ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS

Russell Brown

♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦

STATUS OF INTERVIEWS:
OPEN FOR RESEARCH ON
OCTOBER 25, 2008

♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦

Interviews Conducted and Edited by:
Brit Allan Storey
Senior Historian
Bureau of Reclamation

♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦

Interviews conducted–1993
Interview edited and published–2010

Oral History Program
Bureau of Reclamation
Denver, Colorado

SUGGESTED CITATION:

Brown, Russell, ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW. Transcript of tape-recorded Bureau of Reclamation Oral History Interviews conducted by Brit Allan Storey, Senior Historian, Bureau of Reclamation, October 25, 1993, in the Main Interior Building in Washington, D.C. Edited and desktop published by Brit Allan Storey. Repository for the record copy of the interview transcript is the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland.

Record copies of this transcript are printed on 20 lb., 100% cotton, archival quality paper. All other copies are printed on normal duplicating paper.

Table of Contents

STATEMENT OF DONATION OF ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW OF RUSSELL BROWN

1. In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms, conditions, and restrictions set forth in this instrument, I, Russell Brown, (hereinafter referred to as "the Donor"), of 9917 Vale Road, Vienna, Virginia 22181, do hereby give, donate, and convey to the National Archives and Records Administration (hereinafter referred to as "the National Archives), acting for and on behalf of the United States of America, all of my rights and title to, and interest in the information and responses (hereinafter referred to as "the Donated Materials") provided during the interview conducted on October 25, 1993, at the offices of the Bureau of Reclamation in the Main Interior Building in Washington, D.C.. and prepared for deposit with the National Archives and Records Administration in the following format: cassette tape recordings and transcript. This donation includes, but is not limited to, all copyright interests I now possess in the Donated Materials.

2. Title to the Donated Materials remains with the Donor until acceptance of the Donated Materials by the Archivist of the United States. The Archivist shall accept by signing below.

3. a. It is the intention of the Archivist to make Donated Materials available for display and research as soon as possible, but **the Donor places the following restrictions upon their use:**
interview in all media and all formats shall not be available to researchers within or outside Reclamation until fifteen years after date of interview.

b. The Archivist may, subject only to restrictions placed upon him by law or regulation, provide for the preservation, arrangement, repair, and rehabilitation, duplication, and reproduction, description, exhibition, display, and servicing of the Donated Materials as may be needful and appropriate.

c. For Donated Materials with restrictions, the National Archives will provide access to the Bureau of Reclamation, if the Bureau of Reclamation presents written permission of the Donor specifying the types of information and proposed uses of said information.

4. Copies of the Donated Materials that do not have Donor restrictions on their use, may be deposited in or loaned to institutions other than the National Archives, including the

Bureau of Reclamation. Copies of unrestricted Donated Materials may also may be provided to researchers. The Bureau of Reclamation may retain copies of tapes, transcripts, and other materials if there are no Donor restrictions on their use, and Reclamation may obtain copies of tapes, transcripts, and other materials at the time that Donor restrictions on the use of the materials ends.

5. The Archivist may dispose of Donated Materials at any time after title passes to the National Archives.

Date: 5-24-94 Signed: Russell Brown
Russell Brown

INTERVIEWER: Brit Allan Storey
Brit Allan Storey

Having determined that the materials donated above by Russell Brown are appropriate for preservation as evidence of the United States Government's organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, and transactions, and considering it to be in the public interest to accept these materials for deposit with the National Archives and Records Administration, I accept this gift on behalf of the United States of America, subject to the terms, conditions, and restrictions set forth in the above instrument.

Date:_____ Signed:_____
Archivist of the United States

Introduction

In 1988, Reclamation began to create a history program. While headquartered in Denver, the history program was developed as a bureau-wide program.

One component of Reclamation's history program is its oral history activity. The primary objectives of Reclamation's oral history activities are: preservation of historical data not normally available through Reclamation records (supplementing already available data on the whole range of Reclamation's history); making the preserved data available to researchers inside and outside Reclamation.

The senior historian of the Bureau of Reclamation developed and directs the oral history program. Questions, comments, and suggestions may be addressed to the senior historian.

Brit Allan Storey
Senior Historian
Land Resources Office (84-53000)
Policy and Administration
Bureau of Reclamation
P. O. Box 25007
Denver, Colorado 80225-0007
(303) 445-2918
FAX: (720) 544-0639
E-mail: bstorey@usbr.gov

For additional information about Reclamation's history program see: www.usbr.gov/history

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Oral History Interview
Russell Brown

This is Brit Storey, Senior Historian of the Bureau of Reclamation, speaking to Russell Brown, legislative analyst for the Bureau of Reclamation, [who][1] retired last Friday, I believe. (Brown: A week ago last Friday.) It's October the 25th, 1993. I'm in the offices of the Bureau of Reclamation in the Main Interior Building, Washington, D.C. This is tape one.

Storey: Well, Mr. Brown, would you tell me where you were born and raised?

Born and Raised in Seattle

1. Note that in the text of these interviews, as opposed to headings, information in parentheses, ( ), is actually on the tape. Information in brackets, [ ], has been added to the tape either by the editor to clarify meaning or at the request of the interviewee in order to correct, enlarge, or clarify the interview as it was originally spoken. Words have sometimes been struck out by editor or interviewee in order to clarify meaning or eliminate repetition. In the case of strikeouts, that material has been printed at 50% density to aid in reading the interviews but assuring that the struckout material is readable.

The transcriber and editor also have removed some extraneous words such as false starts and repetitions without indicating their removal. The meaning of the interview has not been changed by this editing.

Brown: Born and raised in Seattle, Washington.

Storey: And educated there?

Studied Geography at the University of Washington

Brown: Yes, I went to the University of Washington, did my undergraduate work in geography, and did work towards a master's degree, also in geography, with emphasis on civil engineering.

Storey: How can you emphasize civil engineering in geography? I don't understand how that relates.

Specialized in Cartography and Used Computers

Brown: Well, in graduate school, they were *just* beginning to use computers for mapping. And in geography, I had specialized in cartography. But computer science was being taught in the School of Civil Engineering. So I took several courses then in civil engineering in graduate school. I was still working towards a master's degree in geography, but because of the course work I did

in the Civil Engineering School, it looks a little funny on my transcript. But I can lay claim to being able to speak a little civil engineer.

Storey: But those were basically computer courses?

Worked for a Time as a Cartographer

Brown: Yes. This is back in 1961 and '62 when punching cards was very important. And of course things have progressed a lot since then and virtually all of the stuff that I learned at that time is out of date. But I went from there to being a practicing cartographer and worked for an architectural firm. I did graduate work for the Tokyo, London, and Seattle Institutes for the Blind, making Braille maps. I did some subcontracting for the Boeing Company, doing lunar models to be used for the Apollo space flight, Apollo lander simulator. And I was still associated with the graduate school at the time

when the chairman of the department, who knew that I was looking for other part-time work, had found a job with the Department of the Interior in Seattle, with an agency called the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation.

Joined the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation (BOR) where he worked on North Cascades National Park and the National Trails System

And they needed a part-time cartographer for preparing the maps for the North Cascades National Park, and also for the nationwide trail study. So I spent about six months part-time, temporary, with the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation as a cartographer. They were satisfied with my work and asked if I would like a permanent position. So I took a permanent position with the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation as a recreation resource specialist, working there in Seattle. And that began my federal career. I

had no intent at the time to work for the *federal* government. I had interviewed with the *private* sector as a cartographer. But I enjoyed the people that I had associated with during my part-time, temporary assignment, and I became convinced that the mission of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation was something that I wanted to help them pursue. So I joined them permanently.

And then during that time, one of the major goals of the Bureau was to assist the Congress and the National Park Service in establishing the North Cascades National Park. As part of that process, the Bureau did the support work for field hearings held by the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, which had jurisdiction over the legislation creating the park. Now the legislation

to establish the Park was sponsored by Senator Henry Jackson of Washington State, who was also chairman of the committee.

Assigned to Drive Senator Henry (Scoop) Jackson Around

In coming up with the assignments to assist the committee with their field hearings, my regional director put names in a hat of all the young guys, and we drew names and drew our assignments. And the name that I drew was Henry Jackson, to be his driver–pick him up at the airport, make sure that he gets to the hearings on time, and drive him around. Well, I really didn't know who the guy was that much, but I knew that he was the Chairman of the interior committee, and I worked for the Department of the Interior, so I knew that he was probably somebody fairly important. And I got my little 1963 GSA Plymouth out of the motor pool, took

it home, cleaned it out, washed it real good, and had to pick Senator Jackson up at King County Municipal Airport. He was coming in on the Bonneville airplane, Bonneville Power Administration. So I went out to pick him up, and he got off the plane. He was traveling by himself, and he had a suitcase and a soft bag. He was standing there on the runway, and I went up to him and introduced myself. I said, "Let me help you with your bags." And I was so excited that I reached down and grabbed his soft bag so hard that I pulled the handle off. He remembered then, who I was, from then on.

So I drove him around for five days. We did the various field hearings and I ran the timer for the hearings to make sure that the witnesses stayed within their agreed-upon time limit, and so on, and dropped him off.

After Two Years at the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation Was Planning to Move to the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration

Well I worked there then at the Bureau for about two years, and I was going to job-jump down to the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, which was the forerunner of EPA [Environmental Protection Agency], and at that time, was part of the Department of the Interior.

Regional Director Suggested He Work for Senator Henry (Scoop) Jackson

And my regional director, knowing that I was going to be leaving the Seattle area, went and spoke with Senator Jackson, and recommended to the senator that I be hired on Jackson's personal staff here in Washington, D.C., on a one-year, temporary assignment to gain a little insight into how Capitol Hill worked. Jackson agreed that he would interview me. He

certainly remembered me after having torn the handle off his suitcase!

". . . in 1967, I interviewed with the senator and he said that I should go ahead and take that job with the Federal Water and Pollution Control Administration for one year . . . and then to join his personal staff in Washington for one year, and then go back with the Executive [Branch]. . . ."

So in 1967, I interviewed with the senator and he said that I should go ahead and take that job with the Federal Water and Pollution Control Administration for one year to gain insight into how that agency worked, and then to join his personal staff in Washington for one year, and then go back with the Executive [Branch].

". . . I managed to stretch that one-year, temporary Capitol Hill assignment out for about twenty-one years. . . ."

So in August of 1968, I came back here to Washington, D.C., to work for Senator Jackson for one year. I liked the work very much, and he liked the work that I performed at his office, so

he decided to keep me on. And I managed to stretch that one-year, temporary Capitol Hill assignment out for about twenty-one years.

"In 1970, I switched from the senator's personal office to the committee staff . . ."

In 1970, I switched from the senator's personal office to the committee staff, and was, I would guess what you would describe as a "floater," doing those jobs which the chairman wanted to have done. So for a period of about two years I handled legislation relating to public lands, wild and scenic rivers, wilderness areas, and related issues.

Assigned to Work for Dan Dreyfus in 1973 on the Water and Power Subcommittee

And then in 1973, the makeup of the Committee was changed and I was assigned to work for a guy named Dan Dreyfus who at that time was the staff director for the Water and

Power Subcommittee, which had jurisdiction over the Bureau of Reclamation.

"I had been familiar with the activities of the Bureau [of Reclamation] from some of the work that I had done when I was with the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation. . . ."

I had been familiar with the activities of the Bureau from some of the work that I had done when I was with the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation. One of the Bureau's activities was to assist Reclamation in planning for recreation use at reservoirs and water projects. And during the time I had been with the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, I had done some planning-related work at proposed Bureau projects, so I knew what the Bureau of Reclamation did, I was impressed with the Bureau as an agency, and I took that impression with me, then, when I went to work for the Water and Power Subcommittee on the Senate Interior Committee. I had a

shakedown cruise with Dreyfus, who's probably the smartest man I have ever met–certainly well organized.

I became ". . . the staff director for the Subcommittee on Water and Power. . . . scheduling of legislation . . . analysis of legislation, preparation of Committee reports, interpretation of the legislation, drafting, and so on. When I say "staff director for the Subcommittee," that's pretty fast and loose with the term, because . . . It was a one-man operation. . . ."

And at the end of about a year, Dreyfus was promoted to be deputy staff director for the Interior Committee, and I assumed, then, the responsibility as the staff director for the Subcommittee on Water and Power. I was responsible for scheduling of legislation, related analysis of legislation, preparation of Committee reports, interpretation of the legislation, drafting, and so on. When I say "staff director for the Subcommittee," that's pretty fast and loose with

the term, because there was no staff except me. It was a one-man operation. And the person that was in charge had to do everything, from pouring water and sharpening pencils and making sure that the name tags were there at the hearings, to the actual drafting of legislation and review. You made presentations before the subcommittee or the full committee. You negotiated with members of the Executive Branch or with the other senators and congressmen that may have had an interest in the legislation.

Kept on the Subcommittee by Senator Jim McClure When the Republicans Took over the Senate in 1980

So I served on that subcommittee until 1980, because following the election of 1980, the Senate changed from Democrat to Republican. And when that happened, the Democrats lost their staffing capability, lost control of the

committee, and lost their budget. So I was going to start looking for work elsewhere, because I'd worked for the Democrats for twelve years, and they couldn't keep me on any more, when I was approached by the *new* chairman, a Republican, Senator Jim McClure from Idaho, who asked me to stay on the committee in the same capacity as working for the majority. And I stayed there then from 1981 until '86, working for McClure and the Republicans.

In 1986 Senator Bennett Johnston Kept Him on a Subcommittee Staff When the Senate Went Democratic Again

Then there was another election, and the Senate changed back from Republican back to Democrat, and once again I was preparing to look for work off of the Hill, when Senator Bennett Johnston approached me. He was going to be the new chairman, and he asked me then to

stay in the capacity of majority staff, working with the Water and Power Subcommittee–same position I held.

"This is a *little* unusual. I know of one other Senate staff person who stayed in the majority during those changeovers, and that's David Gwaltney with the Senate Appropriations Committee. . . ."

This is a *little* unusual. I know of one other Senate staff person who stayed in the majority during those changeovers, and that's David Gwaltney with the Senate Appropriations Committee. So I'm not sure whether it was because of my professionalism, or my knowledge of the subject, but I was retained in the majority capacity.

In 1988 Used the Ramspeck Act to Move to Reclamation in the Executive Branch

In *1988*, although there was not an election, the Committee reorganized, and I took advantage of the Ramspeck Act, which provides

for moving congressional staff to the Executive Branch, and moved down here then to the Department of the Interior, coming in with the Bureau of Reclamation, I believe on March 1st, 1989.

". . . when I got here, they didn't know what do to with me, because certainly I was not a creature of the Executive Branch . . ."

And *that's* how I got to the Bureau! And of course when I got here, they didn't know what do to with me, because certainly I was not a creature of the Executive Branch any more. I was not a bureaucrat, I was not a political employee. I was retained in a career position– not well-trained to work *within* a bureaucracy, having operated a one-man shop for maybe twenty years. And Dale Duvall was the Commissioner at the time–put me to work with a guy named John Anderson, a long-time Bureau

employee, who I had known previously, and in fact I had known many of the Bureau's people in my capacity as subcommittee staff.

Went to Work for John Anderson at Reclamation

So I came down to work for John Anderson, and they weren't really sure what the heck they could do with me, so John put me to work analyzing legislation and reviewing correspondence and checking over witness statements and so on.

". . . reassigned then to work for Paul Holtz in the Office of Congressional Affairs. . . ."

Duvall left, Dennis Underwood became Commissioner, there was *quite* a change in the front office as far as moving people around, and I was reassigned then to work for Paul Holtz in the Office of Congressional Affairs. And that's when I got the title "legislative analyst."

Storey: What does a legislative analyst do?

"I served as a legislative draftsman and reviewer.

I would analyze the impact of legislation–and this is draft legislation . . ."

Brown: What does a legislative analyst do? Well, I think it was kind of a made-up title, to tell you the truth. They wanted me around at the front corridor, because of my knowledge of Capitol Hill and my association with various and sundry people that the Bureau depended upon for legislation and for budget. Also, I had a good working knowledge of the legislative process and how things would happen. So as far as formal duties were concerned, I served as a legislative draftsman and reviewer. I would analyze the impact of legislation–and this is draft legislation, not stuff that's been signed into law. And I would convey my views to Underwood or whoever else was interested in what I thought was happening with this stuff. Occasionally he would seek my advice and counsel as to how to

proceed with Capitol Hill or with various members of the committee or members of the House and Senate. And I spent about two years here shuffling paper and being of all proper assistance, helping out as best I could, occasionally speaking to groups on behalf of the Bureau and representing the Bureau on the Hill–but primarily a paper-shuffling operation. It was very pleasant, and I *liked* the people that I worked with. You know, I was very fortunate. Not many people can get up in the morning every day and spend the day with their best friends, and I was able to do that. I really enjoyed the time while I was here.

". . . with the changeover then to Dan Beard . . . I was offered the choice of going to Denver to a made-up job, or an early retirement . . ."

And then as you know, with the changeover then to Dan Beard, and this

administration, I was offered the choice of going to Denver to a made-up job, or an early retirement, and I chose the early retirement.

Storey: No, I didn't know that.

Brown: Oh yes! I was offered a job in Denver, and when I called up the person that I would have been reporting to in Denver, he had never even heard about it. And in fact, they didn't write the job description for the Denver job until, oh, some time after I had been offered the job.

Storey: Who was it that you would have been reporting to?

Brown: Terry Lynott.

Storey: Okay, so the policy side of ACRM [Assistant Commissioner–Resources Management]?

Brown: Yes. And who knows how long *that* will be in existence? I don't know. But looking at a choice of staying around here or going to Denver, and

knowing that Denver probably is facing quite a reshuffle again, I didn't think it would be wise on my part to go out there. So I thought to myself, "Well I'd probably end up going out to Denver and then the Denver Office would be reorganized and I'd be shuffled off someplace else again." And I only had two-and-a-half years to go to age fifty-five anyway, so I figured, what the heck, pull the plug and get out.

Storey: With your experience on the Water and Power Subcommittee, and the [Senate] ~~House~~ Interior and Insular Affairs Committee wasn't it?

Brown: Well, I was with the Senate.

Storey: Okay, on the Senate side, did you know Mr. Beard?

Previously Knew Dan Beard

Brown: Oh yes! For years!

Storey: Throughout these years?

Brown: Oh yes, indeed.

Storey: Of course he was on the House side.

Brown: That's right.

Storey: How do those two sets of committees interrelate with one another?

The House and Senate Committees Often Had an Adversarial Relationship

Brown: Often it was an adversarial relationship.

Storey: Why would that be?

". . . I worked for people that had a different philosophy. Dan, of course, worked for George Miller, a self-proclaimed critic of the Bureau of Reclamation. . . ."

Brown: Well, because And I worked most of the time for people who were very supportive of the traditional Bureau mission. And so quite often we would find ourselves at opposite sides of the table, dealing with issues.

How the Subcommittee Changed When Bill Bradley Became Chair

And I like to think that I served the people that *I*

worked for, quite well, because most of the legislation went through the way the Senate *wanted* it to go, and not the way that the House did. That is, until I had a subcommittee chairman, Bill Bradley, from New Jersey, and he was more in tune with George Miller's vision for the Bureau.

Storey: And when did Bradley come in?

Brown: '86. That was the changeover from Republican to Democrat in '86, and then Bradley became subcommittee chairman.

Storey: Okay. Let's go back and talk, if it's alright, about Scoop Jackson. You said "Henry," I believe.

Senator Henry (Scoop) Jackson

Brown: Well, yes, his name was Henry Jackson. I very rarely called him "Scoop," and why, I don't know. He was always "Henry" Jackson.

Storey: Did you ever happen to deal with the cultural resource side of things when you were on that subcommittee? I know both Mr. Jackson and Mr. McClure were very active supporters of that program.

Brown: Please define for me what you consider to be "cultural resource."

Storey: Well, the federal historic preservation program, archaeology and history and that sort of thing.

Brown: No, not really. Occasionally there would be legislation where you know that you were going into an area where you had to do a lot of cultural work and archaeological work and so on. And there was one particular project–as I recall, I think it was in Eastern Washington or in Idaho–called Marmes Man.

Marmes Rock Shelter

Storey: Yes, the Marmes Rock Shelter site.

Brown: Yes. And Jackson was very strongly supportive of the work that was done there. That one I do recall. There was another area having to do with an Indian tribe or Indian archaeology.

Ozette Site

And there was some archaeological work to be done at an Indian [village site] ~~remains~~ on the coast of Washington.[2] Jackson was *very* supportive of that effort. He had a good appreciation of history, a little bit like Harry Truman in that he was a *good* amateur historian, and was a student of the past–certainly a student of actions in the Senate. He wasn't, perhaps, as enthusiastic of a Senate historian as is Senator [Robert C.] Byrd [of West Virginia], but Jackson was well aware of precedents and activities.

"He was *very* difficult to work for, because he had such a keen institutional memory, and such a

2. The Ozette Site on the Makah Reservation–a prehistoric coastal site covered by a mud slide while occupied.

good memory of things that had happened. . . ."

He was *very* difficult to work for, because he had such a keen institutional memory, and such a *good* memory of things that had happened. For a young staff guy to go in and try to tell Henry Jackson what was going on was *really* "teaching Granny how to suck eggs." But he was *nice* about it. He had a very, very easy-going way about it. And you'd go in and you'd explain to him what you thought would be a new issue.

"So basically what you learned from Jackson was to go back and look at what has happened before– before you make your current judgements. . . ."

And after you got done with your presentation, he'd kind of chuckle and say, "Well, in 1947 . . . ." and then he'd give you chapter and verse about what you thought was a new issue, and you'd find out that it was an old issue and that he had addressed it, and the Congress had

addressed the question years and years ago. But he did it in a very nice way. So basically what you learned from Jackson was to go back and look at what has happened before– before you make your current judgements. And he was a *very* good teacher, very good teacher. And I *really* enjoyed working for him.

"I think the *worst* thing that Henry Jackson would *ever* say about a person was that they had no honor. And if they had no honor, if they lied, that was a terrible thing in Jackson's eyes. . . ."

[Henry Jackson was] very much of a western gentleman. I think the *worst* thing that Henry Jackson would *ever* say about a person was that they had no honor. And if they had no honor, if they lied, that was a terrible thing in Jackson's eyes. And of course, you know, Mark Twain said, "I never lie. I have enough trouble remembering the truth." I think that holds true for anybody, certainly, that works on the Hill.

You can say, "I can't tell you," but you don't lie, because the stuff always comes back to you.

Storey: And did Jackson, to your knowledge, conduct all of his business the way he conducted business with you?

Brown: Yes.

Storey: So he was difficult to work for in the sense that he knew so much about the *job*, the institution . . .

Brown: That's right. Sometimes you wondered if you were really making any contribution at all. You know the Senate runs late at night quite often, and the staff would hang around in Jackson's office: seven o'clock, seven-thirty, ten o'clock sometimes. And he used to always come back and send everybody home. He'd say, "I've been here a long time. I know how to get to the floor. You go home and spend time with your family."

Very nice guy to work for, very good guy. And I think that you'd find that kind of a reaction from *all* of the people that were his staff. He adopted a very paternal view towards the young people that were on his staff. A lot of them, of course, young kids fresh out of school. He always liked to hire young people and teach them. He would have made a very, very good teacher–and in fact, he *was* a good teacher all the time.

Storey: What was his training, do you know?

Brown: He was a lawyer, but he had grown up under fairly tough circumstances during the Depression. He worked his way through school and waited tables, and had been a county prosecutor and then had run for the Congress in 1940, and been elected to the House of Representatives.

". . . he'd been a very common working guy. He'd had a newspaper route when he was a kid, and

identified very closely with common ordinary people. . . ."

But he'd been a very common working guy. He'd had a newspaper route when he was a kid, and identified very closely with common ordinary people.

Storey: And it sounds to me as if even though he was difficult, in one sense, to work for, he was sort of an enlightened. . . .

END OF SIDE 1, TAPE 1. OCTOBER 25, 1993.
BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE 1. OCTOBER 25, 1993.

Storey: . . . and do your absolute best for him, because he brought that out in you?

Brown: Oh yeah! Yeah, he was somewhat of a father figure, you know, to a lot of people. There were others that worked on his staff back in the 60s and 70s who I know today view his memory with *great* respect. He was a *very* good guy to work for.

Storey: You mentioned earlier that the people you worked for were sort of traditional westerners in support of the old style . . .

Brown: Bureau of Reclamation. Oh yes.

Storey: Could you talk more about that with him, please? He liked water development, or what?

". . . Jackson primarily wanted to provide a way by which people could earn a living, and one of the ways of doing that in the West in the U.S. was the development of resources. He was *very* concerned about economic matters, people being able to have jobs. . . ."

Brown: Well Jackson primarily wanted to provide a way by which people could earn a living, and one of the ways of doing that in the West in the U.S. was the development of resources. He was *very* concerned about economic matters, people being able to have jobs. I guess you'd call him a "lunch bucket Democrat"–very traditional, strong ties with labor, strong ties with–I hate the phrase–"working class," but with people that

wanted to work for a living. And he saw water resources development in the western states as being a key element in allowing people to earn a living. And it delivered jobs and stability. You can go into agricultural areas in the West where you have this boom and bust sort of operation, because it's dependent upon variable rainfall. I like to think of the Dakotas, for example: You can have three good growing seasons dryland farming in the Dakotas, and then you'll have five years of drought. With an irrigation project and assured water supply, you won't get rich, but at least it will be stable. And that stability is very, very important to communities and to families. Jackson saw that. He saw this as just one key element.

"He was also responsible for North Cascades National Park. He was the first recipient of the John Muir Award from the Sierra Club. . . ."

He was also responsible for North Cascades National Park. He was the first recipient of the John Muir Award from the Sierra Club.

"He was a leading advocate . . . "a balanced approach" towards resources; a strong believer in [the] Wilderness System, Wild and Scenic Rivers, national recreation areas, national parks, and yet he was also a strong supporter of water resource development. And that's a very difficult position to be in. . . ."

He was a leading advocate–I hate the term, again–"a balanced approach" towards resources; a strong believer in [the] Wilderness System, Wild and Scenic Rivers, national recreation areas, national parks, and yet he was also a strong supporter of water resource development. And that's a very difficult position to be in. It was very even-handed.

". . . field hearings for the North Cascades National Park, he would have the logging communities speaking out against the park, and he would have the environmental and preservationist communities speaking out in support of the park, and he had to make the

decision of whether or not in fact the park should be established . . ."

I can remember when I accompanied him on those field hearings for the North Cascades National Park, he would have the logging communities speaking out against the park, and he would have the environmental and preservationist communities speaking out in support of the park, and he had to make the decision of whether or not in fact the park should be established, in light of the different viewpoints. And it was not an easy task. The people who know the least about a subject probably have the easiest time making a decision. And it's the people who are well informed who realize fully the consequences of their actions, who have the hardest time. Jackson was *always* well informed. I won't say that he agonized over decisions, but he was well aware of the

consequences *before* he made a decision. And that's a difficult task. I think that was in the fields of natural resources as well as in his foreign activities and defense-related actions. They were very careful, very calculated decisions.

Storey: How did he go about informing himself?

Brown: He was a great listener, and a prolific reader. When they had hearings, you never had to nudge him to stay awake. He was *always* right on the mark, paying attention to the witnesses. He would read the memos, confer with knowledgeable people, and he was a great student of, as I said, history. A very knowledgeable guy. He just would accumulate all of this knowledge and wisdom before he made a decision. He was very good. He was a careful man, also. A great guy to work for.

Storey: How did he dress? What were his personal habits like?

Senator Jackson's Clothing Preferences

Brown: Well, he made life pretty simple. For his business dress, he probably had eight, virtually identical, dark suits–dark blue, dark grey– maybe ten pairs of black wingtips, and all his shirts were white shirts, long-sleeved, and conservative ties. And you could probably walk into his closet with your eyes shut and come out looking just fine, completely matched, very conservative. And in the off hours, comfortable old khakis and a moth-eaten sweater, maybe, and loafers. But he really didn't have time to be worrying about what necktie and what shirt and what suit. He got rid of that particular problem very quickly. Everything was just the same, and it came out of the closet just the same.

Storey: Did he have any personal habits or anything that were interesting? I know one guy was telling me he could hear his supervisor coming on weekends, because he played the harmonica.

"His whole life was the Senate. And that's what he did. . . ."

Brown: I think Jackson may have been tone deaf. I remember one time he talked about not really wanting to go see the Bolshoi Ballet and see "a bunch of Commies jumping around in their underwear." His whole life was the Senate. And that's what he did. He was a fly fisherman, upon occasion. Was not a golfer. I don't think he learned how to drive a car until he was in his forties. But his goal, his whole life's meaning, was his service in the Congress and as a public servant. And he really took *seriously*, the term "public servant," in describing his own job.

"It was very important to him that he was paid by

the taxpayers, and he was sent to Washington not only to represent his constituents, but also to *think* and make decisions on their behalf. This is a significant point of difference amongst elected public officials. I suspect that quite a few members simply vote the way the polls go. . . ."

It was very important to him that he was paid by the taxpayers, and he was sent to Washington not only to represent his constituents, but also to *think* and make decisions on their behalf. This is a significant point of difference amongst elected public officials. I suspect that quite a few members simply vote the way the polls go. And they say to themselves, "Well, I'm elected to represent the people who put me in office, and I will simply do their bidding." That's an easy way out. Jackson, on the other hand, I think had the view that people elected him not necessarily to do simply what they want done, but to do that which *he* thought was best. So he didn't take polls. To my knowledge, he never sent out a

district newsletter or a *district* questionnaire, or a *district* mass mailing. In his view, the people in Washington State or in his old congressional district had sent him to Washington to think and to make the hard decisions.

Storey: That *is* different than the way a lot of politicians operate.

Brown: That is *quite* different than the way a lot of these guys act. And I think he was very well-respected for it.

Storey: And when he was making those decisions, do you remember any in particular where he was supporting Reclamation projects or opposing Reclamation projects or anything like that?

Senator Jackson and Reclamation

Senator Jackson and Floyd Dominy Had Some Issues

Brown: He was generally supportive of Reclamation. Now, you'll have to go talk to somebody else on

this particular point, because I wasn't around at the time, and so everything that I'm going to say now is strictly hearsay: But apparently when Floyd Dominy was commissioner, he came up with the idea of diverting water from the Columbia River down into the Southwest: Southern California or dumping it over in the Colorado and letting it head south. And Jackson found out about this and was *adamantly* opposed to it, and there was a little bit of a running gun battle then between Floyd Dominy and Henry Jackson on *this particular issue*. And yet Jackson would be very supportive of the Reclamation program in general, and was supportive of specific project authorizations and projects in the State of Washington. However, like I said, apparently there was this historical gun battle between Dominy and Henry Jackson.

But you'd have to check with somebody else.

Storey: That would probably be Mr. Dreyfus?

Brown: Oh, yes, I would say that was Dreyfus, because Dreyfus was with the Bureau of Reclamation at the time. Dreyfus probably was the smartest man that Floyd Dominy had working for him, and was privy to *all* of this stuff.

Storey: You don't remember any specific projects that Mr. Jackson supported?

Brown: Oh dear! you name anything in the State of Washington that was authorized, yeah, he supported it. Chief Joe Extension, Oroville, Tonasket, Columbia Basin . . . on and on and on and on.

Storey: You mentioned an archaeological site. Was that the Ozette site on the Makah Reservation?

Brown: Yes.

Storey: Were you involved in the National Historic Trails

Program?

National Historic Trails Program

Brown: Well, yeah, I was involved in that right from the beginning, because that was some of the first work that I did for the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation. But when I got up to the Hill, I was not working on any of the related legislation, so yeah, I knew *of* it, I was personally supportive of it. I think Let's see. Pacific Crest Trail became part of the nationwide system. And when I was working at the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, I had made a recommendation that they try to do a Pacific Coastal Trail as well, but I don't think anything ever came of that. Of course that was, what, almost thirty years ago now.

Storey: Well, I'm particularly interested: You were on the Water and Power Subcommittee, and you had Senator Jackson, a Democrat, for a boss, at first.

And then it became Republican Senator McClure from Idaho.

Brown: Right.

Storey: How did their views on the Bureau of Reclamation and water development vary from one another–or did they?

Democratic and Republican Attitudes Toward Reclamation Were "virtually identical"

Brown: They were virtually identical. They may have had different styles, obviously, but . . . You know the water business is kind of a funny thing out in the western states: Here you have a traditional liberal Democrat, supportive of water resources business; and McClure, of course, was characterized as a conservative Republican, and yet he was also strongly supportive of the Bureau's traditional mission. So from my *own* standpoint, in the way that the committee operated, with regard to the Bureau and the

program, there was virtually no change.

". . . you also have to understand that there had not been a significant Bureau project authorized since 1968. . . ."

Now then, you also have to understand that there had not been a significant Bureau project authorized since 1968. That was Central Arizona Project, Colorado River Basin Project Act. That was the *last* big Bureau effort. You can only build Hoover Dam once. You can only build Columbia Basin Project, Grand Coulee Dam, *once*.

"And let's face it, the Bureau had won. . . . if it had not been for the Bureau of Reclamation, the West would not be the way it is today. . . . They could declare victory. So it was not so much getting new projects authorized, as it was *maintaining* the level of Bureau support for the western economies . . ."

And let's face it, the Bureau had won. I think it's one of our great literary critics, Mark Reisner[3]

3. Author of *Cadillac Desert: The American West and its Disappearing Water*. New York: Viking, 1986; reprint, New York: (continued...)

has said, that if it had not been for the Bureau of Reclamation, the West would not be the way it is today. I think that's very true. So the Bureau had *won*. They could declare victory. So it was not so much getting new projects authorized, as it was *maintaining* the level of Bureau support for the western economies, making sure that the projects did in fact perform, they *did* deliver water, they *did* generate power, they *did* maintain the economy. That was the kind of actions that we were more concerned with during the 70s and the 80s.

". . . some people that were highly critical of the Bureau's programs. And you saw that come to a head during the Carter Administration and the famous "hit list," and the attempt on the part of the Department of the Interior to go back and try to enforce the one hundred and sixty acre limitation and the residency requirements . . ."

There were some people that were highly

3. (...continued)
Penguin Books, 1993.

critical of the Bureau's programs. And you saw that come to a head during the Carter Administration and the famous "hit list," and the attempt on the part of the Department of the Interior to go back and try to enforce the one hundred and sixty acre limitation and the residency requirements for Bureau projects. Traditionally the Bureau projects had been a focus of opposition for the environmental community and the Carter Administration, of course, hired a lot of the people, as I recall, out of the environmental community. They took a good shot at both the Bureau and the Corps of Engineers.

"Then with the Reagan Administration . . . gained a very strong support from western water interests. But you have to listen to them closely . . . 'We have to get western water resource projects moving again.' . . . that was a nice statement to make, but really there *were* no projects . . . to get moving again. And I also knew that if people *did* want to move projects in the

Reagan Administration, they would have to do them with their own money. . . .'

Then with the Reagan Administration, Secretary [James] Watt and officials at the department, capitalized on the Carter Administration's inept handling of the resource development programs, and gained a very strong support from western water interests. But you have to listen to them closely, now speaking of the Reagan Administration. I remember [secretary] Jim Watt addressed the annual convention of the National Water Resources Association out in Salt Lake City, and he brought the roomful of people to their feet by saying, "We have to get western water resource projects moving again." And I was standing in the back of the room, and that was a nice statement to make, but really there *were* no projects, no *new* projects, to get moving again. And I also knew

that if people *did* want to move projects in the Reagan Administration, they would have to do them with their own money. You had an Office of Management and Budget which traditionally has opposed public works projects in general, and *really hated* the Bureau of Reclamation programs, that were in charge in the Reagan Administration.

". . . you had a very peculiar alliance forming, and it had been evident during the Carter Administration, of the environmental community and the budget cutters. . . "

And you had a very peculiar alliance forming, and it had been evident during the Carter Administration, of the environmental community and the budget cutters. And the environmentalists would come in and say, "Well, it may very well be true that these are bad projects, but really you need to cut these projects because of budget problems." And for a short

period of time there, almost all of the National Wildlife Federation statements on authorizing legislation would start with, "You can't spend federal money in these times of deficits," that "Bureau projects were budget-busters," and so on.

"this is hyperbola and rhetoric and bullshit because a hundred-million-dollar Bureau of Reclamation project is not a significant contributor to a trillion-dollar deficit. . . ."

And this is hyperbola and rhetoric and bullshit because a hundred-million-dollar Bureau of Reclamation project is not a significant contributor to a trillion-dollar deficit. And it was smoke and mirrors, but it was a tool that project opponents could use in trying to make sure that no Bureau projects were built.

". . . one of the best quotes I know is that the Bureau's budget is "decimal dust," and has no consequence when it comes to the national debt or deficit spending. But it was a good *angle* that the environmentalists could use in trying to kill

projects. . . ."

Well, one of the best quotes I know is that the Bureau's budget is "decimal dust," and has no consequence when it comes to the national debt or deficit spending. But it was a good *angle* that the environmentalists could use in trying to kill projects.

". . . you still have the same people over at OMB [Office of Management and Budget], I think, that have worked there since the Eisenhower Administration, that *always* wanted to cut public spending anyway. And the Bureau, of course, is a perfect target because they've been so successful. . . ."

And you still have the same people over at OMB [Office of Management and Budget], I think, that have worked there since the Eisenhower Administration, that *always* wanted to cut public spending anyway. And the Bureau, of course, is a perfect target because they've been so successful. They're very visible, they build big

dams and make big projects and make things happen. It makes them an easy target. And at the same time, they were losing their political support. Certainly that is evident in the House of Representatives.

". . . we talk about the western U.S. and the wide open spaces and so on, but the western U.S. is *the* most urbanized area in the United States, and has been for probably twenty-five or thirty years or more. . . ."

You got to remember that we talk about the western U.S. and the wide open spaces and so on, but the western U.S. is *the* most urbanized area in the United States, and has been for probably twenty-five or thirty years or more. The majority of population in the western U.S. lives in cities, simply because the rest of the country is so damned inhospitable. Of *course* people in Nevada live in Reno and Carson City and Las Vegas, because there *isn't* any other place to *live*

in Nevada. Of course people in California live in the major cities, and still do. Your *rural* areas, where there are *large* rural populations, are in Pennsylvania, New York, and Ohio. It's a gentle countryside, and you can live in the countryside in that part of the United States. In the western United States, you *can't*. So finally, it is becoming extremely evident, certainly in the House of Representatives, that they represent cities.

". . . most of the . . . opposition to Bureau projects that you find amongst westerners is from congressmen from the urban areas. In the Senate, where a member represents an entire state, you would find the opposition to Bureau projects coming from *eastern* senators. . . ."

That's why most of the . . . opposition to Bureau projects that you find amongst westerners is from congressmen from the urban areas. In the Senate, where a member represents an entire state, you would find the opposition to Bureau

projects coming from *eastern* senators. Western senators have to represent the entire state, including the rural areas: even though there are not a lot of people in the rural areas, they still represent them. So a senator, you will find–and that was evident . . . . Let's see, let's find a good one. (pause)

Grazing Fees Issues in the Congress

Well, although it doesn't relate to the Bureau, this kind of representation is evident in what's going on in the Congress right now on the grazing fees issue. You will find very little support for the cattlemen and the users of the public domain for economic reasons, in the House of Representatives–because there are very few representatives from those kinds of areas, because all the people are in the cities. You find the support for the cattlemen and the miners and

the users of the public domain in the Senate, because those guys represent the whole state. And you can see that on the vote tally between the House and the Senate on the grazing issues that's going on right now.

So, okay, I've gone through now that, yes indeed, the support for the Bureau's traditional programs has diminished and you see it more in the House of Representatives than you do in the Senate. But the change is also coming about in the Senate. And you can look at California and Washington state as good indicators. The two new senators from California, [Dianne] Feinstein and [Barbara] Boxer have an urban base–Boxer more so than Feinstein. Patty Murray, the new senator from Washington State, has an urban base. And they are not as supportive of the rural issues. And you can see that in their voting

pattern. So you see this split now: traditional western support, even in the Senate now, is diminishing.

". . . that doesn't mean that much to the Bureau anyway, because the last big project was authorized in '68. For twenty years anybody that has watched the Bureau *knows* that the mission, whether or not stated, has in fact, changed. . . ."

But really, that doesn't mean that much to the Bureau anyway, because the last big project was authorized in '68. For twenty years anybody that has watched the Bureau *knows* that the mission, whether or not stated, has in fact, changed.

"The Bureau is becoming something like a utility. It provides goods and services. It'll store water, deliver water, generate electricity, give it to the power marketing administrations for sale and distribution. It has a large physical plant that it must maintain if it is going to provide those goods and services, just like any other big utility. . . ."

The Bureau is becoming something like a utility. It provides goods and services. It'll store water,

deliver water, generate electricity, give it to the power marketing administrations for sale and distribution. It has a large physical plant that it must maintain if it is going to provide those goods and services, just like any other big utility. The construction, the large big dam-building era is over. I've said that in speeches since about 1974 or '75. Other people have said the same thing, and it's not news to anybody as far as I'm concerned.

"The handwriting was on the wall in 1902. You're going to go out, you're going to help settle the West, and then you'll be done. And that part of the Bureau's mission is over. . . ."

The handwriting was on the wall in 1902. You're going to go out, you're going to help settle the West, and then you'll be done. And that part of the Bureau's mission is over. It's not good, it's not bad, it is simply a fact of life. The Bureau itself, as an entity, as a bureaucracy or

whatever you want to call it, has been slow to recognize that.

"five or six proposals over the past twenty years as to what the Bureau would do for a living, and every single time they always say, 'Well, we're not going to build dams any more,' but they don't organize in such a way as to reflect that decision. This time I think it'll happen. I think Dan Beard will be able to carry through a major reorganization of the Bureau. . . ."

People give it lip service on occasion. I think there's been, what, five or six proposals over the past twenty years as to what the Bureau would do for a living, and every single time they always say, "Well, we're not going to build dams any more," but they don't organize in such a way as to reflect that decision. This time I think it'll happen. I think Dan Beard will be able to carry through a major reorganization of the Bureau. I think he has the political support to do it. And it will be probably a very painful process. . . .

END SIDE 2, TAPE 1. OCTOBER 25, 1993.

BEGIN SIDE 1, TAPE 2. OCTOBER 25, 1993.

Storey: This is tape two of an interview by Brit Storey with Russell Brown on October the 25th, 1993.

"There's no question that that's what needs to be done. And it *will* be painful for people that work in the Bureau. . . ."

Brown: There's no question that that's what needs to be done. And it *will* be painful for people that work in the Bureau. Families are going to have to move, people are going to have to look for work, there's going to be disruption. The Bureau should do *everything* that it possibly can to ease that transition for its employees. I don't know if they will. I really don't. It's going to be very difficult for a lot of people. If I knew a young civil engineer just getting out of college right now, I think the last place I'd advise him to go to work is the Bureau of *Reclamation–if* he wants to *build* things. On the other hand, if that individual

is of a mindset to work like a big utility, then fine, by all means, pursue a career with the Bureau. There's a *hell* of a lot of work that needs to be done, a tremendous physical plant that has to be maintained. They have to make the projects work better. The *demands* will not *diminish*–they will *only increase*. But you have a finite resource, a finite physical plant. And you're going to have to try to be able to meet new demands with the same amount of resources, and *that* is a *real* challenge. That's a lot harder to do then simply going out and *building* another project. You're going to have to use that project to meet *much* larger demands than were envisioned at the beginning. And to do that, you also have to try to maintain that economic base. And that is going to be the hardest part of all.

Central Valley Project Improvement Act, title 34 of Public Law 102-575

". . . Central Valley Improvement Act, which is basically stealing water from agriculture for environmental purposes. . . ."

You saw what happened last Congress with the so-called Central Valley Improvement Act,[4] which is basically stealing water from agriculture for environmental purposes. That is indeed an unfortunate way to try to fix the problem.

". . . it's going to be hard on the Bureau personnel. It *could* be even harder on our traditional constituency. . . ."

I mentioned that it's going to be hard on the

4. The 102nd Congress passed multipurpose water legislation signed into law–Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992, an act of October 30, 1992, Public Law 102-575. contains 40 separate titles providing for water resource projects throughout the West. Title 34, the Central Valley Project Improvement Act, mandates changes in management of the Central Valley Project, particularly for the protection, restoration, and enhancement of fish and wildlife. The act dedicated 800,000 acre-feet of water to fish and wildlife annually; implemented tiered water pricing; special efforts to restore anadromous fish populations; no new water contracts until fish and wildlife goals are achieved; no contract renewals until completion of a Programmatic environmental impact statement; terms of contracts reduced from 40 to 25years and development of a plan to increase CVP yield. Information from derived from http://www.usbr.gov/mp/cvpia/index.html at about 4:00 p.m. on Wednesday, March 31, 2010.

Bureau personnel. It *could* be even harder on our traditional constituency. We got a new crew in charge at the Bureau. Their mission should be to make that transition and the serving of additional needs as gentle a transition as possible. And what I mean here is that when I say "gentle," we do not want to disrupt local economies. We don't want to put people out of work. We want to make this transition as easy as possible for our traditional constituents.

". . . I am even more concerned about the communities and economies which depend upon Bureau projects for their livelihood. And what I find to be the most troublesome is what I perceive to be an attitude on the part of the people who are now in control of the Bureau of Reclamation that it is an opportunity for revenge. . . ."

It's going to be tough on Bureau employees, but I am even more concerned about the communities and economies which depend upon Bureau projects for their livelihood. And what I find to

be the most troublesome is what I perceive to be an attitude on the part of the people who are now in control of the Bureau of Reclamation that it is an opportunity for revenge. "We're in charge, and by God, these people are going to *get* it." It's an attitude that because communities and the farmers and power consumers have received subsidies in the past–whether real or imagined–because there have been environmental abuses by Bureau projects, both construction and operation–that now there *will* be this transition, and rather than making it as gentle a transition as possible, that we're "out to get them." And that is a very sad misuse of government power and responsibility. It doesn't have to be that way, but I see it both on the part of certain administration officials, as well as certain elected members in the House and Senate. And it's really a sad

thing. I *hope* it doesn't happen. The way things are going, they may only have three years to do it in. But once you destroy the economic foundation for these areas, I don't know how long it would take to try to put it back together again. You know, the feeling of revenge, that I have seen, makes me glad I'm out.

Storey: Could you tell me, if at all, how you were involved with, how you became aware of the Carter Administration's hit list? I believe that was when you were on the Senate staff working with Senator Jackson.

Carter Administration "Hit List"

Brown: That's correct, that's right.

Storey: And what impacts that had on your committee and the thinking of the senator and so on?

Brown: Well, the hit list . . . Oh dear, I haven't thought about that, really, in-depth, for quite some time.

~~Of course it was sprung deal. And as I recall, I think that our current commissioner had a significant role in coming up with the hit list. There was a White House domestic counsel, and Dan was connected, I think, with the Carter Administration at the time. That was before he came to Interior. Well no, I don't remember.~~

Anyway, from a political standpoint, it was mishandled. I don't think they'd even advised Secretary Andrus that they were going to release the hit list. It was put out by . . . ~~Oh dear, Kitty . . . All I remember is first names Kitty and Kathy—two ladies that were working, I believe, on the White House Domestic Council, or played significant roles in coming up with the hit list.~~ And of course the congressional response was outrage, and it didn't take very long until action was taken which basically took the hit list and

shoved it up OMB's ass. It was a *wonderful* unifying piece of business. If it had been handled correctly, I think the Carter Administration would have, by and large, succeeded with their hit list. But it was a question of arrogance.[5] And I see the same kind of arrogance now surfacing, to some extent, with the Department of the Interior on the question of grazing fees . . and also on some of the things that will happen with the Bureau of Reclamation, what they will propose.

"There is always an adversarial relationship between Capitol Hill, the Congress, and the Executive. And it's built into the system, and I think it's a good way to have it. . . ."

This is not surprising. There is always an adversarial relationship between Capitol Hill, the Congress, and the Executive. And it's built into the system, and I think it's a good way to have it.

5. Dan Beard has also been interviewed for Reclamation's oral history program, and he presents another view of the "hit list."

The hit list itself provided hours of glee, as I recall, because it was so poorly done. You had a bunch of amateurs who were going to pick on western water projects–and don't forget it also included a lot of Corps [of Engineers] stuff too–but who were now, quote, "in charge," unquote, and "by God, this is the Executive Branch and we can *do* these things." And the Congress had a wonderful time telling them that they couldn't.

Acreage Limitation, the Carter Administration, and Reclamation

The same thing happened shortly afterwards with the Carter Administration in regard to the acreage limitation on Bureau of Reclamation projects. And that one was *really* a lot of fun. It was so poorly handled that ultimately . . . Reclamation reform had quite the opposite effect of what the reformers had started out to do.

Let's see, okay, back in the mid-70s to late 70s: it was well recognized that there were abuses of the acreage limitation, that the program was not working the way the Congress had intended it to do. The law of acreage limitation was being circumvented by leasing arrangements [in such a way] that the benefits of the subsidy from the Reclamation program were accruing to certain individuals in excess of what they should have. And I was working at the time, of course, on the Subcommittee on Water and Power. My counterpart on the House [side] was a guy named Jim Casey, who was a retired Bureau of Reclamation employee. My staff director, who was Dreyfus, was also [formerly] a Reclamation employee. I think that they realized that the program really wasn't working right. The environmental community, and I'll call them

"social reformers," also objected to the way that the program was operating.

"So at a *staff* level, we agreed that we were going to tackle the program, the administration of the acreage limitation. And we were going to do it basically one piece at a time. And the first bill that was considered was to provide for one hundred and sixty acre equivalency. . . . The opponents wanted a *comprehensive* review of acreage limitation–and they *got* it. They got it in spades. . . ."

So at a *staff* level, we agreed that we were going to tackle the program, the administration of the acreage limitation. And we were going to do it basically one piece at a time. And the first bill that was considered was to provide for one hundred and sixty acre equivalency. And that is, that on projects where the soils weren't good, and the growing seasons weren't very good and so on, you would provide that a farmer may actually farm and receive water on *more* than a hundred and sixty acres. That bill was killed~~, primarily~~

~~through the efforts of a guy named David Wyman [phonetic spelling]~~. The environmental community and critics of the program viewed that legislation as simply providing a method by which farmers could farm more acres and get around the hundred and sixty acre limitation. I think that myself certainly, and I think Casey and Dreyfus, viewed that effort as a way by which people could farm enough land to provide themselves with a decent living. It is true that it would have legalized abuses which had taken place. But there were damned good reasons why those abuses had taken place–people were trying to earn a living on a hundred and sixty acres of pea gravel, and they needed four hundred acres in order to provide for a decent livelihood. And it was the first effort towards a [gradual] *real* comprehensive change in the acreage limitation

program, and it was defeated. The opponents wanted a *comprehensive* all-at-once review of acreage limitation–and they *got* it. They got it in spades.

Chances are, the program still would have the hundred and sixty acre limitation with equivalency, or three twenty for a husband and wife. Instead, what they ended up with was, what, nine sixty, six forty, three twenty, and all kinds of baggage. The acreage limitation went up, what, four-fold? six-fold? something like that. If they had let the Congress proceed in an orderly fashion, issue by issue, with the acreage limitation program, rather than coming in and killing the first attempt and then going for a comprehensive, over-all changeover, they would have ended up with a program more attuned to what they had originally envisioned.

"Instead, they . . . killed the first attempt, put it over into a Republican administration, forced a comprehensive review on a *very*, very complex program, and ended up with the Rec[lamation] Reform Act of, what was it, '82?, which was a real mess. And portions of it were very poorly drafted. . . ."

Instead, they came in, killed the first attempt, put it over into a Republican administration, forced a comprehensive review on a *very*, very complex program, and ended up with the Rec[lamation] Reform Act of, what was it, '82?, which was a real mess. And portions of it were very poorly drafted. They signed into law, basically law almost impossible to administer. They tried to change, then, the mission of the Bureau of Reclamation from constructor and operator to a regulatory entity. And so far, the Bureau has done a piss poor job of administering the Rec Reform Act, because the Bureau is not a regulatory body–never was–probably never *will*

be, fully.

". . . that's what happened with the spin-off . . . trying to enforce the old acreage limitation. And that . . . backfired on the land reformers, and instead what they got was the '82 Act. And George Miller and his merry men still don't know what happened to them. . . ."

But that's what happened with the spin-off then from the Carter Administration's trying to enforce the old acreage limitation. And that ended up then, it backfired on them, it backfired on the land reformers, and instead what they got was the '82 Act. ~~And George Miller and his merry men still don't know what happened to them.~~

~~You know, sometimes he reminds me of the Red Queen, "I mean what I say. That's what it means." And he still doesn't understand what happened. (tape turned off and on for a break)~~

Brown: Acreage limitation went down the tubes simply because they handled it wrong. I was somewhat

disappointed . . . Are we off the record?

Storey: No, we're on the record. Do you want to . . .

Brown: I want to go off the record, just . . . . (tape turned off and on)

Bill Bradley and George Miller Had Similar Agendas Regarding Reclamation

The reason that I left the Hill–and this again is hearsay–but as I mentioned previously, my subcommittee chairman from 1986 to 1988 was Bill Bradley of New Jersey. And he was more in tune with George Miller as far as their feelings on the Bureau of Reclamation were concerned.

Issues Regarding a Rural Water Supply Project in South Dakota

And there was some legislation providing for the construction of a rural water supply project in South Dakota. And the goal of the legislation was to provide water in rural areas to stabilize

the livestock industry, and to provide good quality drinking water. Included in the area to be served was an Indian reservation where conditions were very, very bad. Families had to haul water in plastic jugs in the back of a pickup truck maybe ten miles, because they would have no water at their residences. So the objective then was to build basically a relatively simple project consisting of a hell of a lot of plastic pipe, taking water to scattered areas. When the bill was in the House, House Interior Committee staff met with the project sponsors and *told* them that they would have to incorporate into the legislation all of the water conservation requirements which were being proposed by the National Wildlife Federation. This had to do with high-tech toilets, very expensive plumbing fixtures, a very costly operation and maintenance

program for water conservation. And the program would also include the authority on the part of the Secretary of the Interior to turn off all of the water in the project if they found any consumer to be in violation of those National Wildlife Federation imposed standards. We're dealing with an extremely poor area–both the reservation and non-reservation–some of the poorest counties in the United States. And the House staff, as I was told, instructed these people that were the project sponsors, not only must they accept these requirements, but they must strongly endorse them. When I found out about this, I was *absolutely* dismayed. First off, I didn't think the Secretary of the Interior should have the authority to shut off a water system that served schools, hospitals, and businesses, simply because somebody down the block had failed to

install a low-flow toilet, or some kind of fancy water restrictor on the bathroom faucet. And the second thing that I objected to was the use of a public position to blackmail people into supporting something that they did not support= it wasn't their idea, and they couldn't afford it. So I basically blew the whistle on this kind of action and activity.

"I informed some people of the kind of activity that had taken place. . . . somebody called up Bill Bradley and said that he should get rid of me . . . And of course Bradley agreed. . . . And that's when I Ramspecked down to the Bureau . . ."

And I informed some people of the kind of activity that had taken place. And of course it got back to the people on the House Interior Committee, and so either Dan Beard or George Miller or somebody called up Bill Bradley and said that he should get rid of me and fire me. And of course Bradley agreed. And Bradley

went then to [John] Bennett Johnston. Ben said, "Reorganize the Committee. I want to get my own man in there," that I didn't agree with what his philosophy was on water resource projects. And that's when I Ramspecked down to the Bureau because the committee was reorganized and I had no job.

On the other hand, the project went through *without* those restrictions, and *without* the authority for the Secretary of the Interior to shut the water off.

". . . my having to go to the Bureau was a very small price to pay–to be able to get a good-quality water supply out in those rural areas. So even though it cost me my job, in retrospect, it was worth it. . . ."

And my having to go to the Bureau was a very small price to pay–to be able to get a good-quality water supply out in those rural areas. So even though it cost me my job, in retrospect, it

was worth it.

"We had two years here where Bradley was the subcommittee chairman, and George Miller was running the House subcommittee, and they *never* could figure out how bills would pass the Senate side in a form that was neither acceptable to Mr. Miller *or* to Mr. Bradley, that I would end-run *both* of them and find other members in the Senate and the House who would work for the legislation to be adopted in a workable manner. . . ."

We had two years here where Bradley was the subcommittee chairman, and George Miller was running the House subcommittee, and they *never* could figure out how bills would pass the Senate side in a form that was neither acceptable to Mr. Miller *or* to Mr. Bradley, that I would end-run *both* of them and find other members in the Senate and the House who would work for the legislation to be adopted in a workable manner.

"One of the things that I saw happening on the House side, during the 1980s, was that projects would be authorized, but I believe that they were *consciously* authorized in a form where they could not be built. And I think probably a good example would be the Animas-La Plata Project. . .

."

Another good example would be the Garrison Reformulation Act. And you can *tell* the constituents, and you can *tell* the sponsoring members, "Yes indeed, we did in fact authorize the project, but the legislative language was written in such a way that it would be virtually impossible to actually *build* the project."

Storey: How do you do that?

Brown: You just put so damned many hoops, so damned many requirements in the path of project construction, that ultimately the project sponsors can't jump through all the hoops. And the first hoop that was actually proposed on the part of the environmental community, which was adopted on projects, was a cost-sharing requirement. Here they were victims of their own beliefs. They believed that Reclamation

projects were so *bad* economically that local sponsors would never ever put up any of their own money, that Bureau projects *had* to be built with federal money.

". . . you started to see cost-sharing requirements placed in legislation. And much to the dismay of the environmental community, the local people then would come up with the local cost share. . . ."

And so you started to see cost-sharing requirements placed in legislation. And much to the dismay of the environmental community, the local people then would come up with the local cost share. Well, obviously, then that was not enough of a disincentive to prevent the project from being constructed. So then they started adding on environmental requirements and other requirements, and more cost-sharing requirements, and they *hoped* that by having a tight Reclamation Reform Act, that would

discourage people from coming in and supporting irrigation projects and so on. So it really didn't quite work, on a *lot* of the stuff. But with . . . well, Lake Andes-Wagner Project,[6] for example, is one where they authorized a project that they hoped would never be built. They put in requirements for test farms and environmental conditions and cost-sharing conditions and so on. So even though the law says [the project] ~~therein, herein~~ is authorized, the Lake Andes-Wagner Project, if you read all of the requirements in the statute, that have to be met before the project is ever constructed, it's very likely it never *will* be. The same thing happened with Garrison. The same thing happened with Animas-La Plata. So the House guys would say, "We're going to

6. The Lake Andes-Wagner Project was authorized by Title 20, the Lake Andes-Wagner/Marty I Act of 1992, of the Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992, an act of October 30, 1992, Public Law 102-575. See footnote on page 60.

authorize your project for you. These are the conditions that you *have* to meet," knowing full well that the conditions, hopefully, would be impossible to meet.

Storey: So now, if I'm understanding your correctly, you're saying that it's your impression that the House staff and the members of the House understood this?

Brown: Certainly! It was their *objective*. They knew they had to, for political reasons, would have to authorize a project. But by golly, they did the best they could to authorize then, a project which [could never be built].

END SIDE 1, TAPE 2. OCTOBER 25, 1993.
BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE 2. OCTOBER 25, 1993.

"There was–and I suspect *is*–a conscious effort to make the Bureau of Reclamation into a check-writing agency . . ."

Brown: . . . to make sure that the Bureau's role in the construction of projects would be diminished or

nonexistent. There was–and I suspect *is*–a conscious effort to make the Bureau of Reclamation into a check-writing agency, rather than a [construction] ~~constructive~~ agency.

Storey: What would we be writing checks for?

Mni Wiconi, Mid-Dakota, and Central Utah Projects

Brown: We would give people money to go build their own projects. And I'm trying to remember now which was the first project to have that philosophy. (pause) I think it was the Mni-Wiconi Project. And the next one certainly was Mid-Dakota, and definitely the Central Utah Project Reauthorization. It turns the Bureau's capacity into writing checks.

Predicts How the Loan Program Will Change

I think you will see that even more so when they finish up with what they do on the loan program. They're going to change the loan program into a

grants program, and do a straight 25 percent grant, and the locals have to come up with the 75 percent cash. So it's *definitely* a diminished role for the Bureau. But that's the philosophy, and I think it was a conscious "get the Bureau" philosophy.

"The National Wildlife Federation and a couple of other environmental groups targeted the Bureau. And it's an easy target because the political support has diminished. The traditional mission for the Bureau is gone. And there would be a decline in the Bureau anyway, so capitalize on that decline, and claim it as your victory. . . ."

The National Wildlife Federation and a couple of other environmental groups targeted the Bureau. And it's an easy target because the political support has diminished. The traditional mission for the Bureau is gone. And there would be a decline in the Bureau anyway, so capitalize on that decline, and claim it as your victory.

". . . these organizations are making the claim that because of their opposition, the Bureau is in

decline. No, it's just the way it's going to happen anyway. . . ."

To a certain extent, the environmental groups that are fighting the Bureau remind me of the rooster who crows every morning in order to make the sun come up. Well, he's making the claim that because he crows, the sun comes up; and these organizations are making the claim that because of their opposition, the Bureau is in decline. No, it's just the way it's going to happen anyway. The problem is, there are still good things that need to be done.

"There is a role for the federal government in helping people do that which they cannot do for themselves. And in the water resources business, there *are* projects where there definitely still needs to be a federal role. . . ."

There is a role for the federal government in helping people do that which they cannot do for themselves. And in the water resources business, there *are* projects where there definitely still

needs to be a federal role. While it *is* true that we're not going to be building any CAPs [Central Arizona Project] and Coulees and Shastas, there are still a lot of people out in rural areas in the western United States who would benefit materially from some kind of water resource development: rural water supplies, additional storage, or things like that. Whether that's going to be the Bureau of Reclamation or the Farmer's Home Administration, or the Corps of Engineers, you can't really say at this time. I don't know, I really don't.

Storey: I think one of the things I'd be interested in your views on, I think Assistant Secretary [Betsy] Rieke is talking about redistributing water from irrigation uses to municipal uses. I know you've already mentioned this briefly. Could you discuss that movement a little more from your

perspective?

Issues in Transferring Water from Rural to Urban Uses

Brown: Sure! I don't see any *problem* with it–if it's willing. But what I'm concerned about is a taking. You know, the Bureau of Reclamation is the "gorilla" in the water business. We have all of the major reservoirs, we have the capacity to move water. It looks good on the paper to say "we need to facilitate the transfer of water from farms to cities." I know of only one area where this is really an apparent need, and that's in southern California. You got a little schizophrenia here. Do we really want another thirty million people living in southern California? I don't think so. I don't think the environmental community wants another thirty million people living in California. But by enabling the transfer of water from ag

[agriculture] to urban uses, you *could* provide the means whereby that would actually happen. I don't think our social reformers and our environmentalists really want that to happen. However, using that idea of transferring water from agriculture to urban interests helps create an adversarial relationship between the two groups, and it makes it easier to take away support from agricultural-rural interests, by creating this split. And what you're saying is, that "You're going to loosen up the hold which agriculture has on their water, so that we can move the water to the cities."

"I don't see the urban *demand*, though. . . . So where does the water go, really? I think it will go for environmental purposes. . . ."

I don't see the urban *demand*, though. We just had, what, seven years of *horrendous* drought in California. I didn't see San Diego and

Los Angeles shutting down. I did see agricultural areas without adequate water supplies.

So where does the water go, really? I think it will go for environmental purposes. If you looked at the real result of the Central Valley Project Improvement Act [CVPIA] last Congress, the real result was 800,000 acre feet of water for environmental purposes, taken from the agricultural sector. And you saw . . . a gesture towards providing agricultural water for urban supplies. I think the ultimate effect of the C-V-P Improvement Act is water for environmental purposes, not water for cities. After all, how much water do the cities need?!

Storey: Uh-huh, they don't need nearly as much as farm [unclear].

"So what they did was cut 800,000 acre feet off the top from the ag supplies, which then

exacerbates the urban-rural relationship anyway . . ."

Brown: So what they did was cut 800,000 acre feet off the top from the ag supplies, which then exacerbates the urban-rural relationship anyway, because you just made the pie 800,000 acre feet smaller.

". . . I see the urban-ag business as creating a split in the power base to make it easier to get water for environmental purposes, and to diminish any kind of vestigial support you may have had in urban areas for rural water. . . ."

So no, I see the urban-ag business as creating a split in the power base to make it easier to get water for environmental purposes, and to diminish any kind of vestigial support you may have had in urban areas for rural water.

Storey: Well, I'm afraid we've run out of time for today.

Brown: So has the Bureau!

(Extraneous conversation removed.)

Storey: [Thank you], I appreciate it. I'd like to ask you

now if you are willing for the tapes and resulting transcripts from this oral history interview to be used by Reclamation researchers and outside researchers?

Brown: No. (tape turned off and on) I should *really* be retired in ten years, so if you could keep the lid on this stuff for a period of ten years, that would be fine.

Storey: So you would prefer that the materials not be released for ten years?

Brown: That's right.

Storey: Okay. Does that mean you're planning to go back into government at some point?

Brown: Who knows?

Storey: You don't have any plans, though?

Brown: Oh yes!

Storey: Oh you do, okay. I'm interested . . . . I started to ask you about the relationship between the House

side and the Senate side before, and we discussed one aspect of it. Another aspect I'm interested in is whether or not the subcommittees have roughly comparable jurisdictions?

Brown: Yes.

Staffing of the House and Senate Subcommittees

Storey: What I'm interested in is why does the House require, I think it's about five or six people, to do the work on *their* legislation in *their* subcommittee, while the Senate only had one person, in the form of you, doing the work on their side of the organization.

Brown: I often wondered that myself. Let's go back a little ways. When I first got there, there was one guy on the House subcommittee.

Jim Casey

That was Jim Casey. And one guy on Senate subcommittee. That was when [Wayne] Aspinall

was chairman. And then Udall became chairman on the House side and there was still only one guy on the subcommittee over there, and I was the one person on the subcommittee on the Senate side. Then when [George] Miller assumed chairmanship of the subcommittee, I believe he then had *two* people on the subcommittee: Dan Beard and Steve Lanich [phonetic spelling]. Now that Miller has assumed *chairmanship* of the committee, they have changed their organization on the House side. And to be quite frank, I don't think that they expanded the Water-Power jurisdiction at all. But it does make a convenient place for additional payrolls. I can't tell you–I don't know why. As far as I know, the Senate side is still the same–one person. And it was a reasonable workload . . . at the time.

Reclamation Legislation in and after the 100th Congress

Now, you got to understand, something funny happened. Let's see, when did I get out of there? March of '88. So that'd be the 100th Congress. I don't think a single Reclamation-related bill passed the House and Senate during the 100th Congress. The last Congress when *I* worked there, there were probably, oh, maybe half-a-dozen Reclamation-oriented pieces of legislation. And then the next full Congress after I left, there wasn't a single piece.

". . . the omnibus bill, which contained a lot of dogs and cats that had been hanging around for years . . . Traditionally, the Senate had considered Reclamation legislation one piece at a time. . . . hearings, . . . mark-up. . . . committee report . . . passed separately. . . . then the House would usually take several measures and combine them into one bill. But each measure had undergone very careful scrutiny. In the last Congress, you saw a tremendous number of individual bills . . . I think the work . . . was not thorough, and the stuff was poorly drafted. And I think the philosophy behind last year's omnibus bill was, 'If we put

enough dogs and cats into one package, we put enough stuff in there that individual members want, they will support the overall bill, even though there may be bad legislation in it.'. . ."

And then the next Congress after that, they did the omnibus bill, which contained a lot of dogs and cats that had been hanging around for years that the Senate Committee had refused to consider. But what you had was a different philosophy. Traditionally, the Senate had considered Reclamation legislation one piece at a time. Each bill was subject to hearings, each bill was subject to mark-up. Each bill had a committee report written on it. And by and large, each bill was passed separately. And this was a concerted, orchestrated effort between the House and the Senate. And then the House would usually take several measures and combine them into one bill. But each measure had undergone very careful scrutiny. In the last Congress, you

saw a tremendous number of individual bills–I think there were thirty or forty–all combined into one omnibus measure. And frankly, I think the work that had been done on many of the individual titles was lacking, was not thorough, and the stuff was poorly drafted. And I think the philosophy behind last year's omnibus bill was, "If we put enough dogs and cats into one package, we put enough stuff in there that individual members want, they will support the overall bill, even though there may be bad legislation in it."[7] And I think that's what happened. And that was a conscious decision on the part of, I *believe,* the House staff. "We will take every dog and cat and stick it in there, so that we can get done the stuff that *we* want to do on Central Valley Project and Central Utah

7. Dan Beard, in his oral history with Reclamation, also talked about passage of the "omnibus bill"–Public Law 102-575. See footnote on page 60.

Project." The objective was those two items. The primary objective was to pass those two bills and they knew that without putting all of this other baggage on it, that they would have problems. That's one way of legislating–one that I don't agree with.

Storey: You intimated earlier that you had an idea of what the administration was going to propose for Reclamation in the future. Would you like to talk about that? That's based on your experience, I think.

". . . what you've got are a bunch of Carter Administration retreads who are now in charge, and they're going to try to do that which they *failed* to do during the Carter Administration. . . ."

Brown: Now you understand, some of this stuff I picked up in the past few months that I was here. But what you've got are a bunch of Carter Administration retreads who are now in charge, and they're going to try to do that which they

failed to do during the Carter Administration. And instead of having a "hit list," you basically have *no* projects that will be proposed. I would anticipate that you will see proposals to deauthorize projects, *but* coupled with something else that people *want*. "I'll trade you deauthorization on *this* project, and we'll get you something else." A little horse trading. There's nothing wrong with that. In fact, it's probably a good idea. You will see an effort to turn us into a check-writing operation. You have already seen evidence of our getting out of our foreign activities program. I think you will see a decline in the support for the Colorado River Salinity Control Program. And I think you will see an element of revenge.

Storey: Which you've already discussed previously. How do you think we're doing in changing?–

realistic change for the Reclamation to meet its new business practices.

How Reclamation Will Change

Brown: It's already happening. It started happening a long time ago. Given the fact that it is a bureaucracy, and bureaucracies are creatures with their own rationale and reason for living and so on. They're like almost a living creature. I *think* the Bureau is doing pretty good, as far as change. You got a lot of dead wood at the top that's going to be leaving because they've got their high three. There's a *lot* of new people coming in. I think that they *will* take the concept of serving a different mission to heart. I think they will be a much better water management group than they have been. The previous administration, and Dennis Underwood, I think laid a good foundation for Dan [Beard] to use for

this transition. I think it will continue–as it should. The only thing that bothers me is whether or not they will make it a gentle transition for the purposes of those people that make a living off of the Bureau's activities.

Storey: One of the things I think that characterizes change is that when you're close to it, it's difficult to see it, very often. If you sort of tried to step back and look at the change that you perceive is going on, how would you characterize it? How is it manifesting itself?

Change in Reclamation Is Occurring at the Project Level

Brown: The real change is not here in Washington. The real change is at project levels. These are the people that actually make the projects work, and you're getting different people with different ideas, they *are* more environmentally conscious–there's no question about it. They see

opportunities out there at the project level, at the resource level, to *do* things, and I think they're doing them–much better than what we are doing here at the Washington level. The guys out there are the problem solvers. They worry every day about turning on the water and keeping the lights on and fixing things and making projects work. That's the real cutting edge for change. We're probably *behind* the curve at the Washington level. Certainly behind the curve at the congressional level. I would guess that the real hope for the future of the Bureau in making that transition gentle is going to be at the project level with the project mangers. You couldn't ask for a better bunch of people out there.

Storey: So you're talking about making the change gentle with the water users?

Brown: Yes, our traditional constituents: water, power,

the people that use projects not only for recreation, but the people that use projects for their livelihood. That's what the projects are for, is to provide people with the ability to earn a living. And the people that'll make it either tough, or make it a real easy transition, ultimately are going to be the people that run the projects. They are *very good* resource managers, and I *like* the emphasis on resource management, but I don't want that to be an excuse for revenge, and it should not be a single-purpose management.

The Old Projects Require Addressing Lack of Environmental Foresight During Original Construction but in Such a Way That Local Economies Aren't Disrupted

A lot of those are *old* projects. We could go back in and address some of the lack of environmental foresight when the projects were first put in place. And how to do that, while at the same time maintaining the economies–that's the hard

question. It will *not* be solved by policy directives at the Washington level. The people that are *really* going to fix the problems are the people who are going to be running the projects themselves.

Reclamation and Environmental Legislation

Storey: Your career with the Senate and Reclamation pretty much coincides with the implementation of the environmental legislation, the passage and implementation . . .

Brown: Oh, yeah, the first big piece was NEPA [National Environmental Policy Act]. And even though Ed Muskie gets a lot of credit for it, the principal sponsor for NEPA was Henry Jackson. And the origin of the Environmental Impact Statement was in the old Senate Interior Committee.

Storey: How has the evolution of the environmental requirements on federal agencies affected

Reclamation from your perspective?

"There're two ways to look at that: the environmental requirements may be used as tools to *stop* projects; or they may be used to make a project better and serve a greater variety of purposes. And what I see lately happening is (unclear) to be used as to *stop* projects, and not make them better. . . ."

Brown: There're two ways to look at that: the environmental requirements may be used as tools to *stop* projects; or they may be used to make a project better and serve a greater variety of purposes. And what I see lately happening is (unclear) to be used as to *stop* projects, and not make them better.

The Administration, While Promoting Optimization of Hydroelectricity for Environmental Reasons, Is Cutting Back on Generation Due to Environmental Effects

There's a dichotomy here that's hard to fix. You have this administration's proposal on greenhouse gases, claiming as one of the major elements, the optimization of hydroelectric

power generation to diminish the dependency on fossil fuels and production of greenhouse gases. Well, at the same time, you see cutbacks in hydroelectric generation at Bureau projects because of adverse environmental impacts. Glen Canyon Dam, for example, is a classic, where you have less generation or less peaking generation because of supposed adverse impacts on the Grand Canyon. And by doing so, then you increase dependency on gas turbines for peaking purposes, which produces more greenhouse gases! You see a tremendous problem on the Columbia-Snake system because of the endangered salmon, and you're going to have to have a reduction in power generation. So you got one hand doing one thing, which is cutting back on our hydrogeneration–while on the other hand you've got the White House saying that we

need to *increase* power generation. All in the name of environment! So they have not yet reconciled different environmental purposes ~~yet~~. Whether or not they ever will, I don't know. But it's fun to watch, and you can argue both sides, and I *have* argued both sides. These are difficult resource questions to balance, and I think back . . . Quite often I say, "Gee whiz, what would Henry Jackson do faced with this kind of a dilemma?" And I don't have the answer–he *would* have, but I certainly don't.

One of the things I've always been privileged [in] is, I've usually worked with people smarter than me. And that is a *real* saving grace.

Storey: Yeah. When you came to Reclamation in '89, you worked with John Anderson. What was he like?

John Anderson

Brown: (sigh) John Anderson . . . as far as I was concerned, was *everything* that makes a dedicated public servant. He was one of the most honest people I've ever worked for. He was very careful, he knew the system, he knew the system of the bureaucracy was extremely frustrating, and I think to a certain extent he was frustrated himself. He had gone through the very difficult transition at the Bureau office, had experienced when it cut back from, I think, two hundred and eighty to two hundred and ninety people back to sixty or seventy people. He was a very caring individual, and very concerned on behalf of the people that worked for him. I think he probably cared [for them more than he cared for himself].

END SIDE 2, TAPE 2. OCTOBER 25, 1993.
BEGIN SIDE 1, TAPE 3. OCTOBER 25, 1993.

Storey: Okay, this is tape three of an interview by Brit

Storey with Russell Brown on October the 25th, 1993, and basically, I need to ask you again if you wish the interview to be closed for a period of ten years?

Brown: Yes.

Storey: Okay, thank you.

END SIDE 1, TAPE 3. OCTOBER 25, 1993.
END OF INTERVIEW.

Appendix I

July 24, 1997

Dear Brit:

I did some cross outs where I thought my personal views on individuals had no place in a history of the Bureau. I also think there is too much stuff about me - but I will leave that up to you.

Just for fun - an update. I am still (again) a Federal employee. This time the Director of Government Relations for an independent Federal corporation that is being privatized. The corporation is in a very difficult and challenging transition from government to the private sector which makes for an interesting work day. I also spend a lot of time on Capitol Hill with the Congress and staff.

I still get up every day and spend it with my best friends.

Sincerely,

Russell R. Brown

9917 Vale Road
Vienna, VA 22181

P.S. Sorry for the delay had a heart attack in June.