### Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Estimate Cooperative Threat Reduction Program



February 2011

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#### I. Description of Operations Financed (continued):

#### Cooperative Threat Reduction: (\$ in Thousands):

Defense Threat	FY 2010 Actuals	Price Change	Program Change	FY 2011 Estimate	Price Change	Program Change	FY 2012 Estimate
Reduction Agency	423,560	5,929	93,023	522,512	7,837	-22,130	508,219
CR Adj				-98,952			
CR Adj Total	423,560			423,560			508,219

<sup>\*</sup>FY 2011 Estimate Column reflects the FY 2011 President's Budget Request. FY 2011 annualized funding under the Continuing Resolution is \$423,560 thousand.

- I. <u>Description of Operations Financed</u>: The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program's overarching mission is to partner with willing countries to reduce the threat from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related materials, technologies, and expertise, including the safe destruction of Soviet-era WMD, associated delivery systems, and related infrastructure. The CTR Program focuses on eliminating, securing, or consolidating WMD, related materials, and associated delivery systems and infrastructure at their source in partner countries. The Department of Defense (DoD) has:
  - Expanded the strategic focus of the CTR Program to support the new "National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats" and the President's Global Nuclear Lockdown initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear material;
  - Increased Cooperative Biological Engagement (CBE) activities to consolidate and secure pathogens and associated research into a minimal number of safe and secure facilities; support transparent and ethical research practices; and research and integrate biosurveillance systems to provide early warning of biological threats;

#### I. Description of Operations Financed (continued):

and enhance a partner country's capacity to comply with international disease reporting quidelines;

- Established a program in coordination with other Federal agencies to enable non-Russian former Soviet Union (FSU) states to detect and capture WMD crossing their borders. Other agencies include:
  - o Department of State (DOS),
  - o Department of Energy (DOE), and
  - o Department of Homeland Security, including the U.S. Coast Guard
- Expanded the CTR Program outside the FSU as authorized in the FY 2008 National Defense Authorizations Act.

While legacy efforts in the FSU, including the elimination of associated delivery systems and related infrastructure in Russia remain important, the CTR program is being transformed to address emerging security challenges and urgent threats in other regions of the world in support of Presidential initiatives. Current plans include expanding the CTR efforts into Pakistan, Afghanistan and other countries. The first priority remains to secure or destroy WMD and related materials at the source. An additional priority is countering potential threats from biological outbreaks that may derive from natural, deliberate, or inadvertent release. A key element in countering this potential threat is a safe secure disease surveillance system to detect, diagnose, and report disease outbreaks quickly and reliably. Infectious diseases can spread quickly among humans and animals, early detection and responses are critical to mitigate pandemics, loss of life and economic impact.

#### I. Description of Operations Financed (continued):

To maximize effectiveness and efficiency, the CTR Program requires partner country cooperation on common program priorities. Legal arrangements are negotiated with partner governments to minimize payment on provided technical assistance of value added and similar taxes and customs fees. The CTR activities are designed to ensure sustainable capacity to combat global threats. If a partner country is non-cooperative, the DoD can terminate a project and target funds to another high priority activity.

In FY 2012, the CTR program areas are restructured or renamed to improve the alignment of funds to program specifications and/or to reflect new congressional guidance or authorities. Additionally, some subactivities have been consolidated to better track the DoD support for the President's effort to secure all vulnerable weapons-usable nuclear materials and to provide more flexibility and responsiveness to future program execution.

This restructuring will:

- Clearly link to established national security strategies
- Gain efficiencies among related project efforts; and
- Enable/promote expansion of the program beyond historical boundaries.

#### I. Description of Operations Financed (continued):

The re-structured CTR program areas and related assistance are:

#### A. <u>Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE)\*</u>:

The potential proliferation of WMD, delivery systems, and related technologies is a serious threat to U.S. and international security. The DoD, through the CTR Program, assists Russia in the elimination of strategic offensive arms in a manner consistent with the recently ratified New START Treaty (NST). The CTR Program will support additional measures beyond the NST that are appropriate and mutually supportive to shared nonproliferation objectives.

The DoD has identified nonproliferation value in assisting Russia to dismantle intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); ICBM silo launchers and road-mobile ICBM launchers; submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), SLBM launchers, and the associated strategic nuclear submarine; and WMD infrastructure. Separately, the DoD assists Ukraine with the storage and elimination of rocket motors from dismantled SS-24 ICBMs.

<sup>\*</sup>Funding reflects a restructured baseline that includes SOAE and the formerly titled Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination (SNAE) activity.

#### I. Description of Operations Financed (continued):

(\$ in Thousands)
FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012

Actual Estimate Estimate
8,000 3,000 9,804

#### B. Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD):

Russia, as a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, has agreed to eliminate its stockpile of chemical weapons. The United States and other Group of Eight countries funded construction of the Shchuch'ye chemical weapons destruction facility (CWDF) near Planovy for organophosphorus (nerve) agent-filled artillery munitions. The Planovy chemical weapons storage facility contained approximately 47 percent of Russia's nerve agent-filled artillery munitions. It is estimated at 5,460 metric tons in nearly two million rocket and tube artillery warheads/projectiles. Russia has reported the elimination of 1725.4 metric tons since chemical weapons destruction operations began in March 2009 through December 2010. The DoD is providing technical support for operations at the Shchuch'ye CWDF.

(\$ in Thousands)
FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012

Actual Estimate Estimate
19,151 18,466 0

#### C. Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security (NWTS)\*:

This program supports U.S. proliferation objectives by enhancing the security, safety, and control of nuclear weapons during shipment and provides railcar maintenance and procurement. Segments of the NWTS program are realigned to the Global Nuclear Security (GNS) program beginning in FY 2012.

#### I. Description of Operations Financed (continued):

\*Funding reflects the net balance remaining after the partial realignment of NWTS activity to the Global Nuclear Security (GNS) program.

(\$ in Thousands)
FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012
Actual Estimate
118,631 164,279 121,143

#### D. Global Nuclear Security (GNS)\*:

This program area renames and consolidates all activities related to nuclear warhead and weapons-grade nuclear material security within selected countries. These efforts provide enhanced physical security, including associated inventory management and security training support, for strategic and non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons and fissile materials. The program also improves security for nuclear material that meets specific criteria for enrichment and quantity and is judged to be vulnerable. In addition, the CTR Program assists in the secure transport of nuclear warheads and other qualifying nuclear material to dismantlement facilities, consolidated secure storage areas, or processing facilities for disposition. This program also assists with the establishment of Centers of Excellence with partner countries to enhance training capability for nuclear security, material control, and inventory management that is consistent with best international practices. The CTR Program partners and coordinates closely with complementary efforts within the U.S. Government as well as international governmental and non-governmental organizations.

<sup>\*</sup>Funding reflects a restructured baseline that includes GNS; the formerly titled Nuclear Weapons Storage Security (NWSS) program, as well as a partial realignment of funds from the formerly titled Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security (NWTS) program, and the Proliferation Prevention (PP).

#### I. Description of Operations Financed (continued):

(\$ in Thousands)

FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012

Actual Estimate 169,132 209,034 259,470

#### E. Cooperative Biological Engagement (CBE):

This program was formerly titled Biological Threat Reduction (BTR). The CBE program counters the threat posed by pathogens (as delineated in the U.S. Select Agent List); related materials and expertise; and other emerging infectious disease risks. The CBE program helps prevent these pathogens from reaching any foreign state or non-state actors who may use them against the United States and its allies. The CBE program focuses on delivering tailored approaches that recognize and build upon partner countries' indigenous capacities through the execution of three key product lines: Safety & Security (BS&S) capacity building; Cooperative Biological Research (CBR); and Disease Surveillance. The CBE program builds capacity and champions best practices for the safe secure handling of extremely dangerous pathogens. The CBE program promotes the open sharing of knowledge, innovation, and ideas across the international life sciences community. It also supports transparent responsible research in partnership with the whole of U.S. Government and international partners. These collaborative partnerships enhance global capacity to detect, diagnose, and mitigate biological risks of concern. These partnerships also facilitate an ability to initiate timely and effective disease control measures to contain trans-border global disease threats.

As of July 2010, capabilities assessments and limited capacity building are commencing in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Research and Development grants to four academic institutes have been awarded to support efforts in Pakistan. Several research efforts have been

#### I. Description of Operations Financed (continued):

initiated through DoD labs to assess risks posed by biological threats in Africa and Afghanistan.

(\$ in Thousands)
FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012

Actual Estimate Estimate
29,061 26,161 28,080

#### F. Proliferation Prevention (PP)\*:

This program was formerly titled "WMD-Proliferation Prevention Initiative". The Proliferation Prevention program enhances the capability of non-Russian FSU states and other partner countries to deter, detect, report, and interdict illicit trafficking of WMD and related materials across international borders. The DoD provides assessments, equipment, infrastructure, logistics support and related training to enhance national and regional capabilities that prevent the proliferation of WMD, components, and related materials to terrorists, rogue states, or organized crime groups. This program is coordinated with the DoD International Counter-Proliferation Program and other U.S. Government border security programs.

(\$ in Thousands)
FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012
Actual Estimate 5,000 2,500

#### G. Threat Reduction Engagement (TRE):

This program formerly titled "Defense and Military Contacts", supports relationship-building engagements intended to advance the CTR mission. The name change is intended to reflect

<sup>\*</sup>Funding reflects a restructured baseline of remaining funds after the partial realignment of the Proliferation Prevention program to GNS.

#### I. Description of Operations Financed (continued):

increased program support for engagement with civilian agencies and entities, important for building relationships in key areas like biological threats and border security. Engagements will continue with FSU states, but will also include new geographic areas to support the CTR Program expansion, per congressional guidance. The TRE program supports the following WMD related activities: non-proliferation or counter-proliferation symposia or workshops; bilateral or regional CTR-related symposia; high level exchanges or planning activities; and tabletop exercises.

(\$ in Thousands)

FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012

Actual Estimate 21,400 23,040 24,001

#### H. Other Assessments/Administrative Support:

This program funds the Audits and Examinations (A&Es) program provided for in the CTR agreements with partner countries and overall program management and organizational costs. The A&E program is a means to ensure the DoD-provided equipment, services, and related training are fully accounted for and used effectively and efficiently for their intended purpose. Other activities include the CTR Program travel, translator/interpreter support, and other agency support services to include organizational costs. The CTR Program personnel assigned to the U.S. Embassy offices in FSU countries are also supported with these funds.

#### II. Force Structure Summary (continued):

This section is aligned to the revised program areas for FY 2012.

#### A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination:

The DoD provides equipment, services and oversees destruction of strategic weapons delivery systems consistent with the relevant implementing and arms control agreements. The DoD contracts to destroy or dismantle intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, ICBM silo launchers, ICBM road-mobile launchers, SLBM launchers, and WMD infrastructure in Russia and Ukraine.

#### Solid Propellant ICBM/SLBM and Mobile Launcher Elimination - Russia

This project shares costs with Russia to eliminate SS-25 and SS-N-20 solid propellant missile systems. Activities include operation and maintenance of missile disassembly and elimination facilities, mobile launcher elimination facilities, destruction of treaty-limited or proliferation risk components, and transportation of SS-25 missiles and solid rocket motors into and out of a temporary storage facility.

### <u>Liquid Propellant Intercontinental Ballistic Missile/Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile</u> and Silo Elimination - Russia

This project deactivates, dismantles, and eliminates SS-18 and SS-19 ICBM silos and associated launch control center (LCC) silos and destroys SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs and SS-N-18 SLBMs.

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Launcher Elimination/SSBN Dismantlement - Russia This project shares costs with Canada and Russia to eliminate SLBM launchers from Deltaclass and Typhoon-class Russian nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). In addition, this project provides the infrastructure required to defuel SSBNs at the Zvyozdochka and Zvezda naval facilities. The launcher section is eliminated, the reactor

#### II. Force Structure Summary (continued):

section removed, and the spent naval fuel placed in casks for long-term storage. Canada defuels the reactor and Russia destroys the bows, sterns, and sails.

#### SS-24 Missile Disassembly, Storage, and Elimination - Ukraine

This project assists Ukraine to store and remove propellant from SS-24 solid rocket motors.

#### B. Chemical Weapons Destruction :

This program supports the agreement with Russia for the Safe, Secure, and Ecologically Sound Destruction of Chemical Weapons and prevents the proliferation of chemical weapons to rogue states and terrorist groups.

#### Chemical Weapons Destruction Technical Support - Russia

This project provides technical support for a Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (near Shchuch'ye, Kurgan Oblast) for organophosphorous (nerve) agent-filled, man-portable munitions.

#### C. Global Nuclear Security:

This program enhances the security, control, and accountability of nuclear weapons and nuclear material. The CTR Program activities are undertaken pursuant to the applicable implementing agreement with Russia or appropriate legal frameworks in other partner countries.

#### Spent Naval Fuel/Fissile Material Disposition - Russia

The DoD provides assistance to transport and to improve the security of facilities associated with spent naval fuel that meets the International Atomic Energy Association definition for vulnerable nuclear weapons-grade material.

#### II. Force Structure Summary (continued):

#### Site Security Enhancements - Russia

The DoD and DOE have provided comprehensive physical security enhancements at the Russian nuclear weapons storage sites. These sites include both national stockpile sites and operational storage sites administered by the 12<sup>th</sup> Main Directorate for the Navy, Air Force and Strategic Rocket Forces as well as temporary storage locations at road-to-rail transfer points. The DoD and DOE are assisting the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) to sustain this installed equipment and infrastructure during a transition period while the MOD builds a cadre of expertise that will enable it to assume full responsibility.

#### Automated Inventory Control and Management System (AICMS) - Russia

This project enhances and expands the previously established automated inventory system for the tracking and cataloging of nuclear weapons to be eliminated. Additional AICMS facilities were constructed and updated hardware and software were installed at all new and existing facilities. The sustainment phase and associated training continues.

#### Nuclear Weapons Transportation - Russia

This project assists Russia to transport nuclear warheads safely and securely to consolidated secure storage and dismantlement facilities.

### Fissile and Radioactive Material Proliferation Prevention - Kazakhstan This project secures radiological materials.

#### Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence

This project will assist with the establishment of Centers of Excellence through cooperative assistance with partner countries to enhance training capability for nuclear security and material control and inventory management consistent with best international

#### II. Force Structure Summary (continued):

practices. The Centers of Excellence will also facilitate training course development and delivery, will serve as a test bed for selection of equipment to enhance nuclear security, material control and inventory management.

#### D. Cooperative Biological Engagement:

The CBE program has revised its project categories by partner countries: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and New Engagement countries. The DoD's effort in Russia is limited due to Russia's reluctance to cooperate with the DoD on biological threat reduction. Additional details on planned project activities are provided in Section IV.

#### E. Proliferation Prevention:

This program enhances the capability of partner countries to prevent, deter, detect, report and interdict illicit trafficking in WMD or related materials. The DoD support includes equipment, infrastructure and operations and maintenance training for border guards, customs officials and military forces with defined roles in WMD proliferation prevention. This program complements ongoing USG and international counterproliferation assistance provided by the DOE's Second Line of Defense program, the DOS's Export Control and Related Border Security program, and the DoD's International Counterproliferation Program.

#### Land Border and Maritime Proliferation Prevention - Ukraine

This project assists development of a comprehensive capability to detect and interdict WMD and related materials transiting the Moldovan and Russian land borders, along Ukraine's maritime border, adjacent coastal waters of the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, and

#### II. Force Structure Summary (continued):

at key seaports. The land border project is closely coordinated with the DOE's Second Line of Defense Program.

#### Expanded Proliferation Prevention

The project will enhance the WMD detection and interdiction capabilities of other partner countries and conduct assessments for future land border and maritime efforts.

#### F. Threat Reduction Engagement:

This program supports specific relationship-building opportunities, which could lead to the CTR Program developments in new geographic areas and achieve other CTR Program benefits.

#### G. Other Assessments/Administrative Support:

#### Audits and Examinations

This project enables the U.S. Government to examine the serviceability of the CTR Program-provided equipment and evaluate whether the provided equipment, services and training are being used for the intended purposes.

#### Program Management/Administration

This project provides program administrative and general support, project development costs, an advisory and assistance services contract, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency infrastructure support and travel. This project funds permanent full-time Defense Threat Reduction Embassy offices (DTROs) in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

#### III. Financial Summary (\$ in Thousands):

FY 2011 Congressional Action

	Conglessional Action							
A. BA Subactivities	FY 2010 Actuals	Budget Request	Amount	Percent	Appro- priated	Current Estimate	FY 2012* Estimate	
<ol> <li>Strategic Offensive Arms         Elimination</li> </ol>	53,185	73,532				73,532	63,221	
2. Chemical Weapons Destruction	8,000	3,000				3,000	9,804	
<ol> <li>Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security</li> </ol>	19,151	18,466				18,466	0	
4. Global Nuclear Security	118,631	164,279				164,279	121,143	
5. Cooperative Biological Engagement	169,132	209,034				209,034	259,470	
6. Proliferation Prevention	29,061	26,161				26,161	28,080	
7. Threat Reduction Engagement	5,000	5,000				5,000	2,500	
8. Other Assessments/Administrative Support	21,400	23,040				23,040	24,001	
Total	423,560	522,512				522,512	508,219	
CR Adjustment		-98,952				-98,952		
CR Adjusted Total	423,560	423,560				423,560	508,219	

<sup>\*</sup>FY 2011 Estimate Column reflects the FY 2011 President's Budget Request. FY 2011 annualized funding under the Continuing Resolution is \$423,560 thousand.

<sup>\*</sup> A restructured program baseline is presented for FY 2010 and FY 2011 to ensure an appropriate comparison with the FY 2012 estimate under the new CTR program structure.

#### III. Financial Summary (\$ in Thousands)(continued):

B. Reconciliation Summary:	Change	Change
	FY 2011/2011	FY 2011/2012
Baseline Funding	522,512	522,512
Congressional Adjustments (Distributed)		
Congressional Adjustments (Undistributed)		
Adjustments to meet Congressional Intent		
Congressional Adjustments (General Provisions)		
Subtotal Appropriated Amount		522,512
Fact-of-Life Changes (CY to CY Only)		
Subtotal Baseline Funding	522,512	522,512
Anticipated Wartime Supplemental		
Reprogrammings		
Price Changes		7,837
Functional Transfers		-5,250
Program Changes		-16,880
Current Estimate	522,512	508,219
Less: Wartime Supplemental		
Normalized Current Estimate	522,512	

\*FY 2011 Estimate Column reflects the FY 2011 President's Budget Request. FY 2011 annualized funding under the Continuing Resolution is \$423,560 thousand.

#### III. Financial Summary (\$ in Thousands)(continued):

C. Reconciliation of Increases	and Decreases	Amount	Totals
FY 2011 President's Budget Requ	nest (Amended, if applicable)		522,512
1. Congressional Adjustments			
a. Distributed Adjustments			
b. Undistributed Adjustment	S		
c. Adjustments to meet Cong	ressional Intent		
d. General Provisions- Sec	8097 - Economic Assumptions		
e. Congressional Earmarks			
FY 2011 Appropriated Amount			522,512
2. War-Related and Disaster Sur	pplemental Appropriations		
3. Fact of Life Changes			
FY 2011 Baseline Funding			522,512
4. Reprogrammings (requiring 14	115 Actions)		
Revised FY 2011 Estimate			522,512
5. Less: Item 2, War-Related a	and Disaster Supplemental Appropriations		
FY 2011 Normalized Current Esti	mate		522,512
6. Price Change			7,837
7. Functional Transfers			
a. Transfers In			
b. Transfers Out			-5,250
1) The Warsaw Initiativ	ve was transferred to the Defense Security		
Cooperation Agency t	to better align functions within the		
Department.		-5,250	
8. Program Increases			56,202
a. Annualization of New FY	2011 Program		
b. One-Time FY 2012 Increas	ses		

#### III. Financial Summary (\$ in Thousands)(continued):

#### C. Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases Amount Totals

- c. Program Growth in FY 2012
  - 1) Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD): This increase provides technical assistance for chemicals weapons elimination in Russia ensuring continued elimination for approximately 5.4 metric tons of Russia's nerve agent-filled artillery munitions. Offsetting this increase is an efficiency reduction to engineering technical services of \$196K, as part of the DoD reform agenda to reduce reliance on service support contractors. (FY 2011 Base: \$3,000).

6,759

2) Cooperative Biological Engagement (CBE): This increase represents expanded bio-engagement in new countries and Central Reference Laboratory construction and sustainment efforts in Kazakhstan and Georgia respectively. This increase will initiate bio-assessments in select areas of Asia and Africa and provide for cooperative bio-research projects in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Offsetting this increase is an efficiency reduction to engineering technical services of \$3,842, as part of the DoD reform agenda to reduce reliance on service support contractors. (FY 2011 Base: \$209,034).

47,300

3) Proliferation Prevention (PP): This increase represents expanded land border and maritime proliferation prevention efforts in extended regional areas. Offsetting this increase is an efficiency reduction to engineering technical services of \$1,071, as part of the DoD reform agenda to reduce reliance on service support contractors. (FY 2011 Revised Base: \$26,161).

1,527

#### III. Financial Summary (\$ in Thousands)(continued):

#### C. Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases Amount Totals

4) Other Assessments/Administrative Support (OA): This increase funds additional support costs associated with the Defense Threat Reduction Embassy Offices in partner countries. Offsetting this increase is an efficiency reduction to management and professional support services of \$479K, as part of the DoD reform agenda to reduce reliance on service support contractors. (FY 2011 Base: \$23,040).

616

- 9. Program Decreases
  - a. Annualization of FY 2011 Program Decreases
  - b. One-Time FY 2012 Increases
  - c. Program Decreases in FY 2012

-73,082

1) Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE): This program provides for the elimination of strategic weapons and delivery systems in Russia in support of the recently ratified NEW START Treaty (NST). The Department's Baseline Review determined that \$2,132 in efficiencies could be achieved from this program. Additionally, funding has been adjusted for delays in the Russian release schedule for missiles, launchers and SSBNs. Also, included as part of this decrease is a reduction to engineering technical support of \$1,326 and an economic adjustment of \$444K. (FY 2011 Revised Base: \$73,532).

-8,664

2) Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security (NWTS): This program decrease represents a completion of railcar procurement efforts in Russia. (FY 2011 Revised Base: \$18,466).

-18,466

#### III. Financial Summary (\$ in Thousands)(continued):

c.	Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases	Amount	Totals
	3) Global Nuclear Security (GNS): This decrease represents the		
	final phase of fissile material security efforts in Kazakhstan		
	and reduced efforts for fissile material disposition in Russia.		
	Included as part of this decrease is an efficiency reduction to		
	engineering technical support of \$932, as part of the DoD reform		
	agenda to reduce reliance on service support contractors.		
	(FY 2011 Revised Base: \$164,279).	-45,877	
	4) Threat Reduction Engagement (TRE): This decrease represents up		
	to 3 fewer defense and military exchanges. (FY 2011 Base:		
	\$5,000).	-75	
	EV 2012 Pudgot Poguogt		E00 010
	FY 2012 Budget Request		508,219

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary

A. <u>Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE)</u>: (Performance activity reflects restructured baseline that includes SOAE and SNAE activity.)

FY 2010 funds executed over three years will:

- Eliminate 14 SS-N-20 SLBMs;
- Eliminate 4 SS-N-18 SLBMs;
- Eliminate 27 SS-25 ICBMs;
- Eliminate 43 SS-25 road-mobile launchers;
- Initiate transportation of spent nuclear fuel that will continue under Global Nuclear Security in FY 2011 and beyond;
- Transport Strategic Rocket Motors (SRMs) to the propellant removal facility;
- Assist Ukraine by making payments for 45 empty SRM cases;
- Store remaining SRMs;
- Support infrastructure improvements for incineration of washed-out propellant and empty motor cases;
- Continue maintenance and repair of SRM storage facilities;
- Provide additional support to Ukraine for elimination of empty motor cases and excess propellant incineration; and
- Provide logistical and administrative and advisory support.

FY 2011 funds executed over three years will:

- Dismantle 12 and eliminate 21 SS-18 ICBM silo launchers and LCCs;
- Dismantle 11 SS-19 launchers and LCCs;
- Eliminate 11 SS-19 ICBM silo launchers and LCCs;

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (continued):

- Eliminate 31 SS-25 ICBMs;
- Eliminate 32 SS-25 road-mobile launchers;
- Decommission 2 SS-25 regiments;
- Eliminate 7 SS-N-20 SLBMs;
- Initiate dismantlement of nuclear reactor cores and launcher sections of 1 Typhoon-class SSBN;
- Dismantle nuclear reactor cores and launcher sections of 1 Delta III-class SSBN and eliminate 16 SLBM launchers;
- Initiate dismantlement of nuclear reactor cores and launcher sections of 1 Delta III-class SSBN;
- Complete infrastructure repairs at the missile elimination and dismantlement facility;
- Transport SRMs to the propellant removal facility;
- Assist Ukraine by making payments for 45 empty SRM cases;
- Store remaining SRMs;
- Continue maintenance and repair of SRM storage facilities; and
- Provide logistical and administrative and advisory support.

#### FY 2012 funds executed over three years will:

- Eliminate 20 SS-19 ICBMs;
- Eliminate 11 SS-19 silo launchers and LCCs;
- Eliminate 36 SS-25 ICBMs;
- Eliminate 27 SS-25 road-mobile launchers;
- Decommission 1 SS-25 regiment;

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (continued):

- Eliminate 20 SS-N-18 SLBMs;
- Complete dismantlement of nuclear reactor cores and launcher sections of 1 Delta III-class SSBN and eliminate 16 SLBM launchers;
- Complete dismantlement of nuclear reactor cores and launcher sections of 1 Typhoon- class SSBN and eliminate 20 SLBM launchers;
- Assist Ukraine by making payments for 45 empty SRM cases;
- Store remaining SRMs;
- Continue maintenance and repair of SRM storage facilities; and
- Provide administrative and advisory support.

#### B. Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD):

FY 2010 through FY 2012 funds provides technical support for the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility at Shchuch'ye, Russia, to include equipment repairs and maintenance, materials procurement assistance, workforce training, failure response, root cause analysis and administrative and advisory support.

C. <u>Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security (NWTS):</u> (Performance activity reflects the net balance remaining after the partial realignment of NWTS activity to Global Nuclear Security (GNS).)

FY 2010 funds executed over three years will:

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (continued):

- Provide equipment for material assessment of nuclear weapons transport equipment and enhance emergency response capabilities headquartered at the Center for Technical Diagnostics and Information Analysis System; and
- Provide logistical, administrative and advisory support.

FY 2011 funds executed over three years will:

- Procure 10 additional cargo railcars;
- Complete development and implementation of a sustainment program for Railcar Consist Security Systems (RCSS) and related off-train communication systems equipment, including training support, maintenance, repair and sparing;
- Provide maintenance/certification for MOD nuclear weapons transport railcars; and
- Provide logistical, administrative and advisory support.
- D. Global Nuclear Security (GNS): (Performance activity reflects restructured baseline that includes GNS, NWSS, as well as partial realignment of funds/activity from NWTS and Proliferation Prevention.

FY 2010 funds executed over three years will:

Continue sustainment for 18 nuclear weapons storage sites, 5 rail transfer points and 2 regional centers (Security Assessment and Training Center (SATC) and Far East Training Center (FETC)) including training, maintenance, repair, and limited spare parts;

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (continued):

- Initiate Russia Nuclear Security Enhancements Sustainment Initiatives to include: vendor service contracts at rail transfer points, Small Arms Training Systems and live fire ranges, Personnel Reliability Programs, Mobile Repair Vehicles, Centralized Maintenance Management System, Unified Operation Centers, and On-Site Repair Points;
- Provide Automated Inventory Control and Management hardware and software at Strategic Rocket Force (SRF) sites;
- Continue construction to expand SATC;
- Transport approximately 42 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads (1,000 to 1,500) from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites or dismantlement and from storage to dismantlement facilities;
- Retrofit 3 DoD-provided guard railcars with Railcar Consist Security Systems (RCSS);
- Develop and implement a sustainment program for RCSS and related off-train communication systems equipment, including training support, maintenance, repair, and sparing;
- Provide maintenance/certification for MOD nuclear weapons transport railcars;
- Kazakhstan: Install additional security measures at the former Semipalatinsk test site; and
- Provide logistical, administrative and advisory support.

#### FY 2011 funds executed over three years will:

 Continue Russia Nuclear Security Enhancements - Sustainment Initiatives to include: vendor service contracts at rail transfer points, Small Arms Training

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (continued):

Systems, Personnel Reliability Programs, live fire ranges, Mobile Repair Vehicles, Centralized Maintenance Management System, Unified Operation Centers, and On-Site Repair Points;

- Provide Automated Inventory Control and Management hardware and software at SRF sites;
- Provide for, in coordination with the Interagency, nuclear security Centers of Excellence outside the FSU;
- Support portal monitoring efforts to secure spent naval fuel (SNF);
- Continue sustainment for 18 nuclear weapons storage sites, 5 rail transfer points and 2 regional centers (SATC and FETC) including training, maintenance, repair, and limited spare parts;
- Kazakhstan: Install additional security measures at the former Semipalatinsk test site;
- Complete construction to expand SATC; and
- Provide logistical, administrative and advisory support.

#### FY 2012 funds executed over three years will:

Continue sustainment efforts (to include training, maintenance, and repair) at 18 nuclear weapons storage sites, 5 rail transfer points and 2 regional centers (SATC and FETC), vendor service contracts at rail transfer points, Small Arms Training Systems and live fire ranges, Personnel Reliability Programs, Mobile Repair Vehicles, Centralized Maintenance Management System, Unified Operation Centers, and On-Site Repair Points;

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (continued):

- Transport approximately 48 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads (1,000 to 1,500) from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites or dismantlement and from storage to dismantlement facilities;
- Continue support for Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence;
- Install additional security measures at former Semipalatinsk test site in Kazakhstan;
- Support shipments of SNF; and
- Provide logistical, administrative and advisory support.

#### F. Cooperative Biological Engagement(CBE):

FY 2010 funds executed over three years will:

- Initiate bio-engagement activities to include minimal biosecurity upgrades in Armenia;
- Continue to provide for 9 Collaborative Biological Research (CBR) projects (2 in Azerbaijan, 3 in Georgia, 2 in Kazakhstan, and 2 in Ukraine);
- Continue to provide training in laboratory diagnostic techniques, epidemiology, clinical sample collection, outbreak surveillance, laboratory and health system management, and biosafety, biosecurity, and bioethics in CBE-engaged countries;
- Continue to develop and deploy Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System (EIDSS) in CBE-engaged countries;
- Continue construction and equipment installation of Secured Pathogen Repositories to include: construction oversight of 1 Central Reference Laboratory (CRL) in Azerbaijan, 1 repository upgrade in Russia, 1 repository upgrade in Ukraine;

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (continued):

- Initiate construction of 1 CRL in Kazakhstan and 1 Veterinary Central Diagnostic Facility in Ukraine;
- Complete design of 1 CRL in Azerbaijan, design of 1 CRL in Kazakhstan, 1 repository upgrade in Kazakhstan, and construction and commissioning of 1 CRL in Georgia;
- Complete 5 Zonal Diagnostic Labs (ZDLs) (1 in Georgia and 4 in Ukraine);
- Continue sustainment of 34 ZDLs (11 in Azerbaijan, 6 in Georgia, 4 in Kazakhstan, 2 in Ukraine, and 11 in Uzbekistan), 1 CRL in Georgia and 1 interim CRL in Ukraine;
- Continue to provide the Russian International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) with staff support, training, workshops, travel, and management oversight for CBE projects;
- Continue to provide for bio-related conference support;
- Continue expansion of the CTR Program with countries outside the FSU that include Pakistan, Afghanistan, and select countries in Asia and Africa;
- Continue biosecurity and biosafety assessments for new countries;
- Continue training in laboratory diagnostic techniques, epidemiology, clinical sample collection, outbreak surveillance, laboratory and health system management, and biosafety and bioethics/nonproliferation for new countries;
- Plan for cooperative biological research with scientists outside the FSU; and
- Continue to provide logistical, administrative and advisory support.

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (continued):

FY 2011 funds executed over three years will:

- Initiate bio-engagement activities to include minimal biosecurity upgrades and engagement in Pakistan;
- Continue to provide for 17 CBR projects (2 in Armenia, 3 in Azerbaijan, 2 in Georgia, 4 in Kazakhstan, 3 in Ukraine, and 3 in Uzbekistan);
- Continue to provide training in laboratory diagnostic techniques, epidemiology, clinical sample collection, outbreak surveillance, laboratory and health system management, and biosafety, biosecurity, and bioethics in CBE-engaged countries;
- Continue to develop and deploy EIDSS in CBE-engaged countries;
- Continue construction and equipment installation of Secured Pathogen Repositories to include: construction oversight of 1 CRL in Azerbaijan, construction of 1 CRL in Kazakhstan, and construction of 1 Veterinary Central Diagnostic Facility in Ukraine;
- Complete 1 repository upgrade in Russia and 1 repository upgrade in Ukraine;
- Complete 6 ZDLs (5 in Ukraine and 1 in Uzbekistan);
- Continue sustainment of 39 ZDLs (11 in Azerbaijan, 7 in Georgia, 4 in Kazakhstan, 6 in Ukraine, and 11 in Uzbekistan), 1 CRL in Georgia and 1 interim CRL in Ukraine;
- Initiate biosurveillance pilot project with Russian Ministry of Agriculture;
- Continue to provide the Russian ISTC with staff support, training, workshops, travel, and management oversight for CBE projects;
- Continue to provide for bio-related conference support; and
- Continue to provide logistical, administrative and advisory support.

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (continued):

FY 2012 funds executed over three years will:

- Initiate biorisk assessments in select areas of Asia and Africa;
- Monitor and address global emerging biorisks and security environment;
- Continue to provide biosecurity upgrades in Afghanistan and select areas of Asia and Africa;
- Continue to provide for 19 CBR projects (1 in Afghanistan, 2 in Armenia, 2 in Azerbaijan, 2 in Georgia, 4 in Kazakhstan, 2 in Pakistan, 3 in Ukraine, and 3 in Uzbekistan);
- Continue to provide training in laboratory diagnostic techniques, epidemiology, clinical sample collection, outbreak surveillance, laboratory and health system management, and biosafety, biosecurity, and bioethics in CBE-engaged countries;
- Continue to develop and deploy EIDSS in CBE-engaged countries;
- Complete construction and equipment installation of Secured Pathogen Repositories to include: 1 Veterinary Central Diagnostic Facility in Ukraine;
- Continue construction oversight of 1 CRL in Azerbaijan and construction of 1 CRL in Kazakhstan;
- Initiate 2 laboratory enhancements in Kazakhstan, 2 security upgrades in Pakistan, and 1 repository upgrade in Russia;
- Complete 2 ZDLs (1 in Armenia and 1 in Pakistan);
- Continue sustainment of 45 ZDLs (11 in Azerbaijan, 7 in Georgia, 4 in Kazakhstan, 11 in Ukraine, and 12 in Uzbekistan), 1 CRL in Georgia, 1 interim CRL in Ukraine, and 1 Veterinary Central Diagnostic Facility in Ukraine;
- Continue biosurveillance pilot project with Russian Ministry of Agriculture;

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (continued):

- Continue to provide staff support, training, workshops, travel, and management oversight for CBE Russian projects;
- Continue to provide for bio-related conference support; and
- Continue to provide logistical, administrative and advisory support.
- **G.** <u>Proliferation Prevention (PP):</u> (Performance activity reflects the net balance remaining after the partial realignment of PP activity to GNS).

FY 2010 through FY 2012 funds provide material and non-material solutions to improve WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment. Specific assistance will be based on effectiveness of previous efforts and includes:

FY 2010 funds executed over three years will:

- Ukraine: Increase WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment along the Moldova/Transnistria border and the Ukraine/Russia border, continue project assessments and support efforts to upgrade international and state ports of entry (POE) and inland clearing stations (ICS);
- Enhance WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment on the Black Sea and Sea of Azov maritime borders; and
- Provide logistical and operational support.

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (continued):

FY 2011 funds executed over three years will:

- Ukraine: Increase WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment along the Moldova/Transnistria border and the Ukraine/Russia border, continue project assessments and support efforts to upgrade international and state POE and ICS;
- Enhance WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment on the Black Sea and Sea of Azov maritime borders;
- Extended Areas: Conduct project assessments for future land border and maritime efforts that enhance the WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment of material and nonmaterial solutions to identified capability gaps; and
- Provide logistical and operational support.

FY 2012 funds executed over three years will:

- Extended Areas: Conduct project assessments for future land border and maritime efforts that enhance the WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment of material and non-material solutions to identified capability gaps; and
- Provide logistical and operational support.

#### IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary (continued):

#### H. Threat Reduction Engagement(TRE):

FY 2010 through FY 2012 funds will support specific relationship-building opportunities with FSU countries and program expansion into new geographical areas. Funding for the Department's Warsaw Initiative was transferred to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, effective with FY 2012.

#### I. Other Assessments/Administrative Cost (OA):

FY 2010 through FY 2012 funds support approximately 8-12 Audits and Examinations per year and provide agency support services as well as contractor administrative and advisory support. Funds also provide U.S. Embassy support for current and emerging DTRA/CTR offices in partner countries.

V. Personnel Summary	FY 2010	FY 2011	FY 2012	Change FY 2010/	Change FY 2011/
				FY 2011	FY 2012
Civilian End Strength (Total)	0	0	0	0	0
U.S. Direct Hire	0	0	0	0	0
Memo: Reimbursable Civilians Included	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian FTEs (Total)	0	0	0	0	0
U.S. Direct Hire	0	0	0	0	0
Total Direct Hire	0	0	0	0	0
Memo: Reimbursable Civilians Included	0	0	0	0	0
Average Annual Civilian Salary (\$)	0	0	0	0	0
Contractor FTEs (Total)	204	184	163	-20	-21

#### VI. OP32 Line Item as Applicable (\$ in Thousands):

Line		FY 2010	PRICE GROWTH	PROGRAM	FY 2011	PRICE GROWTH	PROGRAM	FY 2012
Item	DESCRIPTION	PROGRAM	AMT	GROWTH	PROGRAM	AMT	GROWTH	PROGRAM
308	Travel of Persons	4,193	59	-539	3,713	56	-439	3,330
399	Total Travel	4,193	59	-539	3,713	56	-439	3,330
	Management & Professional Support							
932	Services	9,677	135	595	10,407	156	758	11,321
934	Engineering Technical Services	30,000	420	573	30,993	465	-7,925	23,533
987	Other Intra-governmental Purchases	45,662	639	-4,740	41,561	623	7,530	49,714
989	Other Contracts	334,028	4,676	97,134	435,838	6,537	-22,054	420,321
999	Total Other Purchases	419,367	5,870	93,562	518,799	7,781	-21,691	504,889
9999	TOTAL	423,560	5,929	93,023	522,512	7,837	-22,130	508,219
	CR adjustment				-98,952			
	CR Adjusted Total	423,560			423,560			508,219

<sup>\*</sup>FY 2011 Estimate Column reflects the FY 2011 President's Budget Request. FY 2011 annualized funding under the Continuing Resolution is \$423,560 thousand.

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