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**NRC ENFORCEMENT POLICY**

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## PREFACE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Enforcement Policy sets forth the general principles governing the NRC's enforcement program and the Commission's expectations regarding the process to be used by the NRC to assess and disposition violations of NRC requirements. However, this is a policy statement and not a regulation. The Commission may deviate from this statement of policy as appropriate under the circumstances of a particular case. The Policy also describes how organizations and individuals subject to NRC enforcement actions can provide input to the process. A glossary is provided which defines specific terms or words as they are used in the context of this Policy. The NRC Enforcement Manual contains specific processes and guidance for implementing this Policy. The guidance provided in the Enforcement Manual has been written to be consistent with this Enforcement Policy. The Enforcement Manual appears on the NRC's public Web site, <http://www.nrc.gov> (select **Electronic Reading Room**, then **Basic References**, then **Enforcement Documents**, then **Enforcement Guidance**, then **Enforcement Manual**).

A compilation of the statutes and materials pertaining to current nuclear regulatory legislation can be found on the NRC webpage.

Changes to the NRC Enforcement Policy since it was first published with links to a summary of each change and the *Federal Register* notice for each change are maintained on the NRC Office of Enforcement webpage

## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

The mission of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (referred to as the NRC, Commission, or agency) is to license and regulate the Nation's civilian use of byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety, promote the common defense and security, and protect the environment.

The following are some of the activities the NRC performs as part of its mission:

- a. establishing requirements and guidance addressing the possession and use of source, byproduct, and special nuclear material
- b. licensing applicants to use source, byproduct, and special nuclear material and operate licensed facilities in accordance with NRC requirements and specific license conditions
- c. promoting the transparency and openness of the NRC's enforcement program for all stakeholders

Oversight of licensed activities ensures that licensees are complying with NRC requirements and license conditions. Enforcement is an important part of the NRC's oversight activities.




Figure 1. How the NRC Regulates

1.1 Purpose of the Policy

The NRC Enforcement Policy supports the NRC's mission to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety, promote the common defense and security, and protect the environment. Compliance with NRC requirements, including regulations, technical specifications, license conditions, and orders, provides reasonable assurance to the NRC and the public that safety and security are being maintained. The application of this Policy ensures that associated enforcement actions properly reflect the safety or security significance of such violations. Consistent with this objective, the Enforcement Policy endeavors to do the following:

- a. Deter noncompliance by emphasizing the importance of compliance with NRC requirements.
- b. Encourage prompt identification and prompt comprehensive correction of violations of NRC requirements.

1.2 Applicability of the Policy

The Enforcement Policy applies to all NRC licensees and applicants, to various categories of nonlicensees, and to individual employees of licensed and nonlicensed entities involved in NRC-regulated activities. These include, but are not limited to the following:

- a. organizations and individuals holding NRC licenses
- b. license applicants
- c. contractors and subcontractors to NRC licensees
- d. holders of and applicants for various NRC approvals, including, but not limited to:
  - 1. NRC certificates of compliance
  - 2. early site permits
  - 3. standard design certifications
  - 4. quality assurance (QA) program approvals
  - 5. certifications
  - 6. limited work authorizations
  - 7. construction authorizations
  - 8. other permits and forms of NRC approval
- e. vendors supplying safety-related components to NRC licensees
- f. employees of any of the above

Not all NRC requirements apply to all of the categories listed above; however, the agency will use the Enforcement Policy, as appropriate, to address violations of NRC requirements.

### 1.3 Statutory Authority

The NRC derives its principal authority to license and regulate the civilian use of nuclear materials from two statutes: (1) the [Atomic Energy Act \(AEA\) of 1954](#), as amended, which provides broad authority to license and regulate the civilian use of nuclear materials, and (2) the [Energy Reorganization Act \(ERA\) of 1974](#), as amended, which established the agency and its major offices. The [Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 \(ADRA\)](#), 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-584, provides the statutory framework for the Federal Government to use alternative dispute resolution (ADR).

### 1.4 Regulatory Framework

The NRC's enforcement program is governed by its regulations. Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Part 2, "Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings and Issuance of Orders," Subpart B, "Procedure for Imposing Requirements by Order, or for Modification, Suspension, or Revocation of a License, or for Imposing Civil Penalties," describes the formal procedures that the NRC uses to implement its enforcement authority.

### 1.5 Adequate Protection Standard

Adequate protection of the public health and safety and assurance of the common defense and security and protection of the environment are the fundamental regulatory objectives. Compliance with NRC requirements plays a critical role in giving the NRC confidence that safety and security are being maintained. While adequate protection is presumptively assured by compliance with NRC requirements, circumstances may arise where new information reveals that an unforeseen hazard or security issue/event exists or that a substantially greater potential exists for a known hazard to occur. In such situations, the NRC has the statutory authority to require licensee action above and beyond existing regulations to maintain the level of protection necessary to avoid undue risk to public health and safety, and to ensure security of materials.

The NRC also has the authority to exercise discretion to permit continued operations—despite the existence of a noncompliance—where the noncompliance is not significant from a risk perspective and does not, in the particular circumstances, pose an undue risk to public health and safety. When noncompliance with NRC requirements occurs, the NRC must evaluate the degree of risk posed by that noncompliance to determine whether immediate action is required. If the NRC determines that the noncompliance itself is of such safety significance that adequate protection is no longer provided, or that the noncompliance was caused by a failure of licensee controls so significant that it calls into question the licensee's ability to ensure adequate protection, the NRC may demand immediate action, up to and including a shutdown or suspension of licensed activities. Based on the NRC's evaluation of noncompliance, the appropriate action could include refraining from taking any action, taking specific enforcement action including the use of civil penalties, issuing orders, or providing input to other regulatory actions or assessments, such as increased oversight (e.g., increased inspection). Since some requirements are more important to safety than others, the NRC endeavors to use a risk-informed approach when applying NRC resources to the oversight of licensed activities, including enforcement activities.

## 1.6 Responsibilities

The Executive Director for Operations (EDO) and the principal enforcement officers of the NRC, the Deputy Executive Director for Reactor and Preparedness Programs and the Deputy Executive Director for Materials, Waste, Research, State, Tribal, and Compliance Programs (DEDMRT), have been delegated the authority to approve or issue all escalated enforcement actions. The DEDMRT is responsible to the EDO for NRC enforcement programs. The Director, Office of Enforcement (OE), with some limitations, is delegated the authority by the DEDMRT to approve, sign, and issue all enforcement actions and to oversee and implement the NRC enforcement program.<sup>1</sup>

Subject to the oversight and direction of the Director, OE, and with the approval of the DEDMRT, where necessary, the regional offices normally issue notices of violation (NOVs) and proposed civil penalties. Subject to the same oversight as the regional offices, the Directors of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS), the Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs (FSME), the Office of New Reactors (NRO), and the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR) may also approve, sign, and issue certain enforcement actions as delegated by the Director, OE. The Director, OE, has delegated authority to the Directors of NRR, NMSS, FSME, NRO, and NSIR to issue orders not related to specific violations of NRC requirements (i.e., nonenforcement-related orders.) The Chief Financial Officer has been delegated the authority to issue orders where licensees violate Commission regulations by nonpayment of license and inspection fees. (See NRC Enforcement Manual, Chapter 1, "Responsibilities," for a discussion of delegation of enforcement authority.)

## 2.0 **NRC ENFORCEMENT PROCESS**

The NRC's enforcement process has the following basic steps.

- a. First, violations must be identified.
- b. Next, the NRC must assess the significance or severity of the violation.
- c. Finally, the NRC must disposition the violation.

Throughout the process, an organization or individual subject to an NRC enforcement action has multiple opportunities to provide input.

### 2.1 Identification of Violations

The enforcement process begins with the identification of violations, either through NRC inspections or investigations, or through a licensee report, or by substantiation of an allegation.

All violations are subject to consideration for civil enforcement action; some violations may also be considered for criminal prosecution by the U.S. Department of Justice. After an apparent violation is identified, it is assessed in accordance with this Policy. The NRC's enforcement

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<sup>1</sup> See NRC Enforcement Manual for additional information regarding the authority delegated to the Director, Office of Enforcement.

assessment process is fact driven, performance based, and, when appropriate and possible, risk informed. The NRC reviews each case being considered for enforcement action on its own merits to ensure that the severity of a violation is characterized at the level appropriate to the safety significance of the particular violation.

## 2.2 Assessment of Violations

After a violation is identified, the NRC assesses its significance or severity. The severity level assigned to the violation generally reflects the assessment of the significance of a violation, and is referred to as traditional enforcement. For most violations committed by operating power reactor licensees, the significance of a violation is assessed using the significance determination process (SDP) under the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), as discussed below in Section 2.2.3, "Operating Reactor Assessment Program." All other violations will be assessed using traditional enforcement as described in Section 2.2.4, "Exceptions to Using Only the Operating Reactor Assessment Program." Power reactor facilities under construction, independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSI), and nuclear materials facilities are not subject to the SDP and thus traditional enforcement will be used for these facilities.

### 2.2.1 Factors Affecting Assessment of Violations

The NRC uses risk information whenever possible in assessing the safety significance of violations and assigning severity levels. A higher severity level may be warranted for violations that have greater risk significance, while a lower severity level may be appropriate for issues that have lower risk significance. In determining the appropriate enforcement response to a violation, the NRC considers the following factors:

- a. Whether the violation resulted in actual safety or security consequences. In evaluating actual consequences, the NRC considers issues such as whether the violation resulted in the onsite or offsite releases of radiation, onsite or offsite radiation exposures, accidental criticality, core damage, loss of significant safety barriers, loss of control of radioactive material or radiological emergencies, or whether the security system did not function as required and, as a result of the failure, a significant event or an event that resulted in an act of radiological sabotage occurred.
- b. Whether the violation had potential safety or security consequences. In evaluating potential consequences, the NRC considers whether the violation created a credible accident, security failure, or exposure scenario that could potentially have significant actual consequences. For facilities under construction, the NRC considers the actual or potential impact on the quality of construction and its resulting effect on the safety and security of the facility. Duration of the violation is an appropriate consideration in assessing the significance of the violation.
- c. Whether the violation impacted the ability of the NRC to perform its regulatory oversight function. The NRC considers the safety and security implications of noncompliances that may affect the NRC's ability to carry out its statutory mission. These types of violations include failures to provide complete and accurate information; failures to receive prior NRC approval for changes in licensed activities; failures to notify the NRC of changes in licensed activities; failures to perform 10 CFR 50.59, "Changes, Tests and



Experiments,” and similar analyses; and failures to comply with reporting requirements, etc. Even inadvertent reporting failures are important because many of the surveillance, quality control, and auditing systems on which both the NRC and its licensees rely in order to monitor compliance with safety standards are based primarily on complete, accurate, and timely recordkeeping and reporting. The existence of a regulatory process violation does not automatically mean that the issue is significant to safety or security. In determining the significance of a violation, the NRC will consider appropriate factors for the particular regulatory process violation. These factors may include the significance of the underlying issue, whether the failure actually impeded or influenced regulatory action, the level of individuals involved in the failure and the reason why the failure occurred given their position and training, and whether the failure invalidates the licensing basis.

Unless otherwise categorized in the violation examples contained in this Policy (i.e., Section 6.0), the severity level of a violation involving the failure to make a required report to the NRC will depend on the significance of and the circumstances surrounding the matter that should have been reported. However, the severity level of an untimely report, in contrast to no report, may be reduced depending on the circumstances. The NRC will not normally cite a licensee for a failure to report a condition or event unless the licensee was actually aware of the condition or event that it failed to report. On the other hand, the agency will normally cite a licensee for a failure to report a condition or event if the licensee knew of the information to be reported but did not recognize that it was required to make a report.

- d. Whether the violation involved willfulness. Willful violations are of particular concern because the NRC’s regulatory program is based on licensees and their contractors, employees, and agents acting with integrity and communicating with candor. The Commission cannot tolerate willful violations. Therefore, a violation may be considered more significant than the underlying noncompliance if it includes indications of willfulness. Violations with willful aspects will typically be considered for escalated enforcement (i.e., Severity Level I, II, or III). The term “willfulness” as used in this Policy refers to conduct involving either a careless disregard for requirements or deliberate intent to violate requirements or falsify information. In determining the significance of a violation involving willfulness, the NRC will consider such factors as the position and responsibilities of the person involved in the violation (e.g., licensee official or nonsupervisory employee), the significance of any underlying violation, the intent of the violator (i.e., careless disregard or deliberateness), and the economic or other advantage, if any, gained as a result of the violation. The relative weight given to each of these factors in the significance assessment will depend on the circumstances of the violation. However, if a licensee refuses to correct a minor violation within a reasonable time such that it willfully continues, the violation should be considered at least more than minor. Licensees are expected to take significant remedial action in responding to willful violations commensurate with the circumstances, such that the action reflects the seriousness of the violation, thereby creating a deterrent effect within the licensee’s organization.

## 2.2.2 Severity Levels

Under its traditional enforcement process, the NRC assesses significance by assigning a severity level to all violations by those subject to the NRC's enforcement authority as defined in Section 1.2, "Applicability of the Enforcement Policy," and to some violations by operating power reactor licensees. However, the agency assesses most violations by operating power reactor licensees under the ROP using the SDP (see Section 2.2.3). (Section 6.0 of this Policy provides examples of Severity Level I, II, III, and IV violations in 14 activity areas. These examples are not intended to be exhaustive or controlling.)

In recognition that the regulation of nuclear activities in many cases does not lend itself to a mechanistic treatment, judgment and discretion must be exercised in determining the severity levels of the violations and the appropriate enforcement sanctions. This judgment and discretion include the decision to issue an NOV, or to propose or impose a civil penalty and the amount of this penalty, after considering the general principles of this statement of policy and the significance of the violations, as well as the surrounding circumstances.

Comparisons of significance between activity areas are inappropriate. For example, the immediacy of any hazard to the public associated with Severity Level I in reactor operations is not directly comparable to that associated with Severity Level I violations in facility construction.

- a. Severity Level I violations are those that resulted in or could have resulted in serious safety or security consequences, violations that involved systems failing when actually called on to prevent or mitigate a serious safety or security event, or violations associated with a significant regulatory concern.
- b. Severity Level II violations are those that resulted in or could have resulted in significant safety or security consequences (i.e., violations that created the potential for substantial safety or security consequences or violations that involved systems not being capable, for an extended period, of preventing or mitigating a serious safety or security event).
- c. Severity Level III violations are those that resulted in or could have resulted in moderate safety or security consequences (i.e., violations that created a potential for moderate safety or security consequences or violations that involved systems not being capable, for a relatively short period, of preventing or mitigating a serious safety or security event).
- d. Severity Level IV violations are those that are less serious, but are of more than minor concern, that resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential safety or security consequences (i.e., violations that created the potential of more than minor safety or security consequences).
- e. Minor Violations are those that are less significant than a Severity Level IV violation. Minor violations do not warrant enforcement action and are not normally documented in inspection reports. However, minor violations must be corrected.

### 2.2.3 Operating Reactor Assessment Program

The assessment, disposition, and subsequent NRC action related to inspection findings identified at operating power reactors are determined by the ROP, as described in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0305, "Operating Reactor Assessment Program." Inspection findings identified through the ROP are assessed for safety significance using the SDP described in IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process." The SDP uses risk insights, where possible, to assist the NRC staff in determining the safety or security significance of inspection findings identified within the ROP. Inspection findings processed through the SDP, including associated violations, are documented in inspection reports and are assigned one of the following colors, depending on their safety significance

- a. red—inspection findings with high safety or security significance
- b. yellow—inspection findings with substantial safety or security significance
- c. white—inspection findings with low-to-moderate safety or security significance
- d. green—inspection findings with very low safety or security significance

With the exceptions noted below in Section 2.2.4, violations associated with ROP inspection findings are not normally assigned severity levels, nor are they normally subject to civil penalties, although civil penalties are considered for any violation that involves actual consequences.

### 2.2.4 Exceptions to Using Only the Operating Reactor Assessment Program

Some aspects of inspection findings and their associated violations at operating power reactors cannot be addressed only through the Operating Reactor Assessment Program. Operating reactor inspection findings are assigned significance and, if the associated violation involves traditional enforcement, they are also assigned severity levels and can be considered for civil penalties. In determining the severity level assigned to such violations, the NRC will consider information in this Policy and the violation examples in Section 6.0 of this Policy, as well as SDP-related information, when available. Typically, these types of violations include the following:

- a. violations that resulted in actual safety or security consequences, including but not limited to those listed below:
  - 1. violations resulting in radiation exposures to the public or plant personnel above regulatory limits
  - 2. any violation during an actual General Emergency that prevents offsite response organizations from implementing protective actions, under their emergency plans, to protect the public health or safety
  - 3. violations resulting in substantial releases of radioactive material
- b. violations that may impact the ability of the NRC to perform its regulatory oversight function

- c. violations involving willfulness
- d. violations of NRC requirements for which there are no associated SDP performance deficiencies. These violations are normally dispositioned using discretion, similar to that described in Section 3.2 of this policy.

#### 2.2.5 Export and Import of NRC-Regulated Radioactive Material and Equipment

The NRC will normally take enforcement action for violations of the agency's export and import requirements in 10 CFR Part 110, "Export and Import of Nuclear Equipment and Material," for radioactive material and equipment within the scope of the NRC's export and import licensing authority (10 CFR 110.8, 110.9, and 110.9a) for (1) completeness and accuracy of information, (2) reporting and recordkeeping requirements (10 CFR 110.23, 110.26, 110.50, and 110.54), and (3) adherence to general and specific licensing requirements (10 CFR 110.23, 110.28, and 110.29).

### 2.3 Disposition of Violations

This section describes the various ways that the NRC can disposition violations.

#### 2.3.1 Minor Violations

Violations of minor safety or security concern generally do not warrant enforcement action or documentation in inspection reports but must be corrected. Examples of minor violations can be found in the NRC Enforcement Manual and in IMC 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports" (Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues"). Guidance for documenting minor violations can be found in the NRC Enforcement Manual; IMC 0610, "Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Inspection Reports"; IMC 0612; IMC 0613, "Documenting 10 CFR Part 52 Construction and Test Inspections"; and IMC 0616, "Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards Inspection Reports."

#### 2.3.2 Noncited Violation

Severity Level IV violations and violations associated with green ROP findings are normally dispositioned as noncited violations (NCVs). Inspection reports or inspection records document NCVs and briefly describe the corrective action the licensee has taken or plans to take, if known. Licensees are not required to provide written responses to NCVs; however, they may provide a written response if they disagree with the NRC's description of the NCV and/or dispute the validity of the NCV. Typically, all of the following criteria must be met for the disposition of a violation as an NCV:

- a. Power Reactor Licensees
  - 1. The licensee must place the violation into a corrective action program to address recurrence.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> For reactor facilities under construction in accordance with 10 CFR Part 52, the corrective action program must have been demonstrated to be adequate.

2. The licensee must restore compliance within a reasonable period of time (i.e., in a timeframe commensurate with the significance of the violation) after a violation is identified.
3. The violation must not be repetitive<sup>3</sup> as a result of inadequate corrective action, and, if repetitive, the repetitive violation was not identified by the NRC. This criterion does not apply to violations associated with green ROP findings and violations associated with facility construction under 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," and 10 CFR Part 52, "Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants."
4. The violation was not willful. Notwithstanding willfulness, an NCV may still be appropriate in the following circumstances:
  - (a) The licensee identified the violation and promptly provided the information concerning the violation, if not required to be reported, to appropriate NRC personnel, such as a resident inspector or regional branch chief.
  - (b) The violation involved the acts of a low-level individual (and not a licensee official as defined in Section 2.2.1, "Factors Affecting Assessment of Violations").
  - (c) The violation appears to be the isolated action of the employee without management involvement, and the violation was not caused by lack of management oversight as evidenced by either a history of isolated willful violations or a lack of adequate audits or supervision of employees.
  - (d) The licensee took significant remedial action commensurate with the circumstances. This action demonstrated the seriousness of the violation to other employees and contractors, thereby creating a deterrent effect within the licensee's organization.

The approval of the Director, OE, is required for dispositioning willful violations as NCVs.

b. All Other Licensees

1. The licensee identified the violation.<sup>4</sup>
2. The licensee corrected or committed to correct the violation within a reasonable period of time by specific corrective action committed to by the end of the

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<sup>3</sup> A violation is considered "repetitive" if it could reasonably be expected to have been prevented by the licensee's corrective action for a previous violation or a previous licensee finding that occurred within the past 2 years of the inspection at issue, or the period between the last two inspections, whichever is longer.

<sup>4</sup> An NOV is warranted when a licensee identifies a violation as a result of an event where the root cause of the event is obvious or the licensee had prior opportunity to identify the problem but failed to take action that would have prevented the event. Disposition as an NCV may be warranted if the licensee demonstrated initiative in identifying the violation's root cause.

inspection, including immediate corrective action and comprehensive action to prevent recurrence.

3. The violation is not repetitive as a result of inadequate corrective action.
4. The violation was not willful. Notwithstanding willfulness, an NCV may still be appropriate if it meets the criteria in Section 2.3.2.1.a.4 above.

The approval of the Director, OE, is required for dispositioning willful violations as NCVs.

### 2.3.3 Notice of Violation

A Notice of Violation (NOV) ([see 10 CFR 2.201](#)) is a written notice setting forth one or more violations of a legally binding requirement and normally requires the recipient to provide a written response describing (1) the reasons for the violation or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken, and (4) the date when full compliance has been, or will be, achieved. The NRC may waive all or portions of a written response to the extent that relevant information has already been provided to the NRC in writing or documented in an NRC inspection report or inspection record. The NRC may require responses to NOV's to be under oath; however, normally, responses under oath will be considered necessary only for Severity Level I, II, or III violations; violations assessed using the SDP as white, yellow, or red; or violations of NRC orders. A civil penalty may be issued in conjunction with an NOV. Severity Level I, II, and III violations are normally dispositioned as an NOV.

### 2.3.4 Civil Penalty

A civil penalty ([see 10 CFR 2.205](#)) is a monetary penalty that the NRC may impose for violation of (1) certain specified licensing provisions of the AEA or supplementary NRC rules or orders, (2) any requirement for which a license may be revoked or (3) reporting requirements under Section 206 of the ERA. Based on the circumstances of a specific case, the NRC may increase a civil penalty where application of the guidance in this Policy would normally result in a zero penalty or a base civil penalty, to ensure that the proposed civil penalty reflects the safety significance of the case. The NRC's policy of imposing graduated civil penalties generally takes into account the gravity of the violation as the primary consideration and the ability to pay as a secondary consideration. Thus, operations involving greater nuclear material inventories, potentially significantly higher consequences resulting from a release/exposure to radioactive material, and consequences to the public and workers receive higher civil penalties. Regarding the secondary factor of the ability of various classes of licensees to pay the civil penalties, it is not the NRC's intention that the economic impact of a civil penalty be so severe that it adversely affects a licensee's ability to safely conduct licensed activities or puts a licensee out of business (orders, rather than civil penalties, are used when the NRC's intent is to suspend or terminate licensed activities).


Violations assessed under the SDP normally are not considered for civil penalties. However, civil penalties are considered for violations associated with inspection findings evaluated through the ROP's SDP that involve actual consequences.

The NRC may exercise discretion and assess a separate violation and attendant civil penalty up to the statutory limit for each day the violation continues. The NRC may exercise this discretion when a licensee was aware of a violation, or if the licensee had a clear opportunity to identify and correct the violation but failed to do so.

The NRC considers civil penalties for violations associated with loss of regulated material (i.e., the NRC's lost source policy). Loss of NRC-regulated material is a significant regulatory concern because of potential unauthorized possession, use, or overexposure to members of the public. Violations where regulated radioactive material remains out of the required control of a licensee for any period of time are treated separately, regardless of the use, license type, quantity, or type of radioactive material. Such violations may include but are not limited to, for example, the loss, abandonment, improper transfer, or disposal of a device, source, or other form of regulated material. Notwithstanding the normal civil penalty assessment process, in cases where a licensee has lost required control of its regulated radioactive material for any period of time, the NRC normally should impose at least a base civil penalty. However, the agency may mitigate or escalate a civil penalty amount based on the merits of a specific case. When appropriate, the NRC may consider, for example, information concerning the actual expected cost of authorized disposal and the actual consequences of the material remaining out of the control of the licensee.

The Commission recognizes that violations occur in a variety of activities and have varying impacts; therefore, the civil penalty Tables A and B in Section 8.0 of this Policy contain graduated sanctions based on the severity level of the violation. The tables present the base civil penalty (i.e., normal civil penalty, for any severity level violation for each type of licensee before consideration of factors to either escalate or use discretion to increase or decrease those amounts). The civil penalty amounts applied should be those in effect at the time of the violation.

The flow chart (Figure 2) presented below is a graphic representation of the civil penalty assessment process.



The civil penalty assessment process considers four decision points. Although each of these decision points may have several associated considerations for any given case, the outcome of the assessment process for each violation or problem, absent the exercise of discretion, is limited to one of the following three results: no civil penalty, a base civil penalty, or a base civil penalty escalated by 100 percent. The four decision points are the following:

- a. Did the licensee have any previous escalated enforcement action (regardless of the activity area) during the past 2 years or within the period covered by the last two inspections, whichever period is longer? When the NRC determines that a nonwillful Severity Level III violation or problem has occurred, and the licensee has not had any previous escalated actions (regardless of the activity area) during the past 2 years or two inspections, whichever period is longer, the NRC will consider whether the licensee's corrective action for the present violation or problem is reasonably prompt and comprehensive (see the discussion under Section 2.3.4.c, below). Using 2 years as the basis for assessment is expected to cover most situations, but considering a slightly longer or shorter period may be warranted based on the circumstances of a particular case. For a licensee-identified violation or an event, the starting point of this period is when the licensee becomes aware that a problem or violation exists that requires corrective action. For an NRC-identified violation, the starting point is when the NRC put the licensee on notice of the need to take corrective action for the previous violation, which could be during the inspection, at the inspection exit meeting, or as part of post inspection communication with the licensee. The 2 year period typically ends on the date of the second violation.
- b. Should the licensee be given credit for actions related to identification of the violation? A stated purpose of this Policy is to encourage prompt identification of violations of NRC requirements. While the decision regarding credit for identification can become



complicated, the overarching consideration is whether the NRC should give credit for a licensee's efforts to identify the violation. It is the responsibility of the licensee to demonstrate such identification effort. It is not the NRC's responsibility to show that identification credit is not warranted.

1. The civil penalty assessment should normally consider the factor of identification; in addition to corrective action (see the discussion in Section 2.3.4.c, below). In these circumstances, the NRC should consider whether the licensee should be given credit for actions related to identification when any of the following conditions exist.
  - (a) the violation is Severity Level I or II
  - (b) the violation is a willful Severity Level III
  - (c) the licensee has been issued at least one other escalated action during the past 2 years or 2 inspections, whichever is longer.

In each case, the decision should be focused on identification of the problem requiring corrective action. In other words, although giving credit for identification and corrective action should be separate decisions, the concept of identification presumes that the identifier recognizes the existence of a problem and understands that corrective action is needed. The decision on identification requires considering all the circumstances of identification including the following:

- (a) whether the problem requiring corrective action was identified by the NRC, identified by the licensee, or revealed through an event
- (b) whether prior opportunities existed to identify the problem requiring corrective action, and if so, the age and number of those opportunities
- (c) whether the problem was revealed as the result of a licensee self-monitoring effort, such as conducting an audit, a test, a surveillance, a design review, or troubleshooting
- (d) for a problem revealed through an event, the ease of discovery and the degree of licensee initiative in identifying the root cause of the problem and any associated violations
- (e) for NRC-identified issues, whether the licensee would likely have identified the issue in the same time period if the NRC had not been involved
- (f) for NRC-identified issues, whether the licensee should have identified the issue (and taken action) earlier
- (g) for cases in which the NRC identified the overall problem requiring corrective action (e.g., a programmatic issue), the degree of licensee

initiative or lack of initiative in identifying the problem or problems requiring corrective action

2. Although some cases may consider all of the above factors, the importance of each factor will vary based on the type of case, as discussed in the following general guidance:
  - (a) Licensee Identified—When a problem requiring corrective action is licensee identified (i.e., identified by the licensee before the problem results in an event), the NRC should normally give the licensee credit for actions related to identification, regardless of whether prior opportunities existed to identify the problem.
  - (b) Identified through an Event—When a problem requiring corrective action is identified through an event (i.e., the problem is self-revealing), the decision as to whether to give the licensee credit for actions related to identification normally should consider the ease of discovery, whether the event occurred as the result of a licensee’s self-monitoring effort (i.e., whether the licensee was “looking for the problem”), the degree of licensee initiative in identifying the problem or problems requiring corrective action, and whether prior opportunities existed to identify the problem.

Any of these considerations may be overriding if particularly noteworthy or particularly egregious. For example, if the event occurred as the result of conducting a surveillance or similar self-monitoring effort (i.e., the licensee was looking for the problem), the licensee should normally be given credit for identification. Even if the problem was easily discovered (e.g., revealed by a large spill of liquid), the NRC may choose to give credit because noteworthy licensee effort was exerted in discovering the root cause and associated violations, or simply because no prior opportunities (e.g., procedural cautions, post-maintenance testing, quality control failures, readily observable parameter trends, or repeated or locked-in annunciator warnings) existed to identify the problem.

- (c) NRC Identified—When a problem requiring corrective action is NRC identified, the decision as to whether to give the licensee credit for actions related to identification should normally be based on an additional question: should the licensee have reasonably identified the problem (and taken action) earlier?

In most cases, this reasoning may be based simply on the ease of the NRC inspector’s discovery (e.g., conducting a walkdown, observing in the control room, performing a confirmatory NRC radiation survey, hearing a cavitating pump, or finding a valve obviously out of position). In some cases, the licensee’s missed opportunities to identify the problem may include a similar previous violation, NRC or industry notices, internal audits, or readily observable trends.

If the NRC identified the violation but concludes that, under the circumstances, the licensee's actions related to identification were not unreasonable, the matter would be treated as licensee identified for purposes of assessing the civil penalty. In such cases, the question of identification credit shifts to whether the licensee should be penalized for the NRC's identification of the problem.

- (d) **Mixed Identification**—For “mixed” identification situations (i.e., where multiple violations exist, some identified by the NRC and some by the licensee, or where the NRC prompted the licensee to take action that resulted in the identification of the violation), the NRC's evaluation should normally determine whether the licensee could reasonably have been expected to identify the violation in the NRC's absence. This determination should consider, among other things, the timing of the NRC's discovery, the information available to the licensee that caused the NRC's concern, the specificity of the NRC's concern, the scope of the licensee's efforts, the level of licensee resources given to the investigation, and whether the licensee had dismissed the NRC's path of analysis or was pursuing it in parallel.

In some cases, the licensee may have addressed the isolated symptoms of each violation (and may have identified the violations), but failed to recognize the common root cause and to take the necessary comprehensive action. In this case, the decision as to whether to give the licensee credit for actions related to identification should focus on identification of the problem requiring corrective action (e.g., the programmatic breakdown). As such, depending on the chronology of the various violations, the earliest of the individual violations might be considered missed opportunities for the licensee to have identified the larger problem.

- (e) **Missed Opportunities To Identify**—Missed opportunities include prior notifications or missed opportunities to identify or prevent violations such as (1) through normal surveillances, audits, or QA activities, (2) through prior notice (i.e., specific NRC or industry notification), or (3) through other reasonable indication of a potential problem or violation, such as observations of employees and contractors, and failure to take effective corrective steps. A missed opportunity may include findings of the NRC, the licensee, or industry made at other facilities operated by the licensee where it is reasonable to expect the licensee to act to identify or prevent similar problems at the facility subject to the enforcement action at issue. In assessing this factor, the NRC will consider, among other things, the opportunities available to discover the violation, the ease of discovery, the similarity between the violation and the notification, the period of time between when the violation occurred and when the notification was issued, the action taken (or planned) by the licensee in response to the

notification, and the level of management review that the notification received (or should have received).

The evaluation of missed opportunities should normally depend on whether the information available to the licensee should reasonably have caused action that would have prevented the violation. A missed opportunity to identify is normally not applied where the licensee appropriately reviewed the opportunity for application to its activities and took, or planned to take, reasonable action within a reasonable time.

In some situations, the missed opportunity is a violation in itself. In these cases, unless the missed opportunity is a Severity Level III violation in itself, the missed opportunity violation may be grouped with the other violations into a single Severity Level III “problem.” However, if the missed opportunity is the only violation, then it should not normally be counted twice (i.e., counting it as both a violation and a missed opportunity constitutes “double counting”), unless the number of opportunities missed was particularly significant.

The timing of the missed opportunity should also be considered. While a rigid timeframe is unnecessary, for consistency in implementation, 2 years should generally be considered as the period reflecting relatively current performance.

3. When the NRC determines that the licensee should receive credit for actions related to identification, the civil penalty assessment should normally result in either no civil penalty or a base civil penalty, depending on whether corrective action is judged to be reasonably prompt and comprehensive. When the licensee is not given credit for actions related to identification, the civil penalty assessment should normally result in an NOV with either a base civil penalty or a base civil penalty escalated by 100 percent, depending on the quality of corrective action.

c. Were the licensee’s corrective actions prompt and comprehensive?

The purpose of the corrective action factor is to encourage licensees to (1) take the immediate actions necessary upon discovery of a violation that will restore safety and compliance with the license, regulation(s), or other requirement(s) and (2) develop and implement (in a timely manner) the lasting actions that will not only prevent recurrence of the violation at issue, but will be appropriately comprehensive, given the significance and complexity of the violation, to prevent occurrence of violations with similar root causes.

Regardless of other circumstances (e.g., past enforcement history, identification), the licensee’s corrective actions should always be evaluated as part of the civil penalty assessment process. As a reflection of the importance given to this factor, an NRC judgment that the licensee’s corrective action has not been prompt and comprehensive will always result in the issuance of at least a base civil penalty.

In assessing this factor, the NRC will consider the timeliness of the corrective action (including the promptness in developing the schedule for long-term corrective action), the adequacy of the licensee's root cause analysis for the violation, and given the significance and complexity of the issue, the comprehensiveness of the corrective action (i.e., whether the action is focused narrowly on the specific violation or broadly on the general area of concern). The NRC, in considering the comprehensiveness of the corrective action, will consider whether the licensee applied the corrective actions to all its similarly licensed operations that could be susceptible to the same failure (for those licensees having more than one facility or location). Even in cases when the NRC, at the time of the enforcement conference, identifies additional peripheral or minor corrective action still to be taken, the licensee may be given credit in this area, as long as the licensee's actions addressed the underlying root cause and are considered sufficient to prevent recurrence of the violation and similar violations.

Normally, the judgment of the adequacy of corrective actions will hinge on whether the NRC had to act to focus the licensee's evaluative and corrective process to obtain comprehensive corrective action. This will normally be determined at the time of the predecisional enforcement conference (e.g., by outlining substantive additional areas where corrective action is needed). Earlier informal discussions between the licensee and NRC inspectors or management may result in improved corrective action but should not normally be a basis to deny credit for corrective action. For cases in which the licensee does not receive credit for actions related to identification because the NRC identified the problem, the assessment of the licensee's corrective action should begin from the time when the NRC put the licensee on notice of the problem. Notwithstanding eventual effective comprehensive corrective action, if immediate corrective action was not taken to restore safety and compliance once the violation was identified, corrective action would not be considered prompt and comprehensive. Corrective action for violations involving discrimination should normally be considered comprehensive only if the licensee takes prompt, comprehensive corrective action that (1) appropriately addresses the broader environment for raising safety concerns in the workplace and (2) provides a remedy for the particular discrimination at issue.

If the corrective action is judged to be prompt and comprehensive, an NOV normally should be issued with no associated civil penalty. If the corrective action is judged to be less than prompt and comprehensive, the NOV normally should be issued with a base civil penalty.

In response to violations of 10 CFR 50.59, corrective action should normally be considered prompt and comprehensive only if the licensee makes a prompt decision on operability and does either of the following:

1. makes a prompt evaluation under 10 CFR 50.59 if it intends to maintain the facility or procedure in the as-found condition
2. promptly initiates corrective action consistent with Criterion XVI of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, "Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants," if it intends to restore the facility or procedure to the final safety analysis report (FSAR) description

- d. In view of the circumstances of the violation, should the NRC exercise enforcement discretion to either escalate or mitigate the amount of the civil penalty?

As discussed in Section 3.6, “Use of Discretion in Determining the Amount of a Civil Penalty,” discretion may be exercised by either escalating or mitigating the amount of the civil penalty determined after applying the civil penalty adjustment factors to ensure that the proposed civil penalty reflects all relevant circumstances of the particular case. However, in no instance will a civil penalty for any one violation exceed the statutory daily limit.

### 2.3.5 Orders

An order is a written NRC directive to modify, suspend, or revoke a license; to cease and desist from a given practice or activity; or to take such other action as may be proper (see [10 CFR 2.202](#), “Orders”). Orders may be issued in lieu of, or in addition to, civil penalties, as appropriate, for Severity Level I, II, and III violations. Unless a separate response is warranted pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, “Notice of Violation,” the NRC does not need to issue an NOV in addition to the order when the NOV is based on violations described in the order. Orders are made immediately effective, without prior opportunity for a hearing, whenever the NRC determines that the public health, safety, interest, or common defense and security so requires, or if the violation or conduct causing the violation is willful, the order may provide, for stated reasons, that the proposed action be immediately effective pending further order. Otherwise, the agency grants a prior opportunity for a hearing on the order.

The NRC may also issue orders to nonlicensees, including contractors and subcontractors, holders of NRC approvals (e.g., certificates of compliance, early site permits, standard design certifications, or applicants for any such approvals), and to employees of any of the foregoing and to licensed individuals, such as licensed reactor operators, and nonlicensed individuals.

### 2.3.6 Demand for Information

The Commission may also issue a demand for information (DFI) (see [10 CFR 2.204](#)) to determine whether an order under 10 CFR 2.202 should be issued or whether other action should be taken.

### 2.3.7 Administrative Actions

The NRC also uses administrative actions, such as confirmatory action letters, notices of deviation, and notices of nonconformance, to supplement its enforcement program. These administrative actions are explained in the Enforcement Manual and defined in the glossary of this Policy. The NRC expects licensees and other persons subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction to adhere to any obligations and commitments resulting from administrative actions and will consider issuing additional orders, as needed, to ensure compliance.

### 2.3.8 Reopening Closed Enforcement Actions

Under special circumstances (e.g., when the NRC receives substantial new information indicating that an enforcement sanction was incorrectly applied), the agency may consider, on a case-by-case basis, reopening a closed enforcement action to increase or decrease the severity of a sanction or to correct the record.

Special circumstances include but are not limited to (1) a situation where persons provided incomplete or inaccurate information that would have been considered material to the NRC's disposition of a case, (2) information was deliberately withheld or obscured, or (3) the licensee made errors in calculations that would not have normally been reviewed by the NRC. Special circumstances do not include the discovery of additional information that was reasonably available to the NRC at the time the agency made its initial enforcement decision.

### 2.3.9 Enforcement Guidance Memorandum

Enforcement guidance memoranda (EGM) are used to provide the NRC staff with temporary enforcement guidance, including, in some instances, enforcement discretion, when the criteria specified in the EGM are met. EGM normally describe the situation that has occurred that requires the use of such guidance, as well as the length of time the EGM will be in effect. For a list of current EGM, see [Appendix A](#) of the NRC Enforcement Manual.

### 2.3.10 Commission Notification and Consultation on Enforcement Actions

Certain enforcement actions require either advance written notification to the Commission or advance consultation with and approval by the Commission depending on the nature of the proposed sanction. Specific enforcement actions requiring prior Commission notification and consultation include but are not limited to the following:

- a. Enforcement Actions Requiring Written Notification to the Commission:
  1. all enforcement actions involving civil penalties or orders
  2. all notices of enforcement discretion involving natural events, such as severe weather conditions
  3. the first time that discretion is exercised for a plant that meets the criteria of Section 3.1, "Violations Identified during Extended Shutdowns or Work Stoppages"
  4. where appropriate, based on the uniqueness or significance of the issue, when discretion is exercised for violations that meet the criteria of Section 3.5, "Violations Involving Special Circumstances"
- b. Enforcement Actions Requiring Advance Consultation with the Commission:
  1. an action affecting a licensee's operation that requires balancing the public health and safety or common defense and security implications of not operating

- against the potential radiological or other hazards associated with continued operation
2. proposals to impose a civil penalty for a single violation or problem that is greater than 3 times the Severity Level I value shown in Table A of Section 8.0 for that class of licensee
  3. any proposed enforcement action that involves a Severity Level I violation
  4. any action that the EDO believes warrants Commission involvement
  5. any proposed enforcement case involving an Office of Investigations (OI) report where the NRC staff (other than the OI staff) does not arrive at the same conclusions as those in the OI report concerning issues of intent if the Director, OI, concludes that Commission consultation is warranted
  6. any proposed enforcement action on which the Commission asks to be consulted

#### 2.4 Participation in the Enforcement Process

Before making a final enforcement decision in cases where the NRC is considering taking escalated enforcement action (i.e., a Severity Level III or higher NOV or a greater-than-green ROP finding), the NRC will typically offer the organization or individual subject to the enforcement action a conference with the NRC to present facts relevant to the assessment and disposition of the apparent violations. NRC may also request a conference if additional information is needed to make a determination relevant to the assessment and disposition of the apparent violations (e.g., whether violations occurred, the severity level of the violations, willfulness of any violations, and whether credit should be given for corrective actions or self-identification.) The conference is normally held at an NRC regional office and is normally open to public observation except when the proposed enforcement action involves discussions of classified or Safeguards Information, privacy information, proprietary information, or other sensitive, nonpublic information. In addition, licensees and individuals can be offered ADR (see Section 2.4.3, Alternative Dispute Resolution”).

##### 2.4.1 Predecisional Enforcement Conference

A predecisional enforcement conference (PEC) is the conference held for violations assessed using a severity level. The purpose of the PEC is to obtain information from the licensee, contractor, or other persons to assist the NRC in determining whether an enforcement action is necessary and, if so, what the appropriate enforcement action is. The PEC focuses on areas such as (1) a common understanding of the facts, root causes, and missed opportunities associated with the apparent violation or nonconformance and (2) a common understanding of the corrective actions taken or planned.

If the NRC concludes that it has sufficient information to make an informed enforcement decision involving a licensee, contractor, or vendor, a PEC will not normally be held. If a PEC is not held, the licensee may be given an opportunity to respond to a documented apparent violation (including its root causes and a description of planned or implemented corrective



actions) before the NRC takes enforcement action. However, if the NRC has sufficient information to conclude that a civil penalty is not warranted, it may issue an enforcement action without first obtaining the licensee's response to the documented apparent violation. A PEC is the final step in the NRC's fact-finding process before the agency decides whether to take an enforcement action.

The NRC will normally provide an opportunity for an individual to address apparent violations before the agency takes escalated enforcement action. Whether an individual will be given an opportunity for a PEC or an opportunity to address an apparent violation in writing will depend on the circumstances of the case, including the severity of the issue, the significance of the action the NRC is contemplating, and whether the individual has already had an opportunity to address the issue (e.g., a U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) hearing).

#### 2.4.2 Regulatory Conference

A regulatory conference is conducted in lieu of a PEC for power reactor inspection findings assessed using the SDP. For reactor inspection findings that are preliminarily assessed as greater than green, the licensee will normally be given an opportunity to meet with the NRC to exchange information related to that assessment. Because the significance assessment typically requires a determination as to whether violations occurred, a subsequent PEC is not normally required.

#### 2.4.3 Alternative Dispute Resolution

The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 (ADRA) authorizes and encourages the use of ADR by Federal agencies. ADR refers to a variety of processes that emphasize creative, cooperative approaches to handling conflicts in lieu of adversarial procedures. Mediation is the form of ADR typically used by the NRC. The use of ADR in the NRC's enforcement program is provided for cases involving discrimination and other wrongdoing cases after the NRC OI has completed an investigation (i.e., postinvestigation ADR), and the NRC concludes that pursuit of an enforcement action appears warranted. ADR may also be used for discrimination violations based solely on a finding by DOL; however, the NRC will not negotiate the finding by DOL. Individuals within the Commission's jurisdiction may also be offered ADR. Generally, postinvestigation ADR proceeds in parallel and works in conjunction with the traditional NRC enforcement program. ADR may be offered (1) before a PEC, (2) with the issuance of an NOV, or (3) with the imposition of a civil penalty. Use of the ADR program is voluntary by all parties, including the NRC; any participant may end the process at any time. Mediation activities are kept confidential in accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 574, and the terms of the settlement agreement are normally formalized in a confirmatory order, which is published in the *Federal Register*. Normally, there is a press release regarding the settlement.

In addition, licensees can use ADR to resolve discrimination complaints before the initiation of an investigation by OI (this is known as "early ADR"). Licensees may use the NRC's ADR program (see NRC Management Directive 8.8, "Management of Allegations") or a licensee-sponsored program. If the parties reach a settlement agreement using early ADR that is subsequently approved by the NRC before the initiation of an OI investigation, then the NRC will not pursue the matter through the traditional enforcement process.

For additional information concerning the NRC's postinvestigation ADR program, refer to Chapter 6 of the NRC Enforcement Manual or visit the NRC Web site.

In some circumstances, it may not be appropriate for the NRC to engage in ADR (e.g., the U.S. Department of Justice has substantial involvement in the case, cases in which the subject matter is such that a Confirmatory Order detailing the terms of a settlement agreement cannot be made public, or other particularly egregious cases in which the public interest is not served by engaging in ADR). The approval of the Director, OE, is required in those cases where the staff proposes not to offer ADR.

### **3.0 USE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION**

The NRC may choose to exercise discretion and either escalate or mitigate enforcement sanctions or otherwise refrain from taking enforcement action within the Commission's statutory authority. The exercise of discretion allows the NRC to determine what actions should be taken in a particular case, notwithstanding the guidance contained in this statement of policy. After considering the general tenets of this Policy and the safety and security significance of a violation and its surrounding circumstances, judgment and discretion may be exercised in determining the severity levels of violations and the appropriate enforcement sanctions to be taken.

#### **3.1 Violations Identified during Extended Shutdowns or Work Stoppages**

Notwithstanding the outcome of the normal NOV and civil penalty assessment processes, the NRC may reduce or refrain from issuing an NOV or a proposed civil penalty for a Severity Level II, III, or IV violation that is identified after one of the following:

- a. The NRC has taken significant enforcement action based on a major safety event contributing to an extended shutdown of an operating nuclear reactor or a material licensee (or a work stoppage at a construction site).
- b. The licensee enters an extended shutdown or work stoppage related to generally poor performance over a long period of time, provided that the violation is documented in an inspection report (or inspection records for some materials cases) and meets all of the following criteria:
  1. The violation was either identified by the licensee as a result of a comprehensive program for violation identification and correction developed in response to the shutdown or work stoppage or identified as a result of an employee or contractor concern identified to the licensee through its internal processes.
  2. The violation was based on activities of the licensee before the events leading to the shutdown.
  3. The violation would not be categorized at Severity Level I.
  4. The violation was not willful.

5. The licensee's decision to restart the plant from the shutdown or work stoppage requires NRC concurrence.
- c. Notwithstanding the discretion criterion described above in 3.1.b.4, enforcement discretion for violations involving willfulness may still be appropriate under the specific circumstances of a case. However, the Director, OE, must approve the exercise of such discretion when a willful violation is involved.

### 3.2 Violations Involving Old Design Issues

For operating facilities, the NRC may exercise discretion to refrain from proposing a civil penalty for a Severity Level II or III violation involving a past problem, such as in engineering, design, or installation, if the violation is documented in an inspection report (or inspection records for some material cases) that describes the corrective action and it meets all of the following criteria:

- a. It was identified by the licensee as a result of a voluntary initiative.
- b. It was or will be corrected, including immediate corrective action and long-term comprehensive corrective action to prevent recurrence, within a reasonable time following identification (this action should involve expanding the initiative, as necessary, to identify other failures caused by similar root causes).
- c. It was unlikely to be identified (after the violation occurred) by efforts such as normal surveillances or routinely scheduled QA activities.

In addition, the NRC may refrain from issuing an NOV for a Severity Level II, III, or IV violation that meets the above criteria, provided that the violation was caused by conduct that is not reasonably linked to the licensee's present performance (normally, violations that are at least 3 years old or violations occurring during plant construction) and there had not been prior notice so that the licensee could not have reasonably identified the violation earlier. This exercise of discretion is to encourage licensees to initiate efforts to identify and correct subtle violations that are not likely to be identified by routine efforts before degraded safety systems are called on to work.

### 3.3 Violations Identified Because of Previous Enforcement Action

The NRC may refrain from issuing an NOV or a proposed civil penalty for a Severity Level II, III, or IV violation that is identified after the NRC has taken enforcement action, if the violation is identified by the licensee as part of the corrective action for the previous enforcement action and the violation has the same or similar root cause as the violation for which enforcement action was previously taken. Additionally, the new example must not substantially change the safety significance or the character of the regulatory concern arising out of the initial violation and must be corrected, including immediate corrective action and long-term comprehensive corrective action to prevent recurrence, within a reasonable time following identification.

### 3.4 Violations Involving Certain Discrimination Issues

For violations of the NRC's employee protection regulations (e.g., 10 CFR 30.7, 50.7 and 10 CFR 52.5), the NRC may exercise discretion to mitigate enforcement sanctions and refrain from issuing a civil penalty and/or an NOV when a licensee who, without the need for Government intervention, identifies an issue of discrimination and takes prompt, comprehensive, and effective corrective action to address both the particular situation and, if required, the overall work environment for raising safety concerns.

Similarly, the NRC may exercise discretion when a licensee settles a complaint filed with DOL under Section 211 of the ERA before DOL makes an initial finding of discrimination and, as necessary, addresses the overall work environment. Alternatively, if a finding of discrimination is made, the licensee may choose to settle the case before the evidentiary hearing begins. In such cases, the NRC may exercise its discretion not to take enforcement action when the licensee has addressed the overall work environment for raising safety concerns and has publicized that a complaint of discrimination for engaging in protected activity was made to DOL, that the matter was settled to the satisfaction of the employee, and that, if the DOL area office found discrimination, the licensee has acted to positively reemphasize that discrimination will not be tolerated.

The NRC may also exercise discretion in discrimination cases in which a licensee settles a matter promptly after a person comes to the NRC without going to DOL. The NRC would normally not exercise such discretion in cases in which the licensee does not appropriately address the overall work environment or in cases that involve the following: allegations of discrimination as a result of providing information directly to the NRC, allegations of discrimination caused by a manager above first-line supervisor, allegations of discrimination where a history of findings of discrimination (by DOL or the NRC) or settlements suggests a programmatic rather than an isolated discrimination problem, or allegations of discrimination that appear particularly blatant or egregious.

### 3.5 Violations Involving Special Circumstances

Notwithstanding the outcome of the normal enforcement process, the NRC may reduce or refrain from issuing a civil penalty or an NOV for a Severity Level II, III, or IV violation based on the merits of the case after considering the guidance in this statement of policy and such factors as the age of the violation, the significance of the violation, the clarity of the requirement, the appropriateness of the requirement, the overall sustained performance of the licensee, and other relevant circumstances, including any that may have changed since the violation occurred. This discretion is expected to be exercised only where application of the normal guidance in the Policy is unwarranted. In addition, the NRC may refrain from issuing enforcement action for violations resulting from matters not within a licensee's control, such as equipment failures that were not avoidable by reasonable licensee QA measures or management controls. Generally, however, licensees are held responsible for the acts of their employees and contractors. Accordingly, this Policy should not be construed to excuse personnel or contractor errors.

### 3.6 Use of Discretion in Determining the Amount of a Civil Penalty

Notwithstanding the outcome of the normal civil penalty assessment process addressed in Section 2.3.4, “Civil Penalty”, the NRC may exercise discretion<sup>5</sup> by either proposing a civil penalty where application of the civil penalty assessment factors would otherwise result in zero penalty or by escalating the amount of the resulting civil penalty to ensure that the proposed civil penalty appropriately reflects the significance of the issue. In accordance with Section 2.3.10, “Commission Notification and Consultation on Enforcement Actions”, of this Policy, the Commission must be notified of all enforcement actions involving civil penalties and must be consulted for any proposed civil penalty for a single violation or problem that is greater than 3 times the value in Tables A and B in Section 8.0 for the severity level violation being considered.

Civil penalty discretion should be considered for, but is not limited to, the following:

- a. violations or problems originally categorized at a Severity Level I or II
- b. overexposures or the release of licensed material in excess of NRC limits
- c. particularly poor licensee performance
- d. situations when the licensee’s previous enforcement history has been particularly poor, or when the current violation directly repeats an earlier violation
- e. willfulness, particularly instances where the licensee made a conscious decision to be in noncompliance with NRC requirements in order to obtain an economic benefit
- f. situations where the violation resulted in a substantial increase in risk, including cases in which the duration of the violation has contributed to the substantial increase in risk
- g. violations involving a Master Materials Licensee (MML)—Discretion not to issue a civil penalty may be used in cases where the MML’s oversight program resolved the issue appropriately. In recognition of the scope, level of responsibility, and independence entrusted to MMLs, the NRC may use discretion to increase a civil penalty by multiples of the normal base civil penalty. This increase would normally be applied in cases where a programmatic failure occurred in the MML’s oversight program.

### 3.7 Exercise of Discretion to Issue Orders

The NRC may exercise discretion, where necessary or desirable, by issuing orders with or in lieu of civil penalties to achieve or formalize corrective actions and to deter further recurrence of serious violations.

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<sup>5</sup> In the context of this section, “discretion” refers to the escalation of an enforcement action or sanction. This differs from the typical use of the term to indicate the NRC’s choice to mitigate or not take enforcement action for an issue.

### 3.8 Notices of Enforcement Discretion for Operating Power Reactors and Gaseous Diffusion Plants

The NRC may choose not to enforce the applicable technical specification (TS) limiting condition for operation (LCO) or other license conditions, in circumstances where compliance would involve an unnecessary plant transient or the performance of a test, inspection, or system realignment that may not be the most prudent action to take under the specific plant conditions, or unnecessary delays in plant startup, without a corresponding health and safety benefit. Similarly, for a gaseous diffusion plant, circumstances may arise where compliance with a technical safety requirement or TS or other certificate condition would unnecessarily call for a total plant shutdown or, notwithstanding that a safety, safeguards, or security feature was degraded or inoperable, compliance would unnecessarily place the plant in a transient or condition where those features could be required.

The NRC will issue a notice of enforcement discretion (NOED) only if the staff is clearly satisfied that the action is consistent with protecting the public health and safety or security. The NRC staff may also grant enforcement discretion in cases involving severe weather or other natural phenomena, based upon balancing the public health and safety or common defense and security of not operating against the potential radiological or other hazards associated with continued operation, and a determination that safety will not be impacted unacceptably by exercising this discretion. The staff shall inform the Commission expeditiously following the granting of a NOED in these situations.

Issuance of an NOED does not change the fact that a violation will occur, nor does it imply that enforcement discretion is being exercised for any violation that may have led to the violation at issue. In each case where the NRC has chosen to issue an NOED, enforcement action will normally be taken for the root causes, to the extent violations were involved, that led to the noncompliance for which enforcement discretion was used.

Additional guidance on the process for issuing an NOED is found on the NRC's web site.

## **4.0 ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS INVOLVING INDIVIDUALS**

Any individual may be subject to NRC enforcement action if the individual (1) deliberately causes or would have caused, if not detected, a licensee to be in violation of any, regulation, or order, or any term, condition, or limitation of any license issued by the Commission related to NRC-licensed activities or (2) deliberately provides materially inaccurate or incomplete information to the NRC, a licensee, an applicant or a licensee, or a contractor or subcontractor of a licensee or applicant for a license (e.g., see "Deliberate Misconduct" regulations in 10 CFR 30.10, 10 CFR 50.5, 10 CFR 52.4, and 10 CFR 76.10).

The agency will normally take enforcement actions against nonlicensed individuals only in those cases involving deliberate misconduct by the nonlicensed individual (cases involving a lack of reasonable assurance are an exception, as discussed below in Section 4.2, "Notices of Violation and Orders to Individuals"). However, the NRC may take enforcement action against NRC-

licensed reactor operators<sup>6</sup> even if the violation does not involve deliberate misconduct, since operators licensed by the NRC are subject to all applicable Commission requirements (see 10 CFR 55.53(d)).

The NRC considers enforcement actions against individuals to be significant actions that will be closely evaluated and judiciously applied. Typically, the agency will take an enforcement action involving an individual, either licensed or nonlicensed, only when the violation has actual or potential safety significance. NOVs and orders are examples of enforcement actions that may be issued to individuals. Enforcement actions issued to individuals will normally be placed on the NRC OE Web site. Generally, before taking enforcement action against an individual, the NRC will seek to gather information to determine whether an order or other enforcement action should be issued. The agency may gather such information by conducting a PEC, by requesting a written response from the individual, or by issuing a DFI. If the violation was deliberate, the individual may also be provided the opportunity to address the apparent violation during ADR. The exact nature of the opportunity to address the apparent violation will depend on the circumstances of the case, including the significance of the issue, the enforcement sanction the NRC is contemplating, and whether the individual has already had an opportunity to respond to the apparent violation.

Since it is NRC policy to hold licensees responsible for the acts of their employees and contractors, in most cases, the NRC will cite the licensee for violations committed by their employees and contractors. Violations with a significance that would typically warrant escalated enforcement action against the licensee may warrant an enforcement action against an individual (e.g., deliberately providing inaccurate or incomplete information or deliberate falsification of documents). Typically, the NRC will not take enforcement action against the employee or contractor if failures of licensee management (e.g., improper training or inadequate procedures) are responsible for the individual's improper actions. In deciding whether to issue enforcement actions both to a licensee and a nonlicensed individual, the NRC will make judgments on a case-by-case basis.

#### 4.1 Considerations in Determining Enforcement Actions Involving Individuals

The NRC recognizes that judgments regarding enforcement actions against individuals will have to be made on a case-by-case basis. The NRC may propose an enforcement action or refrain from taking an enforcement action after considering all the relevant circumstances of each case.

The primary factors considered by the NRC are (1) the significance of the underlying violation or technical issue (not considered in discrimination cases) and (2) the individual's position within the organization (e.g., notwithstanding an individual's job title, the position of the individual within the licensee's organizational structure and the individual's responsibilities related to the oversight of licensed activities and to the use of licensed material).

Other factors include whether the violation was the result of deliberate misconduct (a prerequisite for taking action against a nonlicensed individual), the benefit to the wrongdoer

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<sup>6</sup> As used in this Policy, the term "licensed reactor operator" includes NRC licensed reactor operators (ROs) and NRC licensed senior reactor operators (SROs).

(e.g., direct personal or corporate gain), the degree of management responsibility or culpability, and the attitude of the wrongdoer (e.g., admission of wrongdoing, acceptance of responsibility).

#### 4.2 Notices of Violation and Orders to Individuals

Although the NRC has the authority to issue NOV's to any individual who holds an NRC license and violates NRC requirements, regardless of whether willfulness, either deliberate misconduct or careless disregard, was involved, actions against licensed individuals for nonwillful violations are rare. In the case of a licensed operator's failure to meet applicable fitness-for-duty requirements (i.e., 10 CFR 55.53(j)), the NRC may issue an NOV to the individual, or an order to suspend, modify, or revoke the 10 CFR Part 55 operator's license. The agency may also issue to licensed individuals orders containing provisions that would modify or revoke the individual's license or prohibit involvement in NRC-licensed activities for a specified period of time (normally the period of suspension would not exceed 5 years) or until certain conditions are satisfied (e.g., completing specified training or meeting certain qualifications).

The Commission may also take enforcement action (e.g., an order or NOV) against nonlicensed individuals, including contractors and subcontractors and their employees, who knowingly provide components, equipment, or other goods or services that relate to a licensee's activities subject to NRC regulations. However, the NRC will not normally issue an enforcement action against a nonlicensed individual unless the individual's actions were a result of deliberate misconduct. When needed to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety and the common defense and security or the public interest, the NRC may issue an order to an unlicensed person, whether a firm or an individual, requiring (1) the removal of the person from all NRC-licensed activities for a specified period of time (normally, the period of suspension would not exceed 5 years) and (2) prior notice to the NRC before engaging in NRC-licensed activities. In addition, orders to employers who are NRC licensees could require retraining, additional oversight, independent verification of activities performed by the individual, if the individual is to be involved in licensed activities, and to inform other persons or NRC licensees who make reference inquiries (e.g., employment reference inquiries) regarding the nonlicensed individual or firm, of the issuance of such an order.

For either a licensed or nonlicensed individual, the initial determination of a period of prohibition from NRC-licensed activities is normally based on the significance of the underlying violation and the individual's level of responsibility within the organization. A high level of significance combined with a high degree of responsibility results in initially considering a 5-year prohibition period. Depending on the circumstances of the case, the NRC may consider either escalation (including a permanent ban from NRC-licensed activities in significant cases) or mitigation of the prohibition period.

In addition to the above, the NRC may take enforcement action against a licensee that may affect an individual, where the conduct of the individual calls into question the NRC's reasonable assurance that licensed activities will be properly conducted. The NRC may take enforcement action for reasons that would warrant refusal to issue a license on an original application. Accordingly, appropriate enforcement actions may be taken regarding matters that raise issues of integrity (e.g., lying to the NRC), competence, fitness for duty, or other matters that may not necessarily be a violation of specific Commission requirements.



#### 4.3 Civil Penalties to Individuals

Except for individuals subject to civil penalties under Section 206 of the ERA, as amended, the NRC will not normally impose a civil penalty against an individual. However, Section 234 of the AEA gives the Commission authority to impose civil penalties on “any person.” Furthermore, any person, whether or not a licensee of the Commission, who violates any regulations adopted under Section 147, “Safeguards Information,” of the AEA will be subject to the full range of enforcement sanctions, including civil penalties. Section 11s of the AEA broadly defines “person” to include individuals, a variety of organizations, and their representatives or agents.

#### 4.4 Confirmatory Orders to Individuals

Agreements with individuals reached as a result of the ADR process are normally formalized by the issuance of a confirmatory order. ADR is typically offered to individuals consistent with the process used for licensees (see Section 2.4.3 of this Policy).

### **5.0 PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION REGARDING ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS**

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, “Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding,” enforcement actions and licensees’ responses are normally made publicly available for inspection. However, some security-related information will not be made available to the public. The NRC Office of Public Affairs is responsible for making final decisions as to whether press releases will be issued; however, such releases are normally issued for orders and civil penalties at the same time that the order or proposed imposition of the civil penalty is issued. Press releases may also be issued when a civil penalty is withdrawn or substantially mitigated. Press releases are not normally issued for NOVs that are not accompanied by orders or proposed civil penalties, unless the issue or licensee involved is of some particular interest.

### **6.0 VIOLATION EXAMPLES**

The violation examples in this Policy are intentionally broad in scope so as to serve as a set of guiding examples that are neither exhaustive nor controlling for making severity level determinations. Licensed activities are placed in the most appropriate activity area in light of the particular violation involved, including activities not directly covered by one of the listed areas (e.g., import and export license activities). The violation examples are not intended to address every possible circumstance. However, when an enforcement case scenario very nearly achieves all or some of the criteria set forth in an example, the case should be considered to be at the severity level of that example. For example, when using the examples in Section 6.7, “Health Physics”, if the circumstances of a case are such that one or more of the severity levels in an example were very nearly reached, and it was only fortuitous that the limit was not actually met and/or exceeded, then the severity level for the subject example would be applicable. Additionally, if the circumstances for a case of a specific license/certificate category are comparable to an example that is written for a scenario with a different type of license/certificate category and in the same applicable section, the severity level for the subject example will

normally be considered applicable to the case (e.g., the case for an industrial licensee presents a set of circumstances and considerations comparable to those for a medical example provided Section 6.3, Materials Operations”); hence, the severity level for the medical example can be applied).

## 6.1 Reactor Operations

a. *Severity Level I* violations involve, for example:

1. A system<sup>7</sup> that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier is unable to perform its licensing basis safety function<sup>8</sup> when actually called on to function;
2. An inadvertent or unplanned criticality; or
3. A technical specification safety limit is exceeded.

b. *Severity Level II* violations involve, for example:

1. A system that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a DBA or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier would be unable to perform its licensing basis safety function had it been called upon to function.

c. *Severity Level III* violations involve, for example:

1. A licensee fails to shut down the reactor or follow remedial actions permitted by a technical specification action requirement when an LCO is not met (i.e., noncompliance with 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(i));
2. A system that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a DBA or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of the fission product barrier not being able to perform its licensing basis safety function because it is not fully qualified (per the IMC Part 9900, ODP) (e.g., materials or components not environmentally qualified);
3. Changes in reactor parameters cause unanticipated reductions in margins to safety;

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<sup>7</sup> The term “system” as used in these violation examples includes administrative control systems, managerial control systems, as well as physical systems.

<sup>8</sup> “Licensing basis safety function” means the total safety function and is not directed toward a loss of redundancy. A loss of one subsystem does not defeat the intended safety function as long as the other subsystem is operable.

4. A licensee fails to adequately oversee contractors, which results in the use of safety-significant products or services that are defective or of indeterminate quality;
  5. Equipment failures caused by inadequate or improper maintenance substantially complicate recovery from a plant transient;
  6. A licensee fails to obtain prior Commission approval required by 10 CFR 50.59 for a change which has a consequence evaluated by the SDP as having low-to-moderate or greater safety significance (i.e., white, yellow, or red); or
  7. A licensee fails to update the FSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e), and the un-updated FSAR is used to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation for a change to the facility or procedures, implemented without Commission approval, that results in a condition evaluated as having low-to-moderate or greater safety significance (i.e., white, yellow, or red) by the SDP.
- d. *Severity Level IV* violations involve, for example:
1. A failure to comply with a technical specification action requirement demonstrates misapplication of the conventions in technical specifications Section 1.0, "Use and Application", or the allowances for LCO and surveillance requirement applicabilities in technical specifications Section 3.0;
  2. Violations of 10 CFR 50.59 result in conditions evaluated as having very low safety significance (i.e., green) by the SDP;
  3. A licensee fails to update the FSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) in cases where the erroneous information is not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility or procedures; or
  4. A licensee fails to adequately assess the risk of plant operations associated with implementation of a risk-informed technical specification allowance such that the allowance is implemented inappropriately.

## 6.2 Fuel Cycle Operations

This section provides examples in the area of fuel cycle operations for licensees with an integrated safety analysis (ISA) under 10 CFR Part 70, "Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material," Subpart H, "Additional Requirements for Certain Licensees Authorized To Possess a Critical Mass of Special Nuclear Material," and fuel cycle licensees without an ISA. The NRC will determine the appropriate severity level for a specific violation by using licensee ISAs and other applicable risk information.

- a. *Severity Level I* violations involve, for example:
1. Under 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H, a high consequence event occurs; or
  2. For licensees not under 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H, the occurrence of an event with a consequence commensurate with a 10 CFR Part 70 high consequence, as a result of licensed materials or hazardous chemicals produced from licensed materials.
- b. *Severity Level II* violations involve, for example:
1. Under 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H, a high-consequence event is now “not unlikely” based on a licensee’s ISA;
  2. Under 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H, an intermediate-consequence event occurs;
  3. For licensees not under 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H, a very substantial increase in the likelihood of a consequence commensurate with a Part 70 high consequence occurs; or
  4. For licensees not under 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H, an event with a consequence commensurate with a Part 70 intermediate consequence occurs as the result of licensed materials or hazardous chemicals produced from licensed materials.
- c. *Severity Level III* violations involve, for example:
1. Under 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H, a high-consequence event is now “unlikely” based on a licensee’s ISA;
  2. Under 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H, an intermediate-consequence event is now “not unlikely” based on a licensee’s ISA;
  3. For licensees not under 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H, a substantial increase in the likelihood of a consequence commensurate with a Part 70 high consequence occurs;
  4. For licensees not under 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H, a significant increase in the likelihood of a consequence commensurate with a Part 70 intermediate consequence occurs;
  5. A significant failure to comply with the action statement for a technical safety requirement LCO results in the appropriate action not being taken within the required time;
  6. Under 10 CFR 70.72, “Facility Changes and Change Process,” or 10 CFR 76.68, “Plant Changes,” a significant failure to adequately evaluate a change to the

facility results in implementation of the change without a required license or certificate amendment;

7. Under 10 CFR 70.24 or 10 CFR 76.89, both titled "Criticality Accident Requirements," a criticality accident alarm system fails to provide either detection or annunciation coverage for a substantial time period during which operations involving handling or using fissile material occurred;
  8. During an actual site area emergency, a licensee fails to do any of the following promptly and correctly:
    - (a) classify the event
    - (b) make required notifications to responsible Federal, State, and local agencies, or
    - (c) respond to the event (e.g., assess actual or potential offsite consequences, activate emergency response facilities, and augment shift staff) during a site area emergency; or
  9. A licensee fails to meet or implement more than one emergency planning standard.
- d. *Severity Level IV* violations involve, for example:
1. Under 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H, a licensee fails to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 70.61, "Performance Requirements," or Appendix A, "Reportable Safety Events," to 10 CFR Part 70, but the failure does not result in a Severity Level I, II, or III violation;
  2. A failure of safety systems or controls occurs such that an acceptable safety margin has not been maintained, but the failure does not result in a Severity Level I, II, or III violation;
  3. A less significant failure to comply with the action statement for a technical safety requirement LCO occurs when the appropriate action was not taken within the required time;
  4. Under 10 CFR 70.72 or 10 CFR 76.68, a less significant failure to adequately evaluate a change to the facility results in implementation of the change without a required license or certificate amendment. The failure does not result in a Severity Level I, II, or III violation;
  5. Under 10 CFR 70.24 or 10 CFR 76.89, a criticality accident alarm system fails to provide either detection or annunciation coverage of fissile material operations during a time period when fissile material was handled, used, or stored;

6. During an actual Alert emergency, a licensee fails to do any of the following promptly and correctly:
  - (a) classify the event,
  - (b) make required notifications to responsible Federal, State, and local agencies, or
  - (c) respond to the event (e.g., assess actual or potential onsite consequences, activate emergency response facilities, and, if necessary, augment shift staff) during an Alert emergency.
7. A licensee fails to meet or implement more than one emergency planning standard involving assessment or notification during an Alert emergency; or
8. A licensee fails to meet or implement any emergency planning standard or requirement not directly related to assessment and notification (e.g., emergency response training, emergency equipment maintenance).

6.3 Materials Operations

a. *Severity Level I* violations involve, for example:

1. The loss of control over licensed or certified activities, including chemical processes that are integral to the licensed or certified activity, results in serious injury or loss of life;
2. A system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event is inoperable when actually required to perform its design function, and this results in serious injury or loss of life;
3. Failure to use a properly prepared written directive as required by 10 CFR 35.40, "Written Directives," or failure to develop, implement, or maintain procedures for administrations requiring a written directive as required by 10 CFR 35.41, "Procedures for Administrations Requiring a Written Directive," results in serious injury or loss of life; or
4. Failure to have and/or to follow written operating procedures as required by 10 CFR 36.53, "Operating and Emergency Procedures," results in a serious injury or loss of life.

b. *Severity Level II* violations involve, for example:

1. The loss of control over licensed or certified activities, including chemical processes that are integral to the licensed or certified activity, results in the substantial potential for a significant injury or loss of life, whether or not radioactive material is released;

2. A system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event is inoperable when actually required to perform its design function;
  3. A substantial programmatic failure to implement written directives or procedures for administrations requiring a written directive, such as a failure of the licensee's procedures to address one or more of the elements in 10 CFR 35.40 or 10 CFR 35.41, or a failure to train personnel in those procedures, results in a medical event; or
  4. Failure to have and/or to follow written operating procedures as required by 10 CFR 36.53 results in a substantial potential (e.g., an event did not occur, but no barriers, neither procedural nor system, including interlocks, would have prevented it, and the event was not highly unlikely to occur) for a serious injury or death.
- c. *Severity Level III* violations involve, for example:
1. A system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event has one of the following characteristics:
    - (a) It is unable to perform its intended function under certain conditions (e.g., a safety system is not operable unless the required backup power is available), or
    - (b) It is outside design specifications to the extent that a detailed evaluation would be required to determine its operability;
  2. A programmatic failure occurs to implement written directives or procedures for administrations requiring a written directive, such as the following:
    - (a) A licensee's procedures fail to address one or more of the elements in 10 CFR 35.40 or 10 CFR 35.41,
    - (b) A licensee fails to train personnel in procedures for administrations requiring a written directive,
    - (c) A nonisolated failure occurs to use and follow written directives or procedures for administrations requiring a written directive; or
    - (d) A licensee fails to have procedures or requirements for written directives or fails to have procedures for administrations that require written directives.
  3. A licensee fails to secure a portable gauge with at least two independent physical controls whenever the gauge is not under the control and constant surveillance of the licensee as required by 10 CFR 30.34(i);
  4. A significant failure to implement the requirements of 10 CFR Part 34, "Licenses

for Industrial Radiography and Radiation Safety Requirements for Industrial Radiographic Operations,” during radiographic operations includes, but is not limited to, the following:

- (a) During radiographic operations at a location other than a permanent radiographic installation, a licensee fails to have present a radiographer and at least one additional radiographer or qualified individual,
  - (b) A licensee fails, during radiographic operations, to use radiographic equipment, radiation survey instruments, and/or personnel monitoring devices as required by 10 CFR Part 34, or
  - (c) During radiographic operations, a failure to stop work occurs, after a pocket dosimeter is found to have gone off-scale or after an electronic dosimeter reads greater than 200 millirem (mrem), and before a determination is made of the individual’s actual radiation exposure;
5. An unqualified person conducts licensed activities. The unqualified person is characterized by either of the following:
- (a) lacking adequate qualifications, experience, or training to safely conduct activities, or
  - (b) lacking the required certification or training for positions such as radiographer; authorized user under 10 CFR Part 35, “Medical Use of Byproduct Material”; or irradiator operator under 10 CFR 36.51, “Training”
6. Licensed material is used on humans where such use is not authorized;
7. A licensee authorizes the release from its control of an individual who does not meet the release criteria in 10 CFR 35.75, “Release of Individuals Containing Unsealed Byproduct Material or Implants Containing Byproduct Material;”
8. An individual without supervision operates an irradiator when the individual has not been trained as required by 10 CFR 36.51;
9. A programmatic failure occurs to have and follow written operating procedures as required by 10 CFR 36.53;
10. A programmatic failure occurs to perform inspection and maintenance checks as required by 10 CFR 36.61, “Inspection and Maintenance;”
11. A licensee fails to seek required NRC approval before the implementation of a significant change in licensed activities that has radiological or programmatic significance, such as the following:
- (a) a change in ownership,



- (b) a change in the location where licensed activities are being conducted or where licensed material is being stored,
  - (c) an increase in the quantity or type of radioactive material being processed or used that has radiological significance, or
  - (d) a change in program status with regard to the RSO named on its license (e.g., licensee fails to have an RSO; licensee appoints an unqualified individual as RSO);
12. Failures occur involving decommissioning requirements, such as the following:
- (a) a significant failure to meet decommissioning as required by regulation or license condition, or
  - (b) failure to meet required schedules without adequate justification
- d. *Severity Level IV* violations involve, for example:
1. A licensee fails to use a properly prepared written directive as required by 10 CFR 35.40, or fails to develop, implement, or maintain procedures for administrations requiring a written directive as required by 10 CFR 35.41, whether or not a medical event occurs, provided that the failures are characterized by all of the following:
    - (a) are isolated
    - (b) do not demonstrate programmatic weaknesses in implementation
    - (c) have limited consequences if a medical event is involved;
  2. A licensee fails to keep the records required by 10 CFR 35.2040, "Records of Written Directives," and 10 CFR 35.2041, "Records for Procedures for Administrations Requiring a Written Directive;"
  3. A licensee fails to implement procedures including, but not limited to, recordkeeping, surveys, and inventories;
  4. A licensee fails to comply with the U.S. Department of Transportation requirement to provide hazardous material (HAZMAT) employee training as required by 10 CFR 71.5(a);
  5. There is an isolated failure to have and to follow written operating procedures as required by 10 CFR 36.53;
  6. A licensee fails to document the required certification or training for positions such as radiographer, authorized user under 10 CFR Part 35, or irradiator operator under 10 CFR 36.51;

7. A licensee fails to seek required NRC approval before the implementation of a change in ownership that results in little or no adverse impact on radiological or programmatic activities or on the NRC's ability to inspect licensed activities, such that the locations and types of activities are unaffected by the unauthorized license transfer; or
8. A licensee fails to seek required NRC approval prior to replacement of the RSO, where the RSO was evaluated as qualified, and the licensee was making reasonable attempt to amend the license.

#### 6.4 Licensed Reactor Operators

a. *Severity Level I* violations involve, for example:

1. A licensed operator, or a senior operator actively performing the functions covered by that position, is involved in procedural errors that result in, or exacerbate the consequences of, an Alert or higher level emergency, and, at the time the procedural errors occurred, was determined to be either of the following:
  - (a) unfit for duty as a result of a confirmed positive test for drugs or alcohol at cutoff levels established by the licensee, or
  - (b) under the influence of any prescription or over-the-counter drug as described in 10 CFR 55.53(j).

b. *Severity Level II* violations involve, for example:

1. A licensed operator, or a senior operator actively performing the functions covered by that position, is involved in procedural errors, and, at the time the procedural error occurred, was determined to be any of the following:
  - (a) unfit for duty as a result of a confirmed positive test for drugs or alcohol at cutoff levels established by the facility licensee,
  - (b) under the influence of any prescription or over-the-counter drug as described in 10 CFR 55.53(j), or
  - (c) in noncompliance with a condition stated on the individual's license;
2. A deliberate compromise occurs of an application, test, or examination required by 10 CFR Part 55, "Operators' Licenses," or inaccurate or incomplete information is deliberately provided to the NRC and has any of the following effects:
  - (a) in the case of initial operator licensing, contributes to an individual being granted an operator or senior operator license, or

- (b) in the case of operator requalification, contributes to an individual being permitted to continue to perform the functions of an operator or senior operator; or
  - 3. A licensed operator or senior operator, while within the protected area, is involved in the use, sale, or possession of illegal drugs or the consumption of alcoholic beverages.
- c. *Severity Level III* violations involve, for example:
- 1. A licensed operator, or a senior operator actively performing the functions covered by that position, is determined to be any of the following:
    - (a) unfit for duty as a result of a confirmed positive test for drugs or alcohol at cutoff levels established by the licensee,
    - (b) under the influence of any prescription or over-the-counter drug as described in 10 CFR 55.53(j), or
    - (c) in noncompliance with a condition stated on the individual's license;
  - 2. A licensed operator, or a senior operator actively performing the functions covered by that position, is inattentive to duty;
  - 3. A licensed operator or senior operator is involved in the use, sale, or possession of illegal drugs;
  - 4. A nonwillful compromise of an application, test, or examination required by 10 CFR Part 55, or inaccurate or incomplete information inadvertently provided to the NRC, subsequently contributes to the NRC making an incorrect regulatory decision, such as the following:
    - (a) in the case of initial operator licensing, contributes to an individual being granted an operator or senior operator license, or
    - (b) in the case of operator requalification, contributes to an individual being permitted to continue to perform the functions of an operator or senior operator.
- d. *Severity Level IV* violations involve, for example:
- 1. A non-willful compromise of an application, test or examination required by 10 CFR Part 55, or isolated or limited cases of inaccurate or incomplete information inadvertently provided to the NRC that does not contribute to the NRC making an incorrect regulatory decision or an unqualified individual performing the functions of an operator or senior operator, for example:

- (a) in the case of licensed operator medical certification, does not contribute to an individual performing the functions of a licensed operator or senior operator who is found not to have met the requirements set forth in ANSI/ANS 3.4, Section 5, "Health Requirements and Disqualifying Conditions," or
  - (b) in the case of licensed operator medical certification, does not contribute to an incorrect (or no) condition being placed on an individual's license which is necessary to restrict the activities or require additional monitoring of the individuals (such as "solo operation is not authorized" or "must submit medical status report") based on a medical condition; or
2. A licensed operator or senior operator has a confirmed positive test for drugs or alcohol after arriving on-site to perform scheduled work or to attend required requalification training that does not result in a Severity Level I, II, or III violation.

6.5 Facility Construction (10 CFR Part 50 and 52 Licensees and Fuel Cycle Facilities)

- a. *Severity Level I* violations involve, for example:
  - 1. A significant breakdown of a licensee's QA program that results in multiple structures or systems being completed<sup>9</sup> in a manner such that they would not have satisfied their intended safety purpose.
- b. *Severity Level II* Violations involve, for example:
  - 1. A significant breakdown occurs in the QA program, as exemplified by multiple deficiencies in construction QA related to more than one work activity (e.g., structural, piping, electrical, foundations). These deficiencies involve the licensee's failure to provide adequate oversight or take prompt corrective action and involve multiple examples of deficient construction or construction of unknown quality as the result of inadequate program implementation; or
  - 2. Multiple structures or systems are completed in a manner that would have an adverse impact on the safety of operations.
- c. *Severity Level III* violations involve, for example:
  - 1. A breakdown occurs in a licensee's QA program for construction related to a single work activity (e.g., structural, piping, electrical, foundations). This significant deficiency involves the licensee's failure to provide adequate oversight or take prompt corrective action and entails multiple examples of deficient construction or construction of unknown quality as the result of inadequate program implementation;

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<sup>9</sup> The term completed as used in this supplement means completion of a construction activity, including review and acceptance by the construction Quality Control or Quality Assurance organization.

2. A failure to confirm the design safety requirements of a structure or system as the result of inadequate preoperational test program implementation; or
  3. Ineffective corrective actions result in multiple examples of recurring significant deficiencies associated with a single construction activity.
- d. *Severity Level IV* violations involve, for example:
1. A licensee fails to meet regulatory requirements, including one or more QA criteria that have more than minor safety or environmental significance;
  2. A licensee fails to establish, maintain, or implement adequate controls over procurement, construction, examination, or testing processes that are important to safety;
  3. A licensee fails to adequately implement QA processes or procedures; or
  4. A licensee fails to maintain QA records to demonstrate the adequacy of construction.

#### 6.6 Emergency Preparedness

These examples are appropriate for violations at operating power reactor facilities for those violations that are dispositioned under traditional enforcement rather than under the ROP. For operating power reactors, the NRC treats participant performance deficiencies identified in emergency exercises under the ROP. This section also provides examples of violations in the area of emergency preparedness at nonpower reactor facilities.

- a. *Severity Level I* violations involve, for example:
1. During an actual General Emergency, a licensee fails to promptly do any of the following:
    - (a) correctly classify the event,
    - (b) make required notifications to responsible Federal, State, and local agencies, or
    - (c) respond to the event (e.g., assess actual or potential offsite consequences, activate emergency response facilities, and augment shift staff).
- b. *Severity Level II* violations involve, for example:
1. During an actual Site Area Emergency, a licensee fails to promptly do any of the following:

- (a) correctly classify the event,
  - (b) make required notifications to responsible Federal, State, and local agencies, or
  - (c) respond to the event (e.g., assess actual or potential offsite consequences, activate emergency response facilities, and augment shift staff); or
2. A licensee loses its ability to meet or implement any regulatory requirement related to assessment or notification<sup>10</sup> such that the required function would not be implemented during the response to an actual emergency.
- c. *Severity Level III* violations involve, for example:
1. During an actual Alert emergency, a licensee fails to promptly do any of the following:
    - (a) correctly classify the event,
    - (b) make required notifications to responsible Federal, State, and local agencies, or
    - (c) respond to the event (e.g., assess actual or potential offsite consequences, activate emergency response facilities, and augment shift staff);
  2. A licensee's ability to meet or implement any regulatory requirement related to assessment or notification is degraded such that the effectiveness of the emergency plan decreases. Although the regulatory requirement could be implemented during the response to an actual emergency, the implementation would be degraded (e.g., not fully effective, inappropriately delayed); or
  3. A licensee's ability to meet or implement any regulatory requirement *not* related to assessment or notification is lost such that the required function would not be implemented during the response to an actual emergency.
- d. *Severity Level IV* violations involve, for example:
1. Licensee's ability to meet or implement any regulatory requirement *not* related to assessment or notification such that the effectiveness of the emergency plan decreases. Although the regulatory requirement could be implemented during the response to an actual emergency, the implementation would be degraded (e.g., not fully effective, inappropriately delayed).

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<sup>10</sup> As used in this example, "assessment" includes classification, assessment of the impact of a release of radioactivity, and the making of protective action recommendations; "notification" includes initial and followup notifications to offsite response organizations. For power reactors, this includes the risk-significant planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), (b)(5), (b)(9), and (b)(10).

6.7 Health Physics

Personnel overexposures and associated violations incurred during a lifesaving or other emergency response effort will be treated on a case-by-case basis.

a. *Severity Level I* violations involve, for example:

1. An adult worker receives a radiation exposure during any year in excess of 25 rem (0.25 sievert (Sv)) total effective dose equivalent; 75 rem (0.75 Sv) to the lens of the eye; or 250 rem (2.5 Sv) to the skin of the whole body, or to the feet, ankles, hands, or forearms, or to any other organ or tissue;
2. A declared pregnant woman receives a radiation exposure over the gestation period of the embryo/fetus of 2.5 rem (0.025 Sv) total effective dose equivalent;
3. A minor worker (i.e., an individual less than 18 years of age) receives a radiation exposure during any year in excess of 2.5 rem (0.025 Sv) total effective dose equivalent; 7.5 rem (0.075 Sv) to the lens of the eye; or 25 rem (0.25 Sv) to the skin of the whole body, or to the feet, ankles, hands or forearms, or to any other organ or tissue;
4. A member of the public receives an annual exposure in excess of 1 rem (0.01 Sv) total effective dose equivalent;
5. A release of radioactive material occurs to an unrestricted area in annual average concentrations in excess of 50 times the limits for members of the public as stated in 10 CFR 20.1302(b)(2)(i); or
6. Disposal of licensed material occurs in quantities or concentrations in excess of 10 times the limits of 10 CFR 10 CFR 20.2003, "Disposal by Release into Sanitary Sewerage."

b. *Severity Level II* Violations involve, for example:

1. An adult worker receives a radiation exposure during any year in excess of 10 rem (0.1 Sv) total effective dose equivalent; 30 rem (0.3 Sv) to the lens of the eye; or 100 rem (1.0 Sv) to the skin of the whole body, or to the feet, ankles, hands, or forearms, or to any other organ or tissue;
2. A declared pregnant woman receives a radiation exposure over the gestation period of the embryo/fetus in excess of 1.0 rem (0.01 Sv) total effective dose equivalent;
3. A minor worker receives a radiation exposure during any year in excess of 1.0 rem (0.01 Sv) total effective dose equivalent; 3.0 rem (0.03 Sv) to the lens of the eye; or 10 rem (0.1 Sv) to the skin of the whole body, or to the feet, ankles, hands, or forearms, or to any other organ or tissue;

4. A member of the public receives an annual exposure in excess of 0.5 rem (5 millisieverts (mSv)) total effective dose equivalent;
  5. Release of radioactive material occurs to an unrestricted area in annual average concentrations in excess of 10 times the limits stated in 10 CFR 20.1302(b)(2)(i) (except when the Commission has approved operation up to 0.5 rem (5 mSv) per year under 10 CFR 20.1301(c)); or
  6. Disposal of licensed material occurs in quantities or concentrations in excess of 5 times the limits of 10 CFR 20.2003.
- c. *Severity Level III* Violations involve, for example:
1. An adult worker receives a radiation exposure during any year in excess of 5 rem (0.05 Sv) total effective dose equivalent; 15 rem (0.15 Sv) to the lens of the eye; or 50 rem (0.5 Sv) to the skin of the whole body or to the feet, ankles, hands, or forearms, or to any other organ or tissue;
  2. A declared pregnant woman receives a radiation exposure over the gestation period of the embryo/fetus in excess of 0.5 rem (5 mSv) total effective dose equivalent (except when doses are in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 20.1208(d));
  3. A minor worker receives a radiation exposure during any year in excess of 0.5 rem (5 mSv) total effective dose equivalent; 1.5 rem (0.015 Sv) to the lens of the eye; or 5 rem (0.05 Sv) to the skin of the whole body, or to the feet, ankles, hands or forearms, or to any other organ or tissue;
  4. An annual exposure of a member of the public in excess of 0.1 rem (1 mSv) total effective dose equivalent (except when operation up to 0.5 rem (5 mSv) per year under 10 CFR 20.1301(c));
  5. A release of radioactive material occurs to an unrestricted area in annual average concentrations in excess of 2 times the effluent concentration limits referenced in 10 CFR 20.1302(b)(2)(i) (except when the Commission has approved operation up to 0.5 rem (5 mSv) per year under 10 CFR 20.1301(c));
  6. A substantial potential exists for exposures or releases in excess of the applicable limits in 10 CFR 20.1001–20.2401, whether or not an exposure or release occurs;
  7. Disposal of licensed material occurs that is not covered in Severity Levels I or II;
  8. A licensee releases, for unrestricted use, contaminated or radioactive material or equipment that poses a realistic potential for exposure of the public exceeding the annual dose limits for members of the public;



9. A technically unqualified person conducts licensee activities;
  10. A violation involves failure to secure, or maintain surveillance over, licensed material in the following situations:
    - (a) involves licensed material in any aggregate quantity greater than 1,000 times the quantity specified in Appendix C, "Quantities of Licensed Material Requiring Labeling," to 10 CFR Part 20, "Standards for Protection against Radiation,"
    - (b) involves licensed material in any aggregate quantity greater than 10 times the quantity specified in Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 20, where the failure is accompanied by the absence of a functional program to detect and deter security violations that includes training, staff awareness, detection (including auditing), and corrective action (including disciplinary action), or
    - (c) results in a substantial potential for exposures or releases in excess of the applicable limits in 10 CFR Part 20.
- d. *Severity Level IV* violations involve, for example:
1. Intakes exceed those specified in 10 CFR 20.1201(e) or the equivalent for 10 CFR 20.1207, "Occupational Dose Limits for Minors;"
  2. A release of radioactive material occurs to an unrestricted area in annual average concentrations in excess of the limits for members of the public as referenced in 10 CFR 20.1302(b)(2)(i) (except when the Commission has approved operation up to 0.5 rem (5 mSv) per year under 10 CFR 20.1301(c));
  3. A radiation dose rate in an unrestricted or controlled area exceeds 0.002 rem (0.02 microsieverts) in any 1 hour (2 mrem/hour) or 50 mrem (0.5 mSv) in a year;
  4. A licensee fails to conduct required leakage or contamination tests or to use properly calibrated equipment, although the failure does not contribute to an event;
  5. Doses to a member of the public exceed any generally applicable environmental radiation standards of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, such as 40 CFR Part 190, "Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Nuclear Power Operations," as required by 10 CFR 20.1301(e); or
  6. An isolated failure occurs to secure, or maintain surveillance over, licensed material in any aggregate quantity greater than 10 times the quantity specified in Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 20, provided that both of the following apply:
    - (a) The material is labeled as radioactive or located in an area posted as containing radioactive materials, and

- (b) Such failure occurs despite a functional program to detect and deter security violations that includes training, staff awareness, detection (including auditing), and corrective action (including disciplinary action);

## 6.8 Transportation

Some transportation requirements apply to more than one licensee involved in the same activity (e.g., a shipper and a carrier). When such a violation occurs, the NRC will direct enforcement action against the responsible licensee or licensees.

### a. *Severity Level I* violations involve, for example:

1. Failure to meet transportation requirements results in loss of control of radioactive material with a breach in package integrity such that the material causes a radiation exposure to a member of the public in excess of the regulatory limits;
2. Surface contamination exceeds 50 times the NRC limit; or
3. External radiation levels exceed 10 times the NRC limit.

### b. *Severity Level II* violations involve, for example:

1. Failure to meet transportation requirements results in loss of control of radioactive material with a breach in package integrity such that there is a clear potential for a member of the public to receive a radiation exposure in excess of the regulatory limits;
2. Surface contamination exceeds 10 times, but not more than 50 times, the NRC limit;
3. External radiation levels exceed 5 times, but not more than 10 times, the NRC limit; or
4. A licensee fails to make required initial notifications associated with Severity Level I or II violations.

### c. *Severity Level III* violations involve, for example:

1. Surface contamination exceeds 5 times, but not more than 10 times, the NRC limit;
2. External radiation exceeds 1 times, but not more than 5 times, the NRC limit;
3. A violation involves labeling, placarding, shipping paper, packaging, loading, or other requirements that could reasonably result any of the following:

- (a) a significant failure to identify the type, quantity, or form of material

- (b) a failure of the carrier or recipient to exercise adequate controls
  - (c) a substantial potential for either personnel exposure or contamination above regulatory limits or improper transfer of material
4. A licensee fails to make required initial notification associated with Severity Level III violations.
- d. *Severity Level IV* Violations involve, for example:
- 1. A breach of package integrity occurs without external radiation levels exceeding the NRC limit or without contamination levels exceeding the NRC limits;
  - 2. Surface contamination is in excess of, but is not more than 5 times, the NRC limit;
  - 3. A licensee fails to register as an authorized user of an NRC-Certified Transport package;
  - 4. A noncompliance occurs that involves shipping papers, marking, labeling, placarding, packaging, or loading, but the noncompliance does not amount to a Severity Level I, II, or III violation;
  - 5. A licensee fails to demonstrate that packages for special-form radioactive material meet applicable regulatory requirements; or
  - 6. A licensee fails to demonstrate that U.S. Department of Transportation specifications are met for 7A Type A packages as required by 10 CFR 71.5, "Transportation of Licensed Material."

6.9 Inaccurate and Incomplete Information or Failure To Make a Required Report

- a. *Severity Level I* violations involve, for example:
- 1. A licensee official deliberately provides or maintains information known by the licensee official to be incomplete or inaccurate. If the information had been completely and accurately provided or maintained, it would likely have caused the NRC to issue an order requiring suspension or cessation of licensed activity or other immediate action to protect the public health and safety or common defense and security;
    - (a) For example, deliberately incomplete or inaccurate information associated with an inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) notification letter is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 52.99, "Inspection during Construction." If the information had been complete and accurate, it would likely have caused the NRC to issue an order halting a significant portion of construction activities;

2. A deliberate withholding of information or a deliberate failure to make a required report occurs. If the information had been provided or the report been made, it would likely have caused the NRC to issue an order requiring suspension or cessation of licensed activity or other immediate action to protect the public health and safety or common defense and security;
  3. A licensee official provides or maintains information with careless disregard of its completeness or accuracy. If this information had been completely and accurately provided or maintained, it would likely have caused the NRC to issue an order requiring suspension or cessation of licensed activity or other immediate action to protect the public health and safety or common defense and security;
    - (a) For example, a licensee official submits incomplete or inaccurate information associated with an ITAAC notification letter, in accordance with 10 CFR 52.99, with careless disregard for its completeness and accuracy. If this information had been complete and accurate, it would likely have caused the NRC to issue an order halting a significant portion of construction activities;
  4. A withholding of information or a failure to make a required report occurs, with careless disregard of the underlying requirement. If the information had been provided or the report been made, it would likely have caused the NRC to issue an order requiring suspension or cessation of licensed activity or other immediate action to protect the public health and safety or common defense and security; or
  5. A knowing and intentional failure to notify the Commission as required by 10 CFR Part 21, "Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance," occurs.
- b. *Severity Level II* violations involve, for example:
1. A licensee official deliberately provides or maintains information known by the licensee official to be incomplete or inaccurate. If the information had been completely and accurately provided or maintained, it would likely have caused the NRC to reconsider a regulatory position or undertake a substantial further inquiry;
    - (a) For example, a licensee official deliberately provides incomplete or inaccurate information associated with an ITAAC notification letter, submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 52.99. If this information had been complete and accurate, it would likely have caused the NRC to reject closure of that ITAAC;
  2. A licensee official provides or maintains information with careless disregard of its completeness or accuracy. If this information had been completely and accurately provided or maintained, it would likely have caused the NRC to reconsider a regulatory position or undertake a substantial further inquiry.

- (a) For example, a licensee official provides incomplete or inaccurate information associated with an ITAAC notification letter, submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 52.99, with careless disregard for its completeness and accuracy. If this information had been complete and accurate, it would likely have caused the NRC to reject closure of that ITAAC;
  3. A deliberate withholding of information or a deliberate failure to make a required report occurs. If the information had been provided or the report been made, it would likely have resulted in reconsideration of a regulatory position or substantial further inquiry;
  4. A withholding of information or a failure to make a required report occurs with careless disregard of the underlying requirement. If the information had been provided or the report been made, it would likely have resulted in reconsideration of a regulatory position or substantial further inquiry;
  5. Inaccurate or incomplete information is provided or maintained. If this information had been completely and accurately provided or maintained, it would likely have caused the NRC to issue an order requiring suspension or cessation of licensed activity or other immediate action to protect the public health and safety or common defense and security;
  6. A withholding of information or a failure to make a required report occurs. If the information had been provided or the report been made, it would likely have caused the NRC to issue an order requiring suspension or cessation of licensed activity or other immediate action to protect the public health and safety or common defense and security;
  7. A failure to provide the notice required by 10 CFR Part 21; or
  8. A licensee fails to make an immediate notification as required by 10 CFR 20.2202(a)(1) or (a)(2).
- c. *Severity Level III* violations involve, for example:
1. Inaccurate or incomplete information is provided or maintained. If this information had been completely and accurately provided or maintained, it would likely have caused the NRC to reconsider a regulatory position or undertake a substantial further inquiry;
    - (a) For example, incomplete or inaccurate information associated with an ITAAC notification letter, submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 52.99, is submitted. If this information had been complete and accurate, it would likely have caused the NRC to reject closure of that ITAAC;

2. A withholding of information or a failure to make a required report occurs. If this information had been provided or the report been made, it would likely have caused the NRC to reconsider a regulatory position or undertake a substantial further inquiry. The following are examples:
    - (a) failure to make required notifications and reports pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55(e);
    - (b) failure to make a 24-hour notification required by 10 CFR 20.2202(b) or an immediate notification required by 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i);
    - (c) failure to make any report required by 10 CFR 73.71, "Reporting of Safeguards Events," or Appendix G, "Reportable Safeguards Events," to 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials," or 10 CFR Part 26, "Fitness for Duty Programs," except for 10 CFR 26.719(d);
    - (d) failure to submit an initial NRC Form 241, "Report of Proposed Activities in Non-Agreement States," as required by 10 CFR 150.20, "Recognition of Agreement State Licenses";
    - (e) for materials licensees, failure to make an immediate or 24-hour report or notification when required; or
    - (f) failure to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72, "Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors," or 10 CFR 50.73, "Licensee Event Report System," associated with any Severity Level III violation;
  3. A programmatic failure to comply with 10 CFR 20.2207, "Reports of Transactions Involving Nationally Tracked Sources," occurs; or
  4. A 10 CFR Part 50 licensee submits inaccurate or incomplete performance indicator (PI) data to the NRC. Accurate or complete information would have caused a PI to change from green to either yellow or red, white to either yellow or red, or yellow to red.
- d. *Severity Level IV* violations involve, for example:
1. A licensee fails to make a required report which, had it been submitted, would have resulted in, for instance, increasing the inspection scope of the next regularly scheduled inspection;
  2. A licensee fails to make a timely written report as required by 10 CFR 20.2201(b), 20.2204, 20.2206, or 20.2207;
  3. A licensee fails to report an exceedance of the dose constraint established in 10 CFR 20.1101(d);

4. A licensee fails to report indicators of programmatic weaknesses as required in 10 CFR 26.719(d);
5. A licensee fails to make a required by 10 CFR 76.120(d)(2), Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 70, or 10 CFR 70.50(c)(1);
6. A licensee fails to make a written event report, as required by 10 CFR 70.50(c)(1), Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 70, or 10 CFR 76.120(d)(2);
7. A materials licensee fails to provide or make a report or notification, other than an immediate or 24-hour report or notification, to the NRC, including 15- or 30-day written reports, or fails to include all information required by regulation or license condition in a 15-day or 30-day report;
8. A licensee fails to make the 30-day notification required by 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) or 10 CFR 20.2203(a);
9. A licensee fails to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72 or 10 CFR 50.73;
10. A failure to identify all applicable reporting codes on a Licensee Event Report that may impact the completeness or accuracy of other information (e.g., performance indicator data) submitted to the NRC; or
11. A 10 CFR Part 50 licensee submits inaccurate or incomplete PI data to the NRC that would have caused a PI to change from green to white.

#### 6.10 Discrimination

In certain cases, the severity level of a violation may be escalated based on unique escalating factors such as whether the adverse action was taken because the employee had contacted the NRC or whether the applicable NRC employee protection regulation (e.g., 10 CFR 50.7 or similar NRC employee protection regulations) was deliberately violated. Conversely, the severity level of a violation of an NRC employee protection regulation may be mitigated to a lower severity level based on factors unique to the specific facts and circumstances of the case.

- a. *Severity Level I* violations involve, for example:
  1. An executive-level corporate manager (or equivalent) (which for this definition includes a site vice president) is the decisionmaker or plays a significant role in the adverse action decisionmaking process regardless of the severity of the adverse action, but with at least one of the following escalating factors:
    - (a) The adverse action against the employee had a widespread site impact on other employees' willingness to raise concerns, or

- (b) The employer failed to take meaningful action to investigate and address the allegation of discrimination, if such allegation was first raised internally within the employer's processes addressing employee concerns; or
  - 2. A mid- or a senior-level plant manager (or equivalent) or a corporate-level line manager (or equivalent) is the decisionmaker or plays a significant role in the adverse action decisionmaking process; the employment action is relatively more adverse to the employee's terms, conditions, compensation, or privileges of employment (e.g., suspension without pay); and either a.1(a) or a.1(b) above is cited, or other unique factors are present.
- b. *Severity Level II* violations involve, for example:
- 1. An executive-level corporate manager (or equivalent) (which for this definition includes a site vice president) is the decisionmaker or plays a significant role in the adverse action decisionmaking process regardless of the severity of the adverse action but without an escalating factor present;
  - 2. A mid- or senior-level plant manager (or equivalent) or a corporate-level line manager (or equivalent) is the decisionmaker or plays a significant role in the adverse action decisionmaking process; the employment action is relatively more adverse to the employee's terms, conditions, compensation, or privileges of employment (e.g., suspension without pay); and no escalating factor is present;
  - 3. A mid- or senior-level plant manager (or equivalent) or a corporate-level line manager (or equivalent) is the decisionmaker or plays a significant role in the adverse action decisionmaking process; the employment action is relatively less adverse to the employee's terms, conditions, compensation, or privileges of employment (e.g., verbal counseling); and either a.1(a) or a.1(b) above is cited, or other unique escalating factors are present; or
  - 4. A lower level plant manager (or equivalent) or supervisor (or equivalent) is the decisionmaker or plays a significant role in the adverse action decisionmaking process; the employment action is relatively more adverse to the employee's terms, conditions, compensation, or privileges of employment (e.g., suspension without pay), as an example; and either a.1(a) or a.1(b) above is cited, or other unique escalating factors are present.
- c. *Severity Level III* violations involve, for example:
- 1. A mid- or senior-level plant manager (or equivalent) or a corporate-level line manager (or equivalent) is the decisionmaker or plays a significant role in the adverse action decisionmaking process; the employment action is relatively less adverse to the employee's terms, conditions, compensation, or privileges of employment (e.g., verbal counseling); and no escalating factor is present;
  - 2. A lower level plant manager (or equivalent) or supervisor (or equivalent) is the decisionmaker or plays a significant role in the adverse action decisionmaking



process; the employment action is relatively more adverse to the employee's terms, conditions, compensation, or privileges of employment (e.g., suspension without pay); and no escalating factor is present; or

3. A lower level plant manager (or equivalent) or supervisor (or equivalent) is the decisionmaker or plays a significant role in the adverse action decisionmaking process; the employment action is relatively less adverse to the employee's terms, conditions, compensation, or privileges of employment (e.g., verbal counseling); and either a.1(a) or a.1(b) above is cited, or other unique escalating factor(s) are present.

d. *Severity Level IV* violations involve, for example:

1. A lower level plant manager (or equivalent) or supervisor (or equivalent) is the decisionmaker or plays a significant role in the adverse action decisionmaking process; the employment action is relatively less adverse to the employee's terms, conditions, compensation, or privileges of employment (e.g., verbal counseling); and no escalating factor is present.

6.11 Reactor, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Fuel Facility, and SNM Security

a. *Severity Level I* violations involve, for example:

1. The theft, diversion, or act of sabotage involves a formula quantity of special nuclear material (SNM), spent nuclear fuel or a very significant quantity of other radioactive material having the potential for substantial impact on the public; or
2. Any failure of a licensee's security program as outlined in their security plan or insider mitigation program results in an act of sabotage against one or more target sets or target set elements.

b. *Severity Level II* violations involve, for example:

1. An act of radiological sabotage that results in the loss or destruction of a quantity of SNM of moderate strategic significance or a quantity of other radioactive material determined equally or similarly significant by the NRC;
2. The theft, diversion, or act of radiological sabotage involves a quantity of SNM of moderate strategic significance or a quantity of other radioactive material determined equally or similarly significant by the NRC, in which one or more attributes of the security program did not function as required;
3. A licensee fails to involve its reviewing official in developing an unescorted access authorization determination or determination of fitness for duty, following a for-cause action by a licensee that results in an individual's voluntary or involuntary loss of employment; or

4. A licensee fails to maintain the high assurance standard of 10 CFR 73.20 and 10 CFR 73.55.
- c. *Severity Level III* violations involve, for example:
1. An insider (e.g., licensee employee, licensee contractor or subcontractor) attempts an act of radiological sabotage to any radiological material;
  2. The security or insider mitigation program has a failure, but the failure does not amount to a Severity Level I or II violation that challenges the high assurance standard of 10 CFR 73.20, "General Performance Objective and Requirements," or 10 CFR 73.55, "Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors against Radiological Sabotage;"
  3. A licensee fails to develop and maintain records concerning the denial of access, or fails to respond to inquiries concerning denials of access, so that, as a result of the failure, a person previously denied unescorted access or unescorted access authorization is improperly granted such access;
  4. A licensee fails to ensure that a licensee-approved contractor or vendor access authorization program is operating in accordance with regulatory and licensee requirements;
  5. A licensee fails to complete more than one of the requirements of an access authorization program before granting an individual unescorted access or unescorted access authorization;
  6. An individual is assigned to a job task related to implementing the licensee's protective strategy without the person being qualified in accordance with regulatory requirements;
  7. A reviewing official relies on a deliberate falsification of information to make an unescorted access or unescorted access authorization determination;
  8. The safeguards or security systems designed or used to prevent, detect, or assess, and respond to the theft, loss, or diversion of strategic SNM, or significant quantities of other radioactive material, experiences a significant failure; or
  9. A licensee fails to conduct a search or conducts an inadequate search at any protected area access control point, and this failure results in the introduction of firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices or reasonable facsimiles thereof that could assist in committing radiological sabotage or theft or diversion of strategic SNM.

- d. *Severity Level IV* violations involve, for example:
1. A failure of the licensee security or insider mitigation program, as outlined in a licensee's security plan, results in an attempted act of radiological sabotage against one or more target set elements;
  2. A loss of SNM of low strategic significance or less significant quantities of other radioactive material was not detected within the time period specified in the security plan, other relevant document, or regulation; or
  3. Violations occurred in meeting requirements contained in the licensee security plan and implementing procedures, but the violations did not amount to a Severity Level I, II or III violation.

6.12 Materials Security

- a. *Severity Level I* violations involve, for example:
1. The theft, diversion, or sabotage of a Category 1 quantity of radioactive material results from the failure to establish or implement one or more requirements, such as the following:
    - (a) failure to control unescorted access to a Category 1 quantity of radioactive material so that only individuals deemed trustworthy and reliable and having job duties that require unescorted access to the radioactive material are granted such access;
    - (b) failure to immediately respond (e.g., without undue delay in accordance with the licensee's prearranged plan) to an attempted theft, sabotage, or diversion of a Category 1 quantity of radioactive material, including requesting assistance from the local law enforcement agency;
    - (c) failure to provide enhanced monitoring during periods of source delivery and shipment of a Category 1 quantity of radioactive material; or
    - (d) failure to implement the Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern (RAM QC) requirements before shipping a consignment containing a Category 1 quantity of radioactive material.
- b. *Severity Level II* violations involve, for example:
1. The theft, diversion, or sabotage of a Category 2 quantity of radioactive material results from the failure to establish or implement one or more increased control requirements, such as the following:

- (a) failure to control unescorted access to a Category 1 or Category 2<sup>11</sup> quantity of radioactive material so that only individuals deemed trustworthy and reliable and having job duties that require unescorted access to the radioactive material are granted such access;
  - (b) failure to immediately respond (e.g., without undue delay in accordance with the licensee's prearranged plan) to an attempted theft, sabotage, or diversion of a Category 1 or Category 2 quantity of radioactive material, including requesting assistance from the local law enforcement agency;
  - (c) shipping a consignment of a Category 2 quantity of radioactive material by a carrier, other than the licensee, without first verifying that the carrier uses a package tracking system, implements methods to ensure trustworthiness and reliability of drivers, maintains constant control and/or surveillance during transit, and has the capability for immediate communication to summon appropriate response or assistance;
  - (d) failure to provide enhanced monitoring during periods of source delivery and shipment of a Category 1 quantity of radioactive material;
  - (e) failure to implement the RAM QC Additional Security Measures before shipping a consignment containing a Category 1 quantity of radioactive material; or
  - (f) failure to use a method to disable a vehicle or trailer, in or on which a Category 1 or Category 2 quantity of radioactive material is stored, when not under direct control and constant surveillance by the licensee.
- c. *Severity Level III* violations involve, for example:
- 1. A licensee fails to immediately respond (e.g., without undue delay in accordance with the licensee's prearranged plan) to an attempted theft, sabotage, or diversion of a Category 1 or Category 2 quantity of radioactive material, including a failure to request assistance from the local law enforcement agency, but the failure does not result in actual theft, sabotage, or diversion of radioactive material;
  - 2. A licensee fails to determine the trustworthiness and reliability of individuals having unescorted access to radioactive material quantities of concern and devices;

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<sup>11</sup> Violation examples 6.12. b. 1. (a), (b), and (f) recognize that a licensee may possess a total of either Category 1 or Category 2 quantity of radioactive material at the time of the subject incident, but only a Category 2 quantity was actually involved with theft, diversion, or sabotage. Hence, the severity level is determined by the category of material involved in the theft, diversion, or sabotage.

3. A licensee fails to limit access to physical protection information to only those persons with an established need-to-know and who have been determined to be trustworthy and reliable;
4. A licensee fails to verify that a carrier uses package tracking systems, implements methods that ensure trustworthiness and reliability of drivers, maintains constant control and/or surveillance during transit, and has the capability for immediate communication to summon appropriate response or assistance, before shipping a Category 2 quantity of radioactive material, per consignment, by the carrier;
5. A licensee fails to provide enhanced monitoring during periods of source delivery and shipment of a Category 1 quantity of radioactive material;
6. A licensee fails to initiate an investigation to determine the location of a shipment of licensed material containing a Category 2 quantity of radioactive material when the shipment does not arrive on or about the expected arrival time;
7. A licensee fails to notify the NRC Operations Center promptly after initiating a response to any actual or attempted theft, diversion, or sabotage of sources or devices containing a Category 1 or Category 2 quantity of radioactive material;
8. A licensee fails to implement the RAM QC before shipping a Category 1 quantity of radioactive material, per consignment;
9. A licensee fails to use a method to disable a vehicle or trailer, in or on which a Category 1 or Category 2 quantity of radioactive material is stored, when not under direct control and constant surveillance by the licensee;
10. A licensee fails to establish a prearranged response plan with the local law enforcement agency, or a programmatic failure occurs in the implementation of the plan;
11. A licensee fails to establish a program to monitor and immediately detect, assess, and respond to unauthorized access to a Category 1 or Category 2 quantity of radioactive material, or a programmatic failure occurs during implementation;
12. A licensee fails to have a dependable means to transmit information between and among the various components of the intrusion detection system or to summon the appropriate responder; or
13. A licensee fails to verify that a recipient licensee is authorized to possess the material being transferred.

- d. *Severity Level IV* Violations involve, for example:
1. A licensee fails to document the basis for concluding that an individual was determined to be trustworthy and reliable for the purposes of granting unescorted access to a Category 1 or Category 2 quantity of radioactive material;
  2. A licensee fails to perform a complete and adequate trustworthiness and reliability determination for an individual, such that information relevant to access approval was not obtained or considered, but the individual would likely have been granted unescorted access if the required information had been obtained or considered;
  3. A licensee fails to limit approval for unescorted access with respect to a Category 1 or Category 2 quantity of radioactive material to individuals with job duties requiring unescorted access;
  4. A licensee fails to maintain a list of persons approved for unescorted access;
  5. A licensee fails to confirm receipt of transferred/shipped radioactive material;
  6. A licensee fails to document the prearranged plan with the local law enforcement agency or to update the prearranged plan when changes to the facility design or operation affect the potential vulnerability of sources;
  7. An isolated failure occurs in the as-designed operation of the dependable means to transmit information between and among the various components of the intrusion detection system or to summon the appropriate responder. This is a violation if caused by a failure of the licensee in the design, construction, operation, or maintenance of the system. (This example does not include isolated failures caused by means outside the licensee's control, such as service disruptions;)
  8. A licensee fails to contact the recipient or originator of a shipment to coordinate an expected arrival time for a shipment of a Category 2 quantity of radioactive material;
  9. An isolated failure occurs in implementing a portion of the licensee's program to monitor and immediately detect, assess, and respond to unauthorized access to a Category 1 or Category 2 quantity of licensed radioactive material, such that an opportunity exists for unauthorized and undetected access to the material, but the opportunity is neither easily nor likely to be exploitable;
  10. An isolated failure occurs in limiting access to physical protection information to only those persons with an established need-to-know and who are considered trustworthy and reliable, where with a high degree of confidence it is determined to be unlikely that an unauthorized individual who represents a predictable threat to circumvent or defeat the licensee's physical protection program could use the information; or

11. A licensee fails to comply with an element of its procedure to provide enhanced monitoring during periods of source delivery and shipment of a Category 1 quantity of radioactive material, and this failure does not seriously degrade the enhanced monitoring capability.

#### 6.13 Information Security

a. *Severity Level I* violations involve, for example:

1. Failure to control TOP SECRET or SECRET matter where the matter is removed from a controlled area by, or disclosed to, an unauthorized person.

b. *Severity Level II* violations involve, for example:

1. Failure to control TOP SECRET or SECRET matter results in the removal of the matter from a controlled area with the possibility that the matter could have been disclosed to an unauthorized person; or
2. Failure to control classified matter not amounting to TOP SECRET or SECRET classified matter, Safeguards Information (SGI), or Safeguards Information-Modified Handling (SGI-M) results in the matter or information being removed from a controlled area and disclosed to an unauthorized person.

c. *Severity Level III* violations involve, for example:

1. Because of failure to control classified matter, SGI, or SGI-M, there is a substantial potential that the matter or information could have been removed by or disclosed to an unauthorized person; or
2. A licensee fails to protect, control, or mark classified matter, SGI, or SGI-M while the matter or information is outside the protected area and accessible to those not authorized access to the protected area.

d. *Severity Level IV* violations involve, for example:

1. A failure to properly secure, protect, or mark classified matter, SGI, or SGI-M inside the protected area in a case where the matter or information was not removed from the protected area.

#### 6.14 Fitness for Duty<sup>12</sup>

a. *Severity Level I* violations involve, for example:

1. A licensee fails to substantially implement or substantially maintain reasonable assurance of fitness-for-duty program performance in two or more subparts of 10 CFR Part 26; or

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<sup>12</sup> See Section 6.4 for examples of fitness-for-duty violations specific to licensed reactor operators.

2. A licensee fails to substantially implement a licensee employee assistance program (EAP).
- b. *Severity Level II* violations involve, for example:
1. A licensee fails to remove an individual from unescorted access status when this person has been involved in the sale, use, or possession of illegal drugs within the protected area, or a licensee fails to take action in the case of an on-duty misuse of alcohol, illegal drugs, prescription drugs, or over-the-counter medications; or
  2. A licensee fails to take action to meet a regulation or a licensee behavior observation program requirement when observed behavior within the protected area or credible information concerning the activities of an individual indicates possible unfitness for duty based on drug or alcohol use.
- c. *Severity Level III* violations involve, for example:
1. A licensee fails to take the required action for a person confirmed to have tested positive for illegal drug use or to take action for onsite alcohol use, in cases that do not amount to a Severity Level II violation;
  2. A licensee fails to ensure that a licensee-approved contractor's or vendor's fitness-for-duty program is operating in accordance with regulatory and licensee requirements;
  3. A licensee fails to complete or maintain more than one of the requirements of a program for individuals listed in 10 CFR 26.4, "FFD Program Applicability to Categories of Individuals;"
  4. A licensee fails to develop and maintain records concerning the denial of access or to respond to inquiries concerning denials of access so that, as a result of the failure, a person previously denied fitness-for-duty authorization is improperly granted such access;
  5. A licensee's EAP staff fails to notify licensee management when the EAP staff is aware that an individual's condition may adversely affect the safety or security of the facility.
  6. A individual covered by 10 CFR Part 26, Subpart I, involved in a human error which caused or contributed to an actual event or a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant, who at the time the error occurred, was determined to be fatigued as a result of a fatigue assessment as defined in 10 CFR 26.211.
- d. *Severity Level IV* violations involve, for example:
1. A licensee fails to have implementing procedures that are clear, concise, and readily available;



2. A licensee fails to take an action required by the licensee's behavior observation program in cases that do not amount to a Severity Level I, II, or III violation;
3. A licensee violates the requirements of 10 CFR Part 26, but the violation is unrelated to the behavior observation program and does not amount to a Severity Level I, II, or III violation; or
4. Failures to appropriately implement any of the requirements (e.g., work hours, waivers, self declarations, or fatigue assessment) of 10 CFR Part 26, Subpart I that are not isolated or that demonstrate programmatic weaknesses in implementation.

## 7.0 GLOSSARY

This glossary, while not exhaustive, contains many of the terms commonly used throughout the NRC enforcement process.

**Activity Area** refers to the area of NRC-licensed activity that a licensee (or other person) engages in (e.g., radiography, reactor operations).

**Actual Consequences** include such effects as actual onsite or offsite releases of radiation, onsite or offsite radiation exposures, accidental criticality, core damage, loss of significant safety barriers, and loss of control of radioactive material.

**Adverse Action** has an actual, negative effect on an employee. Factors include, but are not limited to (1) a monetary effect (e.g., failure to receive a routine annual pay increase or bonus), (2) demotion or arbitrary downgrade of a position, (3) transfer to a position that is recognized to have a lesser status (e.g., from a supervisory to nonsupervisory position), (4) loss of promotion, and (5) overall performance appraisal downgrade.

**Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)** refers to a variety of processes that emphasize creative, cooperative approaches to handling conflicts in lieu of adversarial procedures. Mediation and arbitration are the most widely recognized processes. The NRC's ADR program uses mediation rather than arbitration (i.e., the parties develop mutually agreeable corrective actions rather than being obligated by an arbitrator's decision).

**Apparent Violation** is a violation of regulatory requirements that is being considered for escalated enforcement action.

**Careless Disregard** refers to situations in which an individual acts with reckless indifference to at least one of three things: (1) the existence of a requirement, (2) the meaning of a requirement, or (3) the applicability of a requirement. Careless disregard occurs when an individual is unsure of the existence of a requirement, the meaning of a requirement, or the applicability of the requirement to the situation, but nevertheless proceeds to engage in conduct that the individual knows may cause a violation. Although aware that the action might cause a violation, the individual proceeds without first ascertaining whether a violation would occur.

**Civil Penalty** is a monetary penalty that may be imposed for violations of (1) certain specified licensing provisions of the AEA or supplementary NRC rules or orders, (2) any requirements for which a license may be revoked, or (3) reporting requirements under Section 206 of the ERA.

**Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL)** is a letter confirming a licensee's or contractor's agreement to take certain actions to remove significant concerns regarding health and safety, safeguards, or the environment.

**Confirmatory Order** is an order that confirms the commitments made by a licensee or individual to take certain actions. Before issuance of the confirmatory order, the licensee or individual and the NRC mutually agree on the terms of the order.

**Contractor**, as used in this Policy, includes vendors who supply products or services to be used in an NRC-licensed facility or activity.

**Corrective Action Program** is a licensee's process for tracking, evaluating, and resolving deficiencies.

**Deliberate Misconduct** occurs when an individual voluntarily and intentionally (1) engages in conduct that the individual knows to be contrary to a requirement, procedure, instruction, contract, purchase order, or policy of a licensee, applicant for a license, or a contractor or subcontractor of a licensee or applicant for a license or (2) provides materially inaccurate or incomplete information to a licensee, applicant for a license, or a contractor or subcontractor of a licensee or applicant for a license.

**Demand for Information (DFI)**, as defined in 10 CFR 2.204, is an order requiring a licensee or other person subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission to respond with specific information for the purpose of enabling the NRC to determine whether an order should be issued or whether other action should be taken.

**Discrimination**, as described in 10 CFR 10 CFR 50.7 (or similar provisions in 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, 52, 60, 61, 63, 70, 71, 72, and 76), is an act against an employee that includes discharge and other adverse actions that relate to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment in retaliation for engaging in certain protected activities.

**Escalated Enforcement Actions** include Severity Level I, II, and III NOVs; NOVs associated with an inspection finding that the SDP evaluates as having low to moderate (white) or greater safety significance; civil penalties; NOVs to individuals; orders to modify, suspend, or revoke NRC licenses or the authority to engage in NRC-licensed activities; and orders issued to impose civil penalties.

**Event**, as used in this Policy, means (1) an occurrence characterized by an active adverse impact on equipment or personnel, readily obvious by human observation or instrumentation, or (2) a radiological impact on personnel or the environment in excess of regulatory limits, such as an overexposure, a release of radioactive material above NRC limits, or a loss of radioactive material. For example, an equipment failure discovered through a spill of liquid, a loud noise, the failure of a system to respond properly, or an annunciator alarm would be considered an

event; a system discovered to be inoperable through a document review would not. Similarly, if a licensee discovers, through quarterly dosimetry readings, that employees had been inadequately monitored for radiation, the issue would normally be considered licensee identified; however, if the same dosimetry readings disclose an overexposure, the issue would be considered an event.

**Fuel Cycle** is the series of steps involved in supplying fuel for nuclear power reactors. It can include mining, milling, isotopic enrichment, fabrication of fuel elements, use in a reactor, chemical reprocessing to recover the fissionable material remaining in the spent fuel, reenrichment of the fuel material, refabrication into new fuel elements, and waste disposal.

**Impacts the NRC's Ability To Perform Its Regulatory Function** refers to a situation that prevents the NRC from using appropriate regulatory tools to address a noncompliance because the agency is unaware that the noncompliance exists (e.g., provision of inaccurate and incomplete information or failure to submit a required report).

**Individual**, as used in this Policy, is any person licensed by the NRC, such as a reactor operator licensed under 10 CFR Part 55; or any person applying for an NRC license; or any person working for an NRC licensee or applicant; or any contractor of a licensee or applicant. Such individuals are considered to be within the NRC's jurisdiction.

**License Applicant**, as used in this statement of policy, means any person who submits an application for review.

**Licensee** is any person or entity licensed by the NRC.

**Licensee Official**, as used in this statement of policy, in general, means a first-line supervisor or above, a licensed individual, a radiation safety officer, or an authorized user of licensed material whether or not listed on a license. Notwithstanding an individual's job title, the NRC will consider the individual's responsibilities relative to the oversight of licensed activities and the use of licensed material.

**Lost Source Policy** (see 65 FR 70139) is the policy of the NRC in which a civil penalty of at least the base civil penalty amount is normally issued in a case where regulated material is out of the control of the licensee for any period of time, regardless of the use, license type, quantity, or type of radioactive material (examples include loss, abandonment, improper transfer, or disposal of regulated material). Violations associated with loss of control of regulated material normally result in escalated enforcement actions.

**Minor Violation** is a violation that is less significant than a Severity Level IV violation. Minor violations do not warrant enforcement action and are not normally documented in inspection reports. However, minor violations must be corrected.

**Noncited Violation (NCV)** is a nonrecurring, typically nonwillful, Severity Level IV violation that is not subject to formal enforcement action if, for a reactor licensee, the licensee places the violation in a corrective action program to address recurrence and restores compliance within a reasonable period of time and, for all other licensees, the licensee corrects or commits to correcting the violation within a reasonable period of time.

**Nonescalated Enforcement Actions** include NOVs that are dispositioned by the NRC as Severity Level IV or minor violations.

**Notice of Deviation (NOD)** is a written notice describing a licensee's failure to satisfy a commitment where the commitment involved has not been made a legally binding requirement. An NOD requests that a licensee provide a written explanation or statement describing corrective steps taken (or planned), the results achieved, and the date when corrective action will be completed.

**Notice of Nonconformance (NON)** is a written notice describing the failure of a licensee's contractor to meet commitments that have not been made legally binding requirements by the NRC (e.g., a commitment made in a procurement contract with a licensee as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B). (If the contractor deliberately fails to meet the terms of a procurement contract, the NRC may issue a violation under the Deliberate Misconduct Rule in 10 CFR 50.5.) NONs request that nonlicensees provide written explanations or statements describing corrective steps (taken or planned), the results achieved, the dates when corrective actions will be completed, and measures taken to preclude recurrence.

**Notice of Violation (NOV)** is a written notice setting forth one or more violations of a legally binding requirement (see 10 CFR 2.201).

**Order** is used to modify, suspend, or revoke a license, or to take other action against a licensee or other person subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission (see 10 CFR 2.202).

**Potential Safety or Security Consequences** include potential outcomes based on realistic and credible scenarios (i.e., the staff considers the likelihood that safety or security could have been negatively impacted under these scenarios).

**Predecisional Enforcement Conference (PEC)** may be conducted with a licensee or individual before the NRC makes an enforcement decision when escalated enforcement action may warranted (i.e., Severity Level I, II, or III violations, civil penalties, or orders). The purpose of a PEC is to obtain information that will assist the NRC in determining the appropriate enforcement action, if any.

**Regulatory Conference** is conducted with a reactor licensee to discuss the significance of findings evaluated through the SDP, with or without associated violations. Such meetings focus on the safety significance of the issues and not necessarily on the corrective actions associated with the issues. Because the significance assessment from the SDP determines whether escalated enforcement action will be taken, a subsequent PEC is not normally necessary.

**Requirement**, as used in this Policy, means a legally binding requirement such as a statute, regulation, license condition, technical specification, or order.

**Repetitive Violation** is one that could reasonably be expected to have been prevented by a licensee's corrective action for the same, or a similar, previous violation or a previous licensee finding that occurred within the past 2 years of the current violation, or that occurred within the period covered by the last two inspections, whichever period is longer.

**Risk Information** is used wherever possible to develop realistic and credible scenarios to use when assessing the safety significance of a violation and assigning severity levels.

**Severity Levels** are used (1) to indicate the significance of a violation assessed under traditional enforcement and (2) to determine the appropriate enforcement action to be taken.

**Significance**, as used in this Policy for violations that do not involve application of the ROP, describes the seriousness of the violation. The significance of violations assessed under the ROP is determined by the SDP, described in IMC 0609 and related documents.

**Substantial Potential for Exposures or Releases in Excess of the Applicable Limits in 10 CFR Part 20** describes a situation where it was fortuitous that the resulting exposure or release did not exceed the limits of 10 CFR Part 20. The concern is not the significance of the resulting or potential exposure, but whether the licensee provided adequate controls over the situation, as required, to prevent exceedance of the 10 CFR Part 20 limits.

**Traditional Enforcement**, as used in this Policy, refers to the process for the disposition of violations of NRC requirements that are not dispositioned through the ROP SDP. Violations that are typically dispositioned using traditional enforcement are those involving (1) actual consequences, (2) willfulness, (3) impeding the regulatory process, (4) discrimination, (5) noncolor (non-SDP) inspection findings (i.e., a violation of NRC requirements for which there is not an associated SDP performance deficiency), (6) materials regulations, and (7) deliberate violations committed by individuals.

**Violation** is the failure to comply with a requirement.

**Willful** violations involve either deliberate intent to violate requirements or to falsify information, or careless disregard of requirements or of the completeness and accuracy of information provided.

**8.0 TABLE OF BASE CIVIL PENALTIES**

**TABLE A**

a.	Power reactors, gaseous diffusion plants, and high-level waste repository .....	\$140,000
b.	Fuel fabricators authorized to possess Category I or II quantities of SNM and uranium conversion facilities .....	\$70,000
c.	Fuel fabricators authorized to possess Category III quantities of SNM, industrial processors, <sup>1</sup> independent spent fuel and monitored retrievable storage installations, mills, and uranium enrichment facilities .....	\$35,000
d.	Test reactors, contractors, waste disposal licensees, industrial radiographers, and other large material users .....	\$14,000
e.	Research reactors, academic, medical, or other small material users <sup>2</sup> .....	\$7,000
f.	Loss, abandonment, or improper transfer or disposal of regulated material, regardless of the use or type of licensee <sup>3</sup> :	
	1. Sources or devices with a total activity greater than $3.7 \times 10^4$ MBq (1 Curie), excluding hydrogen-3 (tritium) .....	\$54,000
	2. Other sources or devices containing the materials and quantities listed in 10 CFR 31.5(c)(13)(i).....	\$17,000
	3. Sources and devices not otherwise described above .....	\$7,000

<sup>1</sup> Large firms engaged in manufacturing or distribution of byproduct, source, or special nuclear material.  
<sup>2</sup> This applies to nonprofit institutions not otherwise categorized in this table, mobile nuclear services, nuclear pharmacies, and physician offices.  
<sup>3</sup> These base civil penalty amounts have been determined to be approximately 3 times the average cost of disposal. For specific cases, the NRC may adjust these amounts to correspond to 3 times the actual expected cost of authorized disposal.

**TABLE B**

Severity Level	Base Civil Penalty Amount (Percent of amount listed in Table A)
I .....	100%
II.....	80%
III.....	50%

## 9.0 INTERIM ENFORCEMENT POLICIES

### 9.1 Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48)

This section sets forth the interim Enforcement Policy that the NRC will follow to exercise enforcement discretion for certain noncompliances with the requirements in 10 CFR 50.48, "Fire Protection," (or fire protection license conditions) that are identified as a result of the transition to a new risk-informed, performance-based fire protection approach included in 10 CFR 50.48(c) and for certain existing identified noncompliances that reasonably may be resolved by compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c). Paragraph (c) allows reactor licensees to voluntarily comply with the risk-informed, performance-based fire protection approaches in National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 (NFPA 805), "Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants," 2001 Edition (with limited exceptions stated in the rule language).

For those noncompliances identified during the licensees' transition process, this enforcement discretion policy will be in effect for up to 3 years from the date specified by the licensee in its letter of intent to adopt the requirements in 10 CFR 50.48(c). This enforcement discretion will continue to be in place until the NRC disposes the licensee's amendment request to transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c). The agency will use NRR Office Instruction LIC-109, "Acceptance Review Procedures," (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML081200811), to process the license amendment request (LAR). If the amendment is acceptable for review, enforcement discretion will continue to be in place, without interruption, until the NRC disposes the LAR. If the amendment is unacceptable with opportunity to supplement, the enforcement discretion will continue while the staff reviews the amendment. If after receipt of the supplemental information, the amendment is determined to be acceptable for review, enforcement discretion will continue until the NRC decides the disposition of the amendment. The NRC will determine the disposition of submittals that are not acceptably supplemented, or submittals initially characterized as unacceptable with no opportunity to supplement, in accordance with normal enforcement practices.

The NRC may grant an additional period of enforcement discretion on a case-by-case basis, if a licensee has made substantial progress in its transition effort. This additional period of discretion, if granted, would end 6 months after the date of the safety evaluation approving the second pilot plant<sup>13</sup> LAR review. The NRC will assess "substantial progress" based on accomplishment of tasks that are not resource limited with respect to technical expertise in fire probabilistic risk assessment (e.g., classical fire protection transition, deterministic nuclear safety performance criteria transition, nonpower operational transition, radioactive release transition, development of the NFPA 805 monitoring program, operator manual action transition to NFPA 805 recovery actions). In order for the NRC to adequately evaluate the transition progress, licensees that request enforcement discretion beyond the 3 years currently available should make their request to the NRC in writing at least 3 months before the expiration of the 3-year discretion period and compile or submit the following information:

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<sup>13</sup> The NRC accepted the request from both Duke Power (ADAMS Accession No. ML051080005) and Progress Energy (ML052140391) to allow Oconee Nuclear Power Station and Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Station, respectively, to become pilot NFPA 805 plants.

- Compile, for onsite NRC audit/inspection, a list of all fire protection-related noncompliances and the related compensatory measures for those noncompliances.
- Document, for onsite NRC audit/inspection, that each operator manual action put in place as compensatory measures is feasible and reliable, in accordance with staff-provided guidance in Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-07, “Compensatory Measures to Satisfy the Fire Protection Program Requirements.”
- Submit a description of the physical modifications performed, if any, to address existing risk-significant fire protection issues.
- Submit a status report on the transition, including a schedule of milestones for completing the fire probabilistic risk assessment. The status report should be divided into the following major areas:
  - classical fire protection transition (in accordance with NFPA 805, Chapter 3)
  - nuclear safety performance criteria transition (in accordance with NFPA 805, Chapters 1, 2, and 4)
  - nonpower operational transitions
  - NFPA 805 monitoring program

If the NRC determines that a licensee has not made sufficient progress during the transition to NFPA 805, the NRC will deny the request for an extension of enforcement discretion.

If, after submitting the letter of intent to comply with 10 CFR 50.48(c) and before submitting the LAR, the licensee decides not to complete the transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c), the licensee must submit a letter stating its intent to retain its existing licensing basis and withdrawing its letter of intent to comply with 10 CFR 50.48(c). After the licensee’s withdrawal from the transition process, the staff, as a matter of practice, will not take enforcement action against any noncompliance that the licensee corrected during the transition process and will, on a case-by-case basis, consider refraining from taking action if reasonable and timely corrective actions are in progress (e.g., an exemption has been submitted for NRC review).

Noncompliances that the licensee has not corrected, as well as noncompliances identified after the date of the withdrawal letter, will be dispositioned in accordance with normal enforcement practices.

a. Noncompliances Identified during the Licensee’s Transition Process

Under this interim Enforcement Policy, enforcement action normally will not be taken for a violation of 10 CFR 50.48(b) (or the requirements in a fire protection license condition) involving a problem in an area such as engineering, design, implementing procedures, or installation, if the violation is documented in an inspection report and meets all of the following criteria:



1. The licensee identified the violation as a result of a voluntary initiative to adopt the risk-informed, performance-based fire protection program under 10 CFR 50.48(c) or, if the NRC identified the violation, the NRC staff found it likely that the licensee would have identified the violation in light of the defined scope, thoroughness, and schedule of the licensee's transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c), provided that the schedule reasonably provides for completion of the transition within 3 years of the date specified by the licensee in its letter of intent to implement 10 CFR 50.48(c) or other period granted by the NRC.
2. The violation was corrected or will be corrected as a result of completing the transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c). Also, the licensee took immediate corrective action and/or compensatory measures within a reasonable time commensurate with the risk significance of the issue following identification (this action should involve expanding the initiative, as necessary, to identify other issues caused by similar root causes).
3. Routine licensee efforts such as normal surveillance or QA activities were not likely to have previously identified the violation.
4. The violation was not willful.

The NRC may take enforcement action when these conditions are not met or when a violation that is associated with a finding of high safety significance is identified.

While the NRC may exercise discretion for violations meeting the required criteria where the licensee failed to make a required report to the NRC, a separate enforcement action will normally be issued for the licensee's failure to make a required report.

b. Existing Identified Noncompliances

In addition, licensees may have existing identified noncompliances that could reasonably be corrected under 10 CFR 50.48(c). For these noncompliances, the NRC is providing enforcement discretion for the implementation of corrective actions until the licensee has made the transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c), provided that the noncompliances meet all of the following criteria:

1. The licensee has entered the noncompliance into its corrective action program and implemented appropriate compensatory measures.
2. The noncompliance is not associated with a finding that the ROP SDP would evaluate as red, or it would not be categorized at Severity Level I.
3. The noncompliance was not willful.
4. The licensee submitted a letter of intent by December 31, 2005, stating its intent to transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c).

After December 31, 2005, this enforcement discretion for implementation of corrective actions for existing identified noncompliances will not be available and the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48(b) (and any other requirements in fire protection license conditions) will be enforced in accordance with normal enforcement practices. However, licensees that submitted letters of intent to transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c) with existing noncompliances will have the option to implement corrective actions in accordance with the new performance-based regulation. The NRC will exercise all other elements of the assessment and enforcement process even if the licensee submitted its letter of intent before the NRC issues its enforcement action for existing noncompliances.

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