

December 8, 2008



## **Results in Brief: Marine Corps Implementation of the Urgent Universal Needs Process for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles**

### **What We Did**

At the request of the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, we reviewed the Marine Corps decision making process to determine whether the decision makers responded appropriately and timely to the February 2005 Urgent Universal Need Statement (UUNS) submitted by field commanders for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)-type vehicles.

### **What We Found**

Shortly after the June 2005 decision by the Commandant of the Marine Corps to replace all High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) in theater with the M1114 up-armored HMMWV, the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Installations and Logistics advised Marine Corps generals that the M1114 up-armored HMMWV was the best available, most survivable asset to protect Marine Corps forces.

In reaction, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) stopped processing the UUNS for MRAP-type vehicle capability in August 2005. Specifically, MCCDC officials did not develop a course of action for the UUNS, attempt to obtain funding for it, or present it to the Marine Corps Requirements Oversight Council for a decision on acquiring an MRAP-type vehicle capability. Further, the MCCDC did not, as it could and should have in July 2005, request that the Deputy Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) take advantage of new Joint Staff processes available to address an immediate and apparent joint warfighter need for an MRAP-type vehicle capability.

DoD was aware of the threat posed by mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in low-intensity conflicts and of the availability of mine-resistant vehicles years before insurgent actions began in Iraq in 2003. Yet DoD did not develop requirements for, fund, or acquire MRAP-type vehicles for low-intensity conflicts

that involved mines and IEDs. As a result, the Department entered into operations in Iraq without having taken available steps to acquire technology to mitigate the known mine and IED risk to soldiers and Marines. We are making recommendations only to the Marine Corps because the scope of our audit was limited to a review of Marine Corps actions to address the IED threat. We plan to address other Services' actions to counter the IED threat during future audits.

### **What We Recommend**

We recommend that the Director, Joint Staff establish procedures in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3470.01, "Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) in the Year of Execution," July 15, 2005, and that the Commanding General, MCCDC establish procedures in Marine Corps Order 3900.17, "The Marine Corps Urgent Needs Process (UNP) and the Urgent Universal Need Statement (Urgent UNS)," October 17, 2008, to enable Service requirements developers to forward urgent requirements that may have joint-Service applicability directly to the appropriate combatant commander for endorsement and subsequent submission to the Joint Staff for validation as a Joint Urgent Operational Need.

### **Client Comments and Our Response**

The comments from the Director, Joint Staff and the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command were responsive to our recommendations. Based on the comments of the Director, Joint Staff, we revised both recommendations to provide for combatant commander endorsement of urgent Service requirements before submission of UUNS that may have joint-Service applicability to the Joint Staff. Please see the recommendations table on the back of this page.

## Recommendations Table

Client	Recommendations Requiring Comment	No Additional Comments Required
Director, Joint Staff		1.
Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command	2.	

**Please provide comments by February 9, 2009.**