

Mid-Columbia Approach to Seismic Hazard

Bill Christman
Martin W. McCann, Jr.

David Moore
Ken Pflueger
Ivan Wong

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Pat Regan

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Norm Abrahamson

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Judy Zachariasen

***NW Hydropower Operators
Meeting***

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Rocky Reach Dam




Chelan Dam



Wells Dam



Priest Rapids Dam



Wanapum Dam




Rock Island Dam


Mid-Columbia Players/Projects

- Chelan PUD, Douglas PUD, & Grant PUD
- Projects
 - Chelan
 - Priest Rapids
 - Rock Island
 - Rocky Reach
 - Wanapum
 - Wells
- Seismic Evaluation Basis – PGA $\sim 0.10g$

Location of Study Region



Preliminary Map of Active and Potentially Active Faults, Central Washington



Background

➤ Technical

- Re-evaluation of the 1872 Chelan earthquake & implications for the seismic safety evaluation of dams in the Mid-Columbia region

➤ Regulatory

- FERC faced with addressing an issue that could have important implications for the Mid-C projects

➤ Industry


- Multi-dam owners facing the same technical issues & potential conflicting evaluations (also regulatory)

➤ Neighbors

- Others interested in the technical issues and evaluations; dam owners (federal), other federal agencies (USDOE, USGS), WA state dam safety program

Technical Motivator

95% confidence location for the 1872 earthquake (Bakun, et al, 2002), **M 6.5-7.0**



(B) Generalized geologic map of north-central Washington

Approach

- FERC & licensee discussions of the issues resulted in agreement on a technical and organizational approach to address the seismic hazard issue in the Mid-C region
- Technical
 - Conduct a probabilistic seismic hazard analysis
- Organizational
 - Collaboration – The PUD would pool their technical & fiscal resources to conduct a regional assessment of the seismic hazard
 - Cooperation – The FERC would invite other agencies to share information with the technical team & sit in on project meetings with the FERC


PSHA Project Plan

- Technical
 - PSHA
 - SSHAC process
 - Based on existing information
- Organizational
 - Participating owners
 - Cooperating agencies
- Schedule

Project Participants

- FERC (Headquarters & the regional office)
- Mid-C PUDS – Chelan, Grant & Douglas
- Mid-C Consultants – Geoengineers, Geomatrix, Hatch-Acres, Jacobs, Shannon & Wilson, URS
- Cooperating Agencies – USACE, USBR, USDOE, USGS, WA DOE


Project Organization





Benefits of Collaboration

- Increased intellectual robustness & stability in the assessment of seismic hazards in the region
- Technical and fiscal efficiency of pooled resources
- Improved technical coordination among stakeholders

Elements of PSHA



Typical PSHA Result



SSHAC Process

- Mid 90's concern about the approach to evaluate epistemic uncertainty in the source characterization and ground motion attenuation – expert elicitation
- Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC) formed by EPRI, USNRC & USDOE – work published in 1997
- Topics addressed:
 - Goal of a PSHA
 - Project organization & responsibilities
 - Expert elicitation methods
 - Levels of analysis (corvair → cadillac)
 - Peer review
- Currently undergoing review & updating


Goal of a PSHA

The goal of a PSHA is to develop inputs that represent the composite distribution of the informed scientific community.


Seismic Source Characterization

- Significant uncertainties in all parts of the PSHA
- For SSC, must rely on expert interpretations of available information
 - Probability of activity of tectonic features
 - Maximum magnitude
 - Fault geometry
 - Recurrence model
- Ground motion attenuation – uncertainties can be large, despite considerable amount of data
 - Data gaps remain (m-d space; faulting type)
- Logic trees are used to model uncertainty in each part of the analysis

Generalized Seismic Source Model Logic Tree



Crustal Sources



Project No. 22238854
Mid-Columbia Dams
PSCWA

LOCATION MAP SHOWING FAULT
SOURCES AND SEISMICITY


Figure
3-4

Mid Columbia SSC Model


➤ Crustal Sources – Faults

- Columbia Hills anticline
- Horse Heaven Hills anticline
- Rattlesnake-Wallula structural trend
- Toppenish Ridge
- Ahtanum Ridge/Rattlesnake Hills
- Yakima Ridge
- Umtanum Ridge
- Manastash Ridge
- Saddle Mountains
- Frenchman Hills
- Kittitas Valley faults
- Arlington-Shutler Butte and Luna Butte faults
- Badger Mountain anticline
- Pinto anticline (Pinto fault)
- Inferred fault associated with the Entiat-Chelan seismic zone

Subduction



Background Sources



Mid- Columbia Dams
PSHA

Project No. 22238854

AREA SOURCE ZONES FOR PSHA

Figure
3-12

Ground Motion Attenuation

➤ Shallow Crustal

- Reverse earthquakes associated with folds
- Reverse and strike-slip earthquakes in source zones
- $5 \leq M \leq 7.5$

➤ Cascadia Interface

- Thrust events $8 \leq M \leq 9.5$
- Focal Depths 20-30 km

➤ Juan de Fuca Intraslab

- Normal/Strike-slip $5 \leq M \leq 7.5$
- Focal Depths 40-100 km

Ground Motion Attenuation

➤ Crustal

- Next Generation Attenuation (NGA) models (multi-year; multi-expert project) (~SSHAC Level 4)
- Supplemented by an epistemic uncertainty model not included in the NGA evaluation

➤ Subduction

- Evaluation of existing models (model weights) & review of aleatory variability

Subduction Models

- USGS draft 2007 set
 - Youngs et al. (1997) [0.25]
 - World-wide data
 - Atkinson and Boore (2003) [0.25]
 - World-wide data
 - Zhao et al. (2006) [0.5]
 - Principally Japanese data – all types of events regressed in combined model with differentiating parameters
- Other models
 - Gregor et al. (2006) update of Gregor et al. (2002)
 - Numerical simulation for Cascadia

Summary

- Technical merits
 - Robustness
 - Explicit identification & evaluation of uncertainties
- Project is in its final phases
 - Verification of computer codes and PSHA inputs (3 consultants with 2 different computer codes)
 - Finalization of the ground motion models (crustal & subduction)
 - Site calculations
- Next steps
 - FERC/consultant review
 - How to use the PSHA results in dam safety evaluations?