

**AIRCRAFT  
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD  
REPORT**

**US ARMY UH-60  
BLACK HAWK HELICOPTERS  
87-26000 AND 88-26060**

**VOLUME 11**

**TABS V-001 thru V-016A**

**AIRCRAFT  
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD  
REPORT**

**COPY**

15

**OF**

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**AFR 110-14 AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD  
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**LIST OF WITNESSES**  
(Arranged in Tab Order)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>
MATTHEWS, PERRY J.....	CW2.....	V-001
MURREY, DANIEL P.....	Second Lieutenant.....	V-002
MURREY, DANIEL P.....	Second Lieutenant.....	V-002A
MURREY, DANIEL P.....	Second Lieutenant.....	V-002B
BONG, JAMES I.....	First Lieutenant.....	V-003
BONG, JAMES I.....	First Lieutenant.....	V-003A
BONG, JAMES I.....	First Lieutenant.....	V-003B
DAWSON, KENNETH D.....	Captain.....	V-004
CONTROL WITNESS 02.....	AWACS Co-Pilot.....	V-005
CONTROL WITNESS 03.....	AWACS Flight Engineer.....	V-006
CONTROL WITNESS 04.....	AWACS Instructor Comm Tech.....	V-007
CONTROL WITNESS 05.....	AWACS Instructor Navigator.....	V-008
CONTROL WITNESS 06.....	AWACS Aircraft Commander.....	V-009
CONTROL WITNESS 07.....	AWACS Instr Comm Syst Op.....	V-010
CONTROL WITNESS 08.....	AWACS Comm Tech.....	V-011
CONTROL WITNESS 09.....	Mission Crew Commander.....	V-012
CONTROL WITNESS 10.....	AWACS Instr Mission Crew Cmdr... V-013	
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CONTROL WITNESS 11.....	AWACS Senior Director.....	V-014
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CONTROL WITNESS 13.....	AWACS Enroute Weapons Dir.....	V-016
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CONTROL WITNESS 18.....	AWACS Air Surveillance Tech.....	V-021
CONTROL WITNESS 19.....	AWACS Air Surveillance Tech.....	V-022
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CONTROL WITNESS 23.....		V-026A
CONTROL WITNESS 24.....	AWACS TAOR Weapons Director... V-027	
CONTROL WITNESS 25.....	F-15 Wingman.....	V-028
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CONTROL WITNESS 26.....	F-15 Lead.....	V-029
FOSTER, CHRISTOPHER T.....	Captain.....	V-030
SCHULZ, JOSEPH W.....	Captain.....	V-031

**LIST OF WITNESSES**  
(Arranged in Tab Order)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>
RICHARDSON, DOUGLAS J.....	Colonel.....	V-032
PILKINGTON, JEFFREY S.....	B-Gen.....	V-033
KULA, JAMES D.....	Colonel.....	V-034
KULA, JAMES D.....	Colonel.....	V-034A
BICKET, JOHN S.....	Major.....	V-035
WHITE, BARTON W.....	Senior Airman.....	V-036
SCHMITT, MICHAEL N.....	Lt Colonel.....	V-037
ROCHEN, JERRY G., JR.....	Chief Master Sergeant.....	V-038
RIVERS, GLORIA H.....	Civilian.....	V-039
NORMAN, TODD B.....	Airman First Class.....	V-040
THOMAS, BENNIE, JR.....	Sergeant.....	V-041
ZAHRT, JOHN W.....	Lieutenant Colonel.....	V-042
SONNENBERG, DAVID L.....	Colonel.....	V-043
(RESERVED).....		V-044
COGGINS, LYNDON R.....	Sergeant.....	V-045
YOUNG, LAVERM.....	Major.....	V-046
NETHERLAND, SCOTT R.....	Major.....	V-047
MENARD, MICHAEL J.....	Chief Warrant Officer 4.....	V-048
HENRY, WILLIAM E.....	Chief Warrant Officer 3.....	V-049
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.....	Chief Warrant Officer 3.....	V-050
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.....	Chief Warrant Officer 3.....	V-050A
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.....	Chief Warrant Officer 3.....	V-050B
KOCH, KENNETH J.....	Chief Warrant Officer 2.....	V-051
BOULEY, WILLIAM R.....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-052
PATTERSON, SCOTT F.....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-053
BEACHLER, CORY C.....	Sergeant.....	V-054
BOWEN, DEON M.....	Sergeant.....	V-055
MCCARTHY, JOHN A.....	Specialist.....	V-056
MONSULICK, CHRISTINA M.....	Specialist.....	V-057
MCCARTHY, RUSSELL P.....	Specialist.....	V-058
INGRAM, JOHN.....	Civilian.....	V-059
PAGE, GILMAN WILLIAM.....	Civilian.....	V-060
STREET, TERRY W.....	Civilian.....	V-061
NEUSER, STEVEN T.....	Captain.....	V-062
JOLY, MICHELE.....	Captain.....	V-063
TAHSIN, MOWFIK.....	Civilian.....	V-064
AMIN, HADI MOHAMMED.....	Civilian.....	V-065
AMIN, AZIZ MOHAMMED.....	Civilian.....	V-066
AMIN, MOHAMMED.....	Civilian.....	V-067
CARLSON, MICHAEL A.....	Chief Warrant Officer 2.....	V-068
SANDERS, DONALD L.....	Major.....	V-069

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>
SANDERS, DONALD L. ....	Major .....	V-069A
SANDERS, DONALD L. ....	Major .....	V-069B
FRASER, GEORGE M. ....	Captain.....	V-070
GANZE, ELIZABETH .....	Captain.....	V-071
SHORT, JOHN E. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-072
LARREAU, ROD P. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-073
DAIGLE, CONNIE S. ....	PFC.....	V-074
DEWITT, TERRY A. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-075
CONTROL WITNESS 34.....	CFAC Mission Dir (Mad Dog) .....	V-076
CONTROL WITNESS 34.....		V-076A
DONOVAN, JOHN C. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-077
WALKER, ROBERT HUGHES .....	Captain.....	V-078
WALKER, ROBERT HUGHES .....	Captain.....	V-078A
KENT, JEFFREY L. ....	Captain.....	V-079
DOUGHERTY, MARK E.....	Lieutenant Colonel .....	V-080
CATLETT, CHARLES E., JR. ....	Technical Sergeant .....	V-081
NOLAN, WILLIAM C. III .....	First Lieutenant .....	V-082
MANION, KEVIN J .....	Captain.....	V-083
NILSEN, CARL R., JR. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-084
SCHNEIDMULLER, GEORGE C., JR .....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-085
LINDAMOOD, DONNA G. ....	Technical Sergeant .....	V-086
GODIN, ROBERT A. ....	Technical Sergeant .....	V-087
MARCIK, ROBERT J. II.....	Master Sergeant .....	V-088
ZIMMERMAN, GARY R.....	Captain.....	V-089
FEMENELLA, JAMES C. ....	Senior Airman .....	V-090
HUNT, JOSEPH F. ....	Colonel.....	V-091
EMERY, CURTIS H. II.....	Colonel.....	V-092
FELS, JAMES D. ....	Lieutenant Colonel .....	V-093
FRECHTLING, ANDREW C. ....	Major .....	V-094
MALBROUGH, RODNEY L. JR. ....	First Lieutenant .....	V-095
PINTER, MICHAEL W. ....	Lieutenant Colonel .....	V-096
O'BRIEN, JAMES R. ....	Colonel.....	V-097
O'BRIEN, JAMES R.....	Colonel.....	V-097A
WIGGINS, BURTON D. ....	Major .....	V-098
MUSTAFA, ALI.....	Civilian.....	V-099
THOMPSON, GERALD B. ....	Colonel.....	V-100
THOMPSON, GERALD B. ....	Colonel.....	V-100A
ATKINS, BRIAN MICHAEL .....	Lieutenant Colonel .....	V-101
BALL, TERRY G.....	Chief Warrant Officer 2 .....	V-102
BROWNE, JAMES S. ....	Captain.....	V-103

**LIST OF WITNESSES**  
**(Arranged in Tab Order)**

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>
BROWNE, JAMES S. ....	Captain.....	V-103A
NYE, MICHAEL A. ....	1st Lieutenant.....	V-104
NYE, MICHAEL A. ....	1st Lieutenant.....	V-104A
THOMAS, SCOTT ALLEN.....	Captain.....	V-105
PINGEL, STEPHEN R. ....	Colonel.....	V-106
HENSON, ALLEN T. ....	Chief Warrant Officer 2.....	V-107
HASSELL, LEONARD G. ....	Colonel.....	V-108
WHITE, LARRY D. ....	Major.....	V-109
WITCHER, CARL J. ....	Lieutenant Colonel.....	V-110
CUMBEE, MARK K. ....	Lieutenant.....	V-111
HALL, WILLIAM E., JR. ....	Colonel.....	V-112
BETHEL, PAULETTE M. ....	Major.....	V-113
STEVENS, PHILIP R. ....	Captain.....	V-114
FOLEY, JOHN M. II.....	Civilian.....	V-115
THOMPSON, ALAN.....	Colonel.....	V-116
MASON, WILLIAM D. ....	Major.....	V-117
BERNARD, ANDREW T. ....	1st Lieutenant.....	V-118
BERNARD, ANDREW T. ....	1st Lieutenant.....	V-118A
BRONSON, MATTHEW F. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-119
MAHER, ROGER D. ....	Colonel.....	V-120
ROGERS, JAMES R. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-121

**LIST OF WITNESSES**  
(Arranged in Alphabetical Order)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>
AMIN, HADI MOHAMMED .....	Civilian .....	V-065
AMIN, AZIZ MOHAMMED .....	Civilian .....	V-066
AMIN, MOHAMMED .....	Civilian .....	V-067
ATKINS, BRIAN MICHAEL .....	Lieutenant Colonel .....	V-101
BALL, TERRY G. ....	Chief Warrant Officer 2 .....	V-102
BEACHLER, CORY C. ....	Sergeant .....	V-054
BERNARD, ANDREW T. ....	1st Lieutenant .....	V-118
BERNARD, ANDREW T. ....	1st Lieutenant .....	V-118A
BETHEL, PAULETTE M. ....	Major .....	V-113
BICKET, JOHN S. ....	Major .....	V-035
BONG, JAMES I. ....	First Lieutenant .....	V-003
BONG, JAMES I. ....	First Lieutenant .....	V-003A
BONG, JAMES I. ....	First Lieutenant .....	V-003B
BOULEY, WILLIAM R. ....	Staff Sergeant .....	V-052
BOWEN, DEON M. ....	Sergeant .....	V-055
BRONSON, MATTHEW F. ....	Staff Sergeant .....	V-119
BROWNE, JAMES S. ....	Captain .....	V-103
BROWNE, JAMES S. ....	Captain .....	V-103A
CARLSON, MICHAEL A. ....	Chief Warrant Officer 2 .....	V-068
CATLETT, CHARLES E., JR. ....	Technical Sergeant .....	V-081
COGGINS, LYNDON R. ....	Sergeant .....	V-045
CONTROL WITNESS 02.....	AWACS Co-Pilot .....	V-005
CONTROL WITNESS 03.....	AWACS Flight Engineer .....	V-006
CONTROL WITNESS 04.....	AWACS Instructor Comm Tech.....	V-007
CONTROL WITNESS 05.....	AWACS Instructor Navigator .....	V-008
CONTROL WITNESS 06.....	AWACS Aircraft Commander .....	V-009
CONTROL WITNESS 07.....	AWACS Instr Comm Syst Op .....	V-010
CONTROL WITNESS 08.....	AWACS Communication Tech.....	V-011
CONTROL WITNESS 09.....	AWACS Mission Crew Commander ..	V-012
CONTROL WITNESS 10 .....	AWACS Instr Mission Crew Cmdr ...	V-013
CONTROL WITNESS 10.....	.....	V-013A
CONTROL WITNESS 11.....	AWACS Senior Director .....	V-014
CONTROL WITNESS 11.....	.....	V-014A
CONTROL WITNESS 12.....	AWACS Instr Weapons Director.....	V-015
CONTROL WITNESS 13.....	AWACS Enroute Weapons Director ..	V-016
CONTROL WITNESS 13.....	.....	V-016A
CONTROL WITNESS 14.....	AWACS Tanker Weapons Director ..	V-017
CONTROL WITNESS 14.....	.....	V-017A
CONTROL WITNESS 15.....	AWACS Air Surveillance Officer.....	V-018
CONTROL WITNESS 16.....	AWACS Advanced Air Surv Tech....	V-019



**LIST OF WITNESSES**  
(Arranged in Alphabetical Order)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>
CONTROL WITNESS 17.....	AWACS Air Surveillance Tech.....	V-020
CONTROL WITNESS 18.....	AWACS Air Surveillance Tech.....	V-021
CONTROL WITNESS 19.....	AWACS Air Surveillance Tech.....	V-022
CONTROL WITNESS 20.....	AWACS Instr Comp/Display Tech ...	V-023
CONTROL WITNESS 21.....	AWACS Airborne Radar Tech.....	V-024
CONTROL WITNESS 22.....	AWACS Airborne Radar Operator ...	V-025
CONTROL WITNESS 23.....	ACE/DUKE .....	V-026
CONTROL WITNESS 23.....		V-026A
CONTROL WITNESS 24.....	AWACS TAOR Weapons Director...	V-027
CONTROL WITNESS 25.....	F-15 Wingman.....	V-028
CONTROL WITNESS 25.....		V-028A
CONTROL WITNESS 26.....	F-15 Lead.....	V-029
CONTROL WITNESS 34.....	CFACC Mission Dir (Mad Dog).....	V-076
CONTROL WITNESS 34.....		V-076A
CUMBEE, MARK K. ....	Lieutenant .....	V-111
DAIGLE, CONNIE S. ....	PFC.....	V-074
DAWSON, KENNETH D.....	Captain.....	V-004
DEWITT, TERRY A. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-075
DONOVAN, JOHN C. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-077
DOUGHERTY, MARK E.....	Lieutenant Colonel .....	V-080
EMERY, CURTIS H. II.....	Colonel.....	V-092
FELS, JAMES D. ....	Lieutenant Colonel .....	V-093
FEMENELLA, JAMES C.....	Senior Airman .....	V-090
FOLEY, JOHN M.....	Civilian.....	V-115
FOSTER, CHRISTOPHER T.....	Captain.....	V-030
FRASER, GEORGE M. ....	Captain.....	V-070
FRECHTLING, ANDREW C.....	Major .....	V-094
GANZE, ELIZABETH .....	Captain.....	V-071
GODIN, ROBERT A. ....	Technical Sergeant .....	V-087
HALL, WILLIAM E., JR.....	Colonel.....	V-112
HASSELL, LEONARD G.....	Colonel.....	V-108
HENRY, WILLIAM E.....	Chief Warrant Officer 3 .....	V-049
HENSON, ALLEN T.....	Chief Warrant Officer 2 .....	V-107
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.....	Chief Warrant Officer 3 .....	V-050
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.....	Chief Warrant Officer 3 .....	V-050A
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.....	Chief Warrant Officer 3 .....	V-050B
HUNT, JOSEPH F.....	Colonel.....	V-091
INGRAM, JOHN.....	Civilian.....	V-059
JOLY, MICHELE .....	Captain.....	V-063
KENT, JEFFREY L.....	Captain.....	V-079
KOCH, KENNETH J.....	Chief Warrant Officer 2 .....	V-051

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(Arranged in Alphabetical Order)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>
KULA, JAMES D.....	Colonel.....	V-034
KULA, JAMES D.....	Colonel.....	V-034A
LARREAU, ROD P.....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-073
LINDAMOOD, DONNA G.....	Technical Sergeant.....	V-086
MAHER, ROGER D.....	Colonel.....	V-120
MALBROUGH, RODNEY L. JR.....	First Lieutenant.....	V-095
MANION, KEVIN J.....	Captain.....	V-083
MARCIK, ROBERT J. II.....	Master Sergeant.....	V-088
MASON, WILLIAM D.....	Major.....	V-117
MATTHEWS, PERRY J.....	CW2.....	V-001
MCCARTHY, RUSSELL P.....	Specialist.....	V-058
MCCARTHY, JOHN A.....	Specialist.....	V-056
MENARD, MICHAEL J.....	Chief Warrant Officer 4.....	V-048
MONSULICK, CHRISTINA M.....	Specialist.....	V-057
MURREY, DANIEL P.....	Second Lieutenant.....	V-002
MURREY, DANIEL P.....	Second Lieutenant.....	V-002A
MURREY, DANIEL P.....	Second Lieutenant.....	V-002B
MUSTAFA, ALI.....	Civilian.....	V-099
NETHERLAND, SCOTT R.....	Major.....	V-047
NEUSER, STEVEN T.....	Captain.....	V-062
NILSEN, CARL R., JR.....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-084
NOLAN, WILLIAM C., III.....	First Lieutenant.....	V-082
NORMAN, TODD B.....	Airman First Class.....	V-040
NYE, MICHAEL A.....	1st Lieutenant.....	V-104
NYE, MICHAEL A.....	1st Lieutenant.....	V-104A
O'BRIEN, JAMES R.....	Colonel.....	V-097
O'BRIEN, JAMES R.....	Colonel.....	V-097A
PAGE, GILMAN WILLIAM.....	Civilian.....	V-060
PATTERSON, SCOTT F.....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-053
PILKINGTON, JEFFREY S.....	B-Gen.....	V-033
PINGEL, STEPHEN R.....	Colonel.....	V-106
PINTER, MICHAEL W.....	Lieutenant Colonel.....	V-096
(RESERVED).....		V-044
RICHARDSON, DOUGLAS J.....	Colonel.....	V-032
RIVERS, GLORIA H.....	Civilian.....	V-039
ROCHEN, JERRY G., JR.....	Chief Master Sergeant.....	V-038
ROGERS, JAMES R.....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-121
SANDERS, DONALD L.....	Major.....	V-069
SANDERS, DONALD L.....	Major.....	V-069A

**LIST OF WITNESSES**  
**(Arranged in Alphabetical Order)**

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>
SANDERS, DONALD L. ....	Major .....	V-069B
SCHMITT, MICHAEL N.....	Lt Colonel .....	V-037
SCHNEIDMULLER, GEORGE C....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-085
SCHULZ, JOSEPH W. ....	Captain.....	V-031
SHORT, JOHN E. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-072
SONNENBERG, DAVID L.....	Colonel.....	V-043
STEVENS, PHILIP R.....	Captain.....	V-114
STREET, TERRY W.....	Civilian.....	V-061
TAHSIN, MOWFIK .....	Civilian.....	V-064
THOMAS, BENNIE, JR. ....	Sergeant.....	V-041
THOMAS, SCOTT ALLEN .....	Captain.....	V-105
THOMPSON, GERALD B.....	Colonel.....	V-100
THOMPSON, GERALD B.....	Colonel.....	V-100A
THOMPSON, ALAN.....	Colonel.....	V-116
WALKER, ROBERT HUGHES .....	Captain.....	V-078
WALKER, ROBERT HUGHES .....	Captain.....	V-078A
WHITE, BARTON W.....	Senior Airman .....	V-036
WHITE, LARRY D.....	Major .....	V-109
WIGGINS, BURTON D. ....	Major .....	V-098
WITCHER, CARL J.....	Lieutenant Colonel .....	V-110
YOUNG, LAVERM.....	Major .....	V-046
ZAHRT, JOHN W.....	Lieutenant Colonel .....	V-042
ZIMMERMAN, GARY R.....	Captain.....	V-089

**CLASSIFIED ADDENDUM WITNESSES  
(Arranged in Tab Order)**

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>	<u>CLASSIFIED ADDENDUM</u>
MATTHEWS, PERRY J.....	CW2 .....	V-001	
MURREY, DANIEL P.....	Second Lieutenant.....	V-002	
MURREY, DANIEL P.....	Second Lieutenant.....	V-002A	
MURREY, DANIEL P.....	Second Lieutenant.....	V-002B	
BONG, JAMES I.....	First Lieutenant .....	V-003	
BONG, JAMES I.....	First Lieutenant .....	V-003A	
BONG, JAMES I.....	First Lieutenant .....	V-003B	
DAWSON, KENNETH D.....	Captain.....	V-004	
CONTROL WITNESS 02.....	AWACS Co-Pilot.....	V-005	
CONTROL WITNESS 03.....	AWACS Flight Engineer ...	V-006	
CONTROL WITNESS 04.....	AWACS Instr Comm Tech	V-007	
CONTROL WITNESS 05.....	AWACS Instr Navigator ...	V-008	
CONTROL WITNESS 06.....	AWACS Aircraft CC.....	V-009	
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CONTROL WITNESS 20.....	AWACS Comp/Disp Tech.	V-023	
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FOSTER, CHRISTOPHER T.....	Captain.....	V-030	pgs 1-6

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>	<u>CLASSIFIED ADDENDUM</u>
SCHULZ, JOSEPH W.	Captain	V-031	pgs 4,5,10
RICHARDSON, DOUGLAS J.	Colonel	V-032	pgs 21-24
PILKINGTON, JEFFREY S.	B-Gen	V-033	
KULA, JAMES D.	Colonel	V-034	
KULA, JAMES D.	Colonel	V-034A	
BICKET, JOHN S.	Major	V-035	
WHITE, BARTON W.	Senior Airman	V-036	
SCHMITT, MICHAEL N.	Lt Colonel	V-037	
ROCHEN, JERRY G., JR.	Chief Master Sergeant	V-038	
RIVERS, GLORIA H.	Civilian	V-039	
NORMAN, TODD B.	Airman First Class	V-040	
THOMAS, BENNIE, JR.	Sergeant	V-041	
ZAHRT, JOHN W.	Lieutenant Colonel	V-042	
SONNENBERG, DAVID L.	Colonel	V-043	
(RESERVED)		V-044	
COGGINS, LYNDON R.	Sergeant	V-045	
YOUNG, LAVERM	Major	V-046	
NETHERLAND, SCOTT R.	Major	V-047	
MENARD, MICHAEL J.	Chief Warrant Officer 4	V-048	
HENRY, WILLIAM E.	Chief Warrant Officer 3	V-049	
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.	Chief Warrant Officer 3	V-050	
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HOLDEN, KENNETH D.	Chief Warrant Officer 3	V-050B	
KOCH, KENNETH J.	Chief Warrant Officer 2	V-051	
BOULEY, WILLIAM R.	Staff Sergeant	V-052	
PATTERSON, SCOTT F.	Staff Sergeant	V-053	
BEACHLER, CORY C.	Sergeant	V-054	
BOWEN, DEON M.	Sergeant	V-055	
MCCARTHY, JOHN A.	Specialist	V-056	
MONSULICK, CHRISTINA M.	Specialist	V-057	
MCCARTHY, RUSSELL P.	Specialist	V-058	
INGRAM, JOHN	Civilian	V-059	
PAGE, GILMAN WILLIAM	Civilian	V-060	
STREET, TERRY W.	Civilian	V-061	
NEUSER, STEVEN T.	Captain	V-062	pgs 19-22,24,26,30,37,51
JOLY, MICHELE	Captain	V-063	
TAHSIN, MOWFIK	Civilian	V-064	
AMIN, HADI MOHAMMED	Civilian	V-065	
AMIN, AZIZ MOHAMMED	Civilian	V-066	

**CLASSIFIED ADDENDUM WITNESSES**  
(Arranged in Tab Order)

**CLASSIFIED**  
**ADDENDUM**

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>	
AMIN, MOHAMMED.....	Civilian.....	V-067	
CARLSON, MICHAEL A. ....	Chief Warrant Officer 2 ....	V-068	
SANDERS, DONALD L. ....	Major.....	V-069	
SANDERS, DONALD L. ....	Major.....	V-069A	
SANDERS, DONALD L. ....	Major.....	V-069B	
FRASER, GEORGE M. ....	Captain.....	V-070	
GANZE, ELIZABETH .....	Captain.....	V-071	
SHORT, JOHN E. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-072	
LARREAU, ROD P. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-073	
DAIGLE, CONNIE S. ....	PFC.....	V-074	
DEWITT, TERRY A. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-075	
CONTROL WITNESS 34 .....	CFACC Mission Dir (Mad Dog)..	V-076.....	pgs 44-46
CONTROL WITNESS 34.....		V-076A	
DONOVAN, JOHN C. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-077	
WALKER, ROBERT HUGHES .....	Captain.....	V-078	
WALKER, ROBERT HUGHES .....	Captain.....	V-078A	
KENT, JEFFREY L. ....	Captain.....	V-079	
DOUGHERTY, MARK E.....	Lieutenant Colonel .....	V-080.....	pgs 39-41
CATLETT, CHARLES E., JR. ....	Technical Sergeant .....	V-081	
NOLAN, WILLIAM C. III .....	First Lieutenant .....	V-082.....	pgs 4,6,7
MANION, KEVIN J.....	Captain.....	V-083.....	pgs 5,7
NILSEN, CARL R., JR. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-084	
SCHNEIDMULLER, GEORGE C.,JR .....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-085	
LINDAMOOD, DONNA G. ....	Technical Sergeant .....	V-086	
GODIN, ROBERT A. ....	Technical Sergeant .....	V-087	
MARCIK, ROBERT J. II.....	Master Sergeant .....	V-088	
ZIMMERMAN, GARY R.....	Captain.....	V-089	
FEMENELLA, JAMES C. ....	Senior Airman .....	V-090	
HUNT, JOSEPH F. ....	Colonel.....	V-091	
EMERY, CURTIS H. II.....	Colonel.....	V-092.....	pgs 4, 21, 24, 30, 31
FELS, JAMES D. ....	Lieutenant Colonel .....	V-093.....	pgs 5,12
FRECHTLING, ANDREW C. ....	Major.....	V-094.....	pgs 6-8,14
MALBROUGH, RODNEY L. JR.....	First Lieutenant .....	V-095	
PINTER, MICHAEL W. ....	Lieutenant Colonel .....	V-096	
O'BRIEN, JAMES R. ....	Colonel.....	V-097	
O'BRIEN, JAMES R.....	Colonel.....	V-097A	
WIGGINS, BURTON D. ....	Major.....	V-098	
MUSTAFA, ALI.....	Civilian.....	V-099	
THOMPSON, GERALD B. ....	Colonel.....	V-100	

**CLASSIFIED ADDENDUM WITNESSES  
(Arranged in Tab Order)**

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>	<u>CLASSIFIED ADDENDUM</u>
THOMPSON, GERALD B. ....	Colonel.....	V-100A	
ATKINS, BRIAN MICHAEL .....	Lieutenant Colonel .....	V-101	
BALL, TERRY G. ....	Chief Warrant Officer 2 .....	V-102	
BROWNE, JAMES S. ....	Captain.....	V-103	pg 2
BROWNE, JAMES S. ....	Captain.....	V-103A	
NYE, MICHAEL A. ....	1st Lieutenant.....	V-104	
NYE, MICHAEL A. ....	1st Lieutenant.....	V-104A	
THOMAS, SCOTT ALLEN .....	Captain.....	V-105	
PINGEL, STEPHEN R. ....	Colonel.....	V-106	
HENSON, ALLEN T. ....	Chief Warrant Officer 2 .....	V-107	
HASSELL, LEONARD G. ....	Colonel.....	V-108	
WHITE, LARRY D. ....	Major .....	V-109	
WITCHER, CARL J. ....	Lieutenant Colonel .....	V-110	
CUMBEE, MARK K. ....	Lieutenant .....	V-111	
HALL, WILLIAM E., JR. ....	Colonel.....	V-112	
BETHEL, PAULETTE M. ....	Major .....	V-113	
STEVENS, PHILIP R. ....	Captain.....	V-114	
FOLEY, JOHN M. II .....	Civilian.....	V-115	
THOMPSON, ALAN.....	Colonel.....	V-116	
MASON, WILLIAM D. ....	Major .....	V-117	
BERNARD, ANDREW T. ....	1st Lieutenant.....	V-118	
BERNARD, ANDREW T. ....	1st Lieutenant.....	V-118A	
BRONSON, MATTHEW F .....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-119	
MAHER, ROGER D. ....	Colonel.....	V-120	
ROGERS, JAMES R. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-121	

**TAB V-001**

**MATTHEWS, PERRY J.**



## SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

**PERRY JOSEPH MATTHEWS, CW2, U.S. ARMY**  
**Company C, 6/159 AVN Regiment**  
**APO AE 09182**

The interview was conducted by Chief Warrant Officer 5 Meline at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, beginning at 0840 hours, 7 May 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14 and the witness was sworn.

### EXAMINATION

I'm an instructor pilot with Eagle Flight detachment in Turkey.

This is my second rotation with Eagle Flight. I have flown approximately fifty to a hundred missions in the TAOR. My last tour was over a hundred days, from June through September of last year. I just got down here this year on the 20th of April.

I'm a UH-60 rated pilot. I'm also rated in the UH-1, however, the only time I've flown the UH-1 was in flight school. I have over twenty-five hundred hours of Black Hawk experience. I've flown in theaters around the world; Korea, Central America, South America, the United States, over here. I've been an instructor pilot since 1990. I probably have six to seven hundred hours of instructor pilot time. I've flown in this theater probably in excess of two hundred hours in the TAOR.

I am familiar with the regulatory requirements regarding transponder operations during multi-ship missions. In this theater, the lead aircraft squawks the ATC functions, which are Mode III, Alpha and Charlie. He also squawks Mode I, II and IV. The trail or additional aircraft squawk Mode I, II and IV.

During past assignments, I have followed pretty much the same transponder operation. One aircraft is designated to squawk the ATC functions when they're in a flight and then, according to whatever is the local directive, the other aircraft would squawk what the directive requires. Usually only one aircraft squawks the ATC type functions.

The requirement regarding only one aircraft to squawk the ATC is in the Airspace Coordination Order, so it's a local directive. Only the lead aircraft squawks the ATC function because, as I understand it, if you have more than one aircraft in close proximity squawking the Mode III functions, it just creates a bunch of clutter on the traffic controller's radar screen.

**MATTHEWS**

AWACS has asked me to turn off my Mode III in the past. I've never been instructed to turn off my IFF. That has happened both in Turkish airspace and in the TAOR.

I am not aware of any functional problems which may arise when operating transponders during multi-ship operations. I have not specifically heard the term signal blanking nor have I heard of any regulatory requirements on the IFF with regard to signal blanking.

In my experience and through the courses I have taken, preparing me for my present occupation, I have not heard about any possibility of Mode IV signals from one aircraft interfering with Mode IV signals from another aircraft in close proximity.

I am familiar with the Airspace Tasking Order. It tells you basically which aircraft are doing what, on what day, and at what time. It also usually contains the SPINS when it's given to us. It shows frequencies and call signs.

(The witness was handed a copy of the ATO for the 14th of April 1994, evidence tag number 106)

I am familiar with this ATO. It's similar to the ATO that I had when I was here on my previous TDY assignment. If you look at the UH-60 section of the ATO, the Mode II comes right after you find your flight, Eagle One, and then the Mode II for that is fifty-five-thirty. Chalk Two or Eagle Two would be fifty-five-thirty-one, according to this.

If you go back, further in the back, you find the other Mode III's and Mode II's. It shows Mode I for a rotary wing in non-AOR is forty-two. I don't see an AOR squawk for Mode I.

I think when I was here previously, we used the same Mode One code in the AOR as we did outside of the AOR. It was in the ATO. It was in the SPINS. It told you what to squawk. I don't recall a differentiation between in the AOR and not in the AOR.

The Mode III is behind that and all the aircraft, within a fifty nautical mile range, have separate Mode III squawks. Eagle has never been on that list, but that's kind of understandable because, when you get outside of the fifty nautical mile range, it says all aircraft squawk twenty-four hundred. The fifty nautical mile range refers to fifty miles from Incirlik. Since we're based out of Pirinlik, we never questioned why we weren't on that list of Mode III squawks.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions)

**MATTHEWS**

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of Perry Joseph Matthews, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Scott C. Black", with a horizontal line extending to the right.

SCOTT C. BLACK, Lt Colonel, USA  
Legal Advisor

**MATTHEWS**

V-001

TAB V-002

V-002

MURREY, DANIEL P.

**VERBATIM TESTIMONY  
OF  
SECOND LIEUTENANT DANIEL P. MURREY  
36 OPERATION SUPPORT SQUADRON  
BITBURG AIR BASE, GERMANY**

COL WILCOX: The time is now 1526 on 16 April 1994. The following persons are present: Colonel Michael Fain, Lieutenant Colonel Brian Lawler, Lieutenant Colonel Wayne Mudge, Colonel Charles Wilcox, --

Lieutenant, what's your first name?

WITNESS: Daniel Murrey, sir.

COL WILCOX: -- Lieutenant Daniel Murrey. The Board reporter is Ms. Erma Brundage-Clark.

At this time I'd like to swear the reporter in.

(The court reporter is sworn.)

COL WILCOX: This interview is being conducted at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. This is an official AFR 110-14 Aircraft Accident Investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters and the possible involvement of U.S. fighter aircraft in the crash of these helicopters in the northern No-Fly-Zone of Iraq on 14 April 1994. This investigation is being conducted at the direction of General Robert C. Oaks, CINCUSAFE.

The purpose of this Accident Investigation is to obtain and preserve all available evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. Testimony given in this Accident Investigation may be used for any purpose deemed appropriate by competent authority, and may be publicly disseminated.

Do you understand the purpose of this investigation?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

COL WILCOX: Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: No, sir.

COL WILCOX: Your testimony will be recorded and transcribed verbatim so that a written

**MURREY**

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record can be made available to the appointing or higher authority. For the benefit of the reporter please avoid using acronyms or jargon.

COL FAIN: Let me add at this point, when you refer to the aircraft you can refer to them as call sign or lead, no names.

WITNESS: Okay, sir.

COL WILCOX: As this is an official investigation, you are required to answer questions put to you by this Board. You are further advised not to discuss classified information unless necessary to develop your testimony. If it is necessary for you to discuss classified information, you need to identify it as such.

Would you please rise so I can swear you in.

(The witness is sworn.)

### EXAMINATION

1.Q. Would you state your full name.

1.A. Daniel P. Murrey, Second Lieutenant.

2.Q. And your organization please.

2.A. I'm attached to the 53d Fighter Squadron, deployed.

3.Q. Where are you stationed presently?

3.A. Bitburg Air Base, 36th Operations Support Squadron.

4.Q. What's your present duty assignment?

4.A. It's Bitburg, sir.

5.Q. Are you TDY here to Incirlik?

5.A. Yes, sir.

6.Q. What is your TDY assignment?

6.A. As Intel Officer to the 53d Fighter Squadron.

7.Q. I'm going to ask you a series of questions concerning the 14th of April. I'm really interested in finding out -- getting information about your contacts with the crews, more specifically, the F-15 crews, if you had any. What I would like you to avoid is telling me anything that they may have said to you. What I'm really interested in is what your thought pattern was and what, if anything, you said to them. Do you understand?

**MURREY**

7.A. Yes, sir.

8.Q. Are you familiar with the incident I described earlier in the No-Fly-Zone in Iraq on 14 April?

8.A. Yes, sir.

9.Q. You said that you work in the Intel section?

9.A. Yes, sir.

10.Q. Just give me a general description of what your duties are, please.

10.A. Sir, I'm the officer in charge of Intel for the 53d here in Turkey. I have an NCO assigned at the shop also. We are co-located with the Operations desk for the 53d Fighter Squadron. We give daily intelligence briefs, threat briefs, those types of things, for the pilots before they step to the aircraft to fly, and we debrief them on what they've seen, what the events were of the flight when they were out in the AOR.

11.Q. Did you give any briefings on the 14th of April?

11.A. Yes, sir.

12.Q. Did you give them to the F-15 crews that were involved -- that were possibly involved in this incident?

12.A. Yes, sir.

13.Q. Did you give both the brief and the debrief?

13.A. Yes, sir.

14.Q. Tell me generally how you do a debrief.

14.A. Sir, on a debrief -- before I start that this is -- let's make it clear that this is the first time I've debriefed on an incident like this.

15.Q. I'm not interested in how you debriefed this particular incident. I'd like to know generally how you conduct a debrief.

15.A. A normal debrief is, I will ask pilots what times -- times they were out in the AOR, what time they hit the gate, what time they left, their refueling times. I will ask them about any kind of contacts they may have had, radar contacts they may have had in the AOR and south of the 36th line. I will ask them for any kind of electronic indications that were specific to that sortie, and if there were any specific events I'll have them expound. I'll get their impression of what was going on, any kinds of altitudes, speeds, those types of things they might want to impart, they feel are important.

16.Q. On the 14th of April when the two F-15 crews returned to Incirlik Air Base, did you go out to the aircraft and meet the aircraft when it came in?

**MURREY**

16.A. Yes, sir.

17.Q. Is that part of your normal debriefing procedure?

17.A. No, sir, it was unique to the situation.

18.Q. Why did you go out and meet this particular crew?

18.A. Sir, the Wing Intelligence people showed up from the composite -- the CFAC -- can't remember what that stands for. Anyway, the CFAC Intel people showed up and they were going to go out to the plane and they were my crews, so I decided to go out with them so I could debrief them, with the captain, the IN for CFAC.

19.Q. Was the fact that the CFAC -- did you say CFAC Intel?

19.A. Yes, sir.

20.Q. Was it normal for them to come out and meet the planes coming back?

20.A. No, sir.

21.Q. Do you know why they came over to meet these particular aircraft?

21.A. Sir, we had a shoot down. We had reports of a shoot down, so -- They were very vague, but they said that there may have been more implications than just a directed shoot down, so that was why they came out. They made it clear that many of the colonels on base were concerned, and so that was the reason for them coming out to the Squadron Operations Center.

22.Q. Did they give you any specifics about -- any additional specifics about why people were concerned?

22.A. Sir, they said that ----

23.Q. That's a yes or no at this point.

23.A. Yes, sir.

24.Q. The debrief, I believe, involved something called a mission report, or a "misrep."

24.A. Yes, sir.

25.Q. Is it normal when crews return that they fill out a "misrep" or a mission report?

25.A. No, sir, what's normal is they give me the information, I fill out a "misrep."

26.Q. Did you fill out the information in this particular case?

26.A. Yes, sir.

27.Q. The crews gave you the information?

27.A. Yes, sir.

**MURREY**



28.Q. Were you the primary debriefer in this case?

28.A. Yes, sir, I co-debriefed with the CFAC IN, but he let me ask the questions and took notes.

29.Q. Who was the CFAC IN?

29.A. Captain Kenneth Dawson.

30.Q. At the time that you performed this debriefing -- Did you ask all the questions during the debriefing?

30.A. Sir, I asked approximately 75 percent of the questions.

31.Q. Captain Dawson asked the other questions?

31.A. Yes, sir.

32.Q. Was there anyone else involved in the debriefing?

32.A. Sir, there were other Intel officers there, as well as my NCO, but they did not ask any questions.

33.Q. So the only two people that were asking questions of the crewmembers members were you and Captain Dawson?

33.A. Yes, sir.

34.Q. Did you believe or did you have any reason to believe that the questions that you were asking were somehow related to a Safety Investigation?

34.A. No, sir.

35.Q. As far as you were concerned then, it was a normal debriefing procedure that you were using?

35.A. Yes, sir.

36.Q. Except for the fact that it had this extra interest?

36.A. Yes, sir, I -- for my own personal feelings, I discounted any concern. I was -- I just thought there was no reason for concern. I conducted it like I would have conducted it had no one come out to the SOC.

37.Q. No one indicated to you that the information gathered from the pilots were somehow protected or privileged?

37.A. Yes, sir, they did.

38.Q. Someone did indicate that to you?

38.A. Yes, sir.

39.Q. Who?

**MURREY**

39.A. The pilots were picked up at the aircraft. We were instructed that they would be taken directly up to the Wing Operations Center.

40.Q. Where did you conduct your debrief?

40.A. Sir, I conducted it on the flight line.

41.Q. At the aircraft?

41.A. Yes, sir.

42.Q. Did you fill out the mission report on the flight line at the time that you were asking the questions of the crew?

42.A. Sir, I took notes. I did not -- I typed the "misrep" up later on after final debriefs.

43.Q. You indicated that you had some reason to believe that perhaps this information was protected or part of a Safety Investigation or privileged.

43.A. Not Safety, I -- my understanding was that anything that happened down here was to be close-held until the General decided to release it to the press. My impression was he wanted to be able to talk to his superiors and ultimately the JCS before the press carried any kind of reports. So we were to -- if any incidents happened whatsoever in Iraq, we were to keep those strictly confidential until we were instructed to do otherwise.

44.Q. So the fact that you believed that this information had some protection on it, when you say that - please correct me if I get this wrong - refers to the protections imposed in a general way by the commanding -- this CTF Commander, with regards to incidents in Iraq?

44.A. Yes, sir.

45.Q. Did you have any reason to believe that the information that was being requested from the pilots was part of a Safety Investigation or a Safety Board or privileged, that is, could not be released by the General? Do you understand my question?

45.A. Not exactly, sir. If I can rephrase what my feelings were at the time. I understood that there was concern other than just the fact that there had been a shoot down over Iraq. I discounted it, so I conducted everything as per normal, but I knew that there was concern at Wing and with Captain Dawson and that was why he was present, and I knew that that information was going to go straight up the channel, and was not to be talked about until we were instructed otherwise, exactly why -- what I felt the reason why was because General Pilkington and his superiors wanted to have all the information before there was -- before rumors started.

46.Q. Did you or did you hear anyone else indicate to the crew members that the information that you were gathering for this mission report was privileged information and couldn't be released?

46.A. Sir, it was classified information, so if that's what you mean by privileged, yes, all the information that was gathered is classified, so it was not to be discussed with some one who was

**MURREY**

cleared or had no need to know.

47.Q. You said that you had a sense that -- or someone told you that there were concerns on this mission over and above the fact that there had been a shoot down?

47.A. Yes, sir.

48.Q. Did people share that concern with you?

48.A. Yes, sir, they did.

49.Q. What was their concern?

49.A. Sir, we were told that there was an overdue flight and so that was what the concern was about.

50.Q. The fact that this concern existed or was articulated to you, did it cause you to do anything different in the way that you debriefed the crew?

50.A. No, sir.

51.Q. Did you ask them any questions because of this concern -- any different questions because of this concern?

51.A. No, sir, I did reiterate several questions just to make sure I was clear on what the pilots felt like they had seen, but I didn't ask anything different.

52.Q. Did you believe that there was any wrongdoing on the part of anyone involved with those crews -- the two crews that you were debriefing, the two crew members?

52.A. At the point of the debrief, sir?

53.Q. Yes.

53.A. No, sir, there was no doubt in my mind that they did the right thing at that point.

54.Q. Did you suspect anyone of any kind of wrongdoing at that point?

54.A. No, sir.

COL FAIN: I might point out that we may need to define privileged versus classified, and re-ask the question.

55.Q. Do you understand the term "privileged information?"

55.A. Yes, sir, I think I understand what the difference in the question is now that it's been brought up.

56.Q. Do you want to change any -- Let me tell you -- Are you familiar with the concept of confidentiality as it applies to Safety Investigations?

**MURREY**

56.A. No, sir, I've never been associated with one.

57.Q. Okay, thank you. Hang on for just a second. Were you aware or were there any indications to you that a Safety Board had been appointed or that an Interim Safety Board president had been designated?

57.A. At the time of the debrief?

58.Q. At the time of the debrief, yes.

58.A. No, sir.

59.Q. Okay, thank you. That's all of the questions I have right now.

59.A. Okay, sir.

COL WILCOX: You are reminded that this is an official investigation and you are ordered not to divulge the nature of this investigation or the questions, answers, or discussions included in this interview unless you are authorized to do so by the Board President, Major General Andrus, CINCUSAFE, or higher authority. If anyone other than a member of this Board should approach you regarding your testimony or the matters discussed here, you must report it immediately.

60.Q. Do you have any questions?

60.A. No, sir.

COL WILCOX: The time is 1545, and this interview is concluded.

(Lieutenant Murrey departed and returned to the interview room at 1550 hours, 16 April 1994.)

COL WILCOX: Lieutenant Murrey, please sit down. Lieutenant Murrey, I've invited you back in. I'd like to remind you that you're still under oath. I want to ask you some more questions. First, I want to explain to you clearly what I was referring to when I was talking about privileged information, vis-a-vis, the safety process. Okay?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

COL WILCOX: I'm going to read some excerpts to you from Air Force Regulation 127-4, 3 January 1990, from page 13, paragraph 1-8. I'll read you several paragraphs from that so you will have an idea what I meant by privileged.

WITNESS: Okay, sir.

COL WILCOX: First of all, the word "privileged" is referred to and described in this paragraph as that information that is exempt by law from disclosure outside the Air Force safety

**MURREY**

community, and includes findings, conclusions, causes, recommendations and the deliberative process of the Safety Board, also statements given to the Safety Board pursuant to a promise of confidentiality and recorded internal aircraft crew communications. Recorded crew communications are made pursuant to a promise of confidentiality and to be used for mishap prevention purposes only and are deemed to be statements made to a safety investigator. Using such communications for aircrew training is consistent with safety and mishap prevention purposes.

The regulation also describes the promise of confidentiality as follows: Investigators need to assess all available evidence to best serve the investigative process. Therefore, a promise of confidentiality is given to all witness' statements and to all government contractors who participate in the investigation, contractors who built, designed, or maintained the equipment. Information thus acquired is privileged and is protected from disclosure outside the Air Force safety community.

In another paragraph it discusses the prohibitions on use within the Air Force. Limited use privileged reports, their attachments and information extracted from them may not be used as evidence for punitive, disciplinary or adverse administrative actions, nor as evidence in determining the misconduct or line of duty status of any person. Persons having access to these reports will not allow them or their attachments to be used as evidence in flying evaluation boards, to review flying evaluation boards, or to determine pecuniary liability. They may not be used as evidence to determine liability in claims in favor of or against the United States Government. The general use of non-privileged reports will not be used within the Air Force for disciplinary purposes in lieu of a report of survey.

You recall that at the beginning of your testimony I read to you the purpose of this particular Board under Air Force Regulation 110-14, and it included that the information gathered here was not privileged and not protected, as opposed to this kind of an investigation, this kind of a Safety Investigation.

61.Q. Do you understand the difference between these two processes?

61.A. Yes, sir.

62.Q. Did you believe or did anyone lead you to believe that the questions that you were asking the aircrew were part of a Safety Investigation?

62.A. No, sir.

63.Q. And did you believe that the information you were gathering was somehow privileged information or protected, as I've indicated to you, outside of the protection you indicated to me before that it was not releasable because the General wanted to see it?

63.A. No, sir, I did not. I thought that was the sole protection of the information.

**MURREY**

64.Q. Thank you very much.

64.A. Yes, sir.

(The witness departed the interview room at 1555 hours, 16 April 1994.)

### REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I certify that the above sworn interview statement, given by SECOND LIEUTENANT DANIEL P. MURREY to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board was recorded by me by stenomask and that the foregoing transcript is a true, accurate, and verbatim account of that statement.

*Erma Brundage-Clark*  
ERMA BRUNDAGE-CLARK, DAFC  
Court Reporter  
Incirlik AB, Turkey

MURREY

**TAB V-002A**

**MURREY, DANIEL P.**

**V-001**

**V-002**

**V-002A**

**VERBATIM TESTIMONY**

**DANIEL P. MURREY, 2LT  
36TH OPERATION SUPPORT SQUADRON  
Bitburg Air Base, Germany  
(2nd Interview)**

COL WILCOX: The time is now 1825, 16 April 94. The persons present are the following: Colonel Michael Fain, Lieutenant Colonel Brian Lawler, Lieutenant Colonel Wayne Mudge, Colonel Charles Wilcox, Lieutenant Colonel Christian Velluz, and the court reporter. Lieutenant Murrey is here as a witness again.

Lieutenant, I'd like to remind you you're still under oath.

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

COL WILCOX: Thank you.

**EXAMINATION**

1.Q. Who gave Tiger One and Two their intel step brief?

1.A. I did, sir.

2.Q. Do you remember what you briefed them specifically?

2.A. Yes, sir.

3.Q. Would you detail to me, please, what you briefed them?

3.A. Yes, sir. Sir, this first part is secret, releasable with multi-national forces.

COL FAIN: Can we proceed with this with the recorder here? Turn the recorder off, please.

(The Board recessed momentarily)

4.Q. Okay, to rephrase that. Would you please detail what you can that is unclassified what you briefed to them, generally, the subject areas.

4.A. Yes, sir, I started out, this first part, I believe just this information is classified secret with all multi-national forces. I briefed them on the Iraqi flight activity for the day and which bases we thought it was out of. I briefed -- this is also classified, multi-national forces. I briefed the location of the missile order of battle that would be a threat to them and the impacts there. There were no changes to the previous briefings. I briefed that there was no real current intel -- this is not classified. I briefed there was no real information on current intel for Iraqi AOR right then as far as what the Government of Iraq was doing, and that kind of thing. We had no new information.

**MURREY**



Classified releasable again, I briefed them on information that the electrical power source had been fed into Iraq from Turkey, had been blown up by, we deemed, terrorists, and they may have been tied to the Government of Iraq. I briefed them -- unclassified, I briefed them on SAR, their search and rescue codes and words for the day. Then I went into a short intel brief on what was going on in Rwanda, what was going on in Bosnia, and what was going on as far as in relation to the Greeks' involvement in Bosnia and the European Union.

At this point I asked them for any questions. Neither of them had any questions, and then I gave them about a 7-minute brief, a threat of the day brief.

5.Q. Okay, that's specific enough. Just that you gave them a threat of the day brief. I would be interested in hearing what the subject matter was, if not the specifics.

5.A. I don't even think it needs to be classified. I gave them a threat brief on the Iraqi Fulcrum, threats, capabilities, locations, that kind of thing. Again, I asked if there were any questions, and there were none, and they stepped to the briefing room for their pre-flight brief.

6.Q. Did you make any reference to increased Iraqi ground activity?

6.A. No, sir.

7.Q. Any reference to a significant increase in Iraqi air activity?

7.A. No, sir, in fact, when I briefed air activity I briefed them that it was a fairly average day. The day before had been a fairly average day.

8.Q. Did you reference any Iraqi violations of the No Fly Zone?

8.A. No, sir.

9.Q. In your opinion, what is the general readiness state of the Iraqi defense forces on 14 April?

9.A. Sir, I think I'd have to divide that into several different areas. I think their ground forces are very ready in the north. I think that their air activity is tapering off for multi-reasons, sanctions being primary. But, as far as the ground goes, missiles and ground forces, my impression is, and I did not brief this, but my impression is they're fairly at a high state of readiness.

10.Q. In your opinion, what is the probability of the Iraqis conducting air ops north of the 36th parallel?

10.A. In my opinion, sir, I believe -- my opinion, I believe that they do every now and then cross the 36th parallel when we're not in the AOR.

11.Q. Okay, and when we are there?

11.A. I think that they do not conduct operations when we are in the AOR.

12.Q. Do you know if there have been discussions in the squadron about Iraqis flying north into

**MURREY**

the No Fly Zone?

12.A. Yes, in fact, there have been many, and it's a standing concern in the squadron that we are not out there enough hours to make sure that the Iraqis are not violating the No Fly Zone.

13.Q. When was the last time that "vis recce" training was conducted in the squadron?

13.A. Approximately a month, month and a week.

14.Q. Are helicopters a normal part of "vis recce" training?

14.A. Yes, sir. I cover four helicopters, four primary helicopters in Iraq, the Gisele, the Hip, the Hind. There are some others in there I have referenced in my visual "rec" slides, and also I give them the CH-53, UH-60, AH-1, because countries involved have those.

15.Q. Do you happen to remember off the top of your head if Tiger One and Two attended that training?

15.A. Sir, I've never given a visual "recce" brief to Tiger Two, but I have given at least two to Tiger One, but that was a primary to six week tour -- preliminary to six week tour. I had not given one during this six week tour.

16.Q. Let me ask at this point, are there other intel officers giving this type of training? Are you the sole source of this training?

16.A. Sir, I'm the sole source for the 53, at least I have been for the last four months.

17.Q. Have you ever had knowledge or briefed aircrews on the flights that occur in the AOR that are friendly?

17.A. Sir, can I go back for just a minute?

18.Q. Certainly.

18.A. On that last question, I say sole, I'm the sole individual down here. The intel officer that was in the 53rd before I came to the squadron and the current actual attached intel officer of the squadron both give visual "recce" briefs. I'm well aware that they gave those in the 53rd prior to my involvement.

19.Q. But they have not given them here?

19.A. In Iraq I'm the sole responsible person for those.

20.Q. Have you ever had knowledge or briefed on the friendly flights in the AOR?

20.A. Yes, sir, I have. I briefed - again, some of these missions are classified.

21.Q. Can you do it without getting into classified, in general terms?

21.A. Yes, sir. In general, I've briefed "recce" flights. I briefed U.N. flights, and when I was given information on other flights, MCC flights, different kinds of U.N. flights, I briefed them on those. I -- I answered that question.

**MURREY**

22.Q. Did you brief any of those in your step brief on the 14th?

22.A. No, sir, I did not. If I can add to that, I was not passed the information on more than the standard flight between Diyarbakir and Zakhu.

23.Q. When you debriefed the crew, what did they debrief?

23.A. Sir, do you want specifics? Again, this is all classified. I can give you an unclassified version.

24.Q. Why don't you give me the unclassified version and then we'll see if we need to go further.

24.A. Tiger One -- I mainly debriefed Tiger One and then just confirmed with Tiger Two, went back with Tiger Two, just confirmed the questions. I debriefed what happened prior to contact, where they were, what they were seeing on their scopes. I debriefed on their flight in, who they talked to, if they were in contact with AWACS, and they were. I briefed -- I debriefed on their visual -- VID pass and then their shooting pass and exactly what they saw and why they thought -- why they thought what they saw was what they saw.

I debriefed what happened after what they saw once they had fired missiles and then what their actions were after that. Then I debriefed what happened for the rest of their CAP, for the rest of their sweep through the area and their DCA CAPS in the AOR. Is that too generic?

COL FAIN: If you could stop the recorder again, please.

(The Board recessed momentarily)

LT MURREY: I met the pilots at the aircraft. Captain Dawson and I started debriefing immediately on exactly what happened as they hit the gate. They hit the gate at 0720Z. The gate is the entrance into the AOR, the northern part of Iraq. As they came into the AOR, they thought they had two contacts, two helicopter contacts right there at the gate. My impression of what they were saying - I did not get real specific with them - was that they thought that was Eagle Flight. They came in the AOR and had contacts out about 30, 35 miles low level about a hundred and thirty knots.

Tiger One looked down at his map and saw that the contacts were about -- over road and thought it was road traffic and decided to investigate because of high speed. As they got closer they were more convinced that it was not road traffic because of speed. They were -- At this point they were in contact with AWACS. AWACS did not have these contacts until they got much closer, until Tiger One and Two got much closer, apparently. What the pilots said was that AWACS tuned down their radar until they could get stuff at that low level.

As Tiger One and Two got closer, they had them around five hundred feet -- the contacts. They had moved off the roads. They were sure they were not road traffic. They were dropping altitudes this whole time, and they went in for their -- they informed AWACS they were going in for a VID pass, and they dropped to around two thousand -- little bit below two thousand feet

**MURREY**

AGL. They entered the valley that their contacts were in. As they got closer -- let me say that I've been saying contacts, actually Tiger One only had a single contact. He thought that it was a single aircraft the whole way in until the VID.

They set up a race track type -- half a race track for a visual identification. He said he flew right in above the helicopter, looking out the side, and as he was looking at the helicopter he saw a shadow and thought the shadow looked a little bit too close and realized it was a helicopter trail, and his initial visual was on the lead. Tiger Two was in trail, I guess a mile back. I didn't ask specifically, but that's standard. Tiger One at this point said he was just under two thousand feet, five hundred knots.

25.Q. Two thousand AGL or ----

25.A. Just under two thousand AGL, is what he ----

26.Q. And the helicopter was estimated to be at?

26.A. About five hundred AGL.

27.Q. Just for the record, AGL, I think, is above ground level.

27.A. I'm sorry, above ground level. Pilots made a turn. From his hand gestures, I believe it was to the left, over the helicopters. They did not get out in front of the helicopters. Looked down out the nine side of the jet to look for markings and get a better visual ID. Tiger One at this point called out "Hind" as he was making his turn. He said, "Maybe I have a hit," and then he asked Two for confirmation because Two was flying over the helicopters at this point. Then he called out again, "No, I'm -- another Hinds."

28.Q. Tiger One?

28.A. Tiger One, and Tiger Two at that point said, "Confirmed." They went back out to around six nautical miles behind the helicopters to set up for stern shot. Again, they would take the trail on the helicopter. At about five nautical miles Tiger One took AMRAAM shot, M-120 AMRAAM shot. At about -- after impact he peeled off to the left and Tiger Two took a -- approximately nine thousand foot AIM-9 shot. At that point they briefed they thought possibly the lead pilot peeled -- jinked to the north. They were flying southeast. The helicopters were flying southeast, and they thought they jinked to the north. I'm not sure if it was evasive or they planned on just turning north. That's when he targeted and fired the AIM-9.

After impact he peeled off to the right. They rejoined and came through for a two -- I believe, two "recce" passes to mark the sites on their INS. Tiger Two thought his INS drifted, so his initial coordinates were not correct, but they were close. After the "recce" passes they went ahead and completed their sweep through the southwest, the mountains, in the northeast side of Iraq. They completed a sweep down through the southeast, towards a lake down the 36th line and then set up the two turns in their CAP before they went to the tanker.

**MURREY**

They had no further contacts or events during their 40 minutes in the AOR. They called out -- They called out their engagement with the two Hinds and called out their shots. AWACS, AWACS, acknowledged, according to them. I'm trying to differentiate between watching, I had films later, and what was debriefed. I did ask them if they were talking to AWACS, they said yes, they were talking to AWACS the whole time, and they knew they were shooting at them.

That's pretty much all I can remember without looking at any notes.

29.Q. I have one question at this point. Was there a discussion of clearance to fire or was that pilot initiated?

29.A. Yes, sir, I did ask them that specifically. I said this was not a AWACS cleared shot. They said, "Yes, this was according to ROE. It was a ROE shot." That was about the end of the debrief.

30.Q. Any discussion of counter measures, flares, in particular?

30.A. No, sir. I asked them if they thought -- I asked them if the helicopters saw them. They said no, they turned above the helicopters for the sole purpose of staying out of the line of sight.

31.Q. Did Tiger Two present any information? You gave us the range or roughly altitudes for ID pass. Did Tiger Two tell you what his ID pass looked like?

31.A. Sir, I believe it was right over the helicopters too. That was my impression of the debrief. I left a couple things out, now I remember them. At 30 miles out -- when I was asking about ID, 30 miles out, Tiger One said they initiated IFF interrogations. They did, interrogating Mode I and Mode IV. Besides an initial -- they got an initial, Mode IV came up for just a second and then went away. All the way into the visual identification, they were switching between Mode I and Mode IV interrogations.

32.Q. Each pilot?

32.A. Both pilots, and I confirmed that with Tiger Two after -- when he came over and joined us at the first jet, that they were both interrogating the whole way and neither of them got any further.

33.Q. Did they mention the code that they were interrogating, number and code?

33.A. No, sir, just Mode I and Mode IV. I can't remember anything else right now.

34.Q. Did Tiger One or Tiger Two give you any indication, verbal or non-verbal, that they were anything less than a hundred percent sure that they had shot down two Iraqi Hinds?

34.A. No, sir, not at the debrief at all. In fact, they were positive that they were two enemy aircraft.

35.Q. Was there any discussion of the description of the aircraft?

35.A. Yes, sir.

**MURREY**

36.Q. What was that discussion?

36.A. Said they set up, they both saw sponsets as they went over the wings from the aircraft, which is initially why they thought they were Hinds. They saw splotchy camouflage, dark green, splotchy, different green colors camouflaging the jets -- the helicopters. They saw no fin flashes, no other markings on the aircraft.

At this point that's the only -- those are the only descriptions of the helicopters that I had.

37.Q. Going back to your visual "recce" brief that you give, do you recall offhand the aspect of the photographs of the Black Hawks and whether or not they have the sponsets on them in your briefing?

37.A. Sir, I don't remember the exact aspect of how you're looking at them. I believe they may have fuel tanks on. I don't think they're -- I don't think they're carrying ordnance on my "vis recce" slides.

38.Q. And those slides are available?

38.A. Yes, sir, they're in the bottom drawer of my safe at the squadron.

39.Q. Was there any discussion from either pilot about reference to the pilot carried "recce" cards or smart book?

39.A. No, sir, they were carrying them. They signed them out. But there was no reference to them.

40.Q. Was there any discussion of the status of the VTR tapes or VTR equipment on board the aircraft?

40.A. Yes, sir, in fact, I didn't ask this question; one of the other pilots asked.

41.Q. At the same time?

41.A. Yes, sir, when we were out at the flight line. At the time of meeting up with the pilots at the flight line, a couple other pilots accompanied us out from the SOC.

42.Q. Let's disregard that question. I'll ask that at another time.

42.A. Okay, sir.

43.Q. Without giving any details of contents of the tapes, did you view either or both of the tapes at anytime?

43.A. I saw one of the tapes later on in the day, sir.

44.Q. And that was a tape of?

44.A. Can I refer to the tape?

**MURREY**

45.Q. Just by call sign.

45.A. It was Tiger Two's tape. It was of the -- it was of both shots.

46.Q. You mentioned notes, are those part of the file or do you have separate notes of your own?

46.A. Sir, they're out in the safe also. I didn't remove anything from the safe. They are in a notebook I use to keep notes on my intel briefs and the like. I also typed up a MISREP that was sent up through Wing.

47.Q. So there's the official MISREP that is part of the official file, then you have your own notes?

47.A. Yes, sir.

48.Q. And the MISREP is a reflection of the content of those notes; is that correct?

48.A. Yes, sir, there are the notes, and also my notes are not in any semblance, or I don't think anybody could -- unless they had that official document, they wouldn't know what the numbers were for. If I could clarify one thing on the "vis recce" slides, they're slides that -- we call them "beer shots." They're shots that -- they're difficult to identify, for the sole purpose of making the pilot know the aircraft well enough to know, if it's a little bit fuzzy they can know which aircraft it is. It makes it more difficult. They're not real clear shots.

49.Q. Are they long or medium or short range type shots?

49.A. The helicopters are all short or medium range. All my fixed wing aircraft are fairly longer ranges, simply because that's probably the way they'll encounter them.

50.Q. Do you recall the Hind slide from your briefing? Do you remember the aspect?

50.A. No, sir, I've got a bunch of pictures from the TV, that's why I can't remember for sure all the pictures I've seen.

51.Q. All right, we can look at those. That's no problem.

51.A. Okay.

LT COL LAWLER: That concludes this portion.

(The testimony concluded at 1853 hours, 16 April 1994, after which the witness returned to the interview room.)

COL WILCOX: The time is now 1857, 16 April 1994. Persons present are, Colonel Michael Fain, Lieutenant Colonel Brian Lawler, Lieutenant Colonel Wayne Mudge, Colonel Charles Wilcox, Lieutenant Colonel Christian Velluz. Lieutenant Murrey is back with us, as is the investigation reporter.

**MURREY**

Lieutenant Murrey, I remind you you're still under oath.

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

### EXAMINATION

52.Q. Lieutenant Murrey, you told me that you had another recollection regarding the briefing before they stepped. Would you relay that to us please.

52.A. Yes, sir. I did not specifically brief the MCC flight. I had the information that Eagle Flight was flying that day. My request through for the intel channels have been, since I've been here, that should we have friendlies flying in the area that those flight plans would be passed to me so I can brief my pilots, since that's their job, is to identify aircraft in the AOR. Those have been passed to me on several occasions, as far as U.N. flights go and other "recce" flights. My impression from C-2 or C-3 was that Eagle Flight's primary flight was between Diyarbakir and Zakhu, which was also what I -- it had become fairly routine that that was what their routine was when they fly their daily -- unless there's a down day.

We were not passed the information that there was any other flight plan. I found out later that the F-16s, the F-16s' squadron had to specifically request the flight plan, that they were never automatically passed to the squadrons.

53.Q. Do you know what prompted that squadron to ask for the flight plan?

53.A. They were at low levels. Their concern was that they would either encounter a helicopter or a U.N. flight or they'd get -- they'd have air traffic they were not aware of and run into somebody.

54.Q. Did they ask for this specific flight's flight plan based on anything that you know of, or did they ask generically are their helicopters at low altitude there?

54.A. No, sir, they got a specific -- they got the flight plans through C-3. They got the exact flight plans. I don't know if you want this now or later. I received the flight plan later on in the day to double check what was going on, and the flight plan that they had was incorrect also. It had Eagle Flight clear across the country from where it was and an hour and a half earlier than the incident.

55.Q. Is that the flight plan that was passed to the F-16s?

55.A. Yes, sir, the incorrect flight plan. But, again, I was not passed any flight plan at all. I had been in the past over the computer, but I was not passed on that day. Just to reiterate, I did not brief the Eagle Flight. I had it posted on the board that they were flying an admin mission, and it was right above the code words, and it was my understanding that they flew between Diyarbakir and Zakhu.

56.Q. Can you tell me exactly what was written on the board?

**MURREY**



56.A. Yes, sir, it's an actual printed sheet that's plasticized on the board on our battle map where they have the missile order battle and the code words for the day. It says MCC helicopter sorties, helicopter sorties scheduled. It has Saturday through Sunday, and then it'll be the date, the actual number date, and what type mission and how many ships it will be, and it said midway down, Thursday, 14th, two-ship admin. That's what was posted on the board.

57.Q. Where did you get that information to post it on the board?

57.A. That information is passed to the MCC sit rep that comes out of Zakhu, and they passed it for a week prior and we post it a week prior, and that is all the information that is passed. It'll either say two-ship admin, two-ship support, or a down day.

58.Q. Do you maintain those sit reps on file?

58.A. Yes, sir, they're in ----

59.Q. So you suspect that that one will be available, the one that you worked from will be available in your squadron.

59.A. Yes, sir, it will be available. It's in the safe right now. I'm sorry, I lost my -- Go ahead, sir.

60.Q. You made a comment that as the F-15s entered the AOR that they thought they had contacts as they entered the gate and assumed that those were the Eagle Flight.

60.A. Yes, sir.

61.Q. What was the basis for their assumption, do you believe?

61.A. Well, I ----

62.Q. I'll ask it this way; I won't ask you to speculate. Did they say anything to you in the debrief about that event?

62.A. Sir, I've been trying to remember whether -- they mentioned it at the aircraft that they had contacts and then they had contacts 30 miles away and that's what they went down to. Later on in further debriefs ----

63.Q. We won't discuss that at this point.

63.A. The other thing that should be -- I guess the Board should be aware of is that there was a lot of air traffic in southern Turkey along the border there right near the gate that was never reported, that AWACS many times did not know it was there.

64.Q. On this particular day or?

64.A. Sir, daily. The routine was that there would be low level aircraft out there in Turkey that was not known what it was. Rarely, if ever, was there any air traffic in Turkey -- or in Iraq,

rather, that was not tracked real well. Normally AWACS knew at least down in Iraq, either knew or tried to find out what they were.

65.Q. Okay.

65.A. What contacts were.

66.Q. All right, that's important information. I appreciate that.

66.A. Yes, sir.


67.Q. Anything else you'd like to add?

67.A. No, sir, I think that's everything.

(The interview concluded at 1902 hours, 16 April 1994.)

#### REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I certify that the above sworn interview statement, given by SECOND LIEUTENANT DANIEL P. MURREY, to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board was recorded by me by stenomask and that the foregoing transcript is a true, accurate, and verbatim account of that statement.

  
ERMA BRUNDAGE-CLARK, DAFC  
Court Reporter  
Incirlik AB, Turkey

**MURREY**

**TAB V-002B**

**MURREY, DANIEL P.**

**V-001**

**V-002**

**V-002A**

**V-002B**

**VERBATIM TESTIMONY OF  
SECOND LIEUTENANT DANIEL P. MURREY  
36TH OPERATIONS SUPPORT SQUADRON  
BITBURG AIR BASE, GERMANY  
(3rd Interview)**

COL AT LEE: The time is 1824 on the 11th of May 1994. This a telephonic interview being conducted at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, with the Witness being located in San Antonio, Texas.

COL AT LEE: All times given with reference to this interview are Incirlik Air Base local time.

COL AT LEE: I have previously asked questions of the Witness which would be known only to him and established his identity to the satisfaction of the interviewers.

**EXAMINATION**

1Q: Would you please state your name for the record?

1A: Second Lieutenant Daniel P. Murrey.

2Q: Lieutenant Murrey, you are the same Lieutenant Murrey who testified previously before this board. Is that correct?

2A: Yes, Sir, I am.

3Q: Do you recall the advice that you were given concerning the difference between a Safety Board and an AFR 110-14 Accident Investigation Board?

3A: Yes, Sir.

4Q: Do you have any questions concerning that?

4A: No, Sir.

COL AT LEE: You are reminded that you are still under oath. Lieutenant Colonel Mudge will continue the questioning.

WITNESS Yes, Sir.

LT COL MUDGE: Lieutenant Murrey, we're trying to clear up some confusion about the flow of information concerning the helicopter flights in or near the AOR.

**MURREY**

**Questions by Lieutenant Colonel Mudge:**

5Q: Generally, what information did you regularly receive about helicopter flights in or near the AOR, the Area of Responsibility?

5A: The regular information I got was from the MCC Zakhu SITREP and it listed just the date and then whether it would be a helicopter sortie or no helicopter sortie. It would either say two-ship admin or two-ship support or down day. It didn't give any flight plans or--we were under the impression they flew from Diyarbakir to Zakhu and back.

6Q: The AOR being the Area of Responsibility and the MCC is the Military Coordination Command?

6A: Yes, Sir, there at Zakhu. I'm sorry, I forgot about the acronyms, Sir.

7Q: What did you normally do with that information from the Situation Report, the SITREP from the MCC?

7A: Sir, I posted it on our Area of Responsibility map, the one we briefed off every day. I put it right above the search and rescue words and letters of the day.

8Q: When did you normally receive that information?

8A: Sir, it would come out daily but it would be for a week in advance so we'd put it up for several days in advance.

9Q: Did you have a normal day that you posted the weekly information or did you update it daily?

9A: Sir, we updated it daily. Sir, to be very honest with you, some days we wouldn't update for a week in advance, but there was always the day of flying. The missions were up there. Do you understand?

10Q: Yes. Specifically concerning 14 April, when did you receive the information about the helicopter flights planned for 14 April?

10A: Sir, I don't remember the exact date. It was fairly routine, but they were up there at least several days in advance, if not a week.

11Q: Do you remember specifically posting the information about the helicopter flights on 14 April?

11A: Yes, Sir, in fact, I'm the one who posted them in green ink. I wrote 14 April and I think it said two-ship support.

12Q: When did you post that information?

12A: Sir, I can't remember the exact date. It was several days beforehand.

**MURREY**

13Q: Are you positive then that when the mishap aircrews, the pilots, came in for their intelligence briefing on 14 April there was some information on your AOR briefing board as you described it concerning helicopter flights in the AOR?

13A: Yes, Sir. When they stepped, there was--when the first two crews stepped, there was information up there. Later on that morning, I had gone ahead and started erasing the board to update it for the final crew. I got the SITREP out and was going to update it for the week--the next whole week, the entire week, but when I briefed, that information was there for the first two crews--or the first two flights, Tiger and Claw.

**Questions by Colonel At Lee:**

14Q: Was the information that was up there mentioned verbally in the course of the briefing?

14A: No, Sir, I did not mention it verbally.

15Q: To your knowledge, did the crews generally understand that that information was available to them?

15A: Yes. It was one of the things that I covered in the Intel indoctrination when they first arrive in theater. It was fairly routine. That's why I didn't brief it daily so I briefed them that it would posted up there.

16Q: Are you able to say whether crews usually made reference to that material?

16A: I would say not, Sir.

17Q: What makes you think that?

17A: They have other things they are worrying about, Sir, like their in-flight brief, more important kind of intel stuff--whether there was flying the day before as far as the Iraqis were concerning, things like that. That wasn't a high priority intelligence item.

18Q: You said that you received this information from MCC Zakhu. Was that the actual place that you got it from or did it come from some other more immediate source?

18A: No, Sir. They send it up to--I believe the Joint Operations Center and then they make copies and disperse it through--I don't know who else gets it but C-2 Intel gets it there at CTF, Combined Task Force and we pick up--each SOC--each Squadron Operations Center has a secret package we pick up in the mornings with various intel items in it and a copy of the Zakhu SITREP is one of those items.

19Q: You said your impression was that the flights went from Diyarbakir to Zakhu?

19A: Yes, Sir.

20Q: Why did you think that?

**MURREY**

20A: Sir, up in there--I talked with the Air Analyst up at CTF--in speaking with them, that was my impression. Also, on their map board up there, they have a flight plan for Eagle Flight that runs from--it's just a straight line from Zakhu--from Diyarbakir to Zakhu and back.

21Q: Were crews briefed in a manner consistent with the understanding you've just described in their indoctrination brief?

21A: No, Sir. Well, Sir, when I brief them that they fly--that the MCC Eagle Flights are up there posted on the board, you know, I would mention that they fly down there to do support missions to Zakhu, but I never described the exact flight plan.

22Q: Do you ever recall telling them that they flew beyond Zakhu into the tactical Area of Responsibility ?

22A: ... Sir.

COL AT LEE: I couldn't hear you, I'm sorry?

WITNESS: No, Sir--no, Sir.

Sir, I had requested that I be passed the information should there be any other friendly aircraft out in the AOR when we are flying. I had gotten several--several flight plans passed before on UN flights and so my feeling was that if I did not receive any information that there would not be any friendly aircraft in the AOR.

23Q: Who had you made that request to?

23A: To both the Wing Operations Center Intel and then also to the C-2 Air Analyst and to the C-2 Watch.

24Q: Is the C-2 Watch the intelligence element that is now combined with the Joint Operations Center to make it the Joint Operations and Intelligence Center?

24A: I believe that may be what they did, Sir. I am not positive how they structured it now. Before, they were separate but they did move them into the same office. I don't know if they are together actually now or not.

25Q: The 24-hour organization for C-2?

25A: Yes, Sir, that's the Watch.

26Q: Do you have any further information or statements or evidence that you believe would be helpful to this Board which you wish to present?

26A: I don't know if it will be helpful or not, Sir. We had a problem before when I made a big deal about getting information about friendly flights in the AOR, we had a problem. One of our guys picked up a contact coming across the line. I don't remember the exact date. It turned out to be a UN cargo flight up around 20--35,000 feet. We had no information on it. AWACS didn't

**MURREY**

know who it was. We had to go do a visual identification on it. We found afterwards that Intel and the Operations Center knew it was going to be there and AWACS should have known it was there, but we did not know anything until our guys did a visual ID and that's when I made a big deal--

27Q: Do you remember approximately when this was, by month and year?

27A: I don't remember the exact month. I think it was January 94, mid-January 94.

28Q: Do you recall who you made a big deal about it with?

28A: Yes, Sir. I talked to Captain Dawson and I talked to Lieutenant Polka. Those are the specific people I spoke to. I spoke to other people about it and we spoke about it there in the squadron, some of the pilots and I.

29Q: What organizations are they with?

29A: Lieutenant Polka was the Air Analyst at the time.

COL AT LEE: At C-2?

WITNESS: She's back at Ramstein now. Captain Dawson is there with the 39th LSS.

30Q: The Air Analyst you referred to with C-2?

30A: Yes, Sir, she was the C-2 Air Analyst. She left the 1st of April to go back to Ramstein--94.

31Q: Anything else?

31A: No, Sir. That's all the information I have.

COL AT LEE: I'm going to ask you to stay on the line for a moment after the interview is concluded but you are once again reminded that this is an official investigation. You are ordered not to divulge the nature of this investigation or the questions, answers or discussions included in this interview with anyone unless authorized to do so by the Board President, Major General Andrus, CINCUSAFE or higher authority.

If anyone other than a member of this Board should approach you regarding your testimony or the matters discussed here, you must report it immediately.

WITNESS: Yes, Sir.

COL AT LEE: Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: No, Sir.

COL AT LEE: The time is 1838 and this interview is concluded.

**MURREY**



## REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I certify that the above sworn interview statement, given by SECOND LIEUTENANT DANIEL P. MURREY to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board was recorded by me by stenomask and that the foregoing transcript is a true, accurate and verbatim account of that statement.



MAUREEN A. NATION, DAFC

Court Reporter

Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

MURREY

**TAB V-003**

**BONG, JAMES I.**

**V-001**

**V-002**

**V-002A**

**V-002B**

**V-003**

**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY  
OF  
FIRST LIEUTENANT JAMES I. BONG  
52nd Fighter Wing  
Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany**

The interview was conducted by Lt Col Wayne I. Mudge, at Incirlik AB, Turkey, beginning at 1559 hours, 16 April 1994. A standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn.

**EXAMINATION**

My name is First Lieutenant James Ira Bong, assigned to the 53rd Fighter Squadron at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany. My duty assignment is as an F-15 pilot currently TDY at Incirlik Air Base.

I am familiar with the incident of the crash of the two US Army Black Hawk helicopters on 14 April. I did have contact with the F-15 crews that were involved in the incident when they first returned to Incirlik. I rode out with several other pilots in one of the trucks from our squadron, SOC 1, out to the HAS's where the aircraft was being parked and I was there when they shut down the engines. Captain Chris Foster, Captain Steve Neuser, Lieutenant Dan Murrey and Captain Joe Schultz is all that I can remember offhand who rode out with me.

It's not normal practice to ride out to all aircraft returning or that all of us go out. It's pretty common for one to go out and pick up the pilots. But because we heard that there possibly may have been some kind of ordeal on that day, we all went out to the aircraft. I heard when I arrived at the squadron on that day, that a Tiger Flight may have expended some missiles over northern Iraq, and as a result, they may have shot at helicopters -- two missiles at Hind helicopters.

It is correct that I went out with this group to welcome the crew back from their mission thinking that they had engaged some enemy helicopters. At that time I did not hear any indications that there may be difficulties or problems with the mission. I was not involved in the debrief of the crews nor was I present when they were debriefed. We were out at the aircraft location probably for about 10 minutes welcoming the crew back. I do not know who the debriefers were.

The crew explained very little about what happened. I did not have any indication at that time that either of the crewmembers had done anything wrong or might be suspected of any kind of wrongdoing or criminal misconduct. I had not heard any talk that there was a Safety Investigation or Safety Board that had been appointed. I didn't believe anything to be wrong.


**BONG**

I don't believe the debriefers stayed out at the aircraft when I left. On a normal mission, debrief is in SOC 1 where our squadron is located. I do not know where the debriefing occurred for this particular mission.

I can't think of any further information, statements or evidence to present concerning this matter discussed.

(The standard witness caution was given, the witness had no questions and the interview concluded at 1609 hours, 16 April 1994.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of LIEUTENANT JAMES IRA BONG, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
CHARLES H. WILCOX II, Colonel, USAF  
Legal Advisor

**BONG**

**TAB V-003A**

**BONG, JAMES I.**

**V-001**

**V-002**

**V-002A**

**V-002B**

**V-003**

**V-003A**

**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY  
OF  
FIRST LIEUTENANT JAMES I. BONG  
52nd Fighter Wing  
Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany  
(Session II)**

The interview was conducted by Lt Col Wayne I. Mudge, at Incirlik AB, Turkey, beginning at 1906 on 16 April 1994. A standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn.

**EXAMINATION**

It is correct that several other pilots and myself talked to Tiger One and Two when they landed. I only went to Tiger One's aircraft. I never did go to Tiger Two's aircraft when I was out there. When I was at Tiger One's aircraft, what I remember him saying, we talked about one thing. We got down and somebody had a map out and one of the things that was asked was where, and we were shown on this big map. I'm not sure who had the map, but where it happened, and I think he said which direction they were going. So we looked at the map. They were in a valley and going a certain direction. He mentioned that it was a big fire ball when the missile had hit. I specifically asked what range of a shot it was, and Tiger One replied, "Five or six miles shot."

He talked about when they got the radar contact that it was their initial sweep down through the area in the mountain ridges to the north where we typically go and check out first. AWACS did not have the contact initially, and that they were calling it out. AWACS was calling clean and then eventually AWACS did call, "Hits," I believe, "There." "Contacts there."

That's all I can remember that we talked about out at the aircraft. Now there may have been some other stuff talked about because I was not around the group of guys talking all the time. I went and looked at the airplane itself, the rail where the missile had come off and stuff like that. So I did not hear everything that was said. But I do remember those things in specific.

I can't remember them specifically mentioning using AAI as they came in. I think I remember him saying that they had done it almost all the way in on the first pass, all the way down for quite a while.

Concerning what they said and their impressions about the vis ID run I do remember somebody, one of the other pilots, asking him if it was a Hind-D versus another version of the Hind. We kind of laughed at it because we wouldn't really know the difference. The pilot who asked questions was a former helicopter pilot, so he might have known. But we didn't, and we laughed and he said no, it's just a Hind.

**BONG**

I remember somebody, I think it was probably one of the intel guys, asking them about the wings or something that is on a Hind and had he seen those things sticking out the side, and a double canopy. I think somebody asked about the double canopy that they had seen, that type of thing in the front of the helicopter.

That's all I remember about the visual ID part that was said.

The only discussion I remember concerning what AWACS said to them during the pass was the part that AWACS was calling clean initially, and then when they were getting in closer that AWACS called contacts or hits there. I can't remember what he said, but then they were getting contacts or hits. They asked about the shot, and they said it was a ROE shot. The way I took it is AWACS did not say bandit or something like that, that they had followed ROE and took a shot.

I was at the aircraft for about 10 minutes.

I did not see any indications at all from Tiger One, either verbal or non-verbal, that there was anything other than a hundred percent clear in his mind exactly what happened is what he told me. At the time I felt totally good about the situation. It was several hours later where I even had the faintest doubt about what had happened. But initially there at the aircraft, everything seemed as it should be, I guess. There was no doubt by any of us that we could tell.

The only indications I had in the past few days about increase Iraqi air activity north of the 36th parallel was what I had read out of the newspaper actually, the Stars and Stripes. I read that the Iraqis had moved certain additional forces up to the north, quite a few additional forces, ground forces. I did not hear of any additional air activity. I was out there, I can't remember what day it was, I think it was a couple days before that where it was the most air activity I had seen since I've been here, which is about two and a half weeks. But, in general, I had not heard anything to that extent and -- not that I was aware of.

I have not had any "vis recce" training specifically since I've been here this time. I've been here two weeks ago on a Saturday. I can't remember. Two or three weeks from today. I was down here about a month and a half before that for seven weeks, and we did have "vis recce" training at that time when I was down here. Occasionally I get the training at home. It's not any set time frame or whatever, but once in a while when we have pilot meetings, the intel folks will get up and we'll practice "vis recce."

I believe the last time I was down here I got helicopter "vis recce." We had several things, including aircraft "vis recce," and I think they even threw in some other types of vehicles and stuff on the ground, tanks and whatnot.

We look at both enemy and friendly. To my recollection, we always have some of both.

**BONG**

I do not remember seeing "vis recce" of Black Hawks, UH-60, but I'm sure I have in the countless times that we've done it.


When I step to fly, I believe I have good knowledge and am briefed on friendly flights that are going to be in the AOR. For the most part, most of the friendly flying, and there's a lot of it that goes on out there, is right out of the frag which we receive on a daily basis. A lot of the aircrews, for example, the French, make specific runs and stuff. They give us a map that we take with us where they're going to be at what time, what altitude, especially if they're going to be anywhere near the border, the line down there. I'm very aware, and I've got a sheet that all pilots take out on their leg which specifically shows who's out there at what time.

Now, that's out of the frag. For Eagle Flight we got listed on a board in our room that there might be a two-ship out there flying today, and that's the most that I'm usually briefed on about that. The way I take it is that they always fly up near what we call a gate, up near the Zakhu area, never really in any farther than that. So that's where I would expect to see the helicopters, up in that area.

I indicated when I was discussing vis ID on Tiger One that he said that he saw the wings of the helicopter. He believed that he saw the -- I think he called them wings. I'm not sure what you call them in a helicopter, but the two things that hold the rocket pods and armament, et cetera. I do believe somebody did mention did you see a double canopy, or something like that. The response was something to the affirmative of yes. I can't remember specifically.

(The standard witness caution was given, the witness had no questions and the interview concluded at 1917 hours, 16 April 1994.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of LIEUTENANT JAMES IRA BONG, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

  
CHARLES H. WILCOX II, Colonel, USAF  
Legal Advisor

**BONG**



**TAB V-003B**

**BONG, JAMES I.**

**V-001**

**V-002**

**V-002A**

**V-002B**

**V-003**

**V-003A**

**V-003B**

## SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

### SESSION III

#### FIRST LIEUTENANT JAMES IRA BONG 53RD FIGHTER SQUADRON, SPANGDAHLEM, GERMANY

The interview was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Mudge, at Incirlik AB, Turkey, beginning at 1918 hours, 21st of April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn.

### EXAMINATION

My name is First Lieutenant James Ira Bong. I am stationed at 53rd Fighter Squadron, Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany. I'm a F15 pilot and I'm TDY at Incirlik Air Base Turkey. My additional duties there are what's called "Tiger Inc", which is kind of a little fund in the squadron which sells patches; T-shirts; paraphernalia, and stuff along that line. And we use that money for functions we may have or something like that.

I've been a F15 pilot for approximately two years. I started flying in July of 1992. Right now I have 350 hours. I have a total of 550 total flying hours. I'm a wingman. I arrived here at Operation PROVIDE COMFORT on December the 18th of 1993. I was here for seven weeks.

I believe February the 6th is the date I left, and I returned back here on March 26. Now until the present time, I've been here. I've flown around twenty-two sorties into Iraq. My additional duty while deployed here, in the Squadron is the "Snack-O". I'm in charge of providing snacks for the Squadron.

I did fly aircraft 9025 on 13 April. My assessment of that aircraft system when I flew it, was that I thought it was a very good airplane in all respects. I don't think I had any problems with that aircraft on that day at all. I did do a systems check on the ground and in the air. I did check the airborne interrogator on that fight. I always check it on every flight.

On the ground we run a BIT check which doesn't really require a Mode or Code and that passed or if it didn't I would have remembered. Once airborne, I'll check Modes I, II, and IV by getting behind my Flight Lead and using his codes that I know he has in it and checking them out. On the 13th of April all those did work. I did run a built in test on the radar that day, it's standard procedures. The radar did pass the test as far as I can remember.

**BONG**

I can't remember that off hand if I queried any other targets either going to and from the AOR where I had any problems with the querying and locking on the targets.

Specifically I don't remember using the AAI system and whether or not it worked correctly. I'm sure I did as I use it numerous times on every mission. I'm sure my radios functioned correctly. I cannot remember any problems being with that aircraft that day.

There were no minor discrepancies or write-ups that I needed to tell the crew chief to fix when I landed. My bottom line assessment of the aircraft's combat capability to accomplish the task, was a hundred percent, ready to go.

This is the only place where I have worked with AWACS. In general, I consider the radio discipline with AWACS pretty good. From the AWACS' standpoint, some days are better than others. Obviously, they have different controllers on different days. Sometimes they talk about things that they don't need to, but, in general, I would say it's pretty good.

There's been a few times where we've called out contacts, which is something that we probably should go investigate or be of concern, and they'll come back and just respond, they have hits there too, but they don't follow up on it by saying, i.e., friendly, boggie, bad guy, go investigate or whatever. That doesn't happen very often, but there's a couple of times where we were amused, I guess at that.

In a scenario like that where they have hits and you have a contact, I would expect them to come back and say friendly if it is. And a couple of times, we just had to pimp them to respond to that. In a sense, we were kind of telling them, hey we got somebody here, we see somebody here. Do you see them, and if so, without so many words, do you know who they are. Sometimes, they just come back without contacts, but then we'll pimp them and they'll usually respond then. Which, in turn, leads to a lot of extra talk, but it gets done.

Other information that I would expect them to pass, other than friendly or hostile is, I would expect them to tell me if they wanted me to go investigate something. Ask us to go take a look, which sometimes they do. In addition, any specifics they may have about the target. For instance, which way it's heading, what altitude. If they have any suspicions as to what it is, i.e., example, road traffic. They may know of some road somewhere that we don't. Any kind of specifics they may have about the target, I would hope that they would pass on.

If the AWACS were to tell me that they were going to use "min Comm", I would guess that, that would mean that they're going to let us do as much as they can, ourselves and only help out when we ask them specifically for something, would be my guess. And, of course, for them to talk, should there be some necessity to talk, should they see something which is obviously wrong or out of the ordinary, to pipe in right away.

**BONG**

I have not used AWACS to determine whether or not a target is to be engaged, but I can think of some scenarios where I would use them. For example, if the target was near a border, although we have systems on board to tell us where they are. If they were close to a border, I would probably back it up with AWACS. In addition, if I had any doubts, I guess, I may try and have them help me determine something about the aircraft that I can't figure out.

I do know of regulations and procedures that require the AWACS to tell you if your IFF system is bad, but I would be getting into classified material.

I put pretty good trust in the information I get from AWACS. As far as if they're getting radar contacts or not. They sometimes see radar contacts that we don't, so I have pretty good trust in their radar capabilities. And I've heard them tell people if they're not picking up certain squawks, so I believe that and I've also heard them. If they weren't picking up squawks, ask for position reports on certain airplanes because they've momentarily lost track of them. So, I have pretty good trust down there, equipment on board the aircraft, I guess.


If I had to assess AWACS' combat capability, I would say, it's pretty good. Realizing the amount of people on board the aircraft, I really don't know how things totally work on the aircraft, although I have been on one. Not while I was flying, but I've had several other people talk to me about what they do. I've seen them do some pretty good work, where they passed information pretty quick. And, like I said, I really like that their radar can look out a long ways and see things sometimes that we can't. I guess, all in all, I would say, it's pretty good.

I do think the AWACS, considering communications, identifications, radar capabilities and working with the fighters, gives us good combat capability. The average length of the twenty-two sorties I've worked with AWACS would be about four hours. I would be in direct contact with AWACS most of the time.

I don't have any further information, statements or evidence that I wish to present.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions. The interview was concluded at 1935 hours on 21 April 1994)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of JAMES IRA BONG, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.



**WILLIAM K. AT LEE, JR., COLONEL, USAF**  
Legal Advisor

**BONG**

**TAB V-004**

**DAWSON, KENNETH D.**

**V-001**

**V-002**

**V-002A**

**V-002B**

**V-003**

**V-003A**

**V-003B**

**V-004**

**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY  
OF  
CAPTAIN KENNETH D. DAWSON  
39th Operations Support Squadron  
Incirlik Air Base, Turkey**

The interview was conducted by Colonel Charles H. Wilcox, at Incirlik AB, Turkey, beginning at 1613 hours, 16 April 1994. A standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn.

**EXAMINATION**

My name is Capt Kenneth Dale Dawson. I'm assigned as the Intelligence Flight Commander, 39th Operations Support Squadron at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.

I was on the scene for the initial debriefing of the two aircrews of the U.S. fighter aircraft that was involved in the crash of the U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters on the 14th of April 94.

As the flight commander of this Intel flight and with Operation PROVIDE COMFORT going on, I have various functions. As the 39th Operations Squadron Flight Commander I'm responsible for providing intelligence to the 39th Wing and the 39th Operations Group. For Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, I also wear the hat as the Combined Forces Air Component Chief of Intelligence and the 7440th Combat Wing Provisional Chief of Intelligence. So, in essence, under PROVIDE COMFORT, I'm the chief of Wing Intelligence. In that respect, I'm responsible for ensuring that intelligence is disseminated down to the deployed fighter units and aircrews and also ensuring that mission reports are reported back up through the chain to me where I again will disseminate that information up to Headquarters, which is Combined Task Force, C-2.

I do not get involved in briefing and debriefing crews regularly, nor do I have people that work for me that do that. The deployed intelligence personnel would work for me in that they are down at the squadrons, and as being deployed down here for PROVIDE COMFORT, their squadron Intel would be responsible. I'd be responsible for squadron intelligence.

I usually get involved with debriefing of aircrews if there is an incident, any sort of ordnance being expended or launches by the Iraqis against coalition aircrews. At this point it's kind of a policy that was developed by the previous director of operations. He wanted someone from the Wing out there when the aircrews landed to ensure the information was recorded quickly so they could at least get the information up to the Wing level, as opposed to the normal length of time taking an aircrew back to the squadron, doing a formal debrief, entering it into our intelligence computer system, called "Sentinel Bite," and then we would eventually get the information. Being out on the flight line, we could get the information quicker

**DAWSON**

The last time I went out on the flight line for a debriefing was April of last year, but I did go to the debrief on 14 April. I felt it was an incident, and I needed to be there to ensure the information got back to Colonel Richardson, who is the Ops Group commander as soon as possible.

I had heard at about 1040 on 14 April, that two of our aircraft had engaged and destroyed two Iraqi Hind helicopters over the northern No-Fly-Zone. That information was what prompted me to go out to the flight line to and assist with the debriefing. I brought along Lieutenant Michael Downs. He's a brand new lieutenant to my organization, and I basically wanted to bring him along to give him the experience. He did not assist in the debriefing. He just watched. He and I went in one vehicle. Several aircrews from the 53rd also went out. The exact number escapes me at this time. Also Lieutenant Dan Murrey went out. I also directed him to go out to ensure that we could get that information. I wanted him to lead the debrief because they are his aircrews, and they are familiar with him. I believe also his intelligence NCO went along with him.

Lieutenant Murrey and myself conducted the debrief. We both asked questions. I was the only questioner for intelligence. At the time of the debrief, I had no information that anything had went wrong. I did not have any reason to believe that there was any misconduct on the part of either crew member, or that they might have engaged in any kind of criminal misconduct. I did not hear or have any reason to believe that there was some sort of Safety Investigation ongoing. The information obtained from the crew was obtained in the normal course of debriefing.

I did not indicate to the crews in any way that the information gathered from them was protected for Safety Investigation purposes. What information we obtained from the aircrews would be the type of information or questions that we would ask them for any normal intelligence debrief, and I believe that's how they understood what we were doing, we were asking questions for intelligence purposes only.

The initial debrief was between 5 and 10 minutes out by the jets. There was also a subsequent debrief. The aircrews were brought back up to the Wing Operations Center where they again went over what happened, with Colonel Mark Dougherty, the Deputy Ops Group Commander. I was present when that took place.

At 1600 local when the President came on TV is when I learned that something might have gone wrong with this particular mission. Prior to that, I had heard that aircraft were late on their mission.

I do not have any further information or statements, except, like I said, all information I gathered I did as an intelligence officer doing a normal intelligence debrief.

**DAWSON**

(The standard witness caution was given, the witness had no questions and the interview was concluded at 1628 hours.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of CAPTAIN KENNETH D. DAWSON, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Charles H. Wilcox II", with a horizontal line underneath it.

CHARLES H. WILCOX II, Colonel, USAF  
Legal Advisor

**DAWSON**



**TAB V-005**

**CONTROL WITNESS 02**

**V-001**

**V-002**

**V-002A**

**V-002B**

**V-003**

**V-003A**

**V-003B**

**V-004**

**V-005**

## **SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY**

### **CONTROL WITNESS #2 963d Airborne Warning and Control Squadron**

The interview was conducted by Major Byas at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, beginning at 1429 hours, 18 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14 and the witness was sworn.

### **EXAMINATION**

I am a co-pilot for the E-3 presently TDY to Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. My duties are to split the flying time in the jet, watch systems and just backup the pilot. I went through undergraduate pilot training at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas and then I stayed there for three years as a T-37 instructor. And then from there I went through the usual co-pilot upgrade and have been flying for about a year now in the squadron. The normal time for a person that enters co-pilot training to become qualified as a co-pilot is about three and a half to four months.

I was at my crew position between the hours of 0630 and 0735 Zulu on the 14th of April. To my knowledge, the aircraft was performing the way it's supposed to perform. We were at 320 and we were headed toward our orbit area and there were minor problems, like the autopilot wasn't working very well and engine number two was working a little funny, but everything was fine. I mean there was no serious problems at all.

The problems did not have any affect on the performance of the aircraft. We were able to be flying exactly as we are supposed to. There were no write ups related to any problems we had.

Prior to the mishap, at about 0630, 0735 Zulu, I was not monitoring any mission crew frequencies. I was monitoring Net One. Between 0630 and 0735 Zulu on the 14th, I did not hear any internal coordination on Net One. There was one statement between the pilot and the MCC and then there was a little bit of conversation after that. Specific things I can recall, I'm sure there were probably other comments between the radio operator and the backenders, rather routine stuff, but the only thing I heard out of the ordinary was when the pilot was about to give a PIREP, you know, a report of the weather to the MCC so that he could use it to pass back. The MCC told the pilot to "Stand by, F15's engaged," and that's the first warning we had that anything was going on.

So we all looked at each other a little shocked and started making plans of what we'd do if there was some kind of problem. And at that point we had no idea what was going on. The pilot

**CONTROL WITNESS #2**

and I were discussing about where, if for some reason Iraqis were doing some kind of attack against us, we were going to go, toward what airfield we were going to head. The next thing we heard from the MCC was, "Crew, this is the MCC. F-15s just shot down two Hinds." It was something to that effect. I couldn't tell you exactly what time that was. It was probably a minute or two after I had asked for the PIREP.

We have three mission nets. Net One is mainly for the pilot talking directly to the MCC. They do some back end coordination on it, but for the most part, that's the only net we really have the capability to monitor. It's so that the front end guys can talk to the back end and vice versa. Net One is our primary coordination frequency from the flight deck and the mission crew. I was monitoring that frequency throughout the mission. Except for critical stuff, like takeoffs and landings and air refueling, we monitor it all the time.

The pilot was getting ready to pass a PIREP to the mission crew and the mission crew commander told him to "Stand by, F15s engaged." We waited, I'm not sure how long, but I don't think it was more than a couple of minutes, when he came back with a second report that "Crew, this is the MCC. We just shot down two Hinds," or, "Our F15s just shot down two Hinds."

The only thing we were doing at that time was looking at maps trying to figure out what we were going to do. I know from that point on we went straight to our orbit area which had been designated and it's really not any different than they've done here for a long time. We stayed in our orbit until our refueling time which I think they moved up thirty minutes. So as far as the flight deck, we just stayed where we were supposed to.

We discussed what we'd do in case there was some kind of Iraqi response because at this point we still thought we'd shot down the bad guys. We were talking about some place, I can't remember exactly how it's pronounced, but there's a place with Hawk missiles that we were thinking we might head toward if there was trouble. So we really didn't do anything other than routine, and since there had been trouble, we did ask our radio operator to go ahead and put in a mission radio under one of our radios so we could listen to what was going on. He put it under our high frequency radio. We never asked specifically, we just asked the radio operator, "Can you put in the mission radio under one of our pushes?" This was after the incident.

I can't be sure what time I heard any information about Eagle flight. I wasn't really paying attention. I wish I had paid better attention now, but they started talking about where Eagle flight was a little bit after the incident. I might have heard some conversation over Net One, but I do remember the pilot got up and went back to talk to the MCC for a while. Some of the information was from the pilot direct and some of it may have been over Net One. But the crew started to be concerned a few minutes after the incident. We didn't know where Eagle flight was and you could just start seeing that this was possibly some kind of friendly fire thing. And of course, it did turn out that way. I think the crew was aware of friendly fire prior to the landing

**CONTROL WITNESS #2**

because of what I had heard over the mission radios. We were almost certain.

I don't know what time this was. I guess everybody was hoping all the way back that things had been like originally thought. They were hoping it wasn't our own guys. So I guess once we finally got on the ground and everything was confirmed, I guess that's when everybody was absolutely a hundred percent sure, but I think most people probably suspected that long before.

Shortly after we got a radio call from the MCC that the F15 had shot two Hinds, we were enroute to our orbit area which is just a race track, it's a setup. Not really an oval but a race track is a good description of what we fly in, and we went to our planned orbit just as we would have if the mission had had no incidents at all. It's an area called ROZ 1. It's set up for our use.

At the time of the incident, I was in my assigned co-pilot's seat. We weren't too far away from where our orbit was. I'm guessing we were maybe forty miles away from where we were supposed to be and were going to set up our orbit. If our orbit was where I thought it was, it would have taken about six or seven minutes to establish orbit.

According to our mission plan, this seemed like a normal mission as far as where we were and where we were headed.

A radio push is one of our up and down knobs. When you pull it up, you can talk out on it if you want, but just by turning the knob you can listen. Our intention was never to talk on it, just to listen to what was going on. And at the time of the incident, we were still listening to departure -- to the incident controller.

We never discussed the participation AWACS had in the shutdown. We talked amongst ourselves about how this was really bad and how we had been regretful that it happened. We don't have a lot of involvement with what the guys do in the back. We mostly just fly where we're supposed to and if the MCC needs us to move around a little bit, we do that, but we don't really get involved with the actual scope stuff.

The pilot didn't go back specifically to see the mission crew coordinator. It was an eleven and a half hour mission, so at different times he'd get up to go use the rest room or we would go back and cook a TV dinner or something, so there was a lot of opportunities that he had to say something in passing or talk to the MCC for a few minutes about different things or whatever. On the way to using the bathroom, the pilot would talk to the MCC, but the pilot wanted to be in the seat most of the time because we were still thinking there might be some kind of response to this.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions)

**CONTROL WITNESS #2**

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of Control Witness #2, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation board.



CHARLES H. WILCOX II, Colonel, USAF  
Legal Advisor

**CONTROL WITNESS #2**

**TAB V-006**

**CONTROL WITNESS 03**

**V-001**

**V-002**

**V-002A**

**V-002B**

**V-003**

**V-003A**

**V-003B**

**V-004**

**V-005**

**V-006**

**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY  
OF  
CONTROL WITNESS #3  
963D AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SQUADRON**

The interview was conducted by Major Aaron D. Byas, at Incirlik AB, Turkey, beginning at 1506 hours, 18 April 1994. A standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn.

**EXAMINATION**

I am presently assigned as the flight engineer on an Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft, on temporary duty to Incirlik Air Base.

As a flight engineer I monitor the engine instruments, hydraulics systems, electrical systems, to make sure they are all working properly. I also maintain the fuel balance to keep the aircraft in the center of gravity limitations. I've just retrained from aircraft maintenance into flight engineer last April. I was maintenance crew chief on F-16s. I have been with AWACS since July 1993. I had two months of academics and simulator training and approximately a month and a half of formal flying with the training squadron. I did complete my initial upgrade training in the required time and am now a qualified flight engineer.

The aircraft was performing properly. There were no systems malfunctions, problems or noticeable write-ups related to the aircraft prior to take off. From my position the aircraft was airworthy and on the 14th performing the way it was supposed to do. I was at my crew position between the hours of 0630 Zulu and 0735 Zulu on the 14th of April and monitoring just Net One and UHF guard. I was not monitoring any of the control frequencies that the weapons controller team was using.

I'm not sure what time it was when the pilot called back to MCC to make the weather report. MCC told him to standby. I'm not sure if this was before entering the orbit area. The next transmission never did get relayed because the MCC had told him to standby. The MCC said "standby we have Eagles engaged." From then on it was quiet. The next conversation I heard on Net One after Eagle is engaged was the MCC calling the radio operators for a SATCOM link. He then mentioned that we had shot down two Hind helicopters. I did not monitor SATCOM, but I did hear the mission crew commander say to the radio operator that there were two Hinds shot down. I can't remember what Net it departed. I want to say on Net One I heard something about the flight being overdue 37 minutes. I really can't remember if it was prior to leaving the orbit or after leaving the orbit area that I was, became aware that there may have been an accidental friendly fire incident. I want to say on Net One I heard something about the one flight being overdue 37 minutes.

**CONTROL WITNESS #3**

I did not hear anything else on Net One after the MCC called the radio operator and indicated that two Hind helicopters had been hit. There was no further conversation on Net One about Eagle Flight. I can't remember if I heard it on the radio or if one of the flight techs had passed it along to me that one flight was overdue 30 minutes. I did not know which flight was overdue; the UN helicopters, I wasn't really sure of their call sign. I did not hear any discussion amongst the crewmembers about their participation in the activity. I don't know if there was one.

(The standard witness caution was given, the witness had no questions and the interview concluded at 1520 hours.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of CONTROL WITNESS #3, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.



CHARLES H. WILCOX II, Colonel, USAF  
Legal Advisor

**CONTROL WITNESS #3**



**TAB V-007**

**CONTROL WITNESS 04**

**V-001**

**V-002**

**V-002A**

**V-002B**

**V-003**

**V-003A**

**V-003B**

**V-004**

**V-005**

**V-006**

**V-007**

**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY  
OF  
CONTROL WITNESS #4  
963D AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SQUADRON**

The interview was conducted by Major Aaron D. Byas, at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, beginning at 1524 hours, 18 April 1994. A standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn.

**EXAMINATION**

I am with the 963d Airborne Warning Control Squadron. I'm an instructor communication technician presently TDY to Incirlik AB, Turkey.

As an instructor communication technician my duties are to train newly arrived communications technicians so that they can be mission ready. When no student is available, my primary duties are to operate the joint tactical information distribution, operate the HAVE QUICK radio system, and maintain all of the radio and communication systems on the airplane. My background experience and qualification include six years as a radio maintenance technician on an EC-135 Looking Glass and Blue Eagle aircraft and two years experience on the EC-135. I received two months of academic training and nine flights to become qualified and five flights to become a communications technician.

It took approximately ten months to be upgraded for the instructor communications technician. I've been an instructor communications technician now four or five months. On this mission I was not there in an instructor nor supervisor capacity. I was a comm advisor for the crew assigned to spin up the CSO and CT local procedures at Incirlik. Our comm equipment was working properly. The only problems noted was radio transmitter 15, the HAVE QUICK system. It was inoperable and that was noted before takeoff and not used or played at all. To the best of my knowledge, the remaining radios were operating correctly.

When the incident occurred I was not on headset. I was in the crew rest area in the back of the plane. Prior to the mishap, I was not around any of the weapon control consoles nor in my crew position, or the surveillance operator consoles. Generally, as a communications technician, we listen to the primary HAVE QUICK frequency, the check-in frequency and both satellite communication systems. I do not recall hearing, prior to the mishap, Eagle Flight checking in nor communicating on Net One.

Generally I monitor all the mission nets. I assist the communication technician prior to take off. I sit at seat five during takeoff which is the seat in the flight deck. As soon as we were

**CONTROL WITNESS #4**

cleared up at 10,000 feet I went back and I got the communication cords and hooked up and listened briefly so that we could get powered up. I showed the other technician how to load the JTIDS and after that I took my headset off and proceeded to the back of the airplane. I was there for at least an hour and then I was told of the incident. So I never heard anyone check-in.


After the incident I was not aware of any communication involving Eagle Flight on the airplane. I really can't recall if I heard any communication or discussion of Eagle Flight on the Mission Net. The information I received was from the crew rest area computer display maintenance technician, Control Witness #20. He informed myself and Control Number #19 that we had shot down two Hind Iraq helicopters. Prior to the mission being over, I remember [Personal Identifier Deleted] making the statement that they think we shot down Eagle Flight. This probably took place approximately two hours after the mishap.

There was not any discussion of participation the AWACS crew might have had in the engagement. Except for logs no other note taking was taken during the course of the mission. I did not hear anyone directed to take notes during the course of the mission.

I have no other statements, information or evidence which I wish to present.

(The standard witness caution was given, the witness had no questions, and the interview was concluded at 1538 hours, 18 April 1994.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of **CONTROL WITNESS #4**, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

  
**CHARLES H. WILCOX II, Colonel, USAF**  
Legal Advisor

**CONTROL WITNESS #4**

**TAB V-008**

**CONTROL WITNESS 05**

**V-001**

**V-002**

**V-002A**

**V-002B**

**V-003**

**V-003A**

**V-003B**

**V-004**

**V-005**

**V-006**

**V-007**

**V-008**

## **SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY**

### **CONTROL WITNESS #5 963d Airborne Warning and Control Squadron**

The interview was conducted by Major Byas at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, beginning at 1543 hours, 18 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14 and the witness was sworn.

### **EXAMINATION**

I am an instructor navigator for the 963d and currently deployed to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.

As a instructor navigator I am responsible for flight planning, navigation and safe flight operations of the aircraft. My background and experience as a flight navigator consisted of specialized undergraduate navigator school at Mather AFB in 1989. I have been an AWACS navigator for the last four years. AWACS qualification training was only three months for basic navigator which included academics and flight time. It took two years before I was upgraded as an instructor and I have been an instructor since February of last year .

On 14 April 1994, specific equipment was operating correctly. Both inertial navigation systems were talking to the navigation computer system and the standard setup without any problems. We were flying the proper altitude and speed for the assigned mission. We were at about 410 knots ground speed, flying the top speed we wanted to fly. There were no problems associated with the equipment.

Prior to the mishap between 0630 and 0735, we were not monitoring any mission crew frequencies because we were still on departure frequency out of Incirlik. I was monitoring Net One, internal coordination. About 0730Z, the aircraft commander called to the mission crew commander to give our pilot report conditions for the weather in the area of responsibility. At that time MCC had called and said to stand by because the fighters had engaged. At that time we started discussing our retrograde procedures and had the communication systems tune up the radio to what the mission crew was listening to.

At 0730Z, we had just been informed by the mission crew commander the fighters had engaged. We started getting our JEPSON to civilian approach flights for civilian operated airports and started reviewing approaches into one of our divert bases. We were reviewing what

**CONTROL WITNESS #5**

we would do if they had shot down two Hind helicopters and what the Iraqi response would be. This took approximately one half hour discussing this issue. During that time I also had the radio operator give me HAVE QUICK and SATCOM into my high frequency (HF) and very high frequency (VHF) pushes and monitored it to figure out what was going on.

After the incident took place, there was discussion for probably five or more hours through the entire flight. I was monitoring all the radios and had the CSO give me a mission Net Three, and from then on, I was monitoring everything that was going on. There was quite a bit of conversation about the engagement. For the most part, they were trying to have Tiger Flight, the ones that did the shooting, do one pass over the site to confirm what they had shot down and the rest of time they were trying to figure out if that was the Army flight of helicopters or the Hinds. There were several discussions as to where the Army helicopters should have been. They thought they would have been 20 miles south of the shutdown site.

They also had a Harrier fly a recon out to that area to see if they could find a parking lot. They had trouble finding the parking lot as well. The individual that was controlling the area was a brand new WD and he said that the fighters had checked in with him and then called out two helicopters. They asked them if he had them on his radar. He had a brief hit on them after they shot the helicopters down. He said it happened just about that fast. The fighter pilots never asked his permission to shoot down. They just got confirmation that he had seen two blips on his radar scope. As far as I know it was just a radar hit only.

They asked them to reconfirm that it was a Hind helicopter and not Blackhawks and the flight on HAVE QUICK basically came across and said they saw two pods, one on each side of both helicopters, and called them out as being weapons pods. They said that they didn't see any ordnance being dispensed from them. In reference to that, everyone on the flight deck was discussing whether it was the fuel tank or weapons pods he had seen. Most of the flight people were trying basically to disprove that it was the Blackhawks that were shot down. Everyone pretty much suspected what had happened but nobody could believe a mistake was made. There was no more conversation pertaining to the Eagle flight during the mission.

About 1030Z, I was in the back making my lunch. Duke was on board and said that he hoped that we had not shot down our own helicopters and that he couldn't believe anybody could make that dumb of a mistake.

The air surveillance officer was keeping a log of events as well as the mission crew commander. I don't know of anyone who might have been making individual private notes pertaining to incident.

One of the AWACS crew members, a weapons controller, said the F-15 called to see if AWACS radar showed the helicopter. The only conversation to determine whether or not the helicopters they were discussing were friendly was when they asked him if he had any contacts

**CONTROL WITNESS #5**

there. He did say he had a couple of hits and the fighters shot them down. I don't think it ever got beyond that.


I have no other statements, information or evidence which I wish to present.

One thing though, we were on the flight deck monitoring the GUARD radio, the emergency frequency radio, both civilian and military the entire flight, and never heard anything called out that was a verbal warning to the helicopters.

After the mishap, there were calls on GUARD from the fighters trying to raise the Blackhawk helicopters. AWACS throughout the day would ask Eagle Flight to come up on 257 decimal zero to brief AWACS but there was no response on Uniform GUARD. At 1056 we had a tone on Uniform GUARD that lasted approximately 30 seconds, and that was the only thing we ever heard on there. Prior to the mishap, GUARD had a little bit of static on it, and that was about it. There were no calls from AWACS trying to call for Eagle Flight.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of Control Witness #5, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

  
CHARLES H. WILCOX, II, Colonel, USAF  
Legal Advisor

**CONTROL WITNESS #5**

**TAB V-009**

**CONTROL WITNESS 06**

**V-001**

**V-002**

**V-002A**

**V-002B**

**V-003**

**V-003A**

**V-003B**

**V-004**

**V-005**

**V-006**

**V-007**

**V-008**

**V-009**

11-22



## SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

### CONTROL WITNESS #6 932d Airborne Warning and Control Squadron

The interview was conducted by Major Byas at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, beginning at 1611 hours, 18 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14 and the witness was sworn.

### EXAMINATION

My present duty assignment is at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. As aircraft commander, my duties and responsibilities are concerned with overall safety of the aircraft and its crew, support the mission crew, and to make sure they arrive to their on-station safely and that I return them safely.

I had about two thousand total flying hours prior to AWACS. I was an aircraft commander in the EC-135 at Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota. Prior to that I was a co-pilot in the same airplane. I went through the KC-135 air refueling squadron upgrade at Castle Air Force Base in California. I graduated undergraduate pilot training at Columbus Air Force Base, Mississippi. My initial qualification to fly the AWACS aircraft consisted of a basic course in aircraft simulator and aircraft academics with Boeing, and then a check out flying course. I spent approximately a year and a half as a co-pilot in the Airborne Warning and Control E-3, and then I upgraded in a similar course to aircraft commander after sixteen hundred hours total time and three hundred hours in the E-3.

During the mission, the aircraft's systems were performing normally. We had a minor problem with the number two engine compressor stall that we had written up in the maintenance forms in the post mission debrief. However it was minor and it had no effect on the mission systems status. Prior to the mishap, I was at the flight level 320, within the airspeed parameters for the mission radar. I was at my crew position between the time of 0630 and 0735 Zulu on the 14th of April. We had just entered the area. At that time I was monitoring the Air Traffic Control frequency. It's normal for us to monitor those frequencies at that time. Once we're established into the area, then it's appropriate for us to monitor whatever mission frequency is appropriate. I was also monitoring UHF GUARD. I do not remember hearing any transmissions on that frequency prior to the mishap.

We were monitoring Net One at the time, which is our normal procedure. I did not hear

**CONTROL WITNESS #6**

any internal crew coordination between 0630 and 0735 Zulu on the 14th of April. Our first indication that there was a problem was as I was going through our normal procedures of entering the area which would be to coordinate with mission crew commander with a PIREP back to the home station, and on that particular day the weather was extremely clear and I called up the mission crew commander over Net One, said "Mission Crew Commander -- Pilot -- PIREP." That's when he came back and responded, "Stand by," something to the effect, "F-15s engaged." And at that point I was standing by for instructions. That was around seven-thirty Zulu.

Immediately my concern is the safety of the aircraft and its crew. I instructed the flight deck to start reviewing procedures for retrograde in case there was hostile actions and my responsibility would be to save the aircraft and its crew. One of those is to put distance between us and whatever hostile act there is. So upon him saying that they were engaged, my focus now was on movement of the airplane and its crew away from any possible hostile activities.

The next response that I heard from the mission crew commander was that we effectively splashed two Hind helicopters. It was a period of a very brief, short period of time. However, I continually pressed on with a plan for possible retrograde to leave the area, and that would include briefing airspeeds, configurations, descents and possible recovery bases and the frequencies at the recovery field. Erzenrum Air Base, Turkey is the one that we were looking at. My focus of attention was not really on the mishap incident itself but on what I would do just to make sure of the survivability of that airplane and its crew. I was convinced by the tone of voice of the mission crew commander that he sincerely believed that there was a hostile aircraft and that a hostile act had occurred.

After he had told me that they'd splashed two Hind helicopters, I instructed the radio operator to put SAVVY Mad Dog frequency under my Uniform push and put the Strike frequency under my Victor push. The next communication I had with the mission crew commander was when I verified the fact that there actually had been a shootdown, and he said "Roger." I went through my procedures and just told him to keep us advised.

At that point I could monitor Mad Dog frequency, and I could monitor the Strike frequency, and I would get a more heads up feel for how things were going.

After about a thirty minute period, I remember Mad Dog coming over and just reminding the Duke of a conversation between Mad Dog and Duke about a possible Eagle Flight in the area, and at that point, I believe, I noticed there was a more intensive search for Eagle Flight over the Strike net.

As far as the flight deck, we continued to press on with a possible retrograde and reviewing those procedures and standing by. I had to assume the worst, that they were Hind helicopters, and I was expecting and preparing for an Iraqi response to that. We were busy doing those kind of things. There's really nothing we could have done except hope that it wasn't

**CONTROL WITNESS #6**

American helicopters that were shot down.

After the shutdown, there was a beacon on Uniform GUARD but that was almost an hour after the shutdown, a longer than usual tone, almost thirty seconds on Uniform GUARD and it went away and never came back again.

I remember crew members, Cougar, which is our backend call sign, our front end call sign being SAVVY, I did remember them calling for Eagle Flight, but I don't specifically remember them saying, "This is Cougar on GUARD."

After the shutdown, I was extremely concerned about events that were going on. We had an air refueling scheduled at twelve-thirty, local time, I believe, and it was maybe two hours before I left my position in the cockpit and that was just briefly.

I stopped by the mission crew commander's station. He was really busy at that point. There were two mission crew commanders, Control Witness 10 and Control Witness 9. Control Witness 9 was at the console. He was busy. I just had a brief conversation and then they said they were concerned that it may have been Eagle Flight, but at that point they still were pretty much convinced that it was Hind helicopters. They had an active search going on with the reconnaissance planes flying over. I remember one time, when I was monitoring the net, it actually saw helicopters in the parking lot.

So, at that point, in my mind, the crew was still convinced that it was Hind helicopters. This was at least two hours after the incident.

I do not believe the crew realized it was an accidental shutdown of a friendly aircraft until we landed, as far as the flight deck. The navigator asked for some points. The navigator monitors mission nets sometimes more than I do, especially when I have to coordinate for air refuelings and those kind of things. He has a little bit more information than I would and he had plotted point Kilo and Lima and estimated the ground speed of the helicopters and some time about an hour and a half after the incident, pointed out to me the likelihood of those helicopters being where they were at. This was just something that we were doing on the flight deck. I'm not sure he shared that information with the mission crew commander. I'm sure he did, but we weren't one hundred percent convinced until we landed.

On our flight plan for that particular mission, we have a fifteen minute window. On that day 0750 local takeoff time. We take off, there's a wake up orbit, it's a 010 radial at thirty-five miles off of Incirlik, where we climb up to thirty-two thousand feet for the mission, let them stay within communication range, and once their communication equipment is up, we would press on toward the East, toward what we call K-town. It's Derick where we will hold until the JTIDS would come up, and then we would press into the orbit, into ROZ.

**CONTROL WITNESS #6**

JTIDS stands for Joint Tactical Information Distribution System. It's a data system where the AWACS and the ground station exchange information. This information is air picture. At the time of the incident, the JTIDS system was functional. We were entering ROZ, our assigned airspace, when the incident occurred. We were straight and level flight, if I remember correctly, and we were just about to enter what we call our orbital pattern, but we were in our airspace.

I'm not sure if the navigator shared with the MCC the plotting of the Eagle Flight from points Kilo to Lima.

There was no discussion by AWACS crew members that I heard concerning their participation in the shutdown. From my listening to the Strike frequency and listening to my back end response, the main focus was searching for Eagle Flight. That continued throughout the day.

I remember listening to reconnaissance airplanes that said that they may have seen them in a regular car parking lot, and I guess maybe they had made another pass and they weren't there anymore, so it may have been a mistake. At first they may have thought they had found Eagle Flight. I remember us feeling good because they thought they had found Eagle Flight. I remember hearing this before our air refueling so it was, I would say, maybe about an hour and a half after the incident. I remember the sequence of events seemed that we were elated about the shutdown. Then we were disappointed and concerned that it may be U.S. helicopters in the area that were unaccounted for, and then we were slightly relieved that they had been located, and then we were let down again that that turned out to be negative.

My primary focus, though, during the entire day was I had to assume that there was a hostile act and what I would do with the aircraft. The total sortie length was eleven hours -- eleven point six hours long. We took off at zero seven-thirty-five and so we would have landed around sixteen-fifteen Zulu. We had to run some computer tape stuff on board so we went to the orbit. We left about fourteen hundred Zulu from the orbit, I believe, and came back and we stayed up there for about an hour working the computer tape relay. At that point the other E-3 had been launched and was picking up our on-station.

Crew members have not really discussed the incident since we returned to Incirlik. Everyone pretty much feels really bad about it. There's not been much discussion, even on a normal AWACS mission. The pilots have a certain area of responsibility where the senior director has an area of responsibility, and the mission crew commander has an area of responsibility. We probably don't talk about it that much amongst each other. So there's really not been much discussion.

I don't know if anyone kept notes about the incident.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions)

**CONTROL WITNESS #6**

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of Control Witness 6, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.



CHARLES H. WILCOX, II, Colonel, USAF  
Legal Advisor

**CONTROL WITNESS #6**

**TAB V-010**

**CONTROL WITNESS 07**

**V-001**

**V-002**

**V-002A**

**V-002B**

**V-003**

**V-003A**

**V-003B**

**V-004**

**V-005**

**V-006**

**V-007**

**V-008**

**V-009**

**V-010**

**VERBATIM TESTIMONY**

**OF**

**CONTROL WITNESS #7  
963d Airborne Warning and Control Squadron**

**COL WILCOX:** The time is now 1717 on 18 April 1994. The persons present are the following: Major Aaron Byas, Colonel Charles Wilcox, Sergeant Paylor-Williams and CONTROL WITNESS #7. Spell your last name, please?

**WITNESS:** CONTROL WITNESS #7.

**COL WILCOX:** This interview is being conducted at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. This is an official AFR 110-14 Aircraft Accident Investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters and the possible involvement of U.S. fighter aircraft in the crash of these helicopters in the northern No-Fly Zone of Iraq on 14 April 1994.

This investigation is being conducted at the direction of General Robert C. Oaks, CINC USAF. This investigation is not a Safety Mishap Investigation conducted under AFR 127-4. The purpose of this accident investigation is to obtain and preserve all available evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary action, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Testimony before a Safety Mishap Investigation Board is given with the understanding that it can only be used for mishap prevention purposes and all witnesses are advised that the testimony will be treated in confidence.

However, testimony given in this accident investigation may be used for any purpose deemed appropriate by competent authority and may be publicly disseminated.

Do you understand the difference between a Safety Mishap Investigation and this Accident Investigation?

**WITNESS:** Yes sir.

**COL WILCOX:** Do you understand the purpose of this investigation?

**WITNESS:** Yes sir.

**COL WILCOX:** Do you have any questions?

**CONTROL WITNESS #7**

WITNESS: No sir.

COL WILCOX: Your testimony will be recorded and transcribed verbatim so that a written record can be made available to the appointing or higher authority. For the benefit of the reporter, please avoid the use of acronyms or jargon.

As this is an official investigation, you are required to answer questions put to you by the board. You are further advised not to discuss classified information unless necessary to develop your testimony. If it's necessary for you to discuss classified information, you need to identify it as such.

Would you please rise so that I can swear you in.

(The witness was sworn)

### EXAMINATION

1Q: State your full name, grade and organization please.

1A: CONTROL WITNESS #7.

2Q: What is your station and present duty assignment?

2A: [Redacted.]

3Q: And your present duty assignment.

3A: I'm an Instructor Communications Systems Operator.

4Q: Are you presently TDY to Incirlik Air Base, Turkey?

4A: Yes sir.

5Q: Could you restate your aircrew position, please?

5A: Yes sir. I'm an Instructor Communications Systems Operator.

6Q: As a communications operator, what are your duties and responsibilities during the flight?

6A: My primary duties are to provide the mission crew with the communications needed to complete the given mission. It's also to set up the tactical digital information link or Link Eleven and also to assist the comm -- communications technician with anything that they would need help in.

7Q: What is your background and experience that qualifies you to perform those functions?

7A: You mean my technical schools . . .

CONTROL WITNESS #7



8Q: Yeah, technical schools and training that you received.

8A: Okay. I went through eleven weeks of technical training school in 1983 at Keesler Air Force Base, and then approximately two and a half months of E-3 specific training at Tinker Air Force Base in January of 1994. I currently have four thousand four hundred hours of which approximately seventeen hundred are instructor hours in the aircraft.

9Q: I think you said '94. Is that '84 that you went to Tinker?

9A: Yes sir. I'm sorry. 1984.

10Q: How long have you been an instructor?

10A: Since 1986. Or maybe '87. I don't remember. It's been quite a while.

11Q: Were you flying in your instructor capacity or as a -- in the position as an operator?

11A: I was a primary crew member operator. I was not flying as an instructor.

12Q: Okay. Were your specific equipment operating correctly?

12A: Yes sir, except for one UHF radio and one VHF radio which were annotated in the aircraft forms before we even took off.

13Q: Were any of those radios being used by the mission crew?

13A: No sir.

14Q: Were you at your crew position between the hours of 0630 and 0735 Zulu on the 14th of April?

14A: Yes sir, I was.

15Q: Prior to the mishap, between the hours of 0630 and 0735 Zulu, were you monitoring any mission crew controlled frequencies?

15A: No sir, I was not.

16Q: Were you monitoring Guard?

16A: No sir.

17Q: What were you doing at that time?

17A: At the time I was just waiting for any changes that may come. I was listening to Turkish SATCOM and, of course, the mission nets but I wasn't actively involved in doing anything . . .

18Q: And so it would be external control frequencies -- you were not monitoring any of those.

18A: No sir.

19Q: What mission nets were you monitoring?

19A: All three mission nets, sir.

**CONTROL WITNESS #7**

20Q: During the period of 0630 to 0735 Zulu on the 14th of April, did you hear any internal communications on any of those three nets?

20A: The . . .

21Q: I'm sure you heard basically a lot of communications, so take your time and try to recall what that information was to the best of your ability.

21A: I really don't remember a whole lot. All's I . . . the one thing that I do remember is the MCC coming over net one saying that two F15s had splashed two Hind helicopters. That's the only specific thing I recall.

22Q: Do you recall any transmission prior to that call?

22A: No sir.

23Q: On any of the nets.

23A: No sir.

24Q: Were . . .

24A: What happens a lot sir is they'll be talking on the nets and since I deal with the senior director and the air surveillance officer quite a bit, they'll be talking weapons type information or surveillance type information. Since I've been doing it so long, I've kind of learned to filter out the -- they're not talking to me specifically, since someone may call on another net, I try not to really pay attention to what they're saying unless they're speaking to me specifically.

25Q: What do they refer to you specifically as on the airplane?

25A: Usually CSO or RO.

26Q: So while you're at your position, you are listening for that?

26A: Yes sir.

27Q: After the MCC stated that the two aircraft had been shot down, what other conversations did you hear transpiring on net one or any of the other nets?

27A: That's all I remember, sir, from those times. I don't -- I don't recall that -- anything else that was said.

28Q: Did you monitor any of the other mission radios after that?

28A: Yes sir, I was. I -- I -- at that time then I turned -- I believe it was the enroute frequency on after -- maybe about ten or fifteen minutes after the incident and I think it was just a natural reaction. We're not required, in my crew position, to listen to any of the radios but it was more of an interest type item and so I -- I turned that on -- the enroute frequency.

29Q: And what did you hear on that frequency?

29A: At one time I heard, and I don't remember the call sign, I think it might have been

**CONTROL WITNESS #7**

Hurricane, was a -- it was a -- it was a British voice saying that he had been locked up by a height finder radar.

30Q: Do you recall about what time it was -- that occurred? Was this after the shutdown?

30A: Yes sir, I want to say it was about fifteen minutes after, but I really cannot remember the exact time, okay, afterwards. But again, that -- I just -- I think I just turned that on just to listen out of my own curiosity, not that I'd really understand what they were talking about.

31Q: Did you recall hearing any crew conversations concerning Eagle Zero One flight?

31A: No sir, none at all.

32Q: During the entire mission, did -- did you hear anything in regards to Eagle Zero One flight?

32A: After the -- after the actual incident, we were discussing that, okay, Eagle Flights are missing. It was being discussed on the net or I may have been talking next to the MCC, and I do . . .

33Q: About what time did you first recall hearing about an Eagle Flight being missing or an aircraft after that being missing?

33A: I'm going to say it was a good forty-five minutes to an hour after the actual downing of the -- what we at the time thought were the Hind helicopters. I just heard, I thought, one of the weapons directors, I don't remember which one, had said that he had gotten a squawk from the Eagles, and I want to say that was like at 0840 sticks out in my mind, but I don't know that to be a fact.

34Q: So the crew at that point believed they had relocated . . .

34A: I can't speak for them, sir. I really don't know.

35Q: Were there any conversations between -- do you recall anyone instructing anyone on the aircraft to start taking personal notes with regards to the mission on that day?

35A: Not on the aircraft, no sir.

MAJ BYAS: Sir, that's all I have.

36Q: Did you hear anyone discussing what their role may -- anyone on the crew discussing what their role might have been during the shutdown?

36A: No sir.

37Q: Has anyone talked to you about the incident since you returned from -- to -- from -- or since you returned to Incirlik, since the incident?

37A: No sir, we were instructed not to talk about it.

**CONTROL WITNESS #7**

38Q: You said after the incident -- about fifteen minutes after the incident, you heard a -- a call, a British voice indicating he had been locked up by some radar?

38A: Yes sir. I believe it was a height finder radar and, in fact, right after, now that I recall that, I believe it was an F-4 because they called out, a Weasel said they had nothing. So I don't know if they were flying in tandem -- I don't . . .

39Q: What is a height finder radar?

39A: It's a radar used to locate their altitude . . .

40Q: Height as in H-E-I-G-H-T?

40A: Yes sir, I believe so.

41Q: You indicated that when you heard this call, you were monitoring a particular radio or particular net or frequency and you referred to it but I didn't catch what you said.

41A: Well sir, I'm not -- I don't remember if it was the Have Quick radio which -- since they were -- the fighters were in the AOR, I would probably say that it was the Have Quick radio that the fighters were on, but this was after the incident.

42Q: When you were flying back to Incirlik on the 14th, after the incident, did you discuss -- was there any discussion between you and the other crew members about what had happened?

42A: Well, there was the normal we weren't sure what had happened or who -- I know I, at the time, after, you know, we -- we flew another eight hours or so after that, that as time went on, we all kind of speculated that -- that, in fact, maybe it was the Eagles that were shot down but we did not know that for a fact. You know, we were just . . .

43Q: Who speculated that? Who said that to you?

43A: I -- I don't remember exactly who I was talking to. You know, we'd just be in a group, you know. Once we were kind of heading back out of our orbit, you know, we -- we tend to just kind of "Hey, how'd the mission go," but we really didn't -- it was a different mood to it that day than -- than normal. We -- we weren't sure -- no one wanted to say, "Yeah, hey, that's what happened," because we didn't know for sure, so no one came right out and said, "Hey, that's -- that's what happened," but we just -- we kind of thought that at the time it was a possibility that that's what -- what, in fact, had happened.

COL WILCOX: You're reminded that this is an official investigation. You're ordered not to divulge the nature of the investigation or the questions, answers or discussions in this interview with anyone unless authorized to do so by the board president, Major General Andrus, CINC USAF, or higher authority. If anyone other than a board -- member of this board should approach you regarding your testimony or the matters discussed here, you must report it immediately.

Do you have any further information, statements or evidence you wish to present?

**CONTROL WITNESS #7**

WITNESS: No sir.


COL WILCOX: Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: No sir.

COL WILCOX: 1733 and the interview is concluded. Thank you very much.

### REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I certify that the above sworn interview statement, given by Control Witness #7 to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board was recorded by me by stenomask and that the foregoing transcript is a true, accurate, and verbatim account of that statement.



BRUCE H. PEGGS, DAFC  
Court Reporter  
Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

**CONTROL WITNESS #7**

**TAB V-011**

**CONTROL WITNESS 08**

## SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

### CONTROL WITNESS #8 963d Airborne Warning and Control Squadron

The interview was conducted by Major Byas at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, beginning at 1755 hours, 18 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14 and the witness was sworn.

### EXAMINATION

My present duty assignment is at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. I am a communication technician. As such, I am responsible to make sure that the radios operate and function properly and, if not, I'm supposed to fix them to the best of my ability. We also have safety duties, like firefighter. I am also responsible for the JTIDS operations.

Prior to my current duty assignment, I didn't really have any electronics background. I was a medic in the Army National Guard and then I also worked as a secretary. The AWACS training was about nine months. That includes academic and flight training. I also had further training which lasted approximately seven months.

During flight training, we receive nine flights at the training schoolhouse and then we get nine more flights. Then we get to our duty squadron. I will have been mission ready for two years in July. This was not my first time flying in this area of operation and I received adequate training for this area upon my arrival.

The specific equipment was working properly that day. We might have had a problem with one SATCOM but we figured out that the codes weren't loaded correctly. There was a write up on high frequency radio number two and there was a write up on another HAVE QUICK radio. We did not use those while we were doing the mission. We tried to use one to see if we could fix the problem, but we couldn't so we did not use it.

I was at my crew position for some of the time between the hours of 0630 and 0735 Zulu on the 14th of April 1994. I was at my position prior to the shutdown but not during the shutdown. One of the extra people that we had on board with us, his knob had come off his mission audio panel that he uses to talk to different people on the plane, and I was fixing a knob for him. Half the time I was monitoring mission crew radio frequencies but I was not listening to the conversations. I was not monitoring the HAVE QUICK frequency.

**CONTROL WITNESS #8**

I was monitoring all of the mission nets, one, two and three. I heard transmissions between the hours of 0630 and 0735 but they were not pertaining to the incident. I don't remember a PIREP call from the flight deck. I don't remember any of the mission communications. Afterwards I was listening to the SATCOM.

I did hear a transmission with regards to two Hind helicopters being shot down. I remember the MCC calling down to SAVVY Ops to let them know and he was also giving them the coordinates. He was calling to say we had splashed two helicopters and they wanted to know the coordinates and the MCC gave them. Duke and Mad Dog were talking about it and they were worried about Eagle flight, if we had had any contact with them. This conversation was about five or ten minutes after the shutdown. I remember Mad Dog asking about Eagle flight. He said they would feel a lot better if they knew we had transmissions with Eagle flight. I was listening and they were asking for information from the F-15s if they had had a visual ID and what kind of armaments were on the helicopters; if they could identify them.

The F-15 said they were armed but they couldn't tell what they were armed with. I don't recall who made the transmission to the F-15s concerning the Hind's armament or identification, but I think Mad Dog asked us and then we had to relay to the F-15s and then they answered us and we relayed to Mad Dog. I think one of the weapons controllers made the relay transmission from AWACS.

When Mad Dog had asked about Eagle, I think some of us had thought about the possibility of a friendly fire incident. Most of us probably didn't believe that it had happened or hoped that it hadn't happened, but we didn't know positively that it had happened until much later in the flight. I wouldn't know if there were any conversations between any of the crew members concerning their involvement in the command and control of the F-15s because most of us were in our positions at that time listening on the radios, trying to see what was going on.

When we were off our crew position and the mission was over, most everybody on the AWACS crew didn't think they had done anything wrong. They weren't sure if the F-15s had done something wrong. Obviously something was done wrong. I say that because we killed twenty-six U.N. people. We knew it was a U.N. flight before we landed. I had asked someone what Eagle flight was and he said it was U.N. helicopters.

Everyone was concerned because no one could raise Eagle flight. It was too much of a coincidence that we couldn't get ahold of Eagle flight and that also two helicopters had been shot down.

Just before the incident, I was working on the interphone system. One of the controller's Net Two knob had come off. He could still hear and he could still talk, but he couldn't turn the

**CONTROL WITNESS #8**



volume either way.

I heard the MCC call SAVVY Ops and tell them that we had splashed two helicopters. They came back and asked for the coordinates I don't know if he referred to them as helicopters or Hinds. Before the incident, I didn't even know what Hinds were so he could have said Hinds and I wouldn't have known what he meant.

Duke is an extra person that we fly with here and I think he works the CTF. He was on our aircraft. Mad Dog is on the ground but I don't know where on the ground.

I would say that the conversation between Duke and Mad Dog indicating that they were worried about Eagle flight happened minutes after the incident happened. At the time, though, I don't think Duke was worrying about Eagle flight.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of Control Witness #8, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation board.



CHARLES H. WILCOX, II, Colonel, USAF  
Legal Advisor

**CONTROL WITNESS #8**

V-011

V-012

**TAB V-012**

**CONTROL WITNESS 09**

**VERBATIM TESTIMONY  
OF  
CONTROL WITNESS #9  
963D AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SQUADRON  
(MISSION CREW COMMANDER)**

COL WILCOX: The time is 1332, on 22 April 1994. The persons present are the following: Major General Andrus, the Board President; Major Aaron Byas; Colonel Wilcox; Erma Brundage-Clark is the Board reporter. This is an interview with Control #9. The interview is being conducted at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.

This is an official AFR 110-14 Aircraft Accident Investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters, and the possible involvement of U.S. fighter aircraft in the crash of those helicopters in the northern No-Fly -Zone of Iraq on 14 April 1994.

This investigation is being conducted at the direction of General Robert C. Oaks, CINCUSAFE.

This investigation is not a Safety Mishap Investigation conducted under AFR 127-4. It is an Aircraft Accident Investigation conducted under AFR 110-14. The purpose of this Accident Investigation is to obtain and preserve all evidence, all available evidence, for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary action, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. Testimony before a Safety Mishap Investigation Board is given with the understanding that it can only be used for mishap prevention purposes, and all witnesses are advised that the testimony will be treated in confidence. However, testimony given in this accident investigation may be used for any purpose deemed appropriate by competent authority and may be publicly disseminated.

Do you understand the difference between a Safety Mishap Investigation and an Accident Investigation?

WITNESS: Yes, I do.

COL WILCOX: Do you understand the purpose of this investigation?

WITNESS: Yes, I do.

COL WILCOX: Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: No, I don't.

**CONTROL WITNESS #9**

COL WILCOX: Your testimony will be recorded and transcribed verbatim or summarized so that a written record may be made available to the appointing or higher authority. For the benefit of the reporter, please avoid using -- please avoid the use of acronyms or jargon. Speak slowly, clearly, loudly, and remember to explain your testimony carefully so that others who do not have your technical training will be able to understand.

As I stated previously, I'm Colonel Wilcox, and this Board is investigating the facts and circumstances surrounding the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the northern "no fly zone" of Iraq on 14 April 1994, and the possible involvement of U.S. fighter aircraft.

You are suspected of the following offense: dereliction of duty, that is, you are suspected of negligently failing to properly manage, supervise, and train the mission crew, in violation of Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. I advise you under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, you have the right to remain silent, that is, to say nothing at all. Anything you say may be used as evidence against you in a trial by court-martial or other judicial or administrative proceedings. I also advise you that you have the right to consult with a lawyer, if you desire, and to have a lawyer present during this interview. You may obtain a civilian lawyer of your own choosing at no expense to the Government, or, if you wish, the Air Force will appoint a military lawyer for you, free of charge. You may request a lawyer at anytime during the interview, and if you decide to answer questions without a lawyer present, you may stop the questioning at any time.

Before deciding whether you wish to exercise your rights under Article 31 of the UCMJ, I further advise you that any previous statements made by you under circumstances that violated your Article 31 rights may not be used against you. For example, previous statements or notes, written or oral, made by you at the direction of your supervisor or other superior officers who suspected you of misconduct or dereliction, cannot be used against you if the individual directing or requesting the statement did not properly advise you of your rights under Article 31. If you've made previous statements under these conditions, you should consider that they cannot be used against you.

Do you understand your rights?

WITNESS: Yes, I do.

COL WILCOX: Do you wish to remain silent or will you answer our questions?

WITNESS: I would like to see an ADC.


COL WILCOX: Very well. The interview is terminated.

(The interview was terminated at 1338 hours, 22 April 1994.)

**CONTROL WITNESS #9**

## REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I certify that the above sworn interview statement, given by CONTROL WITNESS #9 to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board, was recorded by me by stenomask and that the foregoing transcript is a true, accurate, and verbatim account of that statement.

  
ERMA BRUNDAGE-CLARK, DAFC  
Court Reporter  
Incirlik AB, Turkey

CONTROL WITNESS #9

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V-012

**TAB V-013**

V-013

**CONTROL WITNESS 10**

**VERBATIM TESTIMONY  
OF  
CONTROL WITNESS #10  
(MISSION CREW COMMANDER)**

**COLONEL WILCOX:** The time is 0806 on 22 April 1994. The persons present are the following: Major General Andrus, Board President, Major Byas, myself, Colonel Wilcox, and the court reporter, Mister Peggs. The witness is Control Witness 10 and the interview is being conducted at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.

This is an official AFR 110-14 Aircraft Accident Investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the crash of two U.S. Army helicopters and the possible involvement of U.S. fighter aircraft in the crash of these helicopters in the northern No-Fly Zone of Iraq on 14 April 1994.

This investigation is being conducted at the direction of General Robert C. Oaks, CINC USAFE. This investigation is not a Safety Mishap Investigation conducted under AFR 127-4. It is an aircraft accident investigation conducted under Air Force Regulation 110-14. The purpose of this accident investigation is to obtain and preserve all available evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary action, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Testimony before a Safety Mishap Investigation Board is given with the understanding that it can only be used for mishap prevention purposes and all witnesses are advised that the testimony will be treated in confidence.

However, testimony given in this accident investigation may be used for any purpose deemed appropriate by competent authority and may be publicly disseminated.

Do you understand the difference between a Safety Mishap Investigation and as an Accident Investigation?

**WITNESS:** Sir, I guess I do.

**COL WILCOX:** Do you have any questions?

**WITNESS:** No.

**COL WILCOX:** Your testimony will be recorded and may be transcribed verbatim or summarized so that a written record may be made available to the appointing or higher authority. For the benefit of the reporter, please avoid the use of acronyms or jargon and speak slowly, clearly and loudly. Remember to explain your testimony carefully so that others who do not have your technical training will be able to understand.

**CONTROL WITNESS #10**

As this is an official investigation, you are required to answer questions put to you by the board. You are further advised not to discuss classified information unless necessary to develop your testimony. If it is necessary for you to discuss classified information, you need to identify it as such.

Would you please rise so that I can swear you in?

(The witness was sworn)

## EXAMINATION

### (Questions by Major Byas)

1Q: Would you state your organization please?

1A: 963d AWACS.

2Q: Would you state your current temporary duty station?

2A: Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.

3Q: What is your current AWACS crew position?

3A: Mission Crew Commander.

4Q: What are your specific duties and responsibilities during a normal AWACS mission?

4A: Management of the crew, training of the crew and execution of the mission.

5Q: On the 14th of April, 1994, what were your duties and role on the mission?

5A: I was flying as a -- an observer Mission Crew Commander.

6Q: In the role of observer, do you have any assigned written or verbal duties and responsibilities pertaining to the command, control and execution of the mission?

6A: No.

7Q: Could you briefly go over your background and experience?

7A: My Air Force background experience or . . .

8Q: Yes.

8A: Okay. 1978 entered the Air Force, Air Weapons Controller Training School to follow. First assignment, 678th Air Defense Group, Air Weapons Controller. Next I went to Yongman, Korea, Operations Training Officer for one year at a mountaintop radar site. Following that, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma where I entered AWACS Weapons Director training. I was a Weapons Director, Instructor Weapons Director, Senior Director, Instructor Senior Director and

**CONTROL WITNESS #10**



Chief of Senior Director training in a four year time frame. From there I went to . . .

9Q: On your next assignment, we can leave that particular assignment off. Would you tell us once you left your last assignment, once you arrived at Tinker, could you give me some information on the training you received and the length of that training?

9A: I don't understand the question. Could you state it again, please?

10Q: Upon departing your last assignment and arrival at Tinker Air Force Base . . .

10A: Okay.

11Q: What type of training did you receive?

11A: I went through the initial qualification training for Mission Crew Commanders followed by Battle Director training and as a result, a fully qualified Mission Crew Commander.

12Q: How long have you been mission ready?

12A: I was mission ready March 5th of 1993 so today is March 22nd, 1994, that makes it one year and seventeen days if my math is correct.

MAJOR BYAS: Okay. Could we stop the tape for one moment, please?

(The board was recessed at 0813 hours, 22 April 1994)

**CONTROL WITNESS #10**

(The interview was reconvened at 0814, 22 April 1994)

COLONEL WILCOX: The time is 0814. The same parties are present.

**(Questions by Colonel Wilcox)**

13Q: I'd like to ask you a couple of questions, if I could please. You indicated that you were the observer MCC on the mission on the 14th of April.

13A: Yes sir.

14Q: Could you explain to me what the duties are of the observer MCC?

14A: Yes sir. My position is Assistant Director for Operations for the mission. As part of our SPINUP training for all newly arrived crews, we try to have a staff member fly with the appropriate crew position that he is trained in in an advisory role. The person is -- that I'm assisting is mission ready, fully trained, therefore direct supervision is not required. Basically we do this to ensure that crews that -- maybe it's their first time here or maybe they have not been here for a long time, just to make sure they understand the local operating procedures and understand the basics about the area.

15Q: How do you perform those duties when you're the observer MCC?

15A: I -- I'm not necessarily to monitor the -- the scope. Normally the person will stand behind the person they're watching with a headset and monitor any communications.

16Q: Do you have a scope of your own on the aircraft?

16A: Sometimes.

17Q: Did you on the 14th of April?

17A: Yes.

18Q: Were you at -- were you at your scope between 0630 and 0735 on the 14th of April?

18A: Parts of that period.

19Q: What periods weren't you at your scope?

19A: What periods were I at the scope?

20Q: What periods were you not at the scope?

20A: Roughly 0725Z to about -- I estimate I was off headset for about ten or fifteen minutes.

21Q: So you were off the headset and not at the scope during the critical period of time.

21A: Yes sir.

22Q: What were you doing?

**CONTROL WITNESS #10**

22A: I was in the crew rest area and I used the latrine and then I was getting a drink of water, basically taking a break.

23Q: Up until that time, did you have any indication that there was any problems on the flight or on the miss -- with the mission?

23A: No sir. This -- this was one of the smoothest flights to date that I've seen. It was going extremely well.

24Q: Were you familiar with the background training and capabilities of the Mission Crew Commander who was on the aircraft during the flight?

24A: Yes.

25Q: What was your assessment of those capabilities?

25A: Fully qualified.

26Q: Do you know if that Mission Crew Commander had been in the AOR before?

26A: Yes.

27Q: Had he been in the AOR before?

27A: Yes.

COLONEL WILCOX: Thank you.

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

28Q: You indicated that you were not aware of any problems on the flight up 'til that point and the flight had been running very smoothly.

28A: Yes sir.

29Q: Were you aware at that time that the F15s had a radar contact with an unknown airborne aircraft?

29A: No sir.

MAJOR BYAS: Now I can start talking again.

**(Questions by Major Byas)**

30Q: What specific AWACS training did you receive prior to coming over?

30A: I had two -- two three hour simulator sessions with the PROVIDE COMFORT mission scenario. I received roughly a two hour SPINUP academic training from the 963d AWACS tactics shop. When I arrived here as -- oh, I'm sorry, you asked -- you asked before the deployment so . . .

**CONTROL WITNESS #10**

31Q: Yes.

31A: . . . I'll stop there.

32Q: Thank you. The reason that we're going to go through all of these questions is to gather data on the training of MCCs, Mission Crew Commanders, so that we'll be able to compare because you're basically the only other one that we have here. As far as the simulator training, were there any helicopters in the scenario that you experienced?

32A: I don't recall. No, I'd have to say no.

33Q: Okay. Were there any Iraqi heli -- Iraqi aircraft in the scenario that you experienced?

33A: Yes, and I'd like to comment if I can.

34Q: Yes.

34A: After -- after the first sim, I -- I requested some dynamic inputs for the second simulator session because I -- I just -- I didn't think that -- if it's an old scenario and -- and I just thought that -- I wanted my crew to see a few more things, so I talked to the simulator director and I had him throw in some dynamic inputs. Basically I told him to have an -- simulate an Iraqi aircraft violate the No Fly Zone just to let, you know, a couple of times to better exercise the crew, make sure they got the proper training.

35Q: During those two scenarios that you -- you were talking about, at any time did you notice any Iraqi aircraft that was squawking Mode One, Mode Two or did you see any green dots associated with any of the Iraqi aircraft? Green being the IFF indication.

35A: I -- I don't recall. I -- I can say that the scenario did call for a -- an airliner to cross through the area to practice our Rules of Engagement as far as friendly aircrafts and it was squawking. I do recall that.

36Q: In reference to any of the Iraqi military type aircraft that you could interpret from your air picture, did you see any type of IFF readout?

36A: I'd have to say no. Again, it's -- it's very difficult, as you know, to -- to remember every, you know, . . .

37Q: Yes.

37A: . . . because they -- they build in noise -- simulated bad radar returns on the tape and so the crew gets a good idea. Yeah.

(Colonel Bennett entered the interview room)

COLONEL WILCOX: We've been joined by Colonel Pat Bennett.

38Q: Was the ROE in the simulator sessions that you received the same as, totally different from what -- the ROE as used here in this theater?

**CONTROL WITNESS #10**

38A: The ROE was the same.

39Q: So the ROE used in your simulator session was the same as what is used in the this AOR.

39A: The reason I -- I say yes is because the -- the ROE that we execute in the sim is basically based on the academic training that we receive. The sym itself is just a sim tape and I don't know if that's clear to you.

40Q: What training did you receive once you arrived here at the PROVIDE COMFORT operation?

40A: When we arrived here, I with two other members of my staff arrived with -- with a crew, approximately twenty others. We came into AWACS Ops the day after we arrived and we had an in-brief by the current staff that was in place -- excuse me, as a group followed by individual one-on-one mission planning, talk sessions. For example, the Weapons Controllers got together, Mission Crew Commanders got together, the surveillance people got together and we did a one-on-one. The following day we reconvened as a group and we had a formal mission planning sortie for the first sortie which was the following day.

41Q: Was there any specialized training for your crew position, such as ROE, identification that you received?

41A: Yes.

GENERAL ANDRUS: Regarding ROE, I would like to ask you a few questions and what I'm looking for is your understanding of what the ROE contained. That is, again, on or before the 14th of April when the incident in question took place.

The interview was recessed at 0825 hours, 22 April 1994)

**CONTROL WITNESS #10**

(The interview was reconvened at 0825 hours, 22 April 1994)

COLONEL WILCOX: The time is 0825. Same parties are present. This portion of the interview should be classified. Secret level?

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

42Q: Regarding the Rules of Engagement, I'd like to ask you a few questions to determine your understanding of the ROE as it was -- as it existed on the day of the incident and prior to that. Before exercising the right to use force, is there a requirement to give consideration to identification difficulties?

42A: Sir, could you say the question again?

43Q: Okay, this is not a test. Before the fighter aircraft is authorized to use force, is there a requirement to give consideration to identification difficulties?

43A: That's -- that's -- that's a very general question, that's why I'm hesitating. I -- are you referring to equipment or my -- my -- my sensors on my aircraft?

44Q: Any type of identification difficulties, varying from equipment to weather conditions, light conditions, anything along those lines. Is that a consideration according to your understanding of the ROE?

44A: Yes sir. I'd have to say yes. I think every -- every -- every consideration with -- within the power of -- of the person with the information is -- is considered.

45Q: Again, according to the ROE, before exercising the right to use force, is there a requirement to give consideration to the need to give defectors safe conduct?

45A: Yes sir.

46Q: Is there a requirement to consider the possibility of an aircraft being in distress and the crew of that aircraft being unaware of their position? The possibility that the crew may be lost?

46A: Yes sir.

47Q: Have you ever been briefed on the medical markings that could be found on Iraqi military aircraft?

47A: No sir.

48Q: Are you aware of what those medical markings might look like?

48A: I would assume they would be a red cross but I've never been briefed on it.

49Q: According to the ROE, is the intercepting pilot required to report his observations to the controller upon intercept of the unknown aircraft?

49A: Yes sir, he is required to do that.

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50Q: Is the controller required to instruct the pilot whether the identification procedure is to continue?

50A: Could you -- could you state it one more time, sir? I'm sorry.

51Q: Is the controller required to instruct the pilot whether the identification procedure is to continue? You indicated that, according to your understanding, the interceptor pilot would be required to report his observations to the controller. Is the controller then required to instruct the pilot whether the identification procedure is to continue?

51A: No sir.

52Q: If an airborne aircraft is intercepted and is not identified as to whether or not it is friendly or hostile, is radio contact required in an attempt to establish that identification?

52A: No sir.

53Q: If radio contact could not be established in the event it were required, would the -- would visual signals be required in an attempt to identify or communicate with the unknown aircraft?

53A: No sir.

54Q: If the intercepted aircraft were not identified -- was not identified as friendly, would the interceptor be required to order it to land by using visual signals?

54A: If it were identified as not friendly?

55Q: As not friendly. According to your understanding of the Rules of Engagement?

55A: Could I make it -- I need to -- to clarify something on that question.

56Q: Yes.

56A: If it is an Iraqi aircraft, no.

#### **(Questions by Major Byas)**

57Q: Was the ID criteria for surveillance and weapons briefed during your -- your initial academic training once you arrived here at Operation PROVIDE COMFORT?

57A: It's not formally briefed. That portion of the training is conducted on the one-on-one when the surveillance people did their specialized mission training because it's -- that information is in the surveillance flyaway book and it's specific to surveillance only so we don't brief it to the entire crew as a general rule.

58Q: Was tracking and ID responsibility in the AOR clearly defined and assigned tasks divided as far as who was tracking and in what areas and who are -- who was assigned to track? Was that briefed?

58A: Are you talking external to the AWACS or . . .

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59Q: That is correct.

59A: Yes.

60Q: Did you brief or discuss mission details with the Duke prior to your departure on the mission on the 16th of -- or 14th of April? Was the Duke there to go over the mission?

60A: Yes, he was. He attended the pre-mission briefing.

61Q: How many deployments have you had to this theater?

61A: To -- this is my first trip to Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. I've -- well -- could you -- could you define theater because -- because I -- I think you know where I'm coming from.

62Q: Yes. Was this your first deployment in -- to fly in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT?

62A: Yes.

63Q: How many missions have you flown since you've been here at Operation PROVIDE COMFORT?

63A: Four.

64Q: On those four previous missions that you've flown in this theater -- in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, did you notice any Iraqi aircraft squawking IFF? Did you notice any IFF associated with their radar paint.

64A: No.

65Q: Could you give me some detailed information on how the mission crew on the -- that flew the mission on the 14th of April, how did they plan the sortie? What mission planning and what was entailed in that mission planning? Did they conduct ATO breakout or was that done for them by the staff?

65A: The ATO breakout is done by the staff.

66Q: What type of briefings was conducted pertaining to the mission other than the academic briefing?

66A: The crew went in, split up into one-on-one specialized mission planning where the information was discussed in the flyaway kits which is the essential information that they need.

67Q: Were there any face to face briefings with the fighter community and the weapons director community?

67A: No.

**(Questions by Colonel Wilcox)**

68Q: During the -- who conducted this mission briefing?

68A: Which mission briefing are you referring to, sir?

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69Q: The -- excuse me, the one on the -- that preceded the mission on the 14th of April.  
WITNESS: Should I -- should I use the name?

COLONEL WILCOX: No.

MAJOR BYAS: You can just go with the crew position.

69A: The Mission Crew Commander.

70Q: Did you attend the briefing?

70A: Yes, I did.

71Q: Was there anything unusual about the briefing?

71A: No.

72Q: Did it seem thorough?

72A: Yes.

73Q: Why did you attend the briefing?

73A: Everybody that flies is required to attend the briefing.

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

74Q: In the briefing, were assignments given to individual crew positions or sections as to what their responsibilities would be?

74A: I didn't see it but it was done. The reason I know it was done because -- because the appropriate crew members knew their responsibilities. It's standard for the ASO to -- to do that, make the assignments for the Air Surveillance Technicians and the Senior Director to the Weapons Director, but I -- I -- I did not see it personally.

75Q: You indicated that it is standard procedure for the surveillance section to be given their assignments by the Air Surveillance Officer, the Weapons Section to be given their particular assignments as to area by the Weapons Director. Is that correct?

75A: By the Senior Director.

76Q: By the Senior Director.

76A: Yes sir.

77Q: Who gives the assignments to the Surveillance Officer and to the Senior Weapons Director as to which areas their particular sections are responsible for?

77A: Not -- not one particular person does that, sir, that -- that's why I hesitated. Based on the training, the SPINUP and the academic training, the Air Surveillance Officer performs the basic

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tasks that they perform in any theater. The same with the Senior Director.

78Q: To help me understand a little further then, and being more specific, the area is divided with a certain portion of Iraq located south of the thirty-sixth parallel and the rest being north of the thirty-sixth parallel in the No Fly Zone. How is the assignment given as to who will have primary responsibility for monitoring the area south of the No Fly Zone to detect Iraqi aircraft and identifying those aircraft?

78A: That's by the Air Surveillance Officer.

79Q: Is that given as a specific assignment that that is your surveillance section's primary area of responsibility?

79A: The surveillance area of responsibility is maximum three hundred sixty degree coverage within the capability of our system. With the additional tasking of the No Fly Zone, as that's the primary area. The reason I say that is we do have neighboring countries that are potential threats to the E-3 and we have to watch north as well so we don't get attacked from a position we're not watching.

80Q: So the Air Surveillance Section would have the responsibility of monitoring all traffic and identifying all traffic, three hundred and sixty degrees around the AWACS? Is that what you said?

80A: No sir. For AWACS self protection, we are watching three hundred and sixty degrees but we are not required identification in that big of an area. We're primarily concentrating on PROVIDE COMFORT AOR.

81Q: Okay. In the PROVIDE COMFORT AOR, would the surveillance section have the primary responsibility for locating, identifying and monitoring an aircraft within that AOR which is the portion of Iraq north of the thirty-sixth parallel?

81A: Okay. What -- what were the words you used after -- after locating?

82Q: Locating, electronically identifying and monitoring, if possible -- and monitoring aircraft in that particular area.

82A: Yes sir.

83Q: And in addition to that, if I understand correctly, they would be responsible for observing the flight activity south of the thirty-sixth parallel; is that correct?

83A: Yes sir.

84Q: Which would be their primary responsibility?

84A: Our primary responsibility to detect any Iraqi aircraft flying north of the thirty-six degree line. That is our primary mission.

85Q: For the weapons section, understanding what you just said about your responsibilities of

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the surveillance section, what would the responsibilities be of the weapons section pertaining to the area north of the thirty-sixth parallel?

85A: The primary mission of the weapons section north of the thirty-sixth parallel is -- is to control fighters.

86Q: Would they have any responsibility for the detection or electronic identification or monitoring of aircraft other than fighters -- other than friendly fighters operating in that area?

86A: It's possible. Primary responsibility is surveillance. As you know, it's -- it's a team effort. The weapons controller would -- would assist in any way possible, of course. It is a team effort.

87Q: What is the primary function of the weapons control section?

87A: Of the weapons control section as a whole?

88Q: Yes.

88A: Their -- their task is to control friendly fighters.

89Q: Do they have any responsibility regarding other PROVIDE COMFORT aircraft such as helicopters located in the No Fly Zone?

89A: Could you say that question again, sir?

90Q: Do they have any responsibility concerning or regarding other PROVIDE COMFORT aircraft, such as helicopters, in the No Fly Zone?

90A: They have very limited responsibility. I have personally seen the Air Tasking Order and it says "as required" for helicopters. Extremely vague. I'll leave it at that.

91Q: To your knowledge, is anybody specifically assigned the responsibility for monitoring friendly helicopter traffic in the No Fly Zone?

91A: No sir.

COLONEL WILCOX: Excuse me, sir. Can I ask a few preliminary questions?

GENERAL ANDRUS: (Indicated in the affirmative)

COLONEL WILCOX: Thank you.

**(Questions by Colonel Wilcox)**

92Q: In your position as the -- as the MCC -- tell me what your position is within the squadron.

92A: In the squadron I'm the Chief of Current Operations.

93Q: And tell me what those duties include.

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93A: You want to know about my day to day duties or my duties on the AWACS because I'm holding a position in the squadron.

94Q: You have administrative duties as well as mission -- as well as flying duties?

94A: Yes sir.

95Q: Tell me about the administrative duties.

95A: I am the Chief of Current Operations, as I stated. I'm responsible for short and long range scheduling of aircraft tails and crews.

96Q: Are you involved in -- in this SPINUP briefing that occurs when new crews come to the installation?

96A: Yes.

97Q: And what is your role in that?

97A: My role is to brief the crews based on the briefing that we have provided.

98Q: What's included in the briefing?

98A: I've given you a copy.

99Q: Could you tell me what's included in the briefing?

99A: The purpose of PROVIDE COMFORT is the first slide. We basically tell the crews that we're here for . . .

100Q: Don't tell me what's in the briefing, just give me a topical kind of orientation, if you will.

100A: I brief the crews on their schedule. I tell them that they will fly one day, they have one day off and then DNIF cover the third day. I explain to them the -- the scheduling board, that they have to read it every day. Gen -- gen -- general procedures and duties of a crew member.

101Q: Does the briefing include discussions of the ROE? Are you responsible for briefing the ROE?

101A: I am not responsible for briefing that part of the briefing, no.

(The Board was recessed at 0848 hours, 22 April 1994)

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(The interview was reconvened at 1006 hours, 22 April 1994, with all parties present who were present when the prior session was recessed)

**(Questions by Colonel Wilcox)**

102Q: I'm confused about your role in the detachment and I'd like you to explain to me what your functions are in the detachment.

102A: I'm the Assistant Director of Operations for Mission.

103Q: Explain to me again, if you would, what -- what your responsibilities are as the Assistant DO for Mission.

103A: I took some -- I wrote down some thoughts during the break. If you'd like me to expand, I can.

104Q: Please.

104A: Okay.

**QUESTIONS BY GENERAL ANDRUS:**

105Q: Let me ask you first. As the Assistant DO for Operations -- Mission . . .

105A: Yes sir.

106Q: . . . does that put you in a direct supervisory chain in -- in the detachment?

106A: I don't directly supervise anybody here at the moment -- in Turkey.

**QUESTIONS BY COLONEL WILCOX:**

107Q: Is there a DO in the squadron?

107A: No. Well wait, here?

108Q: Yes.

108A: No. If I can explain, I can -- I can maybe clear the light.

109Q: Please.

109A: In the 963d AWACS Squadron, there are only three people that are authorized to be the DETCO, that is the deployed DETCO. That is the squadron commander, the squadron vice commander and the squadron director of operations. Those are the only three people that are allowed to be deployed DETCOs. If the deployed DETCO is a pilot, then no DO is required. We fill that position with the Assistant Director of Operations Mission which I am doing now. So, we'll have a DETCO pilot, no DO, an ADOM, which is my position, and then a Supervisor of Flying.

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The other situation is that the DETCO is not a pilot, i.e., the squadron vice commander, which is a mission crew commander. Then we must have a Director of Operations pilot, an ADOM, Mission Crew Commander, and a Supervisor of Flying. And that's as clear as I can put it.

110Q: Now do the circumstances that you find yourself in here -- I'm assuming that the DET -- the detachment commander is a pilot . . .

110A: Yes sir.

111Q: . . . and therefore there is no DO.

111A: Yes sir. That's a fact.

112Q: You -- so as the Assistant DO for Missions, what is -- what is your responsibility?

112A: Since the DETCO is a pilot, his understanding of the mission crew procedures and operations is limited, so I am basically his liaison to the mission crew.

113Q: Specifically, what is your relationship with the mission crew? I understand you are the liaison for the commander. What is your relationship with the mission crew?

113A: The selection process of my position, ADOM, is -- obviously, this is my first trip here and they selected me as ADOM. It's not based on any -- the selection is based on how the squadron commander perceives your abilities.

114Q: What are you supposed to do in relationship to the mission crews?

114A: I -- well I'm DNIF cover in case the mission commander is sick.

115Q: DNIF?

115A: Duties not involving flying. If the mission commander is sick, then I will replace him and fly with his crew. I post the crew schedules. I answer numerous questions daily on daily taskings in accordance with the mission crew.

#### **(Questions by General Andrus)**

116Q: If you were to determine that a mission crew commander was not performing his duties satisfactorily, what responsibility would you have as the Assistant Deputy for Operations -- Mission, in regard to that mission?

116A: I would refer to the DETCO and the DETCO would make any decisions.

117Q: You would not have the author -- would you have the authority to take action directly yourself in either directing that additional training be provided or some other action be taken, or is the DETCO the only one that has that authority?

117A: I do not have that authority. I would relay to the DETCO the performance of the crew and based on my observation, he would discuss it with the people involved, including myself, and

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then he would make a decision. That's -- that's normal procedure.

**(Questions by Colonel Wilcox)**

118Q: Do you have any responsibility for training or supervising the Mission Crew Commanders or any members of the crew?

118A: No sir, I don't. They're -- they're fully trained when they arrive here. Mission ready.

COLONEL WILCOX: Very well.

MAJOR BYAS: So, I'm -- I'm clear to proceed? Okay.

**(Questions by Major Byas)**

119Q: Okay. Along that same line, are the AWACS staff duties clearly defined, just -- the information you just received -- related to us, is that information written down as to what the DETCO's duties are, what the DO's duties are, what your duties are?

119A: No.

120Q: That information is not written down. It is passed verbally from one person to another and has been going on for the last two years. Is that correct?

120A: I -- I can't say for the last two years because I've not been here for two years.

121Q: But, as of today, it -- there's no written documentation as to your duties and responsibilities.

121A: Not to my knowledge. I -- I have a verbal charter by the commander. He tells us what he wants -- wants us to do when we're deployed. I've not seen it in writing, that's true.

122Q: And for the record, let's -- for AOR certification for this -- any theater that you go to, specifically this theater, where is that certification completed? Is it completed at Tinker Air Force Base or is it completed at Operation PROVIDE COMFORT?

122A: Tinker Air Force Base.

123Q: What written or verbal guidance is there pertaining to tracking and monitoring of helicopters in the tactical area of operations in the PROVIDE COMFORT area of operation?

123A: I -- I don't -- I don't understand the emphasis on helicopters. Maybe we -- we treat helicopters and fixed wing basically the same. I -- I don't recall any specific . . . The only written guidance I've received pertaining helicopters has been in the ARF.

REP: I'm sorry. In the what?

WITNESS: The Aircrew Read File, ARF, A-R-F.

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124Q: Could you give us a general idea of what that information was -- the instructions on helicopters?

124A: I -- I'm -- I'm hesitating because I'm making sure that I don't mix pre-accident with post-accident. There has been many helicopter ROE changes post-accident . . .

125Q: Not ROE, just is there any . . .

125A: Procedures.

126Q: . . . any procedures prior to . . .

126A: Yes and we -- we gave you a copy of a letter from the Army detachment.

127Q: Is that the only document that you have pertaining to your procedures to control or monitor helicopters?

127A: I believe it is. I have not seen anything else.

128Q: On the 14th of April, how was the weapons team organized? Specifically by crew position, not by names.

128A: The Senior Director, obviously as the supervisor, there were three weapons directors on position. Weapons director number one was the check in/enroute controller. WD2 was the tactical area controller. Controller number three was the air refueling controller.

129Q: Is that the normal set up according to the organization?

129A: That's standard procedure.

130Q: How was the surveillance team organized?

130A: They're organized differently at different times in the same mission, depending on who's on break. Generally the Air Surveillance Officer -- under the Air Surveillance Officer would be the Advanced Air Surveillance Technician or AAST. Next we have three air surveillance technicians so you . . .

131Q: That's standard?

131A: That's standard, yeah.

132Q: Thank you. What are the duties and responsibilities of the Duke, the airborne command element in your written guidance or verbal understanding?

132A: The current guidance says the Duke is an Airborne Command Element or ACE directly subordinate to the Mission Director, call sign Mad Dog, located at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. Duties and responsibilities -- it's difficult to -- to explain it. I'll give you my -- my point of view because if you ask three different people you get three different answers right now on the duties of the ACE. Our understanding is that the Duke is an Airborne Command Element, ACE, and that implies many responsibilities if he is considered an Airborne Command Element. One of those being the -- normally the AWACS crew will not have ID -- identification/kill/commit

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authority if we have an Airborne Command Element on board the AWACS. The purpose for their presence is to make those decisions from the AWACS so the ground commander so you don't have the lapse in time. It's a real time decision so you don't have the lapse in time from the AWACS crew calling a ground commander and waiting for the decision to come back. That's my definition of an Airborne Command Element.

133Q: In the tactical area of operation on board the AWACS, who has command, control and execution responsibilities for ATO tasked missions?

133A: That's a -- that's a very general question. The answer would be everybody on position on the AWACS crew. If you'd like to reword the question, I'm not sure what . . .

134Q: Does the Duke have any involvement in the command, control and execution?

134A: Yes. Of course he does.

135Q: The Mission Crew Commander.

135A: Yes.

136Q: Who has overriding authority between the two on execution of the air tasked mission?

136A: On the execution of the Air Tasking Order?

137Q: Right. Missions that are scheduled to go into the ATO, if the MCC wants to make a change, can he do it or will he be overridden by the Duke?

137A: He'll be overridden by the Duke. The -- the Duke is responsible for the fighter flow. He will make the call, "Duke directs the fighters will -- will do something." If we -- if we don't say, "Duke directs," then the fighters normally will not obey the command.

138Q: Does that include engagements?

138A: If -- if we make the call, "Duke directs, kill this target," I believe the aircraft would kill the target.

139Q: If you said, "Kill the target," will the -- will the F15s do it, or whatever aircraft?

139A: Possibly.

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

140Q: Let me clarify a thing, if I might. If one of the controllers gave guidance to one of the fighters to take a certain action, such as terminate the intercept, would the fighter respond? What would the response of the fighter be to that guidance?

140A: He should terminate.

141Q: Would the controller be required to say, "Duke directs that you terminate the

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engagement," or would it be sufficient to just say, "Terminate the engagement."?

141A: If the controller transmitted, "Duke directs terminate," that would have much more authority than if he said, "Terminate."

142Q: I understand. However, is it necessary for the controller, whenever he is giving direction, that is an order to the fighters, does he have to say, "Duke directs," in order for the fighters to comply?

142A: No sir.

143Q: Can you think of an instance where the fighters would not comply with the guidance given by a controller in the AOR?

143A: Yes sir.

144Q: Could you explain?

144A: If the fighter is following the Rules of Engagement as established by PEACE COMFORT, then the fighter pilot has -- has kill authority.

145Q: If the fighter were to be intercepting an unidentified aircraft and were to identify that aircraft as an Iraqi military aircraft without medical markings, and the controller, through other means, identified through electronic means, identified that helicopter as a possible friendly helicopter and directed the fighters to terminate the engagement, to not engage, would the fighters be required to comply?

145A: Yes.

146Q: Would they be required to comply even if they were convinced that the AWACS controller was mistaken, that they had a visual identification and that they were positive that this was a hostile Iraqi military aircraft? With the exception of being in a position of the fighters being under attack. The right of self defense is always allowed, obviously.

146A: They should comply with the controller's request to terminate. Whether or not they will is your guess as well as mine.

147Q: You said that if the controller transmits "Duke directs," that they would always comply; is that correct?

147A: Yes sir.

148Q: But if the controller gave exactly the same guidance without saying "Duke directs," then the fighters are not required to comply; is that correct?

148A: No sir. In -- in -- in both cases, if the controller said, "Knock it off," the fighter says, "I have positive VID, hostile aircraft," if the controller said, "Knock it off," the pilot should knock it off. If -- if he doesn't, he's on his own. I mean, I don't know what else to say.

149Q: In other words, if -- if a mistake is going to be made, would that mistake be made on the

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side of engaging or not engaging?

149A: From the AWACS point of view, not engaging.

150Q: And according to your understanding, is that the same approach taken by all participants in PROVIDE COMFORT?

150A: Yes.

**(Questions by Major Byas)**

151Q: Were you aware of any helicopters operating in the No Fly Zone of Iraq on the 14th of April?

151A: Yes.

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

152Q: Were you aware of that before the incident in question?

152A: Yes sir.

**(Questions by Major Byas)**

153Q: Who was responsible for tracking the helicopter inside of the -- was the helicopter that you observed, was he inside or outside of the -- the No Fly Zone at the time you observed him?

153A: At the time I observed him, he was outside the No Fly Zone, basically at gate one, preparing to enter the No Fly Zone, the standard check in procedure.

154Q: I'd like to restate a question that was asked earlier, just to focus my -- my mind back as to where you were on the airplane. Were you -- in your observer position between 0630 Zulu and 0735 Zulu, on the 14th of April?

154A: Where -- where was I?

155Q: Yes, where were you between that time?

155A: I was behind a console on -- on position from -- immediately upon power available for console power up through estimating time, 0725Z.

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

156Q: You previously testified that at about -- at approximately 0725, you then took a break. How long had you been on duty up until that time?

156A: I had been on -- on position the whole time.

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**(Questions by Major Byas)**

157Q: When was takeoff?

157A: Huh?

158Q: What was the takeoff time? From the time you took off to the time you took your break - 'til you went to the back.

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

158Q: Approximately.

158A: Yeah, we took off about four-thirty -- I was on console about three hours.

159Q: Okay. So you took your break after approximately three hours of time.

159A: Approximately.

160Q: Was there any activity taking place at that point? What I'm trying to establish was, other than the fact that you had been working at a very demanding position for three hours, was there anything about that particular time that made you feel comfortable about taking a break at that particular time?

160A: Yes sir.

161Q: Had there been a significant amount of activity up until that time?

161A: There was -- there was some activity.

162Q: And the activity that had been going on prior to that time, was it still going on?

162A: I'm not really sure. I -- I would have to say yes, because it was Turk -- Turkish special mission activity and it was going on for quite a while. I'd have to look at their surveillance tracking logs and times to really say when it ended, but . . .

163Q: What I'm trying to establish is, had the majority of that special activity that the AWACS crew had been observing, was the majority of that activity now being completed and was that activity winding down?

163A: Yes sir. It appeared that once the AWACS was coming on to station, that the Turkish activity was -- was ending. That's pretty typical. [Classified portion deleted (12 Words)]

164Q: Would that mean then that following that activity, and as that activity was now winding down and considering that you had been on console for three hours, that there was, according to what you had observed, very little activity taking place or being anticipated during the time period that you could then take your break?

164A: When I -- when I went -- I took my break, there was -- it was a good time to take a break

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because there was -- there was basically nothing going on. You know, I don't know how else to put it. That's why I did it when I did.

**(Questions by Major Byas)**

165Q: Are there any standard handover procedures from the enroute controller to the tactical area of operation controller?

165A: Standard procedures on that?

166Q: Yes. Would you as a Mission Crew Commander be aware of that taking place?

166A: Given the proper communication setup, yes.

167Q: Is it possible for that communication to be done verbally between one controller to the other controller and the Mission Crew Commander not be aware of the handover process?

167A: Yes.

168Q: Is that a normal occurrence?

168A: There is no -- there is no requirement for the MCC to monitor that. That's the job of the Senior Director. Some MCCs -- we train for the MCC to monitor as many radios as possible, but due to limitations, we have to prioritize and the Senior Director's job is to directly supervise the WDs and that would be Senior Director's responsibility to monitor, word for word, every decision made from the WD. That's not -- the MCC is necessarily -- might -- he might be talking to a ground agency, for example, and not being able to monitor that because it's a different priority.

**(Questions by Colonel Wilcox)**

169Q: But there's no standard procedure for the Senior Director to do that.

169A: To do what, sir.

170Q: Know what the weapons controllers are doing.

170A: No. Negative. I disagree. That's -- that's -- that's the Senior Director's job description.

171Q: What is the standard procedure for his doing that?

171A: The Senior Director is responsible for every -- every . . .

172Q: I understand his responsibility. My question is, what is the procedure -- what is the standard procedure for him doing that?

172A: To monitor the frequency of both controllers and monitor how each hands over to the other.

173Q: So then you're saying the standard procedure is that the controllers will always hand over an aircraft from one to the other on a net -- on a frequency so they can be heard over the radio.

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173A: No sir. They -- they -- they sit -- they sit side by side.

174Q: So if they do it verbally and not do it over the radio, how does the Senior Director monitor that activity?

174A: He monitors it by -- by watching the position of the aircraft on the scope and the radio calls made.

175Q: But if no radio call is made, then the Senior Director doesn't -- the scope won't change, if I understand correctly. And if no radio calls are made, how does the Senior Director know that the responsibility for tracking and monitoring a particular aircraft has been handed from one weapons director to another?

175A: He has to ask them, via the intercom net. He will say, "W03, did you hand off Tiger 01 yet?" And he'll say yes or no.

176Q: So there is no standard procedure then for the weapons controller to hand the aircraft from one to another. It's only the responsibility of the Senior Director to know -- make sure he understands who's watching which aircraft?

176A: No. I -- I'd have to say no to your question.

177Q: If I understand what you told me, there are two ways that a weapons controller might hand off an aircraft. One is over the radio, okay? In which case, if the Senior Director were monitoring the radio, he would know that.

177A: Yes.

178Q: Another way is to do it verbally. If the Senior Director happened to overhear that conversation, then he would know it happened; is that correct?

178A: The only commands the fighters will hear are commands that are going over the radio.

179Q: I'm only interested, at this point, in understanding how the Senior Director knows which of his weapons controllers is monitoring and controlling a particular aircraft.

179A: Because he assigns the controller to each aircraft.

180Q: And if a weapons controller, who is assigned to an aircraft -- to monitor an aircraft . . .

180A: Uh-huh.

181Q: . . . hands it over to another weapons controller . . .

181A: Right.

182Q: . . . how does the Senior Director know that that's happened?

182A: Several ways. The -- every -- every symbology on the scope -- weapons -- every weapon symbology on the scope will have, in one of the features, it'll have a number designating who has control over that fighter.

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183Q: Which weapons controller?

183A: Right.

184Q: So when it's handed from one weapons controller to another, the symbology will change on the scope?

184A: The controller will take a switch action to assign that symbology from his console to the next controller's console.

185Q: So the symbology on the scope would change if an aircraft . . .

185A: No, the symbology will not change. The amplifying data of the symbology will change. The only . . .

186Q: I understand. I understand.

186A: The symbology won't change.

187Q: I just don't understand all the terminology so sometimes I'm getting confused. The symbology marks the aircraft but the amplifying data would indicate which weapons controller was actually monitoring and controlling that particular aircraft.

187A: It -- it -- it indicates which console that symbology is assigned to at that precise moment.

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

188Q: To clarify then, that would allow the Senior Director, even though he had not heard any radio calls, to monitor at any time and to know at any time exactly who is controlling a specific aircraft. Is that correct?

188A: Yes sir.

COLONEL WILCOX: Thank you.

MAJOR BYAS: That's a tough one.

**(Questions by Major Byas)**

189Q: Were you aware of full IFF and radio IFF checks being completed on the Eagle flight -- Eagle 01 flight while you were on position?

189A: IFF checks?

190Q: Yes.

190A: Would . . .

191Q: Checking his Mode One or Mode Two or Mode Four. Were you aware of any of that being accomplished or was it accomplished on Eagle flight on the 14th of April?

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191A: I don't know if anybody actually did a switch action to check the IFF. I can't say. I don't know.

192Q: Were you monitoring the Eagle flight's frequency?

192A: No, I wasn't.

193Q: If a helicopter inside of the No Fly Zone lands and takes off again, who generally has tracking responsibility once he comes up squawking I -- well, if he comes up and you have an IFF readout inside -- north of the thirty-sixth . . .

193A: Uh-huh (Affirmative)

194Q: . . . who would be responsible for hitting that up?

194A: Normally it would be an Air Surveillance Technician but it could be a weapons director, depending on how it was briefed among that particular crew, but normally surveillance and tracking is an Air Surveillance Technician responsibility.

195Q: Even if it's an IFF readout?

195A: Yeah.

196Q: In the northern No Fly Zone.

196A: If a -- if a controller detected an IFF readout then -- then most likely he would use intercom Net 3 and notify the -- the tracker and say, "Hit up a track on Eagle 01 at that position."

#### **(Questions by General Andrus)**

197Q: Specifically, you said the controller. You mean a surveillance controller or the weapons controller or whichever controller detected the IFF track?

197A: Would -- would use the intercom net on the aircraft and -- and notify the primary tracker for that area and say, "That looks like Eagle 01. Let's initiate a symbology on it."

198Q: In that case, would that primary tracker have been the -- a -- the area controller?

198A: It would have been the Air Surveillance Technician.

199Q: Okay. So the Air Surveillance Technician would have been notified by whoever detected the IFF track that that IFF track existed; is that correct? Did I understand you correctly?

199A: Yes sir. That -- that is correct. The reason they do that is because of the JTIDS link. We typically do not let weapons controllers initiate any symbology because of the -- whatever symbology is detected is passed on to the link so we always -- the Air -- the Advanced Air Surveillance Technician is responsible for the link and that's why we would pull out Net 3 and notify the appropriate tracker that -- that that's who he was and they would initiate the proper symbology on that track. That -- that's the importance of it because the weapons controller would not necessarily know what identification to match with that symbology. There are

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numerous classifications of friendlies, for example, so the Air Technician is the -- is the expert on that and so that's why we always have them initiate the tracks.

200Q: Is that a briefing item that the surveillance section -- Air Surveillance Officer will have that responsibility or is that something that is written in regulations and guidance?

200A: What you'll find in writing is that the Air Surveillance Technician is responsible to detect and initiate any -- any symbologies, but any -- any briefing -- any crew coordination could be briefed that it could be otherwise, but normally it's the Air Surveillance Technician, but a crew could brief a little different.

201Q: In the crew briefing, are you aware as to whether or not it was briefed differently -- that is non-standard?

201A: I'm -- I'm -- I'm thinking back, trying -- trying to remember. I -- I -- I do not recall any special coordination -- coordination which said that the WD would maintain -- the Weapons Director would maintain tracking on Eagle flight or any other friendlies. I -- I don't recall, sir. I -  
- I . . .

202Q: And in the absence of that being covered in the briefing, if I understand correctly, then, you're saying that the standard would be for the surveillance officer to perform that function -- the surveillance section to perform that function; is that correct?

202A: It's -- it's possible that -- that a crew could brief that the weapons controller will -- will have -- will monitor the helicopter traffic once it's -- once the symbology is initiated on it. Yes.

203Q: I understand, but in this case, do you remember that happening?

203A: I -- I honestly can't remember. I -- I can tell you that I know that the weapons controllers were responsible for tracking all of the friendly fighter symbologies in -- in -- in the -- in the No Fly Zone, but as -- but as far as the Eagle flight, I -- I don't remember anything -- nothing was -- was briefed, you know, that said that they would do helicopters. It wasn't considered as a separate entity, so it's . . .

204Q: In the absence of that being briefed, would you tell me again who would have that responsibility?

204A: Okay, we're talking about tracking responsibility in the No Fly Zone, north of the thirty-six line, correct?

205Q: Of Eagle flight. Again, if I understand correctly what you said, that if it were briefed that the weapons controller had that responsibility, then he would . . .

205A: Yes sir, then he would be . . .

206Q: . . . carry that out.

206A: . . . responsible.

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207Q: If it were not briefed that he had that responsibility . . .

207A: Yes sir.

208Q: Then who would have that responsibility under normal conditions?

208A: Then it would be the Air Surveillance Technician.

209Q: It would be the Air Surveillance Technician.

209A: Yes sir.

210Q: So, that would lead us to believe that standard procedure is for the Air Surveillance Technician to have that responsibility unless it was briefed otherwise; is that correct?

210A: No sir, I -- I don't -- I don't think that's totally correct. Not totally. There's so many circumstances that could . . .

211Q: We are attempting to determine who had the responsibility for tracking Eagle flight.

211A: And -- and -- and I -- I don't know. I wish I -- I can't say. I -- I honestly cannot say whether it was WD1 or AST1. I -- I cannot tell you that. I honestly don't know.

**(Questions by Colonel Wilcox)**

212Q: Why is that a difficult question to answer?

212A: Because that -- that -- that's very dynamic. That -- that could even change during the mission. It was an eleven hour sortie. They -- the -- they -- the surveillance team could have coordinated with the weapons team halfway through the sortie and said, "Okay, weapons, now we want you to track helicopters in this area."

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

213Q: But in the absence of that happening, without the surveillance team saying, "Weapons, we want you to track it now," or the weapons team saying to surveillance, "We will track it now," or the Mission Crew Commander or the Senior Director or someone else directing, "At this time, weapons you will track the helicopters," in the absence of any of that, who would have that responsibility under normal conditions?

213A: I'd have to say the Air Surveillance Technician.

GENERAL ANDRUS: Okay.

**(Questions by Major Byas)**

214Q: Do helicopters fly in a No Fly Zone when the AWACS is not on station?

214A: (Pause)

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GENERAL ANDRUS: To the best of your knowledge.

215A: I -- I don't know.

**(Questions by Major Byas)**

216Q: What procedures are followed if there's a loss of radio or radar contact between AWACS and the helicopters?

216A: The procedure . . .

217Q: Yes.

217A: . . . if radio and radar contact is lost . . .

218Q: On a helicopter.

218A: On the helicopters. There are no procedures.

219Q: Is loss of radio contact and radar contact on helicopters a normal event?

219A: Yes, it is.

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

220Q: Do you have any ideas as to what would cause that to be a normal event?

220A: Yes sir.

221Q: Could you explain for -- to us, please, some of the reasons why that might happen?

221A: Yes sir, there are several factors. One being the orbit position of the E3A which is approximately two hundred miles away with very high mountainous terrain between the helicopters and the AWACS orbit so the high terrain is a factor. Another factor is the low altitude of the helicopter. Another factor is the low speed because we're utilizing Pulse Doppler radar and I won't get into classified numbers, but helicopter speed is such where -- where if he's slow enough, we will not detect him. And that's very common.

222Q: To verify. I understand that you may not be able to detect the slow flying helicopter if your radar was set to optimize the radar returns for the faster traveling aircraft; is that correct?

222A: Yes sir, that's correct.

223Q: In order to increase your capability to track the slower flying helicopters, would that mean that you would have to degrade your capability to detect the faster flying fighter aircraft?

223A: Yes sir.

224Q: Would that mean then that if you were to concentrate the radar capabilities to optimize tracking of helicopters, that you could degrade your capability of detecting a hostile Iraqi fighter aircraft?

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224A: Yes sir.

225Q: And is that the reason why you optimize your radar for the higher speeds, to concentrate on the greater threat of the fighter -- possibility of a hostile Iraqi aircraft -- fighter aircraft?

225A: Yes sir. Yes sir.

**(Questions by Major Byas)**

226Q: Are you aware of whether they were using low velocity detection during the mission?

226A: I -- I might have to mention something classified. Can we . . .

227Q: Could you just say yes or no to that question?

227A: Okay. Ask -- ask the question again?

228Q: Were they using low velocity detection?

228A: At the time of the accident . . .

229Q: To your knowledge.

229A: . . . it changed. The . . .

230Q: Prior to you departing at 0725?

230A: No.

231Q: Do you recall the IFF settings?

GENERAL ANDRUS: On Eagle flight.

231A: On Eagle flight?

**(Questions by Major Byas)**

232Q: No, specifically, sir, on the airplane. Do you recall the MCCs IFF settings?

232A: Yes I do. I'll have to -- I heard it, it's -- it's -- I'm -- I -- I'm trying to recall it. Let me think just a second. I -- I recall hearing the Alpha-Beta-Gamma which is the priority on the IFF setting but I -- I honestly don't recall what -- what it was. I -- I can tell you what I think it was, but it wouldn't be fair, I think . . .

233Q: Right.

233A: It wouldn't be an honest assessment.

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

234Q: Going back to my previous question on the optimum radar detection as it varies between

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slow speed and high speed aircraft, can that -- can the adjustments to the radar be made in an extremely short amount of time or does it take several minutes to optimize the radar from a high speed detection to a low speed detection capability?

234A: It's a fairly quick process, sir.

**(Questions by Major Byas)**

235Q: How long is that coordination process to get the information to the person that's going to actually make that change possible? You, as a Mission Crew Commander or the Senior Director, you are requesting now some low velocity detection or the vice versa, you want to stop low velocity and move to -- because you're getting too much garbage.

235A: Right.

236Q: You want to move to another setting. How -- generally how long does that coordination process take?

236A: Oh, it can -- it can easily be done in less than a minute.

237Q: Okay.

237A: I'm sure. I mean . . .

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

238Q: If you had shifted from the high velocity detection to the low velocity detection in this case, referring to the Eagle flight -- if you had shifted the radar in a -- in an attempt to better detect the reported radar contact at low altitude, on the reported hip helicopter, now denoting that it was helicopter traffic, would that have allowed you to adequately monitor the possibility of enemy fighter aircraft entering the area and approaching friendly aircraft?

238A: Negative.

239Q: What would the tactically correct area be to search, in airspeed, in a situation like that? The low speed range or the high speed range? Which would be most advantageous for you to monitor in a tactical situation? Which would run the least amount of risk to the greatest number of people involved in PROVIDE COMFORT in a situation like this, the low speed detection or the high speed detection capability?

239A: I might have to go to classified for this. I don't think I can talk about it unclassified. And I don't mind doing that.

**GENERAL ANDRUS:** Let me rephrase that. Well, let's take a break for a moment.

(The Board session was recessed at 1059 hours, 22 April 1994)

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(The interview was reconvened at 1100 hours, 22 April 1994 with all parties present who were present when the prior session was recessed)

COLONEL WILCOX: The time is 1100, the same parties are present.

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

240Q: If I could re-ask the question, rephrase the question. You have indicated that you have the capability of optimizing the radar for various speeds of possible threats.

240A: Yes sir.

241Q: That if you are concentrating on a very slow speed threat, optimizing the radar to detect the slow speed threat, that that degrades the capability of detecting the high speed threat. Is that correct so far?

241A: It could.

242Q: It could degrade the ability . . .

242A: It could.

243Q: . . . of detecting the high speed threat. In this situation, considering the PROVIDE COMFORT forces that were airborne at the time, and considering the fighters possibly detecting a slow speed target, and considering the possible threat to the greatest number of PROVIDE COMFORT assets, where would the optimum -- what would the optimum be for concentrating the radar capability? Slow speed threat or a high speed threat? Would it be better to take precautions to ensure maximum detection of a high speed threat or to possibly degrade that capability and concentrating on a slow speed threat?

243A: That's a judgment call. If you ask three Mission Crew Commanders, you might get three different answers, to be honest with you. I -- I could -- I could tell you how I think I would do it and it would depend. Every day is different. The weather -- there's a lot of factors involved. The -- the -- the normal procedure is -- is -- is to run through various modes of the radar, play with the thresholds, play with the angles and -- and optimize the best picture for that day, based on what the threat is, and it -- it's -- it's not always the same.

**(Questions by Colonel Wilcox)**

244Q: What do you think it would -- should have been for the fourteenth of April?

244A: I think it should have been?

**(Questions by Major Byas)**

245Q: Let me restate that question for you. Was the radar settings -- first of all, did you observe the radar settings that the MCC was observing?

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245A: Yeah, I did.

246Q: Were they standard for that mission?

246A: Yes.

247Q: In your opinion, would you have used those same stan -- settings?

247A: Yes, I would have.

248Q: Were Mode Four checks completed prior to going on station?

248A: Yes, the standard procedure is everytime the fighter checks in with the check in controller, if the Mode Four check is not good, he will say "sour." That's standard procedure.

249Q: My specific question is, were you -- did you conduct -- did the AWACS conduct Mode Four checks to ensure that its systems were working properly prior to calling on station?

249A: Yes.

250Q: Was there any equipment or specific problems experienced during the mission prior to the mishap?

250A: No.

251Q: Are controllers -- weapons directors trained on dead reckoning procedures?

251A: Yes they are.

252Q: In the event that you have a helicopter in the No-Fly-Zone north of Iraq that may land at a given point in -- in that area, is it standard procedure to extrapolate, zero out, the symbology and let it stay there or let it drift then drop the track? What is the standard procedure if you have -- lose contact with an air -- a helicopter?

252A: They will -- if the helicopter disappears, the radar IFF data, then the symbology has nothing to cling to, if you will, and it will, based on the software tracking program, it will continue tracking in the general direction before the fade up to a certain point, and then when the tracking quality gets so low that it's searching and can't find anything, the symbology will start floating in space, so at that point, normal procedure would be to -- to park the symbology at the last known position and continue searching for additional contacts.

253Q: So you -- the last known position you would have put the symbology so it would have been there and it would have been zeroed out. Is that correct?

253A: Yeah, it -- if there was no way to know whether or not he had landed or still continuing, then the only choice you would have would be go to the last known position and place the symbology there and then search for additional contacts to maybe see which direction he might be headed.

254Q: And if you had knowledge that he was enroute from a particular point to another --

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another point, whether it was directly or indirectly, is it normal procedure to zero that track out once you lose it?

254A: It -- the procedure is not written. I have seen it both ways. I've flown with -- with every crew here and -- let me just say the procedure is not written.

255Q: So in your opinion, is it sound procedures -- is it sound judgment to zero the track out or to drop the track?

255A: In -- in -- in some circumstances it would be.

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

256Q: Could you describe those circumstances where it would be appropriate?

256A: If he lands.

257Q: How would you know that he had landed?

257A: We don't. We can't. Unless he calls us and tells us he's landing, and then we know.

258Q: So unless you receive the radio call indicating that he had landed, it would not be appropriate procedure to zero it out; is that what you're saying? Or would it be?

258A: It could be. Why -- why should you initiate a symbology on a position that is inaccurate? You're -- you're better off because you're in the link with JTIDS and everything and ground sites are receiving it, you'd be better off to put it in the most accurate position which would be the last position you knew and put it in that position. That's the most accurate air picture to the ground commander. Yes, rather than let it -- if you're estimating he was going to that point, you could let it extrapolate itself, but the chances he's going to be in that position could be fifty-fifty or less. I don't know.

259Q: So you're saying that you would zero the symbology out indicating that the last known position of the helicopter was where you had last observed it and had valid indication; is that correct?

259A: I could not question that. If -- if I saw -- if I just knew that -- I -- I -- it depends on situation. I may -- may direct, okay, I think he's going to point "X", let's keep the symbology heading towards point "X" at this speed, or I might say, "Okay, I think he's landed. Let's zero the symbology out at that position. He's landed."

260Q: Would any attempt be made to determine if he had landed -- by radios, for instance?

260A: Yes sir.

261Q: By zeroing out the symbology, does that mean that you are erasing from the scope all traces of that particular contact or does that mean that you are merely zeroing out the airspeed and leaving the symbology in that position?

261A: I'm not a Air Surveillance Technician by trade, but I -- I have good knowledge of the

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system. I -- I think if you zero speed then the symbology will go away. There -- there will be a -- well . . .

**(Questions by Major Byas)**

262Q: In reference to weapons control track -- the specific track we're talking about is the Echo Echo Zero One flight . . .

262A: Uh-huh (Affirmative)

263Q: . . . Eagle flight.

263A: Right.

264Q: The weapons team had assigned it to weapons . . .

264A: Okay.

265Q: . . . and the -- the track was on the scope. It was then lost at 0712 . . .

265A: Okay.

266Q: Is it prudent that knowing that this aircraft had stated that he was going from Whiskey to Lima and then he disappears at a given point, is it -- is it sound procedures for a controller or you, in that given situation, would you zero the symbology out or drop the symbology?

266A: No, I would -- I would . . .

267Q: Would you zero it out?

267A: Well, if I -- if -- if he told me he was going from point "X" to point "Y" and he faded, no. I would -- I would keep the symbology on him and try to extrapolate his -- his -- his known to where he was going, based on his speed.

268Q: And for the record, once you zero out a weapons assigned track, will it drop out of the system?

268A: No.

269Q: Okay.

269A: Because we can -- we can scramble a weapons symbology and park it and typically we'll park them near Incirlik so when we see the IFF, the radar data come up, the aircraft is airborne, then we can associate mainly if it doesn't automatically associate.

270Q: Automatic associate, could you define that for us?

270A: Sure. Every aircraft is assigned a certain squawk. Based on that squawk we've loaded in the computer, when that squawk appears on the computer, that symbology will automatically initiate on that appropriate radar and IFF position. They match up.

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**(Questions by Colonel Wilcox)**

271Q: You have the Eagle aircraft located in the AOR, tracking symbology -- it's got symbology on it, and then you lose it, he comes off the scope, you know he's headed to a destination, you would not zero him out; is that correct?

271A: I -- I would not.

272Q: Would you say again what it is you would do?

272A: I would -- if he told me he was going to point "X" and I knew the position of point "X", and I knew he was flying at sixty knots, then I would put a symbology heading direction point "X" at sixty knots and then I would just let it, you know, I would monitor it to make -- you know, it -- it will eventually drift off course because there's no -- nothing for it to corr -- no radar IFF data for it to correlate to, but it would require a lot of attention, a lot of dedication -- basically if the controller had other aircraft under his control, he would probably be hard pressed to do this, so that -- that's probably why a person would not do it, is because it -- it's -- it's one track getting too much attention. There's too many other things going on. It would just be a priority thing and the helicopter might be of low priority at that moment.

**(Questions by Major Byas)**

273Q: So after you zeroed that track out, then you wouldn't have to worry about keeping up where it is other than knowing it was at this point the last time I saw it?

273A: Yeah, if the track was zeroed out, it would be assumed that it landed and -- and the attention would be diverted somewhere else until maybe it was seen again at another time -- pop up again.

MAJOR BYAS: One of the things we talked about ear . . .

GENERAL ANDRUS: Excuse me.

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

274Q: And if it popped up again, what action would be taken?

274A: Reinitiate that symbology back on his current position.

275Q: So the symbology would have been parked in a position, you would -- you would merely move the symbology to the correct location, and the system would continue tracking.

275A: Yes sir.

**(Questions by Colonel Wilcox)**

276Q: Who would be responsible for doing that?

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**(Questions by Major Byas)**

276Q: Considering it's a weapons track.

276A: Yeah, I understand. If it's a weapons track, then it would be the weapons controller's responsibility.

277Q: Once the weapons controller assumed responsibility for a particular or aircraft, if it popped back up again, I suppose it would be an unknown at that time.

277A: Possible.

278Q: Then whose responsibility would it be?

278A: It's possible. If it's an unknown, it never correlated to be the same aircraft, then the -- the Air Surveillance Technician. Definitely. A weapons controller would never initiate a symbology on an unknown. That is not his job. That is totally out of his realm.

**(Questions by Major Byas)**

279Q: Based upon your system's capabilities and IFF and radar, if -- if low velocity detection was not being used, and you -- and a helicopter was going at a speed at which you cannot detect it, and the helicopter came to an altitude that his transponder was able to transpond, does the speed affect your system's capability to pick that transponder up or is it mainly his radar position?

279A: No.

280Q: So if he was going one mile an hour and he was at a -- a diff -- a -- an altitude, that transponder will come on and you will see that IFF paint?

280A: Yeah.

281Q: Okay.

281A: The IFF is not based on any speed whatsoever.

MAJOR BYAS: Thank you.

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

282Q: If the helicopter were traveling at a hundred and twenty knots, would you have any difficulty painting it with your radar set -- with your radar set at the optimum for high speed fighter traffic?

282A: If he was within line of sight and no terrain obstructions, no sir.

283Q: Would you have any difficulty even if he were as slow as ninety knots?

283A: That's still within our -- our capability of the system.

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**(Questions by Major Byas)**

284Q: Did you monitor the -- were you monitoring the radios? Did you hear the Eagle flight come -- come up on any of the radio frequencies while you were on headset?

284A: No. The -- I was plugged into console fourteen and the -- the communications were not configured where the -- the frequency was in -- was in my console, so I -- I -- I did not hear -- actually hear them check in, no.

285Q: And you -- are you aware of any IFF checks being conducted on the helicopter? Inside or outside of the AOR?

285A: IFF checks.

286Q: Like a Mode One.

286A: Yeah. I'm not -- I'm not aware if an IFF check was taken, but it -- it's standard procedure of the check in controller that he will check IFF on every aircraft that checks in with him.

287Q: Are you aware of the -- is there a difference between the Mode One and the Mode One -- is there a difference between the Mode One inside of the No Fly Zone and the Mode One outside of the No Fly Zone? For helicopters.

287A: I don't know.

288Q: Were you on console when the F15, Tiger flight, entered the airspace?

288A: Yes, I was.

289Q: Were you monitoring Tiger 01's frequency?

289A: No. It was the same frequency as Eagle.

290Q: At that -- at the time he entered the airspace, would he have been on the enroute or would he have been on the check in frequency?

290A: He should be on the check in. Well no let me see.

291Q: I'm sorry.

291A: Well you used -- yeah, you used the wrong terms there.

292Q: Yeah.

292A: It's -- it's -- basically they're with the check in/enroute controller all the way to approximately gate one, and then they change over to the AOR controller. Sometimes they go a little bit further, sometimes a little bit earlier, but once -- once they enter the gate one -- through gate one, AOR, they -- it typically should be the AOR controller talking to them.

293Q: Could you tell me what radio frequencies you were monitoring on the 14th prior to your going to the back of the airplane? What did you have in your Alpha push, Bravo push, Charley

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push, Delta push. I have a comm plan here if it could assist you.

293A: Yeah, it would be, because I had the SATCOM and I'm familiar with . . .

(The Board was recessed at 1100 hours, 22 April 1994)

(The interview was reconvened at 1123 hours, 22 April 1994)

COLONEL WILCOX: It's 1123. The parties are still present.

**(Questions by Major Byas)**

294Q: Was the Duke at his position when the Eagle flight checked in?

294A: I'd say yes, because when I came back, he -- he was there, and yeah, I seen him.

295Q: Before you went on your break, did you observe the Duke sitting in his position?

295A: Yes.

296Q: Could you define -- does the Duke have a console?

296A: Yes.

297Q: Could you give me some information on the training that, to the best of your knowledge, that the Duke receives on board the AWACS?

297A: The -- is -- is what we see on AWACS, is when a new Duke arrives, an experienced Duke will fly with him two times and then the third time he's going out by himself.

298Q: In your opinion, is the Duke trained to be able to deter -- to interpret the AWACS air picture to determine IFF symbology from radar symbology, fighter symbology, friendly fighter symbology from hostile symbology, etcetera?

298A: They're not formally trained. Most of them have -- have -- have a pretty good idea and it varies from Duke to Duke. I won't go into names but out of the four or five that I've -- four I've flown with -- actually I've flown with five or six because they've had, I guess, two fly at one time and things like that. I've seen it vary greatly. Some -- some of them know how to assign their console and know what they're seeing on the scope. Others take some explaining and then they understand it pretty quickly because they are rated officers and they have pretty good knowledge. I'd say it varies.

299Q: But for the worst Duke that you may have seen, would he know IFF returns from radar returns?

299A: No.

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**(Questions by General Andrus)**

300Q: Would he be expected to know those things to perform his duty?

300A: I'd have to say probably not, sir. That's why the mission crew is there. I think -- yeah, that's the mission crew's job.

**(Questions by Colonel Wilcox)**

301Q: How do they -- how do they interface with each other? Does the mission crew provide information to the Duke?

301A: There's -- there's -- there's several ways. One way, is the seating arrangement is very purposeful, the Duke always sits next to the Senior Director and the next is the MCC. There's three consoles in a row, so you have the Mission Commander, the Senior Director and the Duke all within ear shot of each other, basically. There is noise on aircraft. You have to speak loud if you have to yell at somebody, but it's possible so they're -- they're close. The Duke is monitoring the mission air comm nets and the Duke is monitoring the frequencies, the control frequencies -- the control frequencies.

302Q: If the Duke is not expected to be able to read the console, what are the -- what are the procedures for the AWACS aircrew to feed information to him so that he can make decisions? Let me back up and give you one more premise. If the Duke is not expected to read the consoles then I assume that the understanding of his -- that he can't read the consoles and therefore, there should be a procedure whereby the information he needs is fed to him. Is that an accurate premise?

302A: No.

303Q: Why?

303A: In order to make a decision, the Duke has to be able to look at the scope and understand what's going on.

304Q: Then he is expected to read the consoles and interpret the information.

304A: Yes, but the question earlier, from Major Byas, was that would an inexperienced Duke be able to tell the difference from the radar and IFF and my answer was no. I don't think they would, but can they recognize the symbology on the scope? Yes, they can. So -- very, very much so, and can they recognize the Mode C Opti readout, yes, because they -- they have to. If they don't, what's -- what's their usefulness to fly with us. If they . . .

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

305Q: Do they have enough information to perform their job?

305A: I'd have to say yes.

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306Q: And in your opinion, do they have sufficient training to perform their job?

306A: I don't know, sir. I -- I think the -- a -- a lot has to do with a -- with a Duke's experience. I think when they request Dukes, they -- they look for a certain background, certain experience level and that is -- that is implied when, you know, when he flies with us that, okay, he's probably a pilot or a WSO with at least seven, eight years experience, probably flew air to ground, you know, they . . .

307Q: If I can recap what you told us previously, you would expect the Duke to make that final command decision directing such things as engagement, or return to base, or anything in that nature where you needed an overall commander to give directions; is that correct?

307A: Yes sir. I think that's safe to say.

308Q: In order to have the information available to him to make that determination, I believe you indicated that he monitors the radio traffic, that he is in a position where he can see the consoles, that he is sitting next to the Senior Director who has the understanding of the scope and the technical situation and can receive the advice of that Senior Director. Is that correct?

308A: Yes sir.

309Q: Would that be sufficient, in your opinion, for him then to make the tactical decision to give the guidance required or would there be something more that he would need to know or have that he does not have available to him?

309A: It's -- it's normally enough. I would feel comfortable that if you were flying, sir, as the Duke, with your experience, sitting there next to the SD and we -- we spun you up a little bit on what the symbologies look like in the AOR, that you could probably go ahead and make the decisions.

310Q: Let me -- thank you. Let me rephrase that. With the Senior Director immediately next to him to provide him any information that he may need to know that could be obtained from the radar scope, and by monitoring the radio traffic that is available to him, would there be any other information that could be obtained by the AWACS and made available by the AWACS systems to the Duke that he would not have easily accessible to him in order to make a decision?

310A: No.

311Q: So rephrasing it another way, in your opinion, the Duke has sufficient assistance and sufficient information provided to him in order to perform his job; is that correct?

311A: Yes sir.

**(Questions by Colonel Wilcox)**

312Q: Can you be of that opinion whether he can read the radar scopes or not; is that correct?

312A: You'll have . . .

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313Q: If I understood what . . .

313A: I can't -- I can't understand that question.

314Q: Go ahead.

314A: I'll -- I'll answer it the best I can.

MAJOR BYAS: I think - let's take a short break.

(The Board was recessed at 1132 hours, 22 April 1994)

**CONTROL WITNESS #10**



(The interview was reconvened at 1134 hours, 22 April 1994)

COLONEL WILCOX: It's 1134. We're back on the record. The same parties are present. You're still under oath.

**(Questions by Colonel Wilcox)**

315Q: You basically described what the Duke's job is as far as your understanding of it is concerned.

315A: Yes sir.

316Q: And I think, if I heard your testimony so far correctly, the information that the Duke needs comes from the radar scopes on the aircraft and from listening to the radio information over the headsets.

316A: Yes sir.

317Q: So, how does he get this information -- information from the radar scopes and information that's coming in over the radio, the comm. How is that information getting to him?

317A: On his headset.

318Q: He's listening on a headset to the radio frequencies.

318A: Correct.

319Q: How does he get the information from the radar scopes?

319A: He looks at it.

320Q: Is there any other way that he gets information that interprets what he's looking at?

320A: Yes. The Senior Director is sitting next to him and whatever information he's -- they're cross talking.

321Q: So the information that the Duke is looking at is interpreted by an AWACS expert that tells him what the information means if the Duke doesn't know it himself?

321A: If the Duke doesn't know what it is, he'll ask. And the SD -- that's why the Senior Director is right there. He'll say, "Senior Director, why -- why is that aircraft doing that thing he's doing?" And the Senior Director will tell him why, or if he doesn't know why, he'll go out on the frequency and find out why.

COLONEL WILCOX: Thank you.

**(Questions by Major Byas)**

322Q: Were there any distractions prior to the accident while -- at least while you were on

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console? Were there any internal distractions that may have affected the crew or distracted the crew from performing their duty? Such as air conditioning, heating or anything that you are aware of?

322A: Nothing out of the normal, no.

323Q: Who is normally responsible for talking to the -- passing tactical information to the Mad Dog?

323A: The Duke makes all the Mad Dog -- all the calls.

MAJOR BYAS: Thank you. That's all the questions I have.

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

324Q: To clarify one or two more, does the AWACS receive flight plan information on friendly helicopter traffic in the AOR?

324A: No sir, we don't. Well, sir, I -- I can clarify that. Only -- only when the helicopter -- occasionally they will check in and tell us everything they're doing all day long. Sometimes they'll check in and we'll never hear from them again, so if they -- we have nothing written that displays their flight plan but occasionally they'll check in and say "I'm going from here -- I'll be at point "X" for one hour, then I'm taking off going to point "Z" for thirty minutes," and, you know, sometimes that information is passed, but it's -- it's . . .

325Q: So the current procedure, if I understand you correctly, the current procedure is that any flight plan information regarding friendly helicopter traffic that is received by the AWACS, is received by radio transmission; is that correct?

325A: Yeah. There is occasion where intelligence might tell us if it's known. Sometimes -- sometimes when we get our pre-step Intel briefing, they could mention that there might be a helicopter going somewhere, but normally it's just, "Heads up, crew. There's going to be a helicopter in the area and I don't know where it's going." That's normally what we get.

326Q: In order for you to get the normal things that would be expected on a flight plan, that is, take off location, take off time, route of flight and altitude, expected destination, arrival time, destination, are you saying that you receive that information, if you receive it, through radio traffic only?

326A: Yes sir.

327Q: And do you normally receive that information from the helicopter itself or from another agency?

327A: From the helicopter itself.

328Q: Have -- in your experience, have you ever received that information from another agency, such as the helicopter base?

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328A: No sir.

329Q: Do you always receive that information from the helicopters flying in the AOR?

329A: No sir.

330Q: In your opinion, is that dependent upon the particular pilot flying the helicopters?

330A: Yes sir.

331Q: Reference the engagement itself, do you know if anyone on the AWACS questioned the F15 pilots about their intent to engage?

331A: No sir.

332Q: A portion of the AWACS video appears to have been recorded over. Are you aware of that?

332A: Yes sir, I am.

333Q: Could you explain the circumstances of that?

333A: Yes sir. It was truly an accident. The -- the staff weapons director that was flying went to the video recorder after the accident because he -- he was actually off console when it happened, and couldn't believe it, actually, and he wanted to replay and look at it. So he was looking in the little replay -- it's got a little thing there where you can watch -- watch the replay, and what he did, he was -- he was rewinding it and he rewound it back to approximately 0730Z and about -- about the time that he was doing that, then the Senior Director ordered camera on because there was some activity coming up and so they pushed the record button and not -- not realizing that he had rewound it to the spot of the accident, and then probably -- I believe it was about a minute and a half or two minutes was erased before they realized that "Camera off -- oh, shoot, you know, we just," you know. I -- I can assure you it was -- it was -- it was just -- not intentional and it was just -- just a mistake. A case of bad timing.

334Q: When did you first become aware of the F15 intercept engagement?

334A: When I -- when I came off of break back to my console, I put my headset on and I heard of it on the intercom net, is -- is when I heard about it.

335Q: Was it still in process and progress or had it already terminated at that point?

335A: It had already terminated.

336Q: For the record, do you believe -- or did you at that time believe that all the mission personnel were fully qualified and capable of performing their mission?

336A: Yes sir.

337Q: Did you observe in any way any indications of any lax performance on the part of any of the mission personnel?

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337A: No sir, I didn't.

338Q: And did you observe any indications or are you aware of any feelings of complacency on the part of any crew member?

338A: No sir.

339Q: In your opinion, had the Operation PROVIDE COMFORT become so routine that mission personnel had become relaxed to the point of possibly missing key -- key items in their duties?

339A: This -- this was our first flight and I -- they were -- they were pretty -- pretty fired up, pretty charged to get in there and do it. There's no chance of that. There was just -- no sir.

GENERAL ANDRUS: Thank you.

**(Questions by Colonel Wilcox)**

340Q: Let me ask you a question if I could, please. If a weapons controller who is working with the fighter calls a contact and the contact is an unidentified, who has the primary responsibility to identify the contact among the AWACS crew?

340A: Who has the primary responsibility to ID the contact? Under the ROE for PROVIDE COMFORT, we do not have ID authority.

341Q: I don't understand -- then I don't understand what you mean by ID authority, Or -- I've used a term of art now and I don't realize it.

341A: Yeah, maybe -- we do not have the authority to declare that track hostile and enter that into the JTIDS so I can send it to everybody in the JTIDS link.

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

342Q: Who has that authority?

342A: It -- it varies. Again, I'm -- I'm -- I'm -- I'm not the Air Surveillance Officer. The -- depending on if it's a -- there's an airline -- there's an air route that we monitor from Iran going to Turkey. Okay? A lot of traffic on that. And he will ID those guys as airliners friendly. Any -- within Turkey, the Turks don't allow us to ID any -- any -- well we try to put ID on their special aircraft and they -- they always change it on us, so the Turks don't let us do any ID authority  
[Classified portion deleted (47 Words) - ROE]

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**(Questions by Major Byas)**

343Q: But you are allowed to put symbology on that track.

343A: We would put an unknown symbology on it.

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

344Q: Would you only put unknown symbology on the track or, in fact, would someone on the AWACS crew in the enroute position or in the surveillance position, knowing that it was a PROVIDE COMFORT F15, for example, would one of those individuals put symbology on that PROVIDE COMFORT aircraft designating that as friendly?

344A: I -- I lost my train of thought there. I'm sorry, sir.

345Q: Let me restate that. If a PROVIDE COMFORT F15 entered the AOR, would that be -- would the radar contact on that PROVIDE COMFORT F15 have symbology assigned to it?

345A: Yes sir.

346Q: Who would do that?

346A: The weapons directors, as I mentioned earlier, will initiate the symbologies. When the radar and IFF come up with appropriate squawks, normally the symbology will automatically associate. If it doesn't, the weapons director will initiate onto the proper data. So the weapons director.

347Q: Can I understand from that, then, that in that particular case, the weapons director has identified that contact as being a PROVIDE COMFORT F15?

347A: Yes sir.

348Q: So the weapons controller in this case does have identification authority, at least in that instance, in the AOR. Is that correct?

348A: Not based on the definition of ID authority, no. Is what he's doing, it is a fragged aircraft with an ATO, it is a script. It -- it -- it comes up at a precise time with a precise squawk and we're -- in layman's terms, he is identifying it, yes, but under the technical terms of ID authority, it's -- it's a friendly from known because of the origin, and he's not really IDing it, he's just locating it and associating symbology with -- with the proper position.

349Q: He has, through point of origin and through electronic means, that is detecting the squawk . . .

349A: Yes sir.

350Q: . . . and correlating that with the position that he is determining through radio calls, identifying that radar return on the scope as Tiger Zero One, for instance. Is that correct?

350A: Yes sir.

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351Q: In that way -- in that sense he does have that authority. Is that correct?

351A: Yes sir.

352Q: If I understand the previous question and answer correctly then, if a track appears on the scope, that appears only as a radar contact in the AOR, who is responsible for going through that same procedure of correlating track information, point of origin, electronic means such as IFF, to determine if that radar contact is another PROVIDE COMFORT aircraft or conversely, a non-PROVIDE COMFORT aircraft such as an Iraqi military aircraft? Same situation as before except that the contact is first made in the AOR.

352A: So we're looking for that -- if it's possible, then -- then the sole person -- because I . . .

353Q: Position.

353A: . . . it's a -- yeah . . .

354Q: Perception.

354A: So just a rare contact that is -- that is heading north, for example, crossing the thirty-six line? Already in . . .

355Q: Already in the No Fly Zone, a radar contact appears.

355A: Then the Air Surveillance Technician would initiate an unknown symbology on it and direct that attention to the Senior Director and he would turn on interceptors to -- to investigate it.

356Q: Prior to doing that, would there be an attempt made to determine the track or to interrogate IFF to determine if it had IFF . . .

356A: Yes sir.

357Q: . . . or to identify it by some other means prior to directing a visual identification?

357A: We would use all means available.

358Q: And after exhausting those other means and you say all means available, that would include track correlation, IFF, would it include radio contact?

358A: Yes sir, it could.

359Q: Okay, and after exhausting those means, you would then direct the fighters to attempt to visually identify; is that correct?

359A: Let me -- let me -- let me clarify. I -- I -- the radio contact is -- is not -- the Rules of Engagement don't, to my knowledge, don't direct that we attempt radio contact, to -- to my knowledge. To my knowledge.

360Q: Would that be a logical thing to do with a contact that had not been detected entering the No Fly Zone but was only detected well inside the No Fly Zone?

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360A: That would be a -- a low priority to do that. The highest priority would be to use whatever means we have available to identify them, mainly with IFF and special IFF and . . .

361Q: And track correlation . . .

361A: Yes sir.

362Q: . . . for instance if it was tracking from the Turkish border or near the Turkish border towards the center of the area, south towards the center of the area, would that have a different significance than a track that was very near the thirty-six parallel tracking north towards the AWACS position?

362A: Yes sir.

363Q: So the track correlation, if I understand you correctly, would assist in your identification but would not be final confirmation. It would only be a part of the story.

363A: Yes sir.

364Q: And you said you'd also use electronic means such as IFF, special IFF and possibly, if I'm hearing you correctly, you would also use radios if it appeared that that would be the appropriate thing to do?

364A: Yes sir.

365Q: And only after that would you normally direct fighters to visually intercept and attempt to visually -- to intercept and attempt to visually identify it. Is that correct?

365A: Yes sir, that's correct.

366Q: And then to recap the initial question, AWACS does have that authority. Is that correct?

366A: What -- what authority, sir?

367Q: To go through that process in an attempt to determine who that radar contact would be.

367A: Yes sir.

**(Questions by Colonel Wilcox)**

368Q: Let me offer you a scenario and I want you -- and then I'll ask you sort of the same question at the end. Assume this set of facts: a fighter aircraft in the AOR, PC aircraft, PROVIDE COMFORT aircraft calls out a radar contact at a certain distance, let's say sixty miles. The weapons controller sees nothing on the scope and says clear. The fighter aircraft calls out the contact again when he's closer, let's say thirty miles. The weapons controller responds by saying "Hits there." Who's responsible on the AWACS aircraft for going through the procedure that the general just described in trying to, in layman's terms, identify the hits there?

368A: Everybody is.

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369Q: Who has primary responsibility?

369A: I would have everybody looking at that.

370Q: Who has primary responsibility? Is it the weapons controller working with the fighter aircraft or some other member of the AWACS crew?

370A: So it's a question who would have primary responsibility to identify? What's the question again exactly?

371Q: On the AWACS crew -- within the AWACS crew, who has primary responsibility -- who has -- who has primary responsibility to identify the hits described by the weapons controller who says "Hits there?"

371A: Who has primary responsibility to identify hits when you've got a fighter searching?

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

372Q: Rephrasing it, a weapons controller has detected a radar contact and he has confirmed that, he has confirmed he has detected a radar contact by transmitting "Hits there," meaning in the same position that the fighters have indicated a radar contact.

MAJOR BYAS: For this situation, sir, could we say that it is IFF?

COLONEL WILCOX: Let's get to it in a minute.

372A: The primary person responsible for identifying.

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

373Q: Who should have initiated identification procedures as we previously described in this situation?

373A: Maybe I can -- I can -- I can talk -- talk through the scenario, how -- how I think I would do it were -- if it were to happen. Maybe that might -- might -- I might -- because I can -- I can visualize because I'm an operator and I can -- I can tell you. Okay. I'm in a situation. I'm going to call my Air Surveillance Officer on the net and say, "Who is," I say, you know, "What is this . . ."

COLONEL WILCOX: What position are you operating from?

WITNESS: Mission Crew Commander. If I was mission commander, I would say, "ASO, you got anything? What is it?" And in the meantime I would be talking to the Senior Director saying, "All right, you guys, you know, get the fighters in there and -- and we're going to VID it because we don't know what it is. It's an unknown. We're going to VID it." So I've got a couple of people going here. I'm working with the ASO and I'm working with the Senior Director. But

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you're asking who the primary person -- the -- the -- the -- the surveillance section as a whole would be running through the procedures as -- as the general and I -- as discussed by the general. I would say on a normal basis, it would be delegated down to an Air Surveillance Technician.

**(Questions by Colonel Wilcox)**

374Q: Not the weapons director controlling the F15 aircraft.

374A: As far as IDing who it is?

MAJOR BYAS: No sir, as far as putting a piece of symbology on it. You see a hit. There's a green dot or a brown dot. Just put a piece of symbology on it.

374A: The Air Surveillance Technician has to put symbology on it because if he doesn't, then the computer will not give a solution from the intercept symbology to the target symbology. It only gives information based on symbology. So the weapons director would be screaming for symbology. Now, if he didn't get it, then he would initiate it himself, I'm sure. I would.

**(Questions by Major Byas)**

375Q: So the weapons directors will not be monitoring those radios so he is looking, probably, in another area. He's not aware of this -- this contact call unless the Mission Crew Commander or the Senior Director or Weapons Controller notifies him.

375A: It's very possible.

376Q: So the Mission Crew Commander nor the Senior Director or the Weapons Controller, they will wait until a surveillance guy initiates a UEG on a track?

GENERAL ANDRUS: What is a UEG?

MAJOR BYAS: Unknown Enemy General is what that symbology they are supposed to use on it, but do the MCC, the SD and the Weapons Controller have the capability of initiating that particular track?

376A: Yes, they do.

377Q: In the case of the AOR controller observing a contact and acknowledging that by saying "Hit there," would the AOR controller normally initiate action to identify that contact?

377A: His job is to get the fighter information at that point. That's his job.

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

378Q: So his job would not be to initiate identification procedures, but to assist the fighter in continuing on with the fighter's responsibilities; is that correct?

**CONTROL WITNESS #10**

378A: Yes sir.

379Q: By transmitting "Hit there," that would be advising the fighters that AWACS was also observing the contact indicating that there was probably something there; is that correct?

379A: Yes sir. If a -- if a fighter called contact and AWACS was picture clean -- if the F15 called back and said he had additional contact and if AWACS said hits there, yes, that's telling them, "You're right. You see it, we see it, press."

380Q: Would that also mean, by making the transmission "Hits there," that other members on the AWACS crew should be alerted looking for it, and this process of electronic identification or track correlation identification be initiated -- should be initiated?

380A: It is not automatic. It is a matter of crew coordination at that point. The -- I told you what I would do. If I was the Mission Crew Commander, I would not -- if the Senior Director did not notify the Air Surveillance Officer, I would and get some more eyes on it, so it's -- it could be, you know, like I said, I wasn't on headset, I wasn't on position. I don't know what happened to the systems but it could be done several ways. The Weapons Director could call the Air Surveillance Officer and say, "Fighters have a contact here. We're investigating. Initiate symbology on it and let's -- let's find out what it is."

381Q: So the Senior Director or the Mission Crew Commander, whichever observed the situation first, would normally direct the surveillance section to initiate that procedure and lacking that, they would initiate it themselves. Is that correct? In order to ensure that that loop was closed. Is that correct?

381A: Not necessarily. May we restate the question? I might have missed what you were saying.

382Q: Okay. The Senior Director hears the call and perhaps observes hits there. If I understand what you said, the Senior Director would then notify the surveillance section and request -- advise them of the hits and request that they attempt to identify by their means . . .

382A: Yes sir, that's right.

393Q: If that did not happen, in order to ensure that the sequence took place, if I understood correctly, you said that the Senior Director would do it. Is that correct?

393A: At that point the -- the Senior Director has the most knowledge and normally the Senior Director and the ASO coordinate with each other because they're -- they're the supervisors. I would expect my Senior Director to say, "MCC, ASO, heads up. Contact," you know, "Let's find it," and that -- and that gets the ASO in action delegating those people and the -- and then the MCC alerted and anybody else that . . .

394Q: And if they did not take action, either the MCC or the ASO, then the weapons Senior Director would do it himself to ensure that it got done.

394A: Yes sir.

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395Q: Is that correct?

395A: That is correct.

396Q: Okay. Now, let me go back to one other thing that you said. Time out a second here.

(The interview was recessed at 1205 hours, 22 April 1994)

**CONTROL WITNESS #10**

(The interview was reconvened at 1206 hours, 22 April 1994, with all parties present who were present when the prior session recessed)

COLONEL WILCOX: It's 1206. The parties are present, you're still under oath.

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

382Q: Okay. You previously said that the intent would have been when you said, "Hits there," the intent would have been to press. Would you explain what you mean by press?

382A: Press means that -- that to continue and investigate the contact.

383Q: To continue to investigate the contact to determine what?

383A: To determine friend or unfriendly.

GENERAL ANDRUS: Thank you.

**(Questions by Colonel Wilcox)**

384Q: If the Senior Director, in the -- in the scenario that we've described, initiates symbology on the contact or on the hit, does that indicate to other crew members that he has assumed primary responsibility for trying to identify the contact?

384A: If the Senior Director initiate -- initiates symbology on that contact, it would mean to me that that was the most expeditious means to do it and he -- he took the -- the only -- he took the right action, that's all. If the Air Surveillance Technician did not have the symbology on it, it was time critical and he didn't have time to coordinate internally and have the AST initiate on it so he did it himself. That's all . . .

385Q: Did that indicate that he had taken -- then taken the lead in trying to, in layman's terms, identify the hit?

385A: No. No. The reason he would do that is -- is so they could establish computer to computer guidance for the intercept.

COLONEL WILCOX: Who on the AWACS . . .

MAJOR BYAS: The symbology itself would start that identification process.

386A: But he's not attempting . . .

MAJOR BYAS: Just the process of putting . . .

COLONEL WILCOX: Don't testify.

**CONTROL WITNESS #10**

COLONEL WILCOX: Okay, thank you.

Do you have any further questions -- excuse me, any further information, statements or evidence which you wish to present?

WITNESS: No sir.

COLONEL WILCOX: You're reminded that this is an official investigation. You're ordered not to divulge the nature of the investigation or the questions, answers or discussions in this interview with anyone unless authorized to do so by the board president, Major General Andrus, CINC USAFE, or higher authority. If anyone other than a board -- member of this board should approach you regarding your testimony or the matters discussed here, you must report it immediately.


Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: No sir.

COLONEL WILCOX: The time is 1209 and the interview is concluded.

### REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

The above sworn interview statement, given by Control Witness #10 to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board was recorded by me by stenomask. Words contained within brackets, [ ], indicated language that has been substituted at the direction of the Board, to avoid the release of classified information which could not be downgraded and/or personal details which would disclose the identity of military members directly involved in the incident. The substituted language accurately conveys the essential meaning of the original language. Except as noted, I certify that the foregoing transcript is a true, accurate, and verbatim account of that statement.

  
BRUCE H. PEGGS, DAFC  
Court Reporter  
Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

CONTROL WITNESS #10

V-011

V-012

**TAB V-013A**

V-013

**CONTROL WITNESS 10**

V-013A

**TESTIMONY OF  
CONTROL WITNESS #10  
963D AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SQUADRON  
(2nd Interview)**

COL WILCOX: The time is 1400, 6 May 1994. The following persons are present: Control Witness #10, Major Aaron Byas, Major Chris Lisanti, Maureen Nation is the Board Reporter, Lieutenant Colonel Bert Pryor and I am Colonel Wilcox.

This interview is being conducted at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.

**Questions by Colonel Wilcox:**

1Q: I know that you've testified once before. Do you recall the instructions that I gave you at that time?

1A: Yes, I think so.

2Q: I remind you that you are still under oath. We just have a few more questions for you, if you don't mind?

2A: Okay.

**Questions by Major Byas:**

3Q: Concerning the morning of the 14th of April, do you recall the briefing that morning-- were you in attendance at that briefing?

3A: Yes.

4Q: Was it in accordance with the Squadron standards for this theater--did you cover all the items?

4A: Yes.

5Q: Did the weapons team or senior director brief the weapons part of that briefing?

5A: There's a weapons slide that the MCC throws up. I don't recall whether or not the SD actually said anything or not. Sometimes they do and sometimes they don't. I don't recall in this case.

6Q: Was the briefing adequate for the mission?

6A: Yes, it was.

7Q: Were you aware of Control Witness #9's training records or flying activity prior to coming to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT?

7A: I have never seen his training records, but I am aware of his training background.

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8Q: Do you know when the last time was that he flew before he came over here?

8A: No, I don't.

9Q: Did you receive any type of information concerning the flight history of an individual or training records of an individual at this location?

9A: No.

10Q: So if a person comes to you and wouldn't have flown in--once in the last six months, you wouldn't know that?

10A: That's correct.

### **Questions by Colonel Wilcox:**

11Q: You indicated that you knew about Control Witness #9's past training history. How did you learn about it?

11A: He was one class ahead of me in the training.

12Q: What is the history that you're aware of?

12A: Basically, this is his first AWACS assignment. He struggled with a couple of things. Again, this is only my opinion. Of course, he passed the course. It seemed a lot easier for prior AWACS experienced people to pass the course than people that had not been in system before. So nothing in general that I could tell you, just the fact that he graduated on time, as far as I know.

13Q: What course are you speaking of?

13A: The initial qualification course for mission crew commander.

14Q: What portions did he struggle with?

14A: I don't know. I was not his instructor, and I can just tell you rumor, third-hand knowledge, and I'd rather not.

15Q: When you testified previously, you indicated that you were with the crew on the morning of the 14th of April. Is that correct?

15A: With the crew?

16Q: Yes. You were on the mission?

16A: Yes, Sir, I was.

17Q: And I believe your former testimony was that from the time the aircraft took off until approximately 0725, you were on a scope or something to that effect. Is that accurate?

17A: For the majority of time. On takeoff, I was actually in a non-scope seat, and I actually assumed a scope later on in the mission

### **CONTROL WITNESS #10**



18Q: Approximately when did you assume a scope?

18A: Approximately an hour and a half after takeoff, I'd say.

19Q: What time would that be?

19A: Oh, I'd say about 0600Z since takeoff was about 0430.

20Q: And you stayed on the scope until approximately 0725Z?

20A: I'd say about that. Yes, Sir.

21Q: Where was this scope located?

21A: It's located near the right overwing hatch facing to the rear.

22Q: How close are you to the senior director when you are sitting at that scope position?

22A: 10 or 12 feet, I'd say.

23Q: Was he in your field of vision?

23A: No.

24Q: How close is that from you to the mission crew commander?

24A: About the same distance; I'd say about 10 or 12 feet.

25Q: And the Duke?

25A: About the same.

26Q: Could you see what the--any of those three individuals were doing between the period 0700 to 0725?

26A: Yes.

27Q: Tell me please, if you will, what the Duke was doing during that period of time?

27A: He was sitting on position with headset on.

28Q: Did you see him doing anything or did you just see him sitting there? Let me ask the question a different way. Was he alert?

28A: As far as I could tell, he was.

29Q: Why do you believe that's true?

29A: Because I can't prove it's untrue. He was sitting there with his headset on and I'm looking at the back of his head, I can only assume that he's alert.

**Questions by Major Byas:**

**CONTROL WITNESS #10**

30Q: Were you standing up at the time?

30A: Yea, basically, I was standing up behind--

31Q: So you were looking at the back of their heads?

31A: Yes, that's true.

**Questions by Colonel Wilcox:**

32Q: Did you see him perform any physical functions that would indicate that he was alert?

32A: Physical functions that would indicate he was alert?

33Q: Yes, like hitting switches or something along that nature, turning buttons?

33A: I didn't see him push any buttons. They normally don't push many buttons anyway.

34Q: What about the mission crew commander?

34A: He seemed fairly alert. They went through the radar wakeup and IFF, JTIDS, everything --just normal. Everything came up fine.

35Q: Did that occur before 0700 Zulu?

35A: Yes.

36Q: How about between the period of time from 0700 to 0730 Zulu?

36A: I don't know.

37Q: What about the senior director?

37A: Again, I don't know. I was facing the rear.

38Q: Did you have headsets on?

38A: I had headsets on for a portion of that time.

39Q: That time being between 0700 and 0730?

39A: No, I think I went off the headset about 0725 or something like that.

40Q: Were your headsets tuned so that you could hear any conversation from the senior director, the mission crew commander or the Duke?

40A: Yes.

41Q: Did you hear any communications from any of those persons?

41A: Yes, I did.

42Q: From whom specifically did you hear the communications?

42A: I heard the Duke and I heard the MCC.

**CONTROL WITNESS #10**

43Q: What were they saying?

43A: I don't remember, but as far as the MCC, I was monitoring the entire wakeup process, getting the system across, making sure that they got the systems up, just the normal checklist--

(At this point, the entire building loses power and the board recessed at 1409, 6 May 1994.

At 1530, 6 May 1994, the board reconvened.)

COLONEL WILCOX: The time is 1530, 6 May 1994. We are back with Control Witness #10. The same parties are here again.

**Questions by Colonel Wilcox:**

44Q: Before the recess, we were discussing the communications that you were monitoring as you were listening on your headsets and we were talking about the communication you heard concerning the mission crew commander?

44A: Correct.

45Q: Please, would you tell us again when you were listening to the mission crew commander on the headset, what was it he was saying?

45A: That's correct. I was on headset from pre-mission walk around all the way through until the time I indicated I was off headset. Basically, the normal transmissions based on the checklist for equipment checkout, radar warmup, et cetera.

46Q Did you hear the mission crew commander on your headset any time between 0700 and 0725Z?

46A: I don't recall.

47Q: Do you recall hearing the senior director on the headset any time during that period of time?

47A: I don't recall that either.

48Q: Earlier you indicated that during the period of time between 0700 and 0730 you had looked up--you had looked up--you were standing up and you looked over and saw the mission crew commander and he appeared to you to be alert?

48A: Yes, that's correct.

49Q: Did you see the senior director at the same time?

49A: Yea, he was sitting right next to him, same situation--the back of their heads pretty much, as I was standing behind.

50Q: Did he appear to be alert to you as well?

50A: Yes, he did. He appeared normal--I didn't see anything that was abnormal.

**CONTROL WITNESS #10**

51Q: How about the Duke?

51A: Same.

52Q: Do you have any further information, statements or evidence that you wish to present?

52A: No, Sir.

53Q: Let me ask you one final question. Do you know where the Duke was between the hour of 0700 and 0725Z?

53A: To my knowledge, he was on his scope.

COLONEL WILCOX: You are reminded that this is an official investigation. You are ordered not to divulge the nature of this investigation or the questions, answers or discussions included in this interview with anyone unless directed to do so by the Board President, Major General Andrus, CINCUSAFE or higher authority.

If anyone, other than a member of this board, should approach you regarding your testimony or the matters discussed here, you must report it immediately.


Do you have any questions?

WITNESS No, Sir, I don't.

COLONEL WILCOX: The time is 1533 and the interview is concluded.

### REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I certify that the above sworn interview statement, given by CONTROL WITNESS #10 to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board, was recorded by me by stenomask and that the foregoing transcript is a true, accurate, and verbatim account of that statement.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
MAUREEN A. NATION, DAFC  
Court Reporter  
Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

**CONTROL WITNESS #10**

V-011

V-012

**TAB V-014**

V-013

**CONTROL WITNESS 11**

V-013A

V-014

**TESTIMONY  
OF  
CONTROL WITNESS #11  
963D AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SQUADRON  
SENIOR DIRECTOR**

**COL WILCOX:** The time is now 1059 hours, on 21 April 1994. The persons present are the following: Major General Andrus, Major Byas, Colonel Wilcox, and Staff Sergeant Harris.

**WITNESS:** Control Witness #11

**COL WILCOX:** This interview is being conducted at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. This is an official AFR 110-14. Accident Investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters and the possible involvement of U.S. fighter aircraft in the crash of these helicopters in the northern No-Fly Zone of Iraq on 14 April 1994.

This investigation is being conducted at the direction of General Robert C. Oaks, CINC USAFE. This investigation is not a Safety Mishap Investigation conducted under AFR 127-4. It is an Aircraft Accident Investigation conducted under AFR 110-14.

The purpose of this accident investigation is to obtain and preserve all available evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary action, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Testimony before a Safety Mishap Investigation Board is given with the understanding that it can only be used for mishap prevention purposes and all witnesses are advised that the testimony will be treated in confidence. However, testimony given in this accident investigation may be for any purpose deemed appropriate by competent authority and may be publicly disseminated.

Do you understand the difference between a Safety Mishap Investigation and this Accident Investigation?

**WITNESS:** Yes sir.

**COL WILCOX:** Do you understand the purpose of this investigation?

**WITNESS:** Yes I do.

**COL WILCOX:** Do you have any questions?

**WITNESS:** I'd like to confirm that at anytime I want an Area Defense Counsel, we'll stop at that time.

**COL WILCOX:** I'll read the rights to you in just a moment.

**CONTROL WITNESS #11**

**COL WILCOX:** Do you wish to remain silent or will you answer our questions?

**WITNESS:** I'd like to continue with the questioning.

**COL WILCOX:** Do you want a lawyer?

**WITNESS:** Not at this time.

**COL WILCOX:** You are further advised not to discuss classified information unless necessary to develop your testimony. If it's necessary for you to discuss classified information, you need to identify it as such.

Would you please rise so that I can swear you in.

(The witness was sworn)

**COL WILCOX:** For personal data on the witness, please refer to Control Witness Number 11 in the collateral record. You indicated that -- before the interview that prior to going into the interview you wanted to review some notes that you had -- You indicated prior to the interview that you'd like to review some notes that you made, and you believe that we may have those notes. Is that correct?

**WITNESS:** Correct.

**COL WILCOX:** Would you like to do that at this time?

**WITNESS:** Yes.

**COL WILCOX:** Let's take a recess from the interview at this time and we'll see if we can locate those notes for you. We may have them, we're not certain, of course, because we haven't actually looked through the notes, okay?

**WITNESS:** Okay.

**COL WILCOX:** We'll take a recess at this time, it's 1106.

**[The Interview recessed at 1106 hours, 21 April 1994]**

**[The Interview reconvened at 1129 hours, 21 April 1994]**

**COL WILCOX:** The time is 1129, the hear -- the board is reopened. Control Witness 11, I remind you that you are still under oath. We've been joined by Lieutenant Colonel Wayne Mudge.

**CONTROL WITNESS #11**

## EXAMINATION

### Questions by Colonel Wilcox:

1Q: I want to explore, -- first of all I want to articulate, or have you tell us what happened during the course of the break, just so we can get a clean record of what we've just been doing?

1A: Okay, we reviewed some evidence. The evidence was labeled 83A and within the envelope, there's personal notes from crewmembers of the AWACS.

2Q: How -- What was the condition of the envelope?

2A: It was sealed at the time.

3Q: And who unsealed it?

3A: We sealed -- we unsealed it.

4Q: We being, who actually broke the seal on it?

4A: Myself and, with Colonel Wilcox in attendance.

5Q: Okay.

5A: I flipped through the notes looking for my own notes. We found one piece of paper which had my handwriting and my notes. We resealed the envelope without that sheet of paper, and then we recreated 83C with my one sheet of notes.

6Q: We sealed -- Did we seal 83C?

6A: Yes, we did.

7Q: Did you have a chance to look at those notes?

7A: No, I did not.

8Q: Did I look at the notes?

8A: No.

9Q: Okay, would you tell us a little bit about the circumstances under which those notes were made?

9A: Those notes were made while we were airborne. Some of those notes were taken after we reviewed the videotape and, without looking at it closely, I can't tell when the rest of them were made.

10Q: Were the notes made during the normal course of business?

10A: Yes, they were.

### CONTROL WITNESS #11



11Q: Were they made at the direction of anyone?

11A: No, they were not.

12Q: You indicated that there were other notes other than the ones that you found in the sealed envelope, is that correct?

12A: Yes, there were.

13Q: How were the other notes made?

13A: Those were made also during the course of the flight.

14Q: Do you have any objection if the board members review those notes?

MAJOR BYAS : Specifically, your notes, not the other people's notes.

14A: Not with the notes that I have in the envelope, 83C. I don't know what other notes they have or -- that I have.

15Q: None of the notes you made though were made by -- at the direction of anyone?

15A: Uh, I can't say for sure.

16Q: Did someone tell you to make some notes?

16A: Yes, we were told to make statements after we landed and after that I jotted down some notes. I don't know if you have -- you guys are in possession of those, are you not.

17Q: What kind of paper was it that you made those notes on, was it just blank paper?

17A: Some would probably be on legal pad. Some of them would be on a white roll of paper and then some probably on yellow stickies.

#### **Questions by Major Byas:**

18Q: Was any of those notes classified?

18A: Yes, they were that's why I'm not in possession of them now.

#### **Questions by Colonel Wilcox:**

19Q: Who did you give that set of notes to?

19A: Control Witness #12 and the Staff WD and myself put them all in an envelope and we sealed them and put them in the AWACS' safe and that's the last that we saw of them.

20Q: During the course of the flight, did you make any other notes?

20A: Yes, I did.

#### **CONTROL WITNESS #11**

21Q: Were those notes made at the direction of anybody?

21A: It's my duty to keep a running log of the weapon's activity.

22Q: And the notes that you refer to that you made during the flight, are those log notes?

22A: Yes, I have log notes, and as a crew we pretty much came to the conclusion that we were going to have to do some recreating. So, I did direct my WDs to make comments, personal recollections for any recreations later.

23Q: Did anyone direct you to make those personal recollections or to write down your personal recollections?

23A: I guess a suggestion was made that we should make notes.

24Q: By who?

24A: By the mission crew commander.

25Q: Is the mission crew commander your supervisor?

25A: Yes, he is.

26Q: The notes that you retracted, that are now marked 83C, are those the notes that you made as a result of the suggestion from your mission crew commander or are there other notes?

26A: I would have made those notes anyway. After the suggestion was made, you know, just everyone took more copious notes, just to recollect.

27Q: But the notes, those notes would reflect back on something that had already happened?

27A: That's correct.

28Q: Rather than activities that were either ongoing or that were anticipated?

28A: That's correct.

29Q: And the notes that you made that reflect back on what happened, were notes made because your mission crew commander asked you to make them?

29A: I would say that's correct for the most part.

30Q: The notes that are in 83C are not notes made at the direction of the mission crew commander, as you reflected back or are they?

30A: Yes, they are.

31Q: If I understood what you said, you have no objection of our looking at the notes ----

31A: ---- No, I don't ----

32Q: ---- That you segregated out as 83C?

32A: That is correct, I do not have any objection.

**CONTROL WITNESS #11**

33Q: But there are other notes that you are uncertain -- Other notes that you made at the suggestion of your mission crew commander that you'd like to look at before you determine whether or not you'll allow us to look at the notes, is that correct?

33A: That's correct.

34Q: If I understand correctly, your wish to look at the notes is an opportunity to refresh your recollection?

34A: That's correct. I have the notes organized in a sequence of events, with times and such.

#### **Questions by Major Byas:**

35Q: Is that your mission crew log, your senior director mission crew log, is the notes you're referring to?

35A: No, I have several notes in addition to that, and then I also took a set of notes off of the mission crew log.

36Q: I read the mission crew logs, the official document that you used, that you wrote as far as the mission crew log is concerned, but I haven't seen any other notes. It may be possible that your notes were used in developing a chronology of events, document that was used, that was produced by the AWACS crew. Was your time -- Were your notes time sequenced as to what happened at what time?

36A: Yes, there's one set of notes that I recreated from my log, from my official log and then filled in things. So, yeah that could very well have happened.

37Q: That document was typed up and given to us?

37A: Okay, I haven't seen any such document. I don't -- This is the first I've heard of such document.

38Q: The time sequence that was submitted as evidence. It wasn't his, it was submitted by the crew, I believe.

38A: See, they could not have filled that out, without my inputs. And then also, several of my notes were taken on the back of the flow charts, and the time lines and the ATOs.

39Q: Do you wish to see those notes before we proceed?

39A: Not at this time, but I can let you know.

#### **Questions by Colonel Wilcox:**

40Q: So, perhaps what we should do is go through the questioning and as we get through the sequence of events, if -- at the end of the thing, if you want to refresh your recollection, maybe we can do it that way?

40A: Yes.

#### **CONTROL WITNESS #11**

41Q: Would that work okay?

41A: Yes. Can I take notes?

**COLONEL WILCOX:** Of course. Let's take a break. It's 1139.

**[The interview recessed at 1139 hours, 21 April 1994.]**

**[The interview reconvened at 1144 hours, 21 April 1994.]**

**COLONEL WILCOX:** Let's begin. The time is 1144. We're doing an interview with Control Witness #11. Major General Andrus has joined us. The same parties are here as during the last session.

**Questions by Major Byas:**

42Q: What is your AWACS crew position?

42A: I'm the senior director.

43Q: What are your specific duties and responsibilities as the senior director?

43A: I oversee and manage the weapons team, consisting of the weapons directors. On this crew, it was three. And I'm also in charge of overall safety for aircraft control.

44Q: What is your prior background and experience prior to entering the AWACS organization-----

**COLONEL WILCOX:** ---- Excuse me, before you answer that question, I really apologize, I'm tired, my memory is not as good as it -- well it's poor to start with and it's even worse now. Did we swear you in?

**WITNESS:** Yes.

44Q: Prior to entering the AWACS operation?

44A: Yeah, prior to becoming an AWACS controller, I went through initial weapons controller training.

45Q: And how long did that last?

45A: Six months.

46Q: How long did your initial weapons controller training last?

46A: Initial weapons controller training is six months long.

**CONTROL WITNESS #11**

47Q: How long have you been a senior director?

47A: I've been a senior director since September of 1992.

48Q: And your current qualification is a senior director?

48A: That's an affirmative.

49Q: What specific types of training did you receive to qualify you to become a senior director?

49A: To be eligible for senior director you have to have a certain number of hours and an experience level as a AWACS weapons director. Then go through upgrade training which consists of five flights and an additional check ride.

50Q: Do you recall the number of hours that is required?

50A: I can't remember exactly what it was, but it's around five hundred hours to be considered.

51Q: Could you estimate the amount of time that you were a mission ready weapons controller? How long was it before you became a mission ready senior director?

51A: I became a mission ready weapons controller July of 1989, and from that time to the time I became the weapons controller, I maintained proficiency as a weapons controller.

52Q: What specific briefings or training did you receive prior to arriving at Operation PROVIDE COMFORT?

52A: Prior to this deployment we received or I participated in one simulator session with the crew and also received two Spin-up briefs.

53Q: What would be -- simulated training consist of?

53A: It's a two to three hour session where we have a simulator and we have a sim-tape that we run and it is used primarily to familiarize and prepare the crew to work in PROVIDE COMFORT. It's good cross section of a typical day for PROVIDE COMFORT.

54Q: Were there any helicopters in that scenario?

54A: I do recall some helicopters but I'm not sure if we talked to them or if they were controlled or what.

55Q: Do you recall whether they were tracked? Was a symbology initiated on them or was the radar paint allowed to come in and go away?

55A: I can't say for sure.

56Q: What was the general ROE used for that simulator scenario?

56A: What we use for our simulator session was a combination of ROE. We didn't have the exact ROE that's being employed right now in the theater.

**CONTROL WITNESS #11**

57Q: Could you tell me the ROE used for that simulator session, your last simulator session?

57A: Yeah, we -- as always the controllers are told that they're not to give any determination whether it's a hostile or not. So when the sim drivers say that they have a contact, they're told to shadow it and to get as much information as they can. Then we simulate taking it back to the Duke or the Mad Dog or the MCC, whoever we have comms with at the time.

58Q: So, in your simulated scenario, you're taught that once an aircraft makes a contact or has a hit on an aircraft or helicopter, to inform the aircraft to shadow that aircraft that is being engaged?

58A: That's what we do in practice.

59Q: That is the way the simulated session is run?

59A: The simulator session can be run different ways. The ROE that the people who make the sims, the Boeing people give us is quite a bit different than what's in the theater. So, usually the MCC and the senior director tells the Boeing people the kind of ROE that they would like to see. And also, you know, at that point we give them whatever inputs we want to train the crew, to test the crew.

60Q: Do you consider the ROE training you received prior to coming to Operation Provide Comfort, the simulated training more restrictive or less restrictive than the ROE you have to apply to here?

60A: I would say it would be much more restrictive.

61Q: Did you receive any local area training once you arrived in the theater?

61A: On the ground yes. We received a briefing and then also we broke down into specialized groups and the weapons team had two separate days in which to look over the material.

62Q: Did you receive any specific weapons train -- briefings from anyone on the staff?

62A: Yes, we did.

63Q: Were those briefing adequate?

63A: Yes, they were.

64Q: Did they contain -- What was the content of those briefings?

64A: We received a briefing on the current situation, current air order of battle, which is where aircraft are located and also enemy air order of battle, where enemy aircraft and any missiles are located. We also received an area -- we looked at the map and pointed out places of interest. We also had the ATO the Air Tasking Order, and also the ACO, the Airspace Command Order, Airspace Control Order. And we also had notes left to us from previous crews, and we also had AWACS staff specific notes which contained points of interest.

**CONTROL WITNESS #11**

65Q: Were there any documents in your training or were there any briefings received concerning helicopters procedures in this theater, specifically in the "No-Fly-Zone"?

65A: I don't recall any.

66Q: Have you ever flown in PROVIDE COMFORT Operation before?

66A: Yes, I have.

67Q: Was this your first mission on this temporary duty assignment?

67A: For this deployment yes, it was the first mission.

68Q: How many times have you flown in this theater? A ball park figure would be fine.

68A: As far as number of missions or number of deployments?

69Q: Number of deployments and missions?

69A: This is my fourth deployment and, probably sixtieth mission.

70Q: How many?

70A: Sixtieth.

71Q: How long is your normal deployment once you come here?

71A: A normal deployment can range anywhere from three weeks on up to -- my longest deployment has been 48 days, 49 days.

72Q: On the 14th of April, could you tell me how your weapons team was organized, not by name, but just how you had them organized? What duties were they assigned to do?

72A: Uh, yes I had a controller responsible for the enroute position, which provide flight follow for the fighters coming in and going away from the area of responsibility. Another controller was responsible for air refueling and the third controller was responsible for the AOR, area of responsibility, northern Iraq, No-Fly-Zone.

73Q: Who's responsible for tracking fighter aircraft that are tasked according to the Air Tasking Order in the No-Fly-Zone?

73A: That would be the AOR controller.

74Q: Who's responsible for tracking ATO tasked helicopters in the No-Fly-Zone?

74A: Once they're ID'd, it would be the responsibility of the AOR controller.

75Q: Who is responsible for tracking helicopters outside of the No-Fly-Zone, that may come up on your frequency?

75A: Most of the time they would check up with us on the check-in frequency. So, the person that would be talking to them would be the in or out controller. And therefore, he'd probably be the one to check them up, or to tag them up, since he was the one talking to them.

**CONTROL WITNESS #11**

**Questions by Major General Andrus:**

76Q: Excuse me, for point of clarification on the previous question you said that once the track has been identified that, that would be the AOR controller before ----

76A: ---- That, sir, that was with a helicopter in the AOR.

77Q: Before the helicopter was identified in the AOR whose responsibility would that be?

77A: It would be the surveillance, there would be a combination surveillance/weapons function to tag up unknowns. And then, surveillance is responsible for -- they have their area of responsibility where they tag up their unknowns and also they track all the unknowns. Once it was ID'd as a fighter or a friendly aircraft that was on the ATO, weapons would take over tracking.

78Q: You say, surveillance has their area. Do you know what their area is?

78A: Yes, their area of responsibility includes Iraq. Basically everything except for Turkey, but I don't know how they divide up to -- how they have people to ----

79Q: ---- Your understanding is then that anything south of the Turkish border in the No-Fly-Zone, or even south of the 36 parallel that, that would all be the responsibility of the surveillance section until they had identified it. Did I understand correctly?

79A: That's correct, yeah.

**Questions by Major Byas:**

80Q: Were you at your position on the 14th of April between the hours of 0630 and 0735 Zulu?

80A: Yes, I was.

**MAJOR GENERAL ANDRUS:** Could we take a quick break in the proceedings.

**[The interview recessed at 1158 hours, 21 April 1994]**

**[The interview reconvened at 1159 hours, 21 April 1994]**

**COLONEL WILCOX:** The time is 1159, 21 April, and we have the same parties.

**QUESTIONS BY MAJOR GENERAL ANDRUS:**

81Q: Let me ask you some additional questions for -- regarding general procedures and activities that, according to your understanding were in effect or would have been in effect on the

**CONTROL WITNESS #11**



day or prior to the incident itself. In order to assist us in filling in some of the general information. First of all does AWACS receive any flight plan information on helicopter traffic?  
81A: No, we do not.

82Q: We've already talked about who is responsible for identifying helicopter traffic in the AOR. If I understand correctly you indicated that, that would be the responsibility of the surveillance section or the weapons section. Which was that again?

82A: That would be the surveillance section since it would be an unknown.

83Q: Once the helicopter traffic has been identified as friendly and the appropriate symbology placed, who then would have the responsibility for tracking and monitoring that helicopter traffic in the AOR?

83A: The weapons team would then continue to monitor them.

84Q: Do you know if there are any procedures that would require AWACS to check the helicopters Mode IV, Mode I, et cetera, either before entering the AOR or during the AOR?

84A: As a practice we check their Modes when they come up with us, when they initially check up with us and that's our primary means of IDing them. That's how we know that they are a helicopter.

85Q: So, in practice you do it, but you don't know if there's anything required?

85A: I don't know if there's a requirement, but we do it all the time anyway.

86Q: What is the procedure that would be followed if a previously identified track, friendly check, friendly helicopter in the AOR would be lost on radar and therefore the identification lost? What would -- what's the normal procedure, what would you do in a situation like that, the track disappears?

86A: Okay, you're saying the radar or the IFF disappears?

87Q: Both, you lose all contact with that track?

87A: That would be -- situation dependent. Normally, what would happen is a certain section would ask, or surveillance would probably ask us if we were still tracking them. At that point, the controller would probably see if he could reach him, and if he couldn't then the track would be dropped.

88Q: Weapons was tracking that friendly aircraft, monitoring that friendly aircraft, would you normally expect surveillance to determine that it had been lost first or would that normally be weapons, a weapons controller that would discover that the track had been lost?

88A: It can be either one, but if weapons saw that it was no longer on either radar or IFF, they would try to reach them and then if they couldn't -- if they couldn't get a good position from them, they would just drop it.

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89Q: And by just dropping it, what would you be assuming?

89A: A lot of times they assume that either it landed or it's gone, you know, so far so low that we can't see it. And that's also a radio limitation too.

90Q: In the event that, that happened, the track has been tagged, it has its symbology, you're monitoring the track and then the track disappears. You attempt radio contact. You assume that it has landed, cut off its engine whatever, then later on the track reappears, would that track normally have the normal symbology attached to it still, or would it appear as a new contact?

90A: Okay, if it appeared again -- if it wasn't squawking the proper codes or if we didn't get the proper codes from that piece of -- piece of dot, then there's no way that we can figure out who it was for sure.

91Q: Then what procedure would you go through?

91A: We would interrogate it, try to get SIF or IFF from it. If we still didn't get any IFF, you know, if we suspected it to be a certain dot, we could call that certain call sign and try to reach it. But, otherwise there's no way we can ID it.

92Q: Or you would attempt to re-identify it, is what you're saying?

92A: Yes.

93Q: Are you aware of any written guidance regarding the specific responsibility of each AWACS crew position such as surveillance, weapons en route, weapons -- AOR controllers, so forth.

93A: Within our training, we have, what we would call, basically standards and they outline what each position entails and that holds for exercises such as red flags and green flags and it also holds for deployments and any large composite scale exercise. So, yes there are responsibilities outlined.

#### **Questions by Major General Andrus:**

94Q: Let me ask you some questions on ROE. This pertains to the ROE as it existed on or before the 14th of April and I'm attempting to determine your general understanding, how you understood the ROE to read. And what it required or may not have required. Let me just ask you a few questions. Before exercising the right to use force is, according to your understanding, is there any requirement to give any consideration to identification difficulties?

94A: There aren't any provisions in the Rules of Engagement for that. Rules of Engagement were pretty clear that if it's a hostile then, you know, they were clear on it.

95Q: And before exercising, and after being cleared on, or the right to use force, is there a

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requirement to give consideration, to the need to give defectors safe conduct, according to your understanding of the ROE?

95A: No, they wouldn't be given any.

96Q: Is there a requirement in the ROE to consider the possibility of an aircraft being in distress and the crew being unaware of their position, in other words they're lost?

96A: No.

97Q: Have you ever received briefings on the medical markings on Iraqi military aircraft?

97A: I haven't received any briefings, but yeah I'm familiar with it. I've read notes on it.

98Q: So, you would feel comfortable that you know what the markings on an Iraqi military aircraft would be?

98A: Uh, the first thing, I would not feel comfortable of knowing the markings, but I'm familiar with the procedure that we are to allow them.

99Q: According to your understanding of the ROE is the intercepting pilot required to report his observations to the controller upon intercept?

99A: No, there's no specific requirements for that.

100Q: Is the controller required to instruct the pilot whether the identification procedure is to continue, again, according to your understanding of the ROE? Does the ROE require the controller to instruct the pilot, to continue with the identification process or knock it off or whatever?

100A: Can you rephrase the question.

101Q: Is the controller, according to your understanding of what the ROE would contain, is the controller required to instruct the pilot whether the identification procedure is to continue? Whether he is to continue attempting to identify?

101A: Yeah, I think what I don't understand is the requirement, I mean, yeah there will be times that the controller is required to do that. The controller is the link between the pilot and command and control. And, if for some reason, be it the Duke or the Mad Dog, deems it necessary to continue an ID, then yeah, it would be the controller's responsibility to pass that to the fighters.

102Q: If the controller was not comfortable that this pilot had ID'd the aircraft, would the controller be required to ----

102A: ---- The controller may do that and I may do that, but there's no requirement for him to do that.

103Q: If an airborne object -- if an airborne aircraft is intercepted and it's not identified, is radio contact required in an attempt to establish identification?

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103A: No, there's no requirement for radio contact.

104Q: Is there a requirement for visual signals to be used in an attempt to identify, according again, to your understanding of the ROE?

104A: Visual signals such as?

105Q: The International Civil Aviation Organization standard ICAO visual signals?

105A: In the specific ROE that sticks out in my mind, all that they're looking for is an Iraqi military aircraft in the No-Fly-Zone.

106Q: Again, according to your understanding of the ROE would there ever be a situation, according to the ROE, where the controller could be expected to relay information or relay an order to fire warning shots?

106A: Would there ever be a situation?

107Q: Could the controller ever be expected to relay an order to the intercepting pilot, that the intercepting pilot was to fire warning shots, according to your understanding of the ROE? Does the ROE talk about anything like that?

107A: No.

**Questions by Major Byas:**

108Q: Were you aware of any helicopters operating in the No-Fly-Zone on the 14th of April?

108A: Yes.

109Q: Did you see the symbology on Echo Echo 01, like entering the No-Fly-Zone on the 14th of April, Eagle Flight?

109A: I saw it after it was initiated and it was suspended over -- it was suspended in the northeast corner there.

110Q: And I stated earlier, you were on position ----

110A: ---- Northwest corner it was suspended. I can't recall the base it was suspended at.

**Questions by Major General Andrus:**

111Q: That base is Zakhu?

111A: Zakhu, yeah.

**Questions by Major Byas:**

112Q: Once, as you stated earlier, you were on position between 0630 and 0735, is that correct?

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112A: That's correct.

113Q: Once the helicopter departed Zakhu, did the helicopter check in on any of your control frequencies?

113A: Yes, it sure did. It -- we had talked to it initially before that and then, I guess it would have been after it came out of Zakhu it came up again, without my notes, I can't recollect the time. But, it told us that it was up and that it was proceeding from, without my notes I can't say exactly, but I think it was from Point Whiskey to Point Lima.

114Q: Yes, it was.

114A: And that was the last transmission I remember having with it and that was on the enroute frequency with the enroute controller.

115Q: What communication were you monitoring on the 14th?

115A: At that time, I was listening to the enroute frequency. I was listening to the tanker frequency. I was listening to AOR Have Quick and also listening to the Turkish SATCOM. Then I also had a three mission nets up, the mission maintenance net up and also UHF guard.

116Q: Were your consoles and communication, et cetera all working properly?

116A: To the best of my knowledge.

#### **Questions by Major General Andrus:**

117Q: To clarify a previous question, you said that the Eagle Flight had gone into, I believe you said, Zakhu?

117A: Uh-hum.

118Q: And the identification tag was terminated at that point, or did it continue?

118A: The symbology which is our tag for it, was suspended when it was at Zakhu. When it took off again from Zakhu, I don't recall for sure but it must have been squawking, so, that we were able to ID it again as Eagle Flight.

119Q: So, it still would have had symbology then. After it took off from Zakhu, it would have still had symbology at least at that point, is that correct?

119A: Right, and I don't know whether we ID'd it by the squawks or by it talking to the controller and telling it, it was now leaving Zakhu. But those are the two ways that we would have been able to ID it.

#### **Questions by Major Byas:**

120Q: Once the helicopter departed Zakhu entering gate one into the No-Fly-Zone ----

120A: ---- It would have already gone through the gate if it was at Zakhu.

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121Q: Right, I'm sorry. Now, that he's in the No-Fly-Zone, who has responsibility for tracking once it comes back up and the symbology is on the aircraft?

121A: Weapons would be.

122Q: Are there any internal hand over procedures between the enroute controller and the tactical area of operation controller?

122A: Yes, they usually do it -- there are several ways they can do it. They can do it with the computer, or they can do it over the mission nets.

123Q: Were there any types of hand over on this particular helicopter on that day, or was there a need to have that aircraft handed over?

123A: There wasn't a need for it and I don't remember if one was performed or not. It happened when nothing else was being said on any of the radios, so that most of the controllers were monitoring all the radios to build their situation awareness.

#### **Questions by Major General Andrus:**

124Q: So, who would have been monitoring that track?

124A: The enroute controller would have probably handed them over to the AOR controller. But in this case the helicopter kept talking to the enroute controller on his frequency. My understanding is the helicopters are supposed to be monitoring the AOR clear frequency. And if they were, then they would have been able to talk to the AOR controller, which they should when they're in the AOR.

#### **Questions by Major Byas:**

125Q: Were you monitoring the AOR clear frequency?

125A: No, I was not.

126Q: Who was monitoring the AOR clear frequency?

126A: As a minimum, the AOR controller.

127Q: Do you know of anyone else on the airplane monitoring that frequency?

127A: I can't say for sure. It may have been in a spare weapons frequency or a spare weapons console.

128Q: Are the normal IFF checks completed on helicopters as they are on fighter aircraft? Normal checks being Mode II, Mode IV, et cetera?

128A: Yes.

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129Q: Does that include aircraft inside and outside of the No-Fly-Zone? Aircraft originate inside of the No-Fly-Zone that are friendly. Say, once the aircraft landed at Zakhu, do you go through an additional identification process once he appears on your scope again?

129A: Okay, I think you're asking me several questions there.

130Q: I'm sorry. Let's go back to it and I'll start over.

130A: Yeah, okay.

131Q: And I'll read it to you. Who is responsible for IFF -- Were IFF checks conducted outside of the AOR on the helicopter prior to, specifically Eagle Flight, prior to entering the AOR?

131A: I didn't see it being completed, but it would have had to be completed because it was ID'd prior to reaching the AOR.

132Q: Would that same procedure have taken place inside of the AOR?

132A: I mentioned it earlier, there's two ways we could have ID'd it and one would have been strictly by the IFF and the other would have been by the helicopter itself telling us, "We're now taking off out of Zakhu, headed for such and such point". And the reason that would work, is because we had already ID'd it earlier. So, we knew that this helicopter was at this point.

133Q: Okay, so the ID procedures were carried out on Eagle Flight?

133A: An ID procedure was carried out. It may not necessarily have been with IFF.

134Q: Did the weapons team as a unit, were they -- everyone in the weapons team aware that there were helicopters operating in the No-Fly-Zone?

134A: I can't say for sure. I know the enroute controller was and myself was.

135Q: What about the AOR controller?

135A: I can't say for sure.

136Q: I reviewed the tapes of the mission and as I reviewed the tapes of the mission, once the aircraft departed Zakhu it was around 0700Zulu, and there was a good IFF and radar track on, and symbology on that helicopter up until like 0712Zulu.

136A: Okay.

137Q: So, that was about almost twelve minutes. Were the AOR controller, yourself and the mission crew commander on position at that time?

137A: Yes.

138Q: And being on position in that symbology, being there, is it possible that all three of you individuals saw that track?

138A: It's possible, I know I did.

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139Q: When the General -----

139A: ----- To add to that, we did not have any aircraft under control at the time. The package was still proceeding out towards the area, and as far as the mission crew commander's focus, there's no aircraft in the AOR as far as he's concerned.

140Q: So, are you saying that you have a friendly aircraft in the AOR that you have initiated symbology, are you not responsible for providing control to this aircraft?

140A: Control to the point of -- to what extent. We never provide helicopters ----

140Q: ---- Control to -- I would say advisory.

141A: Advisory control, yes. If there were bad guys, you know, if there were a reason to give it bull's eye calls or bad guy calls, we would do that.

142Q: As you read the Air Tasking Order, do you consider the Air Tasking Order as a directive that assigns you a control responsibility or an advisory responsibility?

142A: Can you rephrase that.

143Q: According to -- On the Air Tasking Order that you use to fly the missions, and that includes helicopters and fighter aircraft. According to your understanding, are these missions assigned to you for control and advisory responsibility?

143A: I would say, yes.

144Q: On your previous flight, you stated that you had sixty, around sixty missions or so in this ----

144A: ---- In this theater ----

145Q: ---- In this theater before. Have you ever noticed any IFF squawks on Iraqi slow moving type heli -- aircraft?

145A: I can't say I have. No, I have not.

146Q: You have not seen any Iraqi aircraft squawking any IFF?

146A: I've had unknown aircraft.

147Q: When you see the unknown, what are you -- what type of data, representation are you receiving on your console?

147A: Usually, we'll initially see a brown dot which symbolizes radar.

148Q: So, you will see a radar indication, but you won't see a green dot which indicates IFF?

148A: I have seen radar dots on aircraft that were deemed unknown.

149Q: Have you seen any green IFF on any unknown Iraqi aircraft ----

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**MAJOR GENERAL ANDRUS:** ---- On either an Iraqi aircraft or an unknown aircraft----.

**MAJOR BYAS:** ---- Correct.

149A: I've never seen a green IFF dot on an Iraqi military aircraft.

150Q: What about an unknown aircraft?

150A: I've seen green dots on aircraft that were deemed unknown.

151Q: Can you recall what was the outcome? Did they turn out to be friendlies or did they turn out to be ----

151A: ---- They turned out to be either UN or friendly.

**Questions by Major General Andrus:**

152Q: Would an Iraqi aircraft have the capability of giving an IFF display?

152A: I don't know, I hope not.

153Q: Is there a common frequency for the AWACS controller, the fighter controller and the helicopter to operate on, other than the enroute?

153A: It's my understanding as I mentioned earlier, that the helicopter control -- the helicopters should be monitoring the AOR clear frequency for any threat calls, which we provide to everybody. The fighters are going to be monitoring the AOR, Have Quick frequency if they can. And if they cannot for some reason, equipment or a bad radio, then they would, of course, be listening on the AOR clear frequency. There could be situations where they would be on the same frequency. There's no specific requirement for them to be on the same frequency.

154Q: But if that frequency, would be the AOR clear frequency?

154A: Yes.

155Q: What are the procedures for, if you lose radar contact -- radio contact with a helicopter? What are the procedures that you use?

155A: A lot of times if we're not pretty sure or not sure that he has landed, then what we'll do, is we'll let the symbology track along his current path. Our symbology has the capability to just keep tracking. We'll call him on the frequency we last talked to him. Depending on what that frequency was, we may try to get him on one of the other frequencies that he should be monitoring. And, if we're not getting any dots on him then I can go to the ASO, tell them that, "Hey we lost contact of an aircraft in this area, can you see if you can adjust the sensors for something like that." And we'll look in that specific area to pick up the radar. See if we can get some kind of hits on it and sometimes that helps, and sometimes it doesn't. And sometimes we can reach it on another frequency, sometimes we can.

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156Q: Is it lost if the helicopter -- contact on helicopters are a normal event, loss of radio and IFF, normally?

156A: Yes, that happens quite a bit.

157Q: Did Eagle Flight on the 14th of April 1994, did they require -- request fighter escort or flight following?

157A: No, they did not.

158Q: Was the loss of radar contact on the helicopter reported to anyone?

158A: I think I recall somebody on the surveillance section saying that -- either asking if they could drop the symbology because it was no longer tracking on radar or something to that effect. Asking if they could drop it, because it would have been our track, and surveillance cannot drop weapons tracks.

159Q: Once they made that statement, what happened?

159A: I think the controller probably would have looked down and saw that, yeah that was correct, it wasn't tracking on radar anymore. I don't know what his assumptions would have been. Maybe that it had landed and then dropped the symbology.

160Q: So, the symbology was dropped?

160A: Yes, and there's no way we can track an aircraft if we don't have dots on it.

161Q: Is it standard procedure to notify fighter aircraft of friendly helicopter activity in the No-Fly-Zone upon the fighter aircraft entering the No-Fly-Zone? Is it standard procedure for you to make them aware of any helicopter activity in that area?

161A: Can you ask that again. Is it standard procedure.

162Q: Is it standard procedure to notify fighter aircraft of friendly helicopters in the No-Fly-Zone?

162A: I wouldn't say it was standard procedure, but I would say it's usually done, especially if it's in an area where the aircraft are -- or the aircraft are working -- If -- It is standard procedure to call off friendlies, especially to the F15s because they're in charge of CAP.

#### **Questions by Major General Andrus:**

163Q: Let me ask you a question, going back to a previous question for clarification. You indicated that you thought that you heard a transmission from the surveillance section requesting permission to terminate symbology on a track; is that correct?

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163A: You're right.

164Q: Is it possible for the symbology to be terminated without a switch action, that is, to be terminated by some means external to the AWACS? Either by the helicopter going behind the ridge line and losing all contact or shutting down engines, so there's no electrical power or by any other means.

164A: Not for the symbology, the only way symbology can disappear from our display, is if the symbology was sent to us via the link, the JTIDS. Then if it was dropped then we may lose it. If we didn't initially -- if the symbology was external to the AWACS and we were receiving it only through link.

165Q: So, in order for this symbology to disappear from the scope, it would, if I understand what you're saying, it would have required either an action by one of the AWACS controllers----

165A: ---- Uh-hum ----

166Q: ---- Or an interruption in the JTIDS link, is that correct?

166A: Yes.

167Q: But it could have happened either way, is that correct?

167A: No, not on this day because it was initiated by us. So, the only way it could have disappeared was if somebody on our crew dropped it.

168Q: Do you know which position initiated that action to terminate the ----

168A: ---- To drop it ----

169Q: ---- To drop the symbology?

169A: I can't remember exactly, but it may have been myself.

170Q: Would it have been in the weapons section?

170A: Yes.

171Q: So, it would have been someone on the weapons section. Would it have been the enroute controller, normally?

171A: I can say normally, but I don't know on this day.

172Q: But, you don't remember then which one of you in the weapons section dropped the symbology?

172A: No, it could have been myself.

#### **QUESTION BY MAJOR BYAS:**

173Q: Who is responsible for tracking aircraft, unknown aircraft south of the 36 parallel?

173A: Tracking?

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174Q: Yes, initiating and tracking south of the 36 parallel?

174A: That would be surveillance.

175Q: Who is responsible for tracking north of the 36 parallel inside the No-Fly-Zone?

175A: Tracking of, it would depend on the type of aircraft. Weapons tracks Zone Fighters. Surveillance tracks, they track unknown and hostile aircraft to the point where we commit on it. Once we commit on an unknown or hostile then we'll track it or it will be a joint tracking then. As an example, if a track was south of the 36 line unknown, it would have been tracked by surveillance. As it crosses the line, surveillance would continue to track it. And then, if we committed a fighter against it, then it would be a joint responsibility to track the unknown. Weapons would be responsible for tracking the fighter.

**Questions by Major General Andrus:**

176Q: If the unknown track popped up inside the AOR, north of the 36 parallel, so you did not have that previous trail, whose responsibility would it be at that point to observe, detect the track and then ----

176A: ---- To initiate, it would be the responsibility of the entire crew. I mean, everyone is responsible for hitting up unknowns. Whether it's their area of responsibility or not. As far as tracking, it would be the AST assigned that area. Weapons would -- Weapons having the better SA in the area of responsibility, would probably be the group that initiated the symbology.

177Q: But is any one group assigned the responsibility of doing that, as being the primary responsible agency for doing that inside the AOR?

177A: It would be surveillance.

178Q: So, surveillance would have that also as a primary responsibility?

178A: Uh-hum.

**Questions by Major Byas:**

179Q: Are dead reckoning procedures taught during any phases of your training? Are you aware how to dead reckon and what the terminology is?

179A: Uh-hum. I know that -- I know how to dead reckon and I think in initial manual controllers school, there's a portion where it may not be exactly dead reckoning, but it's time and distance.

180Q: Can you basically estimate the flight class of an aircraft you do not have?

180A: No, we do not have a class.

181Q: So, whenever you lose an aircraft, you do not zero out his symbology where you last lost that contact and try to estimate where he would be heading to?

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181A: Okay, zero out -- if we zeroed out the symbology it wouldn't move.

182Q: It would stay right there?

182A: Yeah, it would be suspending it. Like when we suspend it when they land. If we just flip the symbology track then it would track at whatever last information it had until it started jumping on other things, because of the way the computer's designed. It would jump on whatever, if -- radar it had. Thinking that, that was it.

183Q: Was the symbology on the helicopter, the Eagle Flight? Was it the proper symbology? Was it a helicopter symbology?

183A: Yes, it was.

184Q: And you were aware of a helicopter being enroute from Whiskey to Lima, is that correct?

184A: Yes.

185Q: So, being aware a helicopter enroute from Whiskey to Lima at 0712 when lost contact on that particular aircraft occurred, was there any doubt in your mind or your crews mind that this aircraft had landed, or was he still in flight?

185A: So, you're asking if we thought he had landed or if we thought that he was still flying?

186Q: Right.

186A: I don't know what the other crew was thinking, the rest of the group is thinking.

187Q: What about yourself?

187A: Myself, I had thought he had landed.

#### **Questions by Major General Andrus:**

188Q: Do the helicopters routinely land without calling you and advising you that they were landing?

188A: There's not any real routine. Yes, they do do that. I would say the majority of them do land and take off without telling us.

189Q: So, it would not have been unusual for the helicopters to have either landed or have taken off without making contact with AWACS?

189A: Right it would not be unusual.

190Q: What was the IFF Codes and modes required for the helicopter outside the AOR, specifically the No-Fly-Zone?

190A: You asked first outside the AOR?

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191Q: Outside of the No-Fly-Zone, what are his modes and codes required?

191A: He's squawking Mode I of , can I say?

192Q: To make it easy, is it the same as inside the AOR? Is it Mode I, the helicopter is required to squawk the same outside of the AOR as it is on the inside of the No-Fly-Zone? Once the helicopter enters ----

192A: ---- Yeah, I know what -- he's supposed to be squawking for Mode I outside the AOR. I can't remember if it's supposed to be different for inside or not.

193Q: Do you recall the Mode I of the Eagle Flight on the 14th of April?

193A: Outside the AOR?

194Q: Outside the AOR?

194A: Yes, it was either 42 or 43.

195Q: Min Comm. Could you explain Minimal Comm procedures? I notice that in your training. It's part of your weapons training. Could you explain?

195A: Contrary to how we work in most theaters, in this theater we work more towards minimal communication. What that means to my controllers is that the fighters don't want to hear a lot of chatter on the radios. What they want to hear are things that are relevant to them. Most important and always the highest priority would be threat calls. Not excluded from conversation would be vector calls. What they don't want to hear is a lot of vectoring unless they ask for it. They don't want to hear vectors to their tankers. They don't want to hear a lot of vectors to their friendly aircraft, you know. It's pretty much a big boy principle, you know. Give them a call if it looks like they don't know it, and one call is more than sufficient. If they want the information they'll ask it from you.

196Q: What IFF Modes and Codes have -- are checked during the IFF checkout by the enroute controller?

196A: Okay, we would check Mode IV and let them know if it was sweet or sour and also we would check Mode II and that's because that's what the ATO and the frag gives us and that's how we ID them. Then in the process we would -- all the other Codes would be checked, I and also III.

197Q: What about Mode IV?

197A: I mentioned that one first , I think.

198Q: What if an aircraft has an invalid Mode IV, is that aircraft made aware of that?

198A: Oh, yes. They're not made aware if they have a valid one; they're just made aware if it's an invalid one. That's a procedure that goes along with the MIN COMM.

199Q: As a standard procedure, you check all aircraft IFF, either Mode I, IV or II?

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199A: The way the enroute controller had it set up, he has corridors set up so that aircraft coming from the base fly through this corridor, and the whole time that they're in that corridor, certain codes will be identified and that's how we ID them.

200Q: Those codes are?

200A: As a minimum, he would have a Mode II corridor because, like I said, that's what the ATO publishes. That's what we have, and he would put the symbology on them, and then he would do the Mode IV checks.

201Q: Is that done as a group or is that done individually?

201A: That's done at that individual position.

202Q: On the 14th of April recalling the F15s, were you aware of the F15s once they entered the Tiger Flight, once they entered the No-Fly-Zone?

202A: Was I aware of when they entered it?

203Q: Yes, when they entered the No-Fly-Zone, when they hit gate one?

203A: Yes, that would be true, because they were the first fighters.

204Q: Did you hear the F15s check in on the AOR Have Quick frequency?

204A: Yes, I heard it, but I couldn't tell you what they said.

205Q: Would -- Once the F15s entered the AOR, were they notified of any helicopter activity in the No-Fly-Zone, on that day?

205A: I don't remember.

206Q: Do you recall hearing an engagement call or a contact call by the F15s ----

206A: ---- Yes I heard both. ----

207Q: ---- Upon entering?

207A: Oh, upon entering or at what point?

208Q: What was the first call you heard from the F15?

208A: The first call I heard that I remember is a contact call. He called a contact.

209Q: Do you recall the range?

209A: No, I don't recall the range. They called a contact and then at that point I looked over and I didn't see anything. Then I heard the controller say, he said, clear, I think.

#### **Questions by Major General Andrus:**

210Q: What would he have meant by the word, clear?

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210A: That he didn't have any contacts.

**Questions by Major Byas:**

211Q: Could you estimate about what time was that?

211A: Um, 7:27 maybe.

212Q: Prior to 7:27, were there any calls made?

212A: By?

213Q: By the F15s other than contact. At 7:27, you're stating that ----

213A: ---- Well I can't say for sure. I don't have my notes.

214Q: All right ----.

214A: ---- In fact, no. I didn't hear anything significant from them before that.

215Q: Do you recall the range on the very first contact when he said clear? Do you recall the range the F15 said contact at, you know, 1504, how far?

215A: I -- No, I do not remember.

216Q: What was the next transmission that you heard from the F15? I'm quite sure that once you heard that he was engaged, I mean contact, what was the next call, engaged?

216A: No, I heard several things before he said engaged, but I don't remember what he said immediately after contact. I remember him saying -- I think I have it written in my notes.

217Q: What happened after the controller said clear, is there anything that you can recall, picture clear?

217A: Said by the Eagles -- by the F15s or by the controllers?

218Q: The first fighters, the F15s if you can recall?

218A: I can't remember exactly. He probably said something to the effect of calling the contacts again. Because I remember the controller coming back with hits there.

219Q: What type of -- Did you see the hits there? Did you concur with his calls as hits there?

219A: Remember putting up symbology there and where the fighter had called his hits, where you call the contacts. I don't remember if I saw dots when I threw it up.

**Questions by Major General Andrus:**

220Q: Do you remember what kind of symbology you put up?

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220A: Unknown. It would have been either unknown or unknown assumed hostile, or default symbology. It was probably the default symbology since I slapped it up real quick.

221Q: What might it have been based on? What color dot was on the radar scope?

221A: All our radar dots are brown.

222Q: What is the color of an IFF dot?

222A: Green.

223Q: If you would have seen a green dot, would that -- what significance would that have had to you?

223A: One green dot wouldn't have meant anything to me.

224Q: If you would have seen six sweeps with green dots, what would that significance have been?

224A: That would have told me that it was squawking.

225Q: And if you would have then seen a green dot, which would have told you it was squawking, what kind of symbology would you put on the scope?

225A: I would still put unknown symbology.

226Q: You would put unknown symbology?

226A: Unless I had positive Modes if -- that told me otherwise or a good Mode IV, a variation.

227Q: Previously you had indicated that to the best of your knowledge if it was a green dot?

227A: Uh-hum.

228Q: That it would not be an Iraqi military aircraft; is that correct?

228A: Okay, you've got a double negative there.

229Q: I'm sorry, let's go back. You indicated that a brown dot would be a radar return?

229A: Yes.

230Q: No, IFF.

230A: We can get both, we can get a brown and a green.

231Q: But just a brown dot would have been a radar return, no IFF?

231A: Just a radar return.

232Q: A green dot, would you explain what that would mean again?

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232A: A green dot would mean that there was some kind of code being transmitted. Whether it be Mode Charlie which is altitude, or I, II, III or IV.

233Q: And would you think that, that green dot would have been a possibility of not being an Iraqi military aircraft?

233A: Yeah, I would agree with that. If I had several green dots, it would be hard to think it was an Iraqi helicopter.

234Q: If you had several green, if you observed several green dots on a scope in the location of where a fighter was calling a contact, what would your normal course of actions be? What would you normally do or what should your controller do?

234A: Well, normal and what the controller should do, go through the process of trying to ID it. By virtue of having green dots, you know, that tells us that, you know, it's putting out some codes. So, we would just try to interrogate the codes at that time.

235Q: If the F15 pilot indicated that he was going to engage a contact, that you or your AOR controller saw to be a green dot, what guidance would you give or would you give any guidance at that point to the F15 pilot? And, if so, what guidance would that be?

235A: If we were confident that we had several -- If we were confident that it was squawking. Modes and codes that were friendly, in that situation I would have him skip it.

236Q: If you were not confident that it was for sure an Iraqi military aircraft, what would you have them do?

236A: I'm sure that we wouldn't have them do anything. They would go through their process of IDing it.

237Q: But what I'm getting at, if you have the green dot indicating that it is squawking something, would that be sufficient information for -- to cause doubt in your mind or in your controller's mind that it could be friendly. I'm sorry, doubt in your mind, that it may not be an Iraqi aircraft?

237A: Personally, one dot, probably not. Especially if the helicopters were close by.

238Q: Four dots, six dots?

238A: If I saw that many dots, probably there would be doubt.

239Q: And if there was doubt what action would you take?

239A: If I was controlling, I would probably attempt to let the fighters know that I was receiving doubts.

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**Questions by Major Byas:**

240Q: From what I understand, you initiated the symbology, did you have enough time to -- did the computer -- from the time you initiated the unknown -- what type of symbology was it? Was it unknown enemy general, was it unknown pending general? Which type of symbology was it?  
240A: It was probably the default symbology, which would have been pending.

241Q: From the time that you initiated that track to the actual splash of the helicopter, about how much time elapsed?

241A: Right around two minutes.

242Q: What was the communication that occurred from the time that you initiated the pending track, what calls did your weapons controller make to the fighter?

242A: Okay, I would have initiated it after the fighter called contact, because that would have been my first indication. I looked over there and all I saw were the fighter's symbology, you know, I threw up some symbology hoping to get something. After the contact I remember hearing some stuff. The controller came back with, "Hits there." Somewhere along the line, the fighters went from IDing, one Hip to two Hips, no, one Hip and then a Hind and then two Hinds, then engaged. I can't recall if the controller said anything, you know, after that. I'm pretty sure he didn't.

243Q: Did you say anything?

243A: Did I? No.

244Q: Did anyone on the airplane say anything?

244A: On the radio or -- definitely nobody said anything on the radio. I think I may have said something to ----

245Q: ---- On the internal net?

245A: I don't recall saying anything on the internal net. I probably did turn to the MCC if he didn't already -- I think he already knew but, you know, I turned to him.

**Questions by Major General Andrus:**

246Q: Did you take control of the situation from the AOR controller? Did I understand you say----

246A: ---- No, I did not.

247Q: You say that you -- I thought you said you took control or that would have been me, what did you mean by that?

247A: I'm not sure why I said that.

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248Q: Well, you had indicated that the F15s made the call. That they had the contact, the controller said, "I have a hit there." The F15 said, I have one Hip, I have one Hind, I have two Hinds, engaged. I thought you had indicated that you took some action of some sort at that point?

248A: No, I didn't.

#### **QUESTIONS BY MAJOR BYAS:**

249Q: Prior to the shootdown, do you recall any confirmation by your weapons director as to the ID of the two aircraft that they -- F15s had ID'd?

249A: Confirmed as far as ----

250Q: ---- As hostile?

250A: No, the controller didn't confirm that.

251Q: Is it your understanding that silence is -- means that you agree? What is your normal expectation if a fighter passed you that information and there was no reply?

251A: What do I expect?

252Q: Yes.

252A: From them or from myself?

253Q: From the fighter.

253A: I expect that either through a EID or a VID, electronic means, visual means that he has confirmation.

254Q: Was the Duke on position at the time of the mishap?

254A: Yeah, he was next to me.

255Q: He was sitting next to you?

255A: Um-hum.

256Q: Is the Duke aware of the operations of the AWACS consoles?

256A: I remember asking the Duke if he had flown with us before, if he had flown on an AWACS before, and he said, "yes" and if you need some help, he was comfortable.

257Q: Could he determine a radar return from an IFF return?

257A: Oh, yes.

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258Q: And he was aware of the Eagle Flight engaging the fighters, I mean, engaging the helicopters?

258A: The flight of -- F15s engaging the helicopters?

259Q: That is correct?

259A: I can't say for sure that he knew that. He was on headset, and he had that radio access.

260Q: And he was -- Did he have his own console?

260A: Yes, he does.

261Q: Was he facing his console?

261A: Yeah.

#### **QUESTIONS BY MAJOR GENERAL ANDRUS:**

262Q: At the time of the engagement was the AOR controller the individual in charge, inside the AWACS, was he the individual in charge and responsible for controlling the F15s?

262A: Yes, he was.

263Q: Was anyone supervising him or providing any additional instructions to him?

263A: No.

264Q: Was anyone looking over his shoulder, for instance, to observe that he was doing it properly?

264A: No, he's a mission ready controller, and I'm also on scope.

265Q: Okay, so you were observing the same things on scope that he was?

265A: Everyone who has a console can.

266Q: But would you have been -- Had you observed him doing something incorrectly, would that have fallen to you to correct him or would that have fallen to the Duke or who -- what is the chain?

266A: His supervisor is me. I'm listening to him and watching what goes on the scope and then behind me is the MCC.

#### **Questions by Major Byas:**

267Q: Was the MCC, the mission crew commander, was he on duty?

267A: Yes, he was.

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268Q: Was he watching the air picture?

268A: Yes, he was.

269Q: Did he have his headset on?

269A: Yes.

270Q: Under what circumstances do you normally turn on your video camera?

270A: This the first time we worked with the video camera, so it was under my impression that whenever -- at first I thought we had it on all the time, but I guess we didn't. We had the Staff WD on there to work the camera, and we would turn it on for any significant happenings. We had a ASO that had flown several times already in the theater, and usually the camera was where she could reach it, and she would be the one that turned it on.

271Q: What was the role of Control Witness #12 -- not Control Witness #12, but Control Witness #12 and this mission? You said he was Staff WD, what is his role on the mission?

271A: This being our first flight in the theater, he was available for any questions we might have.

272Q: So, he is just there for -- to answer any questions that you may have?

272A: Um-hum, just to -- he would have probably sat the seat as a controller just to get credit for the mission, because he's also a qualified controller. He's an instructor weapons controller.

273Q: Between the hours of 0630 and 0735 was he on position at anytime?

273A: I think from 7 to 7:30 he wasn't.

274Q: So, from 7 to 7:30 he was somewhere on the airplane?

274A: Yes, he was in -- at the back of the airplane.

275Q: In the back of the airplane. So, did he, in fact, not see the engagement?

275A: He did not see the engagement as it happened.

#### **Questions by Major General Andrus:**

276Q: Did he see it later on video?

276A: I don't know.

#### **Questions by Major Byas:**

277Q: The video camera was turned on once and recorded part of the engagement. Then there was a second time that it came on. Do you know the circumstances surrounding the second time which resulted in a tape over?

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277A: Okay, I have my notes, and it talks about it in my notes. Initially the tape was turned on and that's because we're observing some special missions. Then the tape was turned off, and then for the engagement the tape was turned back on. It would have been right around 7:27; 7:28, the tape was turned on. It was allowed to tape through to well after the engagement.

When Control Witness #12 came back from the back of the airplane, he wanted to rewind the tape prior to the engagement, so that we could review what had happened during the engagement. At that time, we had a track of interest just south of 36 line, and I asked that the recording be turned on, and for some reason the tape just started recording. Because of where the tape was it just started recording over part of the engagement there.

**Questions by Major General Andrus:**

278Q: Was that a switch error in turning the camera on? Did he just throw the wrong switch in other words?

278A: It probably just wasn't rewound or it was rewound too far or fast forwarded too far or something.

279Q: Was it Control Witness #12 that did that switch action?

279A: Yes, he was working the camera at the time.

280Q: In your mind would there have been any possibility that he would have done that intentionally?

280A: No.

**Questions by Major Byas:**

281Q: Do you recall prior to the engagement if the F15s confirmed friendlies in the area?

281A: Prior to that time did the F15s ever call friendlies in the area?

282Q: Just prior to the engagement or at anytime, once the aircraft, once that Tiger Flight entered the No-Fly-Zone, do you recall at anytime that they asked information about friendlies in the area?

282A: No, I don't recall.

**Questions by Major General Andrus:**

283Q: Back to the tape question, did you realize inflight, did anybody realize inflight that the video had -- that a portion of the tape had been taped over?

283A: Yeah, after he stopped the tape, because of the track of interest below 36 was no longer a player, I said go ahead and stop the tape. At that point, I think he went ahead and hit play and

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was seeing the thing and he probably could tell that it was right after the engagement. So, knowing that, he thought he had recorded over part of the engagement, and he was correct.

284Q: Did Control Witness #12 or someone else subsequently direct you and members of the crew to take notes in order to record for sure what happened?

284A: I don't know when it was, but yeah, someone did. If I remember, it was the MCC or the -- maybe it was the staff MCC.

#### **Questions by Major Byas:**

285Q: Can you recall if you were monitoring the history on IFF, on your selective identification, or did you just have presents and history on IFF?

285A: I can't recall for sure because I use both. The reason being, that a lot of time history IFF is real jittery. It does not correlate real well. At times, I do leave it on because if we're not getting good radar, there'll be incidence where we don't get radar but we do get IFF.

286Q: Were there any distractions that may have distracted the weapons team just prior to the engagement or during the engagement? Were there anything going on in the airplane that may have distracted you from performing your duties?

286A: Not that I recall.

287Q: I reviewed the tape and as I reviewed the tape from 0723 up until about 0728 there was intermittent, continuous intermittent IFF. There was never a radar hit during that particular time. There was always a continuous intermittent, it would come, it would be there for a while. As I reviewed the tape of the mission, I was able to detect each time that I took a request SIF, I would get a Mode I back of 42 on that IFF hit during that time, from 0723 to 0728. My question is, at 0723 which is just prior to your -- that was about four minutes that went by of intermittent IFF contact on this target, and there was no symbology or means to start the identification process on it.

What was going on at that time to cause, from what I understand, based upon what you just told me, that the mission crew commander is looking at this situation. That Duke is looking at the situation, you're looking at this situation and the AOR controller is looking at the situation. And none of these four individuals were able to see this continuous intermittent IFF coming and going and sometimes staying for maybe a sweep or two then going away for a whole four -- basically, it lasted from 0727 -- 0723 up until 0728. And at that point, I couldn't determine which target was which because the F15s were -- the lawyer's telling me I'm talking too much. My question is basically, what was going on during that time? Why was there not a track on that aircraft until 0727?

287A: I don't know.

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288Q: There was a call made back to Mad Dog that you had no -- you had --located Eagle Flight. It was in the log book that you had IFF contact on Eagle Flight? Were you aware of that transmission back to Mad Dog?

288A: This was ----

289Q: ---- This was after the incident, probably about an hour or so.

289A: Yeah, they were asking us where Eagle Flight was and the contact was at the border between Turkey and Iraq. We were able to pretty safely say that it was a helicopter and it was squawking the correct Mode I for helicopters. And I think, the squawk that was in the correct Mode III block, no -- either Mode III or Mode II block for helicopters. So, we thought that it was Eagle.

290Q: So, you assumed that it was Eagle but ----

290A: ---- But also, all the friendly helicopters working there use the Eagle call sign. So, it may have been -- it probably was Eagle something else, I think Eagle three or Eagle five or something.

291Q: About after the mishap had occurred, about how long was it before you realized that -- that the crew realized that there may have been a friendly that was inadvertently shot down. Did you know before you landed?

291A: Yes, we did.

292Q: And how did you know?

292A: We heard it relayed from the search and rescue SATCOM.

**MAJOR BYAS:** I think the other questions I have, have already been asked. Do you have any questions.

#### **Questions by Major General Andrus:**

293Q: I have one. At 0742, the AWACS said quote, "Tiger just shot down two Hind helicopters," then gave the coordinates and it says "Checking hard copy and video." What would the comment checking hard copy and video have meant, what does that mean do you know?

293A: Just to make sure that we have it.

294Q: So, you were just confirming that you, in fact, had the hard copy, and that you were not reviewing it?

294A: No.

295Q: At 0847, there was a question that said, "How did we get ID, visual ID and AWACS ID". Was AWACS tracking prior to engagement? Do you know who was asking that question?

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295A: Who asked that. No, I don't know. I think that came over the SATCOM, though. So, it's probably, either relayed through AWACS or from Mad Dog.

**Questions by Colonel Wilcox:**

296Q: How are aircraft assigned or controlled?

296A: You mean computer wise or ----

297Q: ---- I guess what I mean, is I was reading through some of the literature. I'm an attorney, so I don't know much about what ya'll do and I noticed that it talks about controlling all air -- all assigned aircraft and weapons systems. I was wondering what the words, assigned aircraft mean? How are aircraft assigned to the AWACS for control?

297A: Through the ATO.

298Q: There was a Control Witness #12 on board?

298A: Yes.

299Q: That's Control Witness #12, do you know.

299A: Control Witness #12.

300Q: Can you tell me what his duties were on the flight?

300A: He was the staff weapons controller.

301Q: What are the duties of the staff weapons controller?

301A: He was there for the questions. To help us out if we needed any help. He's not an actual part of the crew, but he can serve in the capacity of a weapons controller.

302Q: Does he have any affirmative duties or is he there only to respond to a request for assistance?

302A: Only there for requested assistance. He has no assigned duties.

**Questions by Major General Andrus:**

303Q: Is he acting as an instructor in any capacity?

303A: No, he isn't. There wasn't a need for us to have any instructors.

**Questions by Colonel Wilcox:**

304Q: Did the Duke follow the engagement?

304A: To the best of my knowledge.

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305Q: What is your knowledge based on -- Why do you think he followed the engagement?

305A: I'm not sure what he's listening to. I know that he's physically in his seat. He's physically in front of his console and physically awake. He has access to all the radios he would have needed.

306Q: So, it's possible that he could have followed the engagement, or he could have been looking at something else on the scope and listening to another net?

306A: That's true, his attention could have been somewhere else.

307Q: Did you discuss the incident with him after the engagement took place?

307A: I don't recall.

308Q: Did you discuss the incident with the mission, is it mission control commander?

308A: Mission crew commander. Not in any great detail.

309Q: What did ya'll talk -- What was the level of detail that you discuss the mission -- the engagement?

309A: Just, hey what did you hear on the radio, you know. What happened and yeah that's what I heard.

310Q: What did he indicate that he heard?

310A: Right after it happened he went over the net, told the mission crew that we just shot down two helicopters.

311Q: These particular F15s were the first ones to come into the AOR as I recall?

311A: Yes, they were.

312Q: Is there a procedure whereby the AWACS tells them what they know about the AOR, when the F15s first enter?

312A: Yeah, picture call.

313Q: Who's responsible for that?

313A: The AOR controller.

314Q: Do you know what that picture call was?

314A: No.

315Q: I'd like you if you would please just to walk me through the series of radio calls that happened, starting with when the F15 called out a contact. Would you tell me what you recall about that?

315A: Okay, I have better details in my notes, but it's my best recollection as I stated earlier, helicop -- F15s called contact.

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316Q: Did you do anything when you heard that call?

316A: Oh yeah.

317Q: What did you do?

317A: I expanded up on that area. I slapped up the symbology.

318Q: When you say you, you expanded up on that area, what does that mean?

318A: We have different expansions on our consoles, so that what we see on our scope, we can see the whole world or we can see a small country or a small part of that country or even a smaller part of that. I expanded up so that I saw ----

319Q: ---- So, it has to do with the scale of the map that you're looking at?

319A: That's exactly it, the scale.

320Q: So when you say ----

320A: ---- So, I scaled up on it.

321Q: So, you could see a smaller area in greater detail?

321A: Yes.

322Q: Then what did you do?

322Q: Put up the symbology. Pulled up a track TD and attempted to see what Modes and Codes the track was squawking.

323Q: What is a track TD?

323A: It's a tabulator display that we have that tells us things about a track. For instance, in order for us to get information such as heading, altitude, speed, Mode II, Mode III and the type of initiation, the type of track that's on it, we have to have a tabulator display. And for each track we can take a switch action and pull up a tabulator display, and that's what I did. I put a track up on where the contact was called, and then I pulled up a tabulator display.

324Q: Okay, then what happened?

324A: Some things were said on the radio. I don't recall exactly.

325Q: When you say, things were said, you mean things that are unrelated to the engagement, other activity on the air?

325A: Not necessarily, no. I'm just focusing on the AOR frequency now, the AOR, Have Quick. The fighters said something. The controller came back with "Hits there."

326Q: What did you do then?

326A: What did I do then?

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327Q: Yes.

327A: I listened.

328Q: How long was it between the time the fighters called out the first contact and you heard the AOR controller say "Hits there?"

328A: Seconds, maybe twenty seconds, a very short time.

329Q: When the AOR controller said, "Hits there", did you look back down on your scope or were you watching your scope, the whole time this happened?

329A: Yeah, I was watching my scope. I'm trying to think where else would I be looking then.

330Q: I don't know.

330A: Yeah.

331Q: What happened then?

331A: After he said, "Hits there?"

332Q: Yes.

332A: I think the helicop -- the F15s may have said something -- he may have said something. Then, F-15s[sic] went into one Hip, and then they called Hinds, and then they said two Hinds.

333Q: How long was it between the -- when the AOR controller said, "Hits there," until you heard the F15s call out, "One Hip"?

333A: Seconds.

334Q: Ten, twenty, forty?

334A: Seconds.

335Q: Less than ten?

335A: I don't know.

336Q: And then from Hip to ----

336A: [Question was cut off with another question without finishing the first question]

**MAJ GENERAL ANDRUS:** ---- Can I go back for just a moment while we're in the sequence.

#### **Questions by Major General Andrus:**

337Q: You indicated that the F15s called out contact. You expanded the scope, and assigned symbology?

337A: Not necessarily exactly in that order.

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338Q: Was there any question in your mind at that point that this could have been the Eagle Flight helicopters?

3338: At that point, no.

339Q: So, at that point in your mind were you -- what were you thinking about?

339A: We had unknown contacts.

340Q: That you had unknown contacts?

340A: Experience tells me to be leery, because a lot of times fighters will get contacts that will end up being cars on the highway. They'd be totally irrelevant to us, nothing that we could have picked up anyway. And sometimes vice versa. We'd get contacts that turn out to be cars on the highway that they won't pick up. It just depends on whose radar is looking at it the best way. It's a lot of factors.

341A: So, just to clarify what you're saying, you were leery about whether or not ----

341A: ---- There was something actually there ----

342Q: ---- There even was an airborne contact?

342A: That's true.

343Q: And you said that in your mind, you did not think there was a possibility, and I don't mean to coerce you now, but did you consider that there was a possibility they -- that it could have been the Black Hawk helicopters?

343A: The Black Hawks weren't even a thought.

#### **Questions by Colonel Wilcox:**

344Q: When you say you initiated symbology, is that an attempt by the AWACS aircraft to try and identify another aircraft?

344A: Initiating symbology in itself isn't.

345Q: Was there an attempt along this series of events from where the F15s called contact until they started identifying Hips and Hinds to try and identify ----

345A: ---- Yes, that's when we're interrogating the Modes. As soon as we put up a symbology on it, it automatically interrogates it. So, that if we get -- every time our sweep goes around it will try to pull Codes. And if it does, it will put those Codes in the tabulator display that I had up on my scope.

346Q: So, when you say, you put up symbology and pulled up the tabulator display, that's an attempt to identify the aircraft that's out there?

346A: It's an attempt to pull Codes from it, IFF Codes from it.

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347Q: And that will help you identify whether it's a friendly aircraft or a hostile aircraft?  
347A: Yes.

348Q: And I guess even if there was an aircraft out there?  
348A: Right, because that's a step in the process of identifying it.

349Q: If I have the sequence of events here correctly, they called contact twenty seconds later or thereabouts?  
349A: The times, yeah.

350Q: I understand. I'm not trying to pin you down to a specific time here. And then shortly thereafter they called the -- AOR controller called, "Hits there." The F15 called "Hip, one Hip." That was just seconds later, and then they called "Hinds" and then, "Two Hinds." How long did that sequence of events take?  
350A: Very quick.

351Q: Ten seconds, fifteen seconds.  
351A: Inside of thirty seconds.

352Q: Okay, and how long after that until engaged?  
352A: Very quickly inside of thirty seconds.

353Q: I may have asked you this previously, did you discuss this engagement with the mission crew commander -- mission crew controller, MCC?  
353A: Did I discuss it?

354Q: Yes, discuss the engagement with him, the series of events?  
354A: Did I tell him what happened or ----

355Q: ---- Did the two of you talk about it?  
355A: Yes, we had to, we're -- I'm not sure what you're trying to ask. Yes, we talked about it.

356Q: When did that happen? Would you say, it would have to be part of your duties?  
356A: Yes, to sort out what happened, so that, you know, we could tell Mad Dog.

#### **Questions by Major Byas:**

357Q: One question here so we could get a better understanding of, concerning your radar and your IFF capability to track low level aircraft in mountainous terrain?  
357A: Okay, radar, IFF and also the UHF radios are all line of sight. If you can see an object, then you know you can get radar hits on it. Where we are in our orbit and our altitude, it gives

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us the best picture that we can possibly get. It gives us a lot better picture than say, a ground radar or another aircraft at a lower altitude and our same distance. The region that we're talking about is mountainous, a lot of rivers, a lot of streams. I think the terrain goes up to like eight thousand feet in some areas. Therefore, you have some valleys and stuff. A big problem we have with helicopters is that helicopters like to navigate by the roads and by the rivers and stuff. And therefore, they don't like to fly straight over peaks and stuff. They like to fly in the valleys and the low level areas.

It's not uncommon for us to lose radar, to lose IFF or to lose radios with those helicopters or anybody flying low level for that matter. There's also other limitations to our system. But, basically, you know, line of sight is our biggest limitation. If an aircraft goes into a valley where there's a mountain peak between us and the helicopter, there's no way we're going to be able to see them. There's no way we're going to be able to talk to them. Does that answer your question?

358Q: Yeah. Based upon your experience, is it normal to receive the IFF return first on those low level typed aircraft. Is it normal to receive an IFF from transponders working first, or is it normal to receive the radar paint from past experiences?

358A: From past experiences I would say, radar.

359Q: Even though IFF, that a signal was sent and the radar is more ----

359A: ---- It's still more common for us to pick up the radar first. Once they're tracking, it's not uncommon for us to have IFF and not radar.

360Q: My last question, what procedures do you have written down here at Operation PROVIDE COMFORT concerning your operations with helicopters? How would you control, monitor, or whatever, helicopters? What guidance do you have concerning control of helicopters, verbal or written?

360A: I can't recall. I can recall that there's some mention of helicopters in the information that I looked over after we got here. I can't remember exactly what it said. It wasn't any different than what we usually practice?

361Q: But there is a document or a piece of paper or something?

361A: Yes, and I can't remember if it's an official document or if it's an AWACS technique or lessons learned type thing.

#### **Questions by Colonel Wilcox:**

362Q: You indicated earlier that you'd talk to us without reviewing your notes. Do you want an opportunity now to review those notes?

362A: I really don't need that opportunity now.

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363Q: Do you mind if we review the notes?

363A: I don't know what notes are there, like I said.

**Questions by Major General Andrus:**

364Q: Could we ask you if you would review your notes ----

364A: ---- So, that you could ----

365Q: ---- And then determine if you would allow us to review your notes?

365A: Yes, that would be okay.

**Questions by Colonel Wilcox:**

366Q: Do you have any further information, statements or evidence which you would present?

366A: No.

**COL WILCOX:** You're reminded that this is an official investigation. You're ordered not to divulge the nature of this investigation or the questions, answers or discussions included in this interview with anyone unless authorized to do so by the board president, Major General Andrus, CINCUSAFE, or higher authority. If anyone other than a member of this board should approach you regarding your testimony or the matters discuss there, you must report it immediately. Do you have any questions?

**WITNESS:** Yes, can I get a copy or hear the charge at the beginning.


**COL WILCOX:** Yes. The charge that you refer to is not a charge. A charge is a technical term. The language that I think you're looking for is, you are suspected of the following offense, dereliction of duty. That is, negligently failing -- that is, you are suspected of negligently failing to properly conduct the air battle, negligently failing to control assigned aircraft and weapon systems in the AOR, and negligently failing to supervise all weapons directors, activities, in violation of Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

**WITNESS:** Okay, can I get a copy of that?

**COL WILCOX:** Not at this time. The time is 1339 and the interview is complete.

**CONTROL WITNESS #11**

The above sworn interview statement, given by CONTROL WITNESS #12 of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board was recorded by me by stenomask. Words contained within brackets, [ ], indicate language that has been substituted at the direction of the Board, to avoid the release of classified information which could not be downgraded and/or personal details which would disclose the identity of military members directly involved in the incident. The substituted language accurately conveys the essential meaning of the original language. Except, as so noted, I certify that the foregoing transcript is a true, accurate, and verbatim account of that statement.



THELMA I. HARRIS  
Court Reporter  
Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

**CONTROL WITNESS #11**

V-011

V-012

**TAB V-014A**

V-013

**CONTROL WITNESS 11**

V-013A

V-014

V-014A

**VERBATIM TESTIMONY  
OF  
CONTROL WITNESS #11  
963D AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SQUADRON  
SENIOR DIRECTOR  
(SECOND INTERVIEW)**

**COLONEL AT LEE:** The time is 1509 on the 30th of April 1994. The witness is Control Witness 11 who has previously testified, together with his counsel. Also present in the room are Major General Andrus, Colonel Bennett, Major Lisanti, Lieutenant Colonel Pryor, Lieutenant Colonel Teeters, Colonel Velluz, Colonel Armen, Major Byas, Colonel Wilcox, Mister Brummell, Colonel Fain. I'm Colonel At Lee. This is being conducted at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.

You're reminded that you're still under oath. I also remind you of the advisement regarding the nature of this proceeding and the rights advisement under Article 31, UCMJ, which we have previously given; being suspected of dereliction of duty under Article 92, Uniform Code of Military Justice. I know that you're represented by counsel.

**WITNESS:** Yes, I am.

**COLONEL AT LEE:** And would you name the counsel that you've chosen to represent you?

**WITNESS:** Yes, I'm represented by my Circuit District -- or Circuit Defense Counsel and that would be Major Donald P. Holtz?

**COLONEL AT LEE:** Do you have any questions regarding the advisements that you were previously given?

**WITNESS:** No, I do not.

**COLONEL AT LEE:** Colonel Fain?

**EXAMINATION**

**Questions by Colonel Fain:**

1Q: Would you please restate for the board your AWACS crew position during the mission on 14 April?

1A: Yes sir, I was serving as the Senior Director.

**CONTROL WITNESS #11**

- 2Q: On the morning of 14 April, who conducted the pre-mission briefing?  
2A: The pre-mission briefing before the flight was conducted by the mission crew commander.
- 3Q: Do you recall what items were covered in that briefing?  
3A: The basic items that are usually covered, emergency procedures and basic familiarization.
- 4Q: Were crew positions assigned at that time?  
4A: No, they were assigned prior to that.
- 5Q: Were there any briefing items that covered specific duties of any of the crew positions?  
5A: No, not -- not at the morning brief prior to the flight.
- 6Q: Would you consider the lack of those briefed items to be unusual or standard?  
6A: It's standard.
- 7Q: And the reason that they would be considered standard?  
7A: The reason being is most the crew positions are pretty self-explanatory, each person has their own area of responsibility which is pretty much dictated by their job. The radio operator would perform the jobs of the radio operator and such.

As far as the surveillance functions and the weapons functions, those are either assigned the day prior or that morning by the -- either the air surveillance officer or the senior director.

- 8Q: And in your position, who did you directly supervise during the flight?  
8A: Directly, I had three weapons controllers working for me. One was in the capacity of the AOR controller, the second one was the enroute controller and the third one is the TAC controller.
- 9Q: And you testified in previous testimony the frequencies that you monitored personally. Could you repeat those for the board please?  
9A: Yes. In my -- my radio accesses, in the first one I had the enroute frequency, clear, UHF, the second frequency was -- the second frequency was the tanker, clear, UHF, the third frequency was AOR Have Quick, and the fourth frequency was the Turkish SATCOM.
- 10Q: And who would be monitoring the AOR tactical clear frequency?  
10A: Just the AOR controller.
- 11Q: At any point during the briefing, were handoff responsibilities discussed, i.e., handoff procedures between the controller -- the enroute controller having control of aircraft outside of the AOR, to the controller having control of the aircraft inside the AOR?  
11A: Yeah, that was discussed previous to -- to that morning. It was also discussed at the simulator session that we completed at Tinker.

**CONTROL WITNESS #11**

12Q: What would you consider to be a standard procedure for using, as an example, a fighter flight taking off from Incirlik, contacting the enroute controller and then going to the AOR?

12A: We really don't have a -- a set standard that the controllers have to go by. There are several ways they can do it. They can do it by use of the computer, they can assign it via the computer and that would give an indication to the controller they were passing the responsibility over to. They could do it by what we call Net Four which is just voice, being next to each other, they could just tell him -- they can tell him over the net, which is the weapons discreet net on board the aircraft. And then they can also send him a message via the -- the computer.

13Q: What was the standard handoff procedure, as you know it, for helicopter traffic departing Diyarbakir and entering through Gate One?

13A: Could you rephrase the question? Standard . . .

14Q: We've discussed the fighter handoff . . .

WITNESS: Excuse me, sir.

COLONEL FAIN: Certainly.

(The witness consulted with his attorney)

14Q: We've discussed the fighter handoff, fighters departing from Incirlik. The helicopter, Eagle flights, depart from Diyarbakir and enter at gate one enroute to Zakhu. Is there a standard procedure for handling that helicopter traffic and, if so, is it similar to the fighter procedure?

14A: Sir, do you mean what frequency we keep him on?

15Q: Not necessarily the frequency. Would he be handed off from an enroute controller to an AOR controller?

15A: Normally he would not because the fighters tend to like to stay on just the enroute frequency. They don't go to the tactical AOR frequency.

16Q: You said the fighters? Did you mean helicopters?

16A: I mean, correction, the helicopters do not go over to the tactical AOR frequency.

17Q: When did you first observe Eagle 01 flight on the 14th of April?

17A: It would have been as they were entering the AOR, going through the gate.

18Q: Does the AOR controller monitor the enroute frequency?

18A: Yes he does.

19Q: On the 14th of April, in light of the activity at the time, do you believe the AOR controller was in a position to see and hear transmissions to indicate that Eagle flight was crossing the gate?

**CONTROL WITNESS #11**

19A: I can't really say for sure. He had access to the frequencies and it was within the area that he would have been watching.

20Q: When Eagle flight departed Zakhu, who normally would be responsible for tracking his progress in the AOR?

20A: Once he was identified by the weapons team, primarily it would have been the enroute controller because that would have been the first controller he would have talked to. Weapons would have had the responsibility of tracking them.

21Q: Do you know if the AOR controller was aware of Eagle flight's presence in the AOR after their departure from Zakhu?

21A: Correction. Did I -- did I say AOR on the -- I meant enroute . . .

22Q: Enroute . . .

22A: Enroute controller would have been the person to talk to him and he would have been the one that would have been tracking him.

23Q: And the enroute controller would track him in the AOR after his departure?

23A: Yes, to the point that he could -- until -- until they landed.

24Q: And by landing you mean in the AOR?

24A: Yes.

25Q: Was that a normal practice for the Eagle flights?

25A: Yes, it's -- it's normal for them to -- to land several times, especially there at Zakhu.

26Q: As Eagle flight departed Zakhu, did you hear the radio transmission?

26A: Yes I did.

27Q: And did they describe a route of flight or destination in that transmission?

27A: Yes, they described it fairly simply as proceeding from point such and such to -- to point such and such.

28Q: The point . . .

28A: I can't remember it now, off hand, but I've got it documented.

29Q: They describe points that -- they're often called Delta points. Was the information available on board the AWACS to locate those points, if necessary?

29A: We had a sheet that listed the points and we later found out that one of the points was incorrect.

30Q: Would it be normal, based on your previous experience in the theater . . .

**CONTROL WITNESS #11**

30A: Uh-huh (Affirmative).

31Q: . . . for a controller to be aware of those points and aware of the route of flight of the helicopters when he called departing a Delta point to another Delta point?

31A: Okay, you're asking if -- if it's expected that the controller would know those points?

32Q: First, would it be normal?

32A: I would say it would depend on the controller, how much time he'd spent in the theater and how -- how well he was able to memorize points.

33Q: Would you expect an individual on his first tour to be proficient in that task -- on his first mission?

33A: No, I would not.

34Q: Is there a written requirement for him to be -- to . . .

34A: To know those points? No, there is not.

35Q: Just a clarification on a previous question. Was there, on board the AWACS, written reference that would describe those points?

35A: We had what we thought was the correct coordinates for those points.

36Q: Are you familiar with the daily Air Tasking Order or ATO?

36A: Yes, I am.

37Q: Was that Air Tasking Order carried on board the AWACS on the 14th of April?

37A: Yes, it was.

38Q: Was it available for ready reference by any of all of the crew members on the scopes?

38A: Yes, it was.

39Q: Are you aware of helicopter missions, in particular the Eagle flight missions, on that Air Tasking Order?

39A: Yes.

40Q: And what type of information was available there?

40A: I can't recall the information available.

41Q: Do you consider the UH-60 Eagle flight traffic to be part of the Operation PROVIDE COMFORT package?

41A: Yeah, could I get a clarification?

42Q: Operation PROVIDE COMFORT has a daily package that's specified on the Air Tasking

**CONTROL WITNESS #11**



Order generally including fighters, tankers, the AWACS aircraft, et cetera. Helicopters were also listed on the Air Tasking Order, the UH-60 eagle flight in particular. Do you consider them to be a part of that package for normal control, monitoring, et cetera?

42A: Okay, when you add "for normal control and monitoring," I'd have to say no. I do not include them with that -- in that case.

43Q: Are you familiar with the Airspace Control Order or ACO?

43A: Yes, I am.

44Q: Are you responsible for knowledge of information in the ACO?

44A: Yes, we are.

45Q: Are you aware of a provision of the ACO that requires a fighter sweep -- fighters with AAI radars into the AOR prior to the arrival of other aircraft?

45A: Yes I am, that -- that also includes prior to the AWACS going on station or . . .

46Q: Does that . . .

46A: . . . into the orbit.

47Q: Does that provision apply to helicopter traffic, the Eagle flight, the UH-60s?

47A: Are you asking does the sweep require that the Eagles sweep before the helicopters?

48Q: Yes.

48A: In my interpretation, no.

49Q: And what is the basis of your interpretation?

49A: That the helicopters operate independent of package. The heli -- the F-15s are there in support of the package. The package being the aircraft that -- that fly above the hard deck, the reconnaissance aircraft, the wild weasels, the ECM assets, the E-3 and those aircraft. It's not unusual for us to already have helicopters already in the area prior to the package getting there.

50Q: And is that based on previous experience . . .

50A: Yes it is.

51Q: . . . earlier tours in this theater?

51A: Yes sir.

52Q: As the F-15s arrived, the first F-15s on the 14th of April, at the gate, were they provided a picture by the AOR controller?

52A: I -- I can't recollect whether there were -- it was done.

**CONTROL WITNESS #11**

53Q: Is that act, providing a picture based on the radar presentation from AWACS of the AOR, a normal call made to the first fighters entering the area?

53A: It depends on the picture. Usually the picture consists of what's in the area and whether we have any activities south of the thirty-six line.

54Q: Is that an automatic -- automatically initiated call, initiated by the AWACS controller, or is that based on a request from the fighters entering the AOR?

54A: Are you asking in practice or . . .

55Q: First, in practice.

55A: In practice, yes it is given. When we first have them come into the AOR, and then also whenever they request it.

56Q: Is there any written guidance regarding that call as they enter the AOR?

**MAJOR HOLTZ:** We'd like a moment, please.

**COLONEL FAIN:** Sure.

**MAJOR HOLTZ:** We'll step out.

**COLONEL FAIN:** Off the record for a brief recess.

(The interview was recessed at 1525 hours, 30 April 1994)

(The interview was reconvened at 1530 hours, 30 April 1994, with all parties present who were present when the prior session was recessed.)

**COLONEL AT LEE:** The time is 1530. The individuals present at the time we recessed previously are once again present.

**Questions by Colonel Fain:**

57Q: My last question was with regards to the picture call, and whether that was a required call for the fighters as they entered the AOR. Was that required?

**MAJOR HOLTZ:** I've advised my client not to answer that question.

**COLONEL FAIN:** Okay. Thank you.

**CONTROL WITNESS #11**

58Q: Referring to the helicopters remaining on the enroute frequency, I understand you -- you to say that that was a normal procedure for the Eagle flights?

58A: Yes, it is.

59Q: Is there any direction in the Airspace Control Order or AO -- ACO that would direct them to be on the tactical frequency?

59A: Yeah, it mentions that they should monitor the AOR clear frequency.

60Q: Do you know their reason for not monitoring that freq?

60A: I don't know for sure if they were not monitoring it or if they were.

61Q: Was there any attempt on the 14th of April to change them to a tactical frequency?

61A: I don't know if there was an attempt or not.

62Q: Is it possible for the enroute controller to monitor a track of the helicopters that are on his frequency, the enroute frequency, while performing his other duties as an enroute controller for arriving traffic?

62A: I'd say that depends on the skill level of the controller.

63Q: Is that a normal procedure?

63A: Usually if a controller gets too task saturated, it's his responsibility to -- to let somebody know, to get help from the other controllers. It's not uncommon. Several times we'll only have two controllers on console.

64Q: Going back to the mission briefing, was there a comm plan presented prior to the flight?

64A: Yes, there was.

65Q: Were there any changes to that comm plan?

65A: The comm plan was initially made the day prior and I can't recall if there were any changes. There weren't any major changes as far as what the controllers were monitoring.

66Q: You made reference to an error on the document that you, the AWACS crew, possessed regarding the Delta points used by the helicopters. Was that error significant to either the points Whiskey or Lima? Whiskey being Zakhu and Lima being the destination called by the Eagle flight?

66A: I don't know for sure because I didn't double check the points myself. All I know is that the controllers told me that one of the points were in error. They found that out later..

67Q: Thank you. In the intercept phase by Tiger flight, the actions -- radio calls, I will say, of Tiger flight, were being answered by whom?

67A: They were answered by the AOR controller.

**CONTROL WITNESS #11**

68Q: Were you monitoring those calls?

68A: Yes, I was.

69Q: At any point during the intercept, up to and including the identification, did you have cause for concern regarding his actions and his ability to perform the tasks?

69A: No, I did not.

70Q: Were you comfortable with the identification by the fighter flight?

70A: Sir, I'm not sure what you're -- you're looking for, for an answer. I can say that it wouldn't have mattered whether I was comfortable or not with the call. It's -- it's not my position to -- to stop an intercept with the fighters already engaged.

71Q: Once the identification was made by the fighter flight, who then assumes responsibility for the engagement?

71A: Okay, once the identification has been made? Their ROE gives them the -- the leeway that they can go ahead and finish the intercept to -- to intercept, destroy.

72Q: When would you, in your position on the AWACS crew, intervene in their engagement?

72A: The only time we would intervene after they've called engage is if we knew that their engagement was on the wrong target. That's how it's stated in our -- in our manuals. Where . . .

73Q: What . . .

73A: . . . we . . .

74Q: Excuse me. Go ahead.

74A: Where we can be the most assistance is prior to the engagement phase, prior to they calling -- prior to them calling engaged, during the identification phase.

75Q: Prior to the identification by Tiger flight, did you have any reason to suspect that friendlies were in the area?

**MAJOR HOLTZ:** My client will not answer that question.

76Q: Let me ask a follow on question. In a normal course of events, in your position as a supervisor, if you were to suspect that one of the controllers under your supervision was making an error, would you feel an obligation to intervene?

76A: Yes I would.

**CONTROL WITNESS #11**

**Questions by General Andrus:**

77Q: During the final portion of the intercept, there was a discussion by members of the AWACS crew regarding the temperature in the mission crew area. Do you know who directed that that discussion be terminated?

**MAJOR HOLTZ:** Sir, someone coughed as you were talking and I missed the question.

78Q: During the final portion of the intercept, while the intercept was taking place, there was a discussion by members of the AWACS crew regarding the temperature in the mission crew area. Do you know who directed that that discussion be terminated?

78A: I couldn't recall for sure, sir. I couldn't say.

**GENERAL ANDRUS:** I don't have any more.

**COLONEL FAIN:** We're going to have a few follow up questions to clarify points within the testimony.

**Questions by Colonel At Lee:**

79Q: You referred to having documentation of what the radio call was -- made by Eagle flight, was when they departed Zakhu. Were you referring to your notes that you testified about previously?

79A: I believe it's -- it's contained on those notes and it may be contained somewhere else.

80Q: And those are notes that you provided to Colonel Wilcox that were sealed at the time?

80A: Yes, they're sealed.

81Q: My question was, are we talking about the same pieces of paper that -- your reference now to your notes are to the same notes that were provided to Colonel Wilcox and sealed?

81A: Yes. They were sealed. They weren't released.

**MAJOR HOLTZ:** May we have a short break?

**COLONEL AT LEE:** Surely. Recess and the time is 1540.

(The board was recessed at 1540 hours, 30 April 1994)

(The interview was reconvened at 1543 hours, 30 April 1994, with all parties present who were present when the prior session was recessed.)

**CONTROL WITNESS #11**

**COLONEL AT LEE:** The time is 1543. Persons who were present at the time we recessed are once again present. And I believe you had something you wanted to say.

**WITNESS:** Yeah, we'd like to backtrack on that last question you had, the references about the transmission by the helicopters. We want to clarify that that was contained on the notes that were sealed with -- given to and sealed by Colonel Wilcox, and the reference could also have been noted on other notes which -- which we don't know where they are because they're missing.

**MAJOR HOLTZ:** Explain where they . . .

**WITNESS:** They were originally with all the notes and were not there when the notes -- when the personal notes, Article 83 Alpha were -- were disclosed.

**Questions by Colonel At Lee:**

82Q: Okay. So you -- you have no personal knowledge of where the missing notes might be.  
82A: No, I do not.

**COLONEL AT LEE:** Thank you.

Do you have any further information or evidence that may be helpful to this board that you wish to offer at this time?

**WITNESS:** No, we do not.

**COLONEL AT LEE:** Okay.

**GENERAL ANDRUS:** May I ask another question?

**Questions by General Andrus:**

83Q: In reference to the notes that you indicate are possibly missing . . .  
83A: Yes sir.

**CONTROL WITNESS #11**

84Q: . . . were those notes that you took on the aircraft at the time?  
84A: Yes sir, they were.

85Q: Do you recall if you turned those in to anybody?  
85A: No sir, I did not.

**CONTROL WITNESS #11**

86Q: Can you recall the last time you saw them?

86A: Yes sir. The staff W-D and myself put those in a envelope and they were put in the AWACS safe.

87Q: So the last time you saw those notes, they were being placed in the AWACS safe.

87A: Yes sir.

**GENERAL ANDRUS:** Okay, thank you.

**COLONEL AT LEE:** You're reminded that this is an official investigation. You're ordered not to divulge the nature of the investigation or the questions, answers or discussions in this interview with anyone unless authorized, except your counsel, unless authorized to do so by the board president, Major General Andrus, CINCUSAFE, or higher authority. If anyone other than a member of this board should approach you regarding your testimony or the matters discussed here, you must report it immediately.

**COLONEL AT LEE:** Do you have any questions?

**WITNESS:** No sir.


**COLONEL AT LEE:** The time is 1546 and this interview is concluded.

(The interview terminated at 1546 hours, 30 April 1994.)

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## REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION

I certify that the above sworn interview statement, given by **CONTROL WITNESS #11** to the Accident Investigation Board was recorded by me by stenomask, and that the foregoing transcript is a true, accurate, and verbatim account of that statement.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
**JANET R. CHARLES, SSG, U.S. Army**  
*Court Reporter*  
*Incirlik Air Base, Turkey*

V-011

V-012

**TAB V-015**

V-013

**CONTROL WITNESS 12**

V-013A

V-014

V-014A

V-015



**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY  
OF  
CONTROL WITNESS #12  
963d Airborne Warning and Control Squadron**

The interview was conducted by Major Aaron D. Byas at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, beginning at 1624 hours, 21 April 1994. A standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn.

**EXAMINATION**

I'm Control Witness #12, currently assigned to 963d AWACS as an instructor weapons director. I am presently here at Incirlik Air Base on temporary duty. As an instructor weapons director, my duties are to maintain aircraft control and maintain separation of all aircraft that are under my control to ensure safe flight path, basic flight path separation of any aircraft that are under my control from other aircraft, friendly or otherwise. As an instructor, I'm responsible for instructing a student on their responsibility for safety of flight matters that would be given to a weapons director. I'm basically their shadow, being there to ensure that they receive training and safety matters and regulations are adhered to.

I graduated from undergraduate controller school on 7 March 1990 and completed automated weapons controller school in August of the same year. I was in Iceland on a remote tour for a year, where I was also an instructor weapons director. In June 1990, I attended counter air tactics weapons training course. In October 1991, I left Iceland and began my training as an E3 weapons director. Upon completion of this training, I went to the AWACS Training Squadron where I did live flying. The training squadron is a simulator and academic portion to learn systems knowledge and to begin using the computer system aboard the aircraft. Since 7 June 1992, I have been a mission ready controller in the 963d AWACS.

Prior to coming to Operation Provide Comfort, I received a normal spin-up briefing, to include the intel spin-up. I wasn't going to be on a crew, so I didn't receive any of the simulator stuff that a normal crewmember receives. I have received simulator training before. There's at least two required for each deployment here, and I've had them two previous times, once as a weapons director and once as an instructor.

(The interview recessed at 1632 hours, 21 April 1994.)

(The interview reconvened at 1640 hours, 21 April 1994.)

**CONTROL WITNESS #12**

As I said before, I didn't have the two spin-ups sims that the crews usually get together and have. However, I've done several spin-up sims as an instructor weapons director and as a weapons director in the past 6 months to meet my annual training requirements, things like that. When I was going through these simulator scenarios, I'm not sure if any helicopters were incorporated in that scenario that allowed the controller, that's sitting there watching it, to see how the helicopters come up, hang around or wait, or come back.

Upon my arrival here for Operation Provide Comfort, I received the standard in brief. I was briefed by the outgoing staff WD prior to his departure. I also received specific weapons briefing and ROE briefing. I'm not sure what part of the basic ROE briefing that we received is classified, or what part is not. I don't think that any ARF number, things like that, are classified. I believe you have already collected that evidence.

I don't believe I have any information pertaining to ROE that you did not collect. Everything is all in the two crew books. One that's with the crew flying that day, and one that's a spare. Both of these crew books are identical. Additionally, we always keep the ARF on file, and any changes to them. You did not take ARF 183 with you. It's about an inch thick. ARF 183 was the ARF that spelled out the ROE. ARF stands for aircrew read file. This information is made available to all the crew, and they're required to sign off on the ARF to indicate that they have knowledge of, and are responsible for, the information held within. The crew do this before stepping onto the jet. I provided an ROE briefing to the crew for the mission. I have flown approximately 20 missions in this area of operation before. During these 20 missions, I have never noticed an Iraqi aircraft squawking IFF. The only time I've seen an Iraqi aircraft was south of the 36 line during the times that I've been here.

If I was working as an AOR controller inside the No-Fly-Zone, north of the 36 parallel, and there was an intermittent IFF hit that came up continuously over a 4 minute period, not steady, but comes and goes the way helicopter does, and I saw no radar -- I don't know if I can get into system anomalies, and things like that. I don't think this is classified. The system sometimes will put up spurious or double registrations, and things of that nature. If it was redoing a Mode, or if it's redoing a squawk from somewhere else, or if it's a spurious hit, it may very well have the same Modes I, II, III, IV, whatever that is being received somewhere else, or it may be an inaccurate. If there was no track within 30 miles of that track, it could possibly be friendly. It also could be erratic and be absolutely nothing.

**CONTROL WITNESS #12**

If I had a choice, based upon my previous testimony that I have never seen an Iraqi aircraft squawk an IFF mode, and I saw a continuous intermittent IFF hit for 4 to 6 minute; would I think this is an Iraqi aircraft? This would depend on what switches you choose; you can have just present radar and IFF, you can have past radar and IFF, or combinations of that. What I'm understanding is, that you're saying that there's an IFF hit, and 5 miles, or 10 miles away, several sweeps of the radar; if it's a continuous stream about a radar hit, I don't even know if I've seen that very often. On occasion you see it, but very rarely would you see an IFF hit in a continuous stream that didn't have a couple of radar hits with it. In this type of situation where we're in an unfriendly area, and we have live ordnance, and things of that nature, I would be very hesitant to assume it was a bad guy. With the way we're set up, and with the system, and what we're taught from "day one" with the system, you don't call something a "bandit," you don't call something "hostile;" it's merely a mimicking of other systems. If we receive information from other systems, we can pass it on, but it's information only. It's not to identify somebody.

I was not on the headset between 0630 and 0735 hours on 14 April. I was in the back of the aircraft. I was not on a position during the engagement. Prior to the engagement, right after we came on station, before the aircraft started checking in, I had been cleared off. My understanding of my duties, as a staff weapons director on the aircraft, are to provide a buddy ride, basically to sit by and answer questions about local procedures in case there's a new SD, or a new MCC, or something like that. There's also an MCC that flies. So basically, we can answer questions for the crew if they have questions.

My assigned duties do not include evaluating or observing to determine abilities, or anything like that. It's simply as a source of information, from my understanding. However, I can be used if an SD deems it. If he wants me to be used in that manner, I can be used as a normal weapons director. I can sit in one of the seats as a weapons director. "MR" means mission ready; mission ready means we're able to do the job whenever we're called on.

The person responsible for tracking north of 36 parallel would depend on what the situation is. If it's friendly aircraft, it should be one of the WD's. It depends on who detects the aircraft. If it's a fighter aircraft, then the responsibility is for the AOR, area of responsibility, weapons director. The weapons director keeps track of them through various means, voice, IFF, things of that nature. If an erroneous IFF pops up, if it's a short -- maybe one hit, two hits, and then it

**CONTROL WITNESS #12**

disappears, if there's nothing, if there's not enough time to get a read-back of what they are, or what the IFF is, what it reads, you can pull up stuff to find out if it has any squawks associated with it, or if it's just spurious. A "hit" is defined as a single, maybe a two, radar contacts or paints; it does not constitute a track. This is not also IFF. If someone queried me about a contact that they had at that point, then I would tell them that we have an IFF there, in other code word terms, or something like that.

If I saw an uncorrelated IFF that came on my scope, and it went away, and it came back within a matter of one sweep, and stayed there two or three sweeps; goes away, it comes back, stays there a couple of sweeps; and I can interrogate this uncorrelated track and get an IFF of 1420; what would this mean to me? If it had a Mode I, or II, or III that I was looking for, that I was expecting to see in that area, if it was according to the frag, or whatever, if it was an expected friendly one, then I would probably say that there were potential friendly hits there, potential friendlies. I know the helicopter Mode I squawk for the AOR has changed at least in the last 2 weeks. The helicopter is supposed to change its Mode I from the time he comes outside to the time he goes inside, according to the ATO, because there are two "I's." From my past experience, I think they have. I don't primarily track by Mode I. I'll track by Mode II because it's much easier to figure out exactly who it is. If a contact is called up by somebody, I can tell them that's such and such flight by the Mode II.

The circumstances surrounding the tape over of the videotape are that somebody came back through to the back of the jet and told me that we had shot down two Hinds helicopters. This was about 8 o'clock. I was like, "Yes, right; yes, go ahead; sure." I didn't believe it at first. I was thinking that they were messing with me. After awhile, curiosity got the best of me, and I went back up to the front to the weapons pit. They confirmed that it was no kidding; that there had been a shoot down of two helicopters by one of the flight of fighters in the areas in the AOR.

At that point, I went over to look, to view the tape, to see if we have good comms and a good picture on it because that was one of my jobs on the jet, to show the guys how to set up the video recorder. So I went over to look at it and started rewinding it to view it, and while I was starting to view it, the SD and the MCC, and pretty much everybody all around there started hollering, "Turn on the tape, turn on the tape," because there was a non-squawking, fast mover coming out of Cairo West that we were thinking may have been a retaliatory action, so not thinking, I hit the record button. At this point, unfortunately, it started recording over the portion of the tape that we needed. When I realized it, I told the MCC.

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
As far as I know, the duties and responsibilities of a staff MCC that is flying is basically the same as mine. That includes making sure that the crew MCC is spun up. We're not there to evaluate or to interfere because the crews that come over here are already mission ready, so they are deployable anywhere. We're not there to interfere. It's basically the same thing for the MCC. If the other MCC, the crew MCC, wants to get off scope, and he wants to change over, then the staff MCC can sit in. It's a rare chance for us to actually fly, so we get to do that, too. The staff MCC was not with me during the engagement. He was further forward than I was, but I don't know exactly where he was.

I do not have any further information, statements, or evidence that I wish to present to this board.

(The interview terminated at 1658 hours, 21 April 1994.)

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I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of CONTROL WITNESS #12, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

  
**CHARLES H. WILCOX II, COL, USAF**  
Legal Advisor

V-011

V-012

TAB V-016

V-013

CONTROL WITNESS 13

V-013A

V-014

V-014A

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11-23

**TESTIMONY  
OF  
CONTROL WITNESS #13  
963 AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SQUADRON  
(ENROUTE CONTROLLER)**

COL WILCOX: The time is now 1935 on 20 April 1994. The persons present are the following: Major General Andrus, Board President, Group Captain Doggett, Major Aaron Byas, myself Colonel Charles Wilcox, and Control Witness #13. How do you pronounce your last name?

WITNESS: Control Witness #13.

COL WILCOX: This interview is being conducted at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. This is an official AFR 110-14 Aircraft Accident Investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters and the possible involvement of U.S. fighter aircraft in the crash of these helicopters in the northern No-Fly-Zone of Iraq on 14 April 1994.

This investigation is being conducted at the direction of General Robert C. Oaks, CINCUSAFE. This investigation is not a Safety Mishap Investigation conducted under AFR 127-4. This is an AFR 110-14 Accident Investigation, Aircraft Accident investigation. The purpose of this accident investigation is to obtain and preserve all available evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary action, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Testimony before a Safety Mishap Investigation Board is given with the understanding that it can only be used for mishap prevention purposes and all witnesses are advised that the testimony will be treated in confidence.

However, testimony given in this accident investigation may be used for any purpose deemed appropriate by competent authority and may be publicly disseminated.

Do you understand the difference between a Safety Mishap Investigation and as an Accident Investigation?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

COL WILCOX: Do you understand the purpose of this investigation?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

COL WILCOX: Do you have any questions?

**CONTROL WITNESS #13**

WITNESS: No, sir.

COL WILCOX: Your testimony will be recorded and transcribed and summarized or perhaps transcribed verbatim so that a written record can be made available to the appointing or higher authority. For the benefit of the reporter, please avoid the using acronyms or jargon. Please remember to speak slowly and loudly and remember people who don't have the training that you have will be required to read and understand your testimony.

As I previously stated, I am Colonel Charles Wilcox. This board is investigating the facts and circumstances surrounding the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the northern No-Fly-Zone of Iraq on April 1994 and the possible involvement of U.S. fighter aircraft. You are suspected of the following offense: Dereliction of Duty; that is, you are suspected of negligently failing to properly track and account for aircraft in the northern No-Fly-Zone of Iraq, in violation of Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

I advise you under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, you have the right to remain silent, that is to say nothing at all. Anything you say maybe use as evidence against you in a trial by courts-martial or other judicial or administrative proceeding. I also advise you that you have the right to consult counsel, you have the right to consult with a lawyer if you so desire and to have a lawyer present during this interview. You may obtain a civilian lawyer of your own choosing at no expense to the government or if you wish the Air Force will appoint a military lawyer for you free of charge. You may request a lawyer anytime during the interview and if you decide to answer questions without a lawyer present you may stop the questioning at anytime.

Before deciding whether you wish to exercise your right under Article 31 of the UCMJ, I further advise you that any previous statements made by you under circumstances that violated your Article 31 rights may not be used against you. For example, previous statements or notes written or oral made by you at the direction of your supervisor or other superior officer who suspected you of misconduct or dereliction can not be used against if that individual directing or requesting the statement did not properly advise you of your rights under Article 31. Since you have made previous statements under these conditions you should consider that they can not be used against you. You understand your rights?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

COL WILCOX: Do you wish to remain silent or will you answer our questions?

WITNESS: I'll answer the questions.

COL WILCOX: Do you want a lawyer?

**CONTROL WITNESS #13**



WITNESS: Yes, sir.

COL WILCOX: The interview is terminated at 1940 on 22 April 1994.

(There is a brief recess at this point.)

COL WILCOX: The time is now 2006 the parties are present and we have been joined by the witness. Control Witness #13, I understand that you had a couple of conversations in the hallway and I'd just like to explore that if we could. Would you describe the conversation that you had with Maj Byas for us please.

WITNESS: He was just explaining that if I felt uncomfortable with anything that was going on I could stop this at anytime.

COL WILCOX: Did you respond in any way?

WITNESS: Um-um--No, sir

COL WILCOX: Did you indicate to him in any way that you had an interest in returning to the interview room?

WITNESS: Yes, sir. I'll answer any question you have. It's not a problem.

COL WILCOX: What did you tell Maj Byas when, about the, when Maj Byas , huh, talked to you what did you say to him?

WITNESS: As-as far as ....

COL WILCOX: You said that uh he indicated that you could stop the interview at anytime I'm interested in what you said to him, when he made those comments to you.

WITNESS: I just said that's--that's okay. I didn't really have an acknowledgment I don't think.

COL WILCOX: I know that you also were out talking to the general for a few minutes, could you tell us about that conversation.

WITNESS: Uh, it was basically along with the same game. He was explaining um their safety board versus uh this accident investigation board, the differences and um saying that also same, along the same game that I could stop this if I felt uncomfortable and just to be aware of my rights.

**CONTROL WITNESS #13**

COL WILCOX: It's important when you determine what rights to exercise or that you understand your rights before you exercise them. We want to make sure that any statement that you make is voluntary. Do you understand?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

COL WILCOX: You feel like that anybody is putting pressure on you to ah-to return to the conference room or to return to interview before you have a chance to talk to an attorney?

WITNESS: Ah--No, sir.

COL WITNESS: Was your decision to return to the--to the interview your own decision made freely and voluntarily?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

COL WILCOX: If you like to have a lawyer we can arrange to have a lawyer available for you, do you understand that?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

COL WILCOX: We may be able to find one this evening or if we can't we certainly can find one tomorrow. Do you understand that?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

COL WILCOX: And if you want to wait and not have this interview now, we can wait and would be happy to do that. Do you understand that?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

COL WILCOX: You're entitled to have an attorney present during the interview--have a lawyer present during the interview, you do understand that I believe?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

COL WILCOX: Let me read your Article 31 rights to make sure that you understand them and then I'll ask you the questions again alright?

You know the board is investigating the facts and circumstances surrounding the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the northern No-Fly-Zone of Iraq on 14 April 1994 and the possible involvement of U.S. fighter aircraft. You are suspected of the following offense, Dereliction of Duty, that is you are suspected of

**CONTROL WITNESS #13**

negligently failing to properly track and account for aircraft in the northern No-Fly-Zone of Iraq, in violation of Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

I advise you that under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice you have the right to remain silent; that is, to say nothing at all. Anything you say may be used as evidence against you in a trial by court-martial or in other judicial or administrative proceeding. I also advise you that you have the right to consult with a lawyer if you desire and to have a lawyer present during this interview. You may obtain a civilian lawyer of your own choosing at no expense to the government, or if you wish the Air Force will appoint a military lawyer for you free of charge. You may request a lawyer at any time during the interview, and if you decide to answer questions without a lawyer present, you may stop the questioning at any time.

Before deciding whether you wish to exercise your rights under Article 31 of the UCMJ, I further advise you that any previous statements made by you under circumstances that violate your Article 31 rights, may not be used against you. For example previous statements or notes, written or oral made by you at the direction of your supervisor or other superior officer who suspected you of misconduct or dereliction, can not be used against you if that individual directing or requesting the statement did not properly advise you of your rights under Article 31. If you've made previous statements under these conditions you consider that they can not be used against you. Do you understand your rights?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

COL WILCOX: Do you wish to remain silent or will you answer our questions?

WITNESS: I will answer the questions.

COL WILCOX: Do you want a lawyer?

WITNESS: Ah--Not at this time.

COL WILCOX: Very well. You're further advised not to discuss classified information unless necessary to develop your testimony. If it is necessary for you to discuss classified information you need to identify it as such. If you'll stand, I'll swear you.

(The witness was sworn.)

**CONTROL WITNESS #13**

## EXAMINATION

1Q: Please state your full name and rank.

1A: CONTROL WITNESS #13.

2Q: Your organization and duty station.

2A: 963d AWACS, 552d ACW, Air Control Wing, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma.

### CONTROL WITNESS #13

3Q: Your current temporary assignment.

3A: Um-Um

4Q: Your TDY ...

4A: Yes, I'm TDY.

5Q: To where?

5A: To Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.

6Q: What is your current AWACS crew position?

6A: Weapons Director.

7Q: As a weapons director, what is your duties and responsibilities?

7A: Um--I control aircraft.

8Q: Could you further define control aircraft, how they--how they--how, what does that entail?

8A: It depends on the position your--uh--it depends on many things--uh--if your--it depends on what position you're filling at the time.

9Q: For a mission like Operation PROVIDE COMFORT II, what are some of the duties and responsibilities that you as a weapons controller may have to accomplish during a normal mission?

9A: Depending on the position, uh--say if you were the AOR controller you would point out--you would make "picture calls" which are calls to provide data to the pilots for situational awareness um--if you were the tanker controller mostly tanker points out time the aircraft where the tanker is and altitude deconfliction. Um--safety is a big part of what we do in this area. If you're enroute controller you provide uh--traffic point out and altitude deconfliction for aircraft moving from Incirlik to the gates, to gate one which is the border of Iraq.

### CONTROL WITNESS #13

10Q: And points out--you mean bearing and range to whatever targets ...

10A: That's correct.

11Q: ... there may be. What is your background and experience?

11A: Um-um ....

12Q: For you--why don't you start when you graduated from college.

12A: Okay. Um--I graduated college in May of 90, um--I started controller school in April of 91, um--I arrived at Tinker Air Force Base in October of 91 beginning AWACS training in December of 91, and became mission ready in April of 91, I believe, na maybe May of 91.

13Q: 91 or 92?

13A: You're right, May of 92. I'm sorry.

14Q: Okay. Go ahead.

14A: And um--since then I've been flying the line with the squadron.

15Q: How long have you been mission ready since May 92?

15A: Correct.

16Q: Okay.

16A: Two years.

17Q: And your current qualifications?

17A: Fully qualified.

18Q: Fully qualified weapons controller? Not a weapons instructor weapons controller?

18A: That's correct.

19Q: What specific briefing or training did you receive prior to coming to PROVIDE COMFORT Operations?

19A: We normally have um--well at Tinker we always have two simulations where we practice what we do um--then we usually have a spin-up brief once we arrive here. Providing detailed information of what to expect and what changes there have been since say from the last time we have been here.

20Q: What does that simulated training that you receive, what does it entail? What is the--briefly give me a description of the scenario and particular if there is any helicopter traffic in-in that scenario.

20A: As far as heli--copter traffic uh, I don't remember if there was any in this end. Um mostly it involves aircraft coming out from Iraq tracking north and uh having the person that's

**CONTROL WITNESS #13**

the AOR controller run intercept on them and--and then having fighters um--it's a great deal of sort of a battle management sim.

21Q: How many flying hours do you have?

21A: About 1100.

22Q: Did you receive any local area briefing once you arrived here to PROVIDE COMFORT? Did you receive any specific weapons briefing?

22A: Yes.

23Q: Could you tell me some of the information you received in that briefing, what was the

....  
23A: Um -- Well -- there mostly like ARF 231 which is an altitude saying they activate some altitude floors you know ah in the north you can fly this low it's like 5500 feet or 4500 feet can't recall right now, but ah--that's one thing I remember. Um--they told us uh what types of aircraft were here and uh, they just go over a general flow of how things are going to be as far as players will come out at this time and then you'll tank and then you'll go back on station and then uh--you will do whatever and whatever you were doing before basically. It's a, am I being too vague?

24Q: Uh let me ask you a specific question. Did you receive a ROE briefing?

24A: An ROE briefing um ...

25Q: Did you read the ROE?

25A: Yes I believe we did.

26Q: Can you recall your understanding of the ROE briefing that you received?

26A: [Classified portion deleted (14 Words)-ROE]

27Q: Does that include helicopters, to your recollection?

27A: The only thing I recall it saying is Iraqi military aircraft.

28Q: Okay so that includes helicopters and fighters?

28A: I would suppose so.

29Q: Is this your first time uh--at the PROVIDE COMFORT Operation or have you been here before?

29A: No, I've been here before.

30Q: ..before. In your previous trips here had you noticed any helicopter activity during your--your temporary duty?

30A: Yes sir.

**CONTROL WITNESS #13**

31Q: How was your weapons team organized on the 14th of April? Who--who was sitting, uh who was responsible for doing what task?

31A: Do you want me to start with the entire hierarchy or just the immediate weapons team, or...

32Q: Just the weapons team, and you don't have to give me any names you can just tell me the crew position.

32A: Okay we have an SD above us um ...

33Q: Could you tell me what a SD is?

33A: ... SD is a senior director responsible for managing the weapons team.

34Q: Go right ahead.

34A: Very difficult not to fall into those acronyms.

35Q: Just tell me what he does please ....

35A: He does whatever it takes to manage weapons team uh he tells weapons team what to do basically in any situation, whatever he says goes.

36Q: Okay. And the next one.

36A: Um--there are three basic positions, um--enroute controller, the tanker controller and AOR controller.

37Q: Okay. What was your duty and responsibilities on the 14th of April?

37A: I was the enroute controller.

38Q: As the enroute controller what are your primary duties?

38A: ID and track and provide altitude deconfliction for aircraft taking off from Incirlik Air Base flying through the corridor up until they check with me roughly maybe 10-15 miles before gate one.

39Q: So at gate one you relinquish control or hand them off to another controller?

39A: That's correct.

40Q: Who's responsible for tracking the F-15 and other fighter aircraft that's on the ATO?

40A: If they're in the corridor or taking off from Incirlik Air Base then it will be my responsibility...

41Q: Okay

41A: If there....

42Q: Your responsibility as the enroute controller?

42A: That's correct ...

**CONTROL WITNESS #13**

43Q: So it would be the enroute controller responsibility?

43A: Not necessarily, sir. Once they leave, once I hand them to the next controller any aircraft is their responsibility to track their own aircraft.

44Q: What I was trying to clarify is the enroute controller responsibility, and not your responsibility if you are not sitting as the enroute control.

44A: That's-that's correct.

45Q: If you were acting for instance as the TAOR controller uh then you wouldn't do that until someone handed him off, perhaps, but tracking from Incirlik to the gate is the duty of whoever is holding position of the en-enroute controller ...

45A: Yes sir..

46Q: ... do I understand correctly?

46A: ... that's correct.

47Q: Okay. Who is responsible for tracking helicopters that are on the air tasking order?

47A: There--um are no set procedures to track helicopters.

48Q: Is there any set procedures if a helicopter checks in with you, with the AWACS? Is it the responsibility of the individual once the helicopter checks in on your radio and you see him on your radar scope?

48A: Well the helicopter generally check up at--at or around gate one, so if they, for my method only if they check up with me and I see them I--I'll put some symbology on them, but they're really not the responsibility of the enroute controller because they're already at gate one.

49Q: Other than the uh-Eagle Flight coor--coordination sheet, that's a document that you have in your "fly away kit" which states information on the Eagle flight, the coordinates Lima, Alpha, Papa, okay, other than that document, do you have any other guidance on how to work with helicopters?

49A: Not that I'm aware of.

50Q: Is that your sole document for controlling helicopters in this AOR?

50A: I wouldn't know.

51Q: Were you aware of any helicopters operating in the No-Fly-Zone on the 14th of April?

51A: Yes sir.

52Q: Who had tracking responsibility of the helicopters outside of the gate one, outside of AOR?

**CONTROL WITNESS #13**



52A: There really--ah no set procedures for anyone to track the helicopters. If you happen to be where ever and you see them, you apply symbology. Helicopters frequently, um, are there. They land alot then they take off and if you see them then you apply symbology.

53Q: Does that apply for helicopters inside of the No-Fly-Zone?

53A: Um--can you clarify that.

54Q: Who tracked helicopters inside of the No-Fly-Zone north of the 36 parallel? If a radar presentation come up radar/IFF north of the 36, who identifies that aircraft and who tracks them?

54A: It would uh--depend if it was a pop up target, and surveillance saw it first they might apply symbology on it or if weapons saw it they might apply symbology. Though I don't believe--I believe surveillance um-is responsible basically for tracks below the 36 line, but whoever would see it would probably apply symbology to it.

55Q: So no one is per se assigned to tracking, so whoever sees it, and if it pops up has that, well part of their procedures is to tag him up ...

55A: That's ....

56Q: ... initiate symbology on it.

56A: That's correct.

57Q: What happens if a helicopter originates inside a No-Fly-Zone? Is it still the same principle whoever sees him will initiate symbology on that track?

57A: Possible that's correct, sir.

58Q: Were you sitting on your position between the hours 0630a and 0735 on the 14th of April?

58A: Yes, sir.

59Q: Was your console communication and et ceteras operating correctly?

59A: Yes, sir.

60Q: Where, specifically, were you sitting?

60A: I was sitting at console 01.

61Q: Is that directly behind the senior director?

61A: Yes, sir.

62Q: How are internal hand off procedures coordinated between the enroute controller and tactical area of operation controller? How do you hand off an aircraft from one person to another?

**CONTROL WITNESS #13**

62A: Usually uh most of the fighters know that they just go tactical and they will automatically check in with the controller. Um I, personally as a technique will usually voice over "Net Two" which is a intercom in the--in the aircraft to the AOR controller that so-in-so flight is checking in, and within a second or two they usually come over the frequency.

63Q: What external communication do you use to ensure that an aircraft is properly handed over from the enroute to the tactical AOR freq? Do you tell them to push a certain frequency or do they do that on their own?

63A: No, sir they--the fighters know to do that on their own. They will just go tactical.

64Q: Okay. And do they say that on the radio so that you will know that they have moved over to another frequency?

64A: Uh--they'll usually say something like uh "Push button eleven."

65Q: Okay. What IFF checks are required to be completed on aircraft entering the No-Fly-Zone?

65A: As far as I know there are really no required checks. But there are standard checks that we do as a -- I suppose as matter of our own procedures -- AWACS procedures.

66Q: Okay. What IFF checks do you accomplish, specifically, what IFF checks did you accomplish entering the No-Fly-Zone?

66A: As far as me personally?

67Q: Yes. On the 14th of April.

67A: Um All aircraft taking off from Incirlik Air Base, I would uh check, I would see their Mode usually they're squawking certain codes.

68Q: Could you tell the codes in which you were interrogated on that day?

68A: I had a Mode II corridor and Mode II is the primary identification for aircraft. I then I would, um, not sure if this is classified or not.

69Q: Did you conduct Mode IV on each of the aircraft?

69A: Yes, sir.

70Q: On each of the fighter aircraft?

70A: Yes, sir. On each of the fighters coming out of Incirlik.

71Q: Who's responsible for IFF checks on helicopter out of the AOR, for helicopters do you perform those same IFF checks, do you check the Mode II and Mode IV ?

71A: We'll check Mode IV if they request it, but as far as I know there is no standard procedure to check their Mode IV . -- If they're squawking Mode II then--then we will be able to ID them, but um, helicopters come and go pretty much as they please.

**CONTROL WITNESS #13**

72Q: So on the 14th do you recall seeing Eagle Flight, I think it was Echo Echo Zero One symbology?

72A: Yes sir, I saw them, they checked in as they were hitting gate one into the AOR.

73Q: Did they come up on your frequency?

73A: Yes, they did.

74Q: Did you conduct a Mode IV check on Eagle zero one flight?

74A: Not that I recall.

75Q: Were you aware of any other helicopters operating in the No-Fly-Zone?

75A: There were none at that time that I was aware of, but my--my--my personal area of responsibility is not to watch the AOR. I'm watching the corridor between Incirlik and gate one.

76Q: Okay. On the 14th of April between hours of 0600 and 0738 the echo--the Eagle Flight originated outside of the AOR, is that correct?

76A: Yes, sir.

77Q: And proceeded to gate one?

77A: Yes, sir.

78Q: And he came--the Eagle Flight came up on your control frequency?

78A: That's where they normally check in as they enter the AOR.

79Q: Once he entered the AOR what frequency did he go to?

79A: I believed he stayed on enroute frequency.

80Q: He stayed on your frequency as he entered the No-Fly-Zone?

80A: Yes, sir.

#### **Questions by General Andrus:**

81Q: You say that you picked him up as he was coming out to check his Mode IV, check Mode II, and do you recall if you check his Mode I I don't remember if you.....

81A: Sir, I saw him squawking a Mode I and Mode II and that's--the Mode II is basically what we ID on.

82Q: Do you remember what Mode I he was squawking by any chance?

82A: I believe it was either a four two or four three.

83Q: What would have been the normal Mode I for that position over Turkey? Do you recall, the code name?

#### **CONTROL WITNESS #13**

83A: I can't recall.

84Q: Would it have been four two or would it have been three?

84A: It was -- it was the correct helicopter mode for Turkey.

85A: For that area.

85Q: Yes, that's correct.

86Q: And I believe you said before, whoever picked them up first would tag them with symbology, does that mean you toggle tagged this particular flight Eagle Flight?

86A: Yes, sir, he checked up my frequency, I saw them first. I applied the symbology.

87Q: And then, just to clarify, the aircraft then proceeded to gate one.

87A: No, sir, he checked up at gate one.

88Q: Checked up at gate one, okay, and then proceeded south. Is that correct?

88A: He was heading southeast, I believe.

89Q: In the AOR. And he had been tagged already? You'd already tagged him? I just want to clarify.

89A: No Audible response.

#### **Questions by Major Byas:**

90Q: Is there a common frequency for AWACS, fighters, and helicopters?

90A: No, sir.

91Q: Do helicopters conduct flights when you are not in your orbit area?

91A: Sir, I really don't know the answer to that.

92Q: One question I have on the helicopters from our little list here. Were you tracking the helicopters inside of the AOR (tactical area of operations)?

92A: No, sir. As the enroute controller, I don't watch the AOR or the tanker orbits. I basically watch the area, the corridor, the air corridor that leads from Incirlik to the gate.

93Q: What procedures are normally followed for loss of radio contact or radar between the AWACS and the helicopters? What are your normal procedures? You stated on previous flights that you--you had previous here, as an AOR controller. What do you normally do when you lose radar, radio contact with an aircraft that's in your area?

93A: For a helicopter?

94Q: Yes.

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94A: There are no procedures established that I know of. Now the helicopters generally do drop out because they land a lot and they take off and they hit various points along their routes.

95Q: Did the Eagle flight request fighter escort?

95A: No sir.

**Questions by General Andrus:**

96Q: Again to clarify what you were saying before, do the helicopters normally check in and out with any of the AWACS controllers as they land and take off from various locations within the AOR?

96A: Sometimes.

97Q: Sometimes they do, sometimes you hear them. Does that mean that they may be doing it and it maybe that due to radio difficulties you are not hearing them or is your experience that they are sometimes sporadic in whether or not they are going to check in and out you with you? Do you think it is normal practice for them to check in and out with AWACS as they land and take off from various places?

97A: They do that most of the time it may be due to radio--radio limitations, line of sight.

98Q: Occasionally you may not hear them but that's normally due to a radio problem. Is that a correct statement?

98A: I would say so. I know there are times when I hardly heard anything from Eagle flight and other times they would be very specific and talk to us frequently at every point. I believe it depends on the individual flying the helicopter.

**Questions by Major Byas:**

99Q: As the enroute controller as the first flight of the day enters the tactical area of operation, I think that's the Tiger flight, did you give them a "picture" prior to, or did you brief them on the helicopters in the AOR prior to them entering that area?

99A: No sir, I didn't give them any "picture call" regarding the AOR whatsoever.

100Q: To the best of your recollection do you recall being able to see the helicopter's symbology at the time the F-15s entered the tactical area of operation?

100A: At that time sir I was doing my--I was watching my AOR which was the corridor.

101Q: About that time, how many aircraft did you have under your--your supervision?

101A: I honestly can't recall, I do have a log of the aircraft though.

102Q: Okay, we found a flow sheeting at the very beginning of the whole operation. Can you give me an estimate? I don't need to know the exact number.

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102A: Maybe ten or fifteen.

103Q: So you are talking--you had talked to or were going to talk to ten to fifteen aircrafts?

103A: That's affirmative.

104Q: And accomplish Mode IV checks and those things on those aircraft?

104A: Yes sir.

**Questions by General Andrus:**

105Q: And going along with that, tagging them with symbology, and all of the other things that go along with what you previously described at the end of a controller's duties.

105A: Yes, sir.

**Questions by Major Byas:**

106Q: How many aircrafts do you--would it conceivable for a weapons controller to normally control at one time...

106A: Um ....

107Q: ...and maintain some sense of situational awareness? I know it's kind of a broad question, but give me a general number.

107A: I suppose that would be, that would depend on what you were controlling. If you were controlling an intercept or if you were the enroute controller.

108Q: As an enroute controller, how many do you generally talk to at one time?

108A: Probably about that amount--amount, ten to fifteen aircraft.

109Q: As a -- in the other seat that you -- as the tactical AOR controller how many do you feel comfortable with, does the normal weapons controller feel comfortable with controlling in the tactical area of operation?

109A: I --- wouldn't really know, I mean ...

110Q: From your past experience ...

110A: ... from me personally, um it usually gets pretty crowded if there are more than maybe five, five flights of the aircraft in there, starts getting crowded.

111Q: Okay. Is it standard procedures for you to notify the fighter aircraft or helicopter activity in the No-Fly-Zone? Do you normally notify them? I understand that this was your first flight on this deployment. Is that correct?

111A: Yes sir.

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112Q: So using your past knowledge is it normal procedures for you to notify helicopters - F-15s or any type of fighter aircraft that there are helicopters in the area?

112A: There are no set procedures though if a heli--if a fighter would call a contact and we would have prep codes there we would say that was a friendly there..

113Q: One question I had and I would like this restated, who is responsible for tracking "unknown" north of the 36 inside the No-Fly-Zone?

113A: There is really no set procedures, it's just whoever ...

114Q: Is it the weapons section responsibility or the surveillance section responsibility?

114A: To track unknown aircraft ...

115Q: Right, if a pop up--if a pop up track appears north of the 36, who is going to initiate symbology on that--that track?

115A: Whoever would see it first would initiate the symbology.

116Q: Whether it be the surveillance section or the weapons section?

116A: That's correct.

117Q: From previous testimony the surveillance section states their responsibilities for south of the 36, specially south of the 36.

117A: That's--that's correct.

118Q: Now someone has to be specially responsible for north of the 36, or is that ...

118A: As far as responsible for tracking, weapons is responsible for tracking fighter aircraft north of the 36. I'm not saying that we are not responsible for tracking unknown aircraft, I'm just saying whoever sees the aircraft would apply symbology on it and track if they saw it.

Surveillance, is a general rule, will watch south of the 36 line and we will watch north of the 36 line because we are tracking our fighters.

#### **Questions by General Andrus:**

119Q: To clarify if I might, although surveillance has responsibility for tracking and tagging targets south of the 36 parallel, if they should detect one and see one north of the 36 parallel that has not already been tagged, they may assist if I understand what you're saying they may assist the weapons by tagging that as well, is that correct?

119A: That's correct.

120Q: Would the weapons section do the same sort of thing to assist the surveillance section south of the 36?

120A: Yes sir. In the past we've done that.

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121Q: So even though both sections have a primary area of responsibility it would not be usually for one section or the other to go beyond that to assist if they saw the situation first, is that correct?

121A: In my experience that's correct.

122Q: You work together as a ....

122A: Team effort.

123Q: ...effort.

123A: No audible response.

#### **Questions by Major Byas:**

124Q: Are dead recce procedures trained--taught, are you aware of the dead recce procedures?

124A: No, sir.

125Q: We will just leave that alone. We can take a break when you get ready. Okay

125A: Okay.

#### **Questions by General Andrus:**

126Q: Could I just summarized just a few more questions to clarify and make sure that what you said previously I understand correctly and then to make sure that I filled in gaps. Does anyone on the AWACS receive the flight plan information for helicopters to the best of your knowledge?

126A: No, I don't believe so sir, to the best of my knowledge, no.

127Q: I believe we just established that it is the primary responsibility of the weapons section to tag helicopters that are first detected inside the No-Fly-Zone, is that correct? Did I understand that correctly?

127A: Could you say that again, sir.

128Q: If it's the ...if it's the responsibility of the surveillance section to tag the symbology radar contacts, contact south of the 36 parallel, is it the responsibility of the weapons section to normally tag contacts within the AOR, within the No-Fly-Zone north of the 36 parallel. Was that the way you described the two responsibilities of the two sections?

128A: I guess you can say that sir, yes.

129Q: And again this is stated again to make sure that we're understanding each other. Who then is responsible for tagging helicopters or tagging any unknown airborne aircraft that has not previously been tagged that are discovered within the No-Fly-Zone--Papa?

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129A: I think its question now, usually whoever sees it will tag it up, as far as who is responsible...

130Q: Weapons or surveillance?

130A: ... (long pause) I really don't know how to answer this question. Weapons has the responsibility of tracking its aircraft in the AOR and if they see a pop up target in the AOR they will initiate symbology, but then again so will surveillance. It was--there is no one that's responsible for initiating for pop up tracks. Its just whoever sees him will initiate the symbology. However we are responsible for tracking our aircraft, our fighter aircraft into our control, in the AOR.

131Q: Who will verify that? Who would have a responsibility for working, for any pop up target within the inflight area?

131A: That would be weapons.

132Q: And of weapons which position would that normally be?

132A: The AOR controller.

I appreciate your patience, I thought that's what you said earlier..... Lets take a break at this time.

[The board recessed at 2050 hours, 20 April 1994.]

[The board reconvened at 2054 hours, 20 April 1994]

#### **Questions by Major Byas:**

133Q: What type of symbology did you put on to initiate on the helicopter?

133A: I initiated a friendly helicopter general, FHG.

134Q: So everyone on the airplane would have known that was a helicopter? If they looked at that symbology?

134A: Yes, sir.

135Q: What frequencies were you monitoring?

135A: Well I was at the--in my, do you want me to break it down by the different positions?

136Q: No I have it here so why don't you just tell me?

136A: Okay. My alpha as my primary I had the enroute frequency and I had that turned up fairly loud. Let see, in Bravo I believe it was I'm not sure if it was the tanker or the AOR, but those were in the Bravo and Charlie frequency, one or the other flip flopped. And then in the Delta I believe I had the Duke's frequency.

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137Q: Were you monitoring the AOR Have Quick frequency?

137A: I believe I had it up one click.

138Q: Does one click mean you hear it okay, or you can hear very little or ..

138A: It was more of a background, background radio.

**Questions by Colonel Wilcox:**

139Q: Does one click indicate a volume setting?

139A: Yes sir.

**Questions by General Andrus:**

140Q: Were you also monitoring any of the guard frequencies?

140A: Yes

141Q: Which one?

141A: I believe it was UHF guard 2 43 0.

**Questions by Major Byas:**

142Q: When the helicopter came up on your frequencies did he report to you his destination?

142A: The helicopter made two transmissions that I heard, first one was a general check in at gate one and then he made a another transmission that he was reporting that he was leaving Whiskey and heading towards Lima.

143Q: Is it normal procedures for helicopters to go directly from one point to the other or do they vary their route?

143A: The helicopters as far as I've seen they fly whatever route they want to. If they report in at all they'll say we are going from this point to this point but we don't have a route or they don't tell us, they don't particularly fly straight lines or--at any particular altitude.

144Q: And they do not inform you whether they are going to deviate from one point to the other?

144A: As ....

145Q: Do they inform you if they are not going to go from point Whiskey to point ....

145A: A straight route or a devious route or something along those lines; no they just say we are leaving point Whiskey we're going to Lima. How they get there is totally up to them.

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146Q: What IFF code was Eagle Flight squawking once he entered the No-Fly-Zone? Once he went through gate one, did you recheck his IFF to ensure that he changed over to the No-Fly-Zone frequency or ?

146A: Well, sir....

147Q: Or was that not your procedures?

147A: ... He landed at, I believed he landed at Zakhu and then his Modes--he landed so he had no modes so we didn't see him after that and when he took off again I believe he was squawking a mode to 5530.

#### **Questions by General Andrus:**

148Q: Do you recall what Mode I he was squawking before he took off?

148A: No sir.

#### **Questions by Major Byas:**

149Q: Were you monitoring Mode I? Did you have an area up where you could monitor Mode I?

149A: Sir, that's not possible on our system. We're only able to monitor one type of Mode in corridor and since Mode II is the primary means of identification, we'll usually throw up a Mode II corridor.

150Q: So is it standard procedure once weapons develop the corridor to assign those corridors Mode II?

150A: Yes, sir. As far as in my experience, that's my personal technique.

151Q: On each of the frequencies that you were monitoring on the 14th of April, could you describe the types of information that you receive on the AOR frequencies, types of information you may hear on the tanker frequencies?

151A: On the AOR frequency, generally you would hear the AOR controller giving a picture call and any contacts that the aircraft fighter would get would be called back to us to see if we saw what they saw. On tanker frequency generally it's been on comm tanker frequency and for fighters we generally don't say anything to them because their radar is good enough that they--they can see the tanker; so as long as they are heading towards the right tanker, we generally don't say anything to them.

152Q: On this particular mission what was your primary radio assigned to you for monitoring?

152A: My frequency was the enroute frequency.

153Q: Does min comm procedures apply to the enroute controller?

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153A: No, that uh, you--it, that's a safety type environment. You have altitude deconfliction, you have traffic, so you--if if something needs to be said you could say it in plain English, "You have traffic off your nose twenty miles and he's at twenty thousand feet."

154Q: Could you define your interpretation of minimal communication, min comm?

154A: That's saying as little as possible, if it doesn't need to be said.

155Q: Does min comm apply to the tactical area of operation?

155 A: No, in my opinion, no but it's on a Have Quick frequency. But if it, it's hard to explain. You don't want to be verbose on the control frequency, but you say what you need to say.

156Q: After the F-15s entered the No-Fly-Zone and before the mishap were the F-15s on your frequency?

156A: Could you repeat the question?

157Q: Okay, after the F-15s entered the No-Fly-Zone and prior to the mishap were any F-15s radio call made to the E-3 that you can recall?

157A: To the, once they entered the AOR, is that what you are referring to....

158Q: That is correct.

158A: Once they are in the AOR they generally would talk to the AOR controller.

159Q: Were you monitoring the AOR controllers frequency?

159A: I had it one click.

160Q: Did you hear any communications on that frequency?

160A: Yes, sir.

161Q: Could you tell me....

161A: I couldn't tell, I could tell you that they were talking on that frequency but I couldn't tell what they were saying.

#### **Questions by General Andrus:**

162Q: Do you recall hearing a conversation on that frequency regarding the intercept of the helicopters?

162A: Once the intercept started to happen that kind of attracted my interest personally and I recall hearing fighters call out a contact and I recall hearing the controller say "Clean. We didn't have a contact there, and then they called it out ...

163Q: Excuse me, which controller

163A: ... the AOR controller ...

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164Q: The AOR controller called out clean .....

164A: ... and then, and then I after that, I kind of lost it for a little bit there, I believe I was talking to somebody on enroute frequency and I recall the fighter--I recall the controller saying he had a hit when the fighter called out a contact again.

165Q: Do you recall anything about the intercept?

165A: I recall the fighters saying that they had ID a HIP, helicopter, and after that I don't recall anything. I was probably talking on the enroute frequency again.

166Q: Do you recall hearing anything from the AOR controller after the F-15s called out the trigger contact and a probable kill?

166A: No, sir.

#### **Questions by Major Byas:**

167Q: Who put the,--do you recall when the Echo Echo 0 1 track was not on the scope, did you watch the engagement when the F-15 stated that they had contacts, did you focus in the area that they were looking at?

167A: No, sir, I wasn't exactly focused, I momentarily looked in that area and I recall pulling up a SIF fifth track TD-tabular display on the symbology that was there and then I went back to my area of responsibility.

168Q: What symbology was there?

168A: There was an unknown symbology I believe it was a new UEG type symbology.

169Q: Can you recall how long that symbology was there and who initiated that symbology?

169A: As far as who initiated it I can't say for certain who initiated it. As far as it being there, it didn't seem like very long to me.

170Q: When you looked and saw the symbology did you see any IFF or radar data associated with the symbology?

170A: I thought I might have seen maybe one hit.

171Q: Could you do define that hit.

171A: I saw a single green dot, a single IFF hit, but it was with our system, our system is susceptible to IFF jitters; could have been from anything.

172Q: So it was, was it radar or IFF?

172A: It was a single IFF hit.

#### **Questions by General Andrus:**

173Q: Do you know if anyone else in the AWACS saw that same IFF hit?

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173A: I--I don't know sir.

174Q: Did you hear anyone else--did you hear anyone on the AWACS advise fighters of a possible IFF hit and location?

174A: No, sir, not that I recall.

175Q: And personally how long did the IFF contact remain on the scope?

175A: I just saw it for a single sweep. It was just a single hit.

176Q: And the following sweeps did you see it?

176A: Not that I recall, and also generally with IFF hits if its a Mode II and number the mode should appear next to the hit, and there was no number next to it. So that green dot could have been a Mode II, a Mode III, or a Mode Charlie, or could have been IFF jitters.

177Q: Could it have been Mode I, or Mode IV?

177A: Mode IV no. Mode IV is only a response to a signal that we give.

178Q: Do you know if it could have been a Mode I?

178A: Mode I? I'm not sure sir.

#### **Questions by Colonel Wilcox:**

179Q: You used a couple of terms I didn't understand, and you used them together so I can't....

I'll have a difficult time bringing your attention back to them, I think I heard the word "SIF."

179A: That's selected identification feature.

180Q: What does that mean?

180A: That is basically the different codes that we have--we have five different codes. We have Mode I through IV and Mode Charlie which is an altitude.

181Q: Did you--did you say you hit a SIF? Is that the phrase that you used? I believe it was in response, it was at the beginning of the discussion about the hit on the scope. You noticed it, and if I have my notes right, you hit a SIF and pulled up a UEG?

181A: Okay I believe your talking about the track, the tabular display. We can pull up on a track a small table which has places for each of modes. And if we see--if the modes are registering, if our system registers those modes they will appear on this table.

182Q: What does the term UEG mean?

182A: Unknown Enemy General. I hope that's right.

#### **Questions by General Andrus:**

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183Q: Did anyone on the AWACS question the pilots about their engagement?

183A: Sir, it happened so fast that I don't think they really, that speed in which it happened we weren't really prepared you know. That's kind of difficult to talk about ...

184Q: Then when you say you weren't really prepared, will you explained what you mean, by that?

184A: It just, I personally, you know, when sometime--it would seem--um-- I can't really say because I wasn't sitting the AOR seat, so I don't know everything he was hearing--also he was being supervised by the rest of the crew, the SD, the MCC were watching that area with him and I think we were all pretty shocked at the speed in which this would happen. I mean we've had track from Saudi come up and almost come across the line and we never had people just say oh we got such and such target here and then we're engaged.

185Q: When you say that you weren't prepared you mean because you personally were attending to other responsibilities, did this catch you by surprise, it that what your saying?

185A: Yes, sir, I wasn't expecting it at all.

186Q: Do you recall discussion inside the AWACS aircraft, internal to the aircraft, about aircraft systems or functions or equipment functions or malfunctions taking place about the same time as the intercept and engagement were taking place?

186A: I don't believe there are--I don't recall any discussions. I know there was something a bit strange that we had our own trail following us, our aircraft.

187Q: You mean a radar trail?

187A: No it was an IFF trail.

188Q: So you had an IFF target following your own flight plan to path, and that is not normal, is that correct?

188A: Yes, sir, that's it--I've seen it happen before--in the past, but it's normally not normal.

189Q: Following your aircraft position on your radar scope?

189A: Yes, sir. We were at our location they would be our modes and codes would be right there next to us.

190Q: No discussion about temperature being too cold or too warm or anything like that?

190A: Oh, I really don't recall anything about, or maybe somebody complain the temperature they were saying it was too cold in the surveillance section.

191Q: Do you think in any way that could have distracted any of the crewmembers, talking about temperature at that time or other factors?

191A: I can't recall sir, it could have--it was probably sometime during the mission when they were complaining about it but I don't think anybody was complaining about it during the

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intercept because everybody, well I should say most of the key people were focused in on the intercept.

192Q: We understand there was video they made of the scope and weapons, one of the scopes in the weapons sections, do you know anything about that?

192A: Yes, sir.

193Q: It appears that at one time the video had been turned off for approximately two minutes and then turned on again, are you aware of that situation?

193A: The video was turned on and then turned off, we ....

194Q: It appears that the video had been operating for quite a period of time, then it was turned off for approximately two minutes and then it was turned on again just prior to the engagement, do you know anything about that?

194A: Yes, sir. We were--surveillance was tracking several what the Turks call special missions at that time and they requested me to turn on a camera. The camera was sitting next to me, so I turned the camera on and they were watching the special missions flow in out of Turkey into Iraq and back out again. We left the camera, on I guess for awhile and surveillance said, "Hey is the camera still running?" and then I said, "Yes" and I turned it off.

195Q: Then it appeared as they say about two minutes later it was turned on again, do you remember ....

195A: Well as soon as the--we saw there was a pop track, someone said hey turn the camera, so I turned the camera back on.

196Q: It appears then that immediately prior to the intercept again for just several minutes that the camera was taped over and a later portion of the mission appeared on the tape, do you know anything about that situation?

196A: I believe one of the crew members was trying to review the tape after--after the intercept and mistakenly hit the wrong button for a second and that ....

197Q: And that taped over the tape rather than .....

197A: I assumed that's what happened, sir, I'm not exactly sure.

198Q: Okay. Do you know who that crewmember would have been?

198A: I believe it was a staff member, Control Witness #12.

199Q: When did you first began to suspect that the F-15s may have mistakenly engaged Black Hawk helicopters versus Iraqi military aircraft?

199A: I supposed as soon as we were hearing strange traffic over the--I mean--I can't exactly maybe it was within an hour after the engagement or so, but I started to hear little background things on some of the frequencies and some of the people behind me they were monitoring the

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SATCOM and they were asking for some strange information. I was like hey what's going on here.

200Q: So subsequently an hour .....

200A: Something strange was happening that was out of the ordinary.

201Q: ... but prior to that you did not feel that there was anything out of the ordinary regarding the Black Hawk helicopters, regarding Eagle flight, is that correct?

201A: To my knowledge Eagle flight generally drops out for periods of time, will land on the ground for half an hour, forty-five minutes, they do that pretty often.

#### **Questions by Major Byas:**

202Q: At about 0930 Mad Dog received a--0930 ZULU Mad Dog receive a notification that AWACS had IFF contact with on Eagle Flight, were you aware of that transmission?

202A: No, sir.

203Q: Were you aware of possible relocating that aircraft at some later time?

203A: I recall they had some symbology in the northern part of the AOR was a helicopter symbology, but I really wasn't paying any attention to the AOR.

204Q: You stated that at the time of the intercept the mission crew commander, the senior director were both focused in along with the AOR controller on the intercept, is that correct?

204A: Yes, sir.

205Q: Was the Duke also at his--was the Duke at his position at that time?

205A: Not that I recall, sir.

206Q: The Duke was not on-- console?

206A: I believe when the intercept started to happen I think the Duke was on break or something, I'm not sure exactly what sir, I was--that is normally the beginning of a mission around the time is the busiest part for the AOR controller because they have to ID and track everybody coming out of Incirlik and so it's pretty busy, everybody checking up with you, so

....

207Q: Is it the Duke's responsibility to see that all the aircraft enter the No-Fly-Zone or is it the senior director, mission crew commander, who is responsible for ensuring that each of the ATO tasked aircraft enter the No-Fly-Zone?

207A: As far as entering the No-Fly-Zone, I don't know sir.

208Q: But you do know that the action is taking place by the weapons team. For every ATO aircraft, we say fighter aircraft in particular, that enters the No-Fly-Zone who is responsible for ensuring that you have your complete package?

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208A: I suppose it would be package commander, sir. I mean if aircraft are missing from the package we would inform Mad Dog that, hey these players did not show up.

**Questions by Maj Gen Andrus:**

209Q: By we which position specifically?

209A: I would assume it would be the MCC or SD would contact Mad Dog and tell Mad Dog that certain players had canceled or whatever happened to them.

**Questions by Maj Byas:**

210Q: Was the Duke the airborne command element on position when the F-15--prior to the F-15 entering the No-Fly-Zone?

210A: On that sir, I don't recall.

211Q: And as you stated earlier, during the engagement the Duke was not present or your not sure about that, was he on position or not?

211A: I believe at the very beginning of the engagement he was not on position, I don't know where he was, he was in the back taking a break, I suppose.

212Q: Just prior to the engagement was he on position?

212A: On that sir, I can't recall when he took his break or when he left, or even when he came back. I just remember somebody saying somebody get the Duke back to console, to the console.

213Q: I have one final question about the engagement and I won't come back--go back to that, were there any conversations from the AWACS plane once the F-15 stated that they had contact on two Hinds or Hip aircraft? Did the AOR controller, did you hear anything ...

213A: On that sir, I--I can't say that I heard anything.

214Q: On your internal net what internal net were you monitoring?

214A: I was monitoring all the nets.

215Q: On your internal net during the engagement prior to the mishap, during the engagement and upon the mishap do you recall hearing any conversation or directions on the internal nets, that you were monitoring?

215A: I just remember hearing that the--said that the F-15s had ID'd two-two Hinds.

216Q: Do you know who said that?

216A: On that, sir, I don't know.

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217Q: Was there any other transmission that you could recall?

217A: And I remember hearing them say that they had splashed a Hind.

218Q: From the time that there was stated that there was a contact to the time that the splash that you heard on your net, how much had elapsed?

218A: On that, sir, I can't be sure of the time.

219Q: One minute ...

219A: It was fairly a short time.

220Q: Was it less than a minute, more than a minute?

220A: Maybe a minute.

221Q: Considering a minute is six sweeps ....

221A: It could have been a minute.

222Q: And sweeps is, for the record, is we're speaking in terms of the radar, how long it takes the radar to go around and perform it's function. Did the AWACS at anytime confirm the ID of the helicopter?

222A: Not that I'm aware of.

MAJOR BYAS: I have no more questions.

### **Questions by Colonel Wilcox**

223Q: Do you have any further information, statements or evidence that you wish to present?

223A: Well as I said I pulled up a locate SIF tabular display and after the engagement was over with I recall looking at it to see if there was anything in it and the TD I saw was F-15 codes which means that our system didn't have enough time to lock on to anything if there was anything there, it usually takes, I believe, two minutes for it to see a code and then lock it in and our system will automatically lock in like a Mode II and I didn't see that, so our system didn't have enough time to really sense any codes and assign anything.

224Q: After the engagement took place, did you discuss what happened with other crewmembers?

224A: Well we just said, we were just surprised at how fast it happened. I mean it just like they ID'd it as a HIP, then they ID'd it as two Hinds. Then all of a sudden they were engaged, and we were all surprised at how fast this all happened.

225Q: Do you recall anyone directing you or any other member of the crew to take notes about what had occurred?

### **CONTROL WITNESS #13**

225A: No, sir I don't recall any. Usually the SD keeps the logs and surveillance if something is going on they will usually do up a pencil figure on a piece of paper.

226Q: Did you take any notes?

226A: I personally, no, sir.

227Q: Have you discussed the incident since your return from the mission?

227A: We talked about it a little bit.

228Q: Who did you discuss it with?

228A: Amongst the weapons team.

229Q: Who are the members, by position, who--did you discuss it with both of the other members of the weapons team?

229A: We--yes, sir, we talked about a little bit, saying well you know this happened, this happened and gee I can't believe it. Mostly it was more like "I can't believe this happened" sort of stuff. What was going through their minds? We can't believe they did this sort of a thing.

**Questions by Maj Byas:**

230Q: Once you landed, were you instructed to take any notes, once you landed?

230A: They said when we were--when we landed we were taken over to the command center and said you could write your statement if you wish.

231Q: Did you write a statement?

231A: I basically didn't watch the engagement so there was not much that I could write.

COL WILCOX: You're reminded that this is an official investigation and you're ordered not to divulge the nature of the investigation or the questions, answers or discussions included in this interview with anyone unless authorized to do so by the board president, Major General Andrus, CINCUSAFE, or higher authority. If anyone other than a member of this board should approach you regarding your testimony or the matters discussed here, you must report it immediately.

COL WILCOX: Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: No, sir.

COL WILCOX: The time is now 2129, and the interview is concluded.

## REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

The above sworn interview statement, given by CONTROL WITNESS #13 to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board was recorded by SSgt Beverly Y. Moore. Words contained within brackets [ ], indicate language that has been substituted at the direction of the board, to avoid the release of classified information which could not be downgraded and/or personal details which would disclose the identify of the military members directly involved in the incident. The substituted language accurately conveys the essential meaning of the original language. Except as so noted, I certify that the foregoing transcript is a true, accurate, and verbatim account of that statement.

  
KIMBERLY D. PAYLOR-WILLIAMS, TSgt, USAF

V-011

V-012

TAB V-016A

V-013

CONTROL WITNESS 13

V-013A

V-014

V-014A

V-015

V-016

V-016A

**VERBATIM TESTIMONY  
OF  
CONTROL WITNESS #13  
963D AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SQUADRON  
(WEAPONS DIRECTOR)  
(2nd Interview)**

COL AT LEE: The time is now 1034 on the 30th of April 1994. The individuals present in the hearing room are the Witness, Control Witness #13, his Counsel; and in addition, Major General Andrus, Colonel Bennett, Major Lisanti, Colonel Teters, Colonel Velluz, Colonel Armen, Major Byas, Colonel Wilcox, Mr. Brummell, Colonel Fain and I am Colonel At Lee.

I would note that Control Witness #13 has testified previously and was provided with an advisement of rights at that time for dereliction of duty in violation of Article 92, UCMJ. At that time, the Witness elected to speak without the presence of counsel. Counsel is present today.

I would ask the Witness--Is it correct that you have requested representation in the course of further discussions with this Board?

WITNESS: Yes, Sir.

COL AT LEE: Would you name the Counsel you have asked to represent you?

WITNESS: Captain Teague.

COL AT LEE: And Captain Teague, if I could have your full name please and your duty station?

CAPT TEAGUE: My full name is Rita Ann Teague, T-E-A-G-U-E. My duty station is Randolph Air Force Base, Texas.

COL AT LEE: Thank you.

Control Witness 13 and his Counsel have had opportunity to review the draft transcript of his earlier testimony and I would ask if there are, at this time, any substantive areas that need clarification or correction.

(The board briefly recesses at 1036, 30 April 1994.)

COL AT LEE: The time is 1040 and we were briefly in recess for the Witness and Counsel to be able to confer. All persons are present who were present at the time of the recess.

**CONTROL WITNESS #13**

COL AT LEE: At the time we recessed, the question was whether there were any substantive corrections or clarifications that you wish to make to your previous testimony.

CAPT TEAGUE: This isn't a change to the previous testimony, Sir, but when the discussion was questioning my client about the monitoring different modes, specifically--Were you monitoring Mode I? Did you have an area where you could monitor Mode I?--that was the question. In the answer it says--it's a typo, but it's such a typo that the words don't mean the same things--it says, "Sir, that all possible on our system." It's "that's not possible on our system."

COL AT LEE: The language should have been "that's not possible on our system"?

CAPT TEAGUE: Yes, Sir.

COL AT LEE: We'll ensure that that correction is made.

WITNESS: As a clarification, I mean it's possible to have a Mode I corridor up, but I had a Mode II corridor up and it's not possible to have a Mode I and a Mode II corridor simultaneously.

COL AT LEE: Okay. Thank you.

Are there any other clarifications or corrections that need to be made?

CAPT TEAGUE: No, Sir.

COL AT LEE: With that correction, are you willing to adopt that as part of your testimony today?

WITNESS: Yes, Sir.

COL AT LEE: We have some followup questions that we would like to put to you to assist us in understanding your testimony, some things that we need clarified since we last spoke with you.

COL AT LEE: Colonel Fain?

## EXAMINATION

### Questions by Colonel Fain:

1Q: Would you please, for the record, restate your AWACS crew position on the 14th of April?

CONTROL WITNESS #13



1A: I was a weapons director.

2Q: Who, on the morning of 14 April, conducted the pre-mission briefing?

2A: On that, Sir, I can't recall.

3Q: Was a crew coordination briefing conducted on the morning of 14 April?

3A: Sir, that was so long ago, I can't recall.

4Q: Would it be normal for a crew coordination briefing to be conducted prior to each flight?

4A: For the first mission, yes, Sir.

5Q: On the morning of 14 April, were you given clear responsibilities for your conduct during that flight? Did you understand your responsibilities is my question?

5A: Yes, Sir.

6Q: Do you recall if friendly track handoff procedures were established for that mission on 14 April?

6A: Could you please clarify that question--friendly track handoff? I'm not sure what you're saying.

7Q: As aircraft arrive at Gate 1, for example, they have been previously identified, according to your testimony, as OPC participating aircraft. Your position as the enroute controller would be to monitor those aircraft prior to that point. Is that correct?

7A: Yes, Sir.

8Q: Would you hand those aircraft off to another controller, as they entered the AOR?

8A: Yes, Sir.

9Q: Was that duty and responsibility clear to you on the morning of 14 April?

9A: Yes, Sir.

10Q: Would that also apply to helicopter traffic departing Diyarbakir enroute to Gate 1 to enter the AOR?

10A: Sir, on our handoff procedures--only applied to fighters. We generally have no set procedures for any of the helicopters.

11Q: No set procedures refers to written guidance?

11A: That's correct.

12Q: Were you aware of any verbal guidance or training that you received prior to 14 April regarding the helicopter regarding the helicopter traffic handoffs?

12A: No, Sir, we never had any guidance at all on helicopters.

13Q: When did you first hear radio transmissions and become aware of Eagle 01's presence?

**CONTROL WITNESS #13**

13A: As I can recall, it was about the time they were at Gate 1, they just checked in with me and said--We're here at Gate 1. I saw their codes and assigned a symbology to them.

14Q: After their arrival at Gate 1, could you describe their route of flight to their next destination?

14A: They were on a general southeast heading, as I recall.

15Q: Did they make a stop after entering the AOR?

15A: They disappeared for a while so I assumed that they had landed at Zakhu.

16Q: Did you monitor their takeoff from Zakhu as they departed to the east?

16A: No, Sir. I didn't monitor their departure. They did make one other transmission and once they had made that transmission, I relocated them and set the symbology back into motion because we had suspended the symbology previous to that once we no longer had their modes and codes.

17Q: And the radio transmission that you referred to, can you tell me what frequency that was on?

17A: That was on the enroute frequency.

18Q: Do you recall the text of that radio transmission?

18A: It went along the lines of--We're departing Whiskey for Lima.

19Q: Were you aware of the physical locations at that time, of the points Whiskey and Lima?

19A: No, Sir.

20Q: Did you have information on board to provide you with coordinates or description of those points?

20A: Yes, Sir.

21Q: The radio transmission on the enroute frequency made by Eagle 01 reporting departure from Whiskey to Lima, was that transmission monitored by other members of the AWACS crew?

21A: I believe so, Sir, since anybody who had access to the enroute frequency could listen to that frequency.

22Q: Whose responsibility would it be then to monitor that track that originated from Zakhu to the east within the AOR?

22A: There was no set responsibility to track the helicopters. We're only responsible for tracking our own fighters that are under our control. I suppose if somebody were to be assigned the responsibility, it would have been the responsibility of the AOR controller since they were physically in the AOR.

23Q: Are you aware of the daily Air Tasking Order or ATO?

**CONTROL WITNESS #13**

23A: Yes, Sir.

24Q: Did you possess with you on the 14th of April a copy of that Air Tasking Order?

24A: I believe we had one in the weapons kit, Sir.

25Q: You did not physically have one at your station then. Is that correct?

25A: No, Sir. CTF has a product that's known as a flow sheet which has all the fighters that are leaving Incirlik going into the AOR and we follow that.

26Q: Does that flow sheet have the helicopter flight plans on it?

26A: No, Sir.

27Q: Prior to observing Eagle 01, at the Gate, as you described, were you aware that Eagle 01 would enter the AOR that morning?

27A: No, Sir.

28Q: Are you familiar with the Airspace Control Order or ACO for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT?

28A: Yes, Sir.

29Q: Are you aware of a requirement in that Airspace Control Order that aircraft will not enter the AOR until fighter aircraft with AI radars, Air Intercept radars, have previously swept the AOR?

29A: I'm aware of that. As far as our fighters and our own aircraft, yes, Sir. I have no idea about helicopters or how their operating procedures are.

30Q: So you do not consider that provision of the ACO to apply to the helicopter traffic, Eagle 01, in particular?

30A: To my understanding, it was for the aircraft that were operating out of Incirlik, mostly fighters and their support.

31Q: Moving to a separate area, who is responsible for IFF, Interrogation Friend or Foe, checks on PROVIDE COMFORT entering the AOR?

31A: Since I was the Enroute Controller, players originating out of Incirlik, I gave--I ID'd them by Mode II and I also gave Mode IV checks too, but helicopters--they are not really even in my corridor so I didn't do a Mode IV check on him, that I recall. I may have, but then I probably got busy with the other players in the corridor which is my primary responsibility.

32Q: Are you aware of Mode IV or any other IFF checks being conducted on Eagle 01 that morning by any other member of the crew?

32A: No, Sir, not that I'm aware of.

33Q: I'd like to move now to the intercept phase conducted by Tiger 1. Did you observe the intercept of Tiger 1 on their unknown contact?

**CONTROL WITNESS #13**

33A: No, Sir.

34Q: Could you tell me what frequencies you were monitoring during that phase of flight at approximately 7:20Z to 7:30Z?

34A: I was monitoring all my frequencies, however, the primary frequency that I had on with the most volume would have been the enroute. The other frequencies were on very low volume.

35Q: Do you recall whether you had traffic on your enroute frequency for which you were responsible during the period 7:20 to 7:30?

35A: Yes, Sir, I'm pretty sure I had players under control at that time.

36Q: What would be your primary responsibility during that period?

36A: To ensure safety of flight between our aircraft going between Incirlik and Gate 1.

37Q: In previous testimony, you stated that the conversations regarding the intercept caught your attention, to paraphrase?

37A: Yes, Sir. In the beginning phase of the intercept, I heard a few statements on the AOR on the Have Quick radio.

38Q: At that point, did you look at the Tiger track or the vicinity in which they were calling their hits?

38A: I'm not exactly sure at what time I looked at the area, but I did look at the area. I saw a single green dot. I saw symbology there. At that time, I pulled a locate SIF tabular display and in the TD there was nothing registering, no codes.

39Q: You made a physical switch actuation at that point. Is that correct?

39A: Yes, Sir.

40Q: Would you describe again what your actions were and what results you expected those to obtain for you?

40A: Well, Sir, we have a--we just hit a small switch. On the right hand side, there's a panel with--I guess it's called a track TD and we can pull that up and we input "S" for selective identification feature, and it will give us a small table with all the readouts for that particular aircraft, if there are any. I pulled that up and then went back to monitoring the corridor.

41Q: When you pulled that up, did you observe any IFF squawk within the data that was presented to you?

41A: In the display there weren't any codes at all registering.

42Q: If, in another situation, there were good IFF returns from an aircraft, not Eagle 1, and you made that interrogation, what would you expect to see in that data?

42A: I'd expect to see the codes of the aircraft in that box.

43Q: All codes squawked by the aircraft?

**CONTROL WITNESS #13**

43A: Yes, it should be capable of displaying all the codes, however, with the limitation of our system, it takes a little time--a minute or two.

44Q: A minute or two?

44A: Yes, Sir.

45Q: Would it also display whether or not the aircraft was squawking Mode IV?

45A: Only if you had made a Mode IV check, but at that time and even then, I've seen cases where aircraft have squawked--have had valid Mode IV squawks and on our computer still registered invalid.

46Q: Did you initiate switch actions on Eagle 01, at the point we're discussing, to interrogate Mode IV?

46A: No, Sir, it was in the AOR.

47Q: What UHF frequency, based on your knowledge of the Eagle 01's previous transmissions, do you believe Eagle 01 would have been on at the point of intercept?

47A: I believe he probably would have still been monitoring the enroute frequency.

48Q: Did you hear any radio transmissions during the intercept phase prior to the splash calls that would indicate Eagle 01 made a transmission?

48A: As I recall, Sir, the last transmission I heard was the one where they said they were leaving Whiskey for Lima.

#### **Questions by Major Byas:**

49Q: I have a couple of questions. One, do you recall the range at the time you brought up your track TD on the helicopters? Do you recall the range of the F-15s from you?

49A: No, Sir.

50Q: Prior to, or during, the F-15 engagement, were you aware of any other Iraqi activity south of the 36 parallel that may have distracted or attracted the aircrew's attention?

50A: No, Sir. I wasn't looking down south of the line.

#### **Questions by Colonel At Lee:**

51Q: Referring to the pre-mission briefing, you said you felt you had a clear understanding of your responsibilities for the flight. What was the source of your understanding?

51A: Well, Sir, we were told what our duties would be by the SD.

52Q: And do you recall how the Senior Director described your duties?

52A: Well, he just said that I would be the Enroute Controller.

**CONTROL WITNESS #13**

53Q: Did he similarly describe other people's duties?

53A: Yes, Sir, he specifically said what each controller was going to be doing that day.

54Q: Did he do that by task description or did he amplify?

54A: Merely by task description.

55Q: You said that your understanding was that your responsibilities applied only to fighters and support aircraft for those fighters. What was the source of your understanding for that?

55A: As far as I can recall, that's just the way we've always done it, the way we'd been taught to do it.

**Questions by Colonel Fain:**

56Q: Prior to the mission on 14 April, were you provided with a communications or COMM PLAN that listed the radio frequencies that each member of the crew would use?

56A: Yes, Sir.

57Q: Was that COMM PLAN executed as briefed or were modifications made to it by any individual that you are aware of?

57A: I'm not exactly sure, Sir, maybe one radio might have been down and there might have been some switches, but I can't recall exactly.

58Q: Did you execute the COMM PLAN, as briefed, at your station?

58A: Yes, Sir. Everything in the COMM PLAN was in my pushes.

**Questions by Colonel At Lee:**

59Q: Do you have anything further in the way of evidence or information that would be helpful to this board that you would like to offer at this time?

59A: No, Sir.

COL AT LEE: You are reminded that this is an official investigation. You are ordered not to divulge the nature of this investigation or the questions, answers or discussions included in this interview with anyone except your Counsel unless authorized to do so by the Board President, Major General Andrus, CINCUSAFE, or higher authority. If anyone other than a member of this board should approach you regarding your testimony or the matters discussed here, you must report it immediately. You may report it to a member of the board.

Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: No, Sir.

COL AT LEE: The time is 1101 and this interview is concluded.

**CONTROL WITNESS #13**

## REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I certify that the above sworn interview statement, given by CONTROL WITNESS #13A to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board was recorded by me by stenomask and that the foregoing transcript is a true, accurate, and verbatim account of that statement.



MAUREEN A. NATION, DAFC

Court Reporter

Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

CONTROL WITNESS #13