



PUBLIC AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400



18 JAN 1995

Ref: 94-F-0217

Ms. Kate Doyle
The National Security Archive
The Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street N.W.
Washington DC 20301

Dear Ms. Doyle:

This responds to your September 19, 1992, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request filed with the U. S. Department of State. Your request was referred to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and received in this Directorate on January 26, 1994, with one document to be reviewed for releasability. The document is identified as follows:

- Report of the Maritime and Riverine Resource Planning Team, October 1990, (C - 116 pgs)

The review is now complete and the document is released in part. The redacted information is currently and properly classified in accordance with Section 1.3 (a) (5), Executive Order 12356, in that it pertains to foreign relations and activities of the United States. Release of these portions could reasonably be expected to cause damage to national security. Some portions also contain pre-decisional information which is deliberative in nature, containing internal recommendations or subjective evaluations, the disclosure which would inhibit the decision-making process.

Consequently, Colonel William Lantz, Principle Director of Drug Enforcement Policy & Support, the Initial Denial Authority, has denied the release of the excised information pursuant to Title 5 USC 552 (b) (1) and (5). A copy of your request and the released material is provided at the enclosure.

Incidentally, the charts on pages 2-18 through 2-23 and 3-25 through 3-33 contain what appears to be redacted information on the right side of the page. In actuality, these areas were grayed-out on the original documents and contain no information.

You have the right to administratively appeal this decision. Any such appeal should offer justification to support reversal of the denial and should be forwarded to

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the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Directorate for Freedom of Information and Security Review, Room 2C757, 1400 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1400, within 60 days of receipt of this reply. Fees have been waived in this instance.

Sincerely,



A. H. Passarella
Director
Freedom of Information
and Security Review

Enclosure:
As stated

94-F-0217
9204244

THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE

SUITE 500 1755 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (202) 797-0882

IN ALL CORRESPONDENCE PLEASE REFER
TO ARCHIVE FILE NO. 921029DOS229

Mr. Frank M. Machak
FOIA Coordinator, Rm 1239
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, NW
Washington DC 20520

Sept. 19, 1992

RE: Freedom of Information Act Request

Dear Mr. Machak:

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. Section 552, et seq. (as amended), I hereby request disclosure of the documents described on the last page of this letter for inspection and possible copying.

If you regard any of these documents as exempt from the FOIA's disclosure requirements, I request that you nonetheless exercise your discretion to disclose them. In this connection I note that you are required under the FOIA to release any reasonably segregable nonexempt portions of documents containing information you regard as exempt. Section 552(b). To permit an intelligent, informed decision whether or not to file an administrative appeal of any denial decision, you are also requested to describe withheld records (or portions thereof) and explain the logical and factual basis for exemption claims. See Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Department of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 251 (D.C. Cir., 1977).

This request is made on behalf of the National Security Archive, a nonprofit public interest research institute and library located in Washington, D.C. The Archive is organized and operated as a division of the Fund For Peace, Inc., a tax-exempt nonprofit corporation. The Archive's purpose is to enrich public policy debate by making available records pertaining to important issues of major public concern in the areas of foreign, defense, intelligence, and international economic policy.

Documents obtained by the Archive, including the records requested in this letter, are carefully analyzed, indexed and organized into document sets in the Archive's collection and published. Document sets are available for inspection and copying by scholars, journalists, members of Congress and Congressional staffs, present and former public officials, other public interest organizations, and the general public at the Archive's Washington office. Information in the documents is disseminated across the country through distribution of comprehensive document indices to university and other research libraries and through the Archive's publications.

As a staff member of the Archive, I have been assigned to conduct research on the subject of this request. I am working as part of a research team which includes experts on this subject with a wide variety of educational and professional backgrounds relating to foreign affairs, defense, intelligence and international economic policy. Members of the team have conducted an extensive literature

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search at the Library of Congress and specialized research libraries and have determined that the requested materials are necessary to our research.

I further ask that you waive all fees in connection with this request. In National Security Archive v. U.S. Department of Defense, 880 F.2d 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied March 19, 1990, the D.C. Circuit held that the Archive is entitled to a waiver of all search and review fees under the FOIA as a "representative of the news media". Id. at 1387. The appeals court also determined that Archive requests made in furtherance of its publication and related activities are not for a "commercial use." Id. at 1388.

This request also qualifies for a waiver of duplication fees because disclosure of the information in the requested documents is in the public interest as it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government. See 5 U.S.C. Section 552(a)(4)(A)(iii). Should you decline to waive or reduce all duplication fees, we are prepared to pay normal reproduction costs if I decided to copy the records produced. Our willingness to pay such fees is subject to our rights to appeal and litigate the fee waiver question. I further ask that if you decline to waive duplication fees that you set forth your specific reasons for doing so in writing and that you obtain our authorization before incurring costs in excess of \$100.

In order to expedite the release of the listed documents, I request that you disclose them on an interim basis as they become available to you, without waiting until all the documents have been assembled. If you have any questions that I might be able to answer regarding the identity of the records, their location, or the scope of the request, please call me at the number listed above. I look forward to receiving your response within the ten-day statutory time period.

Sincerely,



Kate Doyle

Attachment

FOIA Sequence Number: 921029D0S229
Date of Request: 09/19/1992
NSA Record Number: 9334

Subject of Request:

Please send a copy of the October 1990 interagency paper "Report of the
Maritime and Riverine Resource Planning Team--Bolivia, Peru, Colombia."

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(S) The Andean Counternarcotics Strategy Implementation Plan identifies the collection and movement of coca base and paste from growing regions to cocaine hydrochloride laboratories as the most vulnerable node of cocaine production. To capitalize on this vulnerability, the plan highlights the critical need for a maritime/riverine program capable of interdicting precursor chemicals, base, and paste in the coca and cocaine hydrochloride producing countries of the Region.

(U) In October 1990, the National Security Council (NSC) and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) jointly commissioned an Interagency Maritime/Riverine Resources Planning Team (MRRPT) to review existing and proposed country/regional supporting riverine plans, assess their effectiveness to date and, in concert with Country Teams, develop a framework for the synchronization of operational concepts, existing and projected resources, force structure, training and support for the maritime/riverine program.

(S) After a comprehensive review of the Andean Counternarcotics Strategy Implementation Plan and supporting intelligence data, the MRRPT found that the strategic objectives, related to maritime/riverine programs, remain valid. However, the Team concluded that the broad strategic objectives of the Andean Implementation Plan have not been universally translated into viable operational concepts and programmatic support for each country. Although there is no single reason for this, it appears that the absence of a centralized oversight authority, both in Washington and the Country Teams, with the responsibility to synchronize disparate riverine program elements (i.e., operational concepts, resources, training and support) is a major contributing factor. The lack of subject matter expertise within the Country Team is another. As a consequence, there are mixed results in program execution.

(C) In addition to identifying and recommending solutions to conceptual and management problems, the MRRPT analyzed projected activities for Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru within the context of a Concept Based Requirements System. In Bolivia, the MRRPT was able to assist the Country Team in finalizing their maritime and riverine strategic plans, operational concepts, and phased implementation plans. The MRRPT and Country were also able to validate requirements for equipment, personnel, training, and support. In Colombia, basic planning is well on track within the Country Team and with some elements of the Host Country. Although the strategic and operational concept requires final acceptance by the Government of Colombia, the MRRPT believes that a viable conceptual framework exists and, within that framework, USG resources can be used effectively. A notional construct was developed for use by the Country Team in Peru in subsequent development of their program. A number of factors have retarded maturation of maritime/riverine programs in that country and, absent consensus with the Host Country regarding strategic and tactical priorities, force structure and application of USG resources, the MRRPT was unable to validate specific requirements.

(C) A number of issues were identified during the course of this study which require Interagency addressal:

- (C) Riverine and maritime programs involve far more than placing boats in the water. A "systems" perspective is required to synchronize resources, operational concepts, support and training. In some Country Teams, personnel assigned lack the specific experience and managerial skills required to orchestrate a successful maritime/riverine program. This is a significant shortfall given the existing situation in Host Countries. (i.e., internal factionalization, competing roles and missions, and outmoded doctrinal concepts).
- (U) There is an absence of a single USG focal point (on the national, regional and U.S. mission levels) to develop goals

encompassing all aspects of riverine/maritime programs and to synchronize programs required to achieve them.

- ~~(S)~~ Finally, proper emphasis has not been given to the establishment of adequate indigenous support systems capable of maintaining, sustaining and employing the law enforcement elements engaged in commerce control.

(U) The majority of problems identified by the MRRPT can be resolved by improving program oversight and management infrastructure. This will not require a great expenditure of resources. In fact, accelerated planning based on the immediate availability of resources and a rush to obtain operational results is a large part of the current problems. Many of the immediate corrective actions required are already in progress. To correct existing shortfalls, the MRRPT recommends for Interagency consideration:

- (U) For the long term, designation of Maritime/Riverine Coordinators (MRC), within existing management structures at the national and Country Team levels, to fuse operational concepts, resources, training and support.
- (U) Continuation of political dialogue to stress importance of maritime commerce control and riverine interdiction.
- (U) Validation of river craft requirements presented in this report and establishment as the maritime/riverine program standards.
- (U) Examination of the present procurement system to determine if it provides the most efficient and responsive use of the resources available to Host Countries.
- (U) Evaluation of Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF) as a means to enhance responsiveness and reduce the unit cost of river craft.

- (U) Consideration of the augmentation of U.S. Missions with full-time USCG Attaches.
- (U) Consideration of the establishment of a Military Personnel Exchange Program (PEP) billets for riverine operations with appropriate naval service of each host nation.
- Examination of the feasibility of additional Coast Guard billets to support U.S. counternarcotics programs.
- Consideration of commissioning a comprehensive survey to determine the maritime commerce control capabilities of Andean Region countries.

~~(C)~~ Accomplishment of Objective II of the Andean Counternarcotics Strategy Implementation Plan is attainable within the range of existing resources. Success is dependent, however, upon the adoption of a USG management structure designed to optimize the application of resources and parallel development, within Host Countries, of the capability to exert maritime commerce control at critical choke points. This involves development of a viable captain of the port (COTP) system, increased surveillance and improved communications.

~~(C)~~ This fixed presence concept must be complemented by a mobile force capability. Such a force would enable the extension of commerce control beyond the range of fixed installations, create increased presence and surveillance on major and secondary waterways, allow the conduct and support of interdiction operations ranging from unopposed board and search up to and including river force projection into ground based targets within a river operating area.

(U) To summarize, we must continue to build upon existing Host Nation capabilities, consider Host Nation absorption and sustainment realities, focus on low tech, low cost options, and recognize the need for maximum flexibility in programmatics to counter the narcotrafficking infrastructure. Maritime and riverine operations can, and do, have an impact on narcotraffickers.

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INTRODUCTION

(U) Maritime and riverine law enforcement is an essential element in the successful implementation of the Andean Counternarcotics Strategy. The narcotics trafficking infrastructure within the Andes has consistently exploited all avenues of logistics movement, demonstrating a continuing ability to employ both maritime and riverine systems to transport bulky precursor chemicals, coca derivatives and, ultimately, refined cocaine products. They have taken advantage of host nation weaknesses by operating in remote areas beyond the range of effective law enforcement capabilities, exploiting traffic patterns and commerce volume that exceed the indigenous control capabilities, and manipulating institutional and legal disparities. The accomplishment of objectives II.a. and II.b. of the Andean Counternarcotics Strategy Implementation require effective maritime and riverine operations for which USG resourcing and planning will be necessary.

(U) Efficient and effective use of maritime and riverine resources in narcotrafficking interdiction programs in the Andean countries has not been pursued with the same vision, vigor and velocity as that of the air and ground programs. Consequently, although maritime and riverine programs have been developed and implemented with varying degrees of success in the Andean Region, the full potential of these programs has not been realized due to an absence of a fully coordinated and comprehensive plan that is thoroughly understood and supported by all levels of either the USG or the host nations. The result has been under-equipped, under-staffed, and under-trained maritime and riverine forces.

(U) Recognizing the value of an effective maritime and riverine law enforcement program in achieving the objectives of the Andean Counternarcotics Strategy Implementation Plan, and in recognition of Congressional and internal Administration interest, the National Security Council (NSC) and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) commissioned a Maritime/Riverine Resources Planning Task Force (MRRPT) to review existing and proposed regional/country maritime and riverine plans, to include detailed identification of the resources required to impede narcotrafficking.

(U) Membership on this task force included representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (OSD/ISA) and Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (OSD/SO-LIC); the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG); the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM); and the Department of State, International Narcotics Matters

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(DOS/INM). In addition to reviewing existing plans, the task force charter included establishing priorities for programs, based on effectiveness, cost, and ability to implement, in current host nation environments. Essentially, the purpose of the review was to validate the Andean Counter-narcotics Strategy Implementation Plan and to provide an omnibus framework that would integrate and synchronize local maritime and riverine programs with the national strategy.

(U) In conducting its review of the Andean Region maritime and riverine program, the MRRPT visited USSOUTHCOM Headquarters in Panama and the U.S. Missions in Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. Prior to departure from Washington, the MRRPT developed the approach it would use to assist the Country Teams in translating their plans into clearly articulated requirements for personnel, training, equipment and resources. The approach agreed upon was the Concepts Based Requirements System (CBRS); a system used by DoD to: (1) identify elements of the threat environment; (2) identify goals and objectives; (3) define an operational concept, to include mission requirements outlined in a strategic context; and (4) define equipment and other resource requirements.

(U) An identical format consisting of seven sections has been used for each country plan. It contains sections which are structured according to the CBRS process: (1) Background; (2) Country Goals; (3) Maritime Riverine Operating Environment; (4) Operational Concept; (5) Strategic Context; (6) Maritime Riverine Operating Environments and Priorities; and (7) Requirements.

(U) Below the strategic level, several factors were considered, such as: program element coordination and integration, host nation absorptive capacity, training requirements, basic intelligence requirements, and maintenance and logistics requirements. These considerations provide the foundation for a sound strategy. While it cannot be said that no stone was left unturned, it was a rigorous and comprehensive effort conducted with the assistance and support of the U.S. Missions.

(U) The MRRPT, in preparation for its survey trip, carefully considered and ultimately rejected, the historical model of maritime and riverine operations in Vietnam as a basis for evaluating Andean maritime and riverine operations. Essentially, the two environments are unique and do not lend themselves to easy comparison. The riverine operating environment in Vietnam contained factors that are not manifesting themselves in the Andes. Due to these operational disparities conclusions cannot be drawn from one experience that generally apply to the other. For a detailed presentation of contrasts between the two, please see the accompanying annex.

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(U) Country plans were in various stages of maturation, depending upon political operating environment. Plans included in this report were developed by the Country Teams with the assistance of the Maritime and Riverine Resources Planning Task Force. It should be noted that Peru, in the absence of a signed military aid agreement, can receive no U.S. military aid and, therefore, its program cannot be judged by the same standard. Nevertheless, the MRRPT did meet with the U.S. Country Team in Peru to discuss CBRS methodology and the importance of developing a sound maritime and riverine law enforcement strategy in the event that an agreement should be signed. The plan for Colombia is a significant step forward in refocusing attention on its inland waterways. Bolivia's plan is by far the most advanced and developed of the three. Various elements of the Country Team had already prepared plans which, in their aggregate, included most of the elements now incorporated in its regional plan. As facilitators, the MRRPT merely assisted the Country Team in: (1) defining its maritime and riverine program objectives, (2) developing an operational concept; (3) identifying personnel and equipment requirements; and (4) consolidating those elements in one strategic plan. The Country Team in Bolivia has since adopted the plan.

(U) The MRRPT did not delve deeply into intelligence requirements since the Central Intelligence Agency Counter Narcotics Center will conduct a comprehensive review of maritime and riverine intelligence requirements after the air, ground, maritime and riverine, and coca leaf containment studies have been completed.

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II. BOLIVIA

1. (U) BACKGROUND.

A. (U) Bolivia, in particular its Chapare region, is estimated to account for 25% of the coca cultivated within the Andes. Recent pressure within Colombia, generated by that government's aggressive counternarcotics campaign, has accelerated the geographic displacement of cocaine refining facilities. This, coupled with a rising entrepreneurial class of Bolivian traffickers who desire a greater role in production and processing, has brought about an increasing proliferation of processing laboratories within the Beni and Pando Departments of Bolivia.

B. (U) Bolivia's internal lines of communication (LOC), i.e., roads, waterways, and air, have been difficult to control with law enforcement activities because of limited resources, the relatively unsophisticated nature of Bolivia's internal security systems, and the huge amount of territory involved. These LOC are primitive and susceptible to the extreme environmental conditions of Bolivia's seasonal (dry-rainy) climate. Illicit commerce, both narcotrafficking and smuggling of contraband, may rely on the rivers as a principal means of transport during the rainy season (October through April) when many roads are inaccessible, although verified intelligence concerning the actual extent of waterway use for movement of narcotics-related contraband is lacking.

C. (U) Maritime commerce control, in terms of documentation, registry, and inspection procedures, occurs infrequently at best and normally only in the larger port areas with limited effectiveness. This in itself leaves Bolivia susceptible to extensive illicit trafficking. Compounding the dilemma is the virtual absence of any capability to extend law enforcement beyond the principal ports into the river systems and their tributaries. Essentially, the unrestrained arterial flow of illicit products along the river systems is a critical vulnerability in any Bolivian campaign to stem the exportation/importation of cocaine-related products.

D. (U) The GOB, with the assistance of the USG (particularly DEA, USCG, and DOS-INM), has taken preliminary steps, via the creation of the "Blue Devils" counternarcotics riverine patrol boat task force under the Special Force for the Fight Against Narco-Trafficking (SFFANT) rubric, to address the problem on their river systems. The analysis that follows will address the future requirements necessary to accomplish the GOB/USG mutual goals. It will be predicated on an operational concept applied in a strategic context that addresses the Bolivian riverine environment in terms of geographic and topographic realities, and the known patterns and vulnerabilities of the narco-trafficking infrastructure.

2. ~~(S)~~ COUNTRY GOALS.

A. In support of the three sub-objectives of the Andean Strategy Implementation Plan which require riverine and maritime efforts, implementing objectives were established by the U.S. Mission in Bolivia and approved by the Deputies Committee. These include:

(1) ~~(C)~~ Isolate key coca growing areas.

- Control river movement by enhancing Rural Mobile Police Units (UMOPAR) and Bolivian Navy riverine patrol/interdiction capabilities;
- Provide training in effective vehicle/boat search procedures;
- Use U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard riverine teams to enhance the operational effectiveness of the police and Bolivian Navy.


(2) (U) Block the shipment of key essential chemicals.

- GOB interdiction of precursor chemical transportation infrastructure by developing a riverine force capability within the Bolivian Navy; conducting riverine operations in the Beni and Pando Departments;
- GOB establish a chemical control regime.

(3) (U) Destroy labs and processing centers.


- Train and equip the Bolivian Air Force and Navy to participate in joint counternarcotics operations;
- Provide effective and timely intelligence to the Bolivian police and military;
- Provide communications support to the Bolivian police and military.

B. (S) Implementation of these objectives, under the lead of the U.S. Country Team, involves the support of several USG elements, to include: DOS-INM, DEA, DoD, and the USCG.



(C) These objectives were then refined into clearer mission statements which then served as the basis for the development of the overarching operational concept.

- Establish Bolivian Naval presence [redacted]
- Gather [redacted] capabilities;
- Establish or enhance existing Bolivian Navy [redacted]



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3. (U) THE MARITIME/RIVERINE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT (MROE).

A. (U) Natural:

(1) (U) Unimproved river channels are the principal means of surface transport throughout most of northern and eastern Bolivia, and rivers flowing north--including the Rios Beni, Mamore, and their tributaries--may be significant to the narcotrafficking transportation infrastructure. Coca leaf and paste are shipped in unknown quantities by raft and boat within and out of the Chapare and Yapacani cultivation areas down the Rios Ichilo, Chapare, and Isobiro to collection points and processing sites in the Trinidad area of the central El Beni Department. Puerto Vilarroel, the largest port in the Chapare, is home port for several hundred boats, many of which are believed to be involved in narcotrafficking. Other ports that play significant roles in the movement of coca leaf, precursor chemicals, and paste are Puerto Grether, Puerto Aurora, and Puerto Patino. Since no special berthing facilities are necessary for rafts and small boats, any river bank on a navigable waterway can serve as a transshipment site.

(2) (U) Natural chokepoints within the waterways can be found at the confluence of the Rios Chapare-Ichilo and Isiboro-Chipirri, the port of Guayaramarin located along the Rio Mamore on the Bolivian-Brazilian frontier, the port of Riberalta near the confluence of the Rios Beni and Madre de Dios and south of the impassable rapids on the Rio Beni, and the confluence of the Rios Itenez and Itonsamas-Machupo-Blanco-San Miguel.

(3) (U) The 6,500+ miles of waterway are significantly affected by the environmental differences between the rainy and dry seasons. The major rivers remain navigable throughout the year; however, tributaries are often marginally filled or entirely dry depending on the severity of the dry season. River widths vary from 12 feet to as much as 12 miles in the major waterways; the tributaries narrow to as little as one to two feet of width as navigable paths through thick swamps. Depths are also widely variable from up to 200 feet for the major systems down to 1-2 feet on terminal tributaries. The natural chokepoints mentioned previously average a depth of 30 feet or greater. Floating obstructions present significant

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challenges to boat operations especially in the rainy season when the speed of the river increases significantly.

B. (U) Manmade:

(1) (U) The narcotics production infrastructure is characterized by two principal subsystems:

- The cultivation zone of the Chapare area where coca leaf is converted to paste with the use of precursor chemicals introduced into the area. Conversion to paste requires relatively little sophistication and alleviates both the problem of spoilage, and the requirement to move bulk loads of coca leaves.
- The processing zones of the Pando and Beni Departments where laboratory operations convert the coca paste into base or finished product (cocaine hydrochloride) using chemicals specifically introduced into the area for the conversion process.

(2) (U) The Bolivian river network is characterized by interlocking LOC that may either be connecting tributaries or seasonal parallel roads that supplement or replace the minor waterways during the dry season. Small rudimentary airstrips have been constructed by the narcotraffickers along many of the major and minor waterways, providing an easy method for transshipment either onto or away from the waterways. While the operational environment is less hostile than that in Colombia and Peru, it should be noted that: (1) armed confrontations are characterized by small arms, direct fire, applied normally by groups no larger than platoon-size (30 personnel), usually smaller; (2) graft and corruption, especially with regard to smuggling activities, is endemic; and (3) popular support for counternarcotics activities is virtually nonexistent because of native apathy toward governmental authority, reliance on the extralegal narcotrafficking economy, and successful exploitation by the narcotraffickers of fear and intimidation. Armed resistance is more criminal in nature than political. Violence, however, is escalating with the displacement of Colombian traffickers and their movement into operations in Bolivia, and the increasing use of weapons by Bolivian traffickers. Heavy weapons, such as mortars, rocket launchers, and heavy machine guns, are not characteristic of

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the narco-traffickers in the Bolivian riverine environment; therefore, there is, as yet, no requirement to provide armor for the riverine forces. As interdiction operations begin to effect the narco-trafficking infrastructure, this may change and accelerated corrective actions may be required.

4. (U) OPERATIONAL CONCEPT:

A. (U) USG and GOB mutual counternarcotics objectives will be accomplished by using an operational concept which enhances the Bolivian Navy's capability to exercise maritime commerce control with a focus on effective presence at critical chokepoints through Captains of the Port (COTP), increased surveillance, and improved communications. This "fixed presence" concept will be complemented by a "mobile force" concept enabling the Bolivian Navy to extend commerce control beyond the range of fixed installations, increase presence and surveillance on major and secondary waterways, and conduct interdiction operations ranging from unopposed board and search up to, and including, projection of combat power ashore from the rivers. This concept is predicated on an overarching emphasis to: (1) build upon existing Bolivian Navy and police capabilities; (2) consider GOB absorption and sustainment realities; (3) focus on low technology, low cost options as the first course of action; and (4) maintain maximum flexibility to counter the narco-traffickers.

B. (U) Analysis of the operational concept was conducted in two primary stages. In the initial mission requirements stage, the two concepts of "Fixed Presence" and "Mobility Forces" were further delineated into specific mission parameters to identify the tasks requiring accomplishment. Secondly, the mission requirements analysis was followed by a detailed evaluation of the operational environment within Bolivia to determine the geographic areas critical to the narco-trafficking infrastructure. The "Fixed Presence" and "Mobility Forces" concepts were then applied to determine requirements and resources needed to deny the use of the riverine transportation system to the narco-traffickers.

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(U) "Fixed Presence" Concept

•• (U) Maritime Commerce Control: This addresses not only law enforcement capabilities, but the legal and diplomatic foundations upon which such enforcement will rest. As had been previously identified by the U.S. Mission, this will include: (1) diplomatic efforts with neighboring countries followed by greater police/customs liaison and exchanges of information; (2) establishment by the GOB of an effective essential precursor chemical regulatory regime, including end-user certificates; (3) the establishment of effective COTP for regulation of maritime commerce; and (4) the development of a Bolivian government baseline capability in chemical diversion control, traffic analysis, and random search.

•• (U) Surveillance and Intelligence Collection and Processing: The paucity of information and viable intelligence within the riverine environment is the Achilles heel of both commerce control and counternarcotics interdiction efforts. Information is primarily collected through a system of paid informants with little corroboration and a lack of collection planning and all-source analysis. Correction of the intelligence shortfall, concerning trafficking patterns, key indicators regarding local residents such as fuel consumption and engine repairs (an indication of optempo and usage rates), etc., along the major and secondary river systems will be essential to providing baseline information for the conduct of the riverine campaign. Such an enhancement cannot occur without U.S. involvement and close coordination with the GOB.

•• (U) Mobile Force Support: Base support for mobile riverine forces will be necessary to provide maintenance and resupply hubs from which mobile operations can be sustained. In addition, the fixed sites can also provide communications base station and intelligence integration support, as well as secure sites for air-ground-riverine planning, coordination and training.

•• (U) Humanitarian and Civic Action: Gaining popular support will be an essential ingredient to a successful effort to establish legitimate control over the MROEs. A well-crafted program of austere, yet meaningful, humanitarian and civic action projects can play an important role in gaining the confidence of an apathetic local populace. Gaining the

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confidence of the local populace can bear fruit in terms of local intelligence opportunities, as well as enhancing the legitimacy and popularity of the Bolivian government and its counternarcotics policy.

* "Mobility Forces" Concept

•• (U) Mobile Operations Between Fixed Points: To counter attempts by narcotraffickers and other criminal elements to simply avoid the designated COTP areas, a random pattern of riverine patrolling operations must be implemented. The objective is to extend the "presence" of law enforcement authority throughout the waterways.

•• (U) Surveillance and Interdiction (Board and Search): Active pursuit of information via both overt and clandestine surveillance will supplement the intelligence base regarding riverine usage patterns, personalities, and modus operandi of illicit activities.

•• (U) Force Projection and Interdiction (Support and Conduct of Amphibious Assault Operations): Riverine forces must be able to provide amphibious lift and direct combat support to UMOPAR forces conducting operations against targets accessible from the water. Direct combat support can include fire support, resupply, medical evacuation, communications, tactical mobility, reconnaissance from the water, and waterborne blocking forces. Interoperability with counternarcotics ground forces (UMOPAR) and airmobile elements (Red Devils) in terms of communication, procedures, and logistics will be essential.

•• (U) Forward Operating Bases (FOB): To enhance the mobility of the riverine forces, extending their range beyond the normal boat operating radius, it will be necessary to employ FOBs. These austere facilities will not be of a permanent nature; rather, they will be compact (airliftable, manportable, etc.) and tailored to the needs of the operating environment. FOBs are not an end unto themselves; they facilitate longer range operations than would otherwise be possible. Additionally, they will enhance medevac and emergency response capabilities within the ROA.

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•• (U) Humanitarian and Civic Action: As mentioned above, the gaining of popular support will be a task of all forces engaged in the counternarcotics campaign. In the case of the mobility forces, this will be more of an ancillary responsibility that must be integrated into a more comprehensive regional plan for the MROE.

5. (U) THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT:

A. (U) As previously mentioned, the narcotrafficking infrastructure is characterized by two principal subsystems:

- The cultivation zone of the Chapare area where coca leaf is converted to paste using precursor chemicals introduced into the area. Conversion to paste requires relatively little sophistication, and reduces both the problem of spoilage, and the requirement to ship leaves in bulk loads.
- The processing zones of the Pando and Beni Departments where laboratory operations convert the coca paste into base or finished product (cocaine hydrochloride) using chemicals specifically introduced into the area for the conversion process.

B. (U) Presently, the primary avenues of introduction of precursor chemicals into Bolivia are by truck from Chile, and train from Argentina. Strategically, the borders with Brazil and Argentina are also potentially significant, especially the longer (and more porous) Brazilian border.

C. (U) It should also be noted that both air traffic and the use of overland ground routes remain viable alternatives for narcotrafficking. The preferences exhibited by the narcotrafficking infrastructure are determined by the seasonal variances of the Bolivian topography based on the rainy-dry season cycle and an avoidance of concerted governmental efforts in one particular node or system. At present, indications are that air transport remains the preferred method of movement of drugs; the mission of riverine forces is, at least initially, primarily one of denial, rather than interdiction of known trafficking systems.

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6. (S) MARITIME/RIVERINE OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS (MROE) AND PRIORITIES:

A. (S) #1 CHAPARE MROE:

The MROE will be sub-divided into two Riverine Operating Areas (ROAs): the Puerto Vilarroel ROA and the Trinidad ROA. Emphasis will be placed on commerce control in the critical port facilities of Puerto Vilarroel and development of the capability to conduct mobile interdiction and raid operations from the Puerto Vilarroel (PV) base. The goal is to deny uncontested use of the waterways in the Chapare area, destroy labs and processing facilities, and to support ground, amphibious, or airmobile operations by other counternarcotics forces. The tasks required to control this MROE, in order of priority, are:

- Establish a mobile force in Puerto Vilarroel;
- Establish a fixed base in Puerto Vilarroel to provide:
 - maritime control in the Puerto Vilarroel ROA;
 - combat service support to the Puerto Vilarroel mobile force;
- Backfill the Trinidad capabilities that will have to be drawn down to initially establish the Puerto Vilarroel ROA, i.e., Trinidad mobile force and support vessel.

B. (U) #2 PANDO - Northwest Beni MROE:

This MROE is synonymous with the Riberalta ROA, i.e., the Rio Beni-Madre de Dios river system. The problem of the proliferation of processing facilities within this ROA is complicated by the inaccessibility from this river system of the Rio Mamore waterway (i.e., impassable rapids). Dedicated assets are required to undertake commerce control at the critical port facilities of Riberalta with the additional capability to conduct mobile interdiction and raid operations out from the Riberalta base area. The objectives would be to deny uncontested use of the waterways in the Pando-NW Beni area, destroy labs and processing facilities

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accessible by the water systems, and to support ground, amphibious, or airmobile operations by other counternarcotics forces. Elements of the MROE, in order of priority, are:

- Establish and deploy a mobile force to Riberalta:
- Augment the capabilities of the Bolivian Navy fixed base in Riberalta to provide:
 - maritime control in the Pando-NW Beni MROE (Rios Beni, Madre de Dios);
 - combat service support to the Riberalta mobile force;
- Establish a support vessel to extend the mobile force operational range.

C. 



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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- Establish a support vessel to extend mobile force operational ranges.

D. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- Augment the capabilities of the Bolivian Navy [REDACTED] to provide:
 - maritime control in the [REDACTED]
 - combat service support to the [REDACTED] mobile force.

7. (U) REQUIREMENTS: The fundamental task of the Maritime and Riverine Resource Planning Team, with the U.S. Mission in La Paz, was to identify requirements for the Bolivian riverine program. Requirements have been addressed in terms of equipment needs (i.e., required operational capabilities), force structure (and packaging with regards to equipment densities), training, and organizational and management imperatives.

A. (U) Equipment Requirements:

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(1) (U) Communications: Three discrete communications nets will be required. Internal communications for the mobile forces will require HF and VHF capabilities to effect craft to craft, craft to ground forces, and craft to air forces communications. A second distinct net will be required for command and control, as well as, intelligence and logistics communications between the mobile forces and their supporting fixed base or forward operating base. A third distinct capability will be required to set up direct discrete communications with SFFANT command and control elements in La Paz; thereby providing the capability to orchestrate clandestine activity and strategically controlled operations.

(2) (U) River Craft:

- Patrol Craft (PC): shallow draft, reinforced hull (due to river hazards and assault beaching), twin outboard motors (at least 140HP due to need for rapid acceleration, or "on step speed", to break contact upon unanticipated engagement; outboard diesel motors are unacceptable due to limited diesel support infrastructure within the country, existing capabilities in diesel are for internal engine plants of larger-type craft), trailer compatible, transportable by C-130 aircraft (considering Bolivia's land-locked position, the Bolivian Air Force inventory and the fact that the nearest C-141/C-5A compatible airfields are in Santa Cruz, Bolivia or Manaus, Brazil), forward mounted machine gun (M-60 or equivalent), 100 nautical mile operating radius, lift capability of 8 personnel (2 crewmembers and 6 operational personnel, which is the size of an UMOPAR operational element), canopy compatible for environmental protection, HF/VHF communications suite, Global Positioning System (GPS) for navigational accuracy, approximate length of 20-25 feet.
- Inflatable Raiding Craft (IRC): lightweight (manportable by 6-man UMOPAR operational element), 25 HP outboard motor (manportable), capable of transporting 6 personnel with individual equipment and an additional 300 pounds of supplies and ammunition/demolitions, black in color, heavy duty reinforced latex or similar material, transportable (uninflated) as helicopter internal load (UH-1H), GPS, small (25 gal and 50 gal) lightweight fuel bladders, paddles, repair kit, pumps, and accessories.

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- **Indigenous River Craft (IC):** locally produced (to permit consonance and blending with other indigenous craft found along the riverine environment); approximately 25 feet in length, high freeboard, 25HP outboard motor, small (25 and 50 gal) light-weight fuel bladders, GPS; (purpose: these craft will be used primarily for surveillance and intelligence collection as well as clandestine activities along the waterways).

- **Support Vessel (SV):** capable of sustaining 15-20 days of underway operations, while supporting six patrol craft (as described above), capacities include 45K liters of MOGAS for patrol craft resupply, 17K liters of diesel for self-support of the support vessel, 17K liters of potable water for crew and mobile force sustainment. It is not necessary that this vessel be of U.S. manufacture; in fact, because of several factors, it would be more practical to convert an existing barge or other type craft within Bolivia to this purpose. Conversion of an existing craft would eliminate the dilemma of delivering the craft to this land-locked country; it would in all probability be accomplished less expensively; it could be kept at a low technology level of sophistication more in keeping with the absorption capabilities of the Bolivian Navy; it could be more easily modified in the future to address unanticipated requirements; and lastly, it could be brought into operational status more quickly.

(3) (U) Forward Area Rearm and Refuel Packages (FARRP):

(U) Small, austere packages specifically developed (or compiled) to enable mobile forces to establish hasty intermediate supply points along the waterways to extend the range of patrol craft and add flexibility so that other options for resupply are available in the absence of support vessels. This will make it difficult for narcotraffickers to anticipate the riverine force operational radius, and it will enhance medevac and emergency response capabilities. Specifically tailored for this mission, the FARRPs need only include a 6-man canvas tent (CP tent) with tarpaulin floor, additional tarpaulins to protect/camouflage ammunition, food, and fuel containers, fuel bladders or other suitable containers with appropriate non-electric pumps, a 3 kw generator and light set for night repairs of boats along the banks, and a manpackage communication capability. The package would be deployable by either helicopter, fixed wing

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aircraft, or patrol craft; the principle variable affecting deployability being the fuel bladders, which should be small enough to permit handling without any additional equipment needs (25 gal, 50 gal, & 100 gal).

B. (U) Force Structure Requirements and Equipment Densities:

(1) (U) Distinct force modules were developed for each of the MROEs based on the environmental characteristics, threat and anticipated operational missions in each.

(2) (U) The primary variable in the force modules is the use of a support vessel and the densities of FARRPs, Inflatable Raiding Craft, and Indigenous River Craft. The Patrol Craft module of six was retained throughout the recommended force structure as the most operationally effective and maintainable module. It provides two teams of two boats each providing internal fire support and overwatch within the two craft element and between the two boat teams. This concept of mutual support was deemed adequate to fulfill the board and search aspects of the interdiction mission, the fire support to ground forces mission, as well as the more offensive missions of amphibious assault and blocking operations. The fifth and sixth craft respectively would allow one craft in maintenance at any one time (not an unrealistic expectation) and another available for augmentation or to serve in a command and control status.

(3) (U) In determining the recommended densities of Inflatable Raiding Craft, Indigenous Craft, and FARRPs, an assessment was made of the topographic realities of the waterways within the respective MROEs, the probability of larger scale (3 or more UMOPAR ground elements) amphibious operations, and the modus operandi of the narco-trafficking infrastructure within the MROE. For example, in those areas with a high density of indigenous canoe-type craft on the waterways, where tributaries are narrow and difficult to navigate with standard patrol craft, the analysis recommended a greater density of indigenous river craft to enhance the opportunities for the collection of clandestine intelligence (by lower signature) and provide an enhanced capability to penetrate formerly inaccessible tributaries.

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(4) (U) Tables 1 through 3 in this section encapsulate the force structure and density requirements for the four MROEs. Additionally, they present the anticipated commitment of both U.S. and Bolivian personnel (Note: the required intelligence detachment within each ROA, 5 in total, have yet to be adequately studied to identify the actual personnel requirements; this must be addressed at a later date as part of a larger intelligence assessment that encompasses ground and riverine enforcement strategy.)

(5) (U) This U.S. commitment includes the partnership law enforcement responsibilities of the DEA and the USCG, as well as the DoD mobile training teams that would be required to facilitate the absorption of equipment, as well as, train and standardize the expanding Bolivian Navy counternarcotics patrol boat force (as has been done with the UMOPAR). It is envisioned that the Bolivian Navy Base at Trinidad will serve as the locus of training for the counternarcotics patrol boat groups, as well as their primary (and only) depot-level maintenance facility. This training and maintenance support function will parallel the ground-force (UMOPAR) model in Chimore. Institutional training provided in the U.S. or Panama, and DoD mobile teams can provide training in the individual skills required for equipment maintenance, operation, and tactical employment. Also, collective skills training will be required to mold newly constituted mobile forces into viable tactical units capable of effective operations. Much of this training can be conducted at the Trinidad Base, but training will also be required within the ROAs to which the mobile forces will be assigned. This training can, however, be conducted within the existing confines of the promulgated Rules of Engagement, i.e., no requirement for DoD assets to participate in actual operations. As has been done in Chimore, with the UMOPAR, the training objective should be to create a viable trainer capability within the Bolivian Navy structure that enables the Bolivians to eventually assume the full burden of primary training themselves. This will be required to replenish the force due to normal attrition and to integrate larger elements in the event of further expansion of the riverine forces.

(6) (U) Participation of USG law enforcement agencies, i.e., the Drug Enforcement Agency and the US Coast Guard, in the overall training effort necessary to expand the force and sustain it, will be essential. Law enforcement-specific skills such as investigations, informant handling, apprehension and arrest procedures, evidence and defendant processing for

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court presentation, and procedures for maritime commerce regulation and controls will remain valid requirements for training that are outside the realm of expertise of DoD's technical and tactical skills trainers.

(7) (U) Additionally, consideration must be given to the practicality of attempting to implement this recommended force structure and its overarching operational concept in the short term. Fiscal realities, both within the U.S. and the GOB, will not support an overly ambitious force expansion. The ability of the GOB to absorb such rapid growth does not exist at this time; additional counternarcotics task groups will have to be identified, trained at the individual level, and eventually molded into elements for collective skills training. Maintenance technicians will have to be trained; and a comprehensive logistics and repair parts supply mechanism will have to be instituted. This will have to be accomplished in phases. Also, it should be noted that the USG, at this juncture, may not be prepared to significantly increase its investment of DEA SNOWCAP personnel and Coast Guard advisors. Lead time will be necessary to resource this expanding requirement in terms of recruitment, training (skills and language), and permit a gradual transition into heightened operational tempo.

(8) (U) A prudent phase-in program is presented in Tables 1 through 3, which forecasts requirements for FY 91, 92, and 93. Such a gradual progression will permit absorption at a realistic pace, allow the USG and GOB to initiate the maritime commerce control and mobile force concepts in the most critical areas and permit a mutual evaluation of the concept's validity and contribution to the overall counternarcotics campaign.

FY 91

BOLIVIA Riverine Program

FY 91

	Riverine Operating Areas				Totals		
	CHAPARE MROE Puerto Villarroel ROA	CHAPARE MROE Trinidad ROA	PANDO-NW BENI MROE		FY91	FY92	FY93
<p>FY 91 Riverine Program Objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct and support Interdiction operations in the Chapare area; extend riverine operations beyond fixed installation ranges (75-100 nm); • Establish a mobile force and fixed site capability at Fiberaita to support riverine operations within the PANDO-NW BENI MROE; • Assist in the strengthening of Captains of the Port capability to stem illicit maritime commerce. 							
Equipment/Activity							
• Riverine Combat Element (approx 30-35 HN pers ea)	1	(1)	1		(1)2		3
• Patrol Craft (military specifications)	7		7		14		14
• Patrol Craft (non-military specifications) <i>Note #1</i>		(9)			(9)		9
• Auxiliary 140HP Engines <i>Note #2</i>	6		6		12		12
• Patrol Craft parts and sustainment package (spares)					2		2
• Support Vessel <i>Note #3</i>							
• Support Vessel parts and sustainment package	4	4	2		10		10
• Inflatable Raiding Craft	9	6	9		24		24
• 25HP Outboard Engines <i>Note #4</i>							
• Inflatable Raiding Craft parts and sustainment package	2		4		6		6
• Indigenous Craft <i>Note #5</i>	2	1	2		5		5
• Forward Area Rearm and Refuel Package (FARRP) <i>Note #6</i>	1	1	1		3		3
• Generator (5KW) <i>Note #7</i>	1	1	1		3		3
• Light Set <i>Note #7</i>							

continued

#1 "Guardian" craft acquired and modified prior to FY 90; #2 Auxiliary outboards computed at 50% coverage per platform to permit optimum op readiness and maintenance; #3 NAS will have hull and superstructure constructed locally; FMFP will be used to provide accessories and support equipment; #4 25 HP engines to provide mobility to Raiding Craft and indigenous Craft; #5 NAS/BOLNAV acquires craft locally; #6 includes fuel bladders, pumps, tarpaulins, and tenting; #7 Both generator and light set support FARRP.

Legend: Numbers in **BOLD FACE** are current year; Numbers in () are previous year(s) total.

DISCLAIMER: Above figures do NOT account for attrition or combat loss.

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FY 91 continued

BOLIVIA Riverine Program

FY 91

Totals

Equipment/Activity	Riverine Operating Areas			Totals			
	CHAPARE MROE Puerto Villarroel ROA	CHAPARE MROE Trinidad ROA	PANDO-NW Beni MROE	FY91	FY92	FY93	Total
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FARRP parts and sustainment package Weapons <ul style="list-style-type: none"> .. M-60 MG for Patrol Craft (mill spec) .. M-60 MG for Patrol Craft (non-mil spec) .. Weapons parts and sustainment package Communications Suite HF/VHF (for Patrol Craft) Base Station Communications HF/VHF <i>Note #8</i> Communications parts and sustainment package Vehicles (4x4) Vehicles (4x4) parts and sustainment package Installation Support 	14		14	28			28
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Personnel DEA SNOWCAP US Coast Guard 	2	4	2	8			8
	2	4	2	8			8

#8 Provides operational base secure communications to higher headquarters (La Paz) and to Riverine Combat Forces, supporting vessels, or other joint ground or air elements.

Legend: Numbers in BOLD FACE are current year;
 Numbers in () are previous year(s) total.

DISCLAIMER: Above figures do NOT account for attrition or combat loss.

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FY 92

BOLIVIA Riverine Program

FY 92

Totals

Equipment/Activity	Riverine Operating Areas			FY91	FY92	FY93	Total
	CHAPARE MROE Puerto Villarroel ROA	CHAPARE MROE Trinidad ROA	PANDO-NW BENI MROE				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Riverine Program Objectives: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct and support interdiction operations in the Chapare and Pando-NW Beni areas; extend riverine operations beyond fixed installation ranges (75-100 mi); • Assist in the strengthening of Captains of the Port capability to stem illicit maritime commerce. 	(1)	(1)	(1)	(3)	+1		4
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Patrol Craft (military specifications) • Patrol Craft (non-military specifications) • Auxiliary 140HP Engines • Patrol Craft parts and sustainment package (spares) <i>Note #1</i> • Support Vessel • Support Vessel parts and sustainment package <i>Note #2</i> • Inflatable Raiding Craft • 25HP Outboard Engines • Inflatable Raiding Craft parts and sustainment package • Indigenous Craft • Forward Area Rearm and Refuel Package (FARRP) • Generator (5KW) • Light Set 	(7)	(9)	(7)	(14)	+7		21
	(6)		(6)	(9)	+6		9
		1	(1)	(2)	+1		18
		1	(1)	(2)	+1		1
		1	1	(10)	+2		3
	(4)	(4)	(2)	(10)	+4		14
	(9)	(6)	(9)	(24)	+12		36
	(2)		(4)	(6)	+4		10
	(2)	(1)	(2)	(5)	+2		7
	(1)	(1)	(1)	(3)	+1		4
	(1)	(1)	(1)	(3)	+1		4

continued

#1 To support/sustain FY 90 acquisitions (issue normally includes a 2-3 year spare parts package); #2 To support/sustain FY 91 acquisition of accessories and support equipment

Legend: Numbers in BOLD FACE are current year; Numbers in () are previous year(s) total.

DISCLAIMER: Above figures do NOT account for attrition or combat loss.

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FY 92 continued

BOLIVIA Riverine Program

FY 92

Totals

FY 92 Riverine Program Objectives:	Riverine Operating Areas			Totals			
	CHAPARE MROE Puerto Villarroel ROA	CHAPARE MROE Trinidad ROA	PANDO-NW BENI MROE	FY91	FY92	FY93	Total
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct and support interdiction operations in the Chapare and Pando-NW Beni areas; extend riverine operations beyond fixed installation ranges (75-100 mi); • Assist in the strengthening of Captains of the Port capability to stem illicit maritime commerce. 	(14)	(14)	(14)	(28)	+14		42
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FARRP parts and sustainment package • Weapons <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M-60 MG for Patrol Craft (mil spec) • M-60 MG for Patrol Craft (non-mil spec) • Weapons parts and sustainment package • Communications Suite HF/VHF (for Patrol Craft) • Base Station Communications HF/VHF • Communications parts and sustainment package • Vehicles (4x4) • Vehicles (4x4) parts and sustainment package • Installation Support Note #3 	(7) (1)	(7) (1)	(7) (1)	(14) (3)	+7 +1		21 4
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEASNOWCAP • US Coast Guard 	(2)	(2)	(2)	(8)	+2		10
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Personnel Note #2 	2	4	2	8	10		10
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEASNOWCAP • US Coast Guard 	2	4	2	8	10		10

#3 La Horquilla is an austere site with no existing infrastructure; improvement of a marginal airstrip will be required as well as the construction of installation, maintenance, and personnel facilities. #2 USG personnel figures are NOT in addition to FY 91 figures.

DISCLAIMER: Above figures do NOT account for attrition or combat loss.

Legend: Numbers in **BOLD FACE** are current year; Numbers in () are previous year(s) total.

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FY 93

BOLIVIA Riverine Program

Totals

Equipment/Activity	Riverine Operating Areas				Total		
	CHAPARE MROE Puerto Villarroel ROA	CHAPARE MROE Trinidad ROA	PANDO-NW BENI MROE	[REDACTED]			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assist in the strengthening of Captains of the Port capability to stem illicit maritime commerce. 	(1)	(1)	(1)	1	(3)	+1	5
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Riverine Combat Element • Patrol Craft (military specifications) • Patrol Craft (non-military specifications) • Auxiliary 140HP Engines • Patrol Craft parts and sustainment package (spares) • Support Vessel • Support Vessel parts and sustainment package • Inflatable Rafting Craft Note #1 • 25HP Outboard Engines • Inflatable Rafting Craft parts and sustainment package • Indigenous Craft • Forward Area Rearm and Refuel Package (FARRP) • Generator (5KW) • Light Set 	(7)	(9)	(7)	7	(14)	+7	28
	(6)	(1)	(6)	6	(12)	+6	9
	1	(1)	1	1	(2)	+3	4
	(4)	(4)	(2)	4	(10)	+3	3
	(9)	(6)	(9)	9	(24)	+10	5
	1	1	1	1	(4)	(4)	24
	(2)	(1)	(4)	2	(6)	(2)	3
	(1)	(1)	(1)	1	(5)	(2)	10
	(1)	(1)	(1)	1	(3)	(1)	7
	(1)	(1)	(1)	1	(3)	+1	5
	(1)	(1)	(1)	1	(3)	+1	5

continued

#1 Replaces inflatable craft acquired in FY 91, anticipated two year serviceable life cycle.

DISCLAIMER: Above figures do NOT account for attrition or combat loss.

Legend: Numbers in **BOLD FACE** are current year; Numbers in () are previous year(s) total.

BOLIVIA Riverine Program

FY 93

Totals

Equipment/Activity	Riverine Operating Areas			Totals			
	CHAPARE MROE Puerto Villarroel ROA	CHAPARE MROE Trinidad ROA	PANDO-NW BENI MROE	FY91	FY92	FY93	Total
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FARRP parts and sustainment package Note #2 • Weapons <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •• M-60 MG for Patrol Craft (mil spec) •• M-60 MG for Patrol Craft (non-mil spec) •• Weapons parts and sustainment package Note #3 • Communications Suite HF/VHF (for Patrol Craft) • Base Station Communications HF/VHF • Communications parts and sustainment package Note #3 • Vehicles (4x4) • Vehicles (4x4) parts and sustainment package Note #3 • Installation Support 	2	1	2			+5	5
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEA SNOWCAP • US Coast Guard 	(14)		(14)	14	(14)	+14	56
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assist in the strengthening of Captains of the Port capability to stem illicit maritime commerce. 	1	1	1	7	(7)	+7	3
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FARRP parts and sustainment package Note #2 • Weapons <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •• M-60 MG for Patrol Craft (mil spec) •• M-60 MG for Patrol Craft (non-mil spec) •• Weapons parts and sustainment package Note #3 • Communications Suite HF/VHF (for Patrol Craft) • Base Station Communications HF/VHF • Communications parts and sustainment package Note #3 • Vehicles (4x4) • Vehicles (4x4) parts and sustainment package Note #3 • Installation Support 	(7)	(1)	(7)	(14)	(7)	+7	28
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEA SNOWCAP • US Coast Guard 	(1)	(1)	(1)	1	(1)	+1	5
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEA SNOWCAP • US Coast Guard 	1	1	1	2	(2)	+2	12
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEA SNOWCAP • US Coast Guard 	1	1	1	3	(3)	+3	3
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEA SNOWCAP • US Coast Guard 	(1)	(1)	(1)	1	(1)	+1	5
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEA SNOWCAP • US Coast Guard 	2	4	2	2	2	10	12
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEA SNOWCAP • US Coast Guard 	2	4	2	2	2	10	12

#2 Replacement fuel bladders, pumps, etc., for FY 91 acquired FARRPs; #3 To support/sustain FY 91 acquisitions (Issue normally includes a 2-3 year spare parts package).

Legend: Numbers in **BOLD FACE** are current year; Numbers in () are previous year(s) total.

DISCLAIMER: Above figures do NOT account for attrition or combat loss.

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
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III. COLOMBIA

1. (U) Background.

A. (C) Since taking office in August, President Gaviria has repeatedly gone on record to say that stopping narcotraffickers and narcoterrorism is the government's chief priority. Despite his commitment and the efforts of his Ministry of Defense (under which the National Police operate), Colombia remains the world's largest cocaine producer. According to senior Colombian government officials, Colombia does not have the resources to wage a counternarcotics campaign on all fronts simultaneously. Without an integrated and coordinated effort (air, ground, maritime and riverine) to destroy the infrastructure used to produce cocaine



B. (U) Interservice rivalry between the police and military, and a reluctance to conduct joint operations is impeding proper coordination of agencies involved in counternarcotics. The Colombia National Police (CNP) Antinarcotics Directorate (DAN) is the nation's lead narcotics enforcement and control agency. It conducts a wide range of counternarcotics operations including destruction of narcotics laboratories, cratering of clandestine runways, seizure of precursor chemicals, investigations and arrests, and crop eradication. The CNP has no capability to establish a maritime/riverine program and conduct the associated maintenance, training, and operations required to control illicit drug trafficking along key coastal parts and the mouths of significant river systems. The inland river systems receive even less emphasis and are primarily relegated to the military.

C. (U) Despite the fact that the CNP is the only officially designated organization with the responsibility for arresting and prosecuting narcotraffickers, current lines of authority within the CNP are extremely complicated and disjointed. Before any effective maritime and riverine program can be established, agreements and understandings among counternarcotics police, port police, customs, the Colombian Army, the Colombian Navy (COLNAV) and Colombian Marine Corps (COLMAR) must be established. Though the COLNAV/COLMAR

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have detainment authority, they lack arrest authority and must be prepared to work closely with the police. COLNAV/COLMAR officials have stated that impediments to such cooperation are not insurmountable.

D. (U) Currently, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has no role in Colombian maritime/riverine operations. The Colombians remain steadfast in their determination not to introduce SNOWCAP into the country, continuing to insist that they need only equipment and training.

E. (U) While the CNP is the lead counternarcotics agency, its ability to operate effectively in remote and uncontrolled rural areas is limited by a lack of mobility and firepower. The narcotraffickers continued use of these remote areas is still to their advantage due to the isolation and security provided by thick jungle canopy and access to clandestine airfields and rivers or small tributaries. The COLNAV has tasked COLMAR with developing capabilities for intelligence gathering, precursor chemical interdiction, lab destruction, and control of insurgents and narcotrafficking on the 9000 miles of navigable waterways located in remote and sparsely populated regions of Colombia.

F. (U) The COLMAR is very receptive to broadening its riverine mission. The centralized command is headquartered in Bogota. The eastern headquarters is in Puerto Carreno on the Venezuelan border and operates units out of five Llanos locations on Colombia's Orinoco basin rivers. The central/western headquarters, in Barrancabermeja, controls units on the Magdalena River. The Marines would like to expand Magdalena operations onto the Cauca River.

2. (C) Country Goals.

A. (U) In support of the three subobjectives contained in Objective II of the Andean Implementation Plan, the following implementing objectives were established by the U.S. Mission in Colombia and approved by the Deputies Committee:


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
(1) (✓) Isolate key coca growing areas.

- It is estimated that only 15% of all cocaine produced is a result of Colombian coca leaf production; however, the area under cultivation is expanding rapidly.

(2) (✓) Block the shipment of key essential chemicals.

- Enhance GOC control of precursor chemical transportation infrastructure by developing Captain of the Port (COTP) and maritime/coastal commerce law enforcement capability with the CNP and maritime/coastal interdiction capability and riverine force capability within the COLNAV/COLMAR.
- Encourage greater involvement of COLNAV/COLMAR in joint counternarcotics operations with the CNP (destroy labs and processing centers).
- Encourage Colombian Air Force, Navy/Marines and National Police to participate in joint counternarcotics operations.
- Provide timely and effective intelligence to CNP and COLNAV/COLMAR.
- Encourage closer cooperation in intelligence sharing between the COLNAV/COLMAR and the CNP.
- Provide enhanced communications support to the Colombian police and military.







B. (✓) Achievement of these objectives, under U.S. Country Team leadership, requires the support of several USG agencies, including: DOS-INM, DEA, DoD, and the USCG. 



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C. (U) These objectives were then included as part of the requirements analysis which will serve as the basis for developing the overall operational concept.

- Enhance or establish and maintain COLNAV/COLMAR 
- Enhance or establish and maintain CNP presence 

- Foster closer cooperation and coordination between the CNP and the military services.
- Develop 
- Establish or enhance existing COLNAV and CNP 


3. (U) The Maritime/Riverine Operating Environment (MROE).

A. (U) Natural: In southern and eastern Colombia, rivers are the primary means of transportation and are heavily used by traffickers as well as legitimate merchants. The principal river systems of interest in Colombia are the Magdalena, the Orinoco, and the Amazon tributaries which flow north, northeast, and southeast respectively. The major tributaries of these river systems are:

- (1) (U) Magdalena:

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- Rios Cauca/Magdalena Flows in a northerly direction; accessible to craft up to 10,000 tons in displacement; regularly scheduled riverboat service as well as a permanent population of several hundred tugboats and barges; 1543 km in length with a basin encompassing 257,483 sq km; and vegetation along the river varies greatly from cultivated grasslands in the valley to heavier vegetation in the northern areas.

(2) (U) Amazon:

- Rio Caqueta: (including the Rio Yani and Rio Caguan) A jungle river 1200 km in length flowing eastward from the Andes and joining the Amazon; basin area of 199,203 sq km; heavy vegetation and highly dependent on seasonal rains; and despite variations, average depth of the river is over one meter.
- Rio Putumayo: Rapidly flowing jungle river that flows easterly to join the Amazon. It is 1350 km long with an average 4 to 5 knot current; heavily dependent on May-October rains for water supply; very heavily silted and densely vegetated; it occupies a basin of 53,165 sq km with a river width averaging 800-1,000 meters; depth varies with season, but does not drop below one meter.
- Rio Vaupes: Another rapidly flowing river that runs 400km southeasterly to join the Amazon Basin; average 4 to 5 knot current; heavily dependent on October-May rains for water supply; depth varies with season, but does not drop below one meter.
- Rio Amazonas: Though the Amazon only transits Colombia's southern-most border for 100km, it provides a major fluvial connection between Peru and Brazil and an eventual outlet to the Atlantic. In this sparsely populated area of Colombia, the river port of Leticia is the most critical international commerce hub.

(3) (U) Orinoco:

- Rios Meta, Inirida and Guaviare: All three flow eastward across the Llanos to join the Orinoco which flows into the Caribbean through Venezuela. The Guaviare is 1350

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km long and occupies a basin 166,168 sq km in area. The Meta is 1000 km long with a basin of 103,052 sq km. The Meta is 250 meters wide at its narrow western end and much wider to the east. The Inirida is similarly configured. Vegetation is heavy in the immediate river basins, but mostly grassland in the adjoining areas.

(4) (U) In all, there are 25 major rivers and 88 major river ports in Colombia. COLMAR has limited presence on only six of these rivers. Most river system tributaries are perennial, but have a large seasonal variation in water level and velocity. Their high and low water periods correspond closely to rainfall periods. During low water many drainage features shrink considerably. The high water period extends from late September or early October to late May. The low water period reaches from early June to mid or late September. Flooding occurs in the lower courses of most rivers between mid-December and mid-April. Additionally, natural enemies, such as piranha, electric eels and disease carrying mosquitoes make parts of Colombia a hostile environment for riverine operations.

B. (U) Manmade: There are several threats to the conduct of counternarcotics riverine operations in Colombia. Most of these threats stem from the fact that the central government has little or no permanent presence outside of major population centers (COLMAR has a presence on only 6 of the 25 major rivers), allowing for the establishment of insurgent and narcotrafficker spheres of influence over local populations.

(1) (U) Narcotraffickers and insurgents use the rivers regularly. Commerce moves to over two-thirds of the country by river or air as no significant road or rail infrastructure exists to move goods east of the Andes. In parts of Colombia, the narcotraffickers are so well armed and financed that the insurgents are reluctant to engage them in their areas of operation. Precursor chemicals from Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, and Venezuela, as well as illegally diverted chemicals from other foreign sources such as the U.S. and Germany, are moved to labs located in the central and eastern portions of the country. It is estimated that 30% may be imported legally and then diverted for illicit use. Paste abounds in the Amazon tributary networks. HCl labs are using sophisticated camouflage and are difficult to pinpoint or attack by air due to the heavy jungle canopy. Labs are becoming more mobile and survivable due to their location in isolated, dense jungle regions. HCl is moved from labs to centralized airstrips

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for flights out of the country. Most air strips are located near rivers and are up to 1400 meters in length.

(2) (U) Insurgents. The poverty of the campesinos, widespread disparities in wealth, and weak local governments allow well-organized insurgent groups to exert their authority over outlying population centers. These circumstances also provide a local recruitment pool for insurgent groups, making indigenous populations along rivers hostile to riverine enforcement actions. Insurgent control and revenue collection from river commerce in these areas is a potential problem as well.

(3) (U) Logistics. The great distances involved in controlling jungle river systems requires a well defined logistical tail which will allow the COLNAV and COLMAR to extend their areas of counternarcotics operations beyond currently established river and port bases. However, the current capabilities of the Navy do not allow for the establishment of forward bases or resupply missions. Cooperation between ground and air support elements for riverine operations by Navy/Marine elements in outlying areas is also problematic.

(4) (U) Force Presence/Equipment/Skill Levels. Historically, the GOC has focused the military on the insurgent threat posed by the FARC, the ELN, the EPL, and the M19. Escalating levels of indiscriminate violence by the narcotraffickers have directly challenged the stability of the country, bringing about an increased military involvement in the counternarcotics campaign. Despite this, the GOC understands that the main source of U.S. funding will be directed towards counternarcotics. This distinction between counterinsurgency and counternarcotics is important to understanding the distribution of Colombian military forces and available funding. Counternarcotics emphasis to date has been focused on operations other than maritime and riverine. A substantial portion of the armed forces, especially the COLMAR, is focused on the protection of national assets, such as its populace, oil refineries, oil pipelines, and oil transshipment routes (i.e., the Magdalena River) against attacks from the guerrilla groups. Further, the COLMAR Riverine Force (CRF) is only a small part of COLMAR. Consequently, COLMAR CRF funding is only a small portion of the overall COLNAV budget.

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(5) (U) Operational Constraints. For the most part, COLMAR's current Riverine Combat Elements (RCEs), which are the components of the CRF, are located at major chokepoints on key coastal and inland waterways or are at locations chosen for supportability/sustainment reasons. The lack of road/rail systems throughout the Llanos (northeast) and the Selvas/Amazona (southeast) make land travel difficult. The sheer weight and bulk of the necessary amounts of precursor chemicals make moving them by air difficult and expensive. The river systems are the only means of transportation capable of supporting the movement of chemicals in the amounts needed for the current volume of HCl production. This form of transportation is slower and more vulnerable to interdiction than air transport or even maritime transportation on the open sea, so it is important to have the capability to interdict the contraband before it assumes its lighter, more concealable HCl form. If those systems can be controlled, drug processing and production will decrease or move elsewhere.

4. (U) Operational Concept.

A. (U) USG and Government of Colombia (GOC) mutual counternarcotics objectives will be accomplished by using an operational concept which enhances Colombian military/police capability to exercise effective maritime commerce control both along the coasts, specifically at the major ports, and also on the inland waterways. These objectives also take into account the GOC's priorities in the area of counterinsurgency.

B. (U) These objectives will be implemented through a focus on critical chokepoints, Captains of the Port (COTP), increased surveillance, increased presence, and improved communications. This "Fixed Presence" concept will be complemented by a "Mobile Force" concept, enabling the Colombian military/police to extend commerce control beyond the range of fixed installations, create increased presence and surveillance on major and secondary waterways, conduct and support interdiction operations ranging from unopposed board and search up to and including the projection of combat power ashore from the rivers. The primary focus will be a simultaneous fixed/mobile presence concept. Though a lack of air assets to effectively support a mobile riverine force in the near future may be a factor, the mobile force concept will emphasize extended range operations sustained by larger vessels capable of deploying for longer periods of time. The concept calls for a four boat menu: (1)

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a patrol craft, (2) a command and control vessel, (3) a support vessel with extended range capability, and (4) a coastal patrol craft capable of patrol/interdiction along key coastlines as well as in the mouths and deltas of the larger waterways. The Colombian MROE is complicated by active and violent insurgencies; at times, it is very difficult to differentiate between the narco-traffickers and the insurgents. Often, they are one and the same. Therefore, the Colombian maritime/riverine mission must address counterinsurgency and counternarcotics as overlapping operational concerns. This operational concept is predicated on an overarching emphasis to: (1) build upon existing Colombian military/police capabilities; (2) consider GOC absorption and sustainment realities; (3) focus on low technology, low cost options as a first course of action; (4) take into account GOC priorities (counterinsurgency and counternarcotics); and (5) maintain maximum flexibility to counter the narcotics trafficking infrastructure.

(U) "Fixed Presence" Concept

•• Maritime Commerce Control: This addresses not only law enforcement capabilities, but the legal and diplomatic foundations upon which such enforcement will rest. This will include: (1) diplomatic efforts with neighboring countries followed by greater police/customs liaison and exchanges of information; (2) enactment by the GOC of laws based upon the model OAS legislation establishing an essential precursor chemical regime, including end-user certificates; (3) the establishment of an effective COTP/customs system; and (4) the development of a customs' baseline capability in chemical diversion control, traffic analysis, and random search.

•• Surveillance and Intelligence Collection and Processing. The paucity of information and intelligence within the MROE significantly impedes commerce control and interdiction efforts. Correction of the intelligence shortfalls, concerning trafficking patterns, key indicators regarding local residents such as fuel consumptions and engine repairs (a signal of optempo and usage rates), etc., along the major and secondary river systems will be essential to the conduct of a successful riverine campaign. Such enhancements cannot occur without U.S. involvement and close coordination with the GOC.

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•• Mobile Force Support. Base support for mobile riverine forces will be necessary to provide maintenance and resupply hubs from which mobile operations can be sustained. In addition to these types of support operations, the fixed sites can also provide communications base support, intelligence integration support, ground based training areas for individual and collective training, rehearsals of tactics and techniques, as well as, secure meeting areas for the coordination of air-ground-riverine planning and operations. Though the river systems are vast, COLMAR believes they can be controlled by establishing/reinforcing chokepoints along the 25 major rivers. The Colombians have proven adept at operating the limited number of boats they currently have on the rivers. Since most COLMAR personnel operating the boats are stationed near their homes, they have a great deal of local knowledge of the rivers on which they operate. Up to now, the traffickers have operated with relative impunity on the inland waterways because of the lack of riverine force presence. Establishment of riverine force projection and presence from fixed sites in order to gain control of the rivers constitutes COLMAR's first priority. Projection of combat power ashore is a secondary, albeit important, priority in the maritime/riverine concept of operations.

•• Humanitarian and Civic Action. A well-crafted program of austere, yet meaningful, humanitarian and civic action projects can play an important role in gaining the confidence of the local population. This sense of trust can bear fruit in terms of local intelligence opportunities, as well as establishing the legitimacy of government authority in outlying areas.

(U) "Mobility Forces" Concept

•• Mobile Operations between Fixed Points. To counter attempts by narcotraffickers and other criminal elements to simply avoid the designated COTP areas where police and customs enforcement capabilities are found, a pattern of random riverine patrolling operations must be implemented. The objective is to extend the "presence" of law enforcement authority throughout the waterway systems. In the short term, the concept calls for upgrading existing COLMAR capabilities giving existing RCE's greater potential to project power and presence beyond the fixed sites. An incremental approach will be required, permitting proper absorption by Colombian forces and establishing the appropriate support and maintenance infrastructure to sustain optimum force readiness.

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•• Surveillance and Interdiction (Board and Search). Active pursuit of information via both overt and clandestine surveillance will supplement the intelligence base regarding riverine usage patterns, personalities, and modus operandi of illicit activities.

•• Force Projection and Interdiction (Support and Conduct of Amphibious Assault Operations). Riverine forces must be able to provide amphibious lift and direct combat support to police and/or military forces. Direct combat support can include fire support, resupply, medical evacuation, communications, tactical mobility, reconnaissance from the water, and waterborne blocking forces. Interoperability with counternarcotics ground forces and airmobile elements in terms of communications, procedures, and logistics will be essential.

•• Forward Operating Bases (FOB). To maximize the mobility of the riverine forces and extend their range beyond the normal operating radius, it will be necessary to employ FOBs. These austere facilities will not be of a permanent nature; rather they will be compact (airliftable, manportable, etc.) and tailored to the needs of the operating environment. They are not an end unto themselves but merely a means to extend the mobility of the forces; therefore, their flexibility and overall presence throughout the riverine operating environment. Additionally, FOBs can be employed to extend the range of air assets, whether police or military in the conduct of airmobile or combined airmobile/riverine operations.

•• Humanitarian and Civic Action. As mentioned above, gaining the support of the local populace will be a task of all forces engaged in the counternarcotics campaign. In the case of the mobility forces, this will be more of an ancillary responsibility that must be integrated into a more comprehensive regional plan for the riverine operating environment.

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5. (U) The Strategic Context.

A. (U) Colombia's geography is significantly different than that of any of its Andean neighbors. Its maritime environment includes over 500 miles of coastline on the Pacific Ocean, 600 miles of Atlantic coastline and 25 major rivers with over 500 tributaries. The Amazon network connects Colombian, Bolivian, Brazilian, and Peruvian feeder systems, further complicating transportation interdependence. Colombia possesses four primary river sub-systems, sourced by the Rios Amazon, Orinoco, Magdalena, and Atrato, as well as a number of systems that flow into the Pacific that are of less importance to CN efforts. The land is divided by the Andean Cordillera into coastal plains, and extensive lowlands in the eastern and southeastern provinces. (These provinces lack significant ground transportation systems.)

B. (U) The lack of transportation infrastructure and the existence of extensive areas where government presence is extremely limited have created excellent opportunities for the narco-trafficking organizations to establish clandestine processing, production, and transshipment points. Despite the aggressive efforts of the GOC, to date, Colombia remains the principal producer and exporter of cocaine HCl. The interconnecting waterways with Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, and Brazil are a significant control dilemma for the overtaxed, and ill-prepared, riverine force structure. With more than 88 ports and outlets to both oceans, the maritime security challenge confronted by Colombia is significantly more complex than that encountered by any of its neighbors. Although there is marginal accountability for imported chemicals that can be used for narcotics manufacture at primary coastal ports, there is virtually no accountability once they enter Colombia. As a result, chemicals imported legally are easily diverted for illegal uses. Additionally, chemicals are also introduced through a well-established smuggling network.

C. (U) The maritime commerce control dilemma can not be easily remedied by the provision of Captains of the Port training and equipment. The Colombians themselves recognize the bureaucratic obfuscation that permeates their maritime commerce control regime. Multiple players, i.e., the CNP, the COLNAV, port police, customs administrators, etc., are involved with no clear delineation of specific authorities nor preeminence in particular

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functional areas. This complex problem, one that involves aspects of administration, law, communications, and bureaucratic dynamics, has been recognized as an area of vulnerability by the Colombians. Remedies will not come easily; a focused advisory effort on the part of the Embassy Narcotics Assistance Section (NAS) and the U.S. Coast Guard will be essential. This should not, however, put maritime commerce control operations on the "back-burner" while the bureaucratic mechanics are worked out. There is an urgent requirement to establish a credible presence along critical coastal nodes. A "mobility force" concept capable of deterring narcotics transshipment, conducting surveillance and interdiction, and providing combat support in the coastal environment will generate equipment and skills requirements that differ from those generated by an inland waterway/riverine environment.

D. (U) Colombian riverine forces are in their early stages of development. Their operations consist of a limited number of river patrols and interdiction of smugglers and guerrillas. A comprehensive plan or strategy to guide future operations has only recently been agreed upon. COLMAR forces typically use 13'-17' "assault boats," which are in a poor state of repair, to patrol designated choke points along main rivers. Boardings are conducted only when vessels can be stopped (this is often limited by the speed of the assault craft--approximately 18 knots). There are no efforts to project force ashore in order to seek out and destroy labs; labs are destroyed only if they are located in the immediate vicinity of the river banks. This is because COLMAR is deficient in training and equipment, and because it lacks the capability to bring sufficient manpower to bear in order to defend themselves from heavily armed narcoguerrillas. On-hand support vessels theoretically provide food, water, fuel, ammunition, and shelter for the assault craft, but the poor physical condition of these vessels, as well as draft and speed limitations, limit their usefulness. The Colombian Air Force (COLAF) has provided the Colombian Army (COLAR) with close air support during some counternarcotics operations, but air support for COLNAV/COLMAR riverine missions has been non-existent due to: (1) the remoteness of the operating area, (2) a lack of fuel, (3) and an unwillingness to assign any importance to this mission.

E. (U) The majority of COLMAR assault boats are 6-10 years old and in critical need of repair. Few are operational at any one time due to the adverse conditions under which they operate and the lack of adequate maintenance and logistic support. The same can be said of the

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outboard motors that propel these craft. Up to 40% of the force's outboards are inoperable at any one time. COLNAV does have the expertise and logistics system capable of supporting hull and engine maintenance, and they have recently taken steps to enhance support to the COLMAR in support of counternarcotics effort. Even with proper support, the existing rivercraft are inadequate for the mission. Their slow speed and light armament make them extremely vulnerable to gunfire from shore. Their small size makes them unstable in a chase or fire fight and their slow speed limits their ability to catch many vessels suspected of smuggling precursors or paste/base/HCl. There is a lack of support vessels capable of sustaining patrol and assault craft which are required to travel great distances (i.e., 100-200 miles from base camps or fixed sites).

F. (U) COLMAR funding for fuel is inadequate. In fact, COLMAR units are often forced to request fuel from vessels they escort through hostile territories. This is not a desirable situation, and illustrates a desperate need for increased funding.

G. (U) The Colombian Riverine Force also lacks 4x4 vehicles to tow assault boats to launch sites along rivers and act as supply vehicles for forward fixed sites. With regard to individual clothing and equipment, great improvements have been made as a result of FY 89/90 Section 506(a)(2) drawdowns. However, many COLMAR personnel still lack boots, hammocks with adequate mosquito netting, ammunition, first aid kits, etc..

H. (U) The COLMAR is comprised largely of conscripts. At age 18, every physically qualified male is inducted for 18 months of service. Because of poor living conditions and the high threat present in riverine operations, few Colombian Marines choose to remain in service beyond the standard 18 month enlistment period. With such high turnover, maintaining the necessary levels of skills is difficult. Basic infantry skills, such as marksmanship, small unit tactics, first aid, night operations, and jungle survival as well as ammunition handling and storage training are particularly impacted.

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6. (U) Maritime/Riverine Operating Environments (MROE) and Priorities

A. (U) General. The development of the FY91-FY94 Colombian maritime/riverine program has been the result of a synergistic effort involving the Colombian Navy, the Colombian Marines, the U.S. Country Team, USSOUTHCOM, and the MRRPT. During the visit of the MRRPT in October 1990, the COLNAV/COLMAR presented an action plan delineating operational concepts, operating areas, priorities, and force requirements. The MRRPT later, through the Country Team and USSOUTHCOM representatives, offered a counterproposal. (Note: Both of these options were presented in the 20 November 1990 coordinating draft of this document. They have been eliminated from this final report; only the final concept and priorities as agreed upon by all parties is presented.) The resulting program will emphasize programatic considerations:

(1) Growth of a Colombian riverine capability must be approached from a practical perspective. While accelerated growth may be desirable, the realities of host nation absorptive capabilities, adequate/available manpower, installation support and facilities, and logistical sustainment capabilities argue for a more deliberate approach of gradual enhancement.

(2) The location of Riverine Operating Areas cannot be solely predicated on operational imperatives. Infrastructure availability may, at times, be the determining factor.

(3) The armed capabilities of both Colombian insurgents and narcotraffickers will require that the riverine force be sufficiently armed to handle the threat.

(4) Program development must support and sustain existing assets.

B. (U) This strategy subdivides the navigable waterways used by the narcotraffickers into 4 regions: (1) The Atlantic Region--Rios Magdalena, Cauca, San Jorge, and Atrato; (2) The Pacific Region--Rios San Juan, Patia, Mira, and Baudo; (3) The Southern Region--Rios Putumayo, Caqueta, and Orteguzaza; and (4) The Oriente Region--Rios Inirida, Guaviare,

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Guainia, Ariari, Meta, Orinoco, Vichada, and Arauca. These areas, in turn, have subsequently been prioritized for the establishment of base installation facilities, and integration of these subdivisions into maritime/coastal patrol.

C. (C) The maritime aspects, particularly those of port control and other Captain of the Port activities, still require detailed resolution. The GOC recognizes this vulnerability and is currently studying both bureaucratic and operational impediments to an effective maritime commerce control program.

The assistance of the USG, particularly Coast Guard, Justice, and Customs may prove essential in this process. Until the foundations of an effective port/commerce control system have been laid, it will be difficult to judge the requirements for an increase in force structure. If a greater portion of trafficking can be stopped at these critical nodes, then less resources need be spent chasing traffickers over the vastness of the inland waterways.

D. (C) The riverine program strategy focuses on ten MROEs:

(C) Priority #1 Putumayo River - Puerto Leguizamo MROE:

The Putumayo river separates the Countries of Colombia and Peru. The 220km river is navigable year round. Although one Riverine Combat Element (RCE) is home ported at Leguizamo, its effectiveness is questionable because of maintenance problems. Of 18 hulls available for use by the existing RCE, only two were found operational and only 4-6 others appeared serviceable as of May, 1990. Specific goals include:

- Upgrade the existing fixed base at Puerto Leguizamo.

- Establish maritime control along the Putamayo river.

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- Establish a support vessel to extend the mobile force operational range and enhance their capability for sustained operations.
- Provide combat service support to an existing RCE and to additional RCEs.
- Increase the riverine force projection capability (patrol, interdiction, amphibious assault) from Puerto Leguizamo.

~~(P)~~ Priority #2: Magdalena River - Barrancabermeja MROE

The Magdalena consists of more than 1000km of navigable waterway, and it is the major north-south Fluvial system in Colombia. Extensive maritime commerce flows from the Atlantic Coast, Port of Baranquilla, to numerous sites inland. This major river is paralleled by an extensive network of rail/road/and air lines of communication (LOC). Barrancabermeja is the location of major oil refineries which feeds the main oil pipeline flowing to the coast. Specific goals include:

- Upgrade the existing fixed base at Barrancabermeja.
 - Maritime control, port security by the COLNAV and CNP along the Magdalena.
 - Provide combat service support to the existing RCEs.
 - Establish a support vessel to extend mobile forces operational ranges for sustained operations.
- Expand the capability of the RCE to project force (patrol, interdiction, amphibious assault) from their present capability at the headwaters of the Magdalena, out to the port of Barranquilla.

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(C) Priority #3: Guaviare and Inirida MROEs

Puerto Inirida is a strategic river port located at the juncture of the Rio Guaviare and Rio Inirida in eastern Colombia. Traffic from the Orinoco River (one of the largest, fastest flowing rivers in the world) flowing down river from Brazil and up river from Venezuela is believed to carry large quantities of chemicals used in the production of cocaine to lab sites located inland on the Inirida and Guaviare rivers. In addition, numerous clandestine airstrips have been identified near the rivers. They function as transshipment sites for base/paste being flown in from Peru and HCL being flown north toward the United States. The objective is to increase the capability of the existing RCE at Puerto Inirida to conduct sustained patrol, interdiction, and amphibious assault inland on the Inirida and Guaviare rivers in order to check the flow of illicit chemicals, base, and paste and to strike at the target-rich shoreline (HCL labs and clandestine air strips) located along or near the banks of these major inland waterways. Specific goals include:

- Establish a fixed site at San Jose de Guaviare.
 - Establish a support vessel to provide RCEs with the capability to project combat power ashore for long periods of time.
 - Upgrade combat service support to existing RCE.

~~(C)~~ Priority #4: San Juan River - Malaguita MROE:

The objective is to mesh Pacific coastal/maritime control with inland river interdiction, patrol, and assault capability along the 210 navigable miles of the San Juan River. There is no COLNAV/COLMAR presence on this key waterway, nor is there any effective coastal patrol or COTP capability. Specific goals include:

- Establish a fixed base at Malaguita.

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- Establish a fixed base at Malaguita.
 - Provide combat service support to [REDACTED] CRE. (a) (5)
 - Support maritime control/coastal security at the mouth of the San Juan river and the adjoining Pacific coast line.
- Establish and deploy a mobile force to Malaguita (patrol, interdiction, amphibious assault).
- Establish a Riverine Training School at Malaguita.

(C) Priority #5: Atrato River - Turbo MROE

The objective is to establish control of the Gulf of Uraba and the rivers that flow into it. Specific goals include:

- Upgrade existing fixed base at Turbo.
 - Establish effective maritime/coastal patrol along the Gulf of Uraba and river waterways.
 - Establish COTP at the port of Turbo
 - Provide combat service support to the RCE that enables the riverine force (Patrol, interdiction, assault) to extend their operations up the Atrato River.
- Increase Riverine force projection capability.

(D) Priority #6: Puerto Carreno MROE

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commerce with Venezuela. There is a Naval Base at Carreno with two British made RTK Patrol Boats and one support vessel that have the responsibility for patrolling the 1000km of navigable waterway on the Orinoco and its major tributaries. The objective is to introduce an effective COTP program at Carreno and provide a mobile riverine force capable of sustained operations over extended ranges. Specific goals include:

- Upgrade existing fixed base.
 - Maritime/COTP control at the heavily used port facility.
 - Provide combat service support for COLMAR RCEs.
 - Upgrade support vessel capability to sustain mobile riverine force operations and extend their range south along 270km of the Orinoco and westward along the 800(+)-km of its major inland tributaries.
- Establish a mobile riverine force.

(P) Priority #7: Arauca MROE:

Puerto Arauca is the primary river port on the Arauca river which forms the northeastern border between Colombia and Venezuela and stretches 300 navigable kilometers east to west. One COLMAR RCE and one ill-equipped support vessel are based here. The objective is to increase the mobile riverine force projection capability of the existing RCE. Specific goals include:

- Upgrade existing fixed base.
 - Provide combat service support for [REDACTED] COLMAR RCEs
- Increase mobile riverine force projection capability.

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- Establish an additional RCE to enhance mobile riverine force projection (patrol, interdiction, amphibious assault) capability.

(P) Priority #8: Tumaco MROE

The objective is to integrate Southern Pacific coastal/maritime control with inland river/interdiction, patrol, and assault operations along the 600 navigable miles of the Patia, Mira, and Baudo rivers. There is no COLMAR presence on these inland waterways. COLNAV capability at Tumaco, the coastal port between the mouths of the Patia and Mira rivers, is limited, hindering their ability to perform the important coastal patrol and COTP missions. Existing assets at Tumaco will be used to undertake commerce control at the critical port facility of Tumaco with capabilities to conduct sustained mobile riverine operations on the inland waterways throughout the Tumaco basin area. Specific goals include:

- Upgrade existing fixed base at Tumaco.
 - Establish effective maritime/coastal patrol along the Pacific coast between the mouths of the Patia and Mira rivers.
 - Establish COTP at the port of Tumaco.
 - Provide combat service support to newly established RCEs enabling the patrol craft to extend their range up the Patia, Mira, and Baudo rivers.
- Increase riverine force projection capability.

(P) Priority #9: Puerto Lopez MROE

Puerto Lopez is located on the Meta River, with access to the town of Villavicencio and the tributary river, Rio Upia. Specific goals include:

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- Upgrade fixed base facilities at Puerto Lopez.

- Establish patrols along the Meta River.

- Support joint counternarcotics operations by working with the CNP and COLAR forces in Villavicencio.

- Provide combat service support to the RCE.

- Increase riverine force projection capability.

7. (U) Requirements:

A. (U) The task of the MRRPT, in concert with the combined efforts of the U.S. Mission in Bogota and the Staff of the Colombian Chief of Naval Operations, was to validate requirements for the current program and to identify/justify requirements for outyear programs. Equipment needs have been addressed in terms of operational capabilities, force structure and packaging that account for the required equipment densities, training, and organizational and management imperatives.

B. (U) Equipment Requirements

(1) (U) Communications: Current on-hand equipment provides effective communications between (COLNAV/COLMAR) headquarters in Bogota and the existing 11 (eleven) Riverine Combat Elements and Riverine Bases throughout the country. Communications with Bogota are conducted via HF or microwave telephone system. The majority of communications between patrol boats and support vessels with fixed base sites is accomplished with VHF-FM non-secure PRC-77's. A need exists to upgrade internal command and control, intelligence, and logistics communications between mobile forces and their supporting fixed or forward operating base as they are subject to intercept by known listening and DF posts operated by the narco-traffickers. Internal communications within the RCEs will require

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operated by the narcotraffickers. Internal communications within the RCEs will require additional HF and VHF capabilities to effect craft to craft, craft to ground forces, and craft to air forces communications.

(2) (U) Riverine Craft:

- **Patrol Craft (PC):** Shallowdraft, reinforced hull (due to river hazards and beaching for assault operations); twin outboard motors (at least 140 HP each for "on-step" acceleration to break contact, system redundancy, and maintainability); trailer compatible; C-130 transportable; forward mounted MK-19, .50 cal MG, or M-60 MG or equivalent; 100 nautical mile operating radius, lift capability of 8-10 Marines and 2 crew members; overhead canopy (for environmental protection); HF/VHF communications suite; Global Positioning System (GPS); 20-25 ft.; 2 yr. spare parts package.

- **Inflatable Raiding Craft (IRC):** Light-weight (manportable by 6-man COLMAR element); 25 HP outboard motor (manportable); capable of transporting 6 personnel with individual equipment and an additional 300 lbs. of supplies/ammo/demo; black in color, reinforced latex or similar non-rubber material; transportable by UH-1H; small light-weight fuel bladders; repair kit, pumps, and accessories; (purpose: force projection from support vessels/helos into narrow/shallow tributaries inaccessible by patrol/assault craft).

- **Indigenous River Craft (IC):** Locally produced/obtained (to facilitate their blending with indigenous craft); high freeboard; 25 HP outboard motor; small light-weight fuel bladders; (purpose: surveillance/intelligence collection and clandestine activities along the waterways).

- **Support Vessel (SV):** Capable of sustaining 15-20 days of underway operations, while supporting up to 3 PC and 1 Command and Control Boat (CCB); capacities should include up to 45K liters of MOGAS for PC resupply, and 30K liters of diesel for self-support of support vessel and support of CCB craft; draft no greater than 5ft; sustained operating speed of 7-10 knots with single or dual screw diesel propul-

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modified LCM-6 or LCM-8 as COLNAV possess capability to modify basic hulls as necessary).

- **Command & Control/Boat (CCB):** Two ft. draft; twin diesel; 400km range; armament: two .50 cal MGs, M-60 MG or equivalent, and MK-19; 5 crew, 10 COLMAR; night vision capability; HF/VHF communication package; GPS; RADAR; trailer-compatible; C-130 transportable; tools and repair kit; 2 year spare parts package; approximately 30-35 ft in length; capable of operating in both rivers and river mouths.

- **Coastal Patrol/Large River Craft (CPC):** Aluminum; "V" Hull; 28-36 ton displacement; 1800 gal fuel capacity; 5 man crew; 100 gal potable water capability; diesel; generator, HF/VHF communications package; magnetic compass; RADAR; armament: 2 .50 cal and 3 M-60 or equivalent; (purpose: craft would operate along the coast near bases at the mouths of major inland waterways and on larger interior inland waterways to conduct patrol, interdiction operations as required). Two similar craft (PB MK3) were given to COLNAV under terms of 506(a) drawdown of 1989.

(3) (U) **Forward Area Rearm and Refuel Packages (FARRP):** Small, light-weight tactical packages to enable COLMAR elements to establish hasty intermediate supply points along the waterways in order to extend the range of patrol/assault craft and increase flexibility of resupply in addition to the use of support vessels. Package includes tentage, canvas tarpaulin, ammo, fuel, food and fuel containers/bladders, hand pumps, 3kw generator, lightweight light set, and man packable HF/VHF communications. Package would be deployable from support vessel, helo, or patrol assault craft.

C. (U) **Forces Structure Requirements and Equipment Densities:** Proposed distribution of maritime/riverine assets by geographic location is contained in the following charts. They also project the FY91 through FY94 procurement schedule for filling out the force structure requirement.

COLOMBIA Riverine Program

	Riverine Operating Areas								Totals					
	Puerto Leguizamo	Barrancabermeja	Malaguita	San Jose de Guaviare	Puerto Ininda	Turbo	Puerto Carreno	Arauca	Tumaco	Puerto Lopez	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94
FY91 Riverine Program Objectives:														
• Establish a continuous presence/surveillance on the Magdalena and Putumayo waterways;														
• Conduct and support interdiction operations;														
• Extend riverine operations beyond fixed installation ranges (75-100 mi);														
• Initiate site establishment/upgrade to support projected FY92 force structure enhancements														
Equipment/Activity														
• Riverine Combat Element (approx 100 HN personnel ea)	2	2									4			
• Patrol Craft (military specifications) <i>Note #1</i>	10	10									20			
• Patrol Craft (non-military specifications) <i>Note #2</i>		6									6			
• Patrol Craft parts and sustainment package (spares)		1									1			
• Command and Control Boat <i>Note #3</i>	2	7									9			
• Command and Control Boat parts and sustainment package											0			
• Support Vessel <i>Note #4</i>	1										1			
• Support Vessel parts and sustainment package											0			
• Inflatable Raiding Craft	2										2			
• Inflatable Raiding Craft parts and sustainment package											0			
• Indigenous Craft <i>Note #5</i>	2										2			
• Patrol Boat Riverine (PBR) parts/sustainment package <i>Note #6</i>		1									1			
• Forward Area Rearm and Refuel Package (FARRP) <i>Note #7</i>	1										1			
• FARRP parts and sustainment package											0			
continued														

#1 Four (4) patrol craft will deploy from each location to San Jose de Guaviare upon completion of the FY92 SJG facility upgrade; #2 "Guardian" craft acquired through FY 90 506A to be used as training platforms; #3 Nine (9) tentatively to be purchased via Ex/Im, with FMFP as contingency source. Puerto Leguizamo and Barrancabermeja are the only sites capable of absorbing/sustaining these craft in FY 91; #4 COLNAV will have hull and superstructure constructed locally. FMFP will be used to provide accessories and support equipment; #5 COLNAV acquires craft locally. FMFP provides engines and parts/sustainment; #6 Supports five (5) PBRs acquired through FY 89 506A; #7 Includes fuel bladders, pumps, tarpaulins, and tenting.

Legend: Numbers in BOLD FACE are current year; Numbers in () are previous year(s) total.

DISCLAIMER: Above figures do NOT account for attrition or combat loss.

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COLOMBIA Riverine Program
FY 91 continued **FY 91 continued**

	Riverine Operating Areas								Totals						
	Puerto Leguizamo	Barrancabermeja	Malaguita	San Jose de Guaviare	Puerto Inrida	Turbo	Puerto Carreno	Arauca	Tumaco	Puerto Lopez	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94	
FY91 Riverine Program Objectives: • Establish a continuous presence/surveillance on the Magdalena and Putumayo waterways; • Conduct and support interdiction operations; • Extend riverine operations beyond fixed installation ranges (75-100 mi); • Initiate site establishment/upgrade to support projected FY92 force structure enhancements	20	20									40				
Equipment/Activity • Weapons • M-60 MG for Patrol Craft (mill spec) • M-60 MG for Patrol Craft (non-mill spec) • M-60 MG for Command and Control Boat • MK-19 for Command and Control Boat • Weapons parts and sustainment package • Communications Suite HF/VHF (for Patrol Craft) • Base Station Communications HF/VHF Note #8 • Communications parts and sustainment package Note #9 • Vehicles (4x4) • Vehicles (4x4) parts and sustainment package • Construction (Site Establishment and/or Support) • Coastal Patrol Craft (CPC) Note #10 • CPC parts and sustainment package	4	6	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	6	2	2	6	0
	2	7									9	0			26
	10	16									2	2			4
	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1			1
	1	1									4	0			0

#8 Provides operational base secure communications to higher headquarters (Bogota) and to Riverine Combat Forces and supporting vessels; #9 Sustains FY 89 & 90 acquisitions under 506A, EDA, and FMFP; #10 Patrol and interdiction along key coastlines as well as in the mouths and deltas of larger waterways (to be used by COLNAV and integrated with Captains of the Port system).

Legend: Numbers in BOLD FACE are current year;
 Numbers in () are previous year(s) total.

DISCLAIMER: Above figures do NOT account for attrition or combat loss.

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COLOMBIA Riverine Program

Totals

FY92 Riverine Program Objectives:	Riverine Operating Areas							Totals					
	Barrancabermeja	Malagulia	San Jose de Guaviare	Puerto Inrida	Turbo	Puerto Carreno	Arauca	Tumaco	Puerto Lopez	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue/sustain FY 91 Riverine Program Objectives; • Establish a continuous presence/surveillance on the Guaviare/Atari, Inrida, Uraba/Atrato, and San Juan/Baudo waterways; • Establish COLNAV/COLMAR Riverine Combat School at Malagulia; • Maintain effective installation support and maintenance readiness at the 6 primary operating sites; initiate site establishment/upgrade to support projected FY93 force structure enhancements. 													
Equipment/Activity													
• Riverine Combat Element (approx 100 HN personnel ea)	(2)	(2)								(4)	+6		
• Patrol Craft (military specifications) Note #1	(6)	(6)								(20)	+12		
• Patrol Craft (non-military specifications) Note #2		(6)								(6)	+1		
• Patrol Craft parts and sustainment package (spares)	(2)	(7)								(1)	+3		
• Command and Control Boat										0			
• Command and Control Boat parts and sustainment package	(1)									(1)	+1		
• Support Vessel Note #3	1									0	+1		
• Support Vessel parts and sustainment package	(2)									(2)	+4		
• Inflatable Raiding Craft	1									0	+1		
• Inflatable Raiding Craft parts and sustainment package	(2)									(2)	+4		
• Indigenous Craft Note #4		(1)								(1)	+1		
• Patrol Boat Riverine (PBR) parts/sustainment package Note #5	(1)									(1)	+3		
• Forward Area Rearm and Refuel Package (FARRP)	1									0	+1		
• FARRP parts and sustainment package Note #6													

continued

#1 Eight (8) craft deploy from Puerto Leguizamo and Barrancabermeja to San Jose de Guaviare; #2 "Guardian" craft acquired through FY 90 506A to be used as training platforms; #3 COLNAV will have full and superstructure constructed locally. FMFP will be used to provide accessories and support equipment; #4 COLNAV acquires craft locally. FMFP provides engines and parts/sustainment; #5 Supports five (5) PBRs acquired through FY 89 506A; #6 Replacement fuel bladders, pumps, etc.

Legend: Numbers in BOLD FACE are current year; Numbers in () are previous year(s) total.

DISCLAIMER: Above figures do NOT account for attrition or combat loss.

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COLOMBIA Riverine Program

Equipment/Activity	Riverine Operating Areas							Totals						
	Puerto Leguizamo	Barrancabermeja	Malaguilla	San Jose de Guaviare	Puerto Inrida	Turbo	Puerto Carrero	Arauca	Tumaco	Puerto Lopez	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Weapons .. M-60 MG for Patrol Craft (mil spec) .. M-60 MG for Patrol Craft (non-mil spec) .. M-60 MG for Command and Control Boat .. MK-19 for Command and Control Boat .. Weapons parts and sustalment package Communications Suite HF/VHF (for Patrol Craft) Base Station Communications HF/VHF Note #7 Communications parts and sustalment package Note #8 Vehicles (4x4) Vehicles (4x4) parts and sustalment package Construction (Site Establishment and/or Support) Coastal Patrol Craft (CPC) CPC parts and sustalment package 	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(40)	+24		
	(4)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)	+6		
	(2)	(7)	(7)	(7)	(7)	(7)	(7)	(7)	(7)	(7)	(9)	+3		
	(6)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(26)	+12		
	(11)	(11)	(11)	(11)	(11)	(11)	(11)	(11)	(11)	(11)	(2)	+2		
	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(6)	+6		
	(11)	(11)	(11)	(11)	(11)	(11)	(11)	(11)	(11)	(11)	0	+6		
											(4)	+6		
											(1)	+2		

FY92 Riverine Program Objectives:

- Continue/sustain FY 91 Riverine Program Objectives:
- Establish a continuous presence/surveillance on the Guaviare/Arial, Inrida, Uraba/Airato, and San Juan/Baudo waterways;
- Establish COLNAV/COLMAR Riverine Combat School at Malaguilla;
- Maintain effective installation support and maintenance readiness at the 6 primary operating sites; initiate site establishment/upgrade to support projected FY93 force structure enhancements.

#7 Provides operational base secure communications to higher headquarters (Bogota) and to Riverine Combat Forces and supporting vessels; #8 Supports/sustains FY 90/91 acquisitions - Puerto Leguizamo, Barrancabermeja, San Jose de Guaviare, and Malaguilla Base Station communications packages.

Legend: Numbers in BOLD FACE are current year; Numbers in () are previous year(s) total.

DISCLAIMER: Above figures do NOT account for attrition or combat loss.

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FY 93

COLOMBIA Riverine Program

FY 93

Totals

Equipment/Activity	Riverine Operating Areas							Totals						
	Puerto Leguizamo	Barrancabermeja	Malagueta	San Jose de Guaviare	Puerto Inrida	Turbo	Puerto Carreno	Arauca	Tumaco	Puerto Lopez	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Riverine Program Objectives: Continue/sustain FY 91 & 92 Riverine Program Objectives; Establish a continuous presence/surveillance on the Arauca, Mira/Paila, Meta, waterways and the Orinoco chokepoint at Puerto Carreno; Maintain effective installation support and maintenance readiness at the 10 primary operating sites. 	(2)	(2)									(4)	(6)	+4	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Riverine Combat Element (approx 100 HN personnel ea) Patrol Craft (military specifications) Note #1 Patrol Craft (non-military specifications) Patrol Craft parts and sustainment package (spares) Command and Control Boat Command and Control Boat parts and sustainment package Support Vessel Note #2 Support Vessel parts and sustainment package Inflatable Raiding Craft Note #3 Inflatable Raiding Craft parts and sustainment package Indigenous Craft Patrol Boat Riverline (PBR) parts and sustainment package Forward Area Rearm and Refuel Package (FARRP) FARRP parts and sustainment package 	(6)	(6)									(20)	(12)	+10	
	1	(2)									(6)	(1)	+3	
											(9)	(3)	+2	
											0	0		
	(1)										(1)	(1)	+1	
	(1)										0	(1)	+2	
	(2)										(2)	(4)	+6	
	(1)										0	(1)	+3	
	(2)										(2)	(4)	+4	
	(1)										(1)	(1)	+1	
	(1)										(1)	(3)	+2	
	(1)										0	(1)	+4	

#1 Two (2) patrol craft will permanently deploy from the San Juan de Guaviare base to Puerto Carreno; #2 COLNAV will have hull and superstructure constructed locally. FMFP will be used to provide accessories and support equipment; #3 Replaces inflatable craft acquired in FY91, anticipated two year serviceable life cycle.

DISCLAIMER: Above figures do NOT account for attrition or combat loss.

Legend: Numbers in **BOLD FACE** are current year; Numbers in () are previous year(s) total.

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COLOMBIA Riverine Program

FY 93 continued

Equipment/Activity	Riverine Operating Areas						Totals							
	Puerto Leguizamo	Barrancabermeja	Malaguita	San Jose de Guaviare	Puerto Inirida	Turbo	Puerto Carrero	Arauca	Tumaco	Puerto Lopez	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Weapons .. M-60 MG for Patrol Craft (mil spec) .. M-60 MG for Patrol Craft (non-mil spec) .. M-60 MG for Command and Control Boat .. MK-19 for Command and Control Boat .. Weapons parts and sustainment package Note #3 Communications Suite HF/VHF (for Patrol Craft) Base Station Communications HF/VHF Communications parts and sustainment package Note #4 Vehicles (4x4) Vehicles (4x4) parts and sustainment package Note #5 Construction (Site Establishment and/or Support) Coastal Patrol Craft (CPC) CPC parts and sustainment package Note #3 	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(40)	(24)	+20	
	(4)	(6)	(14)	(7)	1	(6)	(2)	1	(2)	(2)	(6)	(6)	+4	
	(2)	(7)	(2)	1	(12)	(2)	(2)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(9)	(3)	+2	
	1	(5)	(2)	1	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	0	0	+3	
	(6)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(26)	(12)	+10	
	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	+2	
	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(6)	(4)	+6	
	1	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	0	0	+6	
	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(4)	(6)	+10	
											(1)	(2)	+2	
													+1	

#3 To support/sustain FY 91 acquisition (issue normally includes 2-3 year spare parts package); #4 To support/sustain FY 90-92 acquisitions (issue normally includes a 2-3 year spare parts package); Puerto Leguizamo, Barrancabermeja, San Jose de Guaviare, Matagulla, Turbo, Puerto Inirida, 42 Patrol Craft, 14 CCBs, and 3 SVs; #5 To support/sustain FY 90-92 acquisitions (issue normally includes a 2-3 year spare parts package);

Legend: Numbers in BOLD FACE are current year; Numbers in () are previous year(s) total.

DISCLAIMER: Above figures do NOT account for attrition or combat loss.

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COLOMBIA Riverine Program

FY 94

Totals

Equipment/Activity	Riverine Operating Areas							Totals						
	Puerto Leguizamo	Barrancabermeja	Malaguita	San Jose de Guaviare	Puerto Inrida	Turbo	Puerto Carrero	Arauca	Tumaco	Puerto Lopez	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Riverine Program Objectives: Continue/sustain FY 91, 92, & 93 Riverine Program Objectives; Maintain effective installation support and maintenance readiness at 10 primary operating sites. 	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(4)	(6)	(4)	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Riverine Combat Element (approx 100 HN personnel ea) Patrol Craft (military specifications) Patrol Craft (non-military specifications) Patrol Craft parts and sustainment package (spares) Command and Control Boat Command and Control Boat parts and sustainment package Support Vessel Note #1 Support Vessel parts and sustainment package Inflatable Raiding Craft Note #2 Inflatable Raiding Craft parts and sustainment package Indigenous Craft Patrol Boat Riverine (PBR) parts and sustainment package Forward Area Ream and Refuel Package (FARRP) FARRP parts and sustainment package 	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(20)	(12)	(10)	
	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)
	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0
	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)
	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(2)	(4)	(6)	(4)
	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	0	(1)	(3)	(1)
	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(4)	(4)	(2)
	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(3)	(2)	(1)
	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	0	(1)	(4)	(4)
														+6
														+9
														+1
														+3
														+4
														+5
														+2
														+1
														+1
														+6

#1 COLNAV will have hull and superstructure constructed locally. FMFP will be used to provide accessories and support equipment; #2 Replaces inflatable craft acquired in FY91, anticipated two year serviceable life cycle.

Legend: Numbers in **BOLD FACE** are current year; Numbers in () are previous year(s) total.

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DISCLAIMER: Above figures do NOT account for attrition or combat loss.

FY 94 continued .

COLOMBIA Riverine Program

FY 94 continued

- FY94 Riverine Program Objectives:**
- Continue/sustain FY 91, 92, & 93 Riverine Program Objectives;
 - Maintain effective installation support and maintenance readiness at the 10 primary operating sites.

Equipment/Activity

- Weapons
 - .. M-60 MG for Patrol Craft (mil spec)
 - .. M-60 MG for Patrol Craft (non-mil spec)
 - .. M-60 MG for Command and Control Boat
 - .. MK-19 for Command and Control Boat
 - .. Weapons parts and sustainment package
- Communications Suite HF/VHF (for Patrol Craft)
- Base Station Communications HF/VHF
- Communications parts and sustainment package Note #3
- Vehicles (4x4)
- Vehicles (4x4) parts and sustainment package Note #4
- Installation Support
- Coastal Patrol Craft (CPC)
- CPC parts and sustainment package Note #5

Totals

	Puerto Leguizamo	Barrancabermeja	San Jose de Guaviare	Puerto Inrida	Turbo	Puerto Carrero	Arauca	Tumaco	Puerto Lopez	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94
Weapons	(12)	(12)								(40)	(24)	(20)	
M-60 MG for Patrol Craft (mil spec)		(6)								(6)	(6)	(4)	
M-60 MG for Patrol Craft (non-mil spec)	(4)	(14)								(18)	(3)	(2)	
M-60 MG for Command and Control Boat	(2)	(7)								(9)	0	(3)	+6
MK-19 for Command and Control Boat	(11)	(11)								0	(12)	(10)	
Weapons parts and sustainment package	(6)	(12)								(26)	(2)	(2)	
Communications Suite HF/VHF (for Patrol Craft)		(31)								(2)	(4)	(6)	+10
Base Station Communications HF/VHF		(2)								(6)	0	(6)	+2
Communications parts and sustainment package Note #3	(31)	(2)								0	(6)	(10)	+9
Vehicles (4x4)		(11)								(4)	(2)	(2)	+10
Vehicles (4x4) parts and sustainment package Note #4		(31)								(1)	(2)	(1)	+1
Installation Support													+3
Coastal Patrol Craft (CPC)													
CPC parts and sustainment package Note #5													

#3 To support/sustain FY 90-92 acquisitions (Issue normally includes a 2-3 year spare parts package): Puerto Leguizamo, Barrancabermeja, San Jose de Guaviare, Malaguilla, Turbo, Puerto Inrida, Puerto Carrero, Tumaco, 42 Patrol Craft, 14 CCBs, and 3 SVs; #4 To support/sustain FY 90-92 acquisitions (Issue normally includes a 2-3 year spare parts package); #5 To support/sustain FY 91 & 92 acquisition (Issue normally includes 2-3 year spare parts package); actual assignment site may change based on FY 93 threat assessments.

Legend: Numbers in BOLD FACE are current year; Numbers in () are previous year(s) total.

DISCLAIMER: Above figures do NOT account for attrition or combat loss.

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IV. PERU

1. (U) BACKGROUND

A. (U) Peru produces about 55% of the world's coca leaf and is the center for three production stages: leaf cultivation, paste production, and base processing. Although cocaine HCl has been processed at sites in Peru, most paste and base is transported to HCl processing sites in Colombia. The principal means of transportation of paste and base is by aircraft, while the extensive river network provides the secondary means. Precursor chemicals enter Peru primarily through its vast river networks and its major ports. Kerosene, a major staple of the Peruvian economy used for cooking and heating, is produced locally in readily available quantities and diverted for illicit use in the first stages of cocaine processing. The Peruvian drug trade in the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV) is often marked by violence as narcotraffickers and insurgents eliminate rivals, uncooperative police, and other government officials. There is virtually no government infrastructure or control in the areas in which the drug traffickers operate.

B. (U) The Sendero Luminoso (SL), or the "Shining Path" insurgency, is deeply involved in controlling the nodes of narcotics movement in the UHV. The SL has been able to exploit the lack of government control to create a lawless environment conducive to their interests. The SL has been successful in interposing itself between the coca cultivators and Peruvian and Colombian narcotraffickers. The guerillas have also been known to conduct joint operations with the narcotraffickers.

C. (U) Lines of Communication within the country are difficult to control. The principal air corridor is between the UHV and southern Colombia. There are as many as 100 registered and unregistered air strips in the UHV alone; more than a dozen air strips exist in the Ene Tambo river valley between Puerto Ocopa and the confluence with the Rio Mantaro. There are few roads; the Carretera Marginal serves as the main land artery in the UHV, and only the first 56 of its 328 kilometers are paved. It is used for virtually all overland transport of precursor chemicals, coca paste and base. Although sufficient intelligence to evaluate the volume of illicit trafficking is lacking, it is known that the majority occurs on the

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Huallaga, Ucayali, and Ene rivers, and that the most widely used craft is the dugout canoe with a small outboard motor. Approximately two thirds of Peru's coca products originate in the UHV. The river port of Iquitos is a critical traffic node in the Amazon region. As such, it is a major transshipment site for coca products and precursor chemicals. The port of Callao in Lima has significant international transport facilities, and is used by narcotraffickers to move their products on commercial shipping and airlines. Additional smuggling, in both narcotics and other contraband, originates in the northern ports of Chimbote and Paitia.

D. (C) The control of rivers, ports, and lakes is the responsibility of the Peruvian Coast Guard. An organic unit of the Navy, its mandate is to control illicit activity on the waterways. Its forces are underequipped (24 patrol boats), and they are usually augmented by regular Navy units on such rivers as the Amazon and Ucayali. The Marines are tasked with installation security and counterinsurgency. At COTP activities such as Yurimaguas and Pucallpa, companies of marines are deployed to provide ground support. The Peruvian Navy and Marine Corps are heavily engaged in suppressing two active insurgencies. Much of Peru remains under military control in a series of emergency zones. The Peruvian Navy and Marine Corps have not accepted U.S. counternarcotics military assistance in the form of Foreign Military Financed (FMF) equipment, training, and operational support for use in counternarcotics efforts. Another complication is the fact that the Peruvian National Police (PNP) are prohibited from operating on the rivers without the prior consent of the Peruvian Navy. At this time, there is no GOP commitment to a policy of preventing the flow of illicit commerce on its inland waterways. Without this commitment, the development of a viable concept of operations is unlikely.

E. (U) The limited analysis that follows does not address the future requirements necessary to accomplish Peruvian riverine objectives as outlined in the Andean Strategy Counternarcotics Implementation Plan for the following reasons:

- No GOP/USG mutual goals exist.

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- The GOP does not actively support a riverine counternarcotics assistance program; its Navy and Marines are primarily concerned with combatting insurgency, and the National Police have no riverine responsibility or authority.
- There is no integrated Peruvian national policy for combatting narcotics trafficking and active insurgencies.
- The U.S. and Peruvian military relationship is tenuous in the absence of a signed military aid agreement.

Consequently, this analysis can only present an operational concept applied in a strategic context that is limited to considerations of: (1) the environment encountered in Peru in terms of geographic and topographic realities, and (2) known patterns and facts about the narcotics trafficking infrastructure. This operational concept, developed by the Country Team, focuses on an incremental, focused approach.

2. ~~(S)~~ COUNTRY GOALS.

A. ~~(S)~~ Implementing objectives established by the U.S. mission in Peru and approved by the Deputies Committee are:

(1) ~~(S)~~ Isolate Key Coca Growing Areas.

- Develop a riverine force within the Peruvian Navy/Marines/Police capable of conducting sustained patrol, interdiction, amphibious assault, and maritime control/Captain of the Port (COTP) operations.


(2) ~~(S)~~ Block the Shipment of Key Essential Chemicals.

- Establish controls along major river routes and chokepoints with Marine and Navy riverine forces.

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- Assist the Peruvian Navy in establishing a presence on the major river routes, especially on the Huallaga and Ucayali Rivers.
- Establish tactical riverine communications nets and provide necessary boat-to-boat, boat-to-shore, and boat-to-air communications training.
- Provide Peruvian riverine forces with the capability to conduct direct action and other combat missions.

(3) ~~(S)~~ Destroy Labs and Processing Centers.

- Expand joint DEA/Peruvian National Police (PNP) riverine counternarcotics operations. 
- Train Peruvian Marines to provide security for police operations in a riverine environment.
- Train Peruvian Navy/Marines to project force ashore against armed narcotraffickers, narcoguerrillas, and labs.
- Train and equip Peruvian Air Force, PNP, and Navy units for joint riverine counternarcotics operations.

B. ~~(S)~~



- Provide operational mobility and amphibious assault capability to the Peruvian Navy and Marines.

C. (U) These objectives have yet to be articulated by the Country Team in clear mission statements which could provide the basis for a comprehensive Peruvian riverine operational concept. A lack of bilateral agreement between the USG and the GOP on objectives, priorities, and implementation procedures has hindered the development of a cohesive maritime/riverine strategy. A concept, determined by the U.S. Country Team as being both obtainable and prudent, is discussed later in this chapter.

3. (U) MARITIME/RIVERINE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT (MROE).

A. (U) Natural: The absence of a well-developed road system makes water transportation an important part of the narcotics transportation infrastructure. The more than 8000 miles of river are used extensively to move precursor chemicals for the production of paste and its eventual transfer to one of the hundreds of clandestine airstrips for further shipment to Colombia. The Rio Ucayali, Peru's largest, flows north more than 570 miles and feeds into the Amazon just south of Iquitos. Its average width is 800 meters and its depth ranges from 1.5 meters to 26 meters. The Rio Ucayali is one of three rivers feeding the Amazon; the other two are the Rios Marañon and Napo. Although the latter two are smaller and shorter, they are both important to narcotraffickers as a means of shipping illicit chemicals and products. Distribution of chemicals and paste also occurs on the 400 mile long Huallaga River. Movement of coca paste by small boat and dugout canoes is a common practice along this river. Other rivers of interest are the Rio Yavari, which forms part of the eastern boundary of Peru with Brazil, and the Rio Putumayo which forms Peru's northeastern border with Colombia.

B. (U) Manmade: The absence of roads in the drainage basin of the Amazon jungle dictates the important role the rivers play in Peruvian commerce and transportation. The lack of maritime commerce control makes travel along the rivers dangerous. Corrupt security forces confiscate property from those not powerful enough to influence or threaten them

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personally. In addition to the threat of corrupt officials, insurgents have a history of seeking to control river commerce by collecting tolls. Campesinos who bear the brunt of this burden have little to lose by giving support to these guerrillas. Finally, narcotraffickers use the rivers regularly and are often subject to the tariffs imposed by insurgents. The power and wealth of each group dictates the vantage it will command in using a waterway. In areas of Peru where the insurgents are prone to violence and the narcotraffickers lack the firepower to challenge them, the tolls are paid.

4. (U) OPERATIONAL CONCEPT.

A. (U) USG and Government of Peru (GOP) mutual counternarcotics objectives can only be met through a maritime/riverine operational concept which not only provides for an effective counternarcotics effort, but also takes into account the Peruvian Navy's priorities in the areas of counterinsurgency operations and commerce control.

B. (U) Three functions can be implemented through a focus on critical areas: Captains of the Port (COTP), increased surveillance, and improved communications. A "fixed presence" concept could be complemented by a "mobile force" concept, enabling the Peruvian Navy to extend its control beyond the range of fixed installations, increase their presence on major and secondary waterways, and conduct interdiction and river force projection operations in support of Civil Guard counternarcotics operations within designated River Operating Areas (ROAs). The Peruvian MROE, however, is complicated by two active and violent insurgencies. The riverine mission in Peru must therefore address counterinsurgency and counternarcotics as overlapping concerns. This operational concept is predicated on an overarching emphasis to: (1) build upon existing Peruvian Navy capabilities; (2) consider GOP absorption and sustainment realities; (3) focus on low-technology, low-cost options; (4) take into account GOP priorities (counterinsurgency and commerce control), which complement the counternarcotics priority; and (5) maintain maximum flexibility to counter the narcotics trafficking infrastructure.

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(U) "Fixed Presence" Concept

•• (U) Surveillance and Intelligence Collection and Processing: The lack of information and viable intelligence within the MROE significantly impedes commerce control and interdiction efforts. Correction of the intelligence shortfalls concerning trafficking patterns, and key indicators regarding local residents such as fuel consumption and engine repairs (an indication of optempo and usage rates), etc., along the major and secondary river systems will be essential to the conduct of a successful riverine campaign. Such an enhancement cannot occur without U.S. involvement and close coordination with the GOP.

•• (U) Mobile Force Support: Base support for mobile riverine forces will be necessary to provide maintenance and resupply hubs from which mobile operations can be sustained. Potential sites for fixed bases in support of mobile riverine force projection include Iquitos, an ocean-type port on the Amazon, Yurimaguas at the headwaters of the Marañon, and Pucallpa, a primary port on the Ucayali River and transshipment point for narcotics products. In addition to these types of support operations, the fixed sites can also provide communications and intelligence integration support, as well as secure sites for coordination of air-ground-riverine planning, training, and operations.

•• (U) Humanitarian and Civic Action: Adherence to internationally held standards of human rights should be an important aspect of Peruvian riverine operations. The unsatisfactory human rights record, while less of a concern with the Peruvian Navy than with other branches of the Armed Forces and PNP, is a potential problem which must be addressed through a thorough effort to gain popular support for counternarcotics efforts. A well-crafted program of austere, yet meaningful, humanitarian and civic action projects can play an important role in gaining the confidence of the local population. This sense of trust can bear fruit in terms of local intelligence opportunities, as well as establishing the legitimacy of government authority in outlying areas.

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(U) "Mobility Forces" Concept

•• (U) Mobile Operations between Fixed Points: To counter attempts by narcotraffickers and other criminal elements to simply avoid the designated COTP areas where police and customs forces operate, a pattern of random riverine patrolling must be implemented. The objective is to extend the "presence" of law enforcement authority throughout key waterways.

•• (U) Surveillance and Interdiction (Board and Search): Active pursuit of information via both overt and clandestine surveillance will supplement the intelligence base regarding river usage patterns, personalities, and modus operandi of narcotraffickers.

•• (U) Force Projection and Interdiction (Support and Conduct of Amphibious Assault Operations): Riverine forces must be able to provide amphibious lift and direct combat support to police and/or military forces conducting counternarcotics operations against targets near water. Direct combat support can include fire support, resupply, medical evacuation, communications, tactical mobility, reconnaissance from the water, and waterborne blocking forces. Interoperability with counternarcotics ground forces and airmobile elements in terms of communications, procedures, and logistics will be essential.

•• (U) Forward Operating Bases (FOB): To maximize the mobility of the riverine forces, i.e., extending their range beyond the normal boat operating radius, it will be necessary to employ FOBs. These austere facilities will not be permanent in nature; rather they will be compact (airliftable, manportable, etc.) and tailored to the requirements of the operating environment. They are not an end unto themselves but merely a means to extend the mobility of the forces, and, thereby, increase their flexibility and overall presence throughout the maritime/riverine operating environment.

Additionally, FOBs can be employed to extend the range of air assets, police or military, in the conduct of airmobile or combined airmobile/riverine operations.

•• (U) Humanitarian and Civic Action: As mentioned above, gaining popular support will be a task of all forces engaged in the counternarcotics campaign. In the case of the mobility forces, this will be more of an ancillary responsibility that must be integrated into a more comprehensive regional plan for the riverine operating environment.

C. ~~_____~~

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conceptual planning should be firmly rooted in an appreciation for what is realistic versus what is desirable, and it should avoid resource intensive solutions. Incremental incentives should be used so that GOP sincerity, proper utilization of any training and equipment provided, and overall operational effectiveness can be gauged. Follow-on assistance should be tied to the record of performance in these areas.

5. (U) THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT.

(U) The most vulnerable node of cocaine production is the collection and movement of base and paste from the growing regions in the UHV to the HCI laboratories in Colombia. Though the bulk of base/paste may be transported by aircraft from both clandestine as well as registered airfields in the UHV, rivers provide a less rapid transportation alternative but one that can be used during all weather conditions. In addition, rivers are used to introduce the bulky precursor chemicals into the environment. The Peruvian Navy/Marines mission must be expanded to include denial of the use of river systems to drug traffickers. River access must be controlled through patrolling and maintenance of choke/check points. The result of this effort should be a constriction of the flow of coca paste/base which is being transported on the rivers, and the seizure of precursor chemicals destined for processing facilities.

6. (C) MARITIME/RIVERINE OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS AND PRIORITIES.

Recognizing the limitations of the current political-military situation, the Country Team has proposed an austere initial plan that will focus U.S. assistance on commerce control [REDACTED]. Fundamentally, a Captains of the Port revitalization approach, its objective is to impede the introduction of illicit precursor chemicals and the export of coca products via maritime systems. This emphasis on a "fixed presence" concept will require significant planning and training assistance by the U.S. Coast Guard and other LEAs, and requires only a marginal expenditure for equipment and hardware. One Peruvian Marine company will provide security and limited power projection capability to the [REDACTED] fixed site. Success with this approach would lead to expansion of this effort into other areas in the out-years of 1992 and beyond.

7. (U) REQUIREMENTS

A. (U) Requirements past FY91 are most difficult to fix at this juncture and this report will not postulate hypothetical projections that serve no valid planning purpose. At this point, the FY91 requirements are small when compared to the other Andean States.

B. (U) Training, assistance in planning, and limited equipment infusion for commerce control, database sharing, and communications will be the critical elements.

B. (U) Training and equipping of one Marine company for the Iquitos MROE will be the most substantial FY91 riverine resourcing requirement.

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CONCLUSIONS

SECTION I GENERAL

1. (U) COUNTRY DIFFERENCES

An issue for U.S. policy planners to consider in addressing Andean maritime and riverine programs is the distinct differences that exist among the countries. In fact, there are a number of variables (political, economic, environmental and operational differences, interservice/interdepartmental friction, outmoded doctrinal perspectives, support infrastructure, etc.) that when combined make each country unique. Analysts (wherever they are) need to be wary of "mirror image" programs and "mirror image" expectations. Solutions will be as unique as the countries.

2. (U) THE ANDEAN STRATEGY'S MARITIME/RIVERINE OBJECTIVES ARE SOUND, BUT IMPLEMENTATION HAS BEEN FLAWED.

A. The key maritime/riverine elements of the Andean Strategy and the Country Goals developed many months ago under severe time constraints are amazingly sound in their strategic vision. The shortfall appears to have occurred in translating the broad strategic objectives of the Andean Implementation Plan into more tangible operational concepts that could be specifically applied to each country. Fundamentally, this is a management problem. It involves communications, clarity of lines of authority, and coordination between policy planners and program implementers. Three key factors appear to have contributed to the imbalance between expectations and reality.

(1) (U) A rush to the "bottom line."

Time pressures and demands for programmatic data (funding, quantities, manpower, etc.) led to an accelerated process that was fundamentally skewed towards generating specific requirements in line with previously determined funding levels.

This approach brought about a greater concentration on the end product and its overall cost than on the actual methods that would be undertaken to pursue the stated objectives. For example, in the case of riverine, it appears that the emphasis was more on how many boats were needed and how they would be acquired rather than on what were the specific missions and tasks that needed to be accomplished, under what conditions and circumstances, with what expectation of the ability of the host nation to implement the operational concept, and eventually

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what the optimal v. marginal v. acceptable force structure options would be. Essentially, the primacy of strategy in the requirements development process was supplanted by a emphasis on the programmatic and budgetary aspects of the Andean Implementation Plan.

(B) (U) U.S. Planning does not always match host nation desires.

Compounding the problem of emphasis on programmatic was an ill-defined political-military situation in which seemingly unilateral U.S. planning was not congruent with host nation desires. Often the "reality" of the situation within the host nations was factionalism fueled by political pressures, domestic opinion, institutional rivalries, and cultural patterns. Fundamental issues regarding the roles and missions of the law enforcement elements and the military (and between the various branches of the military) remain unresolved.

(C) (U) Many uncoordinated solutions by different U.S. agencies leads to confusion.

Finally, the maritime/riverine programs were developed by a variety of advisors and experts, who, more often than not, viewed the issue from a parochial aspect. In lieu of a single, focused approach within each of the countries, the MRRPT encountered multiple interpretations of what really needed to be accomplished and the best methods to do so. Multiple strategies existed within U.S. Missions; often times, not completely coordinated with all concerned elements within the Mission. In other cases, there were internal disagreements within the U.S. Mission as to which security force within the host nation should be the beneficiary of U.S. assistance, and towards what end. The virtually unlimited expertise was forthcoming from a wide variety of sources - TDY personnel on MTTs, TDY visitors, the supporting Unified Command, contractors, American and foreign business interests, congressional staffers; the list goes on and on. The U.S. Missions were not prepared to assimilate so much information on a subject (maritime/riverine) in which they possessed so little experience. They were not resourced to adequately perform the task. Another facet of this internal communication and coordination problem is its effect upon external communications and coordination with USSOUTHCOM and Washington agencies. There is no single point of contact for maritime and riverine operations since several elements in each U.S. mission are independent players; therefore, it is difficult to obtain a coordinated position when dealing with only a parochial contact in each Embassy.

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3. (U) ORGANIZING TO MANAGE THE PROBLEM REQUIRES A HARD LOOK

The challenge of counternarcotics, whether the particular case of maritime/riverine programs or the greater issue of country-planning, has created new managerial and operational planning requirements for the U.S. Missions. The dynamics of this political-diplomatic-security-informational campaign (what can only be described as a Low Intensity Conflict) requires talent, skill and experience. Deputy Chiefs of Mission, for example, play key managerial roles in waging what is essentially an operational campaign - what supplemental training/experience must be provided to prepare them for this role? Security Assistance Offices (SAOs) have been called upon to develop operational concepts, force structure programs, etc. These tasks far exceed their specific role of security assistance management - have job descriptions been revised to ensure a thorough personnel screening process by the supporting military services in order to identify individuals with the required talents?

In summary, the shortfall between expectations and reality within the maritime/riverine program illustrates an overarching managerial and structural dilemma that must be addressed. Are U.S. Missions properly staffed and resourced to address the implementation of the Andean strategy?

4. (U) THE MARITIME/RIVERINE OBJECTIVES CANNOT BE ACCOMPLISHED BY JUST PUTTING BOATS IN THE WATER.

This report advocates the adoption of an operational concept, within the three countries, that blends a "Fixed Presence" concept and a "Mobility Forces" concept. The "Fixed Presence" concept focuses on critical chokepoints, an invigorated Captains of the Port (COTP) system, increased surveillance, increased presence, and improved communications. The "Fixed Presence" concept is complemented by "Mobility Forces" that enable the host nation to extend commerce control beyond the range of the fixed installations, increase presence and surveillance on major and secondary waterways, conduct and support interdiction operations ranging from unopposed board and search up to and including river force power projection into the land area surrounding the river operating environment.

This concept cannot stand alone. It will require the synchronization of many other activities to ensure success.

A. (U) Laws can only be enforced, if they have been enacted.

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The host nations must adopt a more proactive legal and diplomatic posture to include (1) diplomatic efforts with neighboring countries followed by greater police/customs liaison and exchanges of information; (2) development and enactment of an essential precursor chemical regime, including end user certificates; (3) the establishment of an effective Captain of the Port (COTP) customs systems; and (4) the development of a customs baseline capability in chemical diversion control, traffic analysis, and random search.

B. ~~(S)~~ We don't know enough to know what we don't know.

The paucity of information and intelligence within the several Maritime/Riverine Operating Environments (MROEs) hampers commerce control and interdiction efforts. Correction of the intelligence shortfalls concerning trafficking patterns, key indicators regarding local residents such as fuel consumption and engine repairs (a signal of op tempo and usage rates), etc., along the major and secondary river systems will be essential to the conduct of successful riverine campaigns. A system over-reliant on paid informants needs to evolve towards a more sophisticated intelligence system. Towards this end, in the case of Bolivia, the MRRPT has recommended the establishment of intelligence detachments within each Riverine Operating Area. The maritime/riverine intelligence architecture must expand to effectively support the proposed force structure enhancements, particularly in the areas of local fusion capabilities, aggressive counterintelligence, clandestine and covert collection with discrete compartmentalization, agent reliability assessment programs, and parallel collection for purposes of cross-checking and verification of sources, means, and data.

C. (U) Putting the puzzle together will be the hard part.

In terms of operational planning, a fusion of the country riverine strategies is required to successfully control the extensive inland waterways of the Andes. The complementary concepts of "Fixed Presence" and "Mobility forces" must be viewed in this context. An effective riverine strategy will concentrate on critical chokepoints and seek to prevent the use of the waterways between these chokepoints by narcotraffickers. Certain conditions must exist to improve the chances of successfully accomplishing this objective.

(1) (U) In the first place, the MROEs must be viewed as complex systems, not simply avenues of transit. Transshipment via ground or air remains a feasible alternative to a narcotrafficking infrastructure that has consistently demonstrated an exceptional ability to adapt. Riverine forces will only be able to exert "influence" in those areas where they are physically operating; however, their area of interest will extend beyond the banks of rivers. To extend the reach of the maritime and

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riverine forces, complementary and supplementary actions must be integrated into the operational planning rubric. Full integration with ground and air operations, as well as normal law enforcement activities must be pursued.

(2) (U) A small force can increase its presence through increased mobility and flexibility. Counternarcotics operations in Bolivia have recognized the utility of enhanced mobility. Riverine Forces need the capability to extend their range with the use of simple support vessels and austere, yet mobile, fueling facilities. If not, narcotraffickers will simply develop networks that avoid those areas accessible to the riverine forces. The use of indigenous craft will permit riverine law enforcement to be extended into secondary waterways and tributaries that are too shallow or narrow for the standard patrol craft. Additionally, the use of indigenous craft will assist clandestine surveillance and intelligence collection capabilities because these craft will more easily blend into the "normal" riverine traffic patterns. Enhanced interoperability with airmobile/lift assets will enable riverine forces to rapidly project force (inflatable raiding raft) into areas of suspected activity to disrupt narcotrafficking activities. It must be pointed out that this will increase demands for helicopter support.

(3) (U) The development of innovative operational plans will be essential to deterring the narcotraffickers' use of the inland waterways. Predictable patrolling patterns, self-imposed range limitations, and the establishment of an overly structured operational regimen will permit the narcotraffickers to conduct pattern analyses of the riverine forces. Such analyses will permit the traffickers to elude law enforcement efforts or, in the worst scenario, plan effective counteractions (ambush, sabotage, etc.).

5. (U) HOW MUCH ASSISTANCE CAN BE ABSORBED.

Regardless of its merits, a strategic plan that does not provide for an orderly transition from the conceptual to the implementation phase is destined to fail. This transition is known as absorption. For purposes of this report, absorption refers to a country's capacity or ability to receive, employ, and maintain additional equipment. Specifically, it includes all those aspects required to physically receive a piece of equipment, maintain it in an operational state of readiness, operate an appropriate spare parts resupply system, plan for and procure the necessary expendable supplies (oils, lubricants, fuels, batteries, etc.) to sustain operations, and to employ the equipment effectively.

Each of the three countries has a different capacity to absorb U.S. assistance depending upon the sophistication of existing logistical infrastructure (systems, procedures, facilities, etc.), entry levels of operational personnel, and the exigencies

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of the operational tempo that may decrease the time available for absorption. There are three basic determinants of absorptive capacity: the maintenance and logistics architecture, the level of training, and personnel selection and stability.

A. (U) Maintenance and Logistics Architecture.

Equipment is not an end unto itself. Its contribution to the overall effort is simply to enhance the human dimension by rendering operational forces more effective in accomplishing their assigned tasks. Therefore, the operational requirements must be the driving force in developing appropriate equipment menus for U.S. assistance programs. Simply providing equipment to meet operational requirements alone is not sufficient, however. If the equipment is to contribute to the overall accomplishment of the objective, there must be adequate infrastructure above the user level specifically focused on maintaining and supporting the equipment. Maintenance and support begins at the lowest level. The operator must understand the equipment and be able to perform basic trouble-shooting and field level maintenance. The operator, however, should not be expected to be an equipment technician.

The equipment technician is one level above the operator, and his primary function is to plan and execute an effective maintenance program. At this level, the focus is to ensure that proper operator maintenance is being conducted, that adequate expendables are available to properly care for the equipment and make minor repairs, and to program an adequate supply of spare parts so that serviceable equipment can be returned to an operational state as quickly as possible.

The next level of maintenance in this hierarchy is the depot level. It is here that the overhaul and rebuilding of equipment occurs. Depot level maintenance and repair requires facilities, equipment, and personnel that is neither affordable nor practical at the field technician level.

Concomitant to this maintenance structure is an overarching logistics architecture that focuses on (1) the programmatic budgetary aspects of forecasting and funding for the sustainment of the equipment; (2) the spare parts and repair parts supply mechanism that predicts demand; (3) the dissemination of information on proper techniques and procedures for maintenance and logistics; and (4) the planning and providing of sufficient consumables to meet the operational requirement. Without a viable maintenance and logistics infrastructure, equipment will be degraded and risk of total failure increases. No program, especially one drawing USG counternarcotics assistance, can afford the luxury of equipment sitting idle for want of a part or simple maintenance.

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The maintenance and logistics infrastructure need not be provided by the host nation. Contracting for the needed services in some cases may be a viable option. By contracting it is possible to accelerate local absorption and defer the need for a sophisticated level of host nation equipment sustainment capability. However, there are risks associated with this alternative. Its most serious drawback is that it may so heavily involve non-host country contributions in every facet of the system, that development of any indigenous capability will be retarded. The introduction of client-contractor relationships into an operational and foreign policy issue is also a problem.

Blending of maintenance and logistics infrastructure between the U.S. (DEA, NAS, Milgrp) and host nation (police, military) will vary from country to country. A description of the level of maintenance and logistics that a host nation is expected to provide must be specifically addressed in strategic plans.

B. (U) Training.

To support the maintenance and logistics infrastructure discussed above, three levels of training will be required: operational, technical/maintenance, and management. At the operational level, a progression of skills will be required to transition an individual into being an effective member of a team. The individual's entry level will determine the baseline of the training requirement, e.g., a raw recruit will require extensive training in the fundamentals of discipline and military/police procedures that may already exist in a more experienced individual. Training programs must be geared to this baseline entry level, and incorporate the essential requirements (critical tasks), acceptable methods of learning, and the degree of supervision available in the actual operating environment.

These critical tasks must be clearly identified so that training requirements can be tailored to the need. This will eliminate waste and ensure the efficient use of scarce training resources. Critical tasks common to most riverine warfare training requirements include, but are not limited to, individual tactical skills, small boat handling, navigation, weapons proficiency, human rights, and boat maintenance procedures. Beyond this, the collective skills required include teaching the individual how to work as a member of a team, the value and need for teamwork, and his role in a coordinated team effort.

At the technical and maintenance levels, special training will be required to develop an indigenous capability to repair and maintain equipment. Each type of equipment introduced into the program will carry with it the requirement to train adequate maintenance personnel as well as the obvious requirement to ensure they are provided with adequate tools and calibration devices.

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To ensure that the first two levels of training are adequate and properly sustained requires training at the management level. Again, strategic plans must provide for training at and above depot level. Specifically included in this training will be planning, programming, and budgeting for maintenance programs to ensure efficient use of resources.

Much, but not all, of this fundamental training can be provided by DoD assets. Mobile training teams can be made available to the MILGRP for the training of particular groups in specific skills. However, the DOD capability to provide training in certain areas, e.g., law enforcement, is limited. A more prudent approach, and one that should be included in future strategic plans, is to seek trainers who are qualified (DEA, USCG, Border Patrol, etc.) and have them conduct this training. Also, while DoD MTTs can provide collective skills training and exercising, they cannot accompany host nation forces in the conduct of actual operations. It is essential to establish a feedback loop between those personnel who do view host nation operational performance (DEA, USCG, etc.) and the Embassy DoD MTT coordinator (in all probability, the US Military Group) to ensure that training deficiencies are corrected, and successful techniques are reinforced in the training regimen.

C. (U) Personnel Selection and Stability.

All players in the counternarcotics strategy must recognize the investment that is occurring in terms of resources and equipment. To maximize this investment, personnel policies must be developed and implemented to ensure that quality personnel are recruited and retained. Criteria must be established, in agreement with the host nation, that addresses entry-level qualifications, realistic retention windows, incentives for continued service beyond the minimum required, and opportunities for repetitive assignments with counternarcotics forces. Distinct standards of operational proficiency and personal conduct must be agreed upon and upheld.

6. (U) RESOURCING - TRYING TO GET THE MOST BANG FOR THE BUCK

A. (U) The host nations are resource poor. The lack of resources is particularly difficult in Bolivia, where the GOB is trying to initiate riverine operations in conjunction with U.S. assistance and guidance. Peru has few resources to devote to maritime and riverine operations, and has chosen to assign it a relatively low priority. Colombia, by far the most aggressive of the three Andean nations in its pursuit of narcotraffickers, is performing limited riverine operations, but primarily against insurgencies on both the Atlantic and Pacific coast. The importance

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of a "brown water navy" has at least become a point of discussion; however, experience indicates that the institutional bias of the Colombian Navy for the "blue water" force will be slow to change.

B. (U) The FMFP Problem.

A problem common to all three Country Teams is the lead time required for delivery of equipment acquired through the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP). Given the time pressures that the U.S. missions are under to build a program and produce positive results, the lengthy FMFP process is inadequate. INM/NAS funding provides a more responsive method for fulfilling Country Team requirements. The frustration on the part of the U.S. mission in Bolivia with the speed of equipment delivery is centered upon FMFP-related services. This has forced the Bolivian Country Team to either press for faster FMFP turnaround (an endeavor which has proven to be of limited value), or to seek other, more creative solutions to obtaining equipment, such as the sole-source purchase of boats. The U.S. Mission in Colombia has encountered similar difficulties.

The turn to non-FMFP alternatives introduces problems of non-standardization of equipment and uncertain long-term delivery schedules, and it will inhibit development of long-term procurement strategies.

C. (U) Standardizing - -A Cost-Effectiveness Measure.

Standardization will serve to remedy many of the problems raised in the discussion of absorption. Commonality of equipment will ease the maintenance burden by narrowing the focus of the technicians to fewer types of equipment. Secondly, and contrary to the unchecked diversification that exists in many Latin American countries, it simplifies the repair parts supply dilemma by again reducing the density of equipment types. Finally, commonality of equipment permits easy cross-attachment of assets from one area to another without creating makeshift supply tails. Standardization of training ensures that all are taught the same tactics, techniques, and procedures and are evaluated against recognized criteria to determine proficiency. This permits and promotes interchangeability and interoperability. Additionally it greatly facilitates the conduct of joint operations since the supporting assets (air and riverine) will operate in a standardized manner with all ground forces regardless of geographic location. This degree of standardization can realistically only be achieved within each individual country; while regional standardization may be achievable with certain key equipment components, complete doctrinal, operational, and maintenance/logistics standardization will remain more of a political than an operational issue.

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D. (U) Procurement: Operational Imperatives Outstripping Responsiveness.

(1) (U) As discussed above, the perceived lack of responsiveness of the security assistance equipment acquisition process has produced frustration within the U.S. Missions and the host countries (Colombia, in particular). The crux of the dilemma lies in the countervailing objectives of the players.

At one end of the spectrum, the U.S. Missions and the host nations emphasize the exigency of the situation. The immediate operational imperative is to engage the narcotraffickers on the waterways to disrupt their transportation infrastructure - all with an eye towards achieving the strategic mandates of the Andean Implementation Plan. Their emphasis is on the rapid delivery of rivercraft to establish a credible force presence "here and now", since there may be no "tomorrow". Their impatience can be understood: they are the ones under pressure to produce results; they are the ones confronting the violence; they are the ones who deal with the issue as a significant element of their lives.

At the other end of the spectrum, the Country Teams see a convoluted "bureaucracy" with a multiplicity of players with varying appreciations of the situation, and, often, parochial perspectives and agendas. The "bureaucracy" includes the interdepartmental players of the USG, the Congress, and assorted contractors/vendors/consultants. A labyrinth of administrative procedures, legal requirements, and variable sources of funding and procurement authority add to this perception of the "bureaucracy."

(2) (U) The demands being placed on the existing security assistance architecture were not envisioned during its development. Rapid supply of equipment non-standard to U.S. military forces was not an objective. Stockpiling, via acquisition, of equipment that would not apply to U.S. Forces menus was not envisioned. The USG assistance program for counternarcotics has generated new requirements, particularly in terms of rivercraft, for which the DoD was institutionally ill-prepared. Steps have been taken, via the development and implementation of a Navy standard boat menu, to systematically address the problem. Such standardization will provide the operational benefits discussed previously in the report. Additionally, it will impose enhanced quality control, lower cost per unit pricing, institutional supportability (in terms of training, maintenance, and logistics) via the US Navy, and an eventual capability for accelerated delivery. The "birth pains" of this process are, however, incompatible with the Country Team desire for accelerated deliveries now. The dilemma is how to close the gap between real time requirements and the eventual capability to deliver rivercraft from the USN standard boat menu.

(3) (U) Paradoxically, though frustrated in procuring rivercraft through the security assistance system, the U.S. Mission in Bolivia pursued the acquisition of a support vessel (AKA "Mothership") through the same system. Endless hours were invested by various players seeking practical alternatives that could be delivered to a land-locked country. Building a craft in segments, cutting-up an existing craft, etc. were researched. A more innovative approach appears to be to build upon existing barges that can be found in Bolivia-augmenting the hull with equipment essential for mission accomplishment. This alternative is low-cost; specifically responsive to SNOWCAP requirements; will involve host nation management as a cooperative player; and can be implemented rapidly.

7. (U) RESOURCING: THE HUMAN DIMENSION

The implementation of an aggressive maritime/riverine strategy within the Andean nations will significantly increase the personnel demands on both the host nations and the U.S.

A. (U) The augmented force structure necessary to implement the MRRPT's recommendations in Bolivia and Colombia will require an increased manpower commitment by the host nations. Personnel will be required for employment within the operational and logistics units, as Captains of Port, and in senior-staff coordination elements. While "quantity" alone will prove itself a significant issue, the "quality" of the manpower will be a significant indicator of the host nation's commitment to success.

B. (U) Concurrently, there will be an increased demand on U.S. personnel assets for training and in the conduct of bi-lateral law enforcement activities. If the past is any indication of the future, then DoD will have to meet the operational and maintenance skills training requirements through expanded use of mobile training teams and institutional education. Other USG department and agencies, particularly DEA and the USCG, however, do not have a parallel ability to surge and sustain an enhanced optempo. The initial dilemma will be encountered in Bolivia, where the FY91 establishment of the Riberalta Riverine Operating Area will require both SNOWCAP (2) and USCG (2) above the current manpower levels. Continued expansion in Bolivia, compounded by the implementation of any SNOWCAP riverine operations in Peru, will place difficult demands on the personnel systems of both the DEA and the USCG. The resolution of how these evolving personnel demands will be resourced is beyond the charter of this particular study; however, the policy and resource options available to the USG should be addressed. It is important to avoid the issue of "unforeseen personnel demands in the Andean

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maritime/riverine program" surface in the future. Steps must be taken to resolve this problem now before it becomes a crisis.

C. (U) The Maritime and Riverine Law Enforcement Program Coordinator

Perhaps the most significant and universally agreed upon problem preventing the development and implementation of an effective Andean Region Maritime and Riverine Law Enforcement Program is the fact that it has no sponsor in the USG. Moreover, there is no single focal point, no overall coordinator, no one entity at the Country level with the responsibility for creating the vision, the strategy, and the implementation plans for the program. Without an infrastructure to support this program the development and adoption of an Andean Maritime and Riverine Law Enforcement strategy is difficult.

The lack of designated maritime and riverine coordinators at the national, regional, and country levels is hampering short-term and long-term planning, programming, and budgeting. A maritime and riverine coordinator is needed in Washington, USSOUTHCOM, and at each U.S. Mission involved. In Washington, the coordinator needs a small dedicated staff comprised of policy and technical experts augmented by resourcing and budgeting specialists. The national coordinator must have the authority, to develop Strategic Plans for the Andean Region, directly assist with the development of Country Plans which support the Regional Plan, and prepare budget documents to ensure resources, equipment, and training are available to meet the objectives of approved USG strategy and Country Plans. Such a systems approach will increase managerial efficiency and permit enhanced coordination.

SECTION II: BOLIVIA - SPECIFIC

1. (C) THE STRATEGY AND ITS REQUIREMENTS

The Maritime and Riverine Strategy of the Mission has been recast. It focuses on a gradual expansion of operating environments with supporting force structure (FY 91 thru FY 93); emphasis on low-technology, relatively low-cost, austere force multipliers; and the creation of an indigenous sustainment capability at the Trinidad base. A more detailed discussion is included in Chapter 2 of the report.

2. (U) MAPPING

Lack of adequate maps, in the hands of the operators, remains a problem which must be resolved. The use of rendezvous points with prepositioned FARRPs will be significantly hampered without adequate and available maps. Efforts to increase surveillance and intelligence collection along the waterways will be hampered by a lack of accuracy in pinpointing narcotrafficking activity. Coordination of multi-dimensional operations, involving several counternarcotics forces (air, riverine, ground) will require precise reconnaissance and detailed planning; all of which, again, will rely on the availability of accurate maps.

3. (U) INTEGRATION OF THE BLUE DEVILS INTO THE BOLIVIAN NAVY

The current arrangement between the Bolivian SEFANT and the Bolivian Navy, regarding operational control and sustainment responsibilities, has been awkward and can only get worse as the counternarcotics patrol boat force structure grows. The operational control line between the SEFANT and the Blue Devils and U.S. Mission SNOWCAP and NAU personnel and the Blue Devils is relatively clear and functioning. The problem is that the Blue Devil forces are essentially disenfranchised from their parent service, i.e., the Bolivian navy, who feel no responsibility to provide such support as dependent housing, medical care, etc. This situation is already causing morale problems within the Blue Devils and will become even more significant as the force structure expands. Although, Bolivian Navy resources may be limited, the USG should take the necessary steps to ensure that the riverine counternarcotics forces are not neglected by their parent service and forced to rely on a system of hand-outs, personal support networks, or long-term USG support.

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4. (U) U.S. TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

As the operational capability matures, there will be greater opportunities to conduct truly joint operations involving riverine, ground, and airmobile forces. This move toward "jointness" will maximize the effectiveness of the individual forces, and bring with it requirements for standardization of training programs and procedures. While DoD trainers can provide much of the collective tactical skills training (to gain interoperability) there will be a continuing need to train in the critical law enforcement aspects of investigations, informant handling, apprehension and arrest procedures, and evidence and defendant processing for court presentation. Again, to ensure continuity of the U.S. effort, it may be prudent to begin early development of Interagency Training Team modules that can be used to integrate the various forces into a joint force. Training teams would be appropriately manned by DEA, USCG, and military personnel and prepared and sustained from a single location. Lessons learned and programs of instruction would be maintained at this location to ensure continuity and consistency and avoid a situation where training is dictated by the preferences of a single instructor. Prior planning at this time would begin with a detailed skills assessment study to determine what common skills apply across the joint spectrum, what collective tasks require joint training, etc. Beginning the process now will avert last minute crises.

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SECTION III: COLOMBIA - SPECIFIC

1. (U) THE STRATEGY AND ITS REQUIREMENTS

(U) The Maritime and Riverine Strategy within Colombia is not cast as a singular plan, supported by all parties within the Government of Colombia and the U.S. Mission. Rivalry among the various military and law enforcement agencies involved is impeding the development and adoption of a coordinated and integrated Colombian Maritime Riverine Strategy. Until the GOC formulates a clearly defined counternarcotics strategy specifically defining the roles of its various military and law enforcement agencies, efforts to combat narcotrafficking will remain fragmented.

2. (U) FRAGMENTED EFFORTS

A. (U) The fundamental dilemma within Colombia is sorting out roles and missions - who is the lead player within the Colombian framework and what are the relationships and authority lines that will serve as the basis for strategy development and implementation? While the COLMAR appears enthusiastic and aggressive at this point, their actual ability to make a difference in the counternarcotics campaign rests in the hands of others. Without a host nation framework and clear priorities, the COLMAR will not have the effect we need.

B. (U) The best interests of the USG and the GOC will be served by avoiding the creation of parallel, duplicative entities for riverine operations. They are costly and exacerbate military/police friction. The U.S. Mission confronts the dilemma of moving the police and military entities together, retaining LEA lead, but capitalizing on military operational support. There is no easy answer.

3. (U) NAS RIVERINE INITIATIVE

A. (U) The NAS Chief has funding available to devote to riverine operations and he has sent a letter to the head of the CNP suggesting the initiation of new riverine programs. However, the CNP Chief has yet to respond, and the NAS Chief has stated that he will not pursue new initiatives until he receives a response.

B. (U) This situation might not exist if there were better communications between the NAS and the National Police. Enhancing communications between all

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parties is a desirable goal; in this case, resourcing is available now for new programs or to expand existing programs. Failure to more aggressively pursue options such as these highlight the difficulties the U.S. faces in dealing with many disparate counternarcotics forces in Colombia. An inventory of available and potential counternarcotics tools needs to be taken and those that are easily obtainable should be pursued immediately.

SECTION IV: PERU - SPECIFIC

1. (U) THE STRATEGY AND ITS REQUIREMENTS

A. (U) Currently, there is no comprehensive Peruvian counternarcotics strategy. Therefore, the MRRPT was unable to accomplish its objective in Peru. Without a strategy, the few ongoing GOP maritime and riverine operations are disjointed efforts that do not complement one another. Such efforts are easily overcome or avoided by the narcotraffickers. In addition to this lack of strategy, the U.S. Mission has been unable to table a comprehensive strategy proposal. The last effort by the Country Team, consisting only of goals and programmatic resource elements, was rejected by the GOP. Since the failure to conclude an FY 90 military aid agreement, no effort has been made to reformulate a strategy. The situation remains stalled.

B. (C) Military service-to-service (i.e., U.S. Navy to Peruvian Navy, U.S. Marine Corps to Peruvian Marine Corps, etc.) initiatives may prove to be the only effective means to influence Peruvian maritime/riverine efforts. Initiatives such as Deployments for Training (DFT), Short Duration Exercises (SDE), Personnel Exchange Programs (PEP), and Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEE) appear to be the only means of maintaining some degree of leverage to break the stalemate within the Peruvian Navy and central government on the need to expand the mission of the Peruvian Navy to include the control of drug trafficking on the river systems.

2. (U) RESOURCING OF MARITIME AND RIVERINE OPERATIONS

A. (U) Peruvian counternarcotics forces (i.e., currently the PNP) are underequipped, understaffed, and undertrained. While there are indications that the Peruvian Navy would like to play a role in counternarcotics riverine operations (beyond the counterinsurgency role they now play), the GOP, in all likelihood, will not support this. Even if approved, funding, personnel, and equipment shortages would limit their effectiveness.

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B. (C) The present levels of anticipated US funding for maritime and riverine activities in Peru is based on a fundamental change in the current GOP stance. Should the GOP reverse itself and decide to accept military assistance agreements, currently programmed funds will suffice until expansion of the program is justified. Any such justification would have to be predicated on requirements derived from a comprehensive strategy.

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VI: RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter is not intended to recap all of the recommendations discussed throughout the text of this report. Rather, it presents the key issues and recommendations for consideration by the interagency.

Recommendations are grouped into a "General" category or country-specific categories:

- Management and Coordination
- Training for Roles
- Increasing Role for the DEA and USCG
- Resourcing - Equipment
- Resourcing - Personnel
- Intelligence
- Bolivia - specific
- Colombia - specific
- Peru - specific

The numbering of issues is not meant to indicate any particular priority.

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CATEGORY: General

SUBJECT: (U) Management and Coordination.

ISSUE #1: (U) The principal chokepoint in the implementation of Maritime/Riverine programs has been the lack of centralized oversight authority, both in Washington and the Country Teams, with responsibility to synchronize disparate riverine program elements (i.e., operational concepts, strategy, resourcing, training, force structure and support) into a synergistic whole. All elements of maritime/riverine programs must be viewed from a "systems" perspective in order to optimize efficiency. At present, individual program elements are being executed effectively, but in a piecemeal fashion. As an example, procurement of riverine assets should be carefully synchronized with development of force structure, training, and support. An oversight system, layered at local, regional, and national levels, would serve to focus the program.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (U) Designate a USG Maritime/Riverine Coordinator to act as the central interagency clearing house and monitor for counternarcotics maritime/riverine issues. Functions should include:

- (1) Strategy/programs integration
- (2) Requirements validation
- (3) Coordination/synchronization of all program elements
- (4) Standardization monitor for procurement, support and training
- (5) Budget and acquisition oversight

Adequate full-time staffing will be essential and it should include sufficient interagency representation. A proposed baseline staffing option includes the following agencies: DEA(law enforcement), USCG(Maritime/Riverine expertise), State INM(Policy and NAS Liaison), DoD(operational support and security assistance/procurement),

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and two additional billets (Program Management/Budget Analysis and Logistics/Contracting).

- (U) The Proponency for the Coordinator's office may be assigned to one of several agencies:

State (INM) - Coordination mandate already exists; precedent established for INM air wing; consistent with State INM designation as lead agency for international counternarcotics matters

DEA - Operational lead with Andean nations

DOD - Coordinator of regional military support and implementer of security assistance

The MRRPT recommends that the function, with additional focus and dedicated manpower, remain with State INM. While there is near term advantage in oversight provided by a high level body with the capacity for expeditious decision making, practical program management on a continuous basis is best obtained within a refocused management structure.

- (U) The MRRPT recommends that Riverine coordination oversight be exercised within the existing management structure. NSD 1 provides for the establishment of Interagency working groups under the aegis of standing PCC's or CSG's. In the case of the Counternarcotics CSG, a maritime/riverine working group with representation as listed below could assist the Coordinator's Office and facilitate program coordination and integration. Interagency representation should include (at a minimum):

- * State INM (Policy/NAS Liaison)
- * DEA (Law Enforcement)
- * USCG (Maritime/Riverine Law Enforcement Expertise)
- * DOD (Operational Support/Security Assistance/Training)
- * Joint Staff (Operational Support/CINC's Representative)
- * Other Agency Representatives (ie., Customs, Border Patrol) (as required)

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- (U) Establish a Maritime/Riverine Steering Group within USSOUTHCOM that can act as the regional military focal point and provide military advice to the U.S. Country Teams, coordinate the disparate military elements in theater contributing to the Andean Strategy Implementation Plan, and monitor the provision of operational, logistical training and security assistance support.

- (U) Designate a Maritime/Riverine Coordinator within each of the U.S. Andean Missions to act as the principal focal point charged with the integration and coordination of Maritime/Riverine efforts. (See issue #7).

- (U) Establish an Interagency Maritime/Riverine Support Address Indicator Group (AIG) to ensure that program related communications are available to all principal operational and support elements.

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CATEGORY: General

SUBJECT: (U) Training For Roles.

ISSUE #2: (U) The challenge of counternarcotics, whether the particular case of maritime/riverine programs or the greater issue of synchronization of diverse USG assets, has created new managerial and operational planning requirements for the U.S. Mission requiring talents, skills and experiences that are not developed within the standardized structure.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- (U) Determine what supplemental training/experience must be provided to Deputy Chiefs of Mission, NAS personnel, and other USG personnel within the mission who either use, plan for, or coordinate DOD operational support or other USG assets in executing the Andean Implementation Plan. Develop appropriate pre-assignment or on-the-job training.

- (U) Ensure that positions in the Security Assistance Offices of U.S. missions are staffed by personnel with training/experience in joint/combined planning, force structure development and operational aspects of counternarcotics operations. This can be accomplished through selective refinement of job descriptions without altering the basic requirement for security assistance management skills. The skill sets required are complementary. Supplemental instruction can be provided during preassignment training (DISAM or enroute at USSOU-THCOM).

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CATEGORY: General

SUBJECT: (U) Resourcing - Personnel.

ISSUE #3. (U) There will be an increased demand placed on DoD personnel assets for training and support of bilateral law enforcement activities.

RECOMMENDATION:

- (U) The current role of DoD personnel (i.e., training and operational support) should not be changed.
- (U) Recognizing the uncertainty of assets and events, DoD's ability to "surge" in order to meet the operational and maintenance skills training requirements through mobile training teams and institutional education should be fully evaluated; the ability to "sustain" such efforts over several years should be also be investigated.
- (U) Increase utilization of NAVSCIATTS (Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School) in Panama. In order to make institutional training in the U.S. and Panama affordable for the Andean nations, the issue of "viaticos" (per diem) must be addressed. The legal requirement for an extremely high per diem rate makes utilization of U. S. facilities prohibitively expensive. NAVSCIATTS could be tasked to provide a 'Mobile Training Team' concept and curriculum for deployment to the Andean Region if a solution cannot be found to the high cost of attendance for U.S. Schools, both INCONUS and in Panama.
- (U) The policy and resource options available to the USG to meet increased personnel demands should be addressed now so that deliberate preparations can be made. This is related to Issue #4.

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CATEGORY: General

SUBJECT: (U) An Increasing Role for the Drug Enforcement Administration and the U.S. Coast Guard.

ISSUE #4. (U) Increased demands for training, and advisory assistance will accompany the planned enhancement to riverine force structure. DEA/USCG assets will play a key role in supporting these enhancements.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (U) Evaluate the policy implications and resource demands of an increased DEA/USCG role as soon as possible so that the budget and support infrastructure will be in place to support the planned force enhancements.

- (U) U.S. Coast Guard study the manpower and funding requirements of supporting an effective maritime commerce control and riverine program in the Andean Region, and present recommendations for Interagency review. (requirements: country attaches, assistance teams, Captain of the Port (COTP) training programs, etc.)

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CATEGORY: General

SUBJECT: (U) Resourcing - Equipment

ISSUE #5. (U) Host nation resources, albeit limited, are not addressing maritime/riverine imperatives.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (U) Continue diplomatic and military-to-military dialogue stressing the importance of maritime commerce control and riverine interdiction. Emphasis should be placed on effecting an appropriate balance between traditional "blue water" programs and the requirements for coastal patrol, inland waterway control, and riverine amphibious operations.

- (U) Conduct a maritime/riverine symposium involving US assets (USCG, USN, USMC, Customs) and parallel organizations within the Andean nations to discuss doctrine, techniques, procedures, etc. Seek to institutionalize it as an annual event, hosted on a rotational basis; the objective would be to stimulate liaison and cooperation, as well as elevate internal priority assigned to maritime/riverine forces..

- (U) Conduct a detailed survey of the maritime commerce control capabilities (coastal and river ports) of the Andean nations to determine the communication and data base architectures required to implement a regional control program.

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CATEGORY: General

SUBJECT: (U) Resourcing - Equipment

ISSUE #6: (U) Frustration within the U.S. Missions and the host nations concerning the responsiveness of the FMFP acquisition process has led to an adoption of many alternatives (GSA purchases, pursuit of sole source, off-shore procurement attempts by host nations). If this trend is not reversed, it will harm the goal of attaining a reasonable standardization of equipment.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (U) Accelerate the implementation of the FMFP U.S. Navy standard boat menu. Ask DoD to study methods to accelerate the acquisition process and the consequences in terms of cost, quality, and delivery dates. Require in-progress reviews to monitor progress and assign priority.
- (U) Validate the generic rivercraft requirements presented in this report and establish them as the maritime/riverine program standards.
- (U) Emphasize the importance of equipment standardization in improving absorption and interoperability. This applies equally to host nation players, U.S. Missions, and other USG involved parties.
- (U) Maximize the use of available assets within the host nation (via reallocation of resources, seizures, local procurement and/or local fabrication to limit the immediate requirements).

Note: This is particularly useful in the cases of indigenous craft for intelligence and surveillance purposes, as well as, fabricating support vessels from existing barges in lieu of seeking newly procured vessels or tailoring excess U.S. defense properties.

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- (U) Use the Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF) as a means of enhancing responsiveness in the long-term and reducing the unit cost of riverine craft.

Note: Competitive bidding and contractual steps are already underway for the procurement of a 22 foot patrol craft. A similar initiative is required for larger craft from the USN standard boat menu. In particular, the technical data package (TDP) for the Standard 38 Ft. Patrol Craft needs to be executed as soon as possible (FY 91) so that competitive bidding and contractual steps can effect preliminary procurement of 10 craft in FY 92.

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CATEGORY: General

SUBJECT: (U) Resourcing-Personnel

ISSUE #7. (U) U.S. Missions are not adequately manned and resourced to address the implications of the maritime/riverine objectives of the Andean Strategy.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (U) Implement Recommendation #1 (USG Maritime/Riverine Coordination Office) to provide advisory assistance and focused entry into the Washington Interagency arena.
- (U) Examine augmentation of U.S. Missions in the Andean countries with a U.S. Coast Guard Attache to provide expertise on maritime commerce control, COTP responsibilities, etc.
- (U) Consider establishment of a military Personnel Exchange Program (PEP) billet for Riverine Operations with the appropriate naval service of each host nation. The U.S. officer can provide essential staff planning assistance in operational and logistics issues to the naval service headquarters (whether Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard) and stress USG strategic objectives. The host nation exchange officer could be assigned to a the USCG unit performing maritime commerce control within the U.S.- a useful experience that can be applied to the counternarcotics effort in the Andean region after tour completion.
- (U) Examine the utility of DoD PASA personnel to provide technical expertise within U.S. Missions.
- (U) In the event that the above recommendations cannot be accomplished, then a Military Group augmentation or an ETSS should be used to exert U.S. influence at key junctures. Institute parallel visitors program for Host Nation naval service officers to come to the U.S. to gain COTP and/or riverine experience.

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CATEGORY: General

SUBJECT: (U) Resourcing - Personnel

ISSUE # 8: (U) The augmented force structure necessary to implement this report's recommendations in Bolivia and Colombia will require an increased qualitative and quantitative manpower commitment by the host nations. Parallel manpower planning should be initiated by the U.S. Missions.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (U) Criteria must be established, in an agreement with the host nation, that address the entry-level qualifications of trainees, realistic retention windows, incentives for continued service beyond the minimum required, and opportunities related to assignment with maritime/riverine forces. Additionally, distinct standards of operational proficiency, personal conduct, and human rights must be agreed upon and enforced.

- (U) U.S. Missions, supported by USSOUTHCOM, should initiate the necessary site surveys in agreement with the host nations, to determine the Host Nation installation support requirements of the Maritime/Riverine Operating Environments recommended in this report. Infrastructure planning should be conducted in parallel with procurement of riverine assets.

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CATEGORY: General

SUBJECT: (U) Resourcing - Personnel

ISSUE #9: (U) While DoD MTTs can provide individual and collective skills training and exercising, they do not accompany host nation forces in the conduct of actual operations. Performance evaluation in the operational environment is not tied to the training base.

RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Establish a feedback loop between those personnel who actually view host nation operational performance (DEA, USCG, etc.) and a designated Embassy DoD MTT Coordinator (in all probability, the U.S. Military Group) to ensure that training deficiencies are corrected, successful techniques developed in the field are incorporated in the training program, and that both are passed on to USSOUTHCOM for incorporation into follow-on MTTs that will be employed throughout the region, and for overall program evaluation.

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CATEGORY: General

SUBJECT: (U) Resourcing - Personnel

ISSUE #10: (U) As operational capabilities mature, there will be more opportunity to conduct truly joint, and possibly multinational, operations involving riverine, ground, and airmobile forces. This move towards "jointness," which will maximize the effectiveness of the various forces, will bring with it requirements for the standardization of training programs and procedures. While DoD trainers can provide much of the individual and collective tactical skills training, there will be a continuing need to train in the critical law enforcement aspects of investigations, informant handling, apprehension and arrest procedures, and evidence and defendant processing for court presentation.

RECOMMENDATION:

- (U) Begin early development of Interagency Training Team modules that would be used to meld the various forces into a joint force.
- (U) Training teams should be manned by the appropriate mixture of DEA, USCG, and military personnel. The teams should be prepared and launched from a single location.
- (U) Lessons Learned and standardized programs of instruction should be maintained at this location to ensure continuity and consistency; avoid situations where training is based on the preferences of the instructor.
- (U) Conduct a detailed skills assessment study to determine what common skills apply across the joint spectrum, what collective tasks require joint training. Translate individual and collective skill requirements into standardized programs of instruction.

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6-14

CATEGORY: General

SUBJECT: (U) Intelligence

ISSUE # 11: (C) Proper collection and use of intelligence is the key to maximizing efficiency of the use of scarce resources in combating narcotrafficking on the rivers. A riverine intelligence infrastructure does not exist.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (U) Develop a maritime/riverine intelligence architecture that can support the proposed force enhancements.



- (U) Develop a 'riverine warfare intelligence' course of instruction and make this schooling available to foreign students from the Andean Region.

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CATEGORY: General

SUBJECT: (U) Intelligence - Mapping

ISSUE #12: (U) Effective coordination of counternarcotics operations will continue to be significantly hampered by a shortage of accurate maps. Efforts to increase the quality and pace of surveillance and intelligence collection operations along the waterways will be impeded by this shortfall, as will coordination of multidimensional operations involving air, ground and riverine elements. Efforts are underway to increase map coverage. Periodic review is required to ensure planned coverage is complementary to ongoing riverine efforts.

RECOMMENDATION:

- (U) Task USSOUTHCOM to ensure that current mapping is synchronized with riverine operational requirements. Initiate remedial action with Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), as required.
- (U) Task USSOUTHCOM to advise U.S. Missions on available map coverage and how to requisition current map holdings.
- (U) Task USSOUTHCOM, in coordination with DMA, to examine the feasibility of special production to cover any critical gaps.

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CATEGORY: Bolivia

SUBJECT: (U) Strategy

ISSUE #13: (U) The Maritime and Riverine Strategy of the U.S. Mission in Bolivia has been adjusted and validated.

RECOMMENDATION:

(U) Specific requirements and implications for the Government of Bolivia should be reviewed and formal bi-lateral agreements established, if required.

(U) Existing USG procurement initiatives and letters of authorization should be reevaluated and brought in line with the revised strategy.

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6-17

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CATEGORY: Bolivia

SUBJECT: (U) Force Structure

ISSUE #14: (U) The increasing size of the force structure will require a concerted effort to standardize training, both operationally and technically, as well as, maintenance and logistics requirements at the second and third echelon levels.

RECOMMENDATION:

- (U) Establish the Trinidad Base as the national riverine training center; develop a dedicated cadre of Bolivian Navy trainers, maintenance technicians, and logisticians; and ensure the installation of adequate support facilities, i.e., classrooms, shops, storage, dry dock, ramps, etc. Standardize training and maintenance procedures.

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CATEGORY: Colombia

SUBJECT: (U) Strategy

ISSUE #15: (C) GOC maritime/riverine strategy lacks integration with their bureaucracy; and lack of adequate port controls remains a problem.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (U) Continue political dialogue to stress the importance of an integrated strategy for maritime commerce control and riverine interdiction.
- (C) Seek to obtain an agreement from the GOC on who will lead maritime/riverine counternarcotics strategy development.
- (C) Seek clarification of roles and missions.
- (C) Provide USCG/Customs/Justice Department assistance to address maritime commerce control at coastal and inland ports.

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**VIETNAM - ANDEAN RIDGE
RIVERINE COMPARISON (cont.)**

VIETNAM

TRAINING: Riverine training preceded by extensive basic combat and individual skills training.

LOGISTICS: Extensive air and waterborne resupply, unlimited funding, principle damage to equipment, weapons, ammo due to salt corrosion and hostile fire.

ANDEAN RIDGE

TRAINING: HN riverine training preceded by minimal amount of basic combat and individual skills training.

LOGISTICS: Limited resupply by air/land, virtually no waterborne resupply, limited/controlled funding, principle damage to equipment, weapons, ammo due to lack of preventive maintenance and fixed maintenance facilities.

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CATEGORY: Colombia

SUBJECT: (U) Strategy

ISSUE #16: (C) Current Colombian maritime/riverine strategy does not fully address critical Amazon Basin nodes.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (C) Stress, as part of overall dialogue with key actors in the GOC and Colombian military, the pivotal importance of Amazon Basin Nodes.

- (C) Once the issues of control over inland waterways and ports are resolved, focus on commerce control [REDACTED]

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CATEGORY: Peru

SUBJECT: (U) Strategy

ISSUE #17: (C) There is no maritime/riverine counternarcotics strategy that is supported by both the GOP and the U.S. Mission.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (U) Continue political dialogue to stress the importance of an integrated strategy for maritime commerce control and riverine interdiction.
- (U) U.S. Mission should, as a matter of priority, develop a strategic proposal to serve as the basis of negotiation on maritime/riverine issues with the GOP. The scarcity of riverine assets necessitates prioritization based on reasonable expectations of end use application.
 - (U) Emphasize a building-block approach based on reasonable expectations (e.g. badly needed maintenance and technical training for existing equipment).
 - (C) Conceptually separate the UHV from other commerce control avenues (i.e., coastal ports, river ports, etc.) in strategic planning.
 - (C) Seek to develop, as a first step, focused "developmental" initiatives that can be implemented and/or expanded quickly should a convergence of USG/GOP interests occur.

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CATEGORY: Peru

SUBJECT: (U) Scope

ISSUES #18: (C) Counternarcotics maritime/riverine activities will have to be expanded beyond the Upper Huallaga Valley in the future.

RECOMMENDATION:

• (C) The [redacted] port [redacted] seems the likely candidate since it is used extensively to: (1) [redacted] importing essential chemicals from Brazil and exporting paste, base, and HCl [redacted] to other transshipment and lab sites and (2) serve as a base for future operations northward up to and along [redacted]

[redacted] is significant as a potential fixed base support site to establish presence along the headwaters [redacted] U.S. Mission planning should consider expansion of riverine interdiction activities beyond the UHV.

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VIETNAM - ANDEAN RIDGE RIVERINE COMPARISON

VIETNAM

THREAT: Infiltration, large scale overt attacks, sabotage; floating mines, swimmers, suicide boats, heavily fortified shore bunkers and assault fire.

CONCEPT: Mobile Afloat Force Concept; large floating bases operating up and down rivers, LSTs, APBs, ARLs, LCM-6s, joint military ops out to 50 km from floating bases, continuous air cover by fixed-wing tactical aircraft and armed helos, extensive vertical lift capability.

ANDEAN RIDGE

THREAT: Small-scale overt attacks, minimal firepower on the water, lightly defended labs and airstrips ashore, contraband and piracy.

CONCEPT: Fixed Operating Base Concept; small riverine bases ashore on/near key river "choke" points, 22-25 ft craft, support vessels, joint Host Nation (HN) military/US-HN LEA ops out to 30 km from fixed site or support vessel, virtually no air cover, minimal vertical lift capability, strong Captain of the Port programs

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VIETNAM - ANDEAN RIDGE RIVERINE COMPARISON (cont.)

VIETNAM

FORCE PRESENCE: Large, unconstrained US presence on and along waterways, HN sovereignty not an issue.

OPERATIONS: Coordinated airmobile, ground, waterborne attacks supported by air and naval forces.

C(3)I: Extensive shipboard/air/land command, control, and intel support, reliable/versatile parallel Army-Navy comms system.

MEDICAL: Medical and surgical teams assigned to floating bases

ANDEAN RIDGE

FORCE PRESENCE: Small, low-profile MTTs, HN sovereignty a primary concern, ROE very restrictive, uncertain HN military/LEA cooperation.

OPERATIONS: Waterborne patrol, interdiction, support, and assault ashore, maritime law enforcement.

C(3)I: Limited comms assets and capabilities, major intel gaps.

MEDICAL: Virtually no medical support available.

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