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TECHNICAL MANUAL

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
TECHNICAL INSPECTION SYSTEM**

THIS PUBLICATION SUPERSEDES TP 25-1/TM 39-25-1/SWOP 25-1/T.O. 11N-25-1 DATED 1 MARCH 1976.

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## SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION

### 1-1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE.

This manual establishes a standard Department of Defense (DOD) Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection (NWTI) System. It delineates policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes standard procedures for conducting NWTI's of all DOD nuclear-capable units. It also establishes the relationship between the Services and the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) concerning NWTI's, and provides consultative staff visits, data review and analysis of NWTI reports, and symposia.

### 1-2 APPLICABILITY.

The provisions of this manual apply to all NWTI systems within the DOD. These provisions are directive in nature to all elements of DOD authorized to conduct NWTI's and informative for all elements in DOD that are subject to NWTI's. The Services may amplify the scope of their inspections to ensure that Service imposed requirements are being met.

### 1-3 DEFINITIONS.

Definitions in Technical Publication (TP) 4-1, "Glossary of Nuclear Weapons, Materiel and Related Terms," apply. Specifically, for the purpose of this manual, the following definitions apply:

#### 1-3.1

1-3.2 ADJECTIVAL RATINGS. Those ratings, in addition to an overall unit rating of SATISFACTORY, SATISFACTORY (Support Unsatisfactory), or UNSATISFACTORY, that may be given to the major areas or sub-areas of an NWTI where such a procedure could prove beneficial to the inspected unit.

1-3.2.1 Outstanding: Operations or procedures conducted with a superior degree of professionalism and strictly as prescribed in directives.

1-3.2.2 Excellent: Operations or procedures accomplished in accordance with directives or with only relatively minor deficiencies.

1-3.2.3 Acceptable: Satisfactory accomplishment of requirements, but with obvious room for improvement.

1-3.2.4 Marginal: Significant deviations from directives. Requires thorough and timely command attention.

1-3.2.5 Unacceptable: Minimum standards not met. Major or critical deviation from directives. Requires immediate attention by higher headquarters/authorities.

1-3.3 CERTIFICATION. A determination by the applicable Service that a unit is capable of performing its mission. Army accomplishes this by Nuclear Surety Inspection; Navy by Nuclear Weapons Acceptance Inspection; and Air Force by Nuclear Surety Inspection.

1-3.16.1 Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection (DNSI) conducted by DNA.

1-3.16.2 Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI) conducted by the Army.

1-3.16.3 Navy Technical Proficiency Inspection (NTPI) and Nuclear Weapons Acceptance Inspection (NWAII) conducted by the Navy.

1-3.16.4 Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI) and Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (INSI) conducted by the Air Force.


1-3.16.5 (added) <sup>Joint Nuclear Surety Inspections conducted concurrently by DNA and Service Inspections</sup>

1-3.17 NUCLEAR WEAPON PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRAM (PRP). The program which establishes personnel reliability standards for individuals performing duties associated with nuclear weapons.

1-3.18 SAFETY RULES. Department of Defense approved rules, developed in accordance with DOD Directive 3150.2 to provide maximum safety, consistent with operational requirements during all phases of operations with nuclear weapons systems.

1-3.19 SECURITY. The total spectrum of procedures, facilities, equipment, and personnel employed to provide a secure environment for nuclear weapons.

1-3.20



#### 1-4 RESPONSIBILITIES.

##### 1-4.1 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (JCS) SHALL:


1-4.1.1 Review the NWTI system periodically for adequacy and the identification of necessary improvements.

1-4.1.2 Sponsor symposia of DNA and Service personnel to discuss problems associated with the NWTI system, when deemed necessary.

1-4.2 THE JOINT STAFF SHALL: Review annually the adequacy of the DNSI sample size. This review will utilize data inputs from the Services and DNA. When appropriate, recommendations shall be made to the JCS to revise the existing annual sample size.

##### 1-4.3 THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY SHALL:

1-4.3.1



1-4.3.2 Coordinate the scheduling of DNA inspections with the Services concerned.

1-4.3.3 Respond to Service headquarters' requests.

1-4.3.4 Provide consultative staff assistance to include visits to Service nuclear weapon inspection organizational and command headquarters as mutually agreed on by the Service headquarters concerned and DNA.

1-4.3.5 Under the sponsorship of, and when directed by, the JCS, conduct symposia of DNA and Service personnel to discuss problems associated with the NWTI system.

1-4.3.6 Review reports/summaries of Service-conducted NWTI's and disseminate information and recommendations, as appropriate.



1-3.4 CUSTODIAL DETACHMENT. A United States (U.S.) unit which maintains custody of nuclear weapons for use by a non-U.S. delivery unit and acts in support of that unit. A custodial detachment may also maintain accountability for nuclear weapons in its custody.

1-3.5 DEFICIENCY. A variance from procedures or criteria prescribed in pertinent technical publications or other Service publications which directly implement DOD requirements.

1-3.6 DNA SURVEILLANCE INSPECTIONS. DNA inspections which consist of the observation and evaluation of Service inspection teams while they are performing the NMTI portion of Service inspections.

1-3.7 EMERGENCY SECURITY FORCES.

1-3.8 HANDLING. That phase of weapon logistics wherein weapons are physically manipulated directly or indirectly by people. (Characterized as lifting, sliding, hoisting, lowering, or moving an item on dollies or pallets over short distances through the use of manpower, tugs, cranes, forklifts, and hoists.)

1-3.9

1-3.10 JOINT NUCLEAR WEAPON PUBLICATION SYSTEM (JNWPS). The JNWPS is a system of technical manuals on nuclear weapons and associated materiel and such supplemental information or data determined appropriate by either the DOD or the Department of Energy (DOE) in connection with the general field of nuclear weapons. The JNWPS exists as a means of providing to the DOE, DNA, and to the respective DOD military departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force), authoritative instructions and procedural data on the technical aspects of nuclear weapons and associated equipment to supplement existing publication systems of the participating agencies/Services.

1-3.11 LOGISTIC MOVEMENT. The transport of war reserve (WR) nuclear weapons by any appropriate noncombat delivery vehicle outside a permanent limited/exclusion area.

1-3.12 LOGISTIC SYSTEM. The organizations, vehicles, and support equipment employed for the loading, movement and transfer of nuclear weapons and nuclear components (except limited life components (LLC's)), but explicitly excluding nuclear-capable combat delivery vehicles.

1-3.13 NONCOMBAT DELIVERY VEHICLE. Any vehicle used for the movement of nuclear weapons, but not the subject of specific nuclear safety rules approved by the Secretary of Defense in accordance with DOD Directive 3150.2, "Safety Studies and Reviews of Nuclear Weapons Systems."

1-3.14

1-3.15

1-3.16 NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNICAL INSPECTION. A Service or DNA inspection of a nuclear-capable unit conducted to examine nuclear weapons technical assembly, maintenance, storage functions, logistic movement, handling, and safety and security directly associated with these functions. The NWTI is encompassed within the following inspections:

1-4.3.7 At the request of DNA or the Services review:

1-4.3.7.1 Service and DNA NWTI processes and determine extent to which these processes may be standardized.

1-4.3.7.2 Methodology for analyzing Service and DNA NWTI data and the system DNA uses to report this data to the Services and the JCS to ensure it meets Service and JCS needs.

1-4.4 THE SERVICES SHALL:

1-4.4.1 [REDACTED]

Selected units will receive a minimum-notice inspection which will key on the unit's ability to provide a secure environment, consistent with its nuclear mission. Such safety items as are practical, should be included. The results of these minimum-notice inspections will be included in the reporting requirements in paragraph 6-2.1.

1-4.4.2 In accordance with guidelines developed in coordination with DNA, and in conformance with the JCS specified annual sample size, designate units to be inspected by DNA (section 4).

1-4.4.3 [REDACTED]

1-4.5 REPORTS CONTROL SYSTEM (RCS) EXEMPTION. Information required from inspected units, inspection reports generated as a result of inspections conducted, and other reports generated under the provisions of this manual are exempt from the Reports Control System (Encl 3, Section VII B, DOD DIR 5000.19 dated 12 March 1976).

## SECTION 2

### NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNICAL INSPECTIONS (NWTI)

#### 2-1 POLICIES.

2-1.1 Service and DNA NWTI teams shall conduct all NWTI's, as prescribed herein, to assure compliance with requirements specified in pertinent DOD and joint publications, and applicable portions of Service publications which directly implement DOD and joint requirements.

2-1.2 The Services may amplify the scope to meet additional Service requirements. The Services may conduct their NWTI's in conjunction with other types of inspections, such as operational readiness inspections, training tests, etc. Service implementing directives governing NWTI's may be expanded in scope to include functional areas not included in this manual.

2-1.5 The Services may accept the DNA NWTI as fulfilling the nuclear weapon technical portion of Service inspection requirements.

2-1.4



2-1.5 Training weapons shall be used:

2-1.5.1 For all certification/recertification inspections.

2-1.5.2 For all operations which are forbidden for war reserve weapons by safety rules or DOD, JCS, Service, or major command directives.

2-1.5.3



#### 2-2 SCOPE OF INSPECTIONS.

The following areas shall be inspected:

##### 2-2.1 MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION.

2-2.1.1 Required up-to-date directives and technical publications applicable to the scope of the NWTI in accordance with this manual. A check shall be made to ensure that changes are being received and posted, and that the unit is not in receipt of unauthorized publications pertaining to nuclear weapons.

2-2.1.2 Unit Standing Operating Procedures/Plans/Instructions implementing DOD and Service requirements in the areas of security, safety, nuclear accident/incident response, emergency destruction, emergency evacuation, supply support, and logistic movement, as required.

2-2.1.3 An organizational listing of personnel assigned nuclear weapons duties, including security forces. This listing will be used in conjunction with inspection of the unit to assure that the unit can safely and securely carry out the assigned nuclear weapons mission.

2-2.1.4 The control and handling of classified plans, manuals, records, reports, and components directly associated with the scope of the NWTI.

2-2.1.5 Required records properly maintained and evidence of timely submission of reports pertaining to nuclear weapons.

2-2.1.6 Accountability and/or custody records, to include courier receipts, shipping documents, and records of audit. Designation in writing of accountable and/or custodial officers and verifying officers.

2-2.1.7 Existing host-tenant agreements to determine adequacy and efficient execution as they pertain to the unit's nuclear weapons mission.

2-2.1.8 Unit training to be based upon the performance of the unit in the areas of technical operations, storage, maintenance, safety, security, and logistic movement. If deficiencies exist, a detailed inspection may be made to determine the extent to which training contributes to the deficiency(ies). This inspection point shall not be construed as a requirement for the generation of records not already required by pertinent Service or major command regulations.

## 2-2.2 TECHNICAL OPERATIONS.

2-2.2.1

[REDACTED] Tables 2-1 through 2-7 list areas subject to inspection during the technical operations portions of NWTI's and shall be used by NWTI teams to assure sufficient functional area coverage of technical operations to assure the readiness of war reserve nuclear weapons. These tables are not to be construed as altering mission capabilities. A limited number of operations specified in tables 2-1 through 2-7 may be omitted at the discretion of the team chief or chief inspector when essential; for example, due to operational requirements, area or facility limitations, or other managerial considerations. When units are unable to demonstrate areas to be inspected and operational commitments afford the opportunity, the unit to be inspected shall notify the inspecting organization of the problem(s) through the Service organization responsible for scheduling the inspection. This notification will be made as soon as the problem is known to permit rescheduling of the inspection if necessary. A notation of the omission(s) will be included in the inspection report.

2-2.2.2

2-2.2.3

2-2.2.4 The operations shall be clearly divided between those which will be [REDACTED] and they shall be organized so that there will be no confusion on the part of the inspected unit as to when the transition from one phase to the other occurs.

2-2.2.5 Certain operations listed individually in tables 2-1 through 2-7 may be combined with or be an integral part of other operations. For example, receipt inspections or verification inspections do not always require starting from or ending with a specific configuration.

2-2.3 TOOLS, TEST, TIEDOWN AND HANDLING EQUIPMENT. Tools, test, tiedown, and handling equipment shall be inspected for adequacy, condition, proper marking, calibration status, and load test, as applicable.

2-2.4 [REDACTED] The following areas shall be inspected:

2-2.4.1 [REDACTED]

2-2.4.1.1 [REDACTED]

2-2.4.1.2 [REDACTED]

2-2.4.1.3 [REDACTED]

2-2.4.1.4 Records associated with weapons, components, and ancillary equipment which are maintained by the inspected unit.

2-2.4.1.5 Stockpile reporting as applicable.

2-2.4.2 [REDACTED]

2-2.4.2.1 Compatibility of items stored or maintained.

2-2.4.2.2 Observance of explosives and active material limits of items stored or maintained.

2-2.4.2.3 Adequacy of interior lighting.

2-2.4.2.4 Adequacy of storage and maintenance structures.

2-2.4.2.5 Condition of storage and maintenance structures.

2-2.4.2.6 [REDACTED]

2-2.5 SECURITY. The inspection shall be conducted to assure that required security standards for protecting nuclear weapons are met. The following areas shall be examined for adequacy and compliance with applicable DOD directives as implemented by the Services.

2-2.5.1 Physical Security.

2-2.5.1.1 [REDACTED]

2-2.5.1.2 [REDACTED]

2-2.5.1.3 [REDACTED]

2-2.5.1.4 [REDACTED]

2-2.5.1.5 [REDACTED]

2-2.5.1.6 [REDACTED]

2-2.5.1.7 [REDACTED]

2-2.5.1.8 [REDACTED]

2-2.5.1.9 [REDACTED]

2-2.5.1.10 [REDACTED]

2-2.5.2 Entry Control Procedures.

2-2.5.2.1 [REDACTED]

2-2.5.2.2 [REDACTED]

2-2.5.2.3 [REDACTED]

2-2.5.2.4 [REDACTED]

2-2.5.2.5 [REDACTED]

2-2.5.2.6 [REDACTED]

2-2.5.3 Performance of Security Personnel.

2-2.5.3.1 Knowledge of required actions.

2-2.5.3.2 Quality of performance of required actions.

2-2.5.3.3 Personnel properly equipped.

2-2.5.3.4 [REDACTED]

2-2.5.4 Plans/Instructions and Procedures.



2-2.5.4.1 Physical Security Plan/Instruction.

2-2.5.4.2 Guard orders.

2-2.5.4.3 Standing Operating Procedures/Implementing Instructions.

2-2.5.5 [REDACTED]

2-2.5.5.1 [REDACTED]

2-2.5.5.2 [REDACTED]

2-2.5.5.3 [REDACTED]

2-2.5.5.4 [REDACTED]

2-2.6 SAFETY. The inspection shall be conducted to assure the adequacy of the following:

2-2.6.1 [REDACTED]

2-2.6.2 Compliance with safety requirements/precautions specified in pertinent directives in the areas of weapons handling, assembly, maintenance, storage operations, and logistic movements.

2-2.6.3 Applicable portions of unit safety program and implementation thereof.

2-2.6.4 Knowledge of and compliance with safety rules (paragraph 1-3.18).

2-2.6.5 Safety practices.

2-2.6.6 Unit fire prevention program, practices, procedures, and the overall implementation thereof.

2-2.7 SUPPLY SUPPORT. The following shall be inspected only as they pertain to nuclear weapons, DOE-furnished components, and items required for maintenance, storage, and handling thereof:

2-2.7.1 The status of nuclear weapons associated equipment and authorized repair parts.

2-2.7.2 The adequacy of replacement procedures (requisitions and follow-up action).

2-2.7.3 The status of authorized and required items of equipment as reflected in the nuclear weapons allowance list/authorized stockage list.

2-2.8 NUCLEAR WEAPON PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRAM. Inspection shall consist of a review of applicable records and questioning of personnel to assure unit compliance with applicable DOD directives as implemented by Service directives. The following shall be examined:

2-2.8.1 Procedures to include screening, qualification, and disqualification.

2-2.8.2 Appropriate documentation in medical and personnel records.

2-2.8.3 Investigative and security clearance requirements and documentation.

2-2.8.4 Knowledge and awareness of the reliability program by personnel in the program.

2-2.8.5 Overall effectiveness of the unit's implementation of the program.

2-2.9 LOGISTIC MOVEMENT. All DOD components supporting or having responsibility for logistic movement of nuclear weapons are subject to NWTI's in accordance with the provisions of this manual.

However, noncustodial units will be required to demonstrate an approved procedure for nuclear weapon tiedown of each weapon system for which the units have a stated mission.

2-2.9.1 Applicability.

2-2.9.1.1 The following are general categories of logistic movements subject to NWTI's. Also listed are examples of support organizations that may become involved in each category.

2-2.9.1.1.1 Military Airlift Operations.

2-2.9.1.1.1.1 Aviation Units, U.S. Army.

2-2.9.1.1.1.2 Tactical Support Squadrons (VR) and Helicopter Combat Support Squadrons (HC), U.S. Navy.

2-2.9.1.1.1.5 Military Airlift Command (MAC) and Tactical Airlift Wings and Squadrons, U.S. Air Force.

2-2.9.1.1.2 Convoy operations; motor vehicle units of Army, Navy, and Air Force.

2-2.9.1.1.5 Waterborne Movement.

2-2.9.1.1.3.1 U.S. Navy ships or craft.

2-2.9.1.1.3.2 U.S. Civil Service-manned ships of the Military Sealift Command.

2-2.9.2 Scope. All organizations supporting or having responsibility for logistic movement of nuclear weapons shall be required to demonstrate proficiency in the following areas, as applicable, insofar as it pertains to logistic movement and is included in the inspected unit's mission.

2-2.9.2.1 Security (paragraph 2-2.5).

2-2.9.2.2 Safety (paragraph 2-2.6). All aspects of safety as related to logistic movement of war reserve weapons to include equipment and procedure certification and maintenance standards.

2-2.9.2.3 Qualification and certification of transport, handling, and courier personnel.

2-2.9.2.4 Equipment for adequacy, condition, maintenance, calibration, and certification.

2-2.9.2.5 Plans and instructions (paragraph 2-2.1.2).



2-2.9.2.6 Nuclear weapons custody and accountability procedures.

2-2.9.2.7 [REDACTED]

2-2.9.2.8 Implementation of the reliability program (paragraph 2-2.8).

2-2.9.2.9 Courier personnel briefings and required documentation and instructions.

2-2.9.2.10 Procedures for notification of shipment to enroute stops, destination(s), and consignees.

2-2.9.2.11 Explosive handling procedures.

2-2.9.2.12 Security personnel briefing.

2-2.9.3 Units Directly Involved With Military Airlift Operations. In addition to areas specified in paragraph 2-2.9.2, units involved with military airlift operations shall be required to demonstrate proficiency in the following areas.

2-2.9.3.1 Point of Origin Procedures.

2-2.9.3.1.1 Briefings [REDACTED]

2-2.9.3.1.2 Acquisition and positioning of opportune cargo.

2-2.9.3.1.3 Loading and tiedown procedures.

2-2.9.3.2 Enroute Procedures, as applicable.

2-2.9.3.2.1 Weather minimums.

2-2.9.3.2.2 Minimum essential navigational aids and communications equipment.

2-2.9.3.2.3 [REDACTED]

2-2.9.3.2.4 [REDACTED]

2-2.9.3.2.5 [REDACTED]

2-2.9.3.2.6 Handling of opportune cargo.

2-2.9.3.2.7 [REDACTED]

2-2.9.3.3 Destination or Offload Point Procedures, as applicable.

2-2.9.3.3.1 Briefings.

2-2.9.3.3.2 Offloading.

2-2.9.3.3.3 Flight planning (if the carrier is to proceed with nuclear weapons cargo).

2-2.9.3.3.4 [REDACTED]

2-2.9.3.3.5 Opportune cargo.

2-2.9.4 Units Directly Involved With Waterborne Movement. In addition to areas specified in paragraph 2-2.9.2, units involved with waterborne movements shall be required to demonstrate proficiency in the following areas. [REDACTED]

## SECTION 3

### NWTI RATING SYSTEM

#### 3-1 INTRODUCTION.

The military importance and political sensitivity of operations with nuclear weapons dictate that all units and personnel maintain the highest possible standards of performance. The inspection system for nuclear weapons must be professional and thorough so that the nuclear capability of each unit is assured. Since there is no way to reduce the rating system to a formula, the final rating awarded must be based on the nature, severity, and number of deficiencies noted during the inspection. In addition, discussion with the unit and judgment by the inspection team are essential in reaching the decision on a final rating. This section provides the guidelines for the inspection criteria to be employed in all NWTI's.

#### 3-2 RATING SYSTEM AND CRITERIA.

The overall rating given to a unit following a nuclear technical inspection shall be either SATISFACTORY, SATISFACTORY (Support Unsatisfactory), or UNSATISFACTORY. Adjectival ratings may be given to the major areas and subareas of an inspection where such a procedure could prove beneficial (paragraph 1-3.2).

3-2.1 A SATISFACTORY rating shall be given when a unit clearly demonstrates that it can accomplish its assigned nuclear weapons mission and produce reliable nuclear weapons in a safe and secure environment in compliance with applicable directives.

3-2.2, A rating of SATISFACTORY (Support Unsatisfactory) shall be given when a condition described in paragraph 3-2.3 exists that is beyond the capability of the inspected unit to avoid, influence, or correct and when the inspected unit performed its portion of the nuclear mission in a satisfactory manner. Responsibility for the unsatisfactory nuclear weapons support condition(s) shall be determined. The responsible headquarters, unit, or activity shall be cited in the report and furnished a copy of the report or an appropriate extract thereof.

3-2.3 An UNSATISFACTORY rating shall be given when any one of the conditions in paragraphs 3-2.3.1, 3-2.3.2, 3-2.3.3, 3-2.3.4, 3-2.3.5, and 3-2.3.6 exist: (It must be emphasized that examples listed below are not all inclusive.)

3-2.3.1 [REDACTED] One or more deficiencies in technical procedures which (assuming the weapon was properly launched, emplaced, or fired) probably would cause the weapon not to function as designed or intended. Examples are:

3-2.3.1.1 [REDACTED]

3-2.3.1.2 Omission or improper performance of required tests or inspections thereby resulting in possible malfunctions remaining undetected.

3-2.3.1.3 Use of test or measuring equipment which is defective or which has exceeded calibration intervals.

3-2.3.1.4 Acceptance of test results that are not within specified tolerance.

3-2.3.1.5 [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

2-2.9.4.1 [REDACTED]

2-2.9.4.1.1 [REDACTED]

2-2.9.4.1.2 [REDACTED]

2-2.9.4.1.3 Courier team procedures [REDACTED]

2-2.9.4.1.4 Communications.

2-2.9.4.2 [REDACTED]

2-2.9.4.2.1 [REDACTED]

2-2.9.4.2.2 [REDACTED]

2-2.9.4.2.3 [REDACTED]

2-2.9.4.2.4 Communications.

2-2.9.5 Units Directly Involved With [REDACTED] In addition to areas specified in paragraph 2-2.9.2, units involved with [REDACTED] operations shall be required to demonstrate proficiency in the following areas.

2-2.9.5.1 Transfer of cargo, to include precautions against hazards.

2-2.9.5.2 Provision of area security when required at origin, enroute, and at destination.

2-2.9.5.5 Use of tiedown equipment, safety chains, and security covers, as applicable.

2-2.9.5.4 Application of quantity-distance requirements.

2-2.9.5.5 Use of warning signs or devices.

2-2.9.5.6 [REDACTED]

2-2.9.5.7 [REDACTED]

2-2.10 SPECIAL SUBJECTS.

2-2.10.1 DNA and the Services may be tasked by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the JCS to evaluate special interest items which may or may not be consistent with the scope of NWTI's.

2-2.10.2 Service headquarters shall be informed of such special subjects, to be evaluated by DNA, prior to inspection.

2-2.10.3 Service NWTI teams may be tasked by appropriate Service headquarters to evaluate special interest items.

*Pages 13 through 21  
inclusive are deleted.*

3-2.3.1.6 [REDACTED]

3-2.3.1.7 [REDACTED] The application of incorrect torque values relating to [REDACTED] operations is a cause for improper [REDACTED]

3-2.3.1.8 [REDACTED] and not taking the required action.

3-2.3.2 UNSAFE ENVIRONMENT. Failure to provide a safe environment for nuclear weapons.

3-2.3.2.1 Deficiencies which create an [REDACTED] hazard.

3-2.3.2.2 Physical damage which is cause for weapon rejection.

3-2.3.2.3 Deficiencies which create a [REDACTED]

3-2.3.2.4 Failure to observe [REDACTED]

3-2.3.2.5 Using lifting, handling, or tiedown equipment which is unserviceable, unauthorized, or has not received mandatory load testing or safety-related inspections.

3-2.3.2.6 Violation of [REDACTED]

3-2.3.2.7 Failure to properly install or set [REDACTED] option selection switches or similar mechanisms.

3-2.3.2.8 Failure to meet reliability program standards for personnel assigned nuclear weapons duties.

3-2.3.2.9 Violation of nuclear weapon system safety rules.

3-2.3.3 INSECURE ENVIRONMENT. Failure to provide a secure environment for nuclear weapons. Failure to provide the required security or permitting unauthorized personnel access to nuclear weapons. Examples are:

3-2.3.3.1 Allowing unauthorized or unidentified access to a nuclear weapon.

3-2.3.3.2 The use of an inadequate or deficient [REDACTED] without sufficient compensatory measures. (Failure of an [REDACTED] does not necessarily constitute an insecure environment, assuming that compensatory measures are instituted once the failure is discovered.)

3-2.3.3.3 [REDACTED]

3-2.3.3.4 Failure to establish limited/exclusion areas as required.

3-2.3.3.5 Violation of the [REDACTED]

3-2.3.3.6 Failure to post required patrols or sentries.

3-2.3.3.7 Failure to lock, or control entrances to limited or exclusion areas.

3-2.3.3.8 Deficiencies in security facilities, as judged against applicable DOD directives and implemented by Service directives, which individually or in combination

with other security deficiencies could lead to unauthorized access to nuclear weapons in the absence of adequate compensatory measures.

3-2.3.3.9 Deleted.

3-2.3.3.10 Deleted.

3-2.3.4 A number of deficiencies or a manner of performance which indicates a lack of competence or disregard for prescribed procedures.

3-2.3.5 Shortages in personnel, equipment, or authorized repair parts which would prevent accomplishment of the assigned nuclear weapons technical functions.

3-2.3.6 Failure to comply with applicable policy and procedures governing use of

3-2.4 Units shall be held accountable only for requirements imposed on them by publications and directives which they are authorized to hold.

### 3-3 CERTIFICATION STATUS.

3-3.1 When a unit is rated SATISFACTORY (Support Unsatisfactory) or UNSATISFACTORY based on criteria established by this manual, the Service shall determine whether or not that unit shall be [REDACTED]. Furthermore, the Service shall take actions necessary to ensure that a safe and secure environment is provided for the nuclear weapons concerned.

3-3.2 When a Service or DNA NWTI team awards a rating of SATISFACTORY (Support Unsatisfactory) or UNSATISFACTORY, the Service may elect to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] that would not jeopardize safety, security, or reliability of nuclear weapons.

### 3-4 REINSPECTIONS.

When a unit is rated SATISFACTORY (Support Unsatisfactory) or UNSATISFACTORY, the Service inspection team may reinspect in accordance with the following procedures. (DNA NWTI team will only verify correction of deficiencies per paragraph 3-4.5)

3-4.1 Service on-the-spot reinspection. When a SATISFACTORY (Support Unsatisfactory) or an UNSATISFACTORY rating is awarded for a condition which can be corrected immediately, the team chief or chief inspector may, at his discretion and with the concurrence of the commander of the inspected unit or support unit, make an on-the-spot reinspection and include the results in the original report.

3-4.2 Limited reinspection. When the Service conducting a reinspection deems it appropriate, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Further, the team chief or chief inspector may expand the scope of the reinspection to include other areas within the scope of this manual if conditions so warrant.

3-4.3 Complete reinspections. When the Service conducting a reinspection deems it appropriate, the reinspection may include all areas within the scope of this manual.

3-4.4 Reinspections specified in paragraphs 3-4.2 and 3-4.3 above shall be conducted within the times specified in governing Service directives.

3-4.5 DNA NWTI verification action. During DNA NWTI's, when a unit is rated SATISFACTORY (Support Unsatisfactory) or UNSATISFACTORY, if deficiencies causing this rating are immediately correctable and if the DNA team chief considers it appropriate, he may (with the concurrence of the commander of the inspected unit or support unit) verify correction of deficiencies prior to the team's departure.

## SECTION 4

### NWTI SCHEDULING

#### 4-1 FREQUENCY.

4-1.1 DNA shall inspect a JCS-specified percentage [REDACTED] of each Service [REDACTED]. These inspections will be scheduled, in conjunction with the appropriate Service agencies, such that each [REDACTED] unit is normally inspected at least every [REDACTED] and not more frequently than [REDACTED]. Section 8, DNA Surveillance Inspections, shall be counted as fulfilling the JCS-specified percentage for NWTI's.

4-1.2 The Services shall assure that [REDACTED] units are inspected on a regular, programmed frequency, not to exceed [REDACTED]. The Services may accept the DNA NWTI as fulfilling the nuclear weapons technical portion of any given Service inspection.

#### 4-2 COORDINATION OF INSPECTION SCHEDULES.

4-2.1 Inspection of units by the Services shall be scheduled in accordance with Service policy.

4-2.2 Inspection of Service units by DNA shall be scheduled in accordance with the following procedures:

4-2.2.1 ARMY Units. Trip scheduling shall be accomplished at [REDACTED] planning conferences attended by representatives of the Department of the Army, DNA, and the major commands to be inspected during the period involved.

4-2.2.2 NAVY and MARINE CORPS Units. Nomination and scheduling of Navy and Marine Corps units for DNA NWTI's shall be formulated in accordance with procedures mutually agreed upon by DNA and the Fleet CINC's, Commandant Marine Corps (CMC), or the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEASYSKOM), as applicable. Fleet CINC's schedule approval will be obtained approximately [REDACTED]. Designation of individual units for the NWTI's shall be accomplished through [REDACTED]. Schedule changes, unit cancellations, and substitutions shall be coordinated through the Fleet CINC's, CMC, or NAVSEASYSKOM, as appropriate.

4-2.2.3 AIR FORCE Units. DNA proposed inspection schedules for each [REDACTED] shall be prepared in coordination with the Directorate of Nuclear Surety, Air Force Inspection and Safety Center. Copies of the proposed schedule will be forwarded to Headquarters USAF for comments and concurrence. Following Headquarters USAF acceptance of the proposed schedule, DNA will distribute the formal schedule to the appropriate agency and commands. When applicable, these procedures will be modified as necessary to protect the no-notice aspect of Air Force inspections.

#### 4-3 NOTIFICATION.

4-3.1 Notification of units to be inspected by a Service shall be in accordance with that Service's directives.

4-3.2 Notification of units to be inspected by DNA shall be as follows:



4-3.2.1 Prior to commencement of an inspection effort [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] DNA shall notify the Services, subordinate commands, and appropriate units of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] DNA should be notified immediately of any conflicts requiring resolution.

4-3.2.2 After initial scheduling and notification, informal direct communications between DNA and the unit to be inspected are authorized for the purpose of arranging trip details.

4-3.2.3 In order to ensure proper distribution of notification letters, the Services shall provide DNA with appropriate chain of command addressees.

## SECTION 5 NWTI PROCEDURES

### 5-1 PURPOSE.

This section reviews the sequence of events from the initial notification of inspection (paragraph 4-5), if applicable, to the final report of corrective action taken on recorded findings.

### 5-2 PREINSPECTION PROCEDURES. (Not applicable to no-notice/minimum-notice inspections.)

After initial notification has been made, the following information shall normally be exchanged between the inspecting headquarters and the inspected unit.

#### 5-2.1 INFORMATION WHICH WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE INSPECTION HEADQUARTERS.

5-2.1.1 [REDACTED] of inspection team.

5-2.1.2 Request for transportation and/or billeting arrangements, if required.

5-2.1.3 [REDACTED]

5-2.1.4 Team identification and clearance data:

5-2.1.4.1 [REDACTED]

5-2.1.4.2 [REDACTED]

5-2.1.4.3 [REDACTED]

5-2.1.4.4 [REDACTED]

5-2.1.4.5 [REDACTED]

5-2.1.4.6 [REDACTED]

5-2.1.4.7 [REDACTED]

5-2.1.5 [REDACTED]

#### 5-2.2 INFORMATION THAT MAY BE REQUESTED FROM THE INSPECTED UNIT.

5-2.2.1 [REDACTED]

5-2.2.2 [REDACTED]

5-2.2.3 Level of maintenance for which the organization is responsible.

5-2.2.4 Organizations providing [REDACTED] support if different from the inspected unit.

5-2.2.5 Uniform requirements; i.e., mandatory winter, summer, or optional.

5-2.2.6 Proposed [REDACTED]

5-2.2.7 Proposed [REDACTED] for technical operations.

#### 5-3 INSPECTION TEAM ARRIVAL AT THE INSPECTED UNIT.

5-3.1 Upon arrival the DNA NWTI teams shall, and the Service NWTI teams may, require the following in writing:

5-3.1.1 A statement on the background of the unit, to include mission statement, the current commanding officer, and the date of his assumption of command.

5-3.1.2 A resume of factors [REDACTED] which the unit cannot correct, to include a list of [REDACTED] shortages of equipment or publications. [REDACTED]

5-3.1.3 The current authorized and assigned manning levels by specialty and grade.

5-3.1.4 Information on the most recent NWTI (type, date, and results).

5-3.1.5 The inspected unit's chain of command, to include major and unified and specified commands (if applicable), and mailing addresses.

5-3.1.6 A list of personnel by type position; e.g., critical, or controlled, under the reliability program.

#### 5-3.2 THE INSPECTED UNIT SHALL BE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE:

5-3.2.1 Administrative assistance (paragraph 5-2.1.5).

5-3.2.2 Reliability program records (paragraph 2-2.8).

#### 5-4 CONDUCT OF THE INSPECTION.

5-4.1 The NWTI begins with the formal preinspection briefing presented by the team chief or chief inspector. The purpose of this briefing is to coordinate final details and permit discussion of questions relative to the conduct of the inspection.

5-4.2 The commander of the inspected unit shall present a briefing on the unit's mission, maintenance capabilities, organization and specific operations to be conducted during the inspection. (Not considered a part of the inspection.)

5-4.3 [REDACTED]

5-4.3.1 [REDACTED]

5-4.3.2 The team chief or chief inspector shall be prepared to brief the [REDACTED] commander to ensure understanding of the scope of the inspection. The [REDACTED] detachment shall arrange for such a briefing subject to the desires of the [REDACTED] commander.

5-4.4 The inspection is then conducted in accordance with the scope described in paragraph 2-2 of this manual.

## 5-5 POSTINSPECTION PROCEDURES.

5-5.1 The inspection team shall prepare either a draft or final report of the inspection. [REDACTED] In addition, a memorandum of minor deficiencies may be prepared (paragraph 6-6).

5-5.2 A time for the critique will be agreed upon between the commander of the inspected unit and the team chief or chief inspector.

5-5.3 Prior to the critique, the team chief or chief inspector shall brief the commander of the inspected unit on the results of the inspection, and provide him the draft or final report and the memorandum of minor deficiencies (if applicable).

5-5.4 Following the briefing of the commander of the inspected unit, the team chief or chief inspector will present the critique to the commander of the inspected unit and other personnel designated and invited by him. The critique formally presents the inspection findings.

5-5.5 Following the inspection, the inspected unit will receive the formal report of the inspection for review and corrective action in accordance with section 6 of this manual.

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## SECTION 6

### NWTI REPORTS

#### 6-1 GENERAL

A separate NWTI report shall be prepared for each unit inspected, or reinspected except for on-the-spot reinspections (paragraph 3-4.1). As a minimum, the following information shall be contained in each NWTI report: (paragraph 8-4 for reporting DNA surveillance inspections.)

6-1.1 Mailing address of the inspected unit.

6-1.2 Major command of the inspected unit.

6-1.3 The inspecting Service or command.

6-1.4 Inspection dates.

6-1.5 Overall rating. (see paragraph 3-2).

6-1.6 Narrative description of reason for a less than satisfactory rating and reinspection rating (if applicable).

6-1.7 Technical operations performed, to include type weapon utilized (war reserve or training approval).

6-1.8 All significant deficiencies. Each deficiency shall be referenced to the appropriate directive(s).

6-1.9 Special subjects inspected (if within the scope of this manual).

6-1.10 When appropriate, comments on causative factors that could assist the unit in taking corrective action may be included.

6-1.11 Other comments as appropriate.

#### 6-2 DISTRIBUTION.

6-2.1 Reports of Services' NWTI's and minimum-notice inspections shall be distributed in accordance with Service directives.

6-2.2 The Services shall send copies of all Reports/Summaries or extracts directly to Commander, Field Command, DNA, ATTN: Inspections Directorate, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico 87115-5000. In addition, each Service will send to FCDNA a complete listing of all NWTI's conducted during a given 6-month period.

6-2.3 Reports of DNA NWTI's shall be distributed directly to the inspected unit with copies to headquarters in the unit's chain of command as desired by the appropriate Service.

### 6-3 CORRECTIVE ACTION.

6-3.1 Report of corrective action required by Service NWTI's shall be forwarded as required by Service directives.

6-3.2 Corrective action required by DNA NWTI's shall be forwarded via Service channels to Headquarters, DNA.

6-3.3 Reports of corrective action shall include a written reply regarding the specific action taken to correct the deficiency noted and those measures or procedures initiated to preclude the recurrence of the deficiency.

### 6-4 REVIEW AND FOLLOW-UP.

6-4.1 Corrective action taken shall be reviewed by each intermediate headquarters/level of command for adequacy. In those cases where the deficiency is beyond the capability of the inspected unit to correct, the appropriate level of command shall initiate corrective action and so indicate by endorsement. Appropriate action shall close the report. Inadequate action shall result in follow-up correspondence to ensure that adequate corrective action is taken.

6-4.2 DNA shall review Service replies to DNA inspection reports for adequacy of corrective action. Each deficiency shall then be categorized as Active or Closed. If a reply is not considered sufficiently responsive and is within the Service's ability to correct, it shall be referred to the Service headquarters for further action. If it is beyond the Service's capability to correct, it shall be referred to the appropriate agency, with information copies to the appropriate Service.

### 6-5 MESSAGE REPORTS UNSATISFACTORY RATINGS.

When a unit is rated UNSATISFACTORY, the Service headquarters and intermediate commands designated by the Services shall be advised by priority precedence, electrically transmitted message. For units rated SATISFACTORY (Support Unsatisfactory), the Service headquarters and intermediate headquarters of both the inspected unit and the support unit rated UNSATISFACTORY shall be advised by priority precedence, electrically transmitted message. The message report will contain a sufficiently detailed description of all major deficiencies which caused the unsatisfactory condition to allow the responsible Service to determine what corrective action is required.

### 6-6 MEMORANDUM OF MINOR DEFICIENCIES.

6-6.1 When appropriate, this memorandum shall be prepared by DNA and Service NWTI teams, to cover all observations noted during the NWTI which are not considered to have a significant bearing on the nuclear weapons mission of the activity but which require correction. The memorandum shall be left with the commander of the inspected unit. The commander shall be instructed that the memorandum with a record of corrective action taken shall be retained on file until reviewed during the next NWTI conducted under the provisions of this manual and/or the appropriate Service directive.

6-6.2 If, upon review, deficiencies contained in the draft report left with the inspected unit are not included in the formal report, they may be returned to the inspected unit to be included in the memorandum of minor deficiencies as an addendum. When a memorandum has not been left with the unit, these deficiencies may be forwarded to the unit as a memorandum for corrective action and filed.

6-7 DNA REVIEW.

6-7.1 DNA shall provide information on the DOD NWTI Program, to include inspection results, potential problems, special interest items, and recommendations to the JCS, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) (ATSD(AE)), Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), and the Services on an on-call basis (see 1-4.3.6 and 1-4.3.7).

6-7.2 After review if specific or potential problem areas are identified, DNA shall make appropriate recommendations to the affected Service headquarters.



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## SECTION 8

### DNA SURVEILLANCE INSPECTIONS

#### 8-1 PURPOSE.

The DNA surveillance inspection program provides for DNA over-the-shoulder evaluation of Service NWTI teams.

#### 8-2 SCOPE.

The DNA surveillance inspection shall consist of the observation and evaluation of Service teams while they are performing the NWTI portion of Service inspections. Surveillance inspections shall count as a DNA NWTI of a [REDACTED] unit (paragraph 1-4.3). DNA surveillance inspections shall not be conducted except by specific request of the parent Service.

8-2.1 The surveillance inspection shall evaluate the adequacy of the Service inspection of a certified nuclear-capable unit.

8-2.2 Surveillance inspection areas shall include:

8-2.2.1 Team briefings.

8-2.2.2 Inspector qualifications.

8-2.2.3 Organization of scheduling of inspection activities.

8-2.2.4 Inspection techniques.

8-2.2.5 Findings.

8-2.2.6 Rating(s) assigned.

#### 8-3 PROCEDURES.

Separate agreements containing detailed procedures for surveillance inspections shall be made between DNA and the Service concerned.

##### 8-3.1 ADMINISTRATIVE.

##### 8-3.1.1 SCHEDULING.

8-3.1.1.1 Surveillance inspections normally shall be scheduled in accordance with section 4 of this manual, except that procedures shall protect the [REDACTED] aspect of Service inspections when applicable.

8-3.1.1.2 The date and location of the surveillance inspection shall be established by direct liaison between the applicable Service headquarters and Field Command, DNA.

8-3.1.1.3 The combined number of DNA surveillance inspections and DNA NWTI's shall not exceed the JCS specified annual sample size (paragraph 1-4.2) without concurrence of the affected Service.

## 8-5.1.2 FUNDING.

FCDNA shall fund for TDY travel and per diem of DNA surveillance inspection team members.

## 8-5.1.3 TEAM COMPOSITION.

The maximum number of DNA inspectors shall be limited in accordance with the agreement between FCDNA and the applicable Service headquarters.

## 8-3.2 OPERATIONAL.

8-3.2.1 Whenever possible, the DNA inspectors [REDACTED] to arrival at the unit to be inspected.

8-3.2.2 The Service team shall be responsible for arranging billeting, work space, and transportation at the inspection site for the DNA inspectors.

8-3.2.3 The Service inspection team chief or chief inspector has final authority to assign the inspection rating.

8-3.2.4 The DNA inspectors shall be introduced as observers at the NWTI in-briefing and may observe all facets of the inspection of functional areas contained in this manual, to include inspection team meetings/discussions.

8-3.2.5 The DNA inspectors shall observe in an over-the-shoulder manner and shall not interfere with inspection progress and/or scheduling of events. This does not preclude discussion between the DNA and Service inspectors during the NWTI.

8-3.2.6 The DNA inspectors shall not make inspection-related comments or statements to members of the unit undergoing the NWTI except when a clearly obvious violation of safety is about to occur, and then only to the extent necessary to prevent the safety violation. Criticism developed by DNA inspectors shall be limited to discussions between the DNA team chief and the Service team chief or chief inspector, and to the DNA official report.

## 8-4 REPORTING.

8-4.1 DNA surveillance inspection reports shall be provided to Headquarters, DNA, the headquarters of the Service inspection team, the applicable major command headquarters, and the Service headquarters.

8-4.2 Replies normally will not be required unless the DNA team does not concur with the findings or procedures of the Service NWTI team or unless the inspection detects serious problems in weapon safety, security, or reliability which require the attention of higher authority. The DNA surveillance inspection report will stipulate if a reply is required.

8-4.3 The Service inspection team will provide the DNA surveillance inspection team access to their written NWTI report.

## SECTION 9

### CONSULTATIVE STAFF ASSISTANCE

#### 9-1 GENERAL.

9-1.1 Consultative staff assistance is intended to provide a means for the direct, immediate exchange of ideas on matters such as inspection directives, scheduling, procedures, results, trends, and corrective actions.

9-1.2. DNA shall provide consultative staff assistance, to include visits, to Service and Service subordinate command headquarters as mutually agreed on by DNA and the Service headquarters concerned. Staff assistance, to include visits, to Unified and Specified Commands shall be as mutually arranged by DNA and the appropriate command.

9-1.3 Consultative staff assistance by DNA to Service inspector counterparts shall be concerned primarily with improving the DOD NWTI system and resolving problem areas and differences.

#### 9-2 PROCEDURES.

##### 9-2.1 SCHEDULING.

9-2.1.1 The Services may request consultative staff assistance from DNA.

9-2.1.2 DNA may suggest consultative staff assistance visits to the Service headquarters when deemed appropriate.

9-2.1.3 The scheduling of this assistance shall be decided mutually by DNA and the Service headquarters concerned.

9-2.1.4 The determination if a visit or assistance by correspondence is best suited to the situation shall be decided mutually by DNA and the Service concerned.

9-2.1.5 When feasible, consultative staff assistance visits shall be in conjunction with other scheduled trips.

##### 9-2.2 REPORTING.

Formal reports are not required on consultative staff assistance visits. Appropriate communications between DNA and the Services are encouraged with a view to improvement of inspection procedures, standards, and directives.

DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE  
Washington, DC, 1 January 1986

BY THE ORDER OF THE SECRETARIES OF THE ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE

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**SECTION 10**  
**SYMPOSIA**

**10-1 GENERAL.**

Under sponsorship of and when directed by the JCS, DNA shall conduct symposia of DNA and Service personnel to discuss problems associated with the DOD NWTI system.

**10-2 PROCEDURES.**

10-2.1 DNA shall be responsible for all administrative matters, including invitation of appropriate personnel in coordination with the Services.

10-2.2 DNA shall host all symposia held in the Washington, D.C. area or at FCDNA. The appropriate Service shall be the host if a symposium is conducted at a Service facility.

10-2.3 The host agency shall provide support necessary to conduct the symposium.

**10-3 MINUTES OF THE SYMPOSIUM.**

A resume of the significant points discussed and decisions reached shall be documented. Distribution shall be made in accordance with the desires of the participants/Service representative.

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