CI Information - Hanford Site

'Richland Field Office Logo ' This section contains information that should help you better understand just what counterintelligence is all about and how it specifically applies to you, the DOE/NNSA employee, contractor, subcontractor, or consultant.

Page Navigation

:: Are you a target?
:: What are we protecting?
:: Treason 101
:: How can you help?
:: Information sought, Information found
:: Terrorism

Are you a target?

As a result of the global shift toward economic and technological competition, some foreign countries are becoming increasingly engaged in economic and industrial espionage. Foreign targeting of US technology and economic and proprietary information is a growing concern. Economic and industrial espionage against the United States by foreign entities, both government-sponsored and private, threatens US economic competitiveness and results in the loss of billions of US dollars and thousands of jobs annually.

The United States continues to be the preeminent world power. It has vital economic interests and military responsibilities around the globe. The protection of trade secret information, critical technologies, and proprietary information is an integral part of US economic security. Due to the importance of maintaining US economic competitiveness, current policy is to treat foreign threats to the economic well being of the United States as a national security issue. As a result, economic security is directly linked to, and inseparable from, national security.

Foreign countries, including some traditional allies, continue their attempts to collect information against US interests. While foreign efforts persist, the US Intelligence Community has detected no significant change from past patterns in both the nature and extent of the threat or in the type of technologies being targeted and collection methods employed. As in previous years, over a half dozen nations continue to be the most active collectors of US proprietary information and critical technologies. These nations gather information through both open and legal means as well as through clandestine efforts. They target industries, the US Government, and US persons in an effort to support their nations' economic and military priorities and to avoid the time and expense of advanced research and development.

Targeting and Collection

Military Force modernization, economic competition, and commercial modernization drive foreign collection efforts. As a result, dual-use technologies - those with civilian and military applications - are consistent targets of foreign collection.

Clandestine collection efforts continue; however, consistent with traditional espionage operations, a significant majority of foreign collection is initially conducted through legal and open means. This activity may be a precursor to economic espionage.

Practitioners of economic and industrial espionage seldom use one method of collection. Instead, they employ a number of collection techniques in a concerted effort that combines legal and illegal, traditional and more innovative methods. Espionage and other illegal collection methods include agent recruitment, use of US volunteers and co-optees, surreptitious entry, theft, and computer intrusions.

Legal collection methods include joint ventures, use of foreign students, scientific exchanges, Internet access, exploitation of cultural or ethnic affinity, mergers and acquisitions, visits to US facilities, and unsolicited requests for information.

When working in an overseas environment you are subject to the laws of that country, and we are also to work within our own laws. Our Government - through the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)- and our company -- through our Code of Ethics -- forbid corrupt payments to foreign government officials. FCPA violations can result in severe civil and criminal penalties, both for the individual and for our corporation, and a violation of our Code of Ethics may result in severe disciplinary action. This is important because violations leave you vulnerable to exploitation and targeting by a foreign intelligence service (FIS). Any vulnerability discovered by a FIS regarding you or the company can result in unwanted attention. Learn more about the FCPA and how it applies to you.

Industrial Espionage

It is imperative that US companies have a well-rounded internal security system and corresponding policies to reduce the potential for loss of sensitive information. Nations that fear falling behind in technological expertise and efficiency may resort to theft as a way to level the playing field.

What are we protecting?

Many people ask, "Why is counterintelligence important?" and, "Just what are we supposed to be protecting?" The answer to the first question should become apparent to you as you peruse the rest of this Website. We will attempt to answer the second, somewhat more complex, question in this section. The bottom line is that we are protecting information, the loss of which could cause damage to the national security, the Department of Energy (DOE), or to DOE's/NNSA contractor and sub-contractor companies. Most people understand this first concept of the damage that could occur if classified information was lost or compromised. However, many people don't understand the potential threat that a loss of sensitive, proprietary, or company private information could pose to DOE/NNSA, its contractors and/or the national security.

One of the first steps a good defense lawyer will do in defending a client in a trial involving espionage is convince the judge and the jury that her/his client did not know the information or equipment stolen was classified or proprietary. The defense lawyer may place an employee of the company -- corporate official or security officer -- on the witness stand and ask her/him what reasonable measures were taken within the company to clearly identify classified or proprietary information and ensure its protection. If the witness cannot satisfactorily articulate the reasonable measures and safeguards used to protect the classified or proprietary information, the case could be dismissed.

Within the United States, we have various federal laws to help ensure the protection of "classified" U.S. Government information. These laws have been used numerous times to prosecute U.S. and foreign citizens for committing espionage against the U.S. Government. Until recently, we did not have a federal law to protect the unclassified proprietary information or trade secrets of private U.S. companies. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 was specifically enacted to provide some protection to U.S. companies to cover this oversight.Read about the case that brought about the enactment of this legislation. The Economic Espionage Act was first used in court during the Avery-Dennison case, which is also the first conviction under that Act. Read about the facts of the Avery-Dennison case and determine what you work on that competitors might wish to obtain. It might be work involving classified, sensitive, dual-use technologies, or something as simple as a new adhesive that an adversary might try to obtain utilizing espionage tactics. Review cases and sentencing of convicted violators of the EEA.

One responsibility every company official has is to clearly identify to employees what classified or proprietary information requires protection. In other words, a company has a responsibility to take reasonable measures to protect classified U.S. Government information or their company trade secrets.

The term "Trade Secret" means all assets such as financial, business, scientific, technical, engineering or economic information. This includes patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, prototypes, formulas, design, procedures, methods, techniques, codes, processes, or programs -- whether tangible or intangible and whether or how stored, compiled or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if:

the owner has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret; and
the information derives independent economic value (actual or potential) from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, the public.

Recognizing that not all assets and activities warrant the same level of protection, a company needs to identify which assets need safeguarding and to assess their relative value or importance. Asset value need not be assessed in dollars. However, the cost of the security countermeasures used to protect assets must be reasonable in relation to their overall value. Assets can be valued relative to their potential loss impact. Within the Department of Defense, the impact of the loss of an asset might involve human lives or national interests.

An asset to the U.S. Government is any person, facility, material, information, or activity, which has a positive value to the U.S. Government or a company. The asset may have value to an adversary, as well as the U.S. Government or company, although the nature and magnitude of those values may differ. The categories listed below may help identify the general types of assets relevant to a U.S. company. The five basic categories include the following:

Five Basic Categories Graphic

The DOE/NNSA and the U.S. Government have codified their own critical assets in the Sensitive Subjects (Please contact your CI office for the Sensitive Subjects List) List and the National Critical Technologies List respectively.

Information about critical assets can be gathered from a variety of sources. The "asset owners" or program managers are generally the most knowledgeable about the assets in need of protection. Sometimes it may be an engineer or scientist. These individuals generally have the best idea as to which assets are the most sensitive and valuable.

Understanding the nature and value of the assets being protected allows employees to make more rational decisions about related vulnerabilities and about the allocation of security countermeasures. It also helps ensure that critical assets will be protected first and that resources will be allocated where they will be the most effective.

Treason 101

This section should serve as your Introduction to Treason and consists of a series of articles on how spies are caught, the prevalence of espionage, and why people spy.

It starts with a short piece on How Spies Are Caught. That comes first, since it is so important for anyone who may be considering espionage to understand that they will ultimately be caught. Perhaps not right away, but eventually. The statute of limitations does not apply to the crime of espionage. Anyone who commits this crime will have to be looking over their shoulder for the rest of their life.

The Insider Espionage Threat identifies four conditions that must exist before espionage occurs:

opportunity to commit the crime
motive
ability to overcome inhibitions such as moral values, fear of being caught, and loyalty to employer or co-workers
trigger that sets the betrayal in motion.

The article then analyzes how these pre-conditions for betrayal are increasing as a result of changes in social and economic conditions in the United States, and in our relations with the rest of the world.

The explosive growth in information technology is increasing exponentially the amount of information that can be collected and compromised by a single, well-placed spy. DOE/NNSA has recently undertaken a significant number of safeguards to mitigate this growing threat.

Espionage by the Numbers describes an unclassified data base on Americans arrested for espionage against the U.S. since World War II. Based on media reports, trial records and unclassified official documents, the data base records 56 variables for 117 cases. Analysis of this data provides descriptive statistics on what sort of people have been arrested, why they committed espionage, how they got involved, what if anything they were paid, and what foreign country received (or was intended to receive) the information.

How you can help?

As a DOE/NNSA badge holder, you are entrusted with safeguarding sensitive and classified material. In addition to reporting attempts by outside individuals to obtain unauthorized access to information, you are expected to report potentially significant, factual information that comes to your attention and that raises potential security concerns about a co-worker. You are also strongly encouraged to help co-workers who are having personal problems that may become a security issue if the problems are not addressed.

Presidential Executive Order 12968 on Access to Classified Information states: "Employees are encouraged and expected to report any information that raises doubts as to whether another employee's continued eligibility for access to classified information is clearly consistent with the national security." It states further that the head of each agency that grants access to classified information shall establish a program to educate employees with access to classified information about their individual responsibilities under this Order.

What and When
What and when to report is a question of your own personal ethics and good judgment in determining what is in the best interests of your country, your organization, and your colleagues. The rules on this are very general, as there can never be enough rules to cover all the potential situations you might encounter

Why
As Americans, we place a high value on our privacy. When we have to make intrusions upon another person's privacy in the name of counterintelligence or security, this must be clearly justified and implemented in a fair and consistent manner. It is important for you to report indicators of illegal, improper, unreliable, or suspicious behavior by a co-worker because:

The amount of damage that can be done by a single insider working for the other side has increased enormously with the growth of interconnected computer networks.
It is now clear that employee and supervisor decisions to report adverse information about co-workers - or decisions not to report such information - have played a significant role in our counterintelligence successes and failures.
The goal is to help employees with problems before they get into serious trouble.
As a DOE/NNSA employee or contractor, compromise of the advanced technology on which your business is based could affect your company's bottom line, as well as national security. This could cause you and your co-workers to lose your job, your next project, or your next raise.

Your vigilance is the best single defense in protecting information, operations, facilities, and people. Apathy, disbelief, or fear of what might happen if we become involved sometimes cause us to look away rather than confront troublesome behavior. But looking the other way from counterintelligence or security issues can pose a risk to a colleague's well-being as well as to your organization and the national security.

You're not expected to be an armchair counterintelligence or security officer, or a psychologist, nor should you conduct your own investigation to verify or validate information. Your role is to be aware of potential issues and to exercise good judgment in determining what and when to report. The key is to intervene, when appropriate, in the interest of national security and your organization, and to protect a colleague from his or her own potentially self-destructive behavior.

Report to Whom?

Information or suspicions should be reported immediately to the Counterintelligence Office. You can be assured that your identity as the source of the information will be strictly protected and only those required to possess that knowledge will know of your disclosure. If you feel you must report anonymously, still please call the Counterintelligence Office and report your suspicions.

Worst-case Motivator

It's all up to you, the DOE/NNSA employee, contractor employee, subcontractor, or consultant, to report any incidents that could be indicators of espionage or threats to national security. And, if all else fails, let money be your motivation… The FBI offers up to a $500,000 reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of a person involved in espionage.

Information Sought, Information Found

The following examples show several scenarios Foreign Intelligence Services and competitors utilize to access information they should not have access to. Think about the last time you talked to a telemarketer, did you stay on the line? Did you answer any questions? How about the last time you received an eMail from someone you had never heard of, did you answer it? Have you looked in your trash lately? Imagine what information an adversary might find regarding projects or personal information if s/he went through your trash.

Treasures or Trash - What's in your Dumpster?

For many years, a variety of US military "red teams" have used the technique called "Dumpster Diving" (or trash surveillance, if you prefer) to recover sensitive but unclassified information about US military operations and capabilities. Invariably, the term trash intelligence, or TRASHINT, became common usage among intelligence collectors. Information retrieved has included a wide range of information, including flag and general officer travel, pilot proficiency in the cockpit, and training and deployment schedules. Although seemingly innocuous, these pieces of information can tell a great deal about intentions and capabilities.

Gathering information on competitors is hardly a new concept, but it now seems corporations are adopting Dumpster Diving as an additional resource to discover information that could be useful in the marketplace. According to the National Security Institute, this data can include financial information, telephone records, production information, and marketing data.

Two recent cases seem to endorse this upsurge in activity. First, in the weeks leading up to the release of the top secret Crusoe chip, the US semiconductor company Transmeta noted a sudden interest in the company's trash, chasing off several people, including one whose car bore the bumper sticker of a well-known rival. The company had successfully kept the chip secret for five years and made sure that no "crown jewels" of information were inadvertently discarded. Management understood the problem with the CEO noting, "We made sure all they got were orange rinds."

More recently Oracle, a huge software maker, hired a detective agency to buy the office trash and find documents of its competitor and archrival Microsoft, hoping to find embarrassing information to support an antitrust case. News of the operation eventually leaked out after offers of cash were made to janitors, and indications that trash had been rummaged through, thus causing Oracle to go public.

Cloak and dagger tactics not withstanding, the Oracle action against Microsoft is an example of the hardball competitive intelligence gathering used in the marketplace today.

e-Mail Inquiries: How to Spot a Fake

Editors note: The President of TEMPEST INC., an engineering firm in the Washington DC area that provides TEMPEST-secure equipment, training, and other services to the US Government and its contractors, wrote an article detailing attempts by unauthorized consumers to acquire classified information over the Internet. Portions of the report are provided below for readers who might encounter similar events:

We have a good reputation, but we are by no means famous. A year ago we opened a Web page on the Internet. After a quiet year, we suddenly began to get a lot of inquiries; the type of inquiries that no businessman can afford to ignore. Very few turned out to be real. Besides wasting a lot of our time, many were blatant attempts to solicit classified information. After dealing with a lot of these fakes, we've found that they have much in common. The following are some ways to recognize possible fake classified information requests:

The fakes are:

A BIG DEAL.

IN A BIG HURRY.

ALWAYS ON THE INSIDE TRACK.

VAGUE.

COME TO OUR COUNTRY.

FASCIST POLICE STATE.

So how do you spot a real inquiry? Here are some tips:

VERY SPECIFIC.

FROM A US GOVERNMENT SITE:

SMALL.

QUICK DECISION MAKERS.

SHOW ME THE MONEY.

Just because someone has a US e-mail address (somebody.com), it does NOT mean s/he is in the US. S/He could be in Cuba, or some other overseas country. Just because someone has an American sounding name, "Jane Doe" does not mean she is American. It is easy to change your e-mail name, just click on "options."

Foreign Collection Trends: Internet-Based Foreign Requests for Information

This article was written by Gene H. Smith, Defense Security Service, Counterintelligence Analyst, 2001.

Beginning in 1998 the Internet became a significant source of foreign collection of US Department of Defense (DOD) technologies. The use of the Internet as a tool used by foreign entities to collect US technology and technical information in 1999 accounted for 27 percent of significant suspicious contact reports made to the Defense Security Service (DSS) by cleared defense industry. This percentage reflects the growing role of the Internet in conducting business. A wealth of once protected technical and proprietary information is now easily retrievable by individuals from around the world. Almost half of the total Internet reporting cited above is predicated by an e-mailed request for information, or RFI. For example, a cleared defense contractor was surprised when he received an e-mailed RFI regarding his company's mapping software from an embargoed nation. The contractor's e-mail address was listed as the point of contact on the small company's Web site. The Web site also highlighted the company's technological advances in mapping software.

There seems to be a sharp increase in the use of the Internet by foreign entities as a tool, or modus operandi (MO), to identify potential targets and to facilitate the actual collection of information. The Internet provides a simple, low-cost, nonthreatening, risk-free means of worldwide access to US DOD technology. E-mailed RFIs are inconspicuous and can bypass many traditional security safeguards, directly reaching the targeted individual. Cleared contractors who most often report e-mailed RFIs have active monitoring solutions in place to protect their unclassified Web sites. These contractors regularly incorporate security into their Web site design and advertising.

When an Internet-based suspicious contact report is made to DSS, such as an eMailed RFI, the DSS Industrial Security Specialist asks the cleared defense company if it believes its Web-based advertising caused the request and what aroused its suspicions. The factors that make an email RFI suspicious are:

The cleared defense company does not normally conduct business with the foreign requestor
The request originates from an embargoed country
The request is in fact unsolicited or unwarranted
The requestor makes claims he or she is representing an official government agency, but the individual has gone outside of channels to make the request
The initial request is directed at an employee who does not know the sender and is not in the sales or marketing office
The requestor is fishing for information
The requestor represents a third party who is not identified
The requestor is located in a country with a collection history directed at US cleared defense industry
The requestor seems to be "skirting controls"

In many circumstances, when a foreign individual is trying to skirt controls, he is usually masking his true intent by making several similar e-mailed RFIs. These requests are usually innocuous and nonthreatening. The reason for this is that the requestor is trying to mask his collection activity. The goal is to establish bona fides to obtain more sensitive and sometimes classified information. For example, over a period of 10 days a US cleared defense company received three foreign e-mailed RFIs requesting that the company provide its software development product to the foreign requestor. The requestor was the same foreign entity in each case, but the requestor used multiple e-mail addresses.

Reports from industry provide useful foreign data. The information provided is data based and used in future community-wide publications. Industry is prudent in reporting this information because the countries in question actively target US technology and e-mailed RFIs are the MO of choice employed to collect US technology. Industry is prudent to detect, assess, and manage risk when it reports suspicious contacts and by presumably not responding to suspicious requests. DSS cannot overstate the importance and long-term value of timely reporting by the cleared defense industry.

Bugged and Burglarized

According to the January 23, 2000 issue of the Sunday Times (London), French intelligence is intercepting British businessmen's calls after investing millions in satellite technology for its listening stations. Since the French Government upgraded signals intelligence last year, secret service elements are not using it to tap into commercial secrets. At least eight centers scattered across France are being "aimed" at British defense firms, petroleum companies, and other commercial targets.

Eavesdroppers can "pluck" digital mobile phone signals from the air by targeting individual numbers or sweeping sets of numbers. Targets have included executives at British Aerospace (BAe), British Petroleum, and British Airways, according to French sources.

Senior executives have been told not to discuss sensitive issues on mobile phones, and BAe staff have been told to be "especially careful" during campaigns for new business, such as the current battle to supply Eurofighter missiles.

An executive within one British defense firm said, "Top people use the same mobile telephones as anyone else, without any sort of high-tech security equipment. There is an understanding that we need to be careful. People never say anything that they would not want heard elsewhere-especially at sensitive times and during projects when other people may have an interest in listening."

This report comes on the heels of another Sunday Times article in late 1999, which reported that BAe executives were burglarized at a Toulouse hotel by French secret service agents involved in industrial espionage. The raid is believed to have been carried out by a Direction et Surveillance du Territoire (DST) unit called Protection du Patrimoine Economique, which is said to operate specialized break-in operations targeting foreign companies. The agent allegedly searched through briefcases and stole documents from BAe officials while they were meeting with officials from the French aviation company Airbus Industrie. The British were notified by the French officials, who apologized and returned photocopies of the company documents. The incident involved at least four BAe staff members who were discussing aviation contacts and BAe's future relationship with Airbus.

Terrorism

Do the following images scare you? Do you believe you can become a victim of a terrorist act? Review the following photographs of previous terrorist incidents, then read on for information relating to terrorism and your role in countering the threat of terrorism.

USS Cole Attack Photo Murrah Attack Photo Dar Es Salaam Attack Photos Khobar Attacck Photo Nairobi Attack Photo Pentagon Attack Photo World Trade Center Attack Photo

Following the horrific events of September 11th, 2001, many people have been focused on the roles that various agencies have in helping to protect us against terrorist activities. While the primary responsibility for investigating terrorist acts rests with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Presidential Decision Directive-39,"U.S. Policy on Counter terrorism", sets forth roles for various agencies of the federal government with respect to detecting and deterring terrorist acts. The particular role of counterintelligence with respect to terrorism is also set forth in Executive Order 12333, which defines counterintelligence as "Information gathered and activities conducted to detect and protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, document or communications security programs."

The DOE/NNSA CI Program is a participant in the U.S. Intelligence Community. To assist in evaluating concerns and issues within DOE/NNSA for any possible terrorist connection, we must all remain observant of unusual activities.

No single definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance. The definition in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) states:

The term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.
The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents; and
The term "terrorist group" means any group practicing, or which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism.

Terrorism can be further broken down into the following:

International terrorism necessitates a foreign involvement or nexus to the act of terrorism (acts of terrorism sponsored or committed by a foreign entity)
Domestic terrorism involves individuals or organizations without any foreign nexus or association to the act of terrorism (indigenous)
Cyber terrorism is defined as "the unlawful use of force or violence against... computer networks that use the TCP/IP network protocols to facilitate data transmission and exchange" (can be foreign or domestic)

The following list pertains to acts of terrorism committed against the United States during the past decade:

2/26/93 Bombing of the World Trade Center kills six
6/22/93 Unabomber device #13 injures Dr. Charles Epstein, UCSF geneticist
6/24/93 Plot to bomb several New York City landmarks uncovered
6/24/93 Unabomber device #14 injures Prof. David G. Gelertner, Computer Scientist, Yale University
12/10/94 Unabomber device #15 kills Thomas Mosser, advertising executive, North Caldwell, New Jersey
4/19/95 Bombing of Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City leaves 168 dead
4/24/95 Unabomber device #16 kills Gilbert Murray, California Forestry Association, Sacramento, California
6/27/95 In a letter to the San Francisco Chronicle, the Unabomber threatens to "blow up an airliner out of Los Angeles International Airport some time during the next six days"
4/7/96 Unabomber device #17 found during search of Theodore Kacyznski's cabin and rendered safe
6/26/96 Truck bomb detonates at U.S. military housing in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia killing nineteen U.S. servicemen
6/27/96 Bomb detonates in Centennial Olympic Park, killing two
1/16/97 Bomb detonates at the Sandy Springs Professional Building, near Atlanta, Georgia
2/21/97 Bomb detonates at the Otherside Lounge, Atlanta, Georgia
8/7/98 U.S. embassies in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya bombed in coordinated attacks, killing 224, including twelve Americans in Nairobi
12/14/99 Terrorist acts prevented with arrest of Ahmed Ressam at U.S./Canadian border
10/12/00 U.S.S. Cole attacked by suicide bombers while in Aden Yemen harbor, seventeen sailors killed
9/11/01 Attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and in Pennsylvania kills thousands of Americans and Foreigners

Terrorism can come from any location throughout the world, other countries/cultures can, and do, harbor resentment for U.S. policies and diplomatic efforts. See the Sanctioned List to view the 27 groups and individuals affected by President George W. Bush's "Executive Order on Terrorist Financing." Further information related to the terrorist groups can be found by clicking here.

Terrorists, like spies, do their homework. In order to conduct a terrorist act, they tend to utilize some of the same activities as espionage agents. The old stereotype that terrorists wear a hood, are all male, won't hurt their victims or themselves, and follow you to determine your habits, must be re-evaluated in light of recent events. Although the ultimate goals and objectives of terrorists and spies are vastly different, the techniques used to achieve their ends are often similar and indistinguishable. You should always report the following as soon as possible:

Unusual questioning regarding your work environment (schedules, projects, personnel, etc.) or if you are told by someone you know that they were approached by someone asking personal questions about you and/or your habits
Individuals you observe in the vicinity of bridges, tunnels, power plants, or chemical storage facilities, taking photographs, carrying knapsacks, or engaging in surveillance type activities
Any appearance of surveillance (continually driving by your facility, someone taking pictures of the facility, etc.)
Suspicious packages left on your property or in the vicinity of your work area (things that don't belong or don't look right)
Mail that is leaking or is stained, has odors, no return address, hand printed address where there is no indication of the identity of the sender
Packages standing alone and unattended at an airport, train, subway, or bus station
An unidentified vehicle parked outside of a DOE/NNSA gate, with the occupant appearing to write down license numbers of those who enter/exit the facility
Cars parked in your neighborhood that you have never seen before, with the occupant appearing to watch your house or that of a neighbor
Anyone seeking official information through unofficial channels
Threats against the U.S.
Anomalies (unusual occurrences)

To protect yourself and your family in the event of an emergency, you should:

Ensure you have an accountability plan to locate and account for members of your family during an emergency
Maintain, in a safe and secure location at your residence: water, nonperishable food items, a portable radio, batteries, a thermal blanket, and a first aid kit
Check with the CI Office for updated information on official and unofficial travel
Note what is normal in your home and place of business, this way you will know when something is out of place
If traveling outside the U.S., be sure to check the Foreign Travel page or contact the CI Office for any questions

Please remember, those of us in Counterintelligence are not Safeguards and Security personnel nor are we law enforcement, if you detect an immediate threat (unaccounted for briefcase, unusual package, telephonic bomb threat), you must report that information to Hanford Patrol, or dial 911 as soon as possible (use your best judgement). Safeguards and Security personnel are trained to deal with immediate threats to the facility, they are experienced and knowledgeable, do not hesitate to report immediate threat information to the proper personnel.

The President issued Executive Order 13224 Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism Notice of September 24, 2001 - Continuation of Emergency With Respect to UNITA. Although the list is not all-inclusive of every terrorist organization or cell in the world, the ones listed are suspected of playing a part or supporting the terrorist acts of September 11th, 2001.

As with indications of espionage, we will maintain close communication and coordination with the FBI concerning issues and concerns with potential terrorist implications. The important thing is to be observant and report unusual activity immediately, awareness is the key to stopping terrorist incidents before they occur. If you have any questions, call your CI Office.

Informative material relating to terrorism and terrorist groups can be found on the following internet addresses:

http://library.nps.navy.mil/home/tgp/tgpmain.htm - Terrorist Group Profiles, Dudley Knox Library
http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/Org.cfm - Terrorist Organization Profiles
http://nsi.org/Library/Terrorism/profterr.txt - State Department, Terrorist Profiles
http://intelweb.janes.com/resource/Groups_table.htm - Terrorist Groups, Jane's IntelWeb
http://www.fbi.gov/mostwant/terrorists/fugitives.htm - Most Wanted Terrorists, FBI