapting to new ways of doing business?

The new environmental laws “did cause problems, because we had people that were reluctant to change and accept those new ways, those new criteria. So it took Reclamation a while to make the change. . . .”

Martin: I think it was. It did cause problems, because we had people that were reluctant to change and accept those new ways, those new criteria. So it took Reclamation a while to make the change. For a long time there was a concept that you show up with the bulldozers, and if they get in the way, you just run over them and build the project. Well, with those new laws, that ceased; that was not possible. But in their minds, in some of the minds of some people, that was still the way they thought, that you can just ignore all of that and just move ahead and they’re not going to stop us, we’ll go ahead and be able to get the project built and get it done in spite of them.

“. . . then, of course, too, that gave the opposition another tool to hold things up . . . hopefully delay it to the point where it cost too much . . . and it became an uneconomical project and then it would just go away. . . .”

It took a while to make that transition. And then, of course, too, that gave the opposition another tool to hold things up, delay things, and I think probably, in their view, hopefully delay it to the point where it cost too much, it was just too costly, and it became an uneconomical project and then it would just go away.

Storey: I guess one of the classic ones for Reclamation would have been New Melones. Was that going on while you were here?

New Melones Dam

Martin: It was. It was built and put into operation while I was here. That was built by the Corps of Engineers and then turned over to the Bureau to operate, and I believe that was completed and turned over to the Bureau in about ‘78 or ‘79. I can’t remember for sure. But, yes, it was going on at the time that I was here, and that one did have a lot of attention focused on it.

Storey: Do you remember any of the issues that came up?

“The principal issue was the flooding of the Stanislaus River, and there was a whitewater rafting area there that would be inundated by the lake, and there was opposition to that. . . . The season was extended by the operation of some projects up above during the natural runoff. . . .”

Martin: The principal issue was the flooding of the Stanislaus River, and there was a whitewater rafting area there that would be inundated by the lake, and there was opposition to that. That was the *primary* opposition. That whitewater was created–well, extended. I shouldn't say created. The season was extended by the operation of some projects up above during the natural runoff. Of course, there was a heavy flow in the river and a lot of whitewater, but then the season was extended by the operation of those projects up above. I think probably PG&E. I think they're PG&E projects.

There was a group, I believe they called themselves the Friends of the River, that opposed the construction and operation of the project, and there was a young fellow by the name of Mark DuBois. He must have been about 6'6" or 6'7", something like that. I know he was quite a bit taller than I am. A very personable young man and a really pleasure to be with, but he was opposed to the project.

"So after the project was completed, and we started filling it, there was opposition. . . . There was some *faction* within the Department of the Interior that was really opposed to it being filled as well. . . ."

So after the project was completed, and we started filling it, there was opposition. Even after it was built, there was opposition to it being filled. There was some *faction* within the Department of the Interior that was really opposed to it being filled as well. But this Mark DuBois said he was going to go up above the dam in the reservoir area and chain himself to a rock, and he was going to hide out up there and chain himself to a rock, so no one knew where he was, and then kind of dared us to fill it up and drown him. So I always assumed that as tall as he was, he probably had a long chain and he could keep his nose above the water.

Flooding below New Melones Because They Weren't Allowed to Store Water

But then there was one of the farmers downstream that said–and there was, I think it was in '79 when it was completed and was ready to start operating, and that was a wet year. It was very wet down on the Stanislaus and we had a *lot* of water coming down. There was some flooding down below the dam because we weren't storing very much. We were letting it come on through. So the water got out into the almond orchards and was doing a lot of flooding down below the dam, and the farmers down there, it made no sense to them. We had a dam there. All we had to do is close the gates and we could prevent that flooding. So one of them told me he was going to chain himself to a tree down below the dam. And this was someone that I'd made acquaintance with. I said, "Well, to be fair, I'm going to have to drown you and Mark both. We'll fill it up, drown him, and release it and drown you if you're going to do that." But we did finally get it worked through.

". . . New Melones was actually being operated out of the Department of the

Interior back East. . . . then we at least got the operation back out here and we did close the gates and take the pressure off from the flood control standpoint, which is what the project was built primarily for, was flood control. . . ."

Along about that time, Secretary Andrus stationed one of his people, one of his assistants, out here. I can't remember his name. Joe–I can't remember his last name. But, anyway, he was the secretary's assistant for governors relationships. He was kind of the point man between the secretary and the governors of the various states. So he stationed him out here as his field rep, and he and I had developed a good working relationship, since there was so much attention being focused on it. The New Melones was actually being operated out of the Department of the Interior back East. So when Joe came out here, then we at least got the operation back out here and we did close the gates and take the pressure off from the flood control standpoint, which is what the project was built primarily for, was flood control. No one was really happy, because the environmental folks didn't want the New Melones filled, folks down below wanted the gates closed so that it didn't flood them and would develop some additional amount of water that they were hoping to be able to put to beneficial use.

Storey: If I recall, there was a historic preservation compliance case also.

Martin: That's correct. That kind of came along at the last minute. There was a site–at least one, maybe two sites–that had to be looked at. I think there was some excavation done, and then with part of it I think it was just some additional armor was put over it and left in place.

How the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Reclamation Worked Together on Projects

Storey: I'm interested in the relationship between Reclamation and the Corps. This project was going to be built by the Corps, turned over to Reclamation. Folsom was the same way, I believe.

Martin: It was.

Storey: Did we participate any in the design and all of those kinds of issues, or did they do that part and then they gave it to us, or how did that work?

Martin: Of course, they had the responsibility for design, and, of course, we did do some review of the design and the specs. And then as the equipment was being installed, primarily the electrical equipment in the final stages or as some of that equipment was being installed, we stationed a crew of people out on site with the Corps so that the transition from construction to operation would be smooth and hopefully uneventful. I thought our relationship with the Corps during the construction and the transition to

operation and maintenance went very well. I was pleased with that relationship.

Storey: I'm remembering that you're an ag economist, right?

Martin: Right.

Storey: So you may not be the right person to ask. But I sort of *assume* that Reclamation may have different conventions and *preferences* for dam construction than does the Corps. And I'm just wondering if there was any consultation about major design decisions and so on.

Martin: To my knowledge, there were *no* consultations on *major* decisions, but in the review of the report, the planning report and the definite plan report and the final design, there was review and comment by Reclamation on those designs. If there were major issues or any real issues, they didn't get to my attention.

Storey: They didn't get to you. Okay.

Martin: If there were any, they were handled at the technical–in Denver or with the staff here and I wasn't aware of it.

Storey: One of the things that's interesting about the Central Valley project is that there are a number of–

END SIDE 2, TAPE 1. OCTOBER 25, 1995.
BEGIN SIDE 1, TAPE 2. OCTOBER 25, 1995.

Storey: This is tape two of an interview by Brit Storey with Bill E. Martin on October the 25th, 1995.

Let me start over. There were in the Central Valley Project a number of features designed and built by the Corps. Some of them they continued to operate, as I understand it, under the direction of Reclamation, others they turned over to us to operate like Folsom and New Melones. For instance, if New Melones is primarily a flood control project, why isn't the Corps operating it?

Martin: Well, I think, to my knowledge, in the Central Valley Project the Corps doesn't operate any facilities.

Storey: Is it Black Butte or something north?

Martin: I think even there–

Storey: I didn't realize that the transition had occurred.

Martin: Under an agreement between the Corps and the Bureau, for the most part, the Corps built the facilities–and this really came along a little later–facilities on the main stems of the rivers, and the Bureau kind of looked and developed more the tributaries. But in the Central Valley, of course, that was a little different because the Bureau built Shasta and the Corps built Folsom and a lot of the other facilities, several of the other facilities. But there was an agreement then that in the operation that would be turned over to the Bureau and those facilities would be–the operation then would be coordinated with facilities that the Bureau built, all as a part of the Central Valley Project.

"The Corps determines what the operating criteria will be for flood control, and then the Bureau operates it to the Bureau's criteria for flood control. . . . "

The Corps determines what the operating criteria will be for flood control, and then the Bureau operates it to the Bureau's criteria for flood control. The Corps would continue to have that responsibility of making any changes in the flood control operation. We would have to work with the Corps on any changes that were proposed from a flood control standpoint. Once the Corps built the project and turned it over, they really had no operational responsibility other than the flood control criteria.

Storey: So let's see if I'm understanding this. From the Corps' point of view, what they're doing is building flood control facilities.

Martin: Um-hmm.

Storey: But Reclamation operates them, and in doing that, as long as we stay within their operating criteria, we can then use the water as we need to use it for irrigation and M&I and so on.

Martin: Right.

Storey: Does the fact that the Corps builds these projects, using different authorities than Reclamation has, then affect us in the way that we can contract for water and so on?

Martin: No, because we work closely with the Corps during the planning process, and in projects that they develop we provide to them the information regarding water needs for irrigation, in some cases M&I, some cases they did that on their own. So we are working very closely with them. And then on the other side of the coin, like in the case of Shasta where we built the project, we work very closely with the Corps and they tell us what the flood control needs are, and that's incorporated and included into the project.

Storey: I don't know whether I'm asking the question the way I should be, but what I'm trying to get at is the cost reimbursement issues and the contracting issues. Are you saying that, say, the Corps builds New Melones and, as an

arbitrary example, 50 percent of it is going to be flood control and 50 percent of it is going to be water supply, so Reclamation provides money under our authorities for 50 percent and, therefore, we can seek reimbursement, or what?

Martin: Like in the case of New Melones where, say, 50 percent of it is flood control, the money for the construction of it just comes out of the Corps' budget. They get their funds under their budget and build it. In that authorization, either in the report that was provided to support the legislation, in some cases in the legislation or the report on the legislation, it spells out how these costs are going to be dealt with. The cost of flood control is non-reimbursable in the case of New Melones, and the cost allocated to water use would be repaid in a manner as prescribed under Reclamation law.

The Secretary of the Interior is charged with the responsibility of entering into the contracts to collect that money to repay those costs. The Corps, in their report, would go through the same cost allocation process and procedure that the Bureau does in its reports, identifying the costs that are non-reimbursable and the costs that are reimbursable, and designating a responsible party for [each of] those to repay those costs.

Storey: I'm probing this because I think it was Mark Reisner in *Cadillac Desert* made a big point about people trying to get Corps projects authorized because then they didn't have to reimburse costs and so on.

Martin: It's been a while since I've read his book, but I think probably what he was talking about there and what was the case in the planning stage there for a long time now–I think it may still be that way–there's a difference. You didn't have to do cost sharing as early in the planning process under the Corps' program as you did under Reclamation. Under Reclamation, they had to start cost sharing very early in the process. But I believe when it got to construction and to repayment of the construction costs, then I believe it's the same, because the reimbursement is being required under Reclamation law particularly for the ag portion. [Tape Interruption. Tape recorder turned off.]

Storey: One of the things you mentioned before we took a little break was screens which would keep out not only fish but eggs. Am I hearing correctly?

Developing Fish Screens That Would Exclude Small Fry and Eggs

Martin: The concept was to try to develop a screen that would not only prevent the small fry from getting into a diversion channel, but also to screen out the eggs as well.

Storey: Seems to me that would have to be awfully small.

Martin: It would have to be very small, and we were having all kinds of problems with the screens clogging up and trying to keep them clean. That was the reason for the test of the different designs, to try to come up with some kind of a screen that would allow you to divert water and at the same time screen out, hopefully, the eggs and the small fish.

Storey: Were we ever successful?

Martin: We had a design that we were reasonably happy with and it appeared that the fish folks would be able to sign off on. It was going to be extremely expensive, but then the Peripheral Canal was going to be a major investment anyway. So the screen, it would have been very expensive, but it would have been a minor part of the total cost.

Storey: So Reclamation was developing. This was new territory, in effect, I guess.

Martin: Um-hmm. Yeah. And as I mentioned earlier, we were working in conjunction with the Department of Fish and Game and Fish and Wildlife Service, so that hopefully whatever design that we came up with would be something that they could accept.

Drainage Issues in the San Joaquin Valley

Storey: I imagine we have plans and that sort of thing somewhere. You mentioned drainage as one of the major issues that came up. Could you talk more about that? Who were the major people involved? What were the major issues? How did we resolve it? What kind of pressures were put on us?

". . . there was a lot of salt in the salt profile and then the additional salt that was taken into the valley from the water out of the Delta. In order to prevent that salt from building up in the root zone and the land continue to be good arable land, there needed to be a drainage system put in. . . ."

Martin: Some of the major issues, of course, they originated with the movement of water out of the Delta through the Delta-Mendota Canal, and then later on the California Aqueduct, which was from San Luis Reservoir south to Bakersfield, which was a part of the joint project built by the state and the feds, part of the San Luis unit. Then that water was used then for irrigation, and there was a lot of salt in the salt profile and then the additional salt that was taken into the valley from the water out of the Delta. In order to prevent that salt from building up in the root zone and the land continue to be good arable land, there needed to be a drainage system put in.

"So there was a drainage system installed along with the water distribution system. Kesterson Reservoir was built . . . *south* of Kesterson so that the drainage water was collected and drained into the Kesterson Reservoir. . . ."

So there was a drainage system installed along with the water distribution

system. Kesterson Reservoir was built as a kind of a regulating reservoir for that drainage water. The collection and the conveyance system was built *south* of Kesterson so that the drainage water was collected and drained into the Kesterson Reservoir. Part of the conveyance system was built.

When I came out here in '74, there were major issues, discussions, and concerns about that drainage system not being completed. The state water project also delivered water down in that area, and they had no means of collecting and draining the salt buildup out of *their* project area. So the decision was made that we would continue building the conveyance system south in the Federal area, but there was language that George Miller had included in the appropriations bill that would not allow any of the appropriated funds to build a conveyance system *north* of Kesterson Reservoir because the concept was to run that drainage water back into the Bay-Delta[31] area and discharge so it could be swept out to the ocean.

". . . there was a prohibition put into the appropriations bill to prevent any development north of Kesterson of that drainage facility . . ."

But there was a prohibition put into the appropriations bill to prevent any development north of Kesterson of that drainage facility, and that was an absolute must. You had to get rid of it. You couldn't just let it collect forever in Kesterson. So when I came here in '74, that was one of the major issues.

"We put together . . . an interagency task force made up of Reclamation and the Department of Water Resources and the State Water Resources Control Board. . . . . We set up a separate unit and staffed it from those three organizations. We hired an independent manager to . . . produce a report and a plan for the collection and discharge of that drainage water out of the San Joaquin Valley out to the ocean. . . ."

We put together, I believe starting in about '75 or '76, an interagency task force made up of Reclamation and the Department of Water Resources and the State Water Resources Control Board. We each put some money into that. We set up a separate unit and staffed it from those three organizations. We hired an independent manager to come in and manage that effort, to take a look at and produce a report and a plan for the collection and discharge of that drainage water out of the San Joaquin Valley out to the ocean. We did–that group did come up with a proposal. It was not implemented. It was never implemented.

". . . a few years after I left, then all the problems started . . . arising from selenium being present in such large quantities within the water in Kesterson. So that . . . put a halt to the *concepts* that were being thought of at the time,

31. The delta of the San Joaquin and Sacramento rivers on San Francisco Bay, often referred to as the Bay-Delta.

and it just kind of started the whole thought process all over again on how do you manage that drainage water . . ."

Then after I left, a few years after I left, then all the problems started to emerge down at Kesterson with the deformed ducks, of course, arising from selenium being present in such large quantities within the water in Kesterson. So that really kind of set back and put a halt to the *concepts* that were being thought of at the time, and it just kind of started the whole thought process all over again on how do you manage that drainage water coming out of those projects.

Storey: I'm not quite clear why an authorization or an appropriation permitting the construction of Kesterson and drainage into Kesterson but not permitting any outflow from Kesterson.

Martin: I guess it was kind of maybe trying to satisfy or deal with two interests at the same time and letting a problem build up in the middle, because the environmental organizations and the Bay-Delta interests didn't want that drainage water discharged into the Bay or the Delta. They were not satisfied that it wouldn't create a problem for it. We looked at various discharge locations within the Delta, the Bay-Delta area, and we were satisfied.

I know one of the areas that we looked at was discharging at Chipps Island. I can't tell you exactly where that is in the Delta without a map. We were satisfied that there were places it could be discharged, that it would be carried out to the ocean and would not create a problem within the Bay-Delta, but there were other folks that never accepted that line of reasoning or that argument. So in order to *accommodate* them, the local congressman said, "All right, we'll let them go ahead and build their drainage system, their collector system, their conveyance system, and their regulating reservoir here in the middle. But until we're *absolutely sure* of what the consequences may be, we won't let them build it north so that they can discharge it into the Bay-Delta." So we were operating it that way and taking enough into the system and evaporating it. So we just took in what evaporated, and so it got quite concentrated within the Kesterson Reservoir.

Storey: And, of course, then once you had that problem surface, it would have been impossible to build a drain there, I imagine.

". . . part of the concept, was you store it in Kesterson, and then during the runoff season when the flows are high, you discharge it out to the ocean or out to the Bay-Delta and it's just swept out into the ocean and there's no impact. . . ."

Martin: Some of the concept, part of the concept, was you store it in Kesterson, and then during the runoff season when the flows are high, you discharge it out to the ocean or out to the Bay-Delta and it's just swept out into the ocean and there's no impact. There were also things looked at, that you put it in a

closed pipe and carry it out. Also looked at other concepts of taking out at the other end.

Storey: You mean across toward Monterey harbor?

Martin: Um-hmm.

Storey: Or bay, I guess it's called. The Kesterson issue, however, in terms of the toxicity and everything was after you left?

Martin: Yes.

Storey: Following on down, my understanding now is that Kesterson's gone, and I'm wondering if in your capacity here in Sacramento after you retired from Reclamation, you were involved any more and became aware of how are they dealing with drainage issues now.

Martin: I haven't been directly involved in any of them. I've been aware that discussions are going on and that there are efforts, efforts been made to look at alternative ways of dealing with the problem. I'm really not that conversant on any of the potential solutions.

Storey: Let's see. . . . Were you aware of any of the conflicts between agriculture and M&I users who wanted to obtain water from Reclamation back in those days, or was that handled at a lower level in the organization?

". . . major issues between ag and municipal and industrial users, and that kind of translated into a north-south issue, because one of the major M&I users, of course, was the Metropolitan Water District customers in southern California. They're kind of a formidable force to deal with, and there is a big *demand* for municipal and industrial water down in that area. . . . the Bureau was kind of peripherally interested . . . because . . . they were trying to get the Bureau to pick up *more* responsibility in the Delta, which would make *more* state water project [supply] available for municipal and industrial use down in southern California. . . ."

Martin: At the time that I was here, there were no real major issues between ag and irrigation for the Federal water project supply. There was, of course, major issues between ag and municipal and industrial users, and that kind of translated into a north-south issue, because one of the major M&I users, of course, was the Metropolitan Water District customers in southern California. They're kind of a formidable force to deal with, and there is a big *demand* for municipal and industrial water down in that area. So there were some major issues between ag and M&I, and the Bureau was kind of peripherally interested or involved in it, because some of the efforts they were making, they were trying to get the Bureau to pick up *more* responsibility in the Delta, which would make *more* state water project [supply] available for municipal and industrial use down in southern

California.

Storey: Of course, we don't extend that far, so we didn't have those kinds of pressures on us.

"If the Central Valley Project is responsible for more of the obligation of maintaining quality in the Delta, then that frees up more state project water for export. . . ."

Martin: Not on us direct for project water, but in an indirect way. If the Central Valley Project is responsible for more of the obligation of maintaining quality in the Delta, then that frees up more state project water for export.

Storey: And were they putting pressure on for that interpretation of who was responsible?

Martin: They were. They were involved, and probably still are involved, in trying to get the Federal government more responsible for a larger part of the Delta obligation.

Storey: Our forebay reduces our responsibility, huh?

Martin: Right.

Storey: It's interesting. While you were here in California, what kinds of contacts did you have with politicians? I presume this is part of the regional director's job. How does it work?

". . . I had contact with a *lot* of politicians. . . ."

Martin: Well, I had contact with a *lot* of politicians. It ranged from the congressional members of Congress both in the House and Senate.

"Bizz" Johnson

In my tenure here, primarily there were more from the House of Representatives. Congressman "Bizz" Johnson, of course, was chairman of the–at that time it was called the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee. He was, of course, from Roseville. His district was Northern California, had the Trinity River areas as well as a lot of the area up north, in Shasta, Redding, that area. So I had a lot of contact with him. About every time he came back to the district, we got together, and he would want me to go to some meeting with him. We spent a lot of time in meetings in Weaverville, in Redding, meeting with people regarding the operation of Shasta Reservoir, with people wanting water supplies. So I spent a *lot* of time with him, a lot of time on the telephone as well as in person when he was out, as well as with all of the members of the House of Representatives that their districts touched on the Central Valley Project area or within the regional area, *except those* down in the Bay area.

George Miller

I didn't have a lot of contact with them except for George Miller. Of course, I had a lot of contact with him because of his interest in the operation of the project.

Storey: This was–is it senior?

Martin: No, this was junior.

Storey: Okay.

Martin: He was already in the Congress. I think he came in shortly after I came out here.[32]

Leo Ryan and Lake Berryessa Issues

And then Leo Ryan. I had quite a bit of contact with him and his office, primarily related to Lake Berryessa issues. We had a major problem there, because the concessioners had their ideas on how they should be allowed to operate and the facilities they should be able to develop. There was a GAO [Government Accounting Office] report that said it was just atrocious what was happening up there. At the time, Senator [John V.] Tunney and, I believe, Ted Kennedy came out, held a little hearing and said that Reclamation was doing a poor job of managing that area, allowing that to happen.

At about the time I came out here, we started putting the squeeze on the county to get the concessioners to do a better job of operating. The county balked at doing that and just handed it back to us. We had an agreement with the county where they would have to take on the responsibility for the recreation facilities, and then they, in turn, entered into some agreements with the concessioners. Then the county gave it back to us, and we were meeting with the concessioners and trying to get them to work up some plans to basically scale back their operation and clean them up, get rid of some of their mobile homes that were no longer mobile.

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BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE 2. OCTOBER 25, 1995.

Storey: . . . San Francisco and the Bay area who had mobile homes up there.

Martin: They would escape to Lake Berryessa on the weekends, and what we were doing would have reduced the number of mobile homes in that area, and that was contrary to what they wanted. So they got Leo Ryan involved. Leo

32. George Miller III has served in the House of Representatives since 1975. His father, George Miller Jr. served in the state legislature. Congressman George Miller III is not related to another California member of the House of Representatives, George Paul Miller, who served from 1945 to 1973..

Ryan and Secretary Andrus and I made a few trips up to Lake Berryessa, meeting with people. I spent a lot of time working with the folks at Lake Berryessa and also with Leo Ryan. He had a solution worked out. He had something in mind that you should do when he came in, so he was not very easy to work with. And then–

Storey: Let's explore that a little further. Because he had developed a solution before he knew the realities of the situation, is that what we're saying?

Martin: Yeah. He had a huge ego and he had the solution that worked out for you, and he had a problem accepting that it wouldn't be worked out that way or finally go that way, and that made him very difficult to work with. And then, of course, he went off to Guyana with the Jonestown episode and was killed while he was still congressman. But he was difficult to work with in that respect.

Storey: What was the solution? You were saying he had a conceived solution. Did you see it all?

Martin: Well, his solution was for us to stay out of it and leave it alone and just let the folks continue to have the operation there that they had. In order to try to appease his constituents, he didn't want the number of mobile homes reduced, he wanted them to just continue the way they were.

We tried to turn it over to the state. I went up there with the state director of parks and recreation, who had at the time was William Penn Mott, and toured the thing with him and tried to convince him that that's one that the state should take on and manage. He said, "Well, when you get it cleaned up, we'll talk to you about it." So he was not very receptive to just taking it on. It was obvious that there were some major local issues and major local problems, and some of the local folks wanted it cleaned up and wanted changes made, and, of course, the concessioners and the people that had the mobile homes there *didn't* want it changed. They wanted us to just go away.

Bernie Sisk and John McFall

There were other congressmen that I worked with, Bernie Sisk and John McFall, who at the time held *key* positions in the Congress because they had been there for a long time, they just had a lot of tenure. And then we worked with the state legislatures, legislators in all of the states that we had responsibility for, the governors' staff and the water resources people, Fish and Game, a lot of the local politicians, county boards of supervisors, and a lot of the local elected officials. So there was a *lot of* contact with the political folks at all levels of government, really.

Storey: Bizz Johnson, for instance, that would have been a very powerful committee for Reclamation, I imagine.

Martin: Um-hmm. It was.

Storey: Did he try to apply a lot of pressure to you?

"Bizz was a very low-key type. He . . . didn't wear his rank on his sleeve or anything. No, he never tried to pressure me into doing anything. He had ideas and concepts and thoughts on some things that he wanted done, and he had a lot of things that he asked me to do and get him information on . . . Most of it I ran through the commissioner before I gave it to him or made him aware of it before I gave it to him. . . . he was not a *heavy pressure* type of person, or at least not overtly. . . ."

Martin: No. Bizz was a very low-key type. He didn't wear his ego on his sleeve, didn't wear his rank on his sleeve or anything. No, he never tried to pressure me into doing anything. He had ideas and concepts and thoughts on some things that he wanted done, and he had a lot of things that he asked me to do and get him information on, which I did. Some of it, he just asked me for it and I gave it to him direct. Most of it I ran through the commissioner before I gave it to him or made him aware of it before I gave it to him. So, yeah, he had a lot of ideas and a lot of things that he wanted to see done in his district or in the state. I guess maybe it was more subtle than overt, but he was not a *heavy pressure* type of person, or at least not overtly.

Acreage Limitation Issues

Storey: One of the things that would have been heating up about this time would have been acreage limitation. Two years after you left, RRA was passed and, of course, there were pressures leading up to the passage of that act, and this is sort of the hotbed for RRA issues.

Martin: It is. That's probably one of the things that I should have included at the outset as one of the major issues. It was prior to RRA, but a lot of the things that were going on here probably caused the action, the RRA action, when it did and probably formed some of the provisions in the Reclamation Reform Act. That was a very, very sensitive issue and it was an emotional issue. Of course, we were building and developing the Westlands project unit at the time, and there were some big landholders in that Westlands area–Southern Pacific Railroad, several of the major oil companies, and then just some big landowners, J. G. Boswell, and some of those folks, some of the big landowners and operators, and they had signed the agreements to dispose of excess lands within the timeframe prescribed by the secretary in the contracts.

George Ballis Headed the National Land for People Organization

There was an organization organized called Land for People. George Ballis was the leader of that movement. There were a number of followers, and *they* didn't like the way that excess land was being divided up. They

were saying, well, because the employees of the companies were ending up with the land or maybe it was being subdivided and relatives were buying it, were owning it, and so they had quite a campaign going. They would go around to lots of meetings and got a lot of publicity talking about "paper farmers" and how that excess land was being disposed of really was not being disposed of, it was just being taken care of in a manner that left the owner in control, the original owner in control.

"What *they* wanted, they wanted to buy that land. Well, they probably didn't really want to buy, or if they did, they wanted it at a real subsidized price or a very low price. . . ."

What *they* wanted, they wanted to buy that land. Well, they probably didn't really want to buy, or if they did, they wanted it at a real subsidized price or a very low price.

So there was a lot of emotion over the way that land was being sold off. They thought that they shouldn't have had that number of years to dispose of it, and they thought that it should have been disposed of in a different way. So it took a lot of time and a lot of effort and caused a lot of stress. I went to a lot of meetings there for a while.

GAO had done a report and they were critical of the way that we were managing the excess lands, and they and this Land for People and the state and some others were saying that we really weren't implementing the law, that we were circumventing the law. GAO had done a report that was critical of the way that we were implementing the law. So there for a while, for several months, there was a fellow from Westlands Water District, from GAO, and from Land for People, and myself. We got invited to participate on a lot of panels around the state to talk about the implementation of the Reclamation law and the disposal of the excess lands in Westlands.

Storey: Of course, at that time it would have been 160-acre limitation, I think.

Martin: 160 acres. Um-hmm.

Storey: Well, what was your reaction to the charge that Reclamation was not implementing Reclamation law properly?

". . . I still believe that at the time, with the law on the books at the time, that Reclamation was making a *reasonable interpretation* of the law and implementing it in a reasonable way. There were things that I didn't necessarily agree with in the law, but I thought we were implementing it in a reasonable way . . ."

Martin: Well, I disagreed with it, and I still believe that at the time, with the law on the books at the time, that Reclamation was making a *reasonable interpretation* of the law and implementing it in a reasonable way. There

were things that I didn't necessarily agree with in the law, but I thought we were implementing it in a reasonable way, implementing the law in a reasonable way.

Storey: How did you respond to Land for People's charges that the land wasn't being distributed out the way they thought it should be?

Martin: We reviewed cases where they pointed to, and we were satisfied that they were legal, that the transactions were legal, that the way they had disposed of the land was legal under the law. That's when some of the partnerships was being formed, and the law, it didn't prohibit this. Those, according to the solicitor's office, was permissible under the law. So the only thing that I could do in those kinds of cases was just have someone take a look at it from a legal standpoint and see whether or not the disposition had been done in a legal manner, whether or not the partnerships were legal and whether it was all legal, and if it was and was not prohibited by the law, then the legal advice that I was getting is that, you know, that's all you can do. So that's where I kind of took my stand and said I really don't have any other option to implement the law other than this way, the way the law is on the books.

Storey: So what we're dealing with here is sort of an emotional issue and also an interpretative issue, I gather.

Martin: It was.

Storey: And we interpreted it differently, we and the solicitor's office, which at that time, I believe, had been separated from Reclamation.

Martin: Yes.

Storey: So it was an independent office.

Martin: It was independent.

Storey: So their advice to us was, well, these are legal.

Martin: Um-hmm.

Storey: They weren't addressing the emotional, moral, whatever, issues that might come into it.

". . . a lot of the decisions that I made . . . you look at the issue from all different aspects and perspectives, and you have to decide. You know someone is going to sue you, so you say, 'Well, now, who do I want to sue me or who do I want to defend myself against?' So you take a look at the legal aspects of it and say, 'What's my strongest defense? What's the most logical thing to do under the law in this case?' . . ."

Martin: No. In a lot of the decisions that I made on the disposal of excess lands or a lot of other issues, too, you look at the issue from all different aspects and perspectives, and you have to decide. You know someone is going to sue you, so you say, "Well, now, who do I want to sue me or who do I want to defend myself against?" So you take a look at the legal aspects of it and say, "What's my strongest defense? What's the most logical thing to do under the law in this case?"

Storey: And I presume the solicitor's advice would play heavily into this.

Martin: Um-hmm

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Storey: Did we have a specific solicitor assigned to Reclamation then?

Martin: The regional solicitor's office here had people assigned to Reclamation and to Fish and Wildlife and the other agencies, other bureaus that they had responsibility for, and then within Reclamation issues they had those assignments kind of a little more specific. Dick Dauber was assigned and handled *most* of the excess lands issues.

Storey: That would be D-A-U-B-E-R?

Martin: Right.

Storey: Was working with the solicitor's office a good working relationship while you were here?

Martin: It was. They had some good attorneys and their relationship was very good, and I thought that the attorneys that they had then that we worked with I thought were very competent and had a good working relationship.

Storey: How, from a personal perspective, did you react to the issues that were involved in the acreage limitation thing, or did you try to not react personally?

". . . there were some people that I would have liked to have seen be able to acquire some land that weren't able to. . . ."

Martin: Well, I tried to not react personally. My preference would have–I would have liked to have seen some of the folks, not necessarily the National Land for People folks, but there were some people that I would have liked to have seen be able to acquire some land that weren't able to get it under the disposal process. I'm not saying that that was unfair, you know, that it was unfair, but there were some people that I would have liked to have seen be able to acquire some land that weren't able to.

"Although we weren't having the problem at the time, later on I did have a problem with the concept of foreigners being able to come in and participate

and acquire land in projects such as this where we're dealing with prime agricultural land, we're dealing with subsidies and those kinds of things. Our folks should have first crack at them. . . ."

I would have liked to have seen it opened up some more so that some portion of that land would have just been put on the open market. I don't know whether you'd bid on it or whatever, however you want to dispose of it, but I would have liked to have seen it opened up, at least a *portion* of the land opened up, so that outsiders could have had a chance at it. Although we weren't having the problem at the time, later on I did have a problem with the concept of foreigners being able to come in and participate and acquire land in projects such as this where we're dealing with prime agricultural land, we're dealing with subsidies and those kinds of things. Our folks should have first crack at them.

Storey: Uh-huh. Yeah.

Martin: But I didn't get involved in that personally, but that's kind of the way I felt about it.

Storey: We were leading up to, because of the studies that were going on with Phil Doe's office, I believe it was, in Denver, leading up to the passage of the RRA Act. Congressional committees. Was Reclamation asking for advice out of this region, since it was the most affected region, and if so, what were we saying out of this region?

Martin: When Phil Doe's office was doing the study, I believe that was *after* I left here.

Storey: It might have been. You know, I'm a little–

"Our advice and our feeling was that Reclamation law needed to be changed, . . . and a lot of other people were picking up on that and urging that as well. There hadn't been any real major movement in that direction . . . until after I left. . . ."

Martin: Our advice and our feeling was that Reclamation law needed to be changed, and we were urging that, that it be changed, and a lot of other people were picking up on that and urging that as well. There hadn't been any real major movement in that direction in terms of putting things on paper until after I left. We had several oversight hearings, hearings by congressional members, in the implementation of the act and what was needed in terms of changes in the act. We had a lot of field hearings, and both the solicitor's office and I went to all those hearings, made statements. Much of it was defending our action on what we had already done, but there was also conversations on how the act should be changed, what should be looked at. There was a lot of conversation at the time on absentee owners and how that should be dealt with.

Storey: Which was illegal under the Reclamation law, wasn't it?

Martin: Yeah. You had to live within fifty miles. I believe you had to live within fifty miles of this. And, of course, the argument there was there were some little old widows that their only source of income is the rent from this land that they have, and they may live in San Francisco or L.A. or someplace, which is more than fifty miles away from the land, but that's their only source of income and they shouldn't be *deprived* of that income just because they don't *live* within fifty miles of the land. And there were a number of other issues, of course, the size of a parcel that a person should be able to own and operate. So there were a lot of oversight hearings, and all of these things were kind of *background* and *building* up to actually getting the changes down on paper.

Storey: You mentioned Reclamation out of the region was recommending changes. What kind of changes were being recommended?

Martin: Well, as I recall, we thought the number of acres needed to be changed. That 160 acres was not realistic.

Storey: Do you remember what was being suggested?

Issues That Changes in Reclamation Law Needed to Address

Martin: I don't recall, but it was probably in that 960 range. We felt that it was just not possible to–it just wasn't realistic to think in terms of the modern equipment and the technology and things, that 160 acres is just no longer an economic unit. And then we felt that the language dealing with partnerships and corporations should be tightened up, should be clarified and tightened up so that we can implement that, have better direction on implementation of that. And then the residency issue needed to be dealt with. The commingling of water, of project and non-project water in project facilities needed to be dealt with and clarified. It seemed like there were a couple of others at the time, but they escape me right now. But those were the ones that come most immediately to mind.

Storey: Can you provide me a personal reaction to what you thought ought to have been done to Reclamation law?

Martin: In terms of the act that was passed or–

Storey: Of changes. No, in terms of changes that you thought personally should be done.

Martin: Well, personally, I felt that the ones that I mentioned, I felt personally that those needed to be changed. I also thought that I would have liked to have seen some provision to allow some of the land, excess land, to be opened up so that it could be accessible to outside people.

Storey: Is it the Klamath Project that's part of this region?

Martin: Yes.

Storey: Were there any issues up there that you recall?

Issues on the Klamath Project

Martin: Yes, there were. There were water supply issues. There were fish and wildlife issues. Then there was just some implementation issues. There were problems between the local folks, the water users, and the Bureau. They kind of felt that they were not a part of this region.

Some Water Users on the Klamath Project Wanted to Be Transferred into Region1 (Renamed the Pacific Northwest Region in 1972) of Reclamation

When I came out here, there were some of the folks even lobbying to be removed from this region and put into Pacific Northwest Region, because they felt that the region wasn't paying attention to their needs.

Storey: This is people in the Reclamation office, or this is water users?

Martin: No, these are water users that were kind of lobbying to be a part of the [Pacific] Northwest Region.

Storey: How did you approach that issue?

Martin: Well, I spent some time with them, and we talked about the things that were concerning them, got some feel for how they thought they were being ignored, what they thought their needs were that weren't being met, and just spent some time with them kind of trying to make them feel better about being a part of this region. They came around and decided that they would give us a try, and they did, and I guess they liked it. Anyway, they stopped talking about wanting to leave the region.

END SIDE 2, TAPE 2. OCTOBER 25, 1995.
BEGIN SIDE 1, TAPE 3. OCTOBER 25, 1995.

Storey: This is tape three of an interview by Brit Storey with Bill E. Martin on October the 25th, 1995.

I had asked you what water supply issues there were up there in Klamath.

Martin: There were projects and project units that didn't have a full supply. So the project was kind of over-allocated, so they were wanting to look for additional water, some supplemental water, to give them 100 percent supply. There were also some distribution problems. Their distributions systems,

some of them were kind of antiquated. There were also some drainage problems with the city of Klamath Falls' draining, with their city developing and developing parking lots and shopping centers and paving over areas, increased runoff. They discharged that into what was called the A Canal, one of the conveyance canals for the project, and that created some capacity problems within the canal and also some water-quality issues. So we had some long drawn-out discussions with the city over discharging into the canal.

Then, of course, the fish and wildlife issues. There are wildlife refuges up there that need water, and that kind of created some of the demand for water and created some of the water supply pressures as well. And there again, the farmers didn't want water going to the refuges; they wanted to use it in their farming operations. So we had some of the same issues there that we had here except on a smaller scale.

Storey: Any particular people stand out up there?

Martin: Well, the one that probably stands out the most was George Proctor. He was an attorney in Klamath Falls, represented a lot of the water users, and he was rather outspoken and vocal about the issues. He was one of them that was kind of leading the charge wanting to go to the Northwest Region, become affiliated with them. But George and I developed a good relationship and he was very active in Oregon water issues. He was involved in the Oregon Water Congress as well as some of the committees and agencies, appointed agencies, that were dealing with some of the local and state water issues, very active in the National Water Resources Association. So he was quite informed on local and national water issues. Although he could be a challenge sometimes, he was good to work with, and I think was an asset to resolving water issues–some of the local water issues.

Storey: I'm trying to think if there's anything else I should be asking you about the Mid-Pacific Region. Was there any major construction going on besides New Melones?

Tehama-Colusa Canal, Westlands, San Felipe Unit, Auburn Unit, and Auburn Dam

Martin: We had the Tehama-Colusa Canal that was under construction. We also had some of the distribution and drainage system in Westlands, and that was kind of an ongoing thing. We started the San Felipe Unit while I was here, and we started the Auburn Unit, the Auburn Dam, in 1975 until the Oroville earthquake hit and then we went into a major study mode on determining whether or not that was a seismically safe site for a dam. Let's see, I guess that was probably the major–

Storey: But Auburn, of course, has turned out to be quite an issue.

Martin: Right.

Storey: I suppose this last spring we could have filled it maybe.

Martin: It would have been useful last spring. Probably it would have been more useful in '86 than it was last year. Last year the flooding up in this part of the state was more of a local nature, local streams rather than the major streams, so that actually the flood control facilities worked well last year. The problems were in local areas, small streams where there was no control. Things clogged up and water backed up.

Storey: Did you select the construction engineer for Auburn?

Martin: The construction engineer was already on site when I came out here. When he retired, I did, but I did it with consultation with the Engineering and Research Center in Denver. I actually made the selection, but I worked very closely with them and consulted very closely with them in deciding who we would put in the job.

Storey: But at the time you came, we were in sort of full-bore construction?

Martin: I believe it was just within a matter of a few weeks or it was either several days or a few weeks after I came on board that we opened the bids for the treatment of the foundation, and we awarded the contract for the treatment of the foundation.

Storey: Now, when you say treatment of the foundation, this would be excavating the cutoff, transfer, and all that sort of thing?

Martin: Yeah.

Storey: So that was completed while you were here?

The Oroville Earthquake

". . . we probably did go ahead and complete all of the foundation treatment, because we thought it would be cheaper to go ahead and complete it than it would be to terminate the contract and pay the damages. . . ."

Martin: Well, it was still in progress when the Oroville earthquake hit, and I believe we probably did go ahead and complete all of the foundation treatment, because we thought it would be cheaper to go ahead and complete it than it would be to terminate the contract and pay the damages. So I believe we did go ahead and complete that. But, yeah, the foundation treatment was completed while I was here, and we had undertaken and done most, maybe about all, of the excavations for doing the seismic and the geologic studies on the dam site itself and whether or not there was a fault through there and what the potential might be for movement there, and to determine whether

or not that was a safe dam site and whether the concrete dam design was a reasonable design for that site.

". . . it was determined that, yeah, it was a . . . safe site and a concrete design was a reasonable design for that site. But, of course, the politics and some of the public reaction had gotten funding stopped, and then . . . there were just so many emotional issues that it became impossible at that time to get major construction money to get Auburn back under way. . . ."

That was completed just about the time I left. I don't remember whether it was just before or right after I left, but it was determined that, yeah, it was a reasonable site and it was a safe site and a concrete design was a reasonable design for that site. But, of course, the politics and some of the public reaction had gotten funding stopped, and then efforts to try to get funding focused again on it, there were just so many emotional issues that it became impossible at that time to get major construction money to get Auburn back under way.

Storey: Sort of peripherally related, I think while you were still in Washington, the leak must have developed at Fontanelle. Do you remember that at all? Do you remember how the Washington office reacted?

". . . there was a lot of concern and a lot of puzzlement over the leakage problem [at Fontanelle] . . ."

Martin: I remember it, and there was a lot of discussion, a lot of concern. That was handled more on our operations and our engineering end rather than in the planning division, so we didn't get that involved in it, and I wasn't directly involved in the discussions that took place on Fontanelle. But there was a lot of concern and a lot of puzzlement over the leakage problem.

Storey: The next question related in my mind, maybe not in anybody else's, is do you remember where you were when Teton failed and do you remember what the reactions in Reclamation were like?

Failure of Teton Dam

Martin: Well, of course, I was here as regional director. I don't remember just where I happened to be physically at the time. It was just a real devastating blow, I think, within Reclamation that when this happens, something like this happens for the first time, this drastic thing, you have a *major* failure such as this and the loss of life and the property damage and just having something that one of the best engineering organizations in the world has put together and then something like this happen, you know, it's just unheard of and it was really devastating to the Bureau.

My sense, my reading of the people that I came in contact with within the Bureau was just kind of disbelief and then, I guess, just a feeling

that it's kind of downhill from here maybe forever, but at least for a long time, and that recovering from something like this is going to be a–you probably can't do it, make a total recovery, and it's just going to haunt us for a long time.

Storey: Did it have any direct effects on the Mid-Pacific Region?

Teton Affected Trying to Get Auburn Dam Restarted

Martin: It did, from the standpoint of trying to get Auburn relaunched. Several times during every conversation regarding Auburn, regarding any dam that we were proposing, Teton would come up, and we could no longer say we had never lost a dam, and before we could [say that]. Without being able to *say* that, where we had in the past, it made it a little more difficult to defend a design and say, "This is not going to fail. This will work." Because they'd say, "Well, didn't you feel that way about Teton?"

Storey: What about dam safety issues? Did you see anything there after the failure of Teton?

Dam Safety Program after the Failure of Teton Dam

Martin: Yeah. After the failure of Teton and also after the failure of a number of other smaller dams over time, of course, we had a major emphasis on dam safety.

Storey: Not our dams?

Martin: Not our dams.

Storey: Oh, okay. Other dams.

Martin: Most of them were private dams, the smaller ones of a private nature. So there was a major emphasis on safety of dams, trying to get money to address some of those safety of dams issues became a major task. Here in the region as well as the other regions, we *did* start focusing more attention and more dollars on safety of dams matters.

Storey: What about publicly raised issues regarding safety of dams? Did you see anything there?

Martin: I didn't. You'd hear–and we heard this even before Teton–but you would hear reactions regarding the safety of a structure. Of course, most of Reclamation's projects are in more remote areas, and you don't have major population areas downstream of most of them. Some of them, of course, we do. But we really didn't hear a lot about, say, failures such as Shasta or any of the major facilities. We really didn't hear that much just from the local folks or the local area. I was trying to remember if there was anything

specific came to mind, but I don't recall a specific incident where there was a *major* issue made by local folks on a specific structure.

Storey: What about requests from Pacific Northwest Region for staffing assistance? Do you remember anything about that?

Martin: I don't recall. Well, I do in processing some of the claims, the Teton claims, there was a request there, and we all worked to try to help them out on processing and moving those claims. And I don't recall specifically any other requests from–there may have been some. I just don't recall any.

Storey: Well, we talked in the first or second interview about your move to Denver. Let's move on to your period as regional director there from '80 to '85, I think it was. I presume there was a whole new set of issues. What are the issues that sort of pop to the surface in your mind for the–let's see, that was the lower–

Major Issues in the Lower Missouri Region, 1980-1985

Martin: Lower Missouri.

Storey: The Lower Missouri Region. What are the major issues that you dealt with there?

Martin: Well, some of them, we had some of the same type of issues, you know, the environmental issues, as here. There just weren't as many of them.

Narrows Unit, Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program

Fairly early on the Narrows Unit of the Missouri Basin Project–that's located on the South Platte River in northeastern Colorado–that had been authorized for construction, and Congress, in an appropriation bill, in appropriating some money for the project, directed the Bureau to prepare the project for construction. So when I went out to a meeting in the local area one night, and, of course, the Narrows unit was very emotional, it was another emotional issue, but I took some of our key staff and we went out. We had a packed house. There must have been 150 people showed up.

Storey: This would have been maybe out at Fort Morgan or someplace.

Martin: Out at Fort Morgan. I believe it was in one of the local motels there. We had one of their conference rooms and it was packed.

"I . . . said that we'd been directed by Congress to prepare the project for construction and that we were really beyond the point of *debating* the merits of the project . . ."

I had opened it up and said that we'd been directed by Congress to prepare

the project for construction and that we were really beyond the point of *debating* the merits of the project, because those had been debated, the project had been authorized, and now Congress has directed us to proceed with construction, prepare it for construction. So that session went on for about three or four hours and, of course, we talked about the merits of the project. They weren't going to let me get away that easy. So we talked about the merits of the project, and we talked about how we're going to proceed in preparing and meeting Congress' direction.

There Were Major Environmental Issues on the Narrows Unit

There were, of course, *major* issues there on the impacts down in Nebraska and the whooping crane habitat, the sandhill crane's habitat on the Platte River of developing that water. So the state of Nebraska, of course, was interested in it, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the E-P-A [Environmental Protection Agency], and the Audubon Society and other environmental organizations. So we had a lot of meetings in Colorado and in Nebraska on that project.

We also had a lot of discussions with the folks down in Nebraska regarding the whooping crane, on the operation of the Platte River, the North Platte Project, out of Wyoming and western Nebraska, and the impact that that was having on the water supply on the Platte River down through that whooping crane habitat area in central Nebraska. And there again, they were looking for more water from the projects to get down into that area.

North Loup Project and the O'Neill Unit

We also had two projects, the North Loup Project that we got under construction shortly after I went over, we also had the O'Neill unit down in Nebraska up in the northeastern part of the state, north central part of the state, really, that was authorized for construction, but it had major environmental issues, because that was right in the area where they said the East meets the West, and you had transition of vegetation from East-West, transition of wildlife species, and they didn't want a dam built there to flood that area where all this transition takes place. Some of the state folks were having some problem with it. They were really kind of noncommittal, although they had supported the project when it was authorized.

O' Neill Unit Finally Died

But the local folks wanted the project, and we spent a lot of time studying that project. It finally just died.

"Silt Run" on the North Platte Project

Then we had in the North Platte Project the Guernsey Dam and Reservoir was built. I can't remember exactly when it was built. But some

of the old distribution systems on the North Platte Project are unlined, and they would do what they call a silt run. They would divert the silty water out of the river into the canal and silt would *seal* their canal so they didn't have so much leakage. When Guernsey was built, the silt settled out in Guernsey Reservoir and just clear water was being delivered then and there was major seepage with that clear water. So the district sued the Bureau. They said that their water right entitled them to the silt in the water.

Bessemer Ditch Suit in Colorado over Silt-laden Water

There was a similar suit filed in Colorado by the Bessemer Ditch, because when the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project was built, their point of diversion was moved so they took water out of the reservoir, out of Pueblo Reservoir. They no longer had the silt-laden water that they had had when they took it directly out of the river, so they filed suit because they said that their water right entitled them to the silt in the water.

"The court held that their water right entitled them to water, not silty . . . water. So with that court ruling, then the folks up on the North Platte backed off of their lawsuit . . ."

The court held that their water right entitled them to water, not silty, not muddy water. So with that court ruling, then the folks up on the North Platte backed off of their lawsuit and didn't pursue it.

" . . . we finally worked out a silt-run agreement with them so that we would provide them with silty water X number of days a year, and for that they would pay. . . . we would shut down the powerplant at Guernsey Reservoir . . . But since we had to take the powerplant out of operation, we thought they should pay something for it . . . a power interference charge for giving them some muddy water. . . ."

A lot of this was going on before I moved over there. But we started a major effort, a major local effort, to try to resolve that issue, and we finally worked out a silt-run agreement with them so that we would provide them with silty water X number of days a year, and for that they would pay. Up until then, they had been getting silt runs, but they hadn't been paying for it. We had to shut down. The way we did it, we would shut down the powerplant at Guernsey Reservoir, we would open the gates, drain the water out of Guernsey. Then we would kind of surge water through Guernsey so that silt would slough off into the water and put mud in the river, muddy water in the river, and they would divert it. E-P-A looked at that kind of with a jaundiced eye, but they never shut it down. But since we had to take the powerplant out of operation, we thought they should pay something for it, and we finally did get it. It was long and agonizing, but we finally did get an agreement worked out with the water users where they would pay us a power interference charge for giving them some muddy water. I believe it was either two or three weeks during the irrigation season.

Storey: In the spring, maybe?

Martin: I don't remember the timing of it exactly. I think it was before the Fourth of July, because we wanted to have Guernsey Reservoir up and operating over the Fourth of July.

Casper Worked with a Local Irrigation District to Obtain Water

Then we did have water supply issues as well. The city of Casper, they needed water. They had kind of worked out an arrangement with one of the local irrigation districts where they would pay for some of the linings on their canals and for the right to buy the water that saved, and we worked with the state engineer's office and got that worked out so they were able to do that. But there were some of the same issues.

Marketing Water out of Green Mountain Reservoir

They dealt more with whooping cranes, which was on the endangered species as well as on the–we also had some major issues on the Colorado-Big Thompson Project, and Green Mountain Reservoir we had a big block of water in Green Mountain to be marketed. When I first went over there, there was a–

END SIDE 1, TAPE 3. OCTOBER 25, 1995.
BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE 3. OCTOBER 25, 1995.

Storey: You were saying there was a major interest by oil shale developers.

Oil Shale Developers Wanted Water from Green Mountain Reservoir

Martin: The oil shale developers wanted to obtain water from Green Mountain Reservoir to use in their oil extraction process from the oil shale. There were, of course, major environmental issues related to that. We had demands for a lot more water than was available from Green Mountain, so we were developing a process to try to allocate that water and also do the environmental compliance so we could market the water. There were environmental issues, endangered species issues on the Colorado River. There were ski resorts that wanted to buy water to make snow.

Issues with Denver and Reclamation Water Rights

The city of Denver has some diversions in that area, and we'd had about two or three lawsuits with Denver before where they were trying to encroach on our water rights. So we had ongoing discussions with the Denver Water Department around the Green Mountain operation and marketing of water from Green Mountain, as well as the people that were wanting to buy the water and the Colorado River Water Conservation District that had some of the major responsibilities for water management

over on the West Slope in that area. So there were major local political issues as well in trying to get to the point where we could allocate that water and get it under contract and put it to use.

Storey: Do you remember any of the individuals who were players in the Denver-Green Mountain Reservoir issues?

Working with Bill Miller, Bill Toll, and Raleigh Fisher

Martin: Well, Bill Miller was the director, or the manager, of the Denver Water Department at the time, so we had a lot of dealings with him. Bill Toll was his assistant and spent a lot of time with him. And over on the West Slope, Raleigh Fisher was the manager of the Colorado River Water Conservation District and his board of directors. I don't remember any of their names, but there were some of them that were quite outspoken and very involved and then knowledgeable on West Slope issues.

Storey: How about Glen Saunders? Is that the right name?

Glen Saunders

Martin: Yeah. Saunders, he didn't get that involved in the Green Mountain, per se, although he was involved in Denver water issues. I'd known Glen for a long time. When I was on the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project, he was the attorney for the Purgatory Irrigation District down around Trinidad, and we worked with him on trying to get a contract with the district for water out of the Trinidad Project that the Corps built. So I didn't have that much direct involvement with Glen on the Green Mountain issues.

Bill McDonald and the Colorado Water Conservation Board

I did with some of the folks on the Colorado Water Conservation [Board],[33] Bill McDonald[34] and the commissioners. I was trying to remember the exact name of it. It's Colorado Water Conservation. It's not council. But they had a board of commissioners, a board of directors, that showed a lot of interest in the Green Mountain issues. The current director of resources for Colorado was on the board at that time. I was trying to recall his name. It escapes me right now.

Storey: I don't know it either.

Martin: But he's an attorney from the West Slope, was very knowledgeable and very involved. I think those were probably the principal players that we were–and then, of course, the Northern Colorado Water Conservation District, they were very involved and very interested in what happens to the

33. The Colorado Water Conservation Board was a division in Colorado's Department of Natural Resources.
34. Interviews of Bill McDonald are included in Reclamation's oral history program.

water from the Colorado Big Thompson Project.

Storey: Yeah. [Unclear], I think, at least.

Martin: Yeah. [Tape Interruption. Tape recorder turned off.]

Storey: Reclamation, of course, has a good deal of water at its disposal, not as much as a lot of people like to think we do. But you mentioned Denver was seeking to encroach on our Green Mountain Reservoir water rights, for instance. Is this kind of thing common in the West, sort of a standardized dance people go through in order to deal with water issues?

Martin: Yeah. I guess it kind of goes back to someone said one time that whiskey's for drinking and water's for fighting, and I think that probably is pretty well true. Of course, water rights are very valuable things to have, so there's a great deal of effort made to *protect* those. Since the demand for water in a lot of places exceeds the developed supply, and there are changing demands, changing interests, there's also always someone looking at how an operation might be changed or how something might be changed to make more water available for their particular interest, their particular need, is there some different interpretation of responsibility for maintaining, say, water quality from the Delta, where the Federal project has a disproportionately larger share of meeting that responsibility than someone else does, and as a way to try to increase their water supply. So there are always issues like that there in some areas. Some places there's probably never a problem. But where the demand exceeds the supply, there's always someone looking at, I guess, at that water right or that water supply, with an eye to how could that be changed so that my need could be accommodated a little better.

Storey: Did you become involved in any planning efforts at Reclamation that would look at those kinds of issues, how could we make more water available without building more?

Martin: We did. Well, in the Central Valley Project we looked at that. We had some major studies there. In the North Platte Project in Wyoming and Nebraska, we were starting to look at that one to see what the potential might be for increasing water supply with a different operation, just strictly operational changes. We were doing that in response to some of the problems down in central Nebraska dealing with environmental issues–can we re-operate the project, leave the water user whole, and have some water available, more water available, to meet some of those environmental needs in the river downstream?

So, yeah, in some cases, some of the work had been completed, some of it had not been complete when I left, and it appeared that you could make some operational changes. Now, trying to sell them to people, that's a different matter. But in the case of some of the water rights, your senior water-right holders are considerably downstream from the originating source

of the water, and those needs have to be taken care of first. Well, if you can operate the system so you kind of take care of the needs as you come down the stream, you can make better use of the water that you have in meeting everyone's need and then, in some cases, have some left over. Those are some of the things that we were going to look at on the North Platte, because some of the more senior water-right holders were downstream at a considerable distance from the reservoirs, and some of the more junior water-right holders were upstream of the senior holders, and there were times when they would have had to just let water go by until that senior water right was satisfied, and then they didn't have the advantage of return flows from the senior water-right holders because they were upstream. So we have looked at those and we were looking at them.

Storey: So it becomes sort of the art of river management.

Martin: Um-hmm. And in some cases you look at lining canals or going to a different distribution system or some other things.

Storey: As I understand it, one of the problems you often run into in issues like canal lining is that it costs money.

Martin: Um-hmm.

Storey: And the people who already have the water say, "Why should I spend more money?"

". . . we were intrigued with the city of Casper's proposal. 'We will pay for the lining [in return] for the opportunity to buy the water that's saved.' . . ."

Martin: That was why we were intrigued with the city of Casper's proposal. "We will pay for the lining [in return] for the opportunity to buy the water that's saved." And then, of course, later on, I believe, the Coachella Canal, some of the folks down in Southern California paid to have that lining installed for the water that was–

Storey: In return for the saved water.

Martin: Yeah. So it seemed like there are some situations where that's probably a pretty good arrangement so that the farmer doesn't have to put out the cost, but you find someone that *is* willing to put up the money for it in order to get the water that's saved. That's a pretty good arrangement when you can find those. In some cases, that *doesn't* work because there's just no one to pay for the water, to pay for it.

Storey: I think Pueblo Reservoir had been built by the time you moved there.

Pueblo Reservoir and the Pipeline to Colorado Springs

Martin: The major construction was completed. There were still some things ongoing. We still had a construction program going. We had built the pipeline from Pueblo Reservoir up to Colorado Springs and were getting that debugged. We had kind of a state-of-the-art system there and that took a while to get some of the bugs worked out of that. We had some kind of testy times with some of the city folks in Colorado Springs until we got that up and running. But for the most part, the construction was complete.

Storey: That's the Fountain Valley Aqueduct, is it?

Martin: Um-hmm.

Storey: The project down the Arkansas Valley is a fairly complex one. I think there's a thing called native water and Reclamation water and so on–

Martin: Right.

Storey: –that has to be kept track of. And this goes back again to our relations with the water users. I think it was Jack Garner was telling me that when he was down there managing that area, the farmers wouldn't tell him anything, wouldn't tell him what native water they were entitled to, what Reclamation water they were entitled to. Why do we have such difficulty with the water users? I don't understand, you know, why they're being so secretive about it and all that kind of thing.

Martin: Well, there are some of them that, you know, farmers and particularly older farmers, that they just want to be left alone so they can farm, and they don't want the government involved, and they figure that's meddling if you are asking too many questions or want to know too much information about their operation, and they really don't want to be bothered with that. They just don't think the government should be meddling in their business. By nature, they're very conservative and probably pretty protective of passing out information that they have regarding their operation. Maybe it's in their genes, I don't know.

Storey: Just the nature of the animal.

Martin: Just the nature of the animal, yeah.

Storey: Do you find that universally throughout Reclamation?

Martin: No. I think probably to about the same degree that we all kind of want to protect our privacy, although I think, for the most part, they understand that they have to provide this information to get the Federal funding for a project or the public funds to fund a project, and they have a pretty good understanding of that, for the most part.

The Fryingpan-Arkansas Project, that was a *different* project than a lot of them that we built. That was strictly a supplemental project. A lot of projects we built, we provided a total water supply. There it was strictly supplemental. So we were commingling project water and non-project water, or their "native water," or their water they're entitled under their water rights. So it's a different relationship than where we provide a total water supply, and they do feel that this native water or this water-rights water, you don't have any business knowing anything about that. But we need to know, because we're providing a supplemental supply. Well, how much of a supplement do you need? That's determined by how much do you have from your other source.

Storey: And I gather it flows in the same streams and so on.

Martin: It does.

Storey: You went from Mid-Pacific to Lower Missouri to what then became the Great Plains Region. Did you notice differences in how the water users like to relate to Reclamation from region to region?

Differences in Water Users and the Public from Region to Region of Reclamation

Martin: Yeah, I did. Not so much from the water users, but maybe the general public. Well, the water users, too, there was a difference. I think the water users in the Missouri Basin, for the most part, maybe felt a little closer and maybe felt maybe a little warmer towards the Bureau than the water users, say, out here do. It probably was that way out here at one time, but over the years, because of the stresses and the demands for water and the changing interests and the different interest groups and their demands for change has caused some of those change in attitudes, probably. It had not evolved to that point over in the Missouri Basin. In some cases, it was probably getting close to that, but it really hadn't evolved to that point. So, yeah, I did notice a difference. There seemed to be a little more receptive attitude towards Reclamation on the part of the water users or, in some cases, on the part of the state officials.

Storey: In the Great Plains area?

Martin: Um-hmm.

Storey: I don't believe we talked much about how your shift from Denver to Billings took place.

"In the Lower Missouri in '85 our program was kind of winding down. We didn't have that much of a planning program going. We had still a little construction . . . So there was a need to try to reduce cost. It was just getting

too *expensive* to . . . pass those costs on to the water user, the power user . . . probably the best solution was to consolidate the two regions, and we made that proposal to the commissioner. . . . we decided to do it, primarily as a cost-reduction measure. . . ."

Martin: In the Lower Missouri in '85 our program was kind of winding down. We didn't have that much of a planning program going. We had still a little construction, some construction going on the North Loup Project, but for the most part, it was kind of winding down, and it was basically kind of an operation and maintenance operation, a little water marketing still on the Colorado-Big Thompson. So there was a need to try to reduce cost. It was just getting too *expensive* to try and pass those costs, prohibitive to pass those costs on to the water user, the power user, and it didn't appear that there was going to be anything on the horizon to come in to give us an opportunity to spread those costs.

So after considerable soul searching and analysis and pondering, it appeared to me that probably the best solution was to consolidate the two regions, and we made that proposal to the commissioner. After considerable discussion and soul-searching on his part, and touching political bases and what have you, we decided to do it, primarily as a cost-reduction measure.

Storey: "We" presented. Who's we?

Martin: This had been kind of contemplated and looked at and talked about in the P-M-C and with the commissioner.

Storey: P-M-C is the Permanent Management Committee.

Regional Directors from Amarillo, Billings, and Denver Proposed Consolidation, over Time, of the Three Regions–with Part of the Southwest Region Going to the Upper Colorado Region

Martin: Permanent Management Committee. And then we just kind of laid it back on the back burner and didn't do anything with it. It got to the point where I just kind of picked it up and talked to the commissioner about it. He suggested that, well, we give him a proposal. So I got together with Gene Hinds, who was regional director in Amarillo at the time. The Southwest Region was getting to that same point. So we were kind of looking to the future as to what would happen there. Joe Marcotte up at Billings, we got together and sat down and talked it over and put together a proposal and made that proposal to the commissioner, Bob Broadbent at the time.

So then it was decided that after discussions with the commissioner and with the secretary, and contacting some of the key people on the Hill and the states, ~~that we would proceed with it,~~ and also with the major water-user organizations within the basin. So we decided to proceed with it.

Storey: Now, what was the plan that you decided to proceed with? I'm hearing that possibly the plan was to consolidate the three regions into one.

Martin: We had decided that at some point in time those three regions, that there needed to be some consolidation. So we proposed that the two Missouri regions be consolidated into one, and then when Gene Hinds retired, rather than filling that job–they still had some things going on–but when *he* retires, that we break that region up, put part of it in the Upper Colorado Region and part of it in what would be the Great Plains Region, so that the Great Plains Region would have most of that front range area, but there would be some parts of the [region] ~~project or some parts of the project~~ that would go back over to the Upper Colorado. And that was kind of timed when Gene Hinds retired. We wouldn't fill–

Storey: About '88, '87, '88 they started implementing it, I guess.

Martin: Yeah.

Storey: Well, what happened to the other regional director? Let's see, that would have been the Upper Missouri Region.

Martin: That was Joe Marcotte.

Storey: Yeah.

Martin: At that time, Bob Broadbent was the assistant secretary for water and science, and Cliff Barrett[35] was acting commissioner.

Storey: The regional director from Salt Lake.

"We decided to headquarter in Billings . . . Denver really made more sense, but we thought politically that was probably not possible. It would have been, but at the time we thought it wasn't. . . ."

Martin: Uh-huh. He was the acting commissioner. He asked me about going up to Billings. We decided to headquarter in Billings, because we thought that politically we probably *couldn't* shut Billings down and move it to Denver. Denver really made more sense, but we thought politically that was probably not possible. It would have been, but at the time we thought it wasn't. So then Cliff asked me if I would go up to Billings, and I told him that I would like to give it some thought and told him to let me know when he had to have a decision and I would let him know.

He called me one day. My wife and I had talked about it some, and I had kind of explored some other options. So Cliff called me one day and says, "Well, I need to know in a couple of days." So I gave it a little more

35. Interviews of Cliff Barrett are included in Reclamation's oral history program.

concentrated thought and called him back and said, "I'll go up there." And then Joe, he went back to Washington on an acting basis in the assistant commissioner's job until he left the Bureau and came out here to one of the irrigation districts, Modesto Irrigation District. And then when Gene Hinds retired, then we did go ahead and break his region up, the Southwest Region up, and put part of it in the Upper Colorado and the rest of it in the Great Plains Region, as [in] the original proposal.

END SIDE 2, TAPE 3. OCTOBER 25, 1995.
BEGIN SIDE 1, TAPE 4. OCTOBER 25, 1995.

Storey: This is tape four of an interview by Brit Storey with Bill E. Martin on October the 25th, 1995.

Did the *size* of that huge new region cause any problems?

It Became a Major Effort to Travel to Areas of the Great Plains Region

Martin: It did. It was a major, major effort to get from Billings down to the coastal area of Texas, down in the Corpus Christi area, and we had interests that ranged from the Canadian border to the Mexican or to the Gulf [of Mexico], and then, of course, all the way to the eastern boundaries in all of the states, and it was a major effort. From that standpoint, it would have been better if it had been located in Denver. It would have made it easier, because in order to get down there, you had to go through at least two and sometimes three and sometimes four airports in order to get to the area that you needed to get to.

Using the Bureau Plane or Flying Commercial

We also had the Bureau plane assigned to the region, but then it became a matter of economics as to whether you take the Bureau plane or whether you go commercial. Usually, unless you had several people going, it was more economical to go commercial, but that took time. Just the logistics of trying to cover the area and trying to maintain the contacts with all of the state and local people, where those relationships needed to be maintained, it was a major, major effort. We relied a lot on the project managers and the project offices to maintain those contacts and let me know when I needed to come out to make a personal appearance.

Storey: Did you have meetings of the project managers?

"We had a meeting of project managers about every month. . . ."

Martin: I did. We had a meeting of project managers about every month. They would come into the regional office and we had meetings every month.

Storey: Oh, really? Was that similar in Lower Missouri (Martin: Um-hmm.) and in

Mid-Pacific?

Martin: Right.

Storey: Oh, okay.

Martin: Yeah. They had project manager meetings every month in every place where I was the director.

Storey: What were the topics of discussion?

Martin: Well, kind of getting a feel for and identify local issues, the things that were going on that were causing them problems either internally or externally. What do you need to get the job done? What are some of the things that the local folks are saying? What are the problems you're faced with out there? What is it that we can do to help get issues resolved so that we can get on with business?

Storey: How was budgeting done while you were in these regions?

Martin: Working with the project managers and the folks in the region putting together a budget, personnel needs, and then we would get together and go through the budget, challenge each other as to just what it is that you need to get the job done, how many people do you need to get the job done.

Storey: Let's say you were regional director here and the gate at Folsom broke.[36] How did you move money around for emergencies, or did you?

Moving Money Around to Take Care of Emergencies

Martin: Oh, yeah. We did. Of course, we would first look internally and see if we could move it around within the region. If it was bigger than what we could handle within the region, then we'd be in contact with the commissioner's office and say, "Look, we've got this kind of a problem." Everybody was aware of the problem if it was that major; everybody became *immediately* aware of it. And we'd say, "Well, we need X number of dollars in order to get the job done."

"Sometimes you're called on to give some up. Sometimes you *need* some. And so I found that there was a fairly cooperative spirit among the regions and among the offices . . ."

I found that people were pretty cooperative and helpful in being willing to give money up in order to take care of a problem. Sometimes

36. Referring to the failure of Gate 3 on Folsom Dam on July 17, 1995. The oral history interviews of Thomas (Tom) J. Aiken include further information on the gate failure. See pages 98-106 of his oral history interviews. In that case, the failure resulted in identification of a design flaw in all the gates, and repairs cost over $20,000,000.

you're called on to give some up. Sometimes you *need* some. And so I found that there was a fairly cooperative spirit among the regions and among the offices in order to do that, in order to deal with those kinds of emergencies. You know, there comes a time in some of those things where a decision just has to be made on a budget matter or whatever the issue is. There's a time for discussion to stop and a decision to be made and get on with life. If it came to that, then we'd make that decision and get on, move on to the next issue.

Storey: For instance, these project manager meetings might be a forum where money could be moved within the region.

Martin: Yeah.

Storey: And I imagine anything that was really major got taken care of pretty quickly outside of that forum.

Martin: Yeah.

Storey: If you think back to the project managers' monthly meetings in the three regions, would there be differences that would strike you, or similarities that would strike you?

Similarities of Project Managers' Meetings in the Various Regions

Martin: I think there were similarities, I guess, in that since I kind of structured the meeting along kind of the way that I thought would work best. You know, I didn't do that just unilaterally; there were other people who had input into it. So there were similarities in structure and information that was brought to the meetings, information that was passed out at the meetings. I think, for the most part, people felt pretty good about the meetings, you know, that they were helpful. There were probably some of them that were not maybe that useful, but for the most part, I think they were in keeping people, the project managers, apprised of what's going on, just what the problems and the issues that we're faced with when we go to Washington to try to get money or try to get personnel ceiling increases. They have a better understanding of the problems that we have in trying to get that money. Just because they want it doesn't necessarily mean we're going to get it.

So I think it helped them understand some of the problems that we faced, and by the same token, I think by them coming in and talking about the problems they were experiencing out there, it gave the regional folks a better feel, a better understanding for some of the things that the project managers were faced with. You can have someone sitting in here designing something or working on a contract or something that doesn't feel the heat that the project manager does out there on the front line with someone that wants to get a contract negotiated and signed, or you want to get a project completed and you've got someone sitting in here not moving as swiftly on

the design of it or reviewing the design or reviewing the specs or whatever that the construction engineer may think they should be. So I think that was helpful in maybe everybody having a little better understanding of the different needs and the way they might impact getting a project done or getting a task done.

Storey: Who else besides yourself and the project managers would have been at these?

Martin: All of the assistant directors and the key regional staff, the division chiefs.

Storey: So everybody could talk for once, maybe. One-day meetings? Two-day meetings?

Martin: Usually one day. There would have been maybe an occasional two-day one, but usually one day.

Storey: G-P–that that would have been quite a task once a month going to Billings. (laughter) How many project managers did you have to cover the Great Plains? As I recall, it got pretty small.

Consolidating Offices in the Lower Missouri and Great Plains Regions

Martin: Well, see, when I was in Denver, I consolidated the Fryingpan-Arkansas, and the Colorado Big Thompson Project, so I had an eastern Colorado office.

Storey: That's the one in Loveland.

Martin: And so I eliminated a project manager's position there. Then in Nebraska, I consolidated the McCook and the Grand Island office and eliminated a project manager, so I had one for Nebraska. Then we had one in Wyoming, in Casper. We also had some construction activity there, too, so we had a couple of construction engineers, one in Pueblo for a while, and the one out on the North Loup Project. Then in Billings; we had one in North Dakota. We had a construction engineer down at Buffalo Bill.

Storey: That was for the increasing of the height of the dam?

Martin: Um-hmm. And we had a construction program going out at Belle Fourche, South Dakota.

Storey: That was an R&B[37] project, I believe.

Martin: Let's see, we had a project manager–I was trying to remember just where that office was located. It was in Montana. And then we had the Garrison

37. Rehabilitation and Betterment.

unit out in North Dakota. I think those were probably all the project managers.

Storey: That would be maybe around ten, then.

Martin: About ten. And then when we took in the Great Plains Region, I set up an office in Austin [Texas], so I had one office down there, and we also had a small office in Oklahoma City, and we later beefed that one up a little bit, but we still looked to Austin to provide kind of the overall coverage and responsibility for that area, that southwest area, even though we had that little office in Oklahoma City.

When I first went there, for several years we had a Wyoming representative, Reclamation representative. We also had one in Kansas. We abolished those along the way, got rid of those, and just looked to the project managers to carry on the duties that those reps had been doing. Then we had maybe eight or ten regional office people. So we would have, say, in the Great Plains, twenty people, eighteen to twenty people, in a monthly meeting with the project managers.

Usually on the day before our big meeting, our major meeting, I had a smaller session with just the project managers and myself and maybe one or two of the assistants, rather than have everybody in the room. So if there were things that they wanted to talk about or we needed to talk about that didn't need to come up in the larger meeting, or they just had some things that they wanted to get off their chest, then they had an opportunity to do that.

Storey: As you look back on your years as regional director, that would have been '74 to '88. Fourteen years, I guess.

Martin: Um-hmm.

Storey: Did you see a change in constituent requests for construction projects over that period of time?

How Interactions with the Public and Water Users Changed over Time

Martin: I don't think I saw any real change in the constituent requests. There were still a lot of requests, just like there is now a lot of requests and a lot of interest on the part of some of the constituents to develop more water. I saw a big increase in some of the other interest groups that thought there were options other than building new projects and also in the political support and the public support for *funding* of those projects. I saw a big change there.

Storey: What was the change?

"There was less money available for Federal projects, *more* requirement for

non-Federal cost sharing, which made it harder . . . to put together a package that you could go with, because some of the locals, they just weren't able to put the money up to do it. So you just didn't have the political support for those projects. . . ."

Martin: Well, with just the increase in the demand for money from the Federal budget, from the Federal government. There was less money available for Federal projects, *more* requirement for non-Federal cost sharing, which made it harder and more difficult to put together a package that you could go with, because some of the locals, they just weren't able to put the money up to do it. So you just didn't have the political support for those projects.

Storey: Did the nature of the construction requests change any over that period of time that you can identify, or was it still for big projects or whatever?

". . . the nature of the program changed, because we got in more of a . . . rehabilitation, safety of dams, and some of the less expensive programs, but I think the interest on the part of . . . the water-user constituents, was still there for major water supply projects. . . ."

Martin: It was still for some major projects because they needed some major water supplies. These people that were interested in making the request were looking for, in some cases, major increments of water. Now, the nature of the program changed, because we got in more of a rehab, rehabilitation, safety of dams, and some of the less expensive programs, but I think the interest on the part of constituents, the water-user constituents, was still there for major water supply projects.

Storey: But they weren't getting them, at least not from Reclamation.

Martin: No.

Storey: Do you have a sense of what they were doing to resolve their water issues then when they weren't getting what they had traditionally got from Reclamation?

Martin: I think, for the most part, in some cases they continued to pump groundwater, continued to use the groundwater. In some areas, they did some conservation practices to try to make better use of the water they had, make the water go further, and in some cases, they probably just modified their operations to fit their water supply.

Storey: You don't identify any projects where they just went out and built their own, for instance?

Martin: No. No. The small Reclamation program was popular there for a number of years, and there was a little bit of effort made to try to rescale some of those projects so that they would fit under the Small Reclamation Project Loan

Program. But for the most part, that probably didn't work out too well, because they just needed a larger project than would fit under the Small Reclamation Program.

Storey: Well, I'd like to continue, but we've been working at it for four hours now. (laughter) So I'd like to ask whether you're willing for the information contained in these cassette tapes and the resulting transcripts to be used by researchers inside and outside Reclamation.

Martin: Yes, that's fine with me. I have no problem with it.

Storey: Good. Thank you very much.

END SIDE 1, TAPE 4. OCTOBER 25, 1995.
BEGIN SIDE 1, TAPE 1. MARCH 19, 1996.

Storey: This is Brit Allan Storey, senior historian of the Bureau of Reclamation, interviewing Bill E. Martin, former regional director and former assistant commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation, on March the 19th, 1996, at about 8:30 in the morning, in the regional offices of the Bureau of Reclamation in Sacramento, California. This is tape one.

Mr. Martin, the last time we talked, you were talking about the kinds of conflicts that were beginning to arise when you were regional director, I think in Sacramento. People need more water for agriculture, they need more water for municipal and industrial use, yet we're beginning to realize also we need it for environmental enhancement. Could you talk about those kinds of issues a little bit and some of your experiences with them, please?

Water for Agriculture vs. M&I vs. Environmental Enhancement

Martin: Well, those issues were already in existence, I guess, when I got out here, but the longer we went along, the more intense the issue became, because there was a lot of competition. Some people wanted water left in the reservoirs, the flat-water recreationists, so they'd have a good high lake to water ski or boat. Then the folks that wanted to see the water in the river below, either for fish and wildlife purposes *or* for water rafting, they wanted the water released from the dam into the river below. Then, of course, the power users wanted the water to go through the turbines to generate power, and the irrigators and the municipal industrial users wanted the water released for consumptive use.

". . . there were some very . . . emotional situations created . . . and the way the . . . Central Valley Project, was authorized at the time, there was no way that we could try to . . . take care of *all* of those situations, either, legally, and we didn't have . . . enough water, to do *all* of those things. But we did try to use all the flexibility that we had within the project authorization to try to accommodate as many of those needs as we could . . ."

So there were some very emotional issues, emotional situations created that are very controversial, and the way the project, the Central Valley Project, was authorized at the time, there was no way that we could try to meet or try to take care of *all* of those situations, either, legally, and we didn't have the water, enough water, to do *all* of those things. But we did try to use all the flexibility that we had within the project authorization to try to accommodate as many of those needs as we could, but it was quite obvious that we were not going to be able to do that.

As I mentioned, some of it did stem from the legal constraints that we had, as well as just the physical lack of water to do all of the things that everybody wanted.

Story: Do you remember any particular instances?

Folsom Dam as an Example of Multiple Demands on Reclamation

Martin: Well, the instance that we had was in Folsom Reservoir. Particularly during the drought years, the reservoir level will get dropped down to the point where some of the sailboats, the keels would be in the mud or we would have to have people come out and pull their boats out of the water.

". . . irrigators were clamoring and pushing for the completion of Folsom South Canal . . ."

At the same time, the irrigators were clamoring and pushing for the completion of Folsom South Canal so that the water out of Folsom Reservoir could be put to use for agricultural purposes.

One Group Wanted Higher Flows in the Lower American River

Then there was also a group that had an interest in maintaining higher flows in the lower American River for recreational *and* fish and wildlife purposes.

Power Users Wanted All the Water to Go Through the Turbines

Then, of course, the power users wanted *all* of that water to go through the turbines, and there were times when that just wasn't possible to do.

". . . people in the Delta, of course, wanted the water released downstream into the Delta to keep the salt barrier pushed, salt curtain pushed back out as far as *they* wanted it, so that in some instances they could just take fresh water right out of the Delta. . . ."

Then people in the Delta, of course, wanted the water released downstream into the Delta to keep the salt barrier pushed, salt curtain pushed back out as far as *they* wanted it, so that in some instances they could

just take fresh water right out of the Delta. And, in some cases it was the fish and wildlife interests arguing for the higher-quality water for fishery purposes.

Story: It gets to be rather complex, doesn't it?

"They are very complex issues, and very difficult to deal with. . . ."

Martin: It does. They are very complex issues, and very difficult to deal with.

Storey: Let's see. How should I ask this question? I would assume that you cannot be expert in *everything*, (Martin: Right.) that you need to know, really, to deal with those kinds of issues. How do you get the region to work so that it actually functions and can arrive at a logical decision on these kinds of issues?

Martin: Of course, we had some good people, some talented people, some people that had been around for a long time that had a lot of history. That, in most cases, was very useful. In some cases maybe familiarity can create problems as well, but you need that institutional history, and there were some people around that had that.

Then we attempted to put together some teams or groups of people that, in some cases, consisted of people from the Bureau, from Fish and Wildlife, from the State Department of Water Resources, State Water Resources Control Board, and other entities that had an interest in that particular situation.

Drainage in the San Joaquin Valley

Drainage, for example, in San Joaquin Valley, for example, which was a major issue.

Storey: And Kesterson.

Martin: Well, Kesterson was involved, but that was before it was known that there was the problem with the selenium, but we were trying to reach a solution to the drainage problem in the San Joaquin Valley.

"We were, I think, reasonably successful in some instances. Some instances, we weren't . . . and some of them still haven't been solved today. There are very tough, knotty issues to deal with. . . ."

That was one of the ways that we attempted it, and then, too, we had groups of people just internally taking a look at some of the issues that we had to deal with. At the same time, of course, we had the special- interest groups all the way from agriculture to the environmental interests pushing for their particular and biased interest. We were, I think, reasonably

successful in some instances. Some instances, we weren't, and we didn't come up with solutions, and some of them still haven't been solved today. There are very tough, knotty issues to deal with.

Storey: Did the issues become less complex when you went to–let's see, Denver was then known as Lower Missouri, wasn't it?

Martin: Yes.

Storey: And Upper Missouri in Billings?

Martin: Right.

Storey: Did they become less complex?

Martin: They were less complex just because of the magnitude of the issue and the political sensitivity of the issues, and just the public interest *groups* that were involved. However, we had some of the same issues, and some of them, as it developed, became just as sensitive as some of the ones out here, but they just didn't get as much *national* attention or as broad or widespread attention as the ones out here, I guess because of primarily the media coverage, probably.

Narrows Unit

But some of the similar issues that we had in Denver, when I went over to Denver from here, was the Narrows Unit, which had been authorized for construction as part of the Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program. It was out in northeastern Colorado out in the South Platte River. That was a very controversial issue. Congress had, in the budget, in the appropriation bill, included some money and some language that said that this money is to be used to prepare the project for construction.

So then we had to go out and convince the local folks, or try to convince the local folks, that this was Congress' intent, so this is what we were going to do, was to spend that money to start getting the project ready for construction, start collecting design data, and start the design work.

Of course, that made the proponents of the project very happy, but there were a lot of people that would have been in the reservoir area that did not want their places inundated, so they were not thrilled with the idea, and there was considerable opposition. We went out to–I can't remember the name of the little town east of Denver around the damsite.

Storey: Fort Morgan, maybe?

"We told them that we were there to advise them that we were following Congress' directive to prepare the project for construction, and these are the

things that we were going to do. . . ."

Martin: Yeah, Fort Morgan. We had a meeting out there one night, and the room was packed with both proponents and opponents. Of course, the proponents were pretty quiet; I guess they thought things were going their way. I had a group of people from the Bureau out there to answer the questions. We told them that we [were] there to advise them that we were following Congress' directive to prepare the project for construction, and these are the things that we were going to do. We laid them out and gave a time schedule for it. We had about a three- or four-hour session that night. We didn't have any converts, we didn't change anybody's mind. Everybody that came there with an opinion, left with the same opinion they came with.

`". . . they eventually got around to relating the Narrows Unit to an endangered species issue down in central Nebraska, the whooping crane issue, and that developing Narrows would deprive the central Platte River in central Nebraska of water that would be needed for the whooping crane survival. . . ."

That was one of the issues, and there were several things that were related to it. One of them, they eventually got around to relating the Narrows Unit to an endangered species issue down in central Nebraska, the whooping crane issue, and that developing Narrows would deprive the central Platte River in central Nebraska of water that would be needed for the whooping crane survival.

Then we also had a couple of projects going down in central Nebraska.

Storey: Frenchman Creek, or something like that?

O'Neill Unit

Martin: The O'Neill was one of them. I can't remember the river that it was on, the stream that it was on, but it was a very controversial one from an environmental standpoint, as well, because it would have developed a major reservoir on the stream. It was up around–well, in the O'Neill area. This is in an area where the environmental interests say the East meets the West, and a lot of species became hybridized at that point where they met. And by flooding that valley, that created all kinds of environmental disharmony, because we were wiping out a major area where the so-called East meets the West and species had been hybridized, and so the project should not be developed.

We looked for several different ways to try to avoid building a reservoir there, and we really couldn't, so the project finally just died.

There were several projects in Wyoming and western Nebraska, too, that were existing projects. There was considerable debate on how the

operation of those projects impacted the whooping crane habitat down in central Nebraska, because all of these were on some fork of the Platte River that then had come together and formed one stream down in central Nebraska. All of these issues became very major as it pertained to the endangered whooping crane.

After Reclamation Identified the Selenium Issue at Kesterson in California, Reclamation Found it Was an Issue in Other Locations Also

Then as the selenium issue arose in California, centered around Kesterson Reservoir in the San Joaquin Valley, we started looking at other sites around the western states that involved Reclamation projects. It was found that selenium was also a problem, or an issue–it hadn't been identified as a problem, but an *issue* in some of the North Platte projects that affected the Platte River down in central Nebraska.

Casper Looks for M&I Water

So those were just kind of an example of some of the environmental issues. The city of Casper needed additional water, and there was none that was readily available. So they had talked to one of the districts, irrigation districts, just outside of Casper about the possibility of the city lining the canals, concrete-lining some of their canals, for the right to buy the water that would be saved by that concrete lining. We worked with the district, with the city, and with the state engineer's office in Wyoming and worked out that agreement. So that was, I think, one of the first, and maybe the *start* of the practice that has been used in other situations where a receiving entity, such as a city, would go in and put up some money to provide some improvements in a project for the water that would be saved.

Storey: Somebody, I've forgotten who right now, told me you really wanted to build the Narrows Project.

Martin: Well, I did. I thought it was another increment of the Platte development that was really needed, because you had the Big Thompson Project up above, and had brought water in from, of course, the West Slope, as well as some of the in-basin waters. It just seemed like a better use of the available water for Colorado than to have a structure down below the Big Thompson Project and those other facilities, to capture some of those return flows and put them to greater beneficial use before they left the state.

Storey: Why didn't we go ahead and build the Narrows?

Martin: I think politically it wasn't in the cards.

Storey: The [political] climate had changed?

Martin: The climate had changed. If it could have ever been built, it certainly had

changed in the eighties, and the environmental issues were forefront. There were some duck clubs in that area that were owned by some people that were fairly influential politically, and so it just got to the point where politically it just wasn't possible.

Storey: And these duck club folks were opposed to the project?

Martin: They weren't publicly or vocally opposed to it, but you knew that they really just as soon [hoped] it wouldn't be built.

San Felipe Division of the Central Valley Project

Storey: Before we leave Mid-Pacific, there's a note somewhere from one of my summer hires, "Ask Bill Martin about the San Felipe Project." I've already asked Don Duck[38] about it, and he's talked about it, but he mentioned that you and he had worked together a lot on that. Could you tell me about the San Felipe Project, where it came from, and your perspectives on it, please?

Martin: We had gone through quite a struggle getting it authorized, and then we had gone through a tremendous amount–spent a lot of time and effort on getting a repayment contract worked out with the Santa Clara Valley Water District and San Benito Water District. We had the specs out, we got the specs out, and got bids. The bids were way over-estimate, and there was no way we could push it and go forward with it with those estimates.

Storey: Why would that be?

Martin: It was just way beyond what the water users could pay. And so I talked with Don Duck about it, and he says, "Well, let us take another look at it." He came out and we went down and met with the local folks, and, of course, they were really exercised and really disappointed at the bids. So Don got the troops to working on it in Denver and came up with a different design. When we put that out for bid, it came in within the range of the engineer's estimate and within the range of the water users' ability to pay.

So then when we started to award the contract, then we were sued for an inadequate environmental impact statement. Fortunately, we got into court fairly quick, and the court ruled in our favor that the statement was adequate. So we gave the contractor notice to proceed, and he got under way.

Storey: This takes water down, I guess, to the area just south of San Francisco Bay and that area?

Martin: Water is taken out of the Delta at the Tracy pumps and is taken down into San Luis Reservoir, put into San Luis Reservoir, and then the water is taken

38. Interviews of Don Duck are included in Reclamation's oral history program.

out of San Luis Reservoir through the–I don't remember the name of that range of mountains through there.

Storey: The Pacheco Pass area?

Martin: Yeah. And takes it through there over into the Santa Clara Valley and into the San Benito area, for both agriculture and municipal use. In the Santa Clara Valley, it's *all* municipal use, and down in San Benito it was all agricultural use.

". . . the original design was for . . . a tunnel that came all the way into San Luis Reservoir. It would just be a gravity flow out of San Luis through the tunnel into the valley on the other side of the mountains. What Don and the Denver folks came up with was a pumping plant that raised the water up and then went through a shorter tunnel that reduced the cost considerably, which made it feasible. . . ."

I believe the original design was for there to be a tunnel that came all the way into San Luis Reservoir. It would just be a gravity flow out of San Luis through the tunnel into the valley on the other side of the mountains. What Don and the Denver folks came up with was a pumping plant that raised the water up and then went through a shorter tunnel that reduced the cost considerably, which made it feasible.

Then what we thought might turn out to a major fight over the adequacy of the environmental impact statement really didn't turn out to be that much of a problem. It really didn't delay us. They had a rather inept lawyer, so that helped.

Storey: Something like that, where you thought you had a project, the bids came in, and all of a sudden you didn't have a project, did you hear from the politicians about this? What kind of interaction would there have been?

Martin: In this particular case, I don't recall that we had reactions or calls from any of the politicians. We heard a lot from the local water user organizations. I'm sure they had been in contact with their political forces. But usually when we heard from the politicians, it was when the local folks, I guess, had gotten to the point where they thought that they needed to have some help in trying to get some additional consideration. It was not to that point in this case, because we were trying to work something out so the project would be feasible and be a viable unit.

Storey: Yes. Interesting.

Martin: So I don't recall that we had a lot of political involvement in that particular unit. Others we did, but I don't recall in that one.

Storey: Another topic of importance in the Central Valley, which is largely, I gather,

what your region was, you know, Cachuma and Ventura and Yakima and Newlands are sort of–I presume they occupied less of your time?

Martin: Right. They did. Newlands, in the Truckee, there were several issues, of course, with the Truckee-Carson, but most of the major issues were in the Central Valley.

Acreage Limitation Issues

Storey: And one of the major topics there would have been acreage limitation. Where was that at the time you were here, and what was going on?

Martin: That's when we were developing the rules and regs. The RRA had been enacted. I can't remember. . . .

Storey: Wasn't RRA '82? Am I misrecalling? '83 maybe? '82, I think.

Martin: Yes, that's right. Well, prior–

Storey: So the acreage limitation rules were what they were working on.

Martin: Yes, but prior to that, when we were developing the distribution system down in the San Luis unit in the Westlands, there was a lot of controversy over acreage limitation under the old law. The Southern Pacific, a lot of the other large landowners down there had signed recordable contracts, and there was a contingent of people that thought that those recordable contracts were too *long*, they gave them too much time, and put the landowner too much in control of the disposable of the excess lands. Of course, *they* wanted to get some of those lands, and they weren't having the opportunity to do that as frequently as they would like. So they gave us fits over implementation of RRA.

Land for the People

There was an outfit called Land for People, I believe that was the name of it.[39] At one time there was–I think it was OPM [Office of Personnel Management] had a workshop or a training session of some kind. So they put together a group of people. They had me and someone from Westlands, someone from the Land for People, and then someone from GAO [Government Accounting Office], because GAO had done an audit on how we were implementing the excess land laws of the Reclamation Act, and they were a little critical of us. So they had those *four* of us on this panel. That became such a popular thing, that there for a while I was attending a lot of sessions on a panel with these other people from these other organizations.

39. See text at page 92.

This Land for People had a canned presentation that they had put on videotape, and they always started off with some guy plucking his guitar and showing pictures of the offices of different landowners, and had quite a little tale going that the paper came in this side on this street and out this side on another street. So it tried to add some confusion to the issue of –

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BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE 1. MARCH 19, 1996.

Storey: So this video was implying that people were confusing the issue about landownership.

Martin: Right. They weren't accusing the Bureau folks of being a part of this conspiracy, but they were implying that the landowner, the large landowner, was not being straight in the disposal of that excess land. So that was a major issue.

And then during that process, we had a lot of public meetings, and we were getting people's reaction to changing the Reclamation law, to change the excess lands provisions of the law, and several folks from Washington, Leo Krewlits [phonetic], who was the solicitor at the time, and several others from the Washington office, either at the department level or at the Bureau level, came out, and we would go out and endure hour upon hour of public reaction to changing the Reclamation law and the administration of Reclamation law.

Some of those were really excruciating experiences, because no one from either side had anything good to say about Reclamation or the way the law was being proposed to be implemented, because it didn't satisfy anyone. And although it didn't happen here–it was Leo Krewlits, who was the solicitor, I think, there was a hearing in Boise, Idaho, and some irate farmer threw a pie in his face. I guess Rod Vissia was the regional director in Boise at the time. I guess Rod had to take Leo out to his house and let him shower and clean up before he caught a plane headed back to Washington.

So that's just kind of an indication of how the emotions ran, and fortunately it wasn't any more violent than that, but then that's just an indication of just how intense the situation was.

Storey: As these discussions went on, did we ever feel the need of having some sort of security?

Martin: No, we didn't. I don't recall that it ever came up, and I don't recall that when any of the local areas that we went into that we did have, that we had asked for security, I don't recall that we did. I'm sure we didn't here in this region.

Storey: You know, Mark Reisner, in *Cadillac Desert*, I think, asserts that Arleigh

West, who was a regional director, actually *feared* the landowners because he was afraid of the way they were going to react to acreage limitation. Of course, he was *earlier* than this, I think.

Martin: Yes. Arleigh was still regional director when I came out here in 1974, but then it wasn't too long after that that he retired. I was never aware that Arleigh was in fear of the landowners, but I'm sure he–well, like I was, I knew the landowners were not going to *like* some of the things that were being talked about. They just didn't like it, and they would get very vocal about it, but I don't recall having a sensation of fear.

Storey: What did it look like to you as all of this was playing out? Reclamation was preparing rules to implement the 160-acre limitation, and then the draft came out, I believe, and then it really hit the fan, I gather.

There Needed to Be Changes in Reclamation Law, and There Were Loopholes That Needed to Be Changed

Martin: It did. Of course, I guess it was when that draft came out that we were having a lot of hearings. I think there were many of us that were, of course, charged with implementation of the Reclamation Act, we felt that it needed to have some changes, that there needed to be some changes in it, because some of the things that people were complaining about we thought were legitimate complaints, but we couldn't do anything about it. There were some loopholes there, and those people are very sophisticated, some of those people are very sophisticated, and they are going to find the talent to find the loophole to their advantage.

Farms as Economic Units

We thought that there needed to some things changed, some things tightened up. We thought the acreage needed to be increased, that 160 acres, or 320 for husband and wife, was ridiculous in today's, or in that day's, level of technology, and just the cost of the equipment that you had to have, the money you had to have tied up in a farming operation, it just didn't make sense that 320 acres was sufficient size for a family farm, with that level of technology developed back in the days when horse power was the primary source of energy on the farm.

So we did feel that it was needed, that there needed to be some changes made. We thought that some of the things that were being proposed probably went too far, and we could empathize with the farmer. So it was a tough one to try to deal with, to try to convince the farmers that there needed to be some changes, or to get the changes that *they* wanted, they were going to have to accept some changes that someone else wanted. And those were some tough ones to deal with.

And also on the other side, to try to get the other side to try to see

some of those things from the farmers' perspective and accept some of the things that they really didn't want to.

Storey: I interviewed Phil Doe, who was involved in all of this at the time, and he asserted that they did a study that showed that 320 acres was an economic farm unit, even given the equipment and everything. And you being an ag economist, I heard a different opinion expressed a minute ago. Could you talk a little more about that?

Martin: Well, it certainly depends on the enterprise that you are involved in. In some cases, maybe 50 acres is an economic unit. So that there are some enterprises that 320 is more than sufficient for a farm unit, but if you are talking about cotton, which is a lot of the crops that are grown down in the San Joaquin Valley, and some of the field crops, then 320 acres is not enough. It just simply isn't.

Storey: It just depends.

Martin: Um-hmm. In some cases it is, you know. You take some of the highly specialized fruits and vegetables, certainly 320 would be.

Storey: A question I've already asked you, but I'd like to pursue again is Teton. Teton failed while you were here in Sacramento. Could you tell me *how* people in Reclamation reacted to the failure?

Failure of Teton Dam

Martin: Well, I suppose it was just like they'd lost a child. It was just so devastating, because here, you know, we could say, and had said, Reclamation has never lost a dam; and we did. And that was just almost beyond comprehension, I think, that a Bureau of Reclamation dam would fail, could fail, and would fail. So it was just very devastating, just almost, like I said, from an emotional standpoint, from a practical standpoint, I think it was almost as devastating as losing a key member of the family.

Storey: What did it mean for this region?

"Everything that we proposed, or contemplated doing, the Teton issue would be raised. . . ."

Martin: Well, of course, it meant that for every structure that we proposed, the Teton Dam issue came up and we had to battle that. Auburn was a good example, even in the San Felipe, even though there wasn't a *major* reservoir structure involved in it. Everything that we proposed, [or] contemplated doing, the Teton issue would be raised. So it added to the time involvement in trying something done. It added to the *cost* because it just took longer to do things, and we had to do more study or more analysis, just more *time* involved, which was also money.

Storey: Did you in those days have what nowadays they would call an Executive Management Committee meeting or anything like that for the regional directors and commissioner and so on?

Keith Higginson Began Permanent Management Committee Meetings

Martin: That started during that time. I can't remember exactly when it started, but it was not during Teton, it was after the Carter Administration came in. We started having the so-called Permanent Management Committee meetings. That was established while Keith Higginson was commissioner, and he came in during the Carter Administration.

Storey: Do you ever remember a discussion of Teton at any of those meetings when all of the regional directors and the commissioner were together? It wouldn't have to be an EMC meeting or whatever.

". . . Teton came up for discussion every time that we had more than one of us together, and so it was a subject of a lot of conversations. . . ."

Martin: Well, yes, I think Teton came up for discussion every time that we had more than one of us together, and so it was a subject of a lot of conversations.

Storey: What were the conversations about, and did they change over time?

Martin: They did [change] some, and the conversations, of course, a lot of the conversation dealt with how it happened and how could it have been prevented, the impact of the failure and what we could do to try to, or could have been done had we, with some foresight, to try to alleviate some of those impacts. And then over time, what can we do to make sure that this doesn't happen again?

"That resulted in a lot of the changes that took place, some . . . of the changes in Denver, . . . and some of those . . . changes were not voted on, or if they were, there were some people who had more votes than others. . . ."

That resulted in a lot of the changes that took place, some of them, some of the changes in Denver, in the Denver organization, the way it was organized, the responsibilities of the Denver office, and some of those, of course, those changes were not voted on, or if they were, there were some people who had more votes than others.

Storey: (laughter) Yeah, I think that was probably true.

If you could think back over your time as regional director in the three regions, how did you spend your time, and did it vary from region to region? And what I mean by that is, did you spend 50 percent of your time in the office and 50 percent out of the office? And how did it change from region to region because of the nature of your business?

Where Time Was Spent as Regional Director in the Three Regions

Martin: In Sacramento, I probably spent 50-60 percent of the time out of the office. I think that here, although the issues are complex and it's a major project, just geographically things are a little closer together than in some of the other regions, so you can kind of go out and back in a day, and it doesn't take you three days to go someplace.

". . . basically the things that I did were essentially the same. . . . dealing with issues . . . within the Bureau, within the region at the commissioner's level, the department . . . And then . . . interfacing and dealing with the water districts, the customer or the general public, the state, and the politicians . . . at the national and the state and the local level. . . ."

But I think basically the things that I did were essentially the same. It was kind of a matter of, in terms of dealing with issues at internally within the Bureau, within the region at the commissioner's level, the department, what have you. And then also the interfacing and dealing with the water districts, the customer or the general public, the state, and the politicians, the political folks at ~~both~~ the national and the state and the local level.

So I think probably in terms of activities, it was probably about the same in each of the regions. Maybe the level of intensity of some of the issues, of course, were different. Here in the region, in this region, I probably spent more time dealing with some of the other interests, the different interest groups, being involved in meetings with them, in just sitting down with them, talking over the pros and cons of what we were doing, what we were planning to do.

"In the Lower Missouri Region and then later on when we consolidated the . . . geography . . . reduced the amount of time that I was in the office, so I spent more time outside the office . . ."

In the Lower Missouri Region and then later on when we consolidated the Lower Missouri, the Upper Missouri, and the Southwest Regions, the geography kind of changed the amount of time that I was in the office, reduced the amount of time that I was in the office, so I spent more time outside the office because I went through three airports getting from Billings, Montana, down to the Texas gulf coast to deal with some of the issues down in that area. And so that was just a function of the time required to get from here to there. But the issues themselves or the activities were quite similar. However, there I didn't spend as much time dealing with some of the special-interest groups as I did here.

". . . when I moved to Billings, there the Indian issues became quite prominent . . ."

In that upper Missouri area when I moved to Billings, there the

Indian issues became quite prominent, so my activities and my involvement in dealing, trying to work on some of the Indian-related issues intensified when I took on the area, and more so than it had been here or in Denver.

Storey: And these would be Indian water rights issues?

Trying to Get Municipal or Domestic Water to Indian Groups

Martin: Some of them were not necessarily Indian water right issues, but some of the programs that we were trying to do to alleviate some of the economic hardships that the Indian people were faced with trying to get municipal water to them, or get their domestic water to them.

Indian Training Program at Yellowtail Dam

Or another case in point, at Yellowtail Dam, we were having a rapid turnover in our powerplant operators and some of our maintenance people. We came up with an idea to try to train some of the Indian folks to do those jobs, so we set up a training program working with one of the local colleges. So we would select these kids, these Indian kids. They would go to school part time and work out at the project part time. And then when they completed their program, then we would hire them as there were opportunities for hiring.

Those were the primary kinds of things. They weren't so much water right issues at that particular time that we were dealing with in the Dakotas, some of the things that Congress had authorized [us] to do would *allow* us to put some money into developing facilities to try to alleviate some of their hardships.

Storey: Did you not have Bureau planes in Billings, for instance?

Reclamation's Planes and Use of Charter Services

Martin: We did, and we used those locally, and made great use of *them* in moving from Billings out into the Dakotas, down into Colorado. As a rule, we didn't take them on down into Texas because it was such a *long* flight. We could get there, it was more economical to go commercial. But in some of the more remote areas, which is just about all of North and South Dakota, and Wyoming, and Montana, and, of course, down in Colorado, Nebraska, Kansas, in those areas we used the Bureau plane just almost exclusively.

Storey: What about when you were in Sacramento?

Martin: In Sacramento, there isn't a Bureau plane located here, but we had some excellent charter service, and so we just had a contract with a charter service company, and let them know, almost on a moment's notice, that we needed to go someplace, needed a plane, and they would provide it.

Storey: You would fly in the Central Valley? I mean, it's a *big* valley.

Martin: Yes. We would fly in the Central Valley. Sometimes I would drive, but normally if it was going to take more than a couple of hours or hour and a half to drive, we would just charter.

Storey: And in Denver, I think there was a plane, wasn't there?

Martin: In Denver, we had the Bureau plane there, so we used it for the local travel within the region. It was known as the commissioner's plane, and the commissioner didn't make that much use of it. Of course, when he was out and needed the plane for his purposes, then we would charter or make some other arrangements.

Storey: How big, in terms of personnel, were the three regions?

Personnel Levels in the Three Regions

Martin: At the peak in the Mid-Pacific Region, we must have had about 1,400 or 1,500 people, something on that order. In the lower Missouri, I don't recall the numbers specifically, but it was probably somewhere around 700 or 800 people within the region. Then when we consolidated the three regions into the Great Plains Region, we, of course, closed the Amarillo regional office. We had a small office in Austin, Texas, and a small office in Oklahoma City, and then we had some small offices in the Dakotas. So probably, we had a total, in that consolidated region, of probably 700 or 800 people, something on that order.

Storey: Why did they consolidate that? You know, it's such a huge geographic area.

Regional Consolidations Resulted from the Winding down of Construction Programs and a Desire to Reduce the Costs Passed on to the Water Users

Martin: Well, it was strictly for the economies of it. When I was in Denver and our program was winding down, we were looking at ways that we could economize, because when we passed those bills along to the water and power users, they get a little sensitive on how much of the cost they pick up, and, of course, we were sensitive, too, to try to hold the cost down.

". . . it appeared that there would be a minimum of about $5 million a year just to keep . . . a regional office open. . . ."

And it appeared that there would be a minimum of about $5 million a year just to keep the office open, just to keep a regional office open.

So then we started looking at how can we reduce those costs, and well, the program in the lower Missouri was grinding down, was greatly reduced. In the Upper Missouri, they still had quite a bit of activity, but

some of it was kind of questionable as to whether or not it was really going to happen, like the Garrison Unit. But at that time they had quite a bit going on. And down in the Southwest, they were kind of grinding down down there as well.

Regional Directors First Recommended Combining the Upper Missouri Region and the Lower Missouri Region and Then Eventually Adding the Southwest Region to the Consolidation

Gene Hinds, who was regional director in Amarillo; Joe Marcotte, who was the regional director in Billings, and I got together, and we kind of came up with the proposal that at that particular point in time we would suggest the consolidation of the Missouri Basin into one region, but with the notion that when a few more things, a little more time had passed, the Southwest Region would be abolished and would be incorporated into both the Great Plains or in the Upper Colorado Region.

". . . we thought at the time . . . that politically we probably couldn't move that office out of Billings and into Denver. We thought Denver would be the logical place for it . . ."

And we thought at the time, politically, with the situation in Montana, Billings being a fairly smaller town, that politically we probably couldn't move that office out of Billings and into Denver. We thought Denver would be the logical place for it, but politically we didn't know whether we could make that happen or not, and we felt that it needed to happen.

So we suggested, or recommended, that the two regions be consolidated and be headquartered in Montana, and so we put that proposal together, made it to the commissioner, and then we did some work with some of the political leaders, both in the Congress and in the states that would be affected by that. We got everything worked out. We also talked to some of the local folks. They weren't too thrilled with it, but they understood.

". . . it was done without a lot of bickering in the press or from the politicians. Of course, . . . it was not good . . . on the impact that it had on people's lives, but it . . . just had to be done. We . . . couldn't justify . . . that kind of money for what was being produced. . . ."

So it was done without a lot of bickering in the press or from the politicians. Of course, some of the folks that were impacted in the regional office, of course, it was not good from that standpoint, on the impact that it had on people's lives, but it was just something we just felt just had to be done. We just really couldn't justify continuing to spend that kind of money for what was being produced.

Storey: One of the other problems, of course, is you have two regional directors, instead of three. How did that work out? What happened there?

Martin: You mean on deciding who was going to–

Storey: Yeah. Who was going to stay and who wasn't, or whatever it was that was decided.

Martin: Well, when the decision was made to consolidate, I think at that time–let's see, Bob Broadbent was the assistant secretary at the time, and I believe at that particular time–

END SIDE 2, TAPE 1. MARCH 19, 1996.
BEGIN SIDE 1, TAPE 2. MARCH 19, 1996.

Storey: This is tape two of an interview by Brit Storey with Bill E. Martin on March 19, 1996.

You were saying that Cliff Barrett was the acting commissioner at that time and was the regional director in Upper Colorado [Region].

Martin: And he asked me if I would go to–and I don't know what conversations he had with Joe Marcotte, the regional director in Billings at the time, but Cliff asked me if I would go to Billings as the director of the consolidated region, and at that time I wasn't really *sure* that I wanted to make the move or if I wanted to maybe try to do something else, so I told him that I would think about it, and for him to let me know, tell me when he had to know, and I would give him an answer.

Then some time passed, and he called me one day and told me that he needed to know. So I said, "Well, I thought it over and I will go."

". . . I had encouraged some of the Lower Missouri folks to go to the consolidated region because there were some good people there, and we needed the expertise and the backgrounds and the history that they had. . . ."

I had already tried to encourage as many of our people in our Lower Missouri Region to take jobs in the consolidated region. Of course, there had been, of course, a team of people working to kind of try to meld those two offices together and sort out people's entitlements. And so I had encouraged some of the Lower Missouri folks to go to the consolidated region because there were some good people there, and we needed the expertise and the backgrounds and the history that they had.

But that was the way that happened. Cliff just asked me if I would take the job, and I eventually said yes, and went. And then Joe Marcotte kind of filled in as the assistant commissioner in Washington, kind of commuting. He never made the move back. It was really on a kind of an

interim-type arrangement until he left the Bureau and went to work for Modesto Irrigation District.

Storey: Is he still down in Modesto, do you know?

Martin: I believe he is. He's no longer with the district, but it's been a while since I've seen him. But I'm pretty sure he's still down there.

Storey: So all of a sudden you were in Billings.

Martin: I was in Billings.

Storey: It was a little bit colder.

". . . Billings was a *good* town to live in. . . ."

Martin: It was. It was different. Moving from Denver to Billings, is, of course, it's a smaller city. The climate's a little different, but Billings was a *good* town to live in.

Storey: What were the major issues when you moved up there? You've already mentioned the Indian issues.

Garrison Division of the Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program

Martin: Garrison was a major issue. The Oahe, Garrison in North Dakota, trying to get funds to continue with the construction, the Garrison Unit [of the Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program].

". . . there were several . . . environmental issues pertaining to wetlands and migratory waterfowl, and then the issue with the Canadians on the threat, or the potential, of introducing some biota out of the Missouri River Basin into Canadian waters . . ."

The issues there, there were several issues, but probably the two major ones were some of the environmental issues pertaining to wetlands and migratory waterfowl, and then the issue with the Canadians on the threat, or the potential, of introducing some biota out of the [Missouri River] Basin into Canadian waters, and those were probably the two *major* issues as it related to Garrison. We spent a lot of time, of course, working on those two issues.

Oahe Unit of the Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program

Then in South Dakota, the Oahe unit, both of these were authorized units of the Missouri Basin program, and the political leadership in both of those states wanted both of those projects built. They wanted them to go. So the major issue in South Dakota was whether the Oahe Unit [of the Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program] should be built, is that the best way to use

money in South Dakota, is building an irrigation project. There was, of course, a lot of study being done on it. The local folks *wanted* the project built, they *wanted* the irrigation project.

"We were also involved in doing some rural domestic water supplies through some loans and grants where we turned the money over to the local folks and they would then do the work. . . ."

We were also involved in doing some rural domestic water supplies through some loans and grants where we turned the money over to the local folks and they would then do the work. We had quite a bit of *that* going on in South Dakota.

"Of course, I didn't get rid of any of the issues going down in the Lower Missouri region. . . ."

Of course, I didn't get rid of any of the issues going down in the Lower Missouri region. I kept those, so we still had the North Platte issues, the Colorado-Big Thompson issues–both East and West Slope, the Fryingpan-Arkansas. All of those, we continued to have those.

The issues on the North Platte were just growing because of the endangered species issues. Nebraska and Wyoming were suing each other over the use of water out of the North Platte River, and we had been kind of dragged into that to some extent.

". . . I went to pay a courtesy visit to the governor of Montana. He, I guess, kind of looked me over, saw my gray hair and said, 'Well, this probably is going to be your last assignment with the Bureau. You'll probably finish out your career here. You've picked a great state to finish your career. Robert Redford isn't going to let you *do* anything. You're going to have a lot of time to enjoy Montana.'. . ."

Then in Montana there wasn't a great deal going on up there, but there were some people that *wanted* some projects built. I remember shortly after I took over the consolidated region, I went to pay a courtesy visit to the governor of Montana. He, I guess, kind of looked me over, saw my gray hair and said, "Well, this probably is going to be your last assignment with the Bureau. You'll probably finish out your career here. You've picked a great state to finish your career. Robert Redford isn't going to let you *do* anything. You're going to have a lot of time to enjoy Montana."

Storey: (laughter) Did it work out that way?

". . . it did work out that we didn't do a lot of work in Montana in the way of building things, but it didn't work out that I had a lot of time to enjoy Montana because it seemed like I was on the *road* all the time. . . ."

Martin: No. Well, it did work out that we didn't do a lot of work in Montana in the way of building things, but it didn't work out that I had a lot of time to enjoy Montana because it seemed like I was on the *road* all the time.

Storey: Which governor was this?

Martin: His name escapes me right now.

Storey: This would have been about '85?

Contacts with Politicians

Martin: That would have been '85, and I just don't remember his name. He was very personable, and he had a name which was kind of different, kind of a different name. [Ted Schwinden?] I remember one time I was with him, and I had taken one of my project managers, Jim Wedeward, with me. He was an electrical engineer. I introduced him to the governor. The governor said, "Well, with a name like that, you're probably not ever going to be successful running for public office." He said, "I have enough trouble with mine, but I think yours will stop you." (laughter) But he had a good sense of humor, and he was very nice and pleasant to work with.

Storey: Was it normal for you to pay courtesy visits on governors and congressmen and so on?

Martin: Yes.

Storey: You would do that on your own initiative?

Martin: Yes.

Storey: You did it California and in Denver?

Martin: I didn't do it here as often, although I did have contact with the governor here. I did it a little different in the Missouri Basin states than here, but I did it.

Storey: What did you talk about?

Martin: Well, we talked about the projects, the Federal projects in the state, the things that we were thinking about doing as we were trying to develop our program for the next year, or we would sit down and talk to the Governor about–a lot of them you'd go down to see, not necessarily to see the governor, but you'd end up in the governor's office just because you'd start talking to the folks in water resources, and they'd say, "Oh, the governor said he'd like to visit with you on this. Will you come down?" So we'd go over and see the governor on it, if he happened to be in, or someone in the governor's office if he wasn't.

It was easier to get into the governors' offices in those states than it is in California, I suppose just because of the level of activity. And I had a lot of contacts with members of state legislatures, with the county boards of supervisors, or whatever the local form of government they had. And then, of course, the congressional delegation to Washington. There were just daily contacts there from someone either on the–well, of course, on the telephone most of the time, but if they were out in the district or in the state, I'd go out and sit in a meeting with them or sit down just to meet with them. Or when I was in Washington, just to pay courtesy visits to their offices when I was back there.

Storey: How often did you actually did you see the senators or congressmen, as opposed to the staff?

Martin: Quite often. Almost every time I would see the member.

Storey: And they wanted to talk about what was going on in their district?

". . . some were more interested than others . . . 'Bizz' Johnson from California, I heard from him daily almost, and every time he was in the district, which was almost every weekend, I would see him. . . ."

Martin: Of course, some were more interested than others, but someone like "Bizz" Johnson from California, I heard from him daily almost, and every time he was in the district, which was almost every weekend, I would see him.

Storey: He was a Central Valley congressman, I believe.

Martin: Yes, he was from up in Northern California. He lived in Roseville. He represented the northern end of the valley.

Virginia Smith, Congresswoman from Nebraska

And then in Nebraska, I saw a lot of Virginia Smith when she was a congresswoman from central Nebraska. I saw a lot of her. Every time I went to Washington, I knew better than to not stop by and see her, and she always wanted to know what was going on, what she could do to help.

Dick Cheney and Malcolm Wallop

Then I saw a lot of Dick Cheney from Wyoming, and also quite a bit of the Wyoming senators, particularly Malcolm Wallop. I saw him a lot. I didn't see so much of the Montana folks, but I did see them on occasion, but I didn't have that much contact with them.

Storey: Tell me more about Virginia Smith, if you would.

Virginia Smith ". . . was in the minority party, she got what she wanted. She

was tough, but she just came across as being this sweet little grandmother . . ."

Martin: Okay. Well, she was a little grandmotherly type, and she was just very personable and affable. She had all kinds of energy. She had a good grasp of what was going on in her district. She spent a lot of time just driving around over the district. I guess she was on the Appropriations Committee. She was a Republican. That's back when the Democrats were in charge of both houses of Congress. And although she was in the minority party, she got what she wanted. She was tough, but she just came across as being this sweet little grandmother that anyone would just really relish having a grandmother like that, and very pleasant, very easy to work with, but tough.

I was in her office one day when the ag bill was up for debate in the house. I don't recall who the secretary of agriculture was at the time. I can't remember whether it was Reagan or Bush was president. She had put in a call to the secretary because they had something in the ag bill that was detrimental to her district, and she didn't like it, and evidently they had had some conversations before. But anyway, he called, he returned her call while I was there. Well, I got up and started to leave, and she said, "No, just stay. It won't take but a few minutes." And she laid all of her charm on the table, and she read the secretary the riot act to get her point across on just what the impact of that legislation would have on her constituents. I don't remember what the final outcome was, but she didn't pull any punches. So you see this sweet little old grandmother here just lay all that on the table and put on her House of Representatives face in representing the interests of her constituents. So that was, I thought, kind of interesting.

And then with the North and South Dakota folks, I worked with them, with the governors and as well as the–well, in the Dakotas, Kansas, Nebraska, and Wyoming, the governors were just personally involved in a lot of the things that we were working on, and so I saw quite a bit of them. Of course, at that time the governor of Nebraska was Bob Kerry, who is now Senator Kerry from Nebraska. He's a Democrat, but he and Virginia always seemed to get along pretty well together.

Then down in Texas, I didn't see that much of the folks in the governor's office down there. I would pay courtesy visits down there, but we had the office in Austin, and I tended to just let that office deal more with the governor's office. I'd just let him tell me when he thought I needed to come down. It was kind of the same way with the congressional folks and the members of the Texas legislature and some of the local politicians. I would get down there fairly often. I tended just to let them–he had already developed a relationship with the folks down there, and so I just let that continue.

Storey: Tell me more about Cheney and Wallop, if you would.

Dick Cheney and the "Silt Run" on the North Platte River

Martin: I was always very impressed with Cheney's knowledge. He was a very knowledgeable person, very intelligent person. He always came across that way. Of course, he was also, like a good many of those members of the Congress, they're there to represent the interests of their people, and he did an excellent job with that. He had some people on his staff that were very competent. The issue that I dealt with him more than anything else on was on the North Platte River, the so-called silt run. I think we may have talked about that before.

Storey: You mentioned it, but it isn't crossed off my list.

Martin: We spent quite a bit of time with him because some of his local constituents didn't like the way we were treating them, what we were trying to do to them on the silt run, so I spent a lot of time talking with him about the silt run. We worked out a solution kind of in conjunction with his office and the folks in the local districts.

Storey: This is probably irrigation ditches where if you didn't let the silt through so that it plugged up all the little leaks, then ditches ran water the wrong way.

Martin: Yes. Most of those canals were unlined, and the districts had always just relied on the muddy water that they diverted out of the North Platte River to temporarily seal their canals.

Then when Guernsey Dam and Reservoir was built and operating, then this water was stored in Guernsey, and the silt settled out in the reservoir and clear water was released, and so their canals, according to them, became much leakier than they had been when they had the muddy water, so they wanted that muddy water. They were contemplating suing the Bureau for delivery of muddy water instead of the delivery of clear water, but there was a lawsuit in Colorado down on the Fryingpan, on the Arkansas River, Bessemer Ditch. That was the same issue.

The Bessemer Ditch wanted muddy water instead of clear water, when Pueblo Reservoir was built, and they had clear water. The court ruled in the Bessemer Ditch case that they were entitled to wet water, but not *muddy* wet water, and so then the folks up on the North Platte backed off of their lawsuit. They never did file their lawsuit, as a matter of fact. We had tried to work out an accommodation with them, or had worked out something with them, or started doing for them. We would just pull Guernsey Reservoir down for two or three weeks every year around the Fourth of July, early July, and we would flush silt into the river and send it down, and give them their so-called silt run.

". . . we had to shut down powerplants at Guernsey dam in order to make that silt run. That, of course, cost the project revenues from the power. So we told

the districts that . . . they were going to have to pay for that power that was lost, and they didn't like that. We also told them that there was going to be a limit to the number of days that we deliver the silt . . ."

There was some question whether EPA was going to allow that to happen, but EPA never said stop it. But then we had to shut down powerplants at Guernsey dam in order to make that silt run. That, of course, cost the project revenues from the power. So we told the districts that in order to continue that silt run, they were going to have to pay for that power that was lost, and they didn't like that. We also told them that there was going to be a limit to the number of days that we deliver the silt, because we didn't want the powerplants out of operation that long, and we didn't want the loss of the revenue.

So that, of course, created a lot of controversy, and it didn't take long to get Mr. Cheney's office involved. So we had a lot of discussions in Washington in his office with him personally and also with his staff. Then they were helpful in finally getting it resolved, and we did finally get it resolved by working out an agreement that we would, I believe it was that we would give them two weeks of a silt run that lasted for two weeks and in exchange for some amount of money. I don't remember now just now what the formula was, but they did finally agree to pay for it. And if it was going to run *over* two weeks, then there would be additional payments that would be required of them. The last I heard, it was still working.

Storey: We've got to have muddy water. (laughter) Let's see. Oh, Mr. Wallop.

Martin: Of course, working with the senator, he was involved in some of the same issues, too, with the silt run, and also with some of the North Platte issues *primarily*. I probably didn't deal with him as closely as I did with Cheney. He kind of left a lot of those things to Cheney's office to work out. But I did see quite a bit of Senator Wallop. Usually when I was back there, I would just stop by for a courtesy visit, and he was always there when I stopped by. Rather than just letting me talk to some staff member, he was usually there, usually available.

Storey: We were talking about the way you spent your time as regional director. Did you have a sort of a formula in your mind about how much you should be away and how much you shouldn't be away or anything like that?

How He Spent His Time as Regional Director

Martin: Well, here I thought I probably should be here around 50 percent of the time.

Storey: In Sacramento.

Martin: I shouldn't be gone more than 50 percent of the time, although I had some people, some assistants that did the job that were very capable. I didn't feel

threatened by them being here and me being someplace else. I felt comfortable with them being here, but I felt that I needed to be around at least 50 percent of the time, and it worked out fairly close to that here. I was probably gone more like 60 percent.

Then in Denver, I had to change that thinking a little bit just because of the amount of time that it took to go one place to the next, although with the Bureau plane, that helped quite a bit. I could still get out and back in most of the places in the Lower Missouri Region in a day, but the amount of time out of the office did increase a little.

In the *consolidated* regions, the time out of the office increased considerably, and there I did just turn a lot of the day-to-day things over to the assistants in their particular areas of expertise. Gordon Wendler went with me from Denver to Billings. I'd known Gordon forever. As a matter of fact, he and I were in the same carpool when I started with the Bureau in Grand Island. Gordon did a lot of just the kind of running the office while I was gone. I probably spent at probably 75 percent of my time, 75 to 80 percent of my time, out of the office when I was in Billings.

Storey: Who were the assistants in each area?

Ed Horton, Bob Hammond, and Jack Mistler

Martin: Here in the Mid-Pacific Region when I came out, Ed Horton was assistant in charge of construction, planning, and engineering. Bob Hammond . . .

END SIDE 1, TAPE 2. MARCH 19, 1996.
BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE 2. MARCH 19, 1996.

Storey: We were just beginning to talk about your assistants when you were regional director in the three regions, I think.

Martin: In the Mid-Pacific Region, as I had mentioned, Ed Horton was the assistant. His area of responsibility primarily was construction, office engineering, and planning. Bob Hammond had the O&M activities, and Jack Mistler was the assistant for administration.

Gordon Wendler and Jim Malila

In Denver, when I moved from here to there, there were some vacancies and also some people retired. They were ready to retire, had retired before I got over there. So I hired Gordon Wendler to be kind of the chief assistant, primary assistant, and had Jim Malila to be the assistant for administration.

Roger Patterson and Don Glaser

In Billings, when we consolidated the two and then later the three regions, Gordon Wendler moved with me from Denver to Montana, and was assistant up there, and he had the primary responsibility for construction, office engineering, and planning activities. I hired Roger Patterson[40] to be the assistant for operations and maintenance activities primarily. We modified that some, but basically that's what he was doing. And Don Glaser[41] was the assistant for administration.

Of course, we had project managers out in the field in area offices to kind of watch after the activities locally, and that was the case in all three of the regions that I had responsibility for.

Storey: Tell me more about Gordon Wendler.

Gordon Wendler

Martin: Well, Gordon and I went back from almost day one of my Bureau career when I moved to Grand Island, Nebraska, to start my work with the Bureau in 1962. Gordon and a couple of other fellows lived in my area, within three or four blocks of where I lived. They already had a carpool formed. They invited me to join, because our office was out by the airport, which was four or five miles out of town. I started almost from day one in a carpool with Gordon, and I'd known him for all those years and kind of kept in touch with him.

When I left Sacramento and went to Denver, Gordon headed up the budget and programs office. He was the programs officer for the region. He was very familiar, had a just in-depth knowledge of the programs within the region, with the funding needs, where some of the sensitive problem areas were. I had a vacancy in the assistant RD's position, so I asked Gordon to apply for it. He did, and I selected him for that job. Then when I went to Billings, fortunately for me, I think Gordon felt some obligation maybe, or at least the desire to go with me to Billings as we consolidated those regions and to try to make them work and work as effectively as we thought they should. So I always had a very high regard for Gordon, both personally and professionally. He just did a very credible job as assistant RD, and then in all the other things that he did, too, as well–program officer and program budget officer for the region.

When he was in Grand Island, I think he was in the engineering analysis section, but he was involved primarily on the budget end out there, too, so he was very familiar with the programs, funding needs, and he also had a knack for asking some of the tough questions of some of the project managers, or people that when they thought they needed money, Gordon wanted to know *why* they needed it and why they needed as much as they

40. Interviews of Roger Patterson are included in Reclamation's oral history program.
41. Interviews of Don Glaser are included in Reclamation's oral history program.

were asking for, and what they were going to do with it if they got it. So he was very competent in that area, and I thought that was something that I really needed there. Gordon filled the bill well.

Storey: What about Jim Malila?

Jim Malila

Martin: I first became acquainted with Jim on the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project in 1964. He was a young engineer down there. He'd just finished his rotation program. He was working for Dick Nash in the engineering analysis branch. Jim was very energetic, he had lots of enthusiasm, had a very inquisitive mind. He was always on the move.

Then I left Pueblo and moved to the commissioner's office, and Jim later moved back to the E&R Center and was involved in a number of things, including some of the automatic tape processing. We hadn't stayed in real close contact, but I was aware of where he was and what he was doing all those years. So when I went back to Denver and I had the vacancy in the assistant for administration, I, of course, was aware of Jim, and knew his sharp mind, his inquisitiveness, and just the drive that he had, so I invited him to apply for the assistant for administration, which he did, and I selected him for that.

Jim handled the job extremely well. He didn't have to go through a lot of training time for it or learning time, because he was aware of many of the issues that he was dealing with, that he was going to be faced with. So he just came in and more or less just took over the administrative functions.

Kathy Mitchell, Finance Officer in Denver

We did have some people there. Kathy Mitchell was there as the finance officer, there others there that were good, that were good people. So Jim fit in and really did an excellent job in running the administrative functions of the region.

Storey: What about Don Glaser? You inherited him, I think, as an assistant regional director.

Don Glaser in Billings

Martin: I did. He was the assistant RD for administration in Billings, and when the regions were consolidated, it became known that I was going to become the director. We were, of course, in the process of trying to fit the two regions together, blend the people and the functions. Jim Malila had already told me that for some personal reasons he was not going to go to Billings, although I had asked him to. It wasn't really certain just what was going to be, you know, or just how things were going to work out there.

Don Glaser, I believe we had a vacancy in the personnel office in Billings, and Don Glaser had been the personnel officer at one time. He told me that if it fit with my plans or my thoughts, my wishes, he would go back to be personnel officer and open up that assistant RD for administration position. I think that by that time Jim had already told me that he wasn't going to go, and I really didn't know Don that well personally. I really didn't know that much about him *personally*. I'd heard some other people's ideas about what he was like and what he was like to work with, so I asked him to just stay on. I told him I'd like him to stay where he was for the time being, and it worked out extremely well. Don was, I thought, very supportive of me and of the consolidation effort.

I used him for things even beyond the assistant for administration. I had him go out to Garrison, kind of between project managers, and act as a project manager out there. I also got him involved in some of the specific issues like dealing with some of the Indian issues in North Dakota. He proved to be very effective at working on some of those special projects, particularly in some of those where there were some very sensitive issues involved, either sensitive issues or sensitive personalities. He seemed to be able to work with those fairly effectively. So I left him in the assistant for administration position, and he ran that–the administrative functions. But then I also used him for additional activities. And then, of course, later on as some of the changes started happening within the Bureau, then he went on to Washington and worked with the commissioner in the commissioner's office, then later on came back out to Denver. So I think Don did a good job. He was supportive and, I think, loyal to me and to what we were trying to get done through the consolidated regions.

Storey: One of the things that was happening while you were in Billings was that Mr. [Bob] Broadbent left, and there was this *long* period when we had acting commissioners, I think almost two years. Then Mr. [C. Dale] Duvall[42] became commissioner, and then we moved into the reassessment process, that ultimately became Reassessment '88. Could you tell me your perspective on what was going on at that time in the management of Reclamation?

Martin: Well, looking at the Bureau, the future of the Bureau, and the reassessment that was done, it was done, I guess primarily through the PMC, so-called PMC.

Storey: That's what?

Martin: The Permanent Management Committee, which was made up of the regional directors, the assistant commissioners, and the commissioner. Dale Duvall, who was the commissioner, he was a very personable, very pleasant person to be with, but I never really felt that, for the most part, he was in charge of

42. An interview of C. Dale Duvall is included in Reclamation's oral history program.

the Bureau or what was happening. So in the process of analyzing and planning and discussing the future of the Bureau, where it was headed, I felt that he did not have very much of a role or a voice in that process, or in the ultimate outcome of the process, the recommendations, and what we finally ended up doing. I think he seemed to just finally accept it and go along with it, but I'm not sure that he really thought or felt that that's the way it should go. But I also felt that maybe he didn't have much of a choice, that it was kind of forced on him.

Storey: By whom?

Martin: Maybe it was some of the folks in the department, out of the assistant secretary's office.

Storey: This would be Jim Zigler?

Martin: That was about the time that Jim Zigler came on board.

Storey: So Mr. Broadbent was gone by that time?

"From the time Broadbent left the Bureau and went down to the assistant secretary's office, I always had the feeling that he was still in charge of the Bureau . . . that he was still running the Bureau from the assistant secretary's office. . . .That continued, too, I think, when Jim Zigler came in . . ."

Martin: Yes. From the time Broadbent left the Bureau and went down to the assistant secretary's office, I always had the feeling that he was still in charge of the Bureau, and I didn't necessarily think that was all *bad*, either, but just from what I saw in my trips to Washington and in my conversations with Bob, I just felt that he was still running the Bureau from the assistant secretary's office. And he wasn't the first assistant secretary to do that either, but there seemed to be some things going on in the Bureau. Maybe there wasn't that much going on in other areas that he had responsibility for. So he tended to pay more attention maybe to the Bureau.

That continued, too, I think, when Jim Zigler came in, and I think he and probably Joe Hall had quite a bit of influence as to where the Bureau was going, but probably more Zigler.

Storey: So why did we need reassessment?

Reassessment '88

Martin: I think it was at a time when some of the same things that we had gone through in the Missouri Basin, I think was going on throughout the Bureau; just what is the need, the present need and the future need, for a Reclamation program, and how can that best be implemented–to the degree that it is needed how can that best be implemented?

So I think what was really being looked at is just what is the real underlying question: what is the need for the Bureau? Does there continue to be a need for the Bureau? And, if so, how's the best way to carry out the program or the activities that are needed?

". . . we went through some exercises in trying to identify some things that the Bureau could do. I thought in some instances that we were really scraping the bottom of the barrel or groping for reasons to continue to exist in a major way. . . ."

And we went through some exercises in trying to identify some things that the Bureau could do. I thought in some instances that we were really scraping the bottom of the barrel or groping for reasons to continue to exist in a major way.

Storey: And did you feel that the regional directors were supportive of this effort?

Martin: Yes. I think, for the most part, the directors were supportive. I think they were supportive of the need to take a good look at ourself. I'm not sure that everyone was totally satisfied that the solution that we came up with was the way to go, or that some of the activities that we identified as activities that the Bureau should be involved in really were the ones that we should be, that maybe we were groping for something there and trying to get involved in some things that we probably shouldn't have been involved in.

Storey: How did management at Reclamation react to the way the assessment was done?

Martin: Well, probably collectively they maybe felt fairly good about it. Of course, I think the commissioner had some real reservations about it, I believe, and some of the directors themselves had some reservations, some questions as to how the best way to implement or organize in order to carry out the functions of the Bureau. So I don't think that there was a total embracement of the entire process, but I think there probably was acceptance of it.

Storey: Now, as I understand it, what happened was Joe Hall was selected to run the process out of WAPA.

Martin: Right.

Storey: Out of Western?

Martin: Out of Western.

Storey: However you want to call it. Western Area Power Administration. And then he went out in Reclamation and selected people. Do you know why they went out to Joe, for instance?

Martin: You mean and ask *him* to come in?

Storey: To come in.

Martin: Well, I think it was his relationship with Jim Zigler.

Storey: So he knew him.

Martin: Um-hmm. And, of course, several of us knew Zigler, but probably those of us– none of us lobbied for it, I don't imagine, either. I'm sure Joe did.

Storey: What was the objective of Assessment '88? What were they trying to achieve in that report *and* in the subsequent reorganization?

"The objective of Assessment '88 was to try to define just what it is the Bureau should be doing, . . . and to lay out a plan for the Bureau's future activities . . ."

Martin: The objective of Assessment '88 was to try to define just what it is the Bureau should be doing, could do and should be doing, and to lay out a plan for the Bureau's future activities and future existence.

So then you decide and agree what the activities are going to be, which is what the Assessment '88 was about. And then you say, "All right, now this is what we're going to do. What kind of an organization should we put together to implement those activities, for those objectives or goals?" And it was the final consensus of the group that since *most* of our contact, much of our contact, was out in the field, out in the states, that we should move a lot of the functions or a lot of the responsibilities back out to the local area, closer to the local area.

So the recommendation to reduce the size and the functions of the commissioner's office in Washington and move it Denver, and delegate some additional authorities and responsibilities to the [regional] directors,[43] get it closer to the people that are going to implement the decisions, or the recipients of the benefits of the programs, the water users, or the general public, that was the concept, or the thinking.

Storey: Where did the assistant commissioner for resources management fit into all this?

Assistant Commissioner–Resources Management

Martin: Well, at the time that this started, the process started, the assistant commissioner for resources management was located in Washington. That position had been vacant for a long time, and I believe when Broadbent was

43. Within Reclamation's regional offices, staff typically refer to the regional director, and answer the phone, using only the word "director" to refer to the regional director.

commissioner, Bob– oh, for crying out loud–he was with Western.

Storey: Oh, Olson?

Bob Olson as Acting Commissioner

Martin: Bob Olson was selected as the assistant commissioner for resource management in Washington. And then when Broadbent left and went to the assistant secretary's office, I think Olson thought that he was going to become commissioner. And when he didn't get the job, then he left the Bureau and went with the private sector.

". . . Terry Lynott was selected by Dale Duvall to be the assistant commissioner for resource management located in Washington. . . ."

Then, of course, the commissioner's job and the assistant commissioner's job was vacant for a couple of years. After we had the regional consolidations and Joe Marcotte left, then Terry Lynott[44] was selected by Dale Duvall to be the assistant commissioner for resource management located in Washington.

With the Assessment '88, after that, it was felt that that was one of the positions that should be located in Denver, get it out closer to the regions that would be looking for the assistance that would come from that office, from the standpoint of operations and maintenance contracts and repayments, some of contract and repayment functions. So there was also one of the branches of the assistant commissioner for resource management that stayed in Washington– contract and repayments. So that move was made from Washington to Denver, and Terry and some of the folks in Washington made the physical move back to Denver.

Storey: And then there was movement of staff from the regions to Denver, also.

Tried to Consolidate Specialized Functions in Denver Rather than Duplicating the Expertise in the Regions

Martin: There was consolidation of some of the functions, more kind of in the specialized areas. We felt that there was a feeling it would be less expensive, more economical to house some of those specific areas of expertise in one location and make it available to all of the regions, as opposed to each region having that particular expertise that would be duplicated five times.

Storey: How did it work?

Martin: It was a mixed bag, and for the most part, I didn't think it worked very well.

44. Interviews of Terry Lynott are included in Reclamation's oral history program.

There were some pluses, but for the most part, I didn't think that it really worked very well.

Storey: In what way?

Martin: Of course, there continued to be some resistance from the regions. There also, I think, continued to be, or not continued to be, but there was an attitude, it seemed to me, in the Denver office, that was not necessarily compatible with getting the job done. There seemed to be an attitude in some arenas that, "I'm in charge of this particular aspect of the program, and it has to come through here. That's the only way that it can go." So that was really not conducive to . . .

END SIDE 2, TAPE 2. MARCH 19, 1996.
BEGIN SIDE 1, TAPE 3. MARCH 19, 1996.

Storey: This is tape three of an interview by Brit Storey with Bill E. Martin on March the 19th, 1996.

You were saying the way the Denver office looked at it, it didn't seem to streamline the process.

Martin: Right. It seemed that the proper attitude adjustment had not been made to facilitate the process the way it was supposed to be, in line with the concept of putting together the technical talent in one place, as opposed to having it dispersed. So there was some resistance on the part of some of the regions to try to work within that concept, and I think it was either an attitude or a perception of attitude by the regions toward Denver, or the attitude actually existed and it didn't work as well as it was originally thought that it would.

Storey: Of course, this was all pretty directly relevant to you, because, what, about four- or five-, six- months after they began the reorganization, I remember an assembly where Mr. Hall introduced you as the new assistant commissioner for resources management.

Martin: Right.

Storey: Tell me what happened. What was going on?

Becomes Assistant Commissioner-Resources Management

Martin: Well, it was felt that the changes that needed to take place, and just the management of the assistant commissioner for resources management, was not being done in a way that would accomplish the concept.

"The commissioner and Joe Hall first started out looking for an assistant for Terry Lynott because they felt that maybe he was just overloaded . . . Then they kind of changed the thinking there that maybe what they needed to . . .

get someone with . . . a lot of regional experience, as well as commissioner's office experience. . . ."

The Commissioner and Joe Hall first started out looking for an assistant for Terry [Lynott] because they felt that maybe he was just overloaded and maybe he needed an assistant.

Then they kind of changed the thinking there that maybe what they needed to do there was just make a change at the Assistant Commissioner position itself and get someone with a regional experience, a lot of regional experience, as well as Commissioner's office experience. So they asked me if I would consider making the move from Billings back down to Denver in that assistant commissioner's position.

I had some reservations about it, because although I had been a regional director for sixteen years or however long, thereabout, I'm not sure exactly the number of years, but for roughly that time, and I thought, well, I might be ready to go try something new or something different, but I had some reservations about it because of the way it might be perceived and how it might affect Terry.

I was also concerned that we try to implement this thing and make it work, and so when they asked me if I would make the move, I told them after I thought about it for a while and talked it over with my wife, and talked it over with some of the folks there in the Billings office, some of my assistants, I decided to make the move, and told them that I would. And that, of course, prompted the meeting that you mentioned where I was introduced as the new assistant [commissioner] for resource management.

Storey: What had you walked into?

". . . it was a tough situation, because I think we were trying to implement something that was new and different, and we still had some people with the old concepts as to how it should function . . ."

Martin: Well, it was a tough situation, because I think we were trying to implement something that was new and different, and we still had some people with the old concepts as to how it should function, how it had functioned in the past, and they really hadn't accepted that there was a change, that a change was being made. And so we had kind of a blending of some of the old concepts and some of the new concepts. It was, I guess, received with mixed feelings, mixed emotions, mixed reactions, and a very mixed level of acceptance of the new concept.

Storey: Where are we talking about? Are we talking in the Denver office, outside the Denver office?

Martin: Well, actually all throughout, but I was speaking primarily about here in the

Denver office itself. And trying to understand what the changes are, what the impact is going to be, and accepting a different role, in some cases, over what they had had in the past.

Storey: So it was tough, or what?

Martin: Yeah, it was tough. Of course, there are a lot of good people in Denver, a lot of very talented people there, and a lot of them were really working, trying to make it work. I think, too, another one of the things that was happening at the same time was the change in the Bureau program and the resistance on the part of some people in the department, or even outside the Bureau, as to just what the Bureau's role should be. So although internally we had decided what it is that we should do and what we were capable of doing, some other people had different ideas, and they didn't totally accept our thinking. So some of the externalities also added to the problem of trying to bring about some change internally.

Storey: In your own mind, how did you differentiate between what the assistant commissioner for resources management's staff was supposed to be doing for Reclamation, as opposed to what the assistant commissioner for engineering and research's staff was supposed to be doing for Reclamation?

"Well, in my thinking, the assistant commissioner for engineering and research, that function was primarily and should be somewhat narrowly focused on the design and construction and research activities, and not get over into the operation and maintenance activities. . . ."

Martin: Well, in my thinking, the assistant commissioner for engineering and research, that function was primarily and should be somewhat narrowly focused on the design and construction and research activities, and not get over into the operation and maintenance activities.

Of course, at the same time we were in the process of seeing our construction program decline, so we had less need for designers and some of the staff over on the engineering and research side. They were looking for reasons for continuing to exist at their current level.

It was obvious, I guess, that in the future, some of the major functions of the Bureau was going to be related to operations and maintenance. So I think they saw some opportunities or thought there may be some opportunities to expand some of their operation over into the operation and maintenance side, which also created some strife and conflicts internally within the offices themselves.

Storey: Was resource management *intended* to be an O&M function? I'm not quite tracking on what ACRM was supposed to do.

Martin: It was supposed to be involved from the management side of the resources,

which, in *my* view, covered about everything except design and construction. Once you get the project constructed and turn it over, then it becomes a resource management matter. And even on some of the research was very much resource management oriented, as opposed to some of the research strictly from a technical standpoint–you know, what's some of the more specialized research in materials or what have you.

Storey: When you came to be the assistant commissioner for resource management, ACRM, as it were, did your ideas change about what ACRM was supposed to be from when you were regional director? This is the first part of the question.

"I had a concept . . . that the ACRM should be more of a technical services-type function and to facilitate the process, reduce the amount of paperwork that had gone on before, where we had a *technical* review of things in Denver and then a *policy* review in Washington. Those were supposed to be consolidated so we had one place there that would get both the technical and the policy review . . ."

Martin: No, I don't think they changed that much. They may have changed some, but not materially. I had a concept at the regional level that the ACRM should be more of a technical services-type function and to facilitate the process, reduce the amount of paperwork that had gone on before, where we had a *technical* review of things in Denver and then a *policy* review in Washington. Those were supposed to be consolidated so we had one place there that would get both the technical and the policy review, and it would function primarily as a technical service center to assist the regions in carrying out the functions out at the regional level, the project level.

I don't think my concept really changed that much after I moved in to Denver. I began to understand and see some of the different attitudes about what the function, and encounter some of the different concepts of what the functions should be.

Storey: Those concepts coming from Washington and other regions?

". . . some of the other regions . . . were not particularly thrilled with the notion . . . of having some of their expertise removed out from under the regional director's control into Denver so it could be shared Bureau-wide. And . . . some of the folks in Denver hadn't accepted or hadn't gotten to the point where they accepted the additional responsibility and authority that had been given to the regions . . ."

Martin: Yeah, or within Denver itself. In the case of some of the other regions, they were not particularly thrilled with the notion, after the fact, of having some of their expertise removed out from under the regional director's control into Denver so it could be shared Bureau-wide.

And then by the same token, some of the folks in Denver hadn't accepted or hadn't gotten to the point where they accepted the additional responsibility and authority that had been given to the regions in implementing the programs. They really hadn't seen themselves yet as a technical organization, per se.

Storey: Now, you mentioned a few moments ago the policy side of what was going on. Did you see any problems there once you got to Denver?

Martin: I saw the situation where it appeared to me that it maybe had not streamlined the process in developing policy by moving some of those functions from Washington out to Denver. I think maybe some of the policy developments maybe got a little more attention or moved along a little faster back at the Washington level, and I think that was probably because of staffing. There was not the proper level of staffing or the level of staffing in Washington to push that along as it should have been.

Storey: I had the impression that somehow the appointment of Commissioner Underwood[45] also affected the reorganization after the fact.

Dennis Underwood as Commissioner

Martin: Well, it did in that, you know, anytime you have someone new come into an organization, and particularly something that has just recently been developed, they want to take a look at it and see if this fits with *their* concept of what the organization should be doing and the way it would implement the activities. So that did slow down the process. Of course, with Dennis, he liked detail, and a lot of things would stack up on his desk and not move, because even though he may have worked eighteen hours a day, because he spent a lot of time and he was a pretty quick study, but just the volume of stuff he had stacked up to take a look at just wasn't very conducive to moving things along very rapidly, and it did slow things up.

Storey: What were the major issues you had to deal with when you became the assistant commissioner?

Martin: Well, there were a number of things that were under way. Of course, one of the major issues was just the office itself trying to get the attitudes adjusted to the degree that they needed to be, to a level of acceptance that this is the way that we have to operate, and then in working with the regions, because the level of acceptance by the regions was different, and just trying to get the regions to accept what we had agreed to as the way we would function, that was a major activity.

We were working on RRA at the time. That continued to be a major activity. We were looking at trying to implement some of the new

45. Interviews of Dennis Underwood are included in Reclamation's oral history program.

programs, like some of the hazardous waste activities that we were trying to get more involved in, and then just trying to work with the folks over in Engineering and Research and coming to terms with them and keep them from trying to take over the place. So those were some of the major issues they were working with.

We still had some planning activities going on, and trying to develop policies related to new concepts for our activities.

Storey: I had the impression there was a constant friction, maybe, with the regions about whose role was what.

". . . Mid-Pacific Region, was one at the forefront of it–didn't want to give up *anything*. . . . they espoused the notion . . . But when it came to the implementation of it, there had been personnel changes and evidently changes in attitude. . . ."

Martin: Oh, there was. Yeah, that was an ongoing debate as to what the responsibility to the region was, and how they would be staffed to carry out those responsibilities. Some of the regions, particularly the Mid-Pacific Region, was one at the forefront of it–didn't want to give up *anything*. But at the time we were going through the exercise of coming up with the new concept of what we would do and how we would function, they espoused the notion, or supported the notion, of moving the people to Denver or putting the expertise in one location in Denver. But when it came to the implementation of it, there had been personnel changes and evidently changes in attitude. So there was constant friction on–

Storey: This was David Houston?

Martin: Um-hmm, and then Larry Hancock.

Storey: And Larry Hancock[46] subsequently. So that was an issue that you had to deal with as ACRM.

Martin: And it was still going when I left, when I retired from the Bureau. We had made some progress, but we did not have it resolved with all regions.

Storey: As I recall, Ray Willms had become the assistant to the ACRM before you came.

Martin: No, after I came.

Storey: *After* you came. How did that come about?

Ray Willms

46. Interviews of Larry Hancock are included in Reclamation's oral history program.

Martin: Well, they had not filled the assistant for ACRM position when I came down, so I hired Ray Willms in that position. He was the project manager at the Eastern Colorado Projects Office in Loveland at the time. Of course, I had worked with Ray for a number of years in different positions starting in the Mid-Pacific Region. I hired him to be the assistant ACRM.

Storey: Tell me more about Ray Willms.

Martin: Ray's an engineer. When I was here in Sacramento, I'm not sure, but I think he may have been in the planning division. I'm not sure about that. But anyway, we had a vacancy at Klamath Falls in the projects office up there. We had some very tough local issues. They were fairly minor by comparison for the rest of the region, but they were very important and very sensitive and tough ones locally. So I selected Ray to be the project manager up there, and he took those issues on, and he was very tenacious and very bright–very tenacious. He delved into some of those things and got a lot of the issues resolved. There were some personalities outside the Bureau in Klamath Falls that created some very sensitive work issues, and Ray was very effective in dealing with those.

Then about the time I left, we had a vacancy in the Central Valley Project Operations Office here in Sacramento, and I hired him to–or selected him to take over that office, which had the responsibility for coordinating the operations for the entire CVP.

When I was the [regional] director in Denver, I had a vacancy at the project manager's position on the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project in Pueblo, and Ray applied for that job, and I selected him for it. He moved in and took over and did a good job there on getting some of the project finished, the construction completed. We had a very sensitive little issue with Colorado Springs over the way the *equipment* was working on the water supply lines and storage tanks from the Fry-Ark Project[47] up into the city, and he and Bob [Gil] Gyllenborg worked very effectively at getting those resolved.

Then when we consolidated the Loveland office with the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project, the project construction on Fry-Ark coming to completion, we were turning over some of the activities on the Big Thompson Project to the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, so we decided that we could save some money, and we consolidated the two projects offices and located it in Loveland, and I asked Ray to be the project manager with that because he developed a good relationship with the Southeastern Water Conservancy District, and probably we would have had a lot of resistance on that consolidation if it hadn't been for Ray. They felt very comfortable with the consolidation since he was going to continue to be the project manager,

47. The Fryingpan-Arkansas Project.

although he would be located in Loveland.

So when I became the assistant commissioner, Ray was one of the people that came to my mind as someone that I would consider moving in as my assistant. There were other people that I thought about as well, and I finally settled on Ray and selected him for the job, because he had been very effective in all the positions that I had relied on him for at the project level, so I thought he could make the change, make the switch.

Storey: In the last few months, I've talked to a number of people–Manny Lopez, Joe Hall, and some others–and they've all said, to a person, "The *best* job in Reclamation is either project manager or it's regional director." And you had been regional director for sixteen years or so. What did you think of the job of assistant commissioner as you moved into it? You were there, what, about two, two and a half years?

Martin: I was there about a year and a half. Yes, just about a year and a half.

Storey: What did you think about that?

". . . I think the best job is a regional director. I felt that way for a long time, and I felt that way *after* I moved into the assistant commissioner's job. . . ."

Martin: Well, I think the best job is a regional director. I felt that way for a long time, and I felt that way *after* I moved into the assistant commissioner's job. I had the feeling that it was not going to be as good a job, as exciting a job, as interesting a job as the regional director's job, because at the regional director's position, you're working with people on *all* sides, on *all* aspects of the issue, from the technical to the political to the public, and so you're involved and come in contact with *everyone* that has *any* interest or *any* responsibility for what you're doing.

With the moving into the assistant commissioner's position, I knew my area . . .

END SIDE 1, TAPE 3. MARCH 19, 1996.
BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE 3. MARCH 19, 1996.

Storey: You were saying that by moving over to ACRM you . . .

". . . very little contact with the public, with water users, and with the political side of it. . . ."

Martin: There was, of course, primarily the technical aspects of the Reclamation activities, some on the policy, but very, very little contact with the public, with water users, and with the political side of it. So I knew that that was going to be a drastic change in that respect, and that was one of the things that caused me to stop and think about whether or not I really wanted to do

that, because I thoroughly enjoyed all of the dealing with all those different interests and being involved in the full spectrum of the Reclamation program, people that either have an interest in or are impacted by a program.

Storey: Were there any other issues while you were *the* ACRM that we should talk about?

Martin: I think we've mentioned the ones that were primarily at the forefront. Just trying to make the thing work was one of the major issues, kind of the focus, and we talked about some of the things that we were doing to try to bring that about. So I think that's probably about–nothing else comes to mind right now.

Storey: What happened to cause you to decide to retire?

Decision to Retire

Martin: Well, when we moved from California in 1980 to Denver, we left our two children, our daughter and son out here, they had married Californians. So when we left, we, of course, had the house, and we decided that we would just keep it since both of the kids were still out here. We'd been gone about ten years, and I had maintained contact with folks out here. I guess it was in about August or September of 1989 when I had a meeting in which Ralph Nissen, who at the time was president of Glen-Colusa Irrigation District, he was also president of the Central Valley Project Water Users Association, and president of the Sacramento River Water Contractors Association, and was also involved in some other things. He told me they were looking for a manager or an executive director for a couple of the associations, that they had consolidated their management needs into this one office, and wanted to know if I would have any interest in that job.

By that time, both of our kids had left California, but we still had the house out here, and we had turned it over to a rental management company. The house became vacant in about November of '89, and I was offered this job, had this job offer out here. I thought, "Well, all these things are kind of coming together, maybe it's time to start thinking about something different."

So I talked to Joe Hall at that time. I think, by that time, Dale Duvall, the commissioner–well, he had left and Dennis Underwood had just been selected as commissioner in about, I don't know, October or November, somewhere in that order. So I talked to them and told them of the opportunity that I had. I said, "I don't want to leave you in a lurch, but will it create a problem for you if I take this job?"

They told me that I should go ahead and do what I felt that I needed to do, so I decided to take this job, or take the job offer out here, and retire from the Bureau, which I did in early January of 1990.

Storey: And you came out here now. Could you tell me again the groups that you represented?

Retired to take over Management of the California Central Valley Flood Control Association, the Sacramento River Water Contractors Association, and the North Delta Water Agency

Martin: Well, the groups that I represented when I left the Bureau and came out here was the California Central Valley Flood Control Association, the Sacramento River Water Contractors Association, and the North Delta Water Agency. None of the three of them were really large enough or had the resources to hire a manager and maintain independent operations, so they consolidated through agreement, with the Flood Control Association being the major one, and they hired a manager and a small staff, primarily using consultants in lieu of staff to kind of carry out the responsibilities that the association had with flood control.

Worked with the Legislature

It was primarily working with the legislature, watching legislation, and the regulatory agencies to try to see that they didn't do anything that would interfere with a district's ability to maintain facilities for flood control or to push legislation that would help them maintain those facilities and provide those facilities.

Worked with the River Contractors to Transfer Excess Water Around

Then with the river contractors, working there to transfer water, excess water, that they had, working with the Bureau and with the North Delta Water Agency. They had a contract with the State Department of Water Resources, and my function there was to administer that contract with the state.

"That was about a four-day-a-week job. . . That reduced my work hours considerably . . . and gave me a little more free time to see if I was ready to slow down a little bit before I got to the retirement date. . . ."

That was about a four-day-a-week job, so the contract I had with them was for four days a week. That reduced my work hours considerably when I did that. I felt that I was working about half to two-thirds time compared to what I was working with the Bureau, and gave me a little more free time to see if I was ready to slow down a little bit before I got to the retirement date.

Storey: Did any of the components of this position cause you to have to work with Reclamation?

Martin: It did.

Storey: In what way, and on what kinds of issues?

Working with Reclamation after Retiring

Martin: Well, the primary one was through the Sacramento River Waters Contractors Association. That's a group of water rights settlement contractors, and they had worked out settlement agreements with the Bureau.

Storey: This is for the riparian water rights?

Martin: For the riparian water rights, in order that some features of the Central Valley Project could be built and operated with some degree of certainty as to how much water supply would be available for the project, and they worked out those settlement contracts.

So then those contractors, or the major part of them–there were a hundred-and-something contractors–but about thirty-seven of them, which represents about 95 percent of the water under those settlement contracts, then formed themselves into an association called the Sacramento River Water Contractors Association. The association was to kind of watch after their interest here in Sacramento and worked with the Bureau.

Then they worked out an agreement with the Bureau that allowed them to pool water that might be excess to their individual contractor needs in a specific year and move it around amongst themselves to people that needed water and to the degree that they had pooled more water than they needed, with Bureau approval could sell it outside the membership.

". . . one of the functions . . . was to move . . . water and work with the Bureau in getting approval to move some of that water outside the association membership, and the Bureau itself bought some of the water. . . ."

So one of the functions of that office, that position that I had, was to move that water and work with the Bureau in getting approval to move some of that water outside the association membership, and the Bureau itself bought some of the water.

Storey: I'm confused. I think in talking to John Budd–I think John had negotiated many of those riparian water rights agreements–I understood those rights ~~that~~ were outside of Reclamation's sphere of influence and power. So I'm wondering why would this group of riparian rights people need Reclamation *permission* to move water around.

". . . there was not total agreement on just what benefit the settlement contractors would *get* from these contracts . . . But certainly there were some benefits to the waters users entering into a contract . . . they would know absolutely *certain* how much water they would get each year. . . . They would

still get a hundred percent of their water, unless the inflow to Shasta was less than some specific inflow . . ."

Martin: When they worked out the settlement contracts, there was not total agreement on just what benefit the settlement contractors would *get* from these contracts, and there was a lot of discussion when they started trying to quantify in terms of numbers of acre-feet, what that water right that they had would entitle them to. But certainly there were some benefits to the waters users entering into a contract, even on their water right water, so that they would know absolutely *certain* how much water they would get each year. Even if the Bureau had to pull that water out of storage, they would get it in a dry year. They would still get a hundred percent of their water, unless the inflow to Shasta was less than some specific inflow, like 3,200,000 acre-feet, and it could go up from there for a couple of years. But they knew *for sure* how much water they were going to have.

". . . in addition, since they weren't sure exactly what they might need in future years, the Bureau permitted them to buy project water for $2 an acre-foot, and they had up to ten years to decide whether or not they wanted to keep that water . . ."

Then in addition, since they weren't sure exactly what they might need in future years, the Bureau permitted them to buy project water for $2 an acre-foot, and they had up to ten years to decide whether or not they wanted to keep that water or if they could turn it back if they decided they didn't want it.

Well, a good many of them kept that project water, and some of them have some fairly large quantities, like Glen-Colusa Irrigation District, and Sutter Mutual Water Company, and Reclamation District 108 have some fairly large quantities of project water.

So in the agreement and under the contract that they had, even on the settlement water, the water right water, since the Bureau was guaranteeing to deliver a specific amount of water each year in the contract, the Bureau insisted on, and the districts finally accepted, a provision that says that even on the settlement water, if it's going to be sold outside the association, the Bureau would approve that. Up until the agreement that the association worked out, the Bureau even had to approve transfers within the association, but through the agreement that was worked out with the association and the Bureau for the project water portion, that could be pooled, and the association could move it around without any further approval by the Bureau within the association. If it went outside, then the Bureau had to approve it.

Storey: Have there been shifts in the association's water needs?

Martin: There has been some, because there have been some conservation measures put in, there have been some changes in cropping patterns. There are a lot of duck club operations. So just the changes in crops, the conservation measures, and the activities, there has been a shift.

Storey: Of course, during the period, I guess, when you were in this position, C-V-I-P-A was passed. Did I get the initials right?

Central Valley Project Improvement Act

Martin: C-V-P-I-A.[48]

Storey: Yeah, the improvement act. Not being expert on that, I would presume that put some pressure on the water supplies. Did that mean that there was a change in the way your groups had to deal with the Bureau of Reclamation, because they were looking for water?

"With the contract that my group . . . has with the Bureau, they are really number one in the list of priorities for water. The only time . . . the water supply under their contract is reduced, is if it's such a dry year that the inflow into Shasta Reservoir is drops below 3,200,000 acre-feet, which is very rare. . . ."

Martin: It changed things considerably. With the contract that my group had and has with the Bureau, they are really number one in the list of priorities for water. The only time their contract is reduced, or the water supply under their contract is reduced, is if [it's] such a dry year that the inflow into Shasta Reservoir is drops below 3,200,000 acre-feet, which is very rare. And if that doesn't occur, then they get 100 percent of their water.

". . . there's a lot of interest on the part of a lot of entities in *buying* water from the river contractors. After CVPIA went into effect and there was a need for more water for environmental purposes, then there was a great deal more pressure . . . *to* sell as opposed to using it in farming operations . . ."

So a lot of entities look with a great deal of envy at the Sacramento Water River Contractors because of the water that they have and the guarantee that they have of getting that water. So there's a lot of interest on the part of a lot of entities in *buying* water from the river contractors. After CVPIA went into effect and there was a need for more water for environmental purposes, then there was a great deal more pressure, I guess, on the part of the contractors as to whether they sell some of that

48. ". . . the 102nd Congress passed multipurpose water legislation which was signed into law October 30, 1992. Previously referred to as H.R. 429, Public Law 102-575 contains 40 separate titles providing for water resource project throughout the West. Title 34, the Central Valley Project Improvement Act, mandates changes in management of the Central Valley Project, particularly for the protection, restoration, and enhancement of fish and wildlife. . . ." Quoted from http://www.usbr.gov/mp/cvpia/index.html on June 3, 2010, at about 2:05 P.M.

water–well, pressure *to* sell as opposed to using it in farming operations or changing their cropping or their conservation practices, or whatever, using more groundwater and giving up project water or settlement water in order to sell to other people, sell to other entities.

Storey: My recollection is that some of those riparian rights are in cities and various other uses besides agriculture. Am I thinking correctly?

Martin: Right. Several of the cities have some of the riparian or appropriative rights, some of those early appropriated rights. Like the city of Sacramento has a contract with the Bureau which is–I don't think it has a termination date. It just goes on in perpetuity.

Storey: Were there any other ways that your job related to Reclamation?

Martin: That was the principal one. With the North Delta Water Agency, it related to some extent because of the impact that project operation could have on the water quality within the North Delta service area. Like if the cross-channel gates are closed, they would send water directly on down the Sacramento River without any of it being diverted through the cross-channel canal over to the pumps. And so that meant that that made it easier to maintain the quality in the North Delta area. But most of our primary issues there were with the state. They were just kind of peripherally related to the Bureau.

Storey: This is not directly related, but the last couple of years have been flood years, I think, we've had a lot of water here in the Central Valley. When that happens, do the State Water Project and Reclamation, for instance, try to pump more and try to fill San Luis up out of the flood waters? How does that work?

". . . where there's a lot of water *available* in the system, then they do try to move water at that time into San Luis. Or if water isn't available within the system naturally, then they try to release water from Oroville or Shasta, the northern reservoirs, get it into the Delta and pump it down to get San Luis filled . . ."

Martin: Yeah, where there's a lot of water *available* in the system, then they do try to move water at that time into San Luis. Or if water isn't available within the system naturally, then they try to release water from Oroville or Shasta, the northern reservoirs, get it into the Delta and pump it down to get San Luis filled, in anticipation, of course, of the runoff from the mountains to refill Shasta and Oroville.

That works pretty well with some of the CVPIA provisions and the Endangered Species Act provisions and some of the agreements that they've worked out with the National Marine Fisheries and the Fish and Wildlife Service in dealing with those endangered species. Then there are some

restrictions on the time that they can pump. So that impacts the operation, so it changes the window that they have to get San Luis filled. So when those windows of opportunity are open, they keep the system full in order to try to get the San Luis filled before the next season.

But with the last couple of years, with all of the water that's occurred, that has given a lot more opportunities because the water has been there, and they haven't had to look to see how much water do I need to hold in Shasta in order to meet the CVPIA responsibilities later on in the year.

Storey: How long did you stay with these groups?

Martin: I worked with them for about six years, almost six years.

Storey: So you left in '95, is that right?

Martin: In August of '95.

Storey: And what prompted you to go into your second retirement?

". . . when I came back out here, I came with the intent of staying with them about three years, but then I stayed almost six. I decided that maybe I was ready to see if I wanted to have a little more free time or a little more flexibility with my time. . . ."

Martin: Actually, when I came back out here, I came with the intent of staying with them about three years, but then I stayed almost six. I decided that maybe I was ready to see if I wanted to have a little more free time or a little more flexibility with my time.

". . . I'd been doing some independent consulting in my spare time, and I decided that I would maybe focus on that a little bit more, but not more than 25 percent of my time . . . with Montgomery Watson Consulting Engineers . . ."

I had been doing some independent consulting. I was allowed to do that in that job that I had with the associations. So I'd been doing some independent consulting in my spare time, and I decided that I would maybe focus on that a little bit more, but not more than 25 percent of my time, and then give me more flexibility and more free time to do some of the other things that I hadn't had time before, like travel.

Storey: You mean with your family?

Martin: With the family, instead of work-related.

Storey: Could you tell me more about the type of consulting you've been doing?

Martin: Well, for the most part, since I left in August, I've been working primarily

under a subcontract with Montgomery Watson Consulting Engineers dealing with installing-- [Tape recorder turned off.]

Storey: You were talking about your consulting work.

Martin: The principal things that I'm doing now is subcontract work with Montgomery Watson Consulting Engineers, looking at fish screens on the diversion facilities that the districts have on the Sacramento River. With the winter run salmon listed on the endangered list, there's a move on to try to screen all of the diversions, and particularly the major diversions, in the river and in the Delta to try to enhance the reproduction and the number of fish, increase the number of fish, and some of this comes about under CVPIA where there were some commitments made and some requirements included in there to double the population of some of the fish species within the next few years. I don't remember the exact time. And so we're working with a number of those districts now to try to get some of their facilities screened.

Storey: So this would be both to prevent returning adults from turning off into the canals, but also to prevent the smolts going downstream?

Martin: The activities that we're involved in now deal more with the smolts that are moving downstream than the adults, because it's actually screening pumping facilities primarily, as opposed to canals. But there are some canals involved, such as Glen-Colusa Irrigation District–we don't happen to be involved in that one–where there is a canal, and they're looking at a long screen in front of a canal. But the ones we are looking at primarily are pump facilities.

Storey: As I recall, you're an ag-economist in terms of technical training.

Martin: Right.

Storey: And, of course, a *lot* of experience with Reclamation, but what is it you're helping them with?

Martin: Well, much of it is just working with the districts and working with the people from the regulatory side in trying to convince the people that they need to go ahead and get this done, and then working on the other side with some of the agencies that have some money available that can some provide financial assistance to the districts, and then working out the permit process, working at getting the permits that will be required.

Montgomery Watson also can enter into an agreement to manage construction or actually implement the installation of the screens. I don't get involved in that. My work is primarily involved in contacts, in working with the districts, and working with the agencies that has the money or has responsibility for the program.

Storey: Have you been doing any other consulting besides with Montgomery Watson?

Martin: I have done some with some of the districts direct in representing their interest at various meetings, some involving the Bureau, some involving other associations within the Sacramento Valley, within the Central Valley, and then working with some of them in transferring or marketing some of their water.

Storey: Were you lobbying or was it more an issue of tracking what was going on?

Martin: I was not a registered lobbyist, so I wasn't a lobbyist as such. I tracked legislation and also supported or opposed the legislation, went before the committees that happened to be hearing specific bills, and presented the views of the association on that particular legislation, and in some cases worked to try to get it defeated or passed.

I guess since I wasn't a registered lobbyist, if we had need for that kind of service, then we would just work with some group that had a registered lobbyist. I saw my role more, in that regard, as education, trying to explain to the people the pros and cons of legislation. And then working . . .

END SIDE 2, TAPE 3. MARCH 19, 1996.
BEGIN SIDE 1, TAPE 4. MARCH 19, 1996.

Storey: This is tape four of an interview by Brit Storey with Bill E. Martin on March the 19th, 1996.

Martin: And working with them to try to be sure that the regulations that they came out with didn't jeopardize the district's ability to maintain flood control facilities.

Storey: That's the regulatory agencies?

Martin: Yes.

Storey: And you worked for three groups?

Martin: Yes.

Storey: Was there an overall name for those three groups?

Martin: No. They each maintained their own separate identity, and I worked for each of them within the name of that entity.

Storey: There's a question that I've been meaning to ask you for a *long* time, and it's never been quite the opportune time, given the way the conversations have

gone, and that is the issues that surround the concept of river basin development. This was authorized, I think, in '36 or '39, and it's been one of the areas where Reclamation has been criticized because it's argued that what we're doing is building uneconomic projects at Location X because Location Y can provide surplus revenues, that kind of thing. I'd like you to talk about river basin development and planning as a concept, if you would, rather than individual project planning the way we did in our earlier days.

River Basin Planning and Development

Martin: Well, the concept of river basin planning and river basin development, I think had merit in that granted you're going to have some individual segments or units that might in and of themselves be feasible, but from the standpoint of the overall development and the overall benefit of the basin, I think there's some merit, maybe, to–or I felt that there was some merit to developing some of those units that would not stand alone–I think it tends to kind of spread the benefit of the development within the basin, I think it kind of spreads the impact of the development throughout the basin so that an area can be sustained, an *economy* can be sustained in a local area that would not otherwise be able to exist, or at least not to the degree that it can with the development.

So I think from a very regional or area standpoint, it's very beneficial to that area, and I think it is for the region as a whole, because in some instances there are resources in that area that maybe could be it would be attractive from an environmental standpoint or water-quality standpoint or some other things that you just can't put numbers to in coming up with a benefit-cost ratio. They're a little more difficult to analyze from an economic standpoint.

So there are maybe some aesthetic values, there are just the values in keeping a viable economy in a particular area. It's a hard one sometimes to try to sell politically to someone outside that area, and the Missouri Basin, I think, was a good case in point because there were some of those areas that, just standing alone, they would not have been feasible. But collectively, looking at it on a basin-wide standpoint, it made sense because it gave you *better* use of the resources that were available within the basin to maintain a way of life or local economy or to improve an environmental situation. There was some specific thing that that development could address, some specific local need that it could address.

Storey: Well, let's see, I'm down to only a couple of questions, if you can believe this. I presume you were in SES, Senior Executive Service.

Martin: Yes.

Storey: When did you enter it, and what kind of training did you take, and all that sort of thing?

Entering the Senior Executive Service

Martin: Well, I entered it when the Civil Service Reform Act was passed and the Senior Executive Service was created. Those of us that were in certain positions had the option of opting in or out. I believe that must have been in '78 or '79.

Storey: I think under the Carter Administration, yeah.

Martin: And so I opted in as soon as the act was passed and we were given the opportunity to do that, or we were asked to do it. I didn't have any specific training for going into the Senior Executive Service as such. I had, from time to time, as required, taken some management training programs or various training programs to kind of keep personnel happy, but I didn't have any training specific to the Senior Executive Service as such.

Storey: Did you go through the Departmental Managers Program or anything like that?

"I always said that I was probably the most undertrained member of the Bureau management team that there was . . ."

Martin: No, I didn't. I always said that I was probably the most undertrained member of the Bureau management team that there was, because I didn't go to a lot of management training programs. I didn't attend either the Bureau or the Departmental Management Training Program. It was mostly just on-the-job training, and then, as I mentioned, I did attend some short courses that would satisfy some of the requirements that OPM had for management training.

Storey: In Reclamation you had quite a few moves.

Martin: Yes.

Storey: What kind of effects did this have on your family–did *your* working for Reclamation have on your family?

"I was fortunate in that the moves that we made were timed fairly well with our kids' schooling. . . . But we found the kids are pretty flexible . . . Every place we went, we found some reasons to like being there and got involved in doing the things that were unique to that particular area"

Martin: I was fortunate in that the moves that we made were timed fairly well with our kids' schooling. It seems that there were kind of natural breaks in their schooling, and we would make a move when they would be going into junior high or something like that. But it did, of course, have some impacts because the kids would make friends and then we'd be there for two or three years and we'd move on. They would have to start over again. But we

found the kids are pretty flexible, and they probably adjust faster than adults do, and we also kind of saw it as an opportunity. Every place we went, we found some reasons to like being there and got involved in doing the things that were unique to that particular area, such as Washington, D.C. There was the seat of government and a lot of history courses and historical sights in and around Washington, and we took advantage of those.

So I don't think there were any real major issues or problems or family impacts that resulted from the moving around. I think probably that our kids maybe benefitted from it from some extent, because instead of reading about some of those things in history, they saw them as we made the moves around the country.

Storey: As you think back on your career at Reclamation, what kinds of social activities took place in the offices where you were, and how did they change as you moved through the hierarchy?

Social Activities at the Various Offices in Which He Worked

Martin: Starting out at the project level, it was, to some extent, kind of a close-knit family-type setting. We'd have picnics, an annual picnic in the summer, a Christmas dinner dance, bowling teams, different activities that kind of pulled us together even outside of work.

At the regional level, we had a bowling team. We also had an annual picnic. There was an annual picnic, but we didn't come together as often, didn't have as much contact outside of work as we did at the project office.

In Washington, in the commissioner's office, our division, planning division, and that was probably more because of the people involved, Dan McCarthy headed up the planning division, so he would have us out to his house, some of us out to his house occasionally for kind of a stag dinner. The division would have a picnic every summer, and the commissioner's Christmas party in the office was held every year. I guess several years the assistant commissioner, Warren Fairchild at that time, had some function around Christmas between Thanksgiving or Christmastime. So there was a little more social contact there that involved the families, either the family or the spouse.

I think the smaller the office, probably the more of a social setting. There was more social contact than there was, say, at the regional level or at the commissioner's office as such. With our own little division, there was a quite a bit of contact, even there not as much as there was at the project level.

Storey: Let's see. As I recall, you went to Washington maybe when Ellis was commissioner?

Martin: Dominy was still commissioner.

Storey: Floyd was still commissioner.

Martin: I moved to Washington in–well, they picked me up on the rolls in the commissioner's office January 1 of '67, and Floyd Dominy was commissioner at the time.

Storey: What was he like?

Floyd Dominy as Commissioner

Martin: Well, Floyd was very bright, he was very quick on his feet. He was very smooth in working with Congress.

"He could be very persuasive in working with Congress, and was very adept at getting things authorized. . . . Most of them took forever to get under construction or never got under construction, but there were a lot of projects authorized under Floyd's tenure as commissioner. . . ."

He could be very persuasive in working with Congress, and was very adept at getting things authorized. We had a lot of things authorized. Most of them took forever to get under construction or never got under construction, but there were a lot of projects authorized under Floyd's tenure as commissioner.

"He . . . was the most effective commissioner that I was associated with. . . ."

He was very persuasive, very quick on his feet, very good in congressional hearings, and, I think, was the most effective commissioner that I was associated with. Of all of them, I think he was the most effective.

Storey: His successor was Ellis Armstrong. I guess you were there throughout his tenure.

Martin: I was. Yes, I was there for his whole term of office.

Storey: How was he as a commissioner?

"I liked Ellis personally, but he was not an effective commissioner. . . . Someone told me one time, or made the observation, that since the goal of the Bureau of Reclamation at that time was to do nothing, Ellis was the perfect commissioner for the job. . . ."

Martin: I liked Ellis personally, but he was not an effective commissioner. There just wasn't much happened during his term as commissioner. Someone told me one time, or made the observation, that since the goal of the Bureau of Reclamation at that time was to do nothing, Ellis was the perfect

commissioner for the job. (laughter)

Storey: And then he was succeeded by Gil Stamm, who was a long-time Reclamation employee.

Gil Stamm as Commissioner

Martin: Of course, I had known Gil when I was in the commissioner's office at the time Gil was the assistant commissioner, not for planning but for the operation, maintenance, and some of those foreign activities. Then when he became commissioner, Gil was smooth, he was, of course, very knowledgeable of the Reclamation program, and he worked very well with people on the Hill, with the politicians. But, unfortunately, Teton happened during the time that he was commissioner, and there was, of course, a change in administration and political parties. With that being the case and the Teton having failed, it was just expected that he would be replaced, which he was.

". . . under Gil's tenure as commissioner . . . I became the regional director out in Sacramento . . . He and Jim Casey were quite instrumental in the moves that I made. . . ."

It was under Gil's tenure as commissioner that I became the regional director out in Sacramento, so he played a major part in my career and some of the things that happened to me, some of the things that I got involved with. He and Jim Casey were quite instrumental in the moves that I made.

Storey: Do you know anything about Stamm leaving?

Martin: Well, not really specific, other than that he left, and then that he didn't, at least for him, he didn't leave under the best of terms, best of conditions. I think he, of course, he knew he was being forced out, and he was not–he was a different person on leaving than he had been before Teton and before some of those things happened.

Storey: What did he do after he left? Do you happen to know?

Martin: Yeah, he moved out here, and he did some consulting for some of the associations and some of the irrigation districts. I know he was a consultant for the San Luis and Mendota Water Users Association. I don't remember, I think he also represented a couple of other districts or associations, too. For the most part, I think he was just retired, but he did continue to be involved.

Storey: And he was succeeded by Keith Higginson. How was Keith as a commissioner for Reclamation?

Keith Higginson as Commissioner

Martin: Well, Keith was, again, he was not in charge of Reclamation.

"Guy Martin, who was the assistant secretary, was really running the Bureau . . ."

Guy Martin, who was the assistant secretary, was really running the Bureau, and Keith really didn't have, or at least from my perspective, it didn't appear to me that he was really in charge.

Storey: So Guy Martin was running it remotely from the assistant secretary's office?

Martin: Uh-huh.

Storey: Let's see. Bob Broadbent was next, a [Ronald] Reagan appointee, I believe.

Bob Broadbent as Commissioner

Martin: And Bob was a politician and didn't claim to be anything other than a politician. I think the first question that he would ask, or at least that appeared to come to mind, is, "How is this going to play politically?" and maybe to some extent, "How is this going to affect me politically?" I think he was effective as a commissioner, but it was in a different way, say, than Dominy was. I think there were a few things, there were some things that he could effectively cause to happen, was effective in bringing them about, but I think it was in a little different way. He was a different commissioner than Dominy, but, I thought, *effective* in a lot of ways, and he was supportive of us in trying to get things done.

Storey: Let's see. After Broadbent came Olson and then Cliff Barrett as acting, and you've already discussed them a little bit. How about Mr. Barrett, a little more about him? You mentioned him just sort of incidentally today, but I don't think other than that.

Cliff Barrett as Acting Commissioner

Martin: Well, Cliff was–I think that probably the first time I got to know him was when we were both in Washington in staff-level positions. I think when I first got to know him, he may have been a special projects officer in the so-called 400 Division, or water and land operations. And then he got to be the assistant division head, and then the division chief, and then became the assistant commissioner for operations. Then he moved from there to the regional director's position. I guess that was when Broadbent became commissioner and Cliff moved out to Salt Lake. I'm not sure that that was his first preference. I think he would have liked to have stayed in Washington, but I think he probably had some baggage with some of the people in the department at the time. Jim Watt was the secretary, so I think there may have been some baggage there someplace.

So Cliff made the move to Salt Lake afterwards. During that hiatus when Bob Olson left, then Cliff went back as acting commissioner, and, I thought, did a good job on keeping the organization together on an interim basis until we got the new commissioner.

Storey: And then Dale came, Dale Duvall.

Dale Duvall as Commissioner

Martin: Dale came. Dale was very personable, very likable, very enjoyable to be with, but there again, he was really not allowed to be the commissioner. He probably maybe wouldn't have been very effective anyway, but he really didn't have the opportunity to find out, or to show what he could do as commissioner, because the activity, I think, was really being conducted from someplace else.

Storey: You already mentioned Dennis Underwood, I think. The last one is Dan Beard, whom you would have seen from your perspective working here in Sacramento for the groups you were representing. How did people react to Mr. Beard out here?

Dan Beard as Commissioner

Martin: Well, they remembered him from his days as the deputy assistant secretary for water and science with Guy Martin, and then when he was just kind of a chief of staff for George Miller on the House Committee for Water and Natural Resources or whatever. I don't remember what the name was changed to. So they were very skeptical, people were very skeptical of him and really didn't trust him. I think that was both inside and outside, the people both inside and outside the Bureau. He was the principal author of the Central Valley Project Improvement Act [CVPIA], and I think people felt that he had an agenda, finally getting an opportunity to put his agenda into legislation, and that they just didn't trust him. I don't know that too many attitudes were changed after he became commissioner. I think there were still a lot of the same mistrust, and maybe just dislike, on the part of some people.

Storey: In this latest conversation, you've raised two names that I'm interested in in particular. Warren Fairchild, for instance. He was brought in by Ellis, I believe.

Warren Fairchild

Martin: Yes.

Storey: And stayed, what, maybe three or four years?

Martin: I think he stayed for all of Ellis' Administration, and then he left, I think,

shortly after Gil became commissioner.

Storey: What was he like, and what was he trying to do? Why was he brought in? Anything you know.

Martin: Well, I don't know a great deal about him. I know he was in Nebraska and was the Director of Department of Water Resources in Nebraska. As I recall, he was very supportive of the water resource district concept that was, I guess, in major practice there in Nebraska, and I think he had been instrumental in maybe setting up some of those districts and pushing the notion of them.

Warren, there again, he had a lot of ideas, and it seemed like we spent a lot of time trying to bring about some changes in the planning activities, policies related to planning, working with the Water Resources Council, and there was quite a bit of activity going on, changing planning concepts.

Warren, I think he was good in that he had a lot of ideas to toss out on the table. Don't know that we really got a lot done during that period, but it was probably during a period that we were just . . .

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Storey: . . . transitioning then.

Martin: . . . an environmental mode. There had been some acts passed–the Clean Water Act, [National Environmental Policy Act] ~~Environmental Project Improvement Act~~, a number of things that were kind of changing the focus, and changing, I guess, the goals that some people had for water projects.

So that probably accounted for a lot of things not happening during that period. But Warren had boundless energy. He was always looking at something new or wanting to talk about something new. I'm really not sure why he was selected for the job. I don't recall that that was ever really made clear. It just happened. So I don't know whether Ellis knew him from someplace, or whether someone else knew Warren and suggested that Ellis hire him. I don't know just how that came about. Of course, at the time Senator [Carl T.] Curtis from Nebraska, he, of course, was a Republican and probably I'm sure had a lot of influence with the administration. So it was probably through Senator Curtis.

Storey: One of the things that was done, I think, while Fairchild was there, was the Westwide Study. Did you get involved in that?

Westwide Study

Martin: I didn't, other than kind of peripherally as the studies came into Washington, into the Washington office for review, those were run through the planning division, so I was really only involved in it from that standpoint, not from the conduct of it.

Storey: Did Westwide actually impact western water policy in Reclamation?

"I don't think it really had a major impact. There was a lot of time and a lot of money spent on it. There were some things probably that came out of it that maybe helped to change the focus of Reclamation, maybe shifting some to the non-construction concepts, conservation concepts, embracing some of the environmental issues. . . ."

Martin: I don't think it really had a major impact. There was a lot of time and a lot of money spent on it. There were some things probably that came out of it that maybe helped to change the focus of Reclamation, maybe shifting some to the non-construction concepts, conservation concepts, embracing some of the environmental issues. I don't know that it was worth the money that was spent on it, but, of course, there was a lot of time and a lot of effort.

Jim Casey

Storey: And a lot of energy and interagency coordination. Jim Casey. You mentioned him. I think you mentioned him in the past, but would you give me a sketch of him, and what he did, and why he was important to Reclamation?

Martin: Well, some of his early career he started out either in Kansas or McCook, one or the other, then left the Bureau and went off to the Corps of Engineers, and then came back to McCook and ended up in Washington.

When I first got to know him was in about 1966. At that time, he was an assistant chief of the Planning Division in the commissioner's office. I was in the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project office in Pueblo, and Jim Casey paid a number of visits to me in Pueblo, trying to convince me that I should come to Washington. I think he had probably heard about me from Pat [Hugh P.] Dugan, who was the regional director at the time in Denver.

So he convinced me to go back to Washington on a two-week detail to kind of look the place over and get a feel for what the commissioner' office does or the planning office in the commissioner's office does. So I went back and looked it over. It was going to be obvious that it was going to be culture shock for the family, moving from Pueblo, Colorado, to Washington, D.C., but my wife and I went back and looked it over. She would have been just as happy to forget it, but I decided to take the job. Casey had twisted my arm in so many different positions, that I felt that I couldn't say no, and he had convinced me career-wise that that would be a great move.

Then, I don't remember, maybe a couple of years after I had been back there a couple of years, he left the Bureau and went up on the Hill to work as a consultant to "Bizz" Johnson on the House Interior Committee, and he stayed in that position until he retired.

Casey had a good understanding of the Reclamation program. He was tenacious. He was one of the few people that would stand up to Floyd Dominy and tell him what he needed to hear, and get away, and survive. And on the Hill, of course, he was in a position there to work on Reclamation activities and get them in a position to move through the committee, working very effectively with committee members on both sides of the aisle, both the minority and the majority, working with both of them in getting the information they needed, and probably convincing some of them of the merits or demerits of a project or a program that was up for consideration.

How Jim Casey Was Involved in His Becoming Regional Director in Sacramento

And then, of course, we continued to be friends over the years, and while he was still on the Hill, I had a lot of contact with him. He was probably, well he *was,* very instrumental in my move from the commissioner's office to the regional directors's position in Sacramento. One day Gil Stamm called me up and ask me if I was interested in moving to Denver as assistant RD. Jim Ingles was the RD at the time, and I told him that I thought I probably would be, but I'd like to think about it, talk it over with my wife. So I talked with Casey about it. At that time, we had the planning division chief was open. Jim O'Brien had been selected for the Planning Division chief, but by that time, Warren Fairchild had left. And so Jim was acting assistant commissioner, and I was the assistant Planning Division chief.

I moved up to acting planning chief, so Jim said, "A regional director's job is open in Sacramento, a regional director's job is open in Billings." But at that time, Val Killin [phonetic] had been tapped to come out here. So Jim says, "Why don't you go tell Gil that you want the Billings job. Why be an assistant RD when there's a RD job open?"

So I went up and I told Gil that I'd thought it over, and I thought that I would like to be the RD in Billings. Bob [Robert L.] McPhail was in the assistant secretary's office, and Jack Horton was trying to get him located back in the Bureau. So Gil, I guess, decided he needed to think about that a little bit. Val Killin pulled out of this job out here. He looked it over and, I guess, decided that he didn't want any part of it. He was also involved with the Colorado Water Congress, I think, at the time.

So this job was open. The planning chief's job was open. The assistant RD's job in Denver was open. The RD's job in Billings was open.

So one day Gil called me up and said, "All right. The RD's job in Sacramento is open. Billings is open. Planning chief here in Washington is open, and the assistant regional director's job in Denver is open. Which one do you want?"

I don't know whether I would have changed my mind or not. In any event, this was a promotion. So I said, "I want the job in Sacramento."

He said, "Okay."

Dan Dreyfus

Storey: There was another man in Washington, I think, about this time, a man named Dan Dreyfus. Could you tell me about him?

Martin: Well, when I went to Washington from Pueblo, I went back to Washington in the reports coordination branch. We had reports coordinators for different regions of the Bureau. I went back as a Missouri River Basin coordinator. Dan Dreyfus was in there as the coordinator for the Colorado River Region, primarily, I guess, the entire Colorado region. He worked at that until after the Central Arizona Project was authorized, and then he was offered a position on the Hill, on the Senate side, working for Senator "Scoop" [Henry] Jackson on his committee staff. And so Dan went up there and worked at that position for several years, and then later became the chief of staff of the committee working for Senator Jackson until he–I don't remember exactly when he left that position. He left government and starting working for, I think it was some natural gas organization.

Dan, there again, he had some experience with the Corps of Engineers, he was a military brat, so he was very bright, very effective in working with people, and I think did a very good with the Bureau, as well as up on the Hill, where he continued to support Reclamation programs and Reclamation activities, and was a real ally for the program on the Senate side, just like Casey was on the House side.

Storey: And now I think he's at Energy, maybe as the head of the radioactive waste program or some such thing.

The last series of questions I want to ask you about is the chief engineers. Do you remember the first chief engineer you met?

Barney Bellport

Martin: I think the first one I met was probably Barney Bellport. I really didn't have much of a contact with the folks over in the chief engineer's office outside of the planning division, but more specifically in the economics branch, until I became regional director. I worked with them some when I was in the Washington office, but primarily after when I became a regional director.

Storey: Did Bellport have a reputation in Reclamation?

"Barney was seen as a tough, get-the-job-done type of guy, that kind of no-nonsense, and let's get on with the business at hand. He seemed to bring out a lot of fear in people . . ."

Martin: Barney was seen as a tough, get-the-job-done type of guy, that kind of no-nonsense, and let's get on with the business at hand. He seemed to bring out a lot of fear in people, and I don't know whether it was fear or just a great deal of respect for his talent.

I got to know Barney *after* he retired and I became regional director out here. He was out here living in Walnut Creek. I would talk with him on the phone quite often, or I would see him on occasion socially or at some dedication ceremony where he'd been invited. But I really didn't know that much about him as chief engineer because I just didn't have the opportunity to have the contact with him or with the people in the E&R [Engineering and Research] Center or the chief's office that did have contact with him.

Harold Arthur

Of course, the one that I probably had the greatest familiarity with was Harold [G.] Arthur. He was probably really the first one that I had that much contact with.

Storey: He was Mr. Bellport's successor. What was Harold like?

Martin: Harold was a very, I think, intense person and was a strong supporter of Reclamation programs and of getting projects built. Of course, it was under his tenure that Teton failed, and so he took a rap for a lot of that. But I thought Harold was a capable, competent chief engineer. And he had some good people there, too.

Don Duck

Don Duck, I have a very high regard for Don. So from my perspective, and the way I worked with him from here, I thought Harold did a very effective job in the chief's position.

Of course, Ellis Armstrong had changed the authorities and the relationships and the responsibilities of that position quite a bit, I guess even, as I recall, even renamed it. He was the one that renamed it from the chief engineer to assistant commissioner for engineering or something.[49]

49. The title changed from chief engineer; to assistant commissioner and chief engineer; to director, Office of Design and Construction/chief engineer; to director, Office of Design and Construction; to assistant commissioner for engineering and research. During Ellis Armstrong's term as commissioner, the title changed in 1970 to director, Office of Design and Construction/chief engineer, and then changed again in April of 1972 (continued...)

Storey: Director of design and construction, I think.

Martin: But I thought Harold and his folks did a good job for us, and I thought was effective in heading up that office.

Storey: Then you knew Robert [B.] Jansen, right?

Robert Jansen

Martin: Um-hmm. I knew Bob when I came out here. He was head of the engineering department or division with the Department of Water Resources of California. So I knew Bob when he was in that position. And then, of course, after Teton happened, he was asked by Higginson to move into the Denver office. I think that was because of some of the contacts that they had had during the Teton investigation.

Storey: Jansen headed the staff, I think.

Martin: Bob, technically, he was a good engineer. Technically I think he was solid. I liked him personally. I don't think he was really the person *for* that job. I think Denver chewed him up. I think the Bureau chewed him up, I should say.

Storey: So he wasn't well received?

Martin: No. As an outsider, he was not well received, and I don't think he really had the temperament for that job. I don't think he should have been selected for the job.

Rod Vissia

Storey: He was succeeded by Rod Vissia–what was Rod Vissia like?

Martin: Well, Vissia–he was different. Of course, at that time, the Bureau was changing, Teton happened. Well, Teton *had* happened, of course. So there were changes being made, and some of them I don't know that Rod had that much control over, but I thought that he was probably not ever really received very well either in that position by a lot of the folks in Denver. I think they probably felt that in a position like that, you needed someone with a *strong technical* background and with a lot of years of experience under your belt. Neither Rod nor Jansen really had that experience or that background or the years of experience either. I'm not sure that at that point in time that an outsider from anywhere would have really been accepted, and certainly not someone with as little technical background or experience as

49. (...continued)
to simply director, Office of Design and Construction. In spite of those changes, Reclamation staff unofficially referred to the position as the chief engineer until after 1988.

either of them had.

Darrell Webber

Storey: The last one was Darrell [W.] Webber.[50]

Martin: By the time we got to that point, and, of course, Darrell was an insider, and there had been so many changes made, I think Darrell was probably, for the most part, I think, he was probably accepted or acceptable to a good many of the folks, but there again, the program had gotten to the point where there just wasn't that much of a need for a lot of design work. I think the responsibility and the need for the expertise that Denver had historically had was just not needed. So I think Darrell just kind of kept things together for a while. I don't know how he would have been if we'd really had something going. He, I thought, spent too much time pushing foreign stuff, maybe trying to make a niche for the Bureau in foreign activities, as opposed to really addressing what the organization really needed to face up to.

Storey: I think when Ellis Armstrong changed the title of the chief engineer, he also changed the responsibilities some, shifted a number of the responsibilities to the regions. How did that work?

Martin: Well, I think to some degree it worked quite well. I did not agree with the notion of moving, diminishing some of the design capability in the chief's office, or the office in Denver, out to the regions. I thought we would be better off and could attract the better talent, the more talented people, by having it consolidated more in Denver. I really didn't think that was a plus.

Storey: Well, the last question I can think of, sort of a standard one, what have I not asked you that I should have asked you?

Martin: Well, we've been doing this for a couple of years off and on now. I don't remember all of the things that we've talked about, but I think that you have been fairly exhaustive in the questions that you've come up with. I think you've gotten into some areas that I had kind of forgotten about or hadn't thought about in a while, so it's rekindled some of my memories of some of those events and some of the people that I worked with. So I don't think of anything.

Storey: OK. Well, I appreciate it. I'd like to ask you again whether the material on these cassettes today and the resulting transcripts can be used by researchers.

Martin: Yes, they can.

Storey: Thank you very much. I appreciate it.

50. Interviews of Darrell Webber are included in Reclamation's oral history program.

END SIDE 2, TAPE 4. MARCH 19, 1996.
END OF INTERVIEWS.