

# Inspector General

United States  
Department of Defense



Procurement and Use of  
Nontactical Vehicles at  
Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan

To obtain additional copies of this report, visit the Web site of the Department of Defense Inspector General at <http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports> or contact the Secondary Reports Distribution Unit at (703) 604-8937 (DSN 664-8937) or fax (703) 604-8932.

## Suggestions for Audits

To suggest ideas for or to request future audits, contact the Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Auditing at (703) 604-9142 (DSN 664-9142) or fax (703) 604-8932. Ideas and requests can also be mailed to:

ODIG-AUD (ATTN: Audit Suggestions)  
Department of Defense Inspector General  
400 Army Navy Drive (Room 801)  
Arlington, VA 22202-4704



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
**hotline**

**To report fraud, waste, mismanagement, and abuse of authority.**

Send written complaints to: Defense Hotline, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1900  
Phone: 800.424.9098 e-mail: [hotline@dodig.mil](mailto:hotline@dodig.mil) [www.dodig.mil/hotline](http://www.dodig.mil/hotline)

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
DCMA	Defense Contract Management Agency
LOGCAP	Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
RCC	Regional Contracting Center
RETC	Rashed Elham Trading Company
TDY	Temporary Duty



INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

October 31, 2008


MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND  
COMMANDER, COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE-101  
COMMANDER, JOINT CONTRACTING COMMAND-  
IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN  
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Procurement and Use of Nontactical Vehicles at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan  
(Report No. D-2009-007)

We are providing this report for your information and use. We considered client comments on a draft of the report in preparing the final report.

Comments on the draft of this report conformed to the requirements of DoD Directive 7650.3 and left no unresolved issues. Therefore, we do not require any additional comments.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to Timothy Moore at (703) 604-9068 (DSN 318-664-9068) or James Setlock (DSN 318-431-4443). If you desire, we will provide a formal briefing on the results.

  
Donald A. Bloomer  
Deputy Director  
Joint and Overseas Operations





# Results in Brief: Procurement and Use of Nontactical Vehicles at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan

## What We Did

The objective of the audit was to determine the effectiveness of the process for procuring and leasing nontactical vehicles at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan. We analyzed the process for procuring and for leasing nontactical vehicles, the justifications for them, and compliance with DoD guidance on their management. We reviewed records maintained by the Regional Contracting Center Bagram, the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-82, and the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) for nontactical vehicles, consisting of cars and trucks. We analyzed the costs of operating these vehicles and justifications for their use by tenant units at Bagram Air Field. We performed our audit fieldwork from November 2007 until January 2008.

## What We Found

DCMA had not purchased nontactical vehicles under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) since May 2006. The nontactical vehicles that were purchased were used to support base operations. Justifications were provided for the purchased nontactical vehicles.

The CJTF-82, Logistics Office (CJ4) provided information that there was growth in the number of leased nontactical vehicles on Bagram Air Field from March 2006 until January 2008. Specifically, CJ4 officials stated that the number of leased nontactical vehicles increased from 102 to 1,548. During that time, CJTF-82 did not comply with provisions of the DoD Regulation 4500.36-R, "Management, Acquisition, and Use of Motor Vehicles," dated March 16, 2007. Thus, Bagram Air Field became congested with

traffic. Documentation for the justification of the leases of nontactical vehicles ranged from providing specific purposes to citing the words "vehicle lease," or a justification was not provided. In addition, documentation for lease justifications did not consider the local DoD bus service. We estimated the additional annual cost of the growth of leased nontactical vehicles from March 2006 until January 2008 was approximately \$16 million. On April 10, 2008, CJTF-101 took command from CJTF-82.

## What We Recommend

We recommend that the Commander, CJTF-101:

- review and ensure that nontactical vehicles used at Bagram Air Field are mission-essential and properly approved;
- enforce DoD Regulation 4500.36-R regarding the justifications and use of nontactical vehicles by tenant units at Bagram Air Field; and
- establish a central consolidation point to collect and maintain nontactical vehicle inventories along with specific mileage and purposes for which they were used at Bagram Air Field.

## Client Comments and Our Response

The Chief of Staff, Combined/Joint Task Force (CJTF)-101 agreed with the recommendations, and no further comments are required. CJTF-101 has taken actions to improve the management oversight of nontactical vehicles in use on Bagram Air Field. The Chief of Staff had general comments, which we addressed after the Finding section.

## Recommendations Table

Client	Recommendations Requiring Comment	No Additional Comments Required
Commander, Combined Joint Task Force-101		1., 2., 3., and 4.



# Table of Contents

<b>Results in Brief</b>	i
<b>Introduction</b>	1
Objectives	1
Background	1
<b>Finding. Controls for Nontactical Vehicle Leases at Bagram Air Field</b>	3
Client Comments on the Finding and Our Response	8
Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response	9
<b>Appendix A. Scope and Methodology</b>	11
Review of Internal Controls	11
Prior Coverage	11
<b>Client Comments</b>	
Combined Joint Task Force-101 Chief of Staff	13





# Introduction

## Objectives

The objective of the audit was to determine the effectiveness of the process for procuring and leasing nontactical vehicles at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan. We also reviewed the cost of operating and maintaining nontactical vehicles and determined whether the amount of use complied with DoD guidance. We limited our review of nontactical vehicles to automobiles and small trucks operated by tenant units for transferring personnel and cargo. See the Appendix for the scope and methodology.

## Background

Bagram Air Field is currently occupied and maintained by the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division of the U.S. Army. Command groups rotate in and out of Bagram Air Field approximately every 15 months. On April 10, 2008, the CJTF-101 replaced the CJTF-82 as Commander, Regional Command East at Bagram Air Field. The CJTF-101 and CJTF-82 missions, in conjunction with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, joint, interagency, and multinational forces, are to conduct full spectrum operations to neutralize insurgent forces in the combined joint operations area, develop Afghanistan national security capabilities, and support the growth of governance and development in order to build a stable Afghanistan. The CJTF-82 replaced the CJTF-76<sup>1</sup> in February 2007.

Documentation provided by the CJTF-82, Logistics Office, hereafter referred to as CJ4, in January 2008 cited 1,548 leased nontactical vehicles on Bagram Air Field. The circumference of the entire base is eight miles. There is one main road that circles the perimeter of the air field. The base is self-contained and guarded at all times, and access is limited to authorized personnel.

### ***DoD-Purchased Nontactical Vehicles***

Documentation provided by DCMA cited 512 nontactical vehicles purchased through the LOGCAP, which the DCMA administers. The support contractor for the LOGCAP is KBR, Inc., formerly known as Kellogg, Brown and Root, Incorporated, which supports Bagram Air Field base operations. The justifications for the purchased nontactical vehicles were included in the procurement documentation. The average cost of these vehicles was approximately \$22,000, and the average annual cost for service and parts was approximately \$2,000. The last nontactical vehicle purchased through the LOGCAP was in May 2006.

---

<sup>1</sup> The mission of the CJTF-76 was to conduct full spectrum operations throughout the area to defeat the enemy extremist movement, establish an enduring security, and reshape its posture for the “Long War” in order to set conditions for long-term stability in Afghanistan.

### ***Leased Nontactical Vehicles***

According to documentation provided by the CJ4, the number of leased nontactical vehicles, as of January 17, 2008, was 1,548. Tenant units at Bagram Air Field could lease nontactical vehicles through the Regional Contracting Center (RCC) Bagram. The average cost was approximately \$900 a month, or \$10,800 a year, including maintenance, depending on the type of nontactical vehicle. RCC Bagram used the support contractor, Rashed Elham Trading Company (RETC), located at Bagram Air Field, for nontactical vehicle leases.

## **Finding. Controls for Nontactical Vehicle Leases at Bagram Air Field**

According to the CJ4 officials, there was significant growth in the number of leased nontactical vehicles on Bagram Air Field from March 2006 until January 2008. Specifically, CJ4 officials stated that the number of nontactical vehicles increased from 102 to 1,548. During that time, CJTF-76 (and later CJTF-82) did not comply with or enforce the provisions of the DoD “Management, Acquisition, and Use of Motor Vehicles” Regulation, DoD 4500.36-R, dated March 16, 2007, which caused the growth of nontactical vehicles. Approximately \$16 million was spent for the additional leasing of vehicles. Documentation for lease justifications was inconsistent and did not consider the local DoD bus service at Bagram Air Field.

### **Requirements for Reducing the Number of Vehicles and Obtaining Approval**

#### ***DoD Management, Acquisition, and Use of Motor Vehicles Regulation***

The DoD Regulation 4500.36-R, “Management, Acquisition, and Use of Motor Vehicles,” dated March 16, 2007 ( DoD Motor Vehicles Regulation) is the overarching regulation for the use of nontactical vehicles by all DoD Components. The DoD Motor Vehicles Regulation defines nontactical vehicles as “any commercial motor vehicle, trailer, material handling, or engineering equipment that carries passengers or cargo acquired for administrative, direct mission, or operational support of military functions.” DoD considers sedans, station wagons, carryalls, vans, and buses to be nontactical. The DoD Motor Vehicles Regulation also requires that motor vehicle resources be organized and managed for optimum responsiveness, efficiency, and economy in support of the DoD mission. Further, the DoD Motor Vehicles Regulation states that when an organization determines that motor vehicle transportation is required, the organization must consider DoD-scheduled bus service the first source of transportation.

Management is to measure the effectiveness of nontactical vehicle activities, and the responsible DoD Component is to establish an annual utilization guideline for the use of nontactical vehicles. In all cases, a document must be retained to show the specific utilization guideline established for each motor vehicle.

#### ***Memoranda and Fragmentary Order***

Before the start of our audit on November 2007, CJTF-76 issued a memorandum on the need to reduce the number of nontactical vehicles at Bagram Air Field, yet the number increased. The CJTF-76 memorandum issued regarding “Non-Tactical Vehicle Reduction” stated that the large number of nontactical vehicles on Bagram Air Field was

causing congestion on the base.<sup>2</sup> The memorandum recommended that CJTF-76 and tenant units reduce the number of nontactical vehicles used on Bagram Air Field by 50 percent.

During our audit, CJTF-82 took proactive measures regarding the leasing of nontactical vehicles at Bagram Air Field by issuing a memorandum dated December 18, 2007, and FRAGO<sup>3</sup> 779 dated January 1, 2008, on the need to have prior approval from CJ4 before a lease could be executed by RCC Bagram. In its memorandum for Regional Contracting Center Bagram, "Lease Vehicle Approval Requirements," CJTF-82 stated that requests for leases of nontactical vehicles on Bagram Air Field must first be endorsed by CJ4 before RCC Bagram executes contracts to procure leased nontactical vehicles.

FRAGO 779 stated that effective January 15, 2008, CJ4 is the approving authority for all leases of nontactical vehicles to be used on Bagram Air Field. Further, CJTF-82 must approve all current and future nontactical vehicle leases to "right size the excessive vehicle fleet on Bagram Air Field." FRAGO 779 implements an internal control requiring CJ4 to approve or deny tenant units the ability to lease nontactical vehicles for use on Bagram Air Field.

After the audit fieldwork was completed, CJTF-82 issued FRAGO 866 on the continuing need to reduce the number of vehicles on Bagram Air Field. The CJTF-82 FRAGO 866, dated March 5, 2008, directed Base Operations to "develop a nontactical vehicle reduction plan with goal of reducing on-post vehicle population by 25%."

After briefing the CJTF-101 Inspector General on June 30, 2008, regarding our audit, we were informed that the CJTF-101, Red Team had issued a report regarding nontactical vehicles dated June 17, 2008. The Red Team analyzed the nontactical vehicle requirements, utilization, and alternatives on Bagram Air Field to determine how best to serve the needs of tenant units while economizing on the use of nontactical vehicles. The analysis provided short-term and longer term actions that could be taken to improve nontactical vehicle management. CJ4 intends to develop and implement new policy guidance on nontactical vehicle management and implement a vehicle registration process.

## **Leased Nontactical Vehicles**

Bagram Air Field tenant units leased nontactical vehicles through RCC Bagram, using the support contractor, RETC, an Afghan company that is located at Bagram Air Field. Neither RETC nor the DoD drivers of the nontactical vehicles maintained a log citing daily mileage, destination, or purpose for each trip. In addition, CJTF-82 did not receive specific mileage from the tenant units or information on how the leased vehicles were used each day. These are the types of controls required by the DoD Motor Vehicles Regulation to measure the use of each motor vehicle.

---

<sup>2</sup> The CJTF-76 memorandum, dated March 3, 2006, was issued by Headquarters CJTF-76 and directed to all Bagram Airfield tenant units.

<sup>3</sup> FRAGO is a DoD term for fragmentary order, which is an abbreviated form of an operation order.

Regarding the mileage incurred on leased nontactical vehicles, RETC provided a memorandum dated December 15, 2007, that reported leased nontactical vehicles at Bagram Air Field logged, on average, an estimated 744 to 930 miles each month. The drivers of the leased nontactical vehicles were not required to track the mileage or purpose of trips.

Justifications submitted to RCC Bagram when beginning the lease process ranged from providing specific details on how the nontactical vehicles would be used each day to simply providing the words “vehicle lease,” or no justifications were provided. All justifications for open leased nontactical vehicles available at RCC Bagram (207 vehicles) were reviewed. A total of 64 Purchase Request and Commitments (Department of Army Form 3953) and 16 Request for Purchases (Air Force Information Management Tool 9) were reviewed. For example, one justification for a leased nontactical vehicle was “vehicle for TDYers” (those on temporary duty). The justifications for nontactical vehicles did not refer to using the established DoD bus service, which according to the DoD Motor Vehicles Regulation is to be considered the first choice for meeting transportation requirements.

CJTF-82 issued a memorandum dated December 18, 2007, that required requests to lease vehicles to be submitted to CJ4 with a justification for the lease, the number of vehicles on hand, and the number of personnel the vehicle would support. CJ4 would review the support documentation and would need to endorse the request before RCC Bagram executed the contract procedures to lease the vehicle. In addition, FRAGO 779, dated January 1, 2008, required tenant units to provide justifications to CJTF-82 for currently leased nontactical vehicles by January 15, 2008. However, as of January 27, 2008, only 4 out of 24 tenant units had submitted justifications for their nontactical vehicles to CJ4. Before FRAGO 779 was issued, CJTF-82 did not have an internal control regarding the review of justification and approval for the leasing of nontactical vehicles by tenant units at Bagram Air Field. Tenant units could use their own funds to lease nontactical vehicles without the prior approval of CJTF-82.

The cost of using vehicles on Bagram Air Field included fuel consumption, vehicle maintenance, and repair cost when the vehicle was returned to RETC at the end of the lease period. The annual cost of fuel for the additional 1,446 leased nontactical vehicles, the difference between the 1,548 leased nontactical vehicles as of January 2008 and the 102 leased nontactical vehicles as of March 2006, was approximately \$1.6 million.

## **Nontactical Vehicle Summary**

The procurements of nontactical vehicles at Bagram Air Field are provided in the table.

### **Nontactical Vehicles Used for Transporting Personnel and Cargo**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Number of Vehicles</b>		
	<b>Leased</b>	<b>Owned</b>	<b>Total</b>
March 2005	98	742	<b>840</b>
March 2006	102	819	<b>921</b>
January 2008	1,548	439	<b>1,987</b>

Source: CJTF-82, Logistics Office (CJ4) at Bagram Air Field, January 17, 2008.


The last nontactical vehicle purchased through the LOGCAP was in May 2006. Not all purchased nontactical vehicles are still in use.

## **Enforcement of the DoD Regulation**

The DoD Management, Acquisition, and Use of Motor Vehicles Regulation requires that motor vehicle resources be organized and managed for optimum responsiveness, efficiency, and economy by all DoD Components. CJTF-76 officials recognized that too many nontactical vehicles were in use at Bagram Air Field on March 3, 2006, when they issued a memorandum recommending that the number be reduced by 50 percent. However, CJTF-76 did not take control of nontactical vehicles and enforce the DoD Motor Vehicles Regulation. When CJTF-82 replaced CJTF-76 in February 2007 and took command at Bagram Air Field, CJTF-82 did not enforce the requirements of the DoD Motor Vehicles Regulation. CJTF-82 had no provision for a central organization at Bagram Air Field to review and approve leased nontactical vehicles until CJTF-82 issued a memorandum dated December 18, 2007, followed by FRAGO 779 on January 1, 2008, that required approval from CJ4 before a lease could be executed. By that time, the number of leased nontactical vehicles by tenant units was causing congestion at Bagram Air Field.

## **Available Bus Transportation**

The average number of bus passengers during March 2006 was approximately 63,000. As of December 2007, the average number of bus passengers each month was approximately 24,000 – a reduction of more than 50 percent. The decrease in bus use by personnel stationed at Bagram Air Field coincided with the increase in the number of leased nontactical vehicles. Further, the additional nontactical vehicles operating at Bagram Air Field created traffic jams for the DoD buses and caused them to get behind schedule. The trend of the average monthly number of bus passengers at Bagram Air Field is shown in the figure.



Source: Regional Transportation Office, Bagram Air Field.

Tenant units did not consider the available bus transportation at Bagram Air Field when determining whether to lease nontactical vehicles. In addition, justifications for leased nontactical vehicles were inconsistent, and tenant units were not required to maintain documentation on nontactical vehicle usage.

## Conclusions

The tenant units located at Bagram Air Field use leased nontactical vehicles to perform their missions. The circumference of the entire base is only eight miles. There is one main road that circles the perimeter of the air field. The base is self-contained and guarded at all times. Access to the base is limited to authorized personnel. According to the CJ4 records, there were 1,548 leased nontactical vehicles at Bagram Air Field as of January 17, 2008, consisting of cars and small trucks. With that number of nontactical vehicles operating at Bagram Air Field, there is traffic congestion.

Although the ability to lease nontactical vehicles to support Bagram Air Field appeared to be effective, additional review of justifications for the use of nontactical vehicles appears warranted. Justifications for leased nontactical vehicles at Bagram Air Field did not consider the local DoD bus service or were not always provided. The tenant units should make better use of the DoD bus service at Bagram Air Field instead of leasing nontactical vehicles for convenience.

Had CJTF-76 and then CJTF-82 enforced the DoD Motor Vehicles Regulation and ensured that the number of leased nontactical vehicles was reduced instead of increased, the U.S. Army could have saved approximately \$16 million, which could have been put to better use for operational units. The average annual lease cost of a nontactical vehicle



was \$900 a month, or \$10,800 each year; therefore, the annual price tag for 1,446 additional leased nontactical vehicles was approximately \$16 million a year.

On March 3, 2006, CJTF-76 did recommend a reduction in the nontactical vehicle fleet at Bagram Air Field by 50 percent. The CJTF-82 FRAGO 866, dated March 5, 2008, directed Base Operations to “develop a nontactical vehicle reduction plan with goal of reducing on-post vehicle population by 25%.” On June 17, 2008, the CJTF-101, Red Team issued a report regarding nontactical vehicles. The Red Team analyzed the nontactical vehicle requirements, utilization, and alternatives on Bagram Air Field to determine how best to serve the needs of tenant units while economizing on the use of nontactical vehicles. The analysis provided short-term and longer term actions that could be taken to improve nontactical vehicle management. CJ4 intends to develop and implement new policy guidance on nontactical vehicle management and implement a vehicle registration process.

## **Client Comments on the Finding and Our Response**

The CJTF-101 Chief of Staff stated that:

Data provided by CJTF-82 Logistics Office (CJ4) on increases in the number of [nontactical vehicles] from 2006 to 2008 is suspect but is probably the best data available to the auditors performing the audit. The start point of 102 [nontactical vehicles] in 2006 is inferred from the last known data point from the CJ4 office and not necessarily corroborated with records in the Resource Management Office or the Regional Contracting Center. To say that there were only 102 leased vehicles on [Bagram Air Field] in March of 2006 is questionable.

During the audit, we discussed this with CJTF-101 CJ-4 officials, and they could not provide any data other than that provided to us by CJTF-82. This was the best available data; thus, we did not revise the report.

Further, the CJTF-101 Chief of Staff commented that the discussion on page 4 on the Red Team study states that it was done “in response to FRAGO 866,” and he stated that this is not correct.

CJTF-101 CJ4 requested the study in order to determine if a flat 25% reduction in [nontactical vehicles] was practicable bottom line: it was not in response to the FRAGO, but rather to gain better understanding of the scope of the problem and to determine a way ahead with reductions and better oversight based on the facts. . . . At the time of the transition to CJTF-101 in April, no efforts had been made to implement a reduction primarily because [Task Force] Cincinnatus was not empowered to mandate reductions. As a result, the status quo continued. The Red Team study provided an initial start point for a new approach on [Bagram Air Field nontactical vehicle] management.

We deleted the words “in response to FRAGO 866” on page 4 of our report.

# **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

## ***Recommendations***

We recommend that the Commander, Combined Joint Task Force-101 implement the following:

- 1. Review the current distribution of leased nontactical vehicles at Bagram Air Field and ensure that the remaining nontactical vehicles are mission-essential.**
- 2. Remove nontactical vehicles from Bagram Air Field that do not have proper approval from the Logistics Office (CJ4).**
- 3. Enforce DoD Regulation 4500.36-R, “Management, Acquisition, and Use of Motor Vehicles,” dated March 16, 2007, for the use and procurement of nontactical vehicles at Bagram Air Field when reviewing the justifications and use of nontactical vehicles by tenant units.**
- 4. Establish a central consolidation point to collect and maintain data on nontactical vehicle inventories and operations and require tenant units that lease nontactical vehicles to record specific mileage and purposes for using nontactical vehicles and submit that data to the Logistics Office (CJ4).**

## ***Client Comments***

The Chief of Staff, Combined/Joint Task Force (CJTF)-101 concurred with the four recommendations. He stated that CJTF-101 has taken actions to improve the management oversight of nontactical vehicles in use on Bagram Air Field. He further stated that upon taking command of CJTF-101, the task force implemented a vehicle traffic study, published in April, and a Red Team study of nontactical vehicle management practices, published in June, and that the task force is implementing procedures to comply with the recommendations.

In addition, the Chief of Staff stated that in October 2008, CJTF-101 was planning to begin a new, annual registration program, incorporating the DoD Motor Vehicles Regulation, for all nontactical vehicles on Bagram Air Field. All vehicles without proper approval or not mission-essential would be redistributed or turned in, depending on the length of the lease. A nontactical vehicle review board was to meet monthly to review trends in usage and validate all new nontactical vehicle procurement requests. Finally, on August 19, 2008, CJTF-101 issued FRAGO 384, which superseded all other FRAGOs related to nontactical vehicles.

## **Our Response**

We commend the actions taken by the CJTF-101. The Chief of Staff’s comments were responsive to our recommendations, and no further comments are required.



## **Appendix A. Scope and Methodology**

We conducted fieldwork for this performance audit from November 2007 through January 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

From November 2007 through January 2008, we reviewed active nontactical vehicle records for costs and mileage. The purchased and leased nontactical vehicles reviewed were for cars and trucks used at Bagram Air Field for the time period of March 2006 through January 2008. We examined leased nontactical vehicle contract records from the RCC Bagram, the nontactical vehicle records from CJTF-82, Logistics Office (CJ4), the Vehicle Density list from DCMA, and the property book records from the Property Book Office. At RCC Bagram, we reviewed justifications for leased nontactical vehicles appearing on Purchase Request and Commitments (Department of Army Form 3953) and on Requests for Purchases (Air Force Information Management Tool 9). We were provided bus use data from the Regional Transportation Office.

Because of a limited time frame to complete the audit, we focused on leased nontactical vehicle contracts available at RCC Bagram. The last nontactical vehicle that was purchased through the LOGCAP at Bagram was in May 2006.

### **Review of Internal Controls**

We identified material internal control weaknesses for CJTF-82 as defined by DoD Instruction 5010.40, "Managers' Internal Control Program Procedures," January 4, 2006, as they applied to the audit objective. DoD Instruction 5010.40 states that internal controls are the organization policies and procedures that help program and financial managers achieve results and safeguard the integrity of their programs. We determined that the CJTF-82 had a material internal control weakness in not organizing or controlling the process by which tenant units at Bagram Air Field leased nontactical vehicles. Implementing our recommendations will improve the internal controls over the issue of nontactical vehicle leases. We will provide a copy of the report to the senior CJTF-82 official responsible for internal controls.

### **Use of Computer-Processed Data**

We did not use computer-processed data in this report.

### **Prior Coverage**

No prior coverage has been conducted on the use of nontactical vehicles at Bagram Air Field during the last 5 years.



# Combined Joint Task Force-101 Chief of Staff Comments



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

CJTF-101 – COS

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF)-101  
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

29 SEP 08

MEMORANDUM FOR Department of Defense Inspector General, 400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, VA 22202-4704 (ATTN: Timothy E. Moore, Program Director, Southwest Asia Operations)

SUBJECT: Command Response to the Report: Procurement and Use of Nontactical Vehicles at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan (Project D2008-D000LQ-0063.000)

1. Reference Department of Defense Inspector General Report, 22 September 2008, subject: Procurement and Use of Nontactical Vehicles at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan (Project D2008-D000LQ-0063.000)
2. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide comments to the recommendations listed in the referenced report. The command concurs with the recommendations identified in the report. CJTF-101 has taken actions to improve the management oversight of NTVs in use on BAF. Upon taking command of CJTF-101 and RC(E) we implemented a vehicle traffic study published in April and a Red Team study of NTV management practices published in June. We are implementing procedures to comply with the recommendations in these documents and the referenced report.
3. Enclosed are the responses to recommendations made reference in the report.
4. The point of contact is LTC John Styer, john.a.styer@afghan.swa.army.mil (NIPR) or DSN 318-481-7160.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Thomas D. Vail".

THOMAS D. VAIL  
Colonel, GS  
Chief of Staff

- 3 Encls
1. General Comments
  2. Report Recommendations and Actions Taken
  3. Comment on Material Internal Control Weakness

CJTF-101-COS

Enclosure 1, General Comments, to memorandum Subject: Command Response to the Report: Procurement and Use of Nontactical Vehicles at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan (Project D2008-D000LQ-0063.000)

In general, CJTF-101 concurs with the recommendations and findings detailed in the DoD IG report of procurement and use of NTVs on BAF. For continuity of record, CJTF-101 provides the following general comments to the factual data presented in the report.

1) Page i. Data provided by CJTF-82 Logistics Office (CJ4) on increases in the number of NTVs from 2006 to 2008 is suspect but is probably the best data available to the auditors performing the audit. The start point of 102 NTVs in 2006 is inferred from the last known data point from the CJ4 office and not necessarily corroborated with records in the Resource Management Office or the Regional Contracting Center. To say that there were only 102 leased vehicles on BAF in March of 2006 is questionable.

Not revised.

2) Page 4. Discussion on the Red Team report states that this study was done “in response to FRAGO 866”. This is not correct.

Revised.

a. CJTF-101 CJ4 requested the study in order to determine if a flat 25% reduction in NTVs was practicable – bottom line, it was not in response to, but rather to gain better understanding of the scope of the problem and to determine a way-ahead with reductions and better oversight based on the facts.

b. CJTF-82 FRAGO 866 to OPORD 07-03, subject: BAF Conservation Program, issued on 5 MAR 08 directed TF Cincinnatus to develop a nontactical vehicle reduction plan with the goal of reducing on-post (Bagram) vehicle population by 25%. At the time of the transition to CJTF-101 in April, no efforts had been made to implement a reduction primarily because TF Cincinnatus was not empowered to mandate reductions. As a result, the status quo continued. The Red Team study provided an initial start point for a new approach on BAF NTV management.

CJTF-101-COS

Enclosure 2, Report Recommendations and Actions Taken, to memorandum Subject: Command Response to the Report: Procurement and Use of Nontactical Vehicles at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan (Project D2008-D000LQ-0063.000)

The DoD IG auditors provided the following recommendations in their review of CJTF-82 NTV management processes. In general, we agree with these recommendations. Actions taken are listed below.

**1) Review the current distribution of leased nontactical vehicles at Bagram Air Field and ensure that the remaining nontactical vehicles are mission-essential.**

**ACTION TAKEN:** In October, we will begin a new registration program for all NTVs on BAF. Registration will begin by re-validating all vehicle distribution and leases to determine mission-essential needs. Vehicles deemed non mission-essential will be redistributed or turned in (depending on the length remaining on the lease). Registration will be required annually.

**2) Remove nontactical vehicles from Bagram Air Field that do not have proper approval from the Logistics Office (CJ4).**

**ACTION TAKEN:** This will occur as part of the NTV registration process and be addressed in subsequent monthly NTV review boards. (The NTV review board will begin in October 2008)

**3) Enforce DoD Regulation 4500.36-R, "Management, Acquisition, and Use of Motor Vehicles," dated March 16, 2007, for the use and procurement of nontactical vehicles at Bagram Air Field when reviewing the justifications and use of nontactical vehicles by tenant units.**

**ACTION TAKEN:** DoD Regulation 4500.36-R procedures will be incorporated into the monthly NTV review board. The NTV review board will cover (at a minimum): review NTV requirements, maintenance and life cycle replacement contracts, NTV handover coordination for transitioning units, review of TMP fleet requirements, bus utilization, fuel usage, and accident reporting. The board will address mission essential criteria for supporting NTV requests.

**4) Establish a central consolidation point to collect and maintain nontactical vehicle inventories and operations and require tenant units that lease nontactical vehicles to record specific mileage and purposes for using nontactical vehicles and submit that data to the Logistics Office (CJ4).**

**ACTION TAKEN:** This will be addressed through the monthly NTV review board. The board will review trends in NTV usage and be the board that validates all new NTV requirements for BAF.



CJTF-101-COS

Enclosure 3, Comment on Material Internal Control Weakness, to memorandum Subject:  
Command Response to the Report: Procurement and Use of Nontactical Vehicles at Bagram Air  
Field, Afghanistan (Project D2008-D000LQ-0063.000)

**Review of Internal Controls**

The audit determined that CJTF-82 had a material internal control weakness by not organizing or controlling the process in which tenant units at Bagram Air Field leased nontactical vehicles.

In January, 2008, CJTF-82 issued FRAGO 779 requiring approval for all “current and future leases of nontactical vehicles.” This FRAGO implemented a process for approval of all NTV’s by requiring a CJ4 approval prior to lease of vehicles thru the Bagram Regional Contracting Center and before issuance of a fuel sticker. This process allowed the CJTF-82 CJ4 to begin to get accountability of the actual number of vehicles operating on BAF and contributed to their ability to account for the 1,987 vehicles identified in the report.

The fuel sticker approval system remained in place through the transition to CJTF-101. This fuel sticker program coupled with the Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB) review of new and renewing NTV requests limited NTV growth on BAF.

On 19 AUG 08, CJTF-101 issued FRAGO 384 to OPORD 08-06, Implementation of BAF Nontactical wheel vehicle (NTV) policy (superceding all previous guidance on BAF NTV management). This FRAGO put in place a mechanism for a monthly NTV review board and provided a warning order for a BAF vehicle registration process. The NTV review board will begin to meet in October. This board will approve all vehicle validations and new lease requirements, review trends, utilization rates, fuel usage, bus utilization and other NTV related metrics as deemed appropriate by the board. Prior to registering NTV’s all units and contractors will be required to revalidate the justification for their vehicles; the board will review and approve or disapprove each validation request. Vehicles that do not present sufficient justification will be turned-in or reallocated to support other mission essential requirements. The objective of the program is to ensure compliance with DoD 4500-36R.

## **Team Members**

The Department of Defense Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Auditing, Joint and Overseas Operations prepared this report. Personnel of the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General who contributed to the report are listed below.

Donald Bloomer

Timothy Moore

Joseph Guba

James Setlock

Kartik K. Srinivasan

Matthew Schwersenska

Liz Scullin



# Inspector General Department of Defense

