U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Degree of Proof Necessary in a Regulatory Enforcement Action
HPPOS-112 PDR-9111210258
Title: Degree of Proof Necessary in a Regulatory
Enforcement Action
See the memorandum from M. G. Malsch to Chairman Palladino
(and others) dated November 9, 1981. Presiding Board or
judge must reach the result dictated by a preponderance of
evidence in the record. This is less stringent than the
criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
At a Commission briefing concerning enforcement matters on
October 27, 1981, a statement was requested on the degree
of proof necessary in a regulatory enforcement action as
opposed to a criminal case. Assuming that the question
refers to the legal standard for proof in an adjudicatory
hearing on an enforcement action, the answer is that the
presiding board or administrative law judge must reach the
result dictated by a preponderance of evidence in the
record. This is true because the agency has made its rules
for adjudications applicable to enforcement matters [see 10
CFR 2.700 and 2.204 (e)] and the preponderance standard has
been held to be the correct one under those rules
[Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant,
Units 1A, 2A, 1B and 2B), ALAB-463, 7 NRC 341, 360 (1878),
citing inter alia Charlton v. FTC, 543 F.2d 903, 907 (D. C.
Cir. 1976); Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (Indian
Point Station, Unit No. 2), ALAB-188, 7 AEC 323, 356-357
(1974)]. Moreover, in license suspension and revocation
proceedings the APA applies as provided by sections 181 and
189a of the Atomic Energy Act, and under the APA the
preponderance of the evidence is the proper standard. This
is a less stringent standard than the criminal standard
which, as the Commission is aware, requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The Supreme Court upheld the preponderance standard in a
challenge to an SEC disciplinary proceeding that resulted
in debarring a petitioner from practicing his profession.
The Court found that where Congress has not specifically
required a different standard and the proceeding is an
adjudication subject to the APA, the preponderance standard
and the proceeding is an adjudication subject to the APA,
the preponderance standard is the correct one [Steadman v.
SEC, ___ U.S. ____, 67 L.Ed.2d 69, rehearing den. 68
L.Ed.2d 318 (1981)]. For a more complete discussion of
this case see the March 2, 1981 memorandum from Bickwith
[SECY-81-129]. Congress has not provided specifically for
a standard of proof in civil penalty hearings and, while
such hearings may not technically be subject to the APA, by
agency rule they apply the same standard the agency applies
to adjudications governed by the APA. Thus it is safe to
say that the preponderance standard would be upheld even in
an NRC enforcement action that had serious personal
consequences for a named offender. This assumes a
challenge in the Court of Appeals. An aggrieved party has
the alternative of a trial de novo in the district court.
See also Vance v. Terrazas [444 U.S. 252 (1980) (finding no
constitutional infirmity in deprivation of citizenship
based on preponderance of evidence)]. In Steadman, the
petitioner did not argue for the criminal standard, but
urged that a "clear and convincing" evidence standard
should be applied. "Clear, convincing and unequivocal" was
the standard at issue in Vance.
Although it need not do so, the Commission could probably
require a greater burden of persuasion depending on the
gravity of the matters in question or the gravity of the
anticipated effect in terms of imposition on individuals of
severe penalties or permanent stigma. See Virginia
Electric and Power Company [ (North Anna Power Station,
Units 1,2,3 and 4), 1 NRC 10, 17 n.18), and Steadman v. SEC
at 80 (Justices Powell and Stewart dissenting)]. As the
Supreme Court has frequently stated, agencies are free to
grant the public greater protection than the APA requires.
See, for example, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Co. v. NRDC
[435 U.S. 519, 545 (1978)]. The Commission could consider
such action in its review of enforcement policy. A
different but related question refers to the standard that
should underlie the agency's decision to proceed with an
enforcement action. Such a decision is in the nature of a
prosecutorial decision and must in large measure be guided
by the Commission's policy on how aggressive an enforcement
stance it wishes to maintain. The decision must, of
course, recognize that in the event the party against whom
the enforcement action is brought requests a hearing, the
agency must meet its burden of proof. At that time,
however, the full panoply of trial procedures are available
to assist in meeting that burden.
Regulatory references: 10 CFR 2
Subject codes: 12.7, 12.19
Applicability: All