

Released 92-F01-1203
30 Oct 92

CONCISE HISTORY OF
THE MIDDLE EAST
FROM 1910

Historical Section
Joint Chiefs of Staff
2 September 1958

#453

FOREWORD

This concise history of the Middle East area since 1910 has been distilled from the best secondary sources immediately available to the Historical Section. The limited time available for the preparation of this study has precluded much investigation of primary sources as well as the use of some good secondary material that could not readily be procured. Almost all of the works cited herein may be found in the Army Library in the Pentagon.

The Historical Section has previously produced two classified studies on the same general area that may be consulted for more detailed information concerning certain phases of Middle East history. One is a compilation of resolutions on the Middle East adopted by the United Nations from May 1947 to February 1957. The second is a detailed Chronology of the World Crisis of 1956-1957, from 2 October 1956 to 31 March 1957, with a supplement describing JCS actions relating to the crisis.

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SECTION I
THE ARAB STATES TO THE
END OF
WORLD WAR II

Egypt

1789
Opening of
contacts
with the
West

The modern era of Egypt is generally conceded to have begun with the French invasion by Bonaparte in 1789. It marked the opening of Western imperial interest in Egypt, and with it, the inevitable dislocation of the old order. The ancient land was caught up and swept into the orbit of contemporary world affairs. The resulting impact of Western ideas and actions produced an ever-increasing momentum of change. To England fell the role of chief protagonist in championing and exploiting an awakening Egypt.

The contact with the modern world created a new context for Egypt that brought external pressures calling for profound internal readjustments. The established economic, political, social, and value patterns had become anachronistic. Thus, through the nineteenth century to the present time, Egypt has experienced a revolution of institutions and orientation. It was Muhammed Ali, credited with being the father of modern Egypt, who first met the challenge and seized the opportunity to usher in the new era.

1805
Muhammed Ali
and the
founding of
Modern Egypt

Muhammed Ali was appointed Viceroy in 1805 by the Ottoman Porte, under whose suzerainty Egypt belonged, and thereby was founded the last Egyptian dynasty, which ruled until 1952. During his long reign, Muhammed Ali pursued an aggressive domestic program of modernization and progress and a policy of territorial expansion. As a result of his enlightened reforms, as well as his military successes against the Ottoman Empire, Egypt gained the prestige and status needed to establish it as a nation-state in the eyes of the world.¹

¹Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Middle East, 2d ed, (London: 1954), pp. 174, 175.

Egypt's
financial
problems
under
Ismail

Muhammed Ali's immediate successors did not follow the precedent of modernizing and reform policies to any great extent. They were revived in part by Ismail, who ruled from 1863 to 1879, but his extravagances and military adventures brought about state bankruptcy which eventually led to European intervention. It was during the latter's reign that the Suez Canal was completed in 1869.²

²The Middle East 1957, 5th ed., Europa Publications Ltd. (London: 1957) p. 84.

1875
British
obtain an
interest in
the Suez
Canal

The Canal project had been financed by public subscription in Europe, chiefly in France. Ismail received a grant of 176,002 shares as his interest in the undertaking, but because of personal financial difficulties, he sold them in 1875. They were purchased by the British Government, which thus made Britain the largest single stockholder in the company. Thereafter, the Egyptian state derived no direct benefit from the profitable operations of the canal until the Suez Canal Agreement was revised in 1937.³

³RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 171-173.

1879
Franco-
British
Dual
Control

By 1876 Ismail had brought Egypt to a state of financial and political chaos. The crisis forced him to accept foreign control of revenues and expenditures in order to protect foreign investments and satisfy the nation's creditors. On 2 May 1876, the Caisse de la Dette was established to supervise the reduction of the

national debt, and toward the end of the same year, on 18 Nov, a partial condominium was instituted wherein French and British Ministers were appointed to the Egyptian Government. Finally, on 25 June 1879, Ismail was deposed as Khedive by the Turkish Sultan, under pressure from the European powers, and the Franco-British "Dual Control" was established over the country.⁴

⁴Ibid., pp. 176f.

Continuing political and financial instability, and the reaction to foreign intervention brought the first definite expression of a nationalist feeling. It took the form of an uprising of Egyptian officers. The insurrection, led by Ahmed Arabi, himself an army officer, provided the occasion for Britain to seize direct and exclusive control of Egypt. In the process of suppressing the insurrection, which ended abruptly with the British victory at Tell el-Kebir on 13 September 1882, Egypt was occupied. Thus began the long period of British military occupation.⁵

13 Sep 82
Beginning of
British
Military
Occupation

⁵Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs, 6th ed. (London: 1956), pp. 750, 751.

Egypt remained nominally under Turkish suzerainty as an autonomous province-state within the Ottoman Empire during the period of occupation prior to the First World War. British control was concealed. It was exercised through a small group of ostensibly minor British officials who were technically only diplomatic representatives equal to the other consuls-generals. British policies and the autocratic methods employed by

British
methods
of control
before WWI

the various resident administrators served to stimulate and give focus to a nascent nationalist movement. It rapidly took on the form of opposition to British control.⁶

⁶The Middle East 1957, pp. 85, 86.

From such amorphous beginnings, Egyptian nationalism gradually developed into an organized political movement. As early as the turn of the century, a Nationalist Party had appeared and had become increasingly active in voicing Egyptian national aspirations. However, it was not until the First Nationalist Congress, which convened on 7 December 1907, that the Nationalist Party was organized into a formal political organization under the leadership of Mustapha Kamel. Once the movement was underway as a political party, it progressively exerted greater and greater influence on the course of events in Egypt, and from then on, became the chief opposing force with which the British had to contend. As nationalism gained a broad base of popular support, the government tried to keep in check the intense passions and excesses that were loosened. Various policies were adopted in an effort to stem the tide. At times repressive measures against violence and disorderly agitation were applied; at others, appeasement. But repression proved only to intensify the strength of the movement, and appeasement only created further demands for greater reforms.⁷

⁷RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 178, 179.

7 Dec 07
Beginning of
the Egyptian
Nationalist
Movement

Constitution
of 1913

By the eve of the First World War, the effectiveness of nationalist pressure forced the government to draft a new constitutional system and a new electoral law, both of which were introduced on 21 July 1913. Among other concessions, a degree of limited popular authority was vested in a legislative assembly which was largely elective. However, the assembly met but once, in 1914, then was suspended for the duration of the war, for, on 6 November of that year, Britain proclaimed a state of war with Turkey.⁸

⁸Ibid.

18 Dec 14
British
Protectorate
established
over Egypt

The entry of Ottoman Turkey into the war on the side of Germany was the occasion for Britain to abandon the tenuous diplomatic evasions by which she ruled Egypt and to regularize her control by establishing a definite, overt status to the relationship. Accordingly, on 18 December 1914, the Government of Great Britain declared a British Protectorate over Egypt. The following day, the Khedive, Abbas Hilmi, was proclaimed Sultan of Egypt to replace the deposed Khedive.⁹

⁹The Middle East 1957, p. 86.

During the course of the war the Nationalist Party grew tremendously. While Egypt enjoyed material prosperity, brought on largely by the wartime price of cotton, nationalist propaganda was stirring up resentment against British domination and creating general discontent. With the termination of the War, unrest reached a point where it broke out into the Nationalist Revolt of 1919.¹⁰

¹⁰ Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt 1914-1951, (London: 1952) pp. 3-5.

Nationalist
Revolt of
1919

The event that precipitated the Revolt was the deportation of Saad Zaghlul Pasha on 8 March 1919. Zaghlul had requested permission of the British to leave the country with a delegation to appear before the Peace Conference. Permission was refused, and he, along with other nationalist leaders who were members of the delegation, was sent to Malta in order to prevent the presentation of the nationalist's case.¹¹

¹¹ Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 751.

Zaghlul and
the rise of
the Wafd

This act immediately made Zaghlul a national hero, and the Wafd (delegation) thereby was launched as a separate political party. From then on the Wafd rapidly overshadowed the Nationalist Party as the dominant popular force in Egyptian politics. Domestic reaction to the deportation set off a nationalist insurrection which was only subdued after military intervention by British troops under Field Marshal Allenby.¹²

¹² RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 178, 179.

The severity of the disorders was such that the British Government was obliged to undertake a basic reconsideration of the entire Egyptian situation. The Milner Commission was appointed to inquire into the causes of the uprising and make recommendations for rectifying grievances to insure against any recurrence. At the same time, Egypt's legislative assembly, which

28 Feb 21
Milner
Commission
Report

was now back in session, passed a resolution in favor of independence. Toward the end of the year the Commission summoned Zaghlul, the most prominent spokesman for Egyptian nationalism, to London for consultations. On 28 February 1921, the findings and recommendations of the Commission were published. The Milner Report proposed independence for Egypt, but qualified it with provisions for guaranteeing certain British interests and for retaining a substantial degree of British control.¹³

¹³RIIA, Great Britain and Egypt 1914-1951, pp. 5, 6.

Apr-Dec
1922
Nationalist
attacks on
the govern-
ment and
violence
against
foreigners

The nationalists objected to the Milner recommendations. With the return of Zaghlul from London on 5 April 1921, a series of attacks on the government began. In the numerous outbreaks of violence against foreigners that followed, many persons were killed. Negotiations were therefore reopened in London on 12 July, conducted this time by the Egyptian premier, Adli Pasha. They broke down on the issue of retention of British troops in Egypt and were suspended on 20 November. Internal strife continued, and on 22 December 1921, Zaghlul and other nationalist leaders were again deported. As a counter-move, the Wafd instituted a campaign of passive resistance.¹⁴

¹⁴RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 178, 179.

In view of the mounting power of the nationalist movement and the increasing effectiveness of Wafd pressure, British policy became more conciliatory. On

28 Feb 22
British
Protectorate
over Egypt
ended

28 February 1922, the British Government published a Declaration of Policy for Egypt. Therein, by unilateral action on the part of Great Britain (the instrument was never formally accepted by Egypt), the British Protectorate over Egypt was terminated and Egypt declared independent. However, decisions on the questions of defense, security of communications, protection of foreigners and minorities, and the Sudan were reserved for future negotiation. Meanwhile, pending final disposition of the reserved problems, the status quo would remain in these areas, with Britain retaining her preferred position and enjoying the same degree of control. Fuad resumed the title of King of Egypt on 15 March, and in the succeeding year, on 4 April, Zaghlul and the other nationalist leaders who had been deported were released from exile and allowed to return to Egypt. From this period, until the overthrow of the monarchy in 1952, Egyptian politics were characterized by a triangular struggle in which the contestants were the King, the Wafd, and the British Government.¹⁵

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 181; The Middle East 1957, pp. 86, 87.

19 Apr 23
Constitution
of 1923

The Egyptian Constitution was promulgated 19 April 1923. Relatively liberal and democratic, it provided for a bicameral parliamentary system consisting of a Senate and a Chamber. Three-fifths of the former, and the entire membership of the latter, were to be elected by universal suffrage; Cabinet Ministers were responsible to the Chamber alone. The Constitution also made Islam the state religion and Arabic the official language. It later served as a model for the constitutions of

Iraq and Syria. In the elections that followed on 27 September of the same year the Wafd won an overwhelming victory.¹⁶

¹⁶RIIA, The Middle East, p. 181.

28 Jan 24
Wafd govern-
ment comes
into power

Saad Zaghlul, undisputed leader of the Wafd and champion of Egyptian nationalism, became premier on 28 January 1924. With a sympathetic administration in power, popular discontent toward the still-exercised British authority over Egyptian affairs intensified and finally erupted in violent civil disorder. Widespread anti-British rioting broke out on 24 and 25 June. Settlement of the reserved questions, defining British jurisdiction and the extent of Egyptian sovereignty, was imperative.¹⁷

¹⁷RIIA, Great Britain and Egypt 1914-1951, pp.9-11.

20 Nov 24
Assassination
of Sir Lee
Stack

A conference between Zaghlul and Ramsay MacDonald, from 25 September to 3 October, failed to produce agreement. On 20 November Sir Lee Stack, the sirdar (commander in chief) of the Egyptian Army and Governor-General of the Sudan, was assassinated by a nationalist fanatic. The British issued an ultimatum demanding punishment of those responsible, and official apology, indemnities, suppression of political demonstrations, and withdrawal of Egyptian military forces from the Sudan. The last touched upon one of the most sensitive points of Egyptian nationalist feeling; Premier Zaghlul was prepared to accept all the terms except those relating to the Sudan. In the face of British insistence, he

resigned in protest. His successor yielded to the demands on 24 November.¹⁸

¹⁸Great Britain and Egypt 1914-1951, pp. 11-14.

12 Mar 25
Wafd
opposition
to the
government

In the elections of 12 March 1925, the Wafd was again victorious and Zaghlul became president of the Chamber. The nationalists then embarked on a program of blocking all measures of the government. Parliament was repeatedly dissolved, only to find on each new election a new nationalist majority ready to pursue the same tactics. This posture of intransigence on the part of the Wafd came to be the normal situation for the next several years.¹⁹

¹⁹RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 184-185.

In the meantime, in contrast to the lack of political cooperation, a measure of constructive Anglo-Egyptian progress was being achieved in the economic sphere. The Aswan Dam, the first of the great storage reservoirs on the upper Nile, had been built as early as 1902, and heightened in 1912. The opening of the Makwar Dam on 21 January 1926, marked an important stage in the utilization of water from the Nile. Egypt was growing increasingly concerned over the diversion of Nile water for irrigation purposes in the Sudan, brought on by rapid development of agriculture, which threatened to affect adversely Egypt's main source of water. A satisfactory agreement on rights to water from the Nile was finally arrived at and signed by Egypt and Great Britain on 7 May 1929: The Sudan was to use only the water from the Blue Nile, whereas that

from the White Nile was reserved for Egyptian use.²⁰

²⁰Mekki Abbas, The Sudan Question (London: 1952) pp. 73-88.

Egypt's economy, under British tutelage, developed along lines largely complementary to that of the United Kingdom; a monetary connection existed and preference was given to British capital and British enterprise.

Cotton was the chief export product.²¹ Egypt's oil

²¹RIIA, Great Britain and Egypt 1914-1951, pp. 152-183.

resources, although comparatively small, were exploited since 1909, chiefly by Anglo-Egyptian Oil-fields Ltd.²²

²²Stephen H. Longrigg, Oil in The Middle East (London: 1954) pp. 17, 22-24.

As Anglo-Egyptian relations were progressively deteriorating rather than improving, the British government determined to seek a permanent settlement of the outstanding issues between the two countries. Discussions were reopened on 18 July 1927, and draft treaties were prepared by both governments in an effort to find mutually acceptable compromises on the various points in dispute. Negotiations and exchanges of draft treaties continued, despite the intense opposition of the nationalists, until early 1930, when further efforts were postponed until such time as the Wafd Party's hostility would not prevent reaching agreement. The Wafd Party then implemented an organized program of

18 Jul 27
Reopening
of Anglo-
Egyptian
negotia-
tions

non-cooperation with the government and encouraged non-payment of taxes. A new series of outbreaks swept the country.²³

²³RIIA, Great Britain and Egypt 1914-1951, pp. 22-26.

To cope with the nationalists' defiance of government authority a new Constitution was introduced on 22 October 1930. It provided for a great reduction of popular participation in government. The adoption of the new reactionary Constitution served to consolidate the various nationalist and democratic elements in common cause against the government. For the next five years nationalist opposition, spearheaded by Wafd agitation, continued to demand a return to the Constitution of 1923. Eventually, sustained nationalist pressure proved successful, and on 12 December 1935, the Constitution was restored. A few months later, in April 1936, the young Farouk became king and his wide popularity as a personality immediately had a further ameliorating effect on the political situation. Shortly thereafter, on 2 May, the nationalists won a sweeping victory in the elections and a Wafd cabinet was formed under Nahas Pasha.²⁴

12 Dec 35
Restoration
of the
Constitu-
tion of
1923

²⁴Ibid., pp. 27-38.

In this generally favorable climate, the Wafd government of Nahas negotiated a treaty between Egypt and Great Britain on 26 August 1936, which was ratified on 22 December of the same year. By its terms, the British agreed to withdraw their military forces from

26 Aug 36
Anglo-
Egyptian
Treaty of
1936

Egypt, with the exception of a force of 10,000 men restricted to the Suez Canal Zone which might be augmented in time of war. England would also maintain a naval base at Alexandria for a period of not more than eight years. Egyptian troops were to return to the Sudan and unrestricted immigration of Egyptians into the area was to be permitted. Egypt was also to become a member of the League of Nations. Finally, it provided for an Anglo-Egyptian treaty of alliance for twenty years, with provisions for renewal.²⁵

²⁵Ibid., pp. 39-42; RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 184-186.

The following year a Conference was held at Montreux, in April and May, between the powers enjoying capitulation rights in Egypt. There on 8 May 1937, an agreement was signed to abolish the capitulations (the special privileges granted to foreign governments by formal conventions originally made by the Ottoman Porte). An exception was made of the mixed courts, which were to continue functioning with certain changes for an additional twelve years.²⁶

²⁶RIIA, Great Britain and Egypt 1914-1951, pp. 42-46.

The settlement reached between Egypt and Great Britain in the Treaty of 1936 signalled the rapid decline of the political power of the Wafd, which had thrived on the Anglo-Egyptian antagonism. Although it retained considerable political strength as the best organized political machine, the Wafd had lost its mission and thereby lost its popular appeal. As

8 May 37
Montreux
Conference
and aboli-
tion of
the capit-
ulations

1937 -
1938
Decline of
Wafd Power

conflicting interests arose among rival factions within the party, opposition between a number of its influential leaders and Nahas appeared. At the same time, considerable friction developed between the Nahas government and the King. On 30 December 1937, King Farouk took advantage of the situation by dismissing the Nahas cabinet and appointing Mohammed Mahmud Pasha, leader of the Liberal Constitution Party, as premier. Then on 2 February 1938, the King dissolved the Parliament, in which the Wafd still held a substantial majority. In the elections that followed, from 31 March to 2 April, the Wafd Party was completely eclipsed when the government party won an overwhelming victory.²⁷

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 48-51.

Rise of
the Moslem
Brotherhood

About this time the Moslem Brotherhood began to assert itself as a force in Egypt's affairs. Beginning in the provinces in 1930 as a religious reform movement, it rapidly grew into a wealthy and powerful organization, having great influence on Egyptian politics. By 1940 it was in open opposition to the Wafd. However, its activities were characterized by such fanaticism and xenophobic propaganda that it eventually had to be suppressed in the interests of law and order. Its terrorism of the late 1940's approached anarchy.²⁸

²⁸ RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 182-183.

Toward the end of 1938, in view of growing world tensions, Egypt began defense preparations to meet the threat of war. An extensive program of mobilization and

19 Nov 38
Preparations
for war

armament build-up was started on 19 November. Universal military training, which had been introduced earlier in the year, was now stepped up to expand the armed forces. Egypt's role in the Second World War, however, proved to be largely a passive one.²⁹

²⁹RIIA, Great Britain and Egypt, pp. 52-56.

Prior to the outbreak of war, Egypt's favor had been curried by Axis propaganda, including visits to the country by Nazi and Fascist notables. But what little pro-German sentiment existed was either isolated opportunism or merely a reflection of traditional anti-British feelings. On British advice, Egypt remained neutral throughout most of the war. By 1942, with the British Empire on the defensive, relations with King Farouk were becoming uneasy, and increased terrorism, directed by the Moslem Brotherhood at all established authority, was threatening internal order.³⁰

³⁰RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 186-187.

The only political party powerful enough and well enough organized to maintain control and to provide the internal stability that Britain needed was the Wafd. Therefore, in February 1942, the British Ambassador, accompanied by an armed escort, entered the Palace and forced Farouk to form a Wafdist government headed by Nahas. The Wafd, despite its traditional anti-British stand, gave wholehearted support to the Allies under the wartime premiership of Nahas. In 1944, when danger to Egypt had passed, the flourishing corruption, concentration and abuse of wartime authority, and general

Feb, 1942
Return of
the Wafd
to power

loss of Wafd prestige (because of collaboration with the British), all contributed to the downfall of the Nahas government.³¹

³¹Ibid., pp. 187-189.

In the general election of 8 January 1945, which was boycotted by the Wafd, Ahmed Pasha became premier. The new Premier was assassinated one month later, on 25 February, after announcing Egypt's declaration of war against the Axis. He was succeeded by Nokrashy Pasha.³²

³²Ibid., p. 189.

One of the most important acts performed by Nahas before leaving office, an event which was to prove of far-reaching significance, was in connection with the formation of the League of Arab States. The idea of an Arab League was inspired largely by hostility to the creation of a Jewish National State in Palestine. It had originally been suggested by Nuri al-Said, Prime Minister of Iraq. However, since the motives of Iraq were open to suspicion, Nahas was able to seize the initiative from Iraq and prevail upon the other Arab countries to hold a conference in Egypt under Egyptian sponsorship in 1944, from which was produced the Alexandria Protocol. This formed the basis for the founding of the League of Arab States in the following year at the conclusion of the Cairo Conference. The Pact (sometimes referred to as the Constitution) of the Arab League was signed 22 March 1945 by Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Yemen. To

22 Mar 45
Founding of
the Arab
League

these original signatory members were later added the Arabs of Palestine, Libya, and the Sudan. The circumstances of the founding of the League, thus, was a blow to Iraq's ambitions and gave to Egypt the undisputed diplomatic and political leadership of the Arab world.³³

³³RIIA, The Middle East, p. 87; The Middle East 1957, pp. 15-18.

With the end of the war, attention again turned toward demands for a revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, and anti-British feeling flared anew.³⁴

³⁴RIIA, Great Britain and the Middle East 1914-1951, pp. 82ff.

Syria and Lebanon

As in Egypt, the modern era of Syria was a product of the impact of the West during the nineteenth century. Among the European powers, France had the most direct interest in the area. Traditional ties with the Catholic population went back as far as the Crusades. Her commercial investments and other enterprises were based on long-held capitulatory rights granted by the Ottoman government, under whose suzerainty Syria belonged. These cultural and economic interests were carefully cultivated as an important cornerstone of France's imperial position in the Mediterranean and in the Moslem world.³⁵

³⁵A.H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon (London: 1946), pp. 24-32; 41-42.

Early French
interest in
Syria

Massacre of
1860 and
French mili-
tary inter-
vention

The event that precipitated entry into Syria and active participation in Syrian affairs by France was the Massacre of 1860. The Turkish government had been encouraging strife between the Moslem Druzes and the Christian Maronites in an effort to vitiate the traditional autonomous status of Lebanon and gain direct control. The resulting unrest culminated in a massacre of 11,000 Christians, which captured the world's attention and invited European intervention. Lebanon was occupied, with the consent of the great powers, by French troops in 1861 as a security measure to prevent the recurrence of further disorders. The international Commission that was convened to investigate the circumstances of the massacre drew up a "Statute", ratified in 1864, which formalized and defined the autonomy of Lebanon. Its terms provided the legal basis for the administration of the country until 1918. With formal political autonomy, Lebanon and surrounding Syria were immediately thrown open to an influx of Western influence.³⁶

³⁶ Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs, 6th ed. (London: 1956), pp. 734-736; 751.

Western-
ization and
moderni-
zation

Westernization, manifesting itself in trade, religious and cultural missions, and especially educational institutions, rapidly brought on modernization and intellectual awakening. It was largely the educated Syrians and Lebanese, many of whom had migrated to Egypt, who pioneered Arab nationalism. On the eve of the First World War, Arab nationalism, widespread among professional men, army officers, and government officials, was already a vital force in Syria. Moreover,

Syrian nationalist societies, such as Al-Fatat, were in close contact with Arab nationalists in the other Arab-speaking regions outside Syria.³⁷

³⁷The Middle East, 1957, 5th ed., Europa Publications Ltd. (London: 1957), p. 318; Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 755.

The revival of political consciousness in Syria, as in other countries of the Ottoman Empire, took the form of opposition to the autocratic rule of the Turkish Sultan. Two main movements developed: one aimed at limiting the Sultan's authority; the other was a movement throughout the Arab provinces for Arab national unity and self-government, but within the framework of the Ottoman Empire. A more particularist movement existed in Lebanon, where the large Christian element of the population, although not hostile to Arab nationalism, desired complete autonomy for itself. Soon, all of these movements began to incline toward complete independence and differed only in the scope of the political entities they wished to establish. In the meantime, European powers saw in the impending collapse of the Ottoman Empire an opportunity for expanding their imperial interests in Syria.³⁸

³⁸Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, pp. 35-42.

Even prior to the outbreak of war, the British had been secretly conducting informal talks with various Arab nationalist groups. As early as 31 October 1914, Lord Kitchener began making overtures to Hussein, Grand Sharif of Mecca, and tendered conditional guarantees of independence for the Arabs. After the entry of Turkey

Rise of
nation-
alism and
European
imperialism

31 Oct 14
Opening of
British
negotiations
with the
Arab nation-
alists

into the war on the side of Germany, formal relations were established in July 1915 between the British authorities and the Sharif, who acted on behalf of the nationalist organizations of Syria. In the ensuing negotiations Hussein agreed to undertake an Arab revolt against the Turks in exchange for British recognition of the sovereign integrity of a Greater Syria taking in a vast section of the Arab Middle East.³⁹

³⁹George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (Ithaca, N.Y.: 1952), p. 75.

The original terms that Hussein submitted for entering the war on the British side demanded recognition of the independence of all the Arab countries south of 37° North Latitude. The reply by Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Egypt, took exception to certain territories claimed by Hussein as part of the future Arab state on grounds that they were non-Arab areas, and indicated the remaining boundaries were acceptable only insofar as they involved territories wherein Great Britain was free to act without detriment to her Ally, France. Hussein accepted the British proposals in part, by conceding the Turkish areas but retaining a claim on the disputed areas of western Syria and the Lebanon. At the same time the French Government indicated its willingness to acknowledge Arab administration for western Syria only if under French influence. On 30 January 1916, the British agreed with reservations to Hussein's general terms, but left the issue of the exact status of the disputed areas to be resolved in the future, and the definition of the French sphere of influence undetermined.⁴⁰

30 Jan 16
British agree-
ment with
Hussein

⁴⁰Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, pp. 43-44.

26 Apr 16
Conflicting
agreements
of European
powers

Meanwhile, the Western Powers were making other agreements among themselves that differed greatly in spirit from the one concluded with the Grand Sharif, and conflicted with--if not directly contradicted--many of its specific terms.

Beginning with the Constantinople Agreement of 8 March 1915, a series of understandings were negotiated by Britain, France, and Russia on the future partition of the Ottoman Empire. Decisions on the disposal of Asiatic Turkey were formalized in the Anglo-Russian-French Agreements of 26 April 1916, which anticipated the creation of an Arab state and provided for spheres of influence divided among the three powers.⁴¹

⁴¹Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, pp. 67-70.

9 May 16
Sykes-Picot
Agreement

These understandings culminated in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 9 May 1916, which was secretly negotiated between England and France, but with the cognizance and acquiescence of Russia. By the terms of this agreement the territories formerly assigned to Britain and France as spheres of influence were to become British and French administrative zones, while the remainder of Turkish Arabia was to be divided into British and French spheres of influence, though organized as an Arab state or federation of states.⁴²

⁴²The Middle East, 1957, p. 318.

2 Nov 17
Balfour
Declaration

Among the other instruments that contravened the British agreement with Hussein was the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917, which embodied the results of negotiations conducted between Great Britain and the Zionist organization. Therein, British policy was committed to support the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, despite the intense and widespread Arab objections to the idea of Zionism.⁴³

⁴³ Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Middle East, 2nd ed. (London: 1954), pp. 20-21.

26 Dec 15
India-Saudi
Agreement

Finally, there was the separate treaty which the British government allowed India to conclude with Hussein's rival Ibn Saud, on 26 December 1915. Not only did it recognize the independence and sovereignty of Saud's domains, but it implicitly acknowledged his claims to areas that had already been promised to Hussein.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 24.

5 Jun 16
Opening of
Arab Revolt
against
Turkey

On 5 June 1916, Hussein, in accordance with the terms of his agreement with the British, began the Arab revolt against Ottoman rule. It opened in the Hijaz with an attack on the Turkish garrison at Medina. Two days later, on 7 June, he proclaimed the independence of the Hijaz. Shortly thereafter the Turkish garrison of Mecca surrendered, and on 29 October Hussein proclaimed himself King of the Arabs and summoned all Arabs to make war on the Ottoman Porte. The British government formally recognized Hussein as King of the Hijaz on 15 December 1916.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 22-24.

15 Nov 16
Beginning of
British
military
offensive
in Syria

The British, in order to support the position of Hussein and strengthen the Arab insurrection generally, opened an offensive in Sinai and Palestine. An advance, under Sir Archibald Murray, the British commander in Egypt, was begun on 15 November 1916. Several fortified Turkish posts were taken; then the British forces met with determined resistance. After two assaults on Gaza, which had been reinforced by German Asienkorps troops under von Falkenhayn, the British were forced to withdraw with heavy losses on 19 April 1917. As a result, Murray, the British commander, was replaced by Sir Edmund Allenby.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ William L. Langer, An Encyclopedia of World History, 3rd ed. (Boston: 1952), p. 938.

Arab mili-
tary
successes

In contrast to British reverses, the military phase of the Arab revolt progressed apace. Inspired by the British war hero of Arabia, Col. T. E. Lawrence, the Arabs embarked upon a successful campaign of harassment and thrusts against Turkish garrisons and communications east of the Jordan. On 6 July 1917, they captured Aqaba, then Maan and Dara, and began their advance on Damascus.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ RIIA, The Middle East, p. 24.

British
strategic
requirements
in Egypt

During this period, strategic demands required Britain to maintain large numbers of troops concentrated in Egypt. On the one hand, the vital Suez Canal had to be protected against Turkish advances from the north, two of which were attempted by Ottoman forces under German direction. On the other, the local security of

the area was threatened by attacks of the Senussi from the west and of the Sultan of Darfur from the south. Thus, it was not until the latter part of 1917 that General Allenby was able to marshal a strong enough British force to launch a second major offensive in Palestine and Syria.⁴⁸

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 469, 470; Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, p. 56.

By December 1917, Jerusalem and much of Palestine had been taken. The following year, when the Turkish front collapsed after the British victory at Mejjido on 18 September, Allenby was able to advance northwards again toward Damascus. The main body of the Arab forces operating in conjunction with Allenby reached the city 30 September and accompanied by a small British formation, entered it the next day, 1 October 1918. In the meantime, Beirut was taken by a French squadron on 5 October, and entered by British troops soon afterward. On the same day, 5 October 1918, Emir Faisal, third son of the Grand Sharif Hussein and commander of the Arab forces, proclaimed a Greater Syrian state that included Lebanon and Palestine. The remainder of Syria was quickly liberated in two operations: one by a British column along the coast, the other by a combined British-Arab force moving in parallel in the interior.⁴⁹

⁴⁹Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, pp. 57-58.

The role of Syria in the war, especially the northern sections, had been largely passive, for most of the suffering and military action had taken place

5 Oct 18
Capture of
Damascus
and liber-
ation of
Syria

in the southern part. The end of the war found all of the Arab countries freed from Turkish rule, but the whole of Syria was occupied by Allied troops.⁵⁰

⁵⁰Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, pp. 48-49.

Immediately, the nationalist aspirations that had motivated the Arab revolt began to assert themselves, and in so doing, ran head on into the imperialist interests of the Western powers.

On 2 July 1919, the Syrian Arabs convened a National Congress at Damascus and asked for complete independence, or failing that, a mandate by the United States of America or Great Britain. But France, invoking the provisions of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, insisted on French jurisdiction over the northern half of Syria. Britain acknowledged the French claims by relinquishing control on 15 September of that year and withdrawing British troops from all of the north of geographic Syria, with the exception of Palestine where a provisional British military administration continued functioning. In December local fighting broke out between the Arabs and the French in widely scattered points.⁵¹

⁵¹Ibid., pp. 50-53.

Early the following year a group of Syrian nationalist leaders offered Emir Faisal the crown of the Greater Syria that had been conceived by the National Congress in Damascus. On 11 March 1920, he accepted and proclaimed himself King, but the French and English refused to recognize him or the sovereignty of the state he represented. France was determined not to let Syrian

2 Jul 19
National
Congress at
Damascus

11 Mar 20
Faisal pro-
claimed King
of Greater
Syria

nationalism or conflicting British promises to the Hashimites jeopardize the implementation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement.⁵²

⁵²RIIA, The Middle East, p. 27; Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, pp. 92-93.

Although the Arabs had unconditionally rejected the Sykes-Picot Agreement, as soon as its secret contents were divulged by the Bolsheviks in 1917, and had repudiated the Balfour Declaration, both were confirmed by subsequent international action. The San Remo Conference of 25 April 1920, allotted France the mandates of Lebanon and the northern part of geographical Syria, while Britain received a mandate for Palestine, with the express obligation of carrying out the policy of the Balfour Declaration, and another mandate for Iraq. Later, the assignment of these mandates was formally approved by the League of Nations on 24 July 1922.⁵³

25 Apr 20
San Remo
Conference

⁵³RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 26-29.

Thus, with the full legal sanction provided by the San Remo Conference, France immediately began to establish her mandatory rights. The French commander in chief and High Commissioner in Syria, General Gouraud, advanced inland with a military expedition and occupied Damascus on 25 July 1920. Faisal, the newly-proclaimed King, was forced to flee into exile, from which he soon returned to assume the throne of Iraq, and the short-lived Kingdom of Greater Syria was at an end.⁵⁴

25 Jul 20
Deposing of
King Faisal

⁵⁴Harouni, Syria and Lebanon, pp. 53-54.

1920-1925
Establish-
ing the
French
Mandate

The French then set about organizing the mandated territory into a loose federation of semi-autonomous units under the control of the French High Commissioner. These consisted of Aleppo, Damascus, and Alouite, with Great Lebanon, because of the large Christian element in her population and her long tradition of autonomy, given separate status. To these were later added Jebel Druse, and the controversial Sanjak of Alexandretta, which was later also separated and given autonomy. On 1 January 1925, the states of Damascus and Aleppo were united to form the single state of Syria proper, and the following year, on 7 May, a much-enlarged Lebanon was proclaimed a republic. The first few years of the mandate were thus devoted to reorganizing the administration of the several regions in an effort to cope with the conflicting interests of each. In the process, French rule was required to adopt a progressively autocratic policy in order to keep in check popular resentment toward the mandate and the disorders generated by a mounting nationalist opposition.⁵⁵

⁵⁵Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, pp. 231-234; The Middle East, 1957, p. 319.

18 Jul 25
Great Insur-
rection of
the Druses

Arab nationalist discontent, which was especially strong in Jebel Druse and the state of Syria, broke out into open revolt on 18 July 1925, in the Great Insurrection of the Druses. It quickly spread into Syria, which became the locus of most of the fighting, and lasted almost two years. In the course of suppressing the insurrection, the French were forced to resort to large-scale military operations employing tanks and aircraft, and Damascus was twice subjected to severe

bombardment by the French forces. The revolt was eventually brought to an end in June 1929, and the rebel leaders fled to Transjordan.⁵⁶

⁵⁶Langer, An Encyclopedia of World History, p. 1098; Harouni, Syria and Lebanon, pp. 185-188.

In the face of continuing nationalist hostility, the French determined to seek a modus vivendi with the Syrians. The period from 1928 to 1933 saw repeated attempts on the part of both the French and the nationalists to draft a mutually acceptable constitution for self-government in Syria and to conclude a Franco-Syrian Treaty, only to have each effort frustrated by nationalist refusal to recognize any degree of mandatory power. Finally, a French-devised Constitution was imposed which made Syria a republic, and on 16 November 1933, a Franco-Syrian Treaty was signed that provided for the retention of extensive controls over Syrian affairs by France.⁵⁷

⁵⁷Harouni, Syria and Lebanon, pp. 190-199.

The signing of the Treaty, in view of its character and the circumstances of its adoption, met with violent opposition and set off widespread civil disorders. As a result, on 3 November of the following year Parliament was prorogued indefinitely by order of the French Mandate authorities. Nationalist agitation and unrest kept increasing, and in January and February of 1936 a general rebellion broke out with fierce street fighting in most cities. Martial law was proclaimed, but the effectiveness of a general strike that was called

16 Nov 33
Franco-Syrian
Treaty

Nationalist
opposition
to the
French
Mandate

throughout Syria forced the French administration to adopt a more conciliatory policy. The High Commissioner conveyed the French Government's receptiveness toward revision of the Treaty of 1933, and permitted the formation of a Nationalist Cabinet on 23 February 1936.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Ibid.; Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, pp. 234-236.

A Syrian delegation then went to Paris to negotiate a new treaty with the sympathetic Popular Front Government that was now in power in France. The French-Syrian Treaty of Friendship and Alliance was concluded on 9 September 1936. Its relatively generous terms provided, inter alia, for ending the Mandate within three years, assistance in the rapid development of the necessary governmental machinery of a fully independent state, admission of Syria to the League of Nations, and a redefining of the status of certain disputed areas of Syrian territory. Important economic and military rights were reserved to France by subsidiary provisions. It was ratified on 26 December by the new Syrian Chamber, in which the elections of 30 November had given the Nationalists a huge majority. Although the Treaty did not resolve all of Syria's grievances, its popularity promised to usher in a new era of internal order and peaceful relations between the Syrian Republic and France. However, failure of France to ratify the treaty, coupled with domestic problems involving dissident regions of the Syrian Republic and increasing nationalist involvement in the Palestine situation, led to new unrest in a few years.⁵⁹

9 Sep 36
French-Syrian
Treaty of
Friendship
and
Alliance

⁵⁹The Middle East, 1957, p. 319.

Conclusion of the French-Syrian Treaty of 1936 immediately brought demands for a similar treaty for Lebanon, which had existed as an autonomous republic since 23 May 1926. The Maronite Christians and other elements desired to preserve a status of political equality between the two countries, not only to counter the latent threat of union with Syria, which was the aim of the Sunni Moslem sections of the population, but also to guarantee Lebanon's competitive position in the Middle East generally. Compared to Syria proper, Lebanon was progressive and enlightened. Her thriving economy, more advanced stage of modernization, and cosmopolitan outlook had given her an importance in the Arab world far out of proportion to her size. Beirut, one of the few free markets of the world, had developed into the commercial and financial center of the Middle East. Besides trade, local industrial and agricultural enterprise flourished, and benefits derived indirectly from the oil of neighboring countries added to the prosperity. The pipelines of the Iraq Petroleum Company and of Aramco, as well as operation of refineries, port facilities, and other installations and services connected with the oil industry, were bringing considerable revenue in the form of royalties, fees, rents, wages, and profits. Any political reorientation of Lebanon toward a Greater Syria was seen as jeopardizing real advantages for the questionable ideal of Pan-Arabism.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 243-246, 248-251 passim; RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 478-488.

13 Nov 36
Franco-
Lebanese
Treaty

France complied with Lebanon's desire to maintain political individuality and on 13 November the Franco-Lebanese Treaty of 1936 was concluded. Similar to the one negotiated with Syria, its chief difference was in the wider military powers that the French retained. It too failed to be ratified by France. Nevertheless, negotiation of two separate treaties marked the formal bifurcation of the national destinies of Syria and Lebanon, which had already been evolving de facto over a long period of time.⁶¹

⁶¹ Harouni, Syria and Lebanon, pp. 186 ff.

Events in
Lebanon
during
World War II

With the advent of the Second World War, Lebanon experienced a series of postponements of the promised independence and constitutional rights. Even prior to the opening of hostilities, French policy dictated extending the period of the Mandate in order to maintain the strategic position of France in the Mediterranean. When metropolitan France fell in 1940 the Mandate was carried on by the Vichy Government. The Free French, who gained control of Lebanon the following year made a token gesture of liberation. On 8 June 1941, General Catroux declared the Mandate officially ended, and on 26 November of the same year he proclaimed Lebanon's sovereign independence. However, the exercise of mandatory power continued, albeit in the guise of temporary wartime authority for military considerations. By 1943 British and American influence compelled the

Free French to yield to the demand for popular elections, which were won by the nationalist 'Constitutional Bloc' party. When the new Parliament insisted on taking legislative action to convert the titular sovereignty into actual independence, the French Delegate-General arrested the President and suspended the Constitution. Public reaction in protest resulted in serious disturbances and the French resorted to the use of force against the civil population. At this point Britain, supported by the United States and the Arab countries, decided to intervene by sending in British troops. The Free French were thus obliged to restore constitutional rights, and through 1944 and the remainder of the war the administrative functions and organs of government were gradually transferred to Lebanese control.⁶²

⁶²Ibid., pp. 231-248; The Middle East, 1957, p. 246.

22 Mar 45
Lebanon
joining the
Arab League
and the
United Nations

On 22 March 1945, Lebanon became one of the signatory members of the Arab League, and in the same month was admitted as a sovereign state to membership in the United Nations. However, the close of the war found foreign troops still present in Lebanon. It required an additional year before the Lebanese Government, supported by the Security Council, could prevail upon France and Great Britain to evacuate their forces.⁶³

⁶³RIIA, The Middle East, p. 472.

In Syria, meanwhile, the signing of the French-Syrian Treaty of 1936 did not abate nationalist currents for long. It served merely to shift their emphasis

temporarily to the serious internal difficulties that soon arose and to the larger external issues confronting the Arab world as a whole.

Indigenous regions that had been made part of the Syrian Republic immediately began to demand autonomy and even secession. A separatist movement by the Kurds in northeastern Syria broke out into open insurrection in July and August of 1937, and was only put down after extensive use of the French air forces. In the northwest, the important Sanjak of Alexandretta was lost completely. Clashes between the Turkish population and Syrian Arabs prompted the League of Nations in 1937 to grant it autonomous status within the French Mandate, but partially under the policy control of the Syrian Government. Turkey, because of common ethnic and historic ties, sought to have it returned, and in the mounting international tension preceding the Second World War, French need for friendly relations provided the opportunity. Accordingly, on 23 June 1939, in exchange for a non-aggression pact France agreed to cede Alexandretta to Turkey. Nationalist indignation over what was considered a betrayal of Syria brought on a new wave of anti-French feeling.⁶⁴

Situation in
Syria on the
eve of World
War II

23 Jun 39
Loss of
Alexandretta

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 471; Harouni, Syria and Lebanon, pp. 205-217.

During the same period, developments outside Syria began to lend Syrian nationalism a broader context and identification. The growing crisis over Zionism revived latent Pan-Arab sentiment throughout the Arab world and gave it form and focus for the first time. Syria became the center of Palestine insurgent activity in

8 Sep 37
Meeting of
Pan-Arab
Congress at
Bladun, Syria

1936 when the Arab High Committee undertook to unite all Arabs in common cause against the incipient Jewish state. On 8 September 1937, the Pan-Arab Congress met at Bladun in Syria to deal more comprehensively with the Palestine problem. Composed of 400 non-official representatives from all the Arab countries, it passed resolutions and recommended policies, but its most significant achievement was the establishment of a permanent executive to provide economic support for the Palestine Arabs and to conduct extensive propaganda. The Bladun Congress was thus a direct forerunner of the Arab League.⁶⁵

⁶⁵Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, pp. 234, 267f.

As the Second World War approached, Syrian nationalism turned again toward opposition to French control and began to gain momentum rapidly. France, anxious not to weaken her military position in the Middle East, announced in December 1938 that no ratification of the Treaty of 1936 was to be expected and that the Mandate therefore would continue in effect until world tensions had eased. This, plus the resentment over loss of Alexandretta, led to protest demonstrations and rioting, and the French High Commissioner suspended the Constitution. When metropolitan France fell in 1940 the Vichy Government carried on the Mandate as before, but in the face of increasing unrest in 1941, promised reforms and partial return to constitutional procedure.⁶⁶

Events in
Syria during
the early
part of World
War II

⁶⁶The Middle East, 1957, p. 319.

14 Jul 41
Entry of Free
French into
Syria

Evidence of pro-Axis collaboration on the part of the Vichy authorities, as well as intrigue by the more irresponsible nationalist elements who opportunistically began to entertain ambitions for a Greater Syria, brought military intervention by the Allies. British and Free French forces seized the country, after a short but bitter campaign, on 14 July 1941, and a Free French administration was installed. General Catroux, on behalf of the Free French Government, had already proclaimed the end of the Mandate on 8 June 1941, then on 28 September of the same year he officially recognized the sovereign independence of the Syrian Republic. However, despite these formalities, the Free French in reality continued to exercise the same mandatory powers as their predecessors.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 36f, 471f.

Events in
Syria during
the latter
part of World
War II

The nationalists quickly recognized the old Mandate in its new form and directed their opposition toward the Free French. To cope with the agitation for restoration of Constitutional rights and independence, the Free French authorities imposed what amounted to military government and occupation. As unrest increased, the French resorted to force to quell civil disorders, but nationalist hostility persisted. Finally, in 1943, British pressure compelled the French to give in to the demand for popular elections, which brought into office the 'National Bloc' Party. Syria's new nationalist government, with the full support of the people and endorsed by the British and American Governments, was determined to wrest control from the French and function

as an independent state. In view of the British and American interest, the Free French reluctantly began the transfer of public services and administrative authority to Syrian control. Considerable animosity and tension accompanied the slow process of surrendering the complex apparatus of political and economic power.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, pp. 231-254.

26 Feb 45
Syria joins
the United
Nations;
22 Mar
the Arab
League

On 26 February 1945, Syria was admitted as a sovereign state to membership in the United Nations, and on the following 22 March became a signatory member of the Arab League.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 255ff.

Termination
of French
control in
Syria

Toward the end of the war, a final controversy arose concerning the remaining vestiges of French military control over Syria's internal affairs. It involved the 'Troupes Speciales', the French-trained internal security forces, which France refused to turn over before the conclusion of a favorable Franco-Syrian treaty. Outbreaks of violence began to occur between nationalist irregulars and the Syrian gendarmerie on the one hand and the French garrison on the other. When the local French commander carried out a bombardment of Damascus in retaliation for one of these attacks on 26 May 1945, the British Government ordered the Commander in Chief, Middle East to intervene with armed forces and British troops were sent in. Not until the following year was the Syrian Government, with the help of the Security Council, able to bring about the complete withdrawal of all foreign troops.⁷⁰

⁷⁰The Middle East, 1957, p. 319.

French Man-
date policy
and economic
development
in Syria

French policy toward Syria during the long period of the Mandate had been, at its best, paternalistic, and at its worst, exploitative. Although it held back political development and failed to encourage much-needed economic development, it had been in many respects beneficial. France provided a certain measure of order and stability during the traumatic transition from one civilization to another. Modernization was begun, techniques of government introduced, a cadre of professional civil servants trained, and a system of public education established. However, little was contributed to the creating of new industries or the improving of old ones. Syria's greatest economic problem was lack of investment capital, and foreign sources were largely denied her because of France's exclusive financial policy. Her greatest asset was her geographic situation. Revenues from the oil pipelines of the Iraq Petroleum Company and Aramco, that, to the credit of the French, had been permitted to cross her territory, became the most important item in her economy next to agriculture. At the same time this geographic situation was a vulnerability, for it exposed Syria on every side to alien political adventures. Postwar events again made of her a crossroads of ideology and imperialism.⁷¹

⁷¹Ibid., pp. 322-325; RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 484-500.

Saudi Arabia

The Arab state of Saudi Arabia, occupying the land that gave birth to Islam and the Arab civilization, had its roots in the Wahabi religious revival of the 18th century. The puritanical and reforming Wahabi movement served as a vehicle for the House of Saud of the Nejd, in the interior of Arabia, to conquer its neighbors and eventually to extend its hegemony over much of the Arabian peninsula. In the process, a dynastic rivalry developed between the Hashimites of the Hejaz and the Wahabi Saudis of Nejd over the right to rule the Arabians.⁷²

⁷²Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs, 6th ed. (London: 1956), pp. 740-741.

The modern political existence of Saudi Arabia is the product of one man's efforts in the twentieth century. Prior to the First World War, little Western influence had penetrated the Arabian peninsula, and the poverty and isolation of the land did not encourage modernization. Although technically a part of the Ottoman Empire, only a shadowy Turkish suzerainty gave this vast region any semblance of political unity. In this context Abd al-Aziz ibn-Saud, leader of the Wahabis and Governor of Nejd, in 1901 embarked upon a series of daring campaigns that by the eve of the war won him control of all of central Arabia and the Hasa coast of the Persian Gulf. The war itself was but a brief hiatus in the ascendancy of ibn Saud and the nation he was welding together.⁷³

1901
Beginnings
of ibn-Saud's
conquest

⁷³K. S. Twitchell, Saudi Arabia (Princeton: 1953), pp. 88-98.

During the course of the First World War, ibn Saud, aware of the agreements between Great Britain and Hussein, the Hashimite Grand Sharif of Mecca, did not side actively with the Allies nor participate in the Arab Revolt. He devoted his energies to consolidating and organizing his newly won domain in preparation for the inevitable clash with the ambitious Hussein, who had proclaimed himself King of the Arab countries and was already formally recognized by the British Government as King of the Hejaz. Britain meanwhile cultivated the favor of both. On 25 December 1915, after long negotiations, the Government of India concluded an agreement with ibn Saud which recognized him as Sultan of Nejd and acknowledged the independence and sovereign integrity of his territorial possessions. The following year he received a British mission at his capital, Riyadh, and promised to observe neutrality in exchange for a pact of friendship. By the end of the war, ibn Saud was in a position of strength, ready to challenge Hussein's claims to leadership of the Arabs, and to assert for himself a dominant role in the postwar political maneuvering in the Middle East.⁷⁴

1915
Relations
with British
India

⁷⁴The Middle East, 1957, Europa Publications Ltd. (London: 1957), p. 26.

As soon as the Turks had been driven out, the smoldering feud between the two most powerful rulers of Arabia broke out into open warfare. At Turaba in

1919
Renewed
conquests of
ibn Saud

May 1919 Hussein's forces suffered a disasterous defeat, but the Nejd success failed to be followed up because of British warnings not to invade Hejaz. Instead, ibn Saud turned north and in quick succession conquered and absorbed the territories of lesser rivals whom Hussein had incited against him. In August 1919 Asir fell to him. Then the following year he crushed the Rashidis and annexed their possessions; their capital, Hail, was captured on 2 November 1921, thereby putting an end to the Rashid dynasty. Next he took Jauf in July 1922 and eliminated the Shalan dynasty. When his northward expansion began to threaten Transjordan, Iraq, and Kuwait, the British intervened. On 2 December 1922 he signed an agreement with Britain to refrain from further aggression and to cooperate in promoting the peaceful interests of the Arab countries.⁷⁵

⁷⁵Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Middle East, 2nd ed. (London: 1954), pp. 86-88.

Within two years hostilities broke out again between the greatly enlarged Nejd and Hejaz. On 24 August the Wahabis of ibn Saud, incensed at Hussein's effrontery in assuming the religious title of Caliph of Islam, launched an all-out attack on the Hejaz. Taif was captured on the 5th of September, and in a short campaign all of the country, with the exception of the large cities, was overrun. In the debacle, the unpopular King Hussein, rejected by his own supporters, was forced to abdicate on 3 October 1924 in favor of his eldest son, Ali. The new king evacuated Mecca, when it was taken by ibn Saud on the 13th of the same month, and

Oct 24
Saud takes
Mecca

Dec 25
Saud master
in Arabia

withdrew to Jidda. The following year Medina surrendered on December 5th. Shortly thereafter, on 23 December 1925, Jidda fell and the deposed King Ali fled to Iraq. Ibn Saud at last had become undisputed master of the two largest kingdoms of Arabia. His domain, extending over nine-tenths of the Arabian peninsula, made him ruler of the largest country in the Arab world.⁷⁶

⁷⁶William L. Langer, An Encyclopedia of World History, 3rd rev. ed. (Boston: 1952), p. 1104.

1926-1936
Foreign
relations

On 8 January 1926, the victorious ibn Saud, Sultan of Nejd, proclaimed himself King of the Hejaz. The first foreign power to recognize his new dual status as King of Hejaz and Nejd was the USSR on 11 February 1926. Britain soon followed on 20 May 1927 in the Treaty of Jidda. Despite later acquisition of additional territories, the country remained the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd until 22 September 1932, when it was renamed Saudi Arabia.⁷⁷

⁷⁷The Middle East, 1957, p. 26.

In the succeeding years ibn Saud concluded treaties of friendship with other nations in order to establish a firm diplomatic base of international recognition for his country. Such a treaty was negotiated with Turkey on 3 August 1929; a similar one with Iran on 24 August of the same year; with Iraq, with whom there had been considerable dispute over frontier boundaries, on 22 February 1930; with Transjordan, where serious border incidents had occurred repeatedly, on 27 July 1933; a

second one with Britain (Treaty of Sana), which gave British interests a preferential position for forty years, on 11 February 1934; with Iraq again, in which Arab brotherhood was emphasized, on 2 April 1936; and a treaty with Egypt, after years of strained relations, on 7 May 1936. By the late 1930's ibn Saud had gradually emerged as one of the champions of Pan-Arabism. In contrast to the revived Arab Nationalism advocated by other leaders, he sponsored a less pragmatic approach that stressed cultural and religious understanding rather than political bonds between the Arab countries. His political stature and prestige as a personality gave import to his views and influenced the direction and character of the movement.⁷⁸

⁷⁸Langer, An Encyclopedia of World History, p. 1104; Twitchell, Saudi Arabia, pp. 100-103.

Meanwhile ibn Saud had been occupied with the difficult task of unifying and developing his country. Immediately upon taking over Hejaz the pressing need for territorial and political consolidation of his far-flung kingdom engaged his attention. The traditional loose political organization, based on personalities rather than institutions, which had been characteristic of Arabia for centuries, was an obstacle to creating the necessary administrative apparatus of a national government. Provincial hostility to centralization during these formative years often had to be overcome by force. The isolation of some regions, furthermore, invited local civil wars between rival factions both within and between dependencies. Conflicting border

Mar 34
War with
Yemen

claims, due to ill-defined frontiers, encouraged intrigue between dissident elements on the periphery of the kingdom and ambitious neighboring states, resulting in open rebellion against ibn Saud's authority. One of the most serious of these insurrections, incited by such outside agitation, finally led to a short war with Yemen in 1934, which lasted from March to May. The Yemen forces were completely routed, but through Britain's timely mediation a moderate peace treaty was signed on 20 May 1934, which merely rectified the frontiers and allowed Yemen to retain her independence.⁷⁹

⁷⁹Twitchell, Saudi Arabia, pp. 110-116; George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, (Ithaca, N.Y.: 1952) pp. 345f, 357-360.

During the same period ibn Saud began to introduce the minimum modernization that the primitive conditions of the country demanded before it could function as a modern state. Innovations, such as starting a basic system of communications and improving sanitation standards, met with popular resistance; on the one hand the sheer inertia of established folk customs resented change, and on the other the ascetic orientation of the Wahabia religious sect objected to material luxuries. However, a measure of progress was achieved, especially in the urban centers. The policy of colonizing uninhabited areas, which ibn Saud had begun in 1910, was pursued vigorously. It provided a solution to the problem of the unruly Bedouin nomads, who were prevailed upon to become sedentary in agricultural communities and thus became more tractable.

By the eve of the Second World War Saudi Arabia was a relatively stable and self-sufficient nation-state, although the backwardness of the country made her an anachronism in the twentieth-century world.⁸⁰

⁸⁰ Twitchell, Saudi Arabia, pp. 122-138; RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 122-138.

Oil
exploitation

The event in the modern history of Saudi Arabia that proved to be of the most far-reaching significance was the discovery and exploitation of the vast oil resources of the Arabian peninsula. The growth of the oil industry revolutionized Saudi Arabia and came to dominate her economy and determine her social and political life. Development of Saudi Arabia's oil was held back because of the famous "Red Line Agreement" of 1912, by which the large international oil corporations divided up concession areas in the Middle East and restricted competitive activity. Extensive exploration for oil had begun as early as 1933, when the Standard Oil Company of California received a concession from ibn Saud, but up to the Second World War, which interrupted further development, little progress was made in exploiting the oil fields. It was not until Aramco (Arabian American Oil Co.) was created by a corporate combine after the war that the tremendous potential of Saudi Arabia's oil resources began to realize in the form of actual production.⁸¹

1912
Red Line
Agreement

⁸¹ Benjamin Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers (New York: 1955), pp. 244f, 285-317.

1 Mar 45
Declaration
of war with
Germany

Saudi Arabia did not participate actively in the Second World War. Although an Italian air raid was made on the US air base under construction at Dhahran the military struggle did not affect her directly. Some economic dislocation was felt and a few privations experienced, but her role was largely passive and disinterested. On 1 March 1945 Saudi Arabia, hitherto technically neutral, declared war on Germany and consequently was a charter member of the United Nations. Shortly thereafter, on 22 March of the same year, Saudi Arabia became one of the original signatory members of the Arab League.⁸²

⁸² The Middle East, 1957, p. 27; Lenczkowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, pp. 347-350.

Transjordan from the end of World War I
to the end of World War II

1920
British
control
Transjordan

The modern history of Jordan began in World War I, when the area east of the Jordan River became the main theater of the Anglo-Arab war against the Turks. The conclusion of the war found most of what was to be called Transjordan under the control of Faisal, third son of Hussein, the Sharif of Mecca. After the withdrawal of Faisal, under French pressure, in July 1920, the area was politically split among contending sheikhs, but under British control. On 20 August, Sir Herbert Samuel, British High Commissioner for Palestine, declared that Great Britain favored a system of local self-government, operating with the assistance of British advisers. The country, however, remained in a state of administrative confusion until the arrival of Abdullah,

24 Mar 21
British
recognize
Abdullah
as Emir

Faisal's older brother, in November. Travelling through Transjordan, he rallied the inhabitants to his standard with the apparent intention of driving the French out of Syria. At a conference with British authorities in Jerusalem on 24 March 1921, however, Abdullah's ambitions were pacified by British recognition of his position as Emir of Transjordan, ruling under a British mandate.⁸³

⁸³Ann Dearden, Jordan (London: Robert Hale, 1958), pp. 41-45.

British
get
Mandate

This was formalized on 22 July 1922 by the approval by the Council of the League of Nations of the final draft of the Mandate for Palestine. This mandate, which became effective that September, gave Great Britain considerable latitude in the administration of the territory east of the Jordan River, including the power to exclude, as it did, this area from the projected Jewish National Home in Palestine. Transjordan was thus constituted a semi-autonomous Arab principality under Abdullah, subject under the Mandate to the British High Commissioner in Jerusalem. On 25 May 1923, Transjordan was officially proclaimed an independent state under British tutelage. The British would control foreign relations, finance and fiscal policy, and jurisdiction over foreigners, and would provide financial support.⁸⁴

⁸⁴RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 27-28, 353-354.

The borders of the new state of Transjordan had been set somewhat arbitrarily, and ran, consequently, across tribal areas and grazing grounds with little concern for custom or tradition. In general, however,

Arab
Legion

Troubles
with
Ibn Saud

the postwar years were peaceful ones. A small but efficient armed force, known as the Arab Legion and built up under the guidance of the British Captain F. G. Peake, was able to handle a few local revolts against Abdullah's rule, and the entire area was soon pacified and loyal. There was, nevertheless, a threat from without that was not so easily handled. Ibn Saud was at this time attempting to unify Arabia under his rule, and in 1922 his Wahabi troops advanced on Transjordan. They were stopped on the outskirts of Amman by British armored cars and bombers. In September 1924, there was more trouble with Saud, and, in June 1925, with British support, Abdullah incorporated the areas of Maan and Aqaba into Transjordan, giving his country its only port. The transfer of these territories to Hashimite control was a bitter pill for Saud to swallow, and increased the acrimony of the Saudi-Hashimite feud.⁸⁵

⁸⁵Dearden, Jordan, pp. 47-49; The Middle East, 1957, pp. 224-225.

1924
British
tighten
control

During the early years after the establishment of Transjordan, Great Britain kept only a loose control of the country. As a result, the fiscal status of Transjordan declined rapidly. In 1924, finally, with the country nearly bankrupt, the British Government decided to act. Great Britain tightened its control of financial and administrative matters, and Transjordan was run like a Crown Colony. Abdullah's powers were exercised only under firm British control. The British rebuilt the nation's economy, linking it with that of Palestine.

Transjordan provided grain for Palestine, and Palestine's coastal cities gave Transjordan Mediterranean ports.⁸⁶

⁸⁶Dearden, Jordan, pp. 49-50.

Feb 28
Anglo-Trans-
jordanian
Treaty

In February 1928, an Anglo-Transjordanian treaty recognized the independence of Transjordan, but left finance and foreign affairs under British control. Great Britain, also, continued to be responsible for the defense of the country. The same treaty provided for a Transjordanian constitution, which was promulgated in April 1928. Under this constitution, the Transjordanian Government was directly responsible to Abdullah, rather than to the people, and Abdullah was free to accept or reject legislation. He was assisted by a Legislative Council of five appointed members plus a chamber of elected deputies. He had, moreover, the right to rule by decree should the legislative body not be sitting. Following elections late in 1928--in which Abdullah's supporters won handily--the first meeting of the Legislative Council was held in the spring of 1929.⁸⁷

Apr 28
Trans-
jordanian
Constitution

⁸⁷Ibid., pp. 50-51, 54; The Middle East, 1957, p. 225.

2 Jun 34
UK permits
greater inde-
pendence

On 2 June 1934, a supplementary agreement with Great Britain gave Transjordan a somewhat greater degree of independence under British control. Transjordan was given the right to fix its own customs tariffs and to appoint its consular representatives in other Arab states. In May 1939, Great Britain agreed to the formation, in place of the Legislative Council, of a

Council of Ministers (or Cabinet), each member of which was in charge of a department and responsible to Abdullah. Abdullah was given direct command of the Arab Legion, which, under the English officer John Bagot Glubb, had been developed into an effective fighting force.⁸⁸

⁸⁸RIIA, The Middle East, p. 354; Dearden, Jordan, p. 54.

The Council of Ministers was formally established on 6 August 1939, and was indicative of the growing progress of Transjordan toward self-government. During World War II, the country remained loyal to its ties with Great Britain. In 1944, Abdullah suggested the negotiation of a new treaty to give his country complete independence, and an accord was signed on 22 March 1946 that gave Transjordan almost all that Abdullah desired.⁸⁹

⁸⁹RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 354-355.

During the 1930's, Abdullah had held himself aloof from the growing conflict between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. He offered, late in this period, a plan for incorporation of Palestine into Transjordan, with self-government for the Jews within this kingdom. He was also prepared to support a division of Palestine, with the Arab part going to Transjordan, or a separate Arab-Jewish Palestine state, as proposed by the British White Paper of 1939. Dearest to his heart, however, was his "Greater Syria" plan, by which Syria, Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan might be united under his

22 Mar 46
Transjordan
independent

leadership. He did not press this scheme until the war years, and he met with opposition on the part of Great Britain. Similar to this was a "Greater Syria" scheme proposed by Iraq's Prime Minister Nuri es-Said at about the same time, which envisioned an Arab federation built around Iraq. Both Abdullah and Nuri, however, were frustrated by the formation of the Arab League on 22 March 1945. This organization effectively halted "Greater Syria" schemes in the name of Arab unity. Abdullah was willing to join the League, but he never dropped his ideas about "Greater Syria," and his aspirations in Palestine would have a rebirth in the Palestine War of 1948.⁹⁰

⁹⁰Dearden, Jordan, pp. 55-58.

The Minor States of the Arabian Peninsula
(to the end of WW II)

Along Arabia's southern and eastern coasts lie a number of small states, mainly British protectorates, of varying importance. Some of them, rich in oil today, are of major interest to the Free World; others, without oil, nevertheless provide the West a foothold on the huge peninsula.

Yemen

At the southwest corner of the Arabian Peninsula, along the coast of the Red Sea, lies the small state of Yemen. Under Turkish control since the early years of the sixteenth century, and unsuccessful in a major revolt against this rule in 1911, Yemen gained some degree of

1911-1918
Yemen's
struggle for
independence

independence during the Italian-Turkish War of 1911-1912. The Turkish hold on Yemen was further weakened during World War I, and in November, 1918, Yemen became free of Turkey.

For several years after the end of the war, Yemen was split between the forces of the Imam Yehya, who claimed suzerainty over the entire area, and those of the Idrisi tribes. In March 1925, however, the Imam defeated the Idrisi, and by the following October had consolidated his hold on the area.

1926
Relations
with Italy

Three states dominated Yemen's foreign relations in the ensuing years. Italy, anxious to penetrate the Red Sea area, signed a ten-year treaty of friendship and commerce with Yemen on 2 September 1926, and an additional arms agreement the following June. The basic treaty was renewed for a year in 1937, and a 25-year treaty was signed on 15 October 1938. But there was no real chance for Italy to establish a sphere of influence here, and close relations between the two countries never actually existed.

1927-1928
Disputes
with
Britain

Yemen's relations with Great Britain revolved about the Imam's claim for territory in the bordering Aden Protectorate. During the mid-1920's, Yemeni forces occupied some of the disputed territory, and in 1927 and 1928 the Imam repeatedly carried out raids on the Protectorate. Driven to effective action, finally, in 1928, the British used troops and airpower to drive the Imam back to his original boundaries, and to force him to sue for a truce. Still unwilling as yet to give up his claim to the Aden territory, in 1931 the Imam at last agreed to refrain from pressing it and to begin

11 Feb 34
Treaty
with UK

negotiations with the British. This change of heart was due mainly to the rise of Saudi Arabian power to his north, which posed a threat to his own territory. After protracted negotiations, on 11 February 1934, a British-Yemeni treaty was signed, providing for friendship, co-operation, and the maintenance of the status quo along the disputed border area for 40 years. The British, for the first time, formally recognized the complete independence of Yemen, but were unable to secure a definite renunciation from the Imam of his territorial claims.

Apr 34
Border war
with Saudi
Arabia

In April 1934, Ibn Saud, provoked by the Imam's support of dissident tribes in the Yemen-Saudi Arabia border area, attacked Yemen. He forced Yemeni troops out of areas along the border that had been in dispute, but, in a moderate peace treaty, did not attempt to take over any of the area of Yemen proper.

The Anglo-Yemeni treaty of 1934 and the Saudi Arabian action of the same year brought peace and quiet, in general, to Yemen's borders. During World War II, Yemen was neutral, but waited until the British victory over Rommel before yielding to Britain's requests to intern Axis nationals on its territory and to silence an Axis radio station operating there. Yemen was a charter member of the Arab League, but did not join other Arab states in declaring war on Germany and Japan. It was not, therefore, a charter member of the United Nations, but was admitted in 1947.⁹¹

⁹¹Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, pp. 357-361; RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 101-103; The Middle East, 1957, p. 26.

The Aden Protectorate

Immediately south of Yemen, and running east north-east along the coast of the Gulf of Aden, is the Aden Protectorate, including the British port and colony of Aden, the only good harbor on the main ocean trade route between Egypt and India. The British captured the port in 1839 and, for nearly 100 years, it was administered from India. On 1 April 1937, finally, it was constituted a Crown Colony. A Legislative Council for Aden, granted in 1944, was inaugurated in 1947.

1 Apr 37
Aden a Crown
Colony

Beyond the port of Aden, the Aden Protectorate consists of the territories of 23 Arab states, whose rulers, between 1882 and 1914, entered into protective treaty relations with Great Britain. British control of the area has gradually increased since the dates of those original treaties.⁹²

⁹²RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 110-118; The Middle East, 1957, pp. 48-49.

Muscat and Oman

Next to the Aden Protectorate, for 1,000 miles along the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman, lies an independent Sultanate, traditionally associated with Great Britain, with the peculiarly dual name of Muscat and Oman. The country has been an independent Arab state since the latter part of the seventeenth century, rising to a peak of power and prosperity in the first half of the nineteenth. Since the end of that century, however, the authority of the sultan has not actually extended beyond the coastal areas. In 1913, the tribes

in the interior revolted and elected their own imam, and since then the interior has generally been free of the sultan's control. In 1937, Petroleum Development (Oman) Ltd., an IPC associate, was granted a 75-year oil concession for most of Muscat and Oman. Exploratory drilling, however, has as yet failed to reveal oil in commercial quantities.⁹³

⁹³RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 134-137; The Middle East, 1957, p. 38.

The Trucial States

The Trucial States (or Trucial Coast, and sometimes Trucial Oman) consist of seven semi-independent sheikdoms bound to Great Britain by treaties signed in 1853 and 1892. They lie along the south shore of the Persian Gulf, bordering on Oman. Their unusual name derives from the two treaties signed with Great Britain. The first provided for the suppression of piracy and the cessation of hostilities at sea among the signatories, and gave Great Britain the duty of enforcing peace; the second treaty bound the chiefs to enter into no other agreement with any foreign power other than Great Britain, and to cede, sell, or mortgage no part of their territory without British permission. Oil concessions in the Trucial States were given to Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd., an IPC affiliate, beginning in 1937, but drilling has so far revealed no oil of commercial importance.⁹⁴

⁹⁴RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 134, 569; The Middle East, 1957, p. 47; "Persian Gulf," Encyclopedia Britannica (15th ed.; 24 vols.; Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1942), XVII, 603.

Qatar

The sheikdom of Qatar is a peninsula, midway up the west coast of the Persian Gulf, and immediately north of the Trucial States. It has been a British protectorate since 1882, and on 3 November 1916 concluded an agreement with Great Britain similar to that signed by the sheiks of the Trucial Coast. Until the beginnings of oil explorations in the 1930's, the people of Qatar eked out a bare living through pearling, fishing, and nomadic herding. In September 1932, the Anglo-Persian (later Anglo-Iranian) Oil Company obtained permission for a two-year geological survey of Qatar. When these indicated favorable prospects, the company negotiated a 75-year concession with the sheik of Qatar that was signed on 17 May 1935. In 1937, this was transferred to an IPC subsidiary, Petroleum Development (Qatar) Ltd. Drilling operations were started in 1938, and oil in commercial quantities was discovered in 1939. Small amounts were being produced when the advent of World War II brought a halt to activities. Production was resumed in 1947, and rose steadily in the years that followed.⁹⁵

⁹⁵RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 132-133; Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers, pp. 397-398; Sir Rupert Hay, "The Impact of the Oil Industry on the Persian Gulf Shaykhdoms," MEJ, Autumn, 1955, pp. 368-369.

Bahrain

The Bahrain Islands, in the Persian Gulf between the Qatar peninsula and the mainland, comprise an independent sheikdom that has been a British protectorate

since December 1880. British control over the islands has been increased by a number of agreements following the original accord. In 1914, Bahrain was the first assembly point of the British Expeditionary Force to Mesopotamia, and in 1935 it became the principal British naval base in the Persian Gulf. A British adviser, Sir Charles Belgrave, was appointed in 1926 to assist the sheik in putting the administration of his state on a sound basis. Belgrave, who was still there in 1956, did much to organize the sheikdom on a modern basis, even before the exploitation of oil in commercial quantities. As a result of his activities, Bahrain has had the longest and most orderly development toward modernization of all the Persian Gulf principalities.

In 1910, British geologists discovered seepages of oil in Bahrain, but the actual discovery of oil was still many years off. On 2 December 1925, the first Bahrain oil concession was granted to a British syndicate, which eventually granted an option to Standard Oil of California. This raised certain international questions, and after negotiations between the British and American governments on 12 June 1930, the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO), a subsidiary of Standard Oil, registered in Canada, was permitted to take up the concession. Geologists and drillers were sent immediately to Bahrain and on 31 May 1932 struck oil in commercial quantities. Bahrain was thus the first of the Persian Gulf principalities in which oil was discovered. Bahrain oil began reaching the world market at the end of 1934. A refinery was built in 1935, and production rose rapidly during the years that followed. As in other areas, oil

operations in Bahrain were slowed during World War II. After the war, however, oil production continued to rise.⁹⁶

⁹⁶RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 128-132; Shwadhan, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers, pp. 369-383 passim; Hay, "The Impact of the Oil Industry on the Persian Gulf Shaykdoms," MEJ, Autumn, 1955, pp. 362-365; Herbert J. Liebesny, "Administration and Legal Development in Arabia: The Persian Gulf Principalities," MEJ, Winter, 1956, pp. 37-39.

Kuwait

The sheikdom of Kuwait, near the head of the Persian Gulf, is the most northerly of the gulf principalities. It is bounded on the north and northwest by Iraq and on the southwest by Saudi Arabia. Directly south of Kuwait, on the gulf coast, is a so-called Neutral Zone, in which Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have shared equal rights since 1923, pending a final agreement on the disposition of this territory. A similar arrangement covered an area to the west of Kuwait, established at the same time as a Neutral Zone between Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Kuwait was of interest to the West long before the discovery of oil there in relatively recent times. In 1850, the British thought of its sheltered bay as the southern terminus of a Euphrates valley railway, and half a century later the Germans planned to extend their projected Berlin-Baghdad railway to Kuwait. British influence in the area was too strong, however, and by a treaty on 23 January 1899 the Sheik placed his interests under British protection. In 1914, in return for cooperation with the British, Great Britain assured

the Sheik that Kuwait would be recognized as an independent principality under British protection, and during the war Kuwait was occupied by British forces. In 1919 and again in 1927-1928, British armed intervention defeated Saudi Arabian invasions.

Kuwait possesses perhaps the greatest oil field in the Middle East, if not in the entire world. Until the 1930's, however, the country eked out an existence from pearling and as a commercial entrepot. The same British syndicate that had obtained a concession in Bahrain, also obtained one in Kuwait in the early 1920's, and, as in Bahrain, attempted to transfer it to an American firm. After several years of Anglo-American negotiations, a compromise was finally reached, and a concession was obtained in late 1934 by the Kuwait Oil Company Ltd, jointly owned and financed by British and American interests. Drilling began in 1936, but it was not until 1938 that any considerable success was encountered. By July 1942, nine producing wells had been drilled. Operations were suspended from mid-1942 to mid-1946, when they were once more resumed. Production has risen rapidly since that time.⁹⁷

⁹⁷ RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 121-125; Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers, pp. 384-397 passim; Mary Cubberly Van Pelt, "The Sheikdom of Kuwait," MEJ, Jan, 1950, pp. 12-26 passim; Hay, "The Impact of the Oil Industry on the Persian Gulf Shaykdoms," MEJ, Autumn, 1955, pp. 365-366.

Iraq

The modern era of Iraq was late in getting under way. Unlike Syria and Egypt, where interaction with Europe had occurred gradually and the beginnings of

modernization were introduced relatively early, the impact of the West on Iraq came about abruptly. The geographic isolation and poverty of the country were not conducive to political or economic intercourse with the outside world. Only a few army officers and government functionaries trained at Constantinople were exposed to Westernization in any degree. Their limited numbers did not affect the inert patterns and institutions of a feudal system that was inherently hostile to change. Thus, the influence of modern ideas was not felt until recent times. When the events of the First World War burst upon her, Iraq was suddenly catapulted into the unfamiliar context of the contemporary world, and an active role in its affairs was thrust upon her. Then, caught between the internal pressures of nationalism and the arbitrary interests of foreign imperialism, she experienced a profound struggle for adjustment and self-realization.

It was Britain's commercial penetration via the Persian Gulf--which led eventually to political infiltration--that was Iraq's first contact with the West. By the time of the First World War, British economic enterprise had established a firm foothold on the southern edges of the country around Basra. Of particular importance was the terminus of the oil pipeline from Iran. The interior of the country, however, was as yet largely unaffected by foreign exploitation or political intervention.⁹⁸

British
penetration

⁹⁸ Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, Iraq, 1900 to 1950 (London: 1953), pp. 59-74.

Domestically, Iraq was still little different on the eve of the war from the al-Iraq of the fifteenth century. Occupying the ancient land of Mesopotamia, she was an obscure province-state of the Ottoman Empire consisting of the three vilayas of Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra; each of these comprised a loose collection of semi-independent principalities, autonomous tribal areas, petty local sheikdoms, and free 'millets' of minority groups. The whole was under nominal Turkish suzerainty, but actual evidence of Ottoman hegemony was barely discernible this far from the Sublime Porte.⁹⁹

⁹⁹ Ibid., pp. 1-58.

As in the other Arab countries at the turn of the century, the first stirrings of an awakening political consciousness began to appear. These slowly evolved into a nationalist movement that identified itself with the comprehensive Arab nationalism aiming at unity and autonomy of all Arab Asia within the Ottoman Empire. Leaders of the movement in Iraq were the army officers, many of whom belonged to al-Ahd, the nationalist secret society that had members in most Arab countries. Basra particularly became a center of nationalist activity.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ The Middle East, 1957, p. 160

Shortly after the opening of the First World War, Iraq became actively involved as a scene of military operations, although her own role was indirect and largely passive. The Mesopotamian campaign started modestly when Britain, immediately following the

declaration of war on Turkey, dispatched a small force from India on 22 November 1914 to occupy Basra, ostensibly for the protection of the oil installations. Then, for greater tactical security, this force was augmented and the area of occupation extended. Within a month fighting broke out between the Anglo-Indian troops and the Turks. The British successfully repulsed Turkish counter-attacks, and on 3 June 1915 began a general offensive toward Baghdad. By the end of the year the British advance had slowed down, and after the indecisive battle of Ctesiphon on 22-24 November, the British forces retreated as far back as Kut-el-Amara, which they attempted to hold. Five months later, on 7 December 1915, the besieged British forces occupying Kut were forced to surrender with the loss of 12,000 men. In the fall of 1916, after marshalling large numbers of reinforcements and quantities of supplies, the British launched a second offensive. By 24 February 1917 the city of Kut fell to the British and the Turks were pursued northward. Baghdad was taken on the following 11 March, and Samarra, eighty miles beyond, on 23 April. Near the end of the same year, the British captured Ramadi on the Euphrates on 29 September, and Tikrit on the Tigris on 6 November. This marked the furthest extent of the British advance into Iraq and from then on the military situation remained relatively static.¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹Langer, An Encyclopedia of World History, pp. 927f, 938; Longrigg, Iraq, 1900 to 1950, pp. 75-92.

While the war was in progress the Iraqi nationalists, although not participants in the Arab Revolt, had come to include themselves in the independent Arab state that Hussein, the Grand Sharif of Mecca, contemplated and that had been promised by the British. Thus by the end of the war the anticipation of independence for Iraq had filtered down to the grass-roots level. A vital force was reflected in the popular nationalist sentiment that was building up throughout the country.¹⁰²

¹⁰²Longrigg, Iraq, 1900 to 1950, pp. 99f; Human Relations Area Files, Inc., Iraq, HRAF-58, J. Hop.-2, (Washington: 1956), pp. 13f.

The Armistice found the British in occupation of most of Iraq, with a military administration carrying on the functions of civil government. The British had a commitment allowing them to retain control and were determined to stay. By the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 9 May 1916, which provided for the division of Turkish Arabia between Britain and France, most of Iraq fell into the British zone. Peremptory as this arrangement was, it was however validated by the San Remo Conference of 25 April 1920, wherein a mandate over Iraq was officially assigned to Great Britain by the Supreme Council. The mandate was later confirmed by League of Nations action.¹⁰³

British
Mandate

¹⁰³The Middle East, 1957, p. 160.

Public announcement of the San Remo decision was followed by violent nationalist reaction. Demonstrations and rioting among the tribesmen of the south soon

developed into a widespread insurrection. Popular disappointment over loss of the hoped-for Arab independence, fanned by nationalist agitation, repudiated the mandate as a betrayal of Britain's wartime promises to Hussein and to the Arabs at large. The rebellion lasted from May 1920 through the end of that year and required the use of considerable armed force before it could be suppressed. Thereafter the focus of Iraq's nationalist movement was on opposition to British control.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁴ Longrigg, Iraq, 1900 to 1950, pp. 100-106.

The British began to implement the mandate as soon as possible. On 1 October 1920, even before the rebellion had been put down completely, the provisional military rule was terminated. In its place an Arab Council of State was established to govern the country under the direction of a British High Commissioner, who retained broad authority, and an advisory staff of British officials. In compliance with the responsibilities expressly placed on Britain as the mandatory power by the San Remo Conference, a plebiscite was held to select a ruler to head the theoretically sovereign state. Britain's choice, in view of her obligations to the Hashimites, was Hussein's son, Faisal, the former King of Syria who had fled to Basra upon being deposed by the French. A referendum indicated ninety-six percent of the population in favor of Britain's nominee. Accordingly, on 23 August 1921 Sir Percy Cox, the first High Commissioner, proclaimed Faisal King of Iraq.¹⁰⁵

British
Civil
Government

¹⁰⁵RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 262-263.

25 Mar 22
Anglo-Iraqi
Treaty

The following year, despite the objections of the nationalists, an Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was concluded on 25 March 1922. It granted Great Britain substantial political authority, guaranteed preferential treatment of her special interests, and insured the retention of a large measure of military control. Several months later, on 10 October 1922, another agreement was signed which transformed the mandate into an alliance relationship. This, however, did not materially alter British rights and powers.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶Iraq, HRAF-58, pp. 19-26.

Kurdish
unrest

During the same time that these treaties were being negotiated, serious internal troubles arose in the form of a revolt by the Kurds in the North of Iraq. Their movement for independence or autonomy broke out into an insurrection on 18 June 1922 and lasted until July 1924, when it was subdued with the help of British Middle East forces. The Kurds continued to be a dissident element and a new outbreak occurred in 1930, followed by a third in 1932. Other indigenous groups also sought special status and contributed to instability and unrest.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷The Middle East, 1957, p. 161.

27 Mar 24
Constitution

On 27 March 1924 the Constituent Assembly, which had been formed as a result of the Electoral Law published in May 1922 in compliance with the mandate requirement,

adopted the Organic Law as the constitution of Iraq. It introduced a liberal, parliamentary system of government under a hereditary monarchy. Over the succeeding years many of its provisions gradually reached realization as effective machinery of government became organized and administrative authority was turned over to Iraqi control. However most of its principles were defeated by the factional intrigue and corruption of internal politics until, by 1936, only a facade of democracy remained.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸ Longrigg, Iraq, 1900 to 1950, pp. 134-175.

The ill-defined and often equivocal boundaries that circumscribed the geographic area of the Iraqi state were slowly resolved through international agreements. The most far reaching of these pertained to the Mosul province, which later proved to hold vast riches in oil resources. Claimed both by Iraq and Turkey, the Mosul had long been in dispute. After drawn-out negotiations, influenced by recommendations of the League of Nations, the question was finally settled on 5 June 1926 in an agreement between England and Turkey, by which most of the Mosul was incorporated into the Kingdom of Iraq. This disposed of the outstanding problem regarding the territorial integrity of Iraq. Then, through a series of treaties establishing fixed frontiers, the major cause of the frequent border clashes with neighboring states was gradually eliminated. Such treaties were made with Nejd on 2 December 1922, 1 November 1925, and 24 February 1930; with Iran on 11 August 1929; and with Syria on 20 November 1932.¹⁰⁹

Mosul
dispute

1922-1932
Border
treaties

¹⁰⁹ The Middle East, 1957, pp. 160-161; Langer, An Encyclopedia of World History, pp. 1105-1106.

27 Dec 27
Independence

On 27 December 1927 a new Treaty with Great Britain was signed that formally recognized the independence of Iraq. Among other things, it granted Britain three additional air bases and placed the training of the Iraqi army under British officers. The treaty was ratified in 1930 and was presented to the League of Nations in 1931 as evidence of Iraq's complete independence and sovereignty. On 3 October 1932 Iraq was admitted to membership in the League. King Faisal died on 8 September of the same year and was succeeded by his son Ghazi.¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ Longrigg, Iraq, 1900 to 1950, pp. 176-186.

1927
Discovery
of oil

A significant event in the history of Iraq was the discovery of oil in the Kirkuk area in 1927. The rapid development of Iraq's oil industry that followed proved to be of vast importance to her internal affairs and international relations. The Turkish Petroleum Company, later renamed the Iraq Petroleum Company, had been granted concessions to any oil fields that might exist in the provinces of Baghdad and Mosul by the Ottoman Government in 1914, but the war interrupted exploration. After the war, when Iraq became a mandate of Great Britain, the subsidiary provisions of the San Remo Agreement reserved oil exploitation rights to British interests, with France participating in exchange for allowing pipelines to cross French-mandated Syria and Lebanon. By 1934, when two twelve-inch pipelines were

completed, Iraqi oil was flowing in tremendous volume directly to the Mediterranean for export to overseas markets. Oil then became the dominant item in Iraq's economy.¹¹¹

¹¹¹Leonard M. Fanning, Foreign Oil and the Free World (New York: 1954), pp. 46-54; Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, Oil in the Middle East (London: 1954), pp. 13-32.

1935-1937
Political
unrest

In March 1935 the incipient revolts and popular unrest, particularly among the tribes along the Euphrates, led to the formation of a reform national government under General Hashimi. It crushed the revolts and in the elections of 6 August it won a decisive victory. The following year, on 29 October 1936, General Bakr Sidqi seized power in a coup d'etat sanctioned by the King. He dissolved Parliament and established what amounted to a military dictatorship in imitation of Kemalist Turkey. However, Sidqi was assassinated by a Kurd on 11 August 1937. A new Pan-Arab, anti-British Cabinet was then installed. Two years later King Ghazi died in an automobile accident and was succeeded by his three-year-old son Faisal II.¹¹²

¹¹²Longrigg, Iraq, 1900 to 1950, pp. 237-276.

Developments
1937-World
War II

In the period after 1937 relations with Great Britain deteriorated rapidly, mainly because of nationalist resentment at British policy toward Zionism and the Palestinian Arabs. German influence increased, especially in military and political circles. In April 1941, after another coup d'etat, a regime pledged to non-belligerency but openly sympathetic to Germany came into

power under Rashid Ali al-Gailani. It was suspected of negotiating with the Vichy Government of Syria. Finally, when a dispute over passage of British troops developed on 2 May 1941, British forces and the Transjordan Arab Legion occupied Baghdad and Basra. On the 29th of the same month, after the Rashid Ali government had fled, an armistice was signed. Thereafter, succeeding governments cooperated effectively with the Allied war effort. Iraq became an important base from which aid was sent to Russia through Iran.¹¹³

¹¹³RIIA, The Middle East, pp. 264-266.

In 1943 Iraq declared war on the Axis powers, and thereby subsequently became one of the charter members of the United Nations. On 22 March 1945 in Cairo the Arab League was formed, with Iraq among the original signatory members. Such an organization had long been advocated by Iraqi political leaders, especially by Nuri es-Said, but Egypt's premier, Nahas, had been able to take the initiative away from Iraq in 1944. The League thus came into being in Egypt under Egyptian sponsorship. The event marked a significant shift in the center of gravity of the growing Pan-Arab nationalist movement.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁴Longrigg, Iraq, 1900 to 1950, pp. 328-332.

SECTION II
THE ARAB STATES SINCE THE
END OF
WORLD WAR II

THE ARAB STATES: 1945 TO SUMMER, 1958

The Arab League and Arab Unity

The development of Arab unity and disunity in the Middle East during the thirteen years since World War II has been affected by several elements, each of them separate, but each, nevertheless, an inseparable part of the whole. These elements may be listed as follows: the formation and growth of the Arab League; the continued Hashimite-Saudi rivalry, and the Hashimite plan for a "Greater Syria"; the establishment of the state of Israel; and the emergence of Nasser's Egypt as the leader of Arab aspirations and actions.

Establishment of the Arab League

On 22 March 1945, representatives of the seven Arab states of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Transjordan met in Cairo and signed a pact establishing the Arab League.¹ Its formation was an

22 Mar 45
Formation
of the Arab
League

1. The text of this pact is reproduced in The Middle East, 1957 (5th ed.; London: Europa Publications, 1957), pp. 15-17. Text of a cultural treaty signed on 20 Nov 46 is reproduced on pp. 17-18. For the establishment of the Arab League, see The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey (2d ed.; London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954), pp. 32-34; George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 399-404; J. S. Raleigh, "Ten Years of the Arab League," MEA, March, 1955, pp. 65-71; T. R. Little, "The Arab League: A Reassessment," MEJ, Spring, 1956, pp. 138-140.

outgrowth of an Arab desire for greater strength through unity, and of British encouragement. It also represented, paradoxically, an attempt by Egypt and Saudi Arabia to obstruct Transjordanian and Iraqi hopes to establish a "Greater Syria," and was thus in large part the result of the rivalry between Ibn Saud of Arabia

and the Hashimite rulers of Transjordan and Iraq.

During World War II, the British had worked consistently and purposefully to encourage Arab unity, and to develop a pan-Arabism friendly to Great Britain. The diminution of French influence in the area allowed the British to return for the first time to their plan of World War I for the establishment of a pro-British Arab federation or kingdom to guard the flank of the line of communications to India and to act as a buffer against Russian expansion to the south. The plan for a "Greater Syria"--Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan, linked with Iraq by a federative agreement--had been put forward by the Hashimites, and, during World War II, imaginatively and forcefully presented by Iraq's Prime Minister, Nuri es-Said. Great Britain gave the plan its full endorsement, but the scheme ran into considerable opposition in the Middle East itself. Ibn Saud was strongly against any unification under the aegis of the rival Hashimite clan, and he found ready support in Egypt, which feared the emergence of a large united Arab state to the north as a threat to its own ambitions. There was also some opposition to the "Greater Syria" plan in Syria and Lebanon, where a form of independent democracy was preferred to the monarchy offered by the Hashimites. In 1943 and 1944 opponents of the "Greater Syria" proposal, led by Prime Minister Nahas Pasha of Egypt, continued to work against the scheme. A series of inter-Arab conferences was held in Cairo, at which the groundwork for the Arab League was laid. On 7 October 1944, the seven Arab states that were to sign the Arab League pact the following March formulated the Alexandria Protocol, outlining the

7 Oct 44
Alexandria
Protocol

aims and proposed constitution of an Arab League. This protocol called for an association of nations, rather than a union, and specifically proclaimed the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of the members. The wording of the pact of the Arab League accepted this concept and, indeed, established an even looser association of states than was originally proposed. "In political reality," notes one commentator, "the League [was] founded on the preservation of the status quo, as opposed to pan-Arab union schemes."²

2. Raleigh, "Ten Years of the Arab League," MEA, Mar, 1955, p. 71.

The Arab League functions through a Council, which has met in Cairo twice a year. This Council has had little real power, since its decisions are binding only upon those states that accept them. There was originally no provision for a collective security system, although the pact did provide for the pacific settlement of disputes, and the main stress was laid on voluntary cooperation and consultation. In effect, the League provides the framework for Arab unity and cooperation, but it has established no such unity and has left, in the unresolved conflicting ambitions of Hashimites on the one hand and Saudi-Arabians and Egyptians on the other, the grounds for continued disunity.

Early Development of the Arab League

Despite the looseness of the Arab League organization, its first years of existence seemed promising. As the Arab nations of the Middle East established

20 Nov 46
Cultural
Treaty of
the Arab
League

their independence from British or French domination, and as they gained recognition as members of the United Nations, they appeared, at the same time, to be honestly working toward increased cooperation with each other, at least in non-political areas. In the fields of cultural, technical, and economic cooperation some progress was made. Academic and scientific conferences were held, exchanges of scholars were arranged, and the groundwork was laid for other cultural cooperation. These programs were outlined in the Cultural Treaty of the League, signed on 20 November 1946. Economic cooperation appears to have been mainly restricted to a boycott of Jewish goods. The outstanding example of unity in the Arab League appeared in the position of the League as a spokesman for the Arab cause in Palestine, where the conflict of Jews and Arabs was rapidly approaching a climax. The League was chiefly responsible for presenting the Arab case during the investigation by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, in the first part of 1946, of the problem of Jewish immigration into Palestine. The League also spoke for the Arab cause in the later United Nations discussion of the Palestine problem.³

3. Lenczowski, The Middle East, pp. 404-405; The Middle East, 1957, pp. 15, 17-18; Raleigh, "Ten Years of the Arab League," MEA, Mar, 1955, pp. 73-74; Joseph Dunner, The Republic of Israel: Its History and Its Promise (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950), pp. 63-64.

The Impact of the Palestine Problem

So long as the Arab League was attending to cultural exchanges or passing resolutions and making diplomatic representations on the question of Palestine,

its members displayed nothing but unity. When, however, the Arab states were faced with the political reality of the establishment of the state of Israel and the necessity of attempting to destroy it, the old quarrels, jealousies, and fears were reawakened--if, indeed, they had ever really been allowed to sleep.

14 May 48
State of
Israel
established

15 May 48
Arabs
invade
Palestine

On 14 May 1948, Jewish authorities in Tel Aviv proclaimed the establishment of Israel. Fighting between Jews and Arabs in Palestine had been going on for years, but on 15 May the regular forces of Egypt, Transjordan, and Iraq began to invade Palestine, turning the struggle into a full-scale war. If ever an example were needed of the weaknesses inherent in coalition warfare, the Palestine conflict provided it. The Israelis, outnumbered, outweighed in heavy armaments, and surrounded on three sides by hostile states, were, nevertheless, well organized, determined, and, most important of all, united in their efforts. Not so their enemies. The Arab armies, including small Saudi Arabian, Lebanese, and Syrian forces that later joined the fray, not only fought separately and without any unified supreme command, but they appeared to be less interested in defeating Israel than in assuring the achievement of their individual aims in Palestine--if necessary, to the detriment and cost of each other.

The two chief Arab rivals were Transjordan, whose King Abdullah had become the recognized Hashimite leader after the death of Iraq's Emir Faisal, and Egypt, which feared lest Abdullah take over Arab Palestine and then make a separate peace with Israel. Abdullah had expounded the theme of a "Greater Syria" with increasing

22 Mar 46
Establish-
ment of Trans-
Jordan

vigor after the establishment, on 22 March 1946, of an independent Transjordan. When, in 1947, however, Syria had made plain its determination to remain an independent republic, Abdullah had turned his eyes toward Palestine, where the probability of a division of the country between Arabs and Jews raised the possibility of territorial aggrandizement for Transjordan. With the strong Arab Legion ready to march, and with the friendly cooperation of Musa Bey al-Alami, representative of Palestinian Arabs in the Arab League, Abdullah was in an excellent position to take the first step, at least, towards establishment of a "Greater Syria," and Egypt was not without grounds for its apprehensions. The Egyptian countermove to Abdullah's plans, in which Cairo was supported by Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Lebanon, was to try to establish an independent Arab nation in Palestine. To this end, the Egyptians--possibly with the permissive assistance of the French, who may still have nourished unpleasant recollections of their ouster from Syria by the British--engineered the escape from Paris of the Mufti of Jerusalem, and brought him back to Cairo with honors. The Mufti, who had his own quarrel with the Hashimites, going back at least as far as his participation in the Axis-supported revolt in Baghdad in 1941, also had, in his personal ambitions, a definite interest in establishing and maintaining an independent Arab Palestine. With Egyptian support, the Mufti returned to Palestine as a counterweight to Abdullah's Musa Alami. Thus, by late 1947, the struggle for control of Arab Palestine was well joined.

Fighting over the spoils of war before the war is won, or, as in this case, before it is even begun, can often lead to disaster for the intended victors. In the Palestine War, it ensured the existence of the state of Israel, at a time when the viability of the new nation was open to serious doubt. Each of the five Arab armies or contingents that entered Palestine fought separately, and, indeed, often at cross purposes. The Egyptians refused to aid Palestinian Arabs who were pro-Abdullah, and Hashimite sources of arms supplies were closed to those who were not. Abdullah's Arab Legion fought cautiously, refusing to overextend its lines of communication by an advance to the sea, and refraining from any other action that might so weaken it as to allow other Arab troops to occupy what Abdullah considered as his portion of Palestine. The Egyptians, on the other hand, instead of concentrating on a drive along the coast, divided their forces, sending one group inland toward Jerusalem, to prevent Transjordan gaining complete control of that area. As a result of this division, the Jerusalem force was badly defeated and the force moving up the coast could barely hold on to a small strip in the Gaza area. Abdullah, needless to say, did nothing to assist his hard-pressed ally. To add to this situation, there were several armed clashes between Jordanian and Egyptian troops in the Hebron-Bethlehem area, where differences of opinion arose over which group was to have control. Finally, late in the war, when Egyptian troops were forced to evacuate the Negev, it was the complete absence of support by any of the other Arab forces

that enabled Israel to throw its main strength against the retiring Egyptians. This sort of behavior did little to encourage Arab unity.

20 Sep 48
Palestine
Arab Govern-
ment Formed

As if to emphasize the growing split in Arab ranks, on 20 September 1948, the Arab League announced the formation in Gaza of an Arab government for Palestine. Since this government was under the auspices of Egypt, Abdullah promptly refused to recognize it, and announced he would bar it from any territory controlled by his troops. On 1 December, not surprisingly, a conference of Palestinian Arabs meeting in Jordanian-held Jericho proclaimed Abdullah "King of Palestine," and on

1 Dec 48
Abdullah
proclaimed
"King of
Palestine"

13 Dec 48
Transjordan
approves
union with
Palestine

13 December the Transjordanian parliament approved a future union with Arab Palestine. There was little the rest of the Arab League could do about this, since the presence of Abdullah's Arab Legion in east-central Palestine assured him control of this area.

Jan 49
Cease-fire
in Palestine

Meanwhile, the Palestine War continued, and, despite the interruption of two brief truces, and the continued efforts of the United Nations to end the conflict, fighting did not finally stop until January, 1949, and it was late July before armistice agreements were signed between Israel and all of its opponents (with the exception of Iraq, with whom Israel never signed an armistice, although no further hostilities took place). The armistice left Israel in possession of considerably more territory than she had been allowed under the United Nations partition plan. The Arab League, on the other hand, had gained little for its troubles but bad publicity, a sense of frustration, and an intensification of old rivalries. Arab unity

had been dealt a damaging blow.⁴

4. The Middle East (RIIA), passim; Lenczowski, The Middle East, pp. 405-409; Raleigh, "Ten Years of the Arab League," MEA, Mar, 1955, p. 75; Little, "The Arab League," MEJ, Spring, 1956, pp. 142-143; Clare Hollingworth, The Arabs and the West (London: Methuen, 1952), pp. 129-172, passim. See also the chronologies for this period in MEJ.

The Aftermath of the Palestine War

For nearly a year after the signing of the armistice agreements ending hostilities in Palestine, the Arab League seemed on the brink of dissolution. Abdullah, encouraged no doubt by his gains in Palestine, continued to press his scheme for a "Greater Syria," and in this he was aided initially by the unstable political situation in Syria. The downfall of the nationalist Quwatli government on 30 March 1949 gave Syria, in the new government of Husni Zaim, a leadership which appeared ready to join a "Greater Syria." Zaim, however, soon began to waver, and, by the end of the year, two more coups had taken place in Syria (14 August, 19 December), resulting in the removal from office, and in some cases the execution, of those interested in the formation of a "Greater Syria." This effectively closed the door on Hashimite plans for a union with Syria. To keep it closed, on 24 January 1950, Saudi Arabia extended to the new Syrian government, as part of a commercial agreement, a \$6 million interest-free loan.⁵

30 Mar,
14 Aug,
19 Dec
Coups in
Syria

24 Jan 50
Saudi loan
to Syria

5. Lenczowski, The Middle East, p. 409; Alfred Carleton, "The Syrian Coups d'Etat of 1949," MEJ, Jan, 1950, pp. 1-11; "Developments of the Quarter," MEJ, Apr, 1950, pp. 217-218.

3 Jun 49
Establishment of
"Hashimite
Kingdom of
Jordan"

With developments on the Syrian front apparently quieted, Arab eyes turned back to Palestine. On 3 June 1949, it had been announced in Amman that henceforth Transjordan would be known as "The Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan," a further indication that Abdullah had no intention of retiring to the east bank of the Jordan River.⁶ During early 1950, moreover, the other members

6. "Developments of the Quarter," MEJ, Oct, 1949, p. 449.

of the Arab League were further incensed by persistent reports, apparently true, that Abdullah was considering a separate peace with Israel to further solidify his hold on eastern Palestine. Jordan's relations with the Egyptian-dominated majority of the League became so strained, indeed, that when the spring meeting of the Council opened on 25 March 1950, Abdullah announced his intention to boycott it. He quickly changed his mind, however, and sent a representative when it appeared that anti-Jordan sentiment might get out of hand in the absence of a Jordanian delegate.

Apr 50
Arab League
actions
against
separate
peace with
Israel

On 1 April, all the Arab states at the meeting (including Jordan) voted to expel from the League any member making a separate peace with Israel, and empowered the League to take punitive measures against that member. A week later, on Egypt's initiative, the League drafted an Arab collective security pact. Adopted by the League Political Committee on 9 April, this accord stated that aggression against any one of the signatories would be considered as aggression against all, and that the signatories would take all measures to repulse any such aggression. The pact also

provided for a Joint Defense Council and a permanent committee of chiefs of staff. Three days later, on the 12th, the Political Committee passed a resolution forbidding any member of the League to make a separate peace with Israel.

24 Apr 50
Jordan
incorporates
Arab
Palestine

The League actions of early April 1950 appeared to indicate some lessening of the strain between Abdullah and his Egyptian-Saudi rivals, but tensions were heightened again on the 24th when the Jordanian parliament voted the annexation, and thus full incorporation, of Arab Palestine controlled by Jordan. In presenting this fait accompli to the other members of the League, Jordan ignored a face-saving formula offered by Iraq and Lebanon under which it would be announced that the annexation was "temporary" and that Jordan was merely holding Arab Palestine "in trust" for the rest of the League. In early May, the League's Political Committee began a discussion of the Jordanian action, and, on the 13th, the Jordanian representative walked out of the meeting. Two days later, in his absence, the Committee agreed that Jordan's annexation of Arab Palestine was a violation of the 12 April no-separate-peace resolution. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Lebanon voted to expel Jordan from the League, but no final action was taken because of the opposition of Iraq and Yemen.

On 12 June, the Arab League Council met to consider the signing of the Collective Security Pact drawn up by the political committee. At this meeting, Egypt demanded the expulsion of Jordan from the League, but again the opposition of Iraq and Yemen prevented

17 Jun 50
Arab League
Collective
Security
Pact

further action. Five days later, on 17 June, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen signed the Collective Security Pact. In the absence of Jordan, Iraq refused to initial the accord, and it was not until 2 February 1951 that Nuri es-Said agreed to sign a revised and somewhat watered-down agreement. Jordan signed the pact a year later, on 16 February 1952.⁷

7. "Developments of the Quarter," MEJ, Jul, 1950, pp. 329, 334, and Oct, 1950, p. 468; Lenczowski, The Middle East, pp. 410-411; The Middle East (RIIA), p. 40; Raleigh, "Ten Years of the Arab League," MEA, Mar, 1955, p. 75; "Chronology," MEA, Mar, 1952, p. 99.

The Collective Security Pact was, in the words of one Arab leader, "strategically speaking . . . an aggregate of zeros."⁸ While it had a wide general

8. Quoted in Little, "The Arab League," MEJ, Spring, 1956, p. 144.

appeal among the Arab states, it was primarily an Egyptian counter to Hashimite plans for a "Greater Syria," and as such could never hope to lead to the attainment of Arab unity. No unified military command was ever set up under the pact, and there was hardly any coordination of equipment and training. Even agreement on so simple a matter as standardization of military terminology could not be reached. Mutual suspicion and jealousies still prevented any real achievements.⁹

9. Ibid., pp. 143-144; The Middle East (RIIA), pp. 40-41; Raleigh, "Ten Years of the Arab League," MEA, Mar, 1955, pp. 72-73.

Decreased Importance of the League

20 Jul 51
Assassination
of Abdullah

The assassination of Jordan's King Abdullah on 20 July 1951 and Egypt's preoccupation with her own internal affairs and her relations with Great Britain, beginning at about the same time, tended to lessen, though not remove, tensions among the Arab states in the Middle East. Egypt, especially, turned more to her own problems, and Saudi Arabia, without Egyptian backing, was not eager for trouble. Jordan, too, was concerned with internal affairs, and no more was heard of the "Greater Syria" plan. The other Arab states tended also to look to their own internal problems.

28 Mar 53
Libya joins
Arab League

The admission of Libya to the Arab League on 28 March 1953 did not affect the general course of events. This preoccupation with local, rather than foreign affairs, while it decreased international tensions in the Arab world, did not, at the same time, do anything to increase Arab unity or joint action from 1951 through 1954.¹⁰ As one observer noted early in 1955:

10. Little, "The Arab League," MEA, Mar, 1955, p. 146. See also the chronologies for this period in MEJ and MEA.

It would seem, after the first ten years of its existence, that the Arab League has neither succeeded in coordinating inter-Arab policies, mitigating or eliminating inter-Arab tensions, or solving inter-Arab problems. In spite of mediation attempts by individual member-states . . . , the League's Council has served as a sounding board for recriminations rather than a force for unity and conciliation.¹¹

11. Raleigh, "Ten Years of the Arab League," MEA, Mar, 1955, p. 76.

The Beginning of the Baghdad Pact

In the years following the outbreak of the Korean War, there had been a growing preoccupation by the West with the problems of Middle East defense. The weaknesses of the Arab states and their vulnerability to Soviet attack were sources of anxiety, and on 13 October 1951, the United States, Great Britain, and France, after talks that summer with Turkey, called for the establishment of a joint defense organization, to include the Arab states, in the Middle East. The Western proposal, however, found no welcome among the Arab states. Not only did the Arabs have no pressing fear of Soviet Russia, but they were suspicious of Western connections with Israel, and maintained their traditional hostility toward Turkey. There was, moreover, the added distraction provided by Anglo-Egyptian disagreement over the proposed revision of the 1936 treaty between those states. The question of a Middle East joint defense organization, therefore, was allowed to lapse, not to rise again until 1954.¹²

13 Oct 51
US, UK,
France call
for joint
defense in
Middle East

12. The Baghdad Pact: Origins and Political Setting (RIIA Information Department Memorandum [mimeographed pamphlet]; London: RIIA, 1956), p. 2; The Middle East (RIIA), pp. 40-42.

During 1954, Western interest in the Middle East intensified. On 11 June, however, Egypt announced rejection of Western plans for anti-Communist defense organizations in the Middle East by proclaiming the achievement of a Saudi-Egyptian agreement to pool defense and military resources. Six weeks later, on 27 July, Great Britain announced its willingness to

11 Jun 54
Egypt rejects
Western plans

19 Oct 54
Anglo-
Egyptian
Treaty

withdraw troops from the Suez Canal area over a period of twenty months, a step formalized by the signing of an Anglo-Egyptian agreement on 19 October. Although the agreement gave Britain the right to reoccupy Suez in the event of an attack on any Arab League state or Turkey, the West's position was obviously weakened, and stronger and broader measures for a practical defense organization in the Middle East were needed. Accordingly, the British welcomed the initiative of Iraq's Prime Minister Nuri es-Said when, late in the year, he suggested the possibility of a Middle East defense organization, similar to NATO, in which Great Britain and possibly the US should be associated. This step by Nuri, however, served to re-open old wounds, raising again the specter of Iraqi-Egyptian tensions. The Saudi-Egyptian agreement and the Iraqi move toward the West underlined once more the split in Arab policies.¹³

13. "Chronology," MEA, Aug-Sep, 1954, pp. 296-297; "Developments of the Quarter," MEJ, Winter, 1955, pp. 58-60; The Baghdad Pact, pp. 4-5; Little, "The Arab League," MEA, Mar, 1955, pp. 146-147.

24 Feb 55
Turco-Iraqi
Treaty
(Baghdad
Pact)

Nuri's scheme was enthusiastically seconded by Turkey, and on 12 January 1955, Turkey and Iraq announced their decision to conclude a mutual cooperation and defense treaty. The pact, which was signed on 24 February, was not intended to be merely bilateral, but was aimed at achieving solidarity in the entire Middle East. It was, in fact, the beginning of the Baghdad Pact.

The announcement of the Turco-Iraqi agreement unleashed a storm of violent criticism in the Arab world. Egypt, under its new leader, President Gamal

Abdel Nasser, led the critics with the powerful voice of Radio Cairo. Iraq was bitterly accused of deserting the Arab cause and of helping the West to undermine Arab solidarity and freedom of action. On 16 January, four days after the announcement of the forthcoming Turco-Iraqi pact, Egypt called an emergency session of Arab leaders. The group convened in Cairo on the 22d, although Iraqi delegates did not arrive until the 25th. Despite an all-out campaign by the Cairo press, however, Egypt was unable to force passage of a resolution critical of Iraq. And even Egypt's threat to withdraw from the Arab League Collective Security Pact, and the visit to Baghdad of Egyptian, Lebanese, Syrian, and Jordanian representatives failed to dissuade Iraq from going ahead with its intention of signing the announced accord with Turkey.¹⁴

14. The Baghdad Pact, p. 5; "Developments of the Quarter," MEJ, Spring, 1955, pp. 163-167.

Development of the Baghdad Pact and Arab Reaction

The year 1955 saw an enlarging of the Baghdad Pact and a hardening of Egyptian-led Arab reaction toward it. On 4 April 1955, Great Britain signed a treaty with Iraq, revising the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930, and making Britain a member of the Baghdad Pact. On 23 September, Pakistan joined the pact, and on 25 October, Iran also became a member. The first meeting of the Pact Council opened in Baghdad on 21 November, and US representatives were present. Attempts to bring Jordan into the pact failed, however, when a strong anti-Pact reaction in that country led to the dissolution of the Jordanian Parliament at the end of the

4 Apr 55 UK
joins Baghdad
Pact

23 Sep 55
Pakistan
joins
Baghdad
Pact

25 Oct 55
Iran joins
Baghdad Pact

year and the establishment of a new government pledged to avoid new alliances.

Egypt's Nasser, meanwhile, had not been standing still in his determined opposition to the Baghdad Pact and his announced intention of forming a "neutralist" bloc of Arab states in a new defense pact that would replace the Arab League Collective Security Pact. It was no problem at all for Nasser to gain Saudi Arabia's adherence to his plan, and Syria, after some hesitation and internal differences of opinion, also joined the group. On 6 March 1955, the three states announced agreement to establish a unified military command, under Egyptian leadership. Economic cooperation was also planned, and the three agreed, further, that none would conclude any other international military or political accords without the consent of the others. On 26 March, Yemen announced its intention to join the new bloc. Jordan and Lebanon, however, despite pressure from both the Baghdad Pact and the new Egyptian-led bloc, remained neutral. Implementation of the Egyptian-Saudi-Syrian agreement came in the fall when Syria, on 20 October, and Saudi Arabia, on the 27th, signed mutual defense pacts with Egypt under the terms originally conceived. Since 1955 had seen a renewal of Israeli-Arab clashes along the borders of Israel, and a general deterioration of Israeli-Arab relations, these agreements were directed as much against Israel as they were against Iraq.

6 Mar 55
Egyptian-
Saudi-Syrian
defense agree-
ment

Egypt's Emergence as leader of the Arab World

In June, 1955, meanwhile, Nasser had thrown another log on the growing Middle East fire by informing the US ambassador in Cairo that he was making

27 Sep 55
Egypt-Czech
arms deal

inquiries about the possible purchase of arms from the Soviet Union. Despite a British threat to cut off Britain's arms shipments to Egypt, Nasser soon made his decision, and on 27 September announced the signing of an agreement to barter Egyptian cotton for arms from Czechoslovakia. The first shipment of weapons reached Alexandria on 20 October. The effect of the Egyptian arms agreement was threefold. First, it tremendously increased Nasser's prestige in the Arab world by demonstrating that the Arabs need not be dependent on Western support. Second, it increased the danger of another Arab-Israeli war by giving the Egyptian bloc the potential to wage such a conflict and removing the moderating influence of the West. Third, it undercut Western hopes of gaining further Arab membership in the Baghdad Pact.¹⁵

15. The Baghdad Pact, pp. 6-12; "Developments of the Quarter," MEJ, Spring-Autumn, 1955, pp. 163-167, 309-319 passim, 434-445 passim, and Winter, 1956, pp. 60-75 passim.

Egypt's emergence as a leader of the Arab states had one other extremely important result. It provided a powerful impetus to the growing spirit of Pan-Arabism that Egypt had been espousing with increasing vigor since the rise of Nasser. Radio Cairo, the "Voice of the Arabs," played on this theme in a growing crescendo. Nasser, moreover, provided the Arabs with a hero, a leader to light the way to the promised land of Arab unity. His success in achieving British withdrawal from Suez, his support for Tunisian, Moroccan, and Algerian independence, his oft-stated policy of

destroying Israel, his opposition to the Baghdad Pact-- these and other anti-Western policies all gladdened the hearts of Arab nationalists. The challenging figure of Nasser, supported by arms and encouragement from the Soviet-bloc, seemed to offer the first real chance of achieving Arab unity in modern times.¹⁶

16. Anwar G. Chejne, "Egyptian Attitudes Toward Pan-Arabism," MEJ, Summer, 1957, pp. 262-267.

2 Mar 56
Hussein
dismisses
Glubb

The immediate effect of Egypt's increased stature was seen in Jordan, where anti-Western sentiment reached such a peak that on 2 March 1956 King Hussein dismissed Lt Gen John Bagot Glubb as chief of staff of the Jordanian Army. Although Hussein turned down subsequent overtures from the Egyptian bloc, and insisted he would maintain a middle-of-the-road position, it was clear that anti-Western elements in Jordan were pushing that country steadily towards Egypt. On

6 May 56
Egyptian-
Jordanian
Military
accord

6 May, a joint Egyptian-Jordanian communique announced agreement on plans to coordinate the armed forces of the two states, although a unified command was not projected.

21 May 56
Jordan-
Lebanon
military
accord

On 21 May, Jordan and Lebanon agreed to coordinate defense plans and to unite their forces in the event of war. Three days later, the pro-Egyptian Lt. Col. Ali Abu Nuwar, an enemy of General Glubb, was named as the new commander of the Arab Legion. On 31 May, finally, Jordan and Syria announced conclusion of an agreement for the establishment of a permanent body for military consultation and for joint military action in case of

31 May 56
Jordan-Syria
military
accord

21 Apr 56
Egypt-Saudi-
Yemen
military
pact

war. On 21 April, meanwhile, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen had signed a five-year military alliance. By 13 June 1956, when the last British soldiers left Egypt,

19 Jan 56
Sudan joins
Arab League

all of the Arab states save Iraq and the Sudan (which had joined the Arab League on 19 January 1956) were linked together by a series of bilateral and trilateral military agreements. The link between Iraq and Jordan appeared broken or at least greatly weakened, and Iraq, tied to the West through the Baghdad Pact, seemed isolated from the growing Pan-Arab movement. On

21 Oct 56
Jordan elects
anti-West
party

25 Oct 56
Jordan,
Egypt, Syria
sign military
agreement

21 October, Jordanian elections brought an anti-West party into power and four days later, on the 25th, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria signed an agreement for joint military action, under an Egyptian commander, in case of war. Not only had the Western-inclined Iraq been excluded, but now, for the first time, there appeared a good opportunity for united Arab action against Israel.¹⁷

17. "Developments of the Quarter," MEJ, Spring-Autumn, 1956, pp. 178-191 passim, 274-289 passim, 395-415 passim, and Winter, 1957, p. 81.

Suez and Its Aftermath

29 Oct 56
Israel
invades
Egypt

On 29 October 1956, four days after the signing of the Jordanian-Egyptian-Syrian military accord, Israeli forces invaded Egypt, the most formidable of Israel's enemies. The attackers advanced swiftly toward the Suez Canal. During the summer, meanwhile, Egypt had continued to receive support from the Soviet bloc and, in a move against the West, had nationalized the Canal.¹⁸ Efforts at settlement had been unsuccess-

18. For the background of the Suez Canal crisis, see below, the section on Egypt.

ful, and tensions between Egypt on the one hand and

30 Oct 56
Anglo-French
ultimatum

31 Oct 56
Anglo-French
attack Egypt

15 Nov 56
UNEF lands
in Egypt

Britain and France on the other had grown increasingly severe. On 30 October, an Anglo-French ultimatum called for a cease-fire and a withdrawal of Egyptian and Israeli forces from the Canal Zone. When Israel acceded to this, but Egypt refused, Anglo-French aircraft and warships began attacking Egypt on 31 October, and on 5 November British and French paratroops landed in the Canal Zone. Meanwhile, the United Nations had called for a cease-fire, and the first contingent of a United Nations Emergency Force landed in Egypt on 15 November to supervise a truce and the withdrawal of the invaders. By 22 December, all British and French forces had left Egypt, and Israeli forces were gradually withdrawn from Sinai during early 1957.

The significance of the short-lived war in Sinai and the Suez Canal area lies not in tactical details, but in the overall effect of the conflict on the Arab world. Tactically, Egypt suffered a sharp reversal at the hands of her attackers, and lost a considerable amount of military equipment to the Israelis. Egypt's allies, moreover, had not come to her aid by attacking Israel, and the only positive anti-Western step by the other Arabs had been the sabotaging of oil pipelines in Syria. Jordan's new pro-Egyptian government announced the country's intention of fulfilling its obligations under the military agreement with Egypt and Syria, but Jordan was hardly in a position to act. Since earlier that fall, Iraq and Syria had been stationing troops on the Jordanian border, ready to move in and take over should Jordan fall to an Israeli attack, or also, in the case of Iraq, should Jordan

3-4 Nov 56
Iraqi and
Syrian
Troops enter
Jordan

become a victim of Syrian-Egyptian intrigues. On 3 November, Iraqi troops moved into Jordan, followed by Syrian troops within a day. These units, it was announced, were to protect Jordan against Israeli attack, but in fact the Syrians and Iraqis were busily watching each other, to see that neither force moved suddenly to take over Jordan. The entrance into Jordan of Saudi Arabian troops also complicated the picture. On the surface, then, Nasser and Arab unity appeared to have received a setback.

8 Dec 56
Iraqi Troops
leave Jordan

The actual effects of the events of late 1956, however, were somewhat different than a casual observer might have been led to believe. Nasser emerged once more as the Arab hero against the West. From a seemingly hopeless position, he had, with the support of the Soviet Union and even the United States, emerged triumphant over his enemies. The Suez Canal was now firmly in Egyptian hands, Western forces of imperialism had once more been driven from the area, the Israelis were back within their borders, and the West no longer had any choice but to meet Nasser's terms for the use of the Canal. The problem of Jordan was effectively solved, from Egypt's view, when Iraqi troops withdrew on 8 December (Syrian and Saudi Arabian troops remained) and the pro-Egyptian government of Jordan began taking steps for an even closer link with the Egyptian-dominated bloc of Arab states. The position of Egypt--and, by extension, that of the Arab states allied with it--had never been stronger or more promising. The recalcitrance of Iraq seemed the only bar now to the achievement of complete Arab unity.¹⁹

19. "Developments of the Quarter," MEJ, Winter-Spring, 1957, pp. 63-89 passim, 167-188 passim; Henry C. Atyeo, "Egypt Since the Suez Crisis," MEA, Jun-Jul, 1958, pp. 197-203; Benjamin Shwadran, "The Kingdom of Jordan: To Be or Not To Be," MEA, Aug-Sep, 1957, pp. 274-276.

The Middle East in 1957

During 1957, the turbulent Middle East continued to boil. The situation was highlighted by continued Israeli-Arab tensions, growing Soviet interest and influence, including arms shipments, in the area, and another switch in Jordanian policy, this time away from the Egyptian-dominated bloc of Arab states.

The year opened with President Eisenhower's announcement, on 5 January, of the "Eisenhower Doctrine" for the development of economic strength of countries in the Middle East and for supplying military assistance and cooperation to countries requesting aid "against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism."²⁰ The USSR denounced the

5 Jan 57
Eisenhower
Doctrine

20. Text in New York Times, 6 Jan 57.

"Eisenhower Doctrine" as interference in the internal affairs of Middle Eastern states, a criticism echoed by Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Iraq, with other members of the Baghdad Pact, supported the doctrine.

19 Jan 56
Egypt, Saudi
Arabia,
Syria agree
to aid
Jordan

On 19 January, in a move bringing Jordan closer into the Egyptian bloc, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria signed an agreement with Jordan under which they would supply that country with £12,500,000 (\$35 million) annually for ten years, to replace the annual British subsidy. This was the last step before final abrogation

12 Feb 57
US-Jordan
Treaty to be
abrogated

of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty of 1948, negotiations for which the pro-Egyptian government of Jordan had requested on the previous 21 December. On 12 February 1957, Britain and Jordan agreed to cancel the treaty, terminate the subsidy, and evacuate British troops and bases from Jordan. On the 27th, Jordan joined Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia in issuing a joint statement declaring their positive neutrality in the cold war, and on 1 April, Saudi Arabia paid its share, £5 million, of the first annual subsidy to Jordan.

10-30 Apr 57
Jordan
crisis

Just when it appeared, however, that Jordan was safely in the Egyptian camp, another change took place in that little kingdom to completely alter the picture. King Hussein had been increasingly at odds with his pro-Egyptian premier, Suleiman Nabulsi. On 10 April, Hussein dismissed the Nabulsi government, and, on the 14th and 15th removed other pro-Egyptian leaders in the army and the government. The new government of Hussein Fakhri Khalidi, however, still retained strong pro-Egyptian elements; pro-Egyptian mobs demonstrated in Jordanian Palestine and even in Amman; dissidents in the Army were prevented from moving against the king only by the action of loyal Bedouin soldiers; and Syria reinforced the garrison it had maintained in Jordan since the Israeli attack on Egypt the previous fall. On the other side of the ledger, the United States offered its assistance to Jordan against aggression, and Saudi Arabia, surprisingly, took this moment to come to Hussein's assistance. On 20 April, Saudi Arabia offered military aid, and placed Saudi Arabian troops in Jordan under Hussein's command.

Events moved rapidly during the next ten days. Continued pro-Egyptian agitation brought about the resignation of the Khalidi cabinet on 25 April. The king replaced it with a new one, composed entirely of his supporters and headed by Ibrahim Hashim. At the same time, he imposed martial law, abolished political parties, and accused Egypt and international communism of supporting a conspiracy to overthrow him. On the same day, the United States Sixth Fleet moved into the eastern Mediterranean. While Hussein and his new government proceeded to round up pro-Egyptians, leftists, and communists, Syria and Egypt, on the 26th, sent a delegation to King Saud to try to dissuade him from his new course. Saud, however, was unconvinced and, as if to prove it, sent a congratulatory telegram to Hussein on the same day. On the 28th, Hussein flew to Riyadh for talks with Saud and, on the 29th, submitted a request to the United States for economic aid. Within a few hours, the US granted him \$10 million. Within another week, Hussein appeared to have the situation in Jordan well in hand.

The events of April had produced a serious split in Arab unity. Jordan appeared once again to be back in the Western camp, and Saudi Arabia, for reasons unclear, seemed to be splitting away from the Egyptian bloc. One may speculate that the Saudi defection was influenced by King Saud's reliance on Western oil contracts and his possible fear that Jordan's troubles were a real indication of just how deeply communism had penetrated in the Middle East.

If such was the case, the Soviet Union continued to provide Saud with evidence of communist penetration.

6 Aug 57
Soviet aid
promised
to Syria

Fall, 1957
Syrian-
Turkish
Crisis

On 6 August, a Syrian-USSR communique announced that the Soviet Union had promised extensive economic and military aid to Syria, and less than two weeks later a coup placed pro-Soviet officers in control of the Syrian army. On 7 September, President Eisenhower reaffirmed his intention of carrying out the policies of the "Eisenhower Doctrine," with reference to possible Syrian aggression. On the 9th, the U.S. began an airlift of arms to Jordan. Arms shipments from the US to Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia were also stepped up. The Soviet Union did its share to increase tensions by accusing the US, on 10 September, of planning with Turkey to subvert the government of Syria. Two days later, Syria echoed Soviet charges by asserting that the US was inciting Turkey to concentrate large forces on the Syrian border. As the Soviet Union continued to accuse Turkey of planned aggression against Syria, Egypt, on 13 October, announced the dispatch of Egyptian troops and tanks to Syria for deployment near the Turkish border. A week later, on the 20th, King Saud, after talks in Beirut with Lebanese leaders, offered to mediate, an offer promptly accepted by Turkey and welcomed by the US, but refused by Syria. This proposal interrupted a UN debate on the Syrian question, which had been in progress since 18 October. The debate was resumed in a few days, but ended without decision on 1 November. Tensions continued through the end of the year and then died down.²¹

21. A. G. Mezerik (ed.), The Middle East: Unification Among Arab States (International Review Service, IV, No. 42, May 1958), pp. 31-34. See also the chronologies for the period in MEJ and MEA. For events in Jordan, see also Shwadran, "The Kingdom of Jordan," MEA, Aug-Sep, 1957, pp. 277-288.

Mergers and Realignment in 1958

1 Feb 58
Proclamation
in UAR

On 1 February the United Arab Republic was proclaimed in Cairo, creating a union of Syria and Egypt. The union was the result of talks that had begun as early as 1956 and which, on 3 September 1957, had brought about an Egyptian-Syrian agreement for economic union. The unification was quickly ratified by plebiscites in both countries on 21 February and the legal establishment of the UAR was announced on 22 February. Its first president was Gamal Abdel Nasser. All other Arab states were invited to join the new republic, but only Yemen, on 2 March, announced its willingness to become a member. On 8 March it signed a federation agreement with the UAR, linking it federally but not actually placing it within the Egyptian-Syrian union.²²

8 Mar 58
Yemen joins
UAR

22. Atyeo, "Egypt Since the Suez Crisis," MEA, Jun-Jul, 1958, pp. 207-208; M. Perlmann, "Fusion and Confusion: Arab Mergers and Realignment," MEA, Apr, 1958, pp. 126-127; Mezerik (ed.), The Middle East, p. 35.

The creation of the UAR increased Nasser's prestige even more, and added to his reputation as the leader of Pan-Arabism. In Cairo and Damascus he was hailed as the "founder of the Arab Union" and the "destroyer of imperialism." Retiring President Quwatli of Syria announced his pleasure at handing over the reins of government and the mission of achieving Arab unity to Nasser, "the young enthusiastic Arab who is full of loyalty to the Arab nation."²³ The impact of

23. Quoted in Atyeo, "Egypt Since the Suez Crisis," MEA, Jun-Jul, 1958, p. 207.

the new union, the establishment of which was broadcast triumphantly by Radio Cairo to the rest of the Arab world, was, in the words of one observer, "immediate and galvanizing." The younger generation of Arabs, subject for years to the effect of Egyptian propaganda, viewed the UAR as heralding the dawn of Arab unity. Pictures of Nasser were seen everywhere, and Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon echoed with praise and sympathy for the UAR and its leader.²⁴

24. Perlmann, "Fusion and Confusion," MEA, Apr 1958, p. 128.

The potential threat of the UAR to Iraq and Jordan was quickly realized by those countries, and on 14 February, even before the plebiscites on the establishment of the UAR were held, Iraq and Jordan announced their confederation into an Arab Federation, open to any other Arab states that wished to join. The formal federation took place officially on 12 May. The Arab Federation, under the leadership of King Faisal of Iraq, was a step toward the materialization of the old scheme of a "Greater Syria" championed by Nuri es-Said and the late King Abdullah of Jordan. It was, however, considerably smaller than had been originally contemplated.²⁵

25. Mezerik (ed.), The Middle East, pp. 35-36.

The formation of the UAR and the Arab Federation made glaringly evident the split in Arab ranks, and seemed to write finis, at least for a while, to hopes for the achievement of Arab unity. Without some drastic change or upheaval, the aspirations of Nasser

14 Feb 58
Arab Feder-
ation
announced

to unite all of Arabdom under his banner seemed frustrated. But there was an ominous note to Nasser's public reaction to the formation of the Arab Federation: "The false federation . . . established to stand against the Syrian-Egyptian union," he asserted, "will be blown away by winds like chaff. . . . Dear brothers, you know these people are agents of imperialism, and as such their power is but a short-lived thing."²⁶

26. Quoted in Atyeo, "Egypt Since the Suez Crisis," MEA, Jun-Jul, 1958, p. 208.

While the UAR and the Arab Federation thus stood figuratively glaring at each other, Saudi Arabia seemed intent on neutrality. On 1 March, King Saud stated that he would "co-operate with all Arab states within the commitments he [had] already undertaken."²⁷ And

Mar-Apr 58
Saudi
Arabian
declarations
of neutrality

27. Quoted in "Chronology," MEA, Apr, 1958, p. 157. Emphasis added.

on 18 April Saudi Arabia announced that it would join neither the UAR nor the Arab Federation, but would pursue a policy of "positive neutrality" and avoid membership in any foreign pacts that "contradict Arab interests."²⁸ Between these two statements, however,

28. Quoted in "Chronology," MEA, Jun-Jul, 1958, p. 242.

there had occurred two interesting events. On 5 March, Nasser had accused Saud of responsibility for a plot to assassinate him,²⁹ and on 24 March, King Saud had

5 Mar 58
Nasser accuses
Saud of
assassination
plot
24 Mar 58
Saud gives
powers to
Faisal

29. Mezerik (ed.), The Middle East, p. 35.

turned over to his brother, Crown Prince Faisal, "full power to lay down the state's internal, external and financial policies and to supervise implementation of these policies."³⁰ Then he had departed for a tour

30. Quoted in "Chronology," MEA, May, 1958, p. 190.

abroad, leaving everything in the hands of the reputedly pro-Egyptian Faisal. Despite Faisal's 18 April declaration of neutrality, there have been a number of conferences between Saudi and UAR officials since that date, and there is increased speculation about the possibility of a federal arrangement between the two states. Whether the influence of Western oil concessions on Faisal will be less than it apparently had been on his brother still remains obscure.³¹

31. New York Times, 10 Aug 58, E5:6; Perlman, "Fusion and Confusion," MEA, Apr, 1958, p. 130.

Another Arab state that hoped to remain neutral in the UAR-Arab Federation rivalry was Lebanon. On 25 March the Lebanese government declared that it would not join the UAR, the Arab Federation, or any other group that would limit its "independence, sovereignty and freedom."³² But Lebanon was soon to have its own

32. Quoted in "Chronology," MEA, May, 1958, p. 190.

internal troubles. On 10 May revolt broke out in the city of Tripoli and soon spread through much of the country. On 13 May, Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik charged that the rebellion was being aided by arms and

10 May 58
Start of
Lebanese
revolt

men from Syria, and protested to the UAR about "massive interference" in his country's internal affairs. The UAR rejected the protest on 14 May as "unjustifiable," and President Nasser, then in Moscow, received from Soviet Premier Khrushchev, on the 15th, assurances of support in uniting the Arab people. Lebanon continued to accuse the UAR of assisting the rebels with both men and materiel, and, on 22 May, requested an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council to consider its charges against the UAR. Security Council consideration of the question was postponed when the Arab League Council undertook to discuss the charges, but that group, meeting early in June, took no action whatsoever. On 11 June, finally, the Security Council adopted a Swedish proposal to establish a UN observers team to "ensure" against illegal foreign intervention in Lebanon. The team reported on 4 July that there was no evidence of any "massive infiltration," but the US and Great Britain disputed this report.

11 Jun 58
UN observers
sent to
Lebanon

14 Jul 58
Iraqi revolt

15 Jul 58
US Troops
landed in
Lebanon

Ten days later, on 14 July, while the Lebanese revolt still remained unsettled, a military coup overthrew the royal regime in Iraq. On the 15th, US troops landed in Lebanon and on the 16th British troops entered Jordan. On 18 July, in the Security Council, the USSR vetoed a US resolution to establish an armed UN emergency force to replace American troops in Lebanon.³³

33. New York Times, 27 Jul 58, E1:2, 6 Aug 58, 6:1; "Chronology," MEA, Jun-Jul, 1958, pp. 239-240.

In the summer of 1958, it seemed that the pendulum had swung once again toward the UAR's President Nasser. Iraq, the strongest of his enemies among

the Arab states, apparently had been knocked from its pro-Western alignment, and with its Hashimite king and the fierce old politician, Nuri es-Said, dead, it might soon fall into the orbit of the UAR. Jordan, deprived of the prop that Iraq had provided, now stood supported only by British bayonets. Lebanon and Saudi Arabia were still question marks, but they too, it seemed, were dependent for their existence on Western support.

The Arab States: Internal Developments

While the overall themes of Arab unity and disunity have dominated relationships between the Arab states during the period from 1945 to the present, these relationships have been greatly affected by internal changes within almost all of the Arab nations. Some, like developments in Egypt, have been more important than others, but all have been significant.

Egypt

The year 1945 opened in Egypt with a general election on 8 January that saw the election of the government of the pro-British Ahmed Maher Pasha. The election had been boycotted by the Wafd (Nationalist Party), however, and the assassination of the new Prime Minister on 24 February (just as he was announcing Egypt's declaration of war on the Axis) was indicative of a new trend toward extremism in Egyptian politics. On the left were the Communists who, although their party was illegal, had gained greatly in strength as a result of Soviet victories during World War II. On the extreme right stood the powerful Moslem Brotherhood. These groups, and the Wafd, provided a continuing

opposition to the Saadist party, which, in coalition with other minority parties, dominated most of Egypt's governments through 1949. The first Saadist Prime Minister after Ahmed Maher's death was Mahmud Fahmi Nokrashi Pasha, who remained in office for most of the time until the end of 1948.

Jul 46
Saadist Govt
moves against
Communists

In its attempt to maintain order, the Saadist government moved first against the Communists. In July, 1946, after a series of strikes and demonstrations, and again in October and November of that year, the government rounded up large numbers of Communists. A trial of twenty Communist leaders began in January, 1947, and most of them were given jail sentences.

8 Dec 48
Moslem
Brotherhood
outlawed

It was not until the end of 1948, however, that the Government moved against the Moslem Brotherhood. Late in the year a series of terrorist acts by the Brotherhood culminated in the assassination of Cairo's chief of police, and on 8 December the Brotherhood was outlawed. In reprisal, on the 28th, a student member of the Brotherhood assassinated Prime Minister Nokrashi Pasha, but six weeks later, on 12 February 1949, the leader of the Brotherhood was himself assassinated. King Farouk now stepped in with an appeal for national unity, and asked the Wafd to enter the government, though not to lead it. In return for acceptance of certain conditions, the Wafd entered a coalition cabinet in July 1949. This lasted only until November, when it was replaced by a caretaker government, in preparation for the January, 1950 elections. These elections gave the Wafd a resounding victory, interpreted as a rebuke to the Saadists for their inept handling of the

Jan 50
Wafd victory
in elections

Palestine War of 1948. The Wafd victory ended five years of government by minorities. By June, 1950, with Mustafa an-Nahas Pasha as Prime Minister, the Wafd had firm control of the entire government.

During these years of internal uneasiness, Egypt's relations with Great Britain had been deteriorating. Determined to revise the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936, Egypt had two special grievances: the continued presence of British troops in Egypt, and the problem of the Sudan. On 23 September 1945, the Egyptian Government demanded that the treaty be terminated (thus removing British troops) and that the Sudan be transferred to full Egyptian control (under the principle of the "Unity of the Nile Valley"), ending the Anglo-Egyptian condominium.

On 9 May 1946, in the face of growing anti-British agitation, Great Britain announced its willingness to withdraw forces from Egypt. Anglo-Egyptian negotiations were carried on during the summer, and in October Prime Minister Sidki Pasha and Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin formulated a draft agreement on outstanding problems. Under this agreement, British troops would be withdrawn from Egypt by September 1949. A joint policy for the Sudan called for continuation of the condominium, "within the framework of the unity between the Sudan and Egypt under the common Crown of Egypt," in preparation for Sudanese self-government. The phrase concerning the "common Crown of Egypt," however, aroused Sudanese resentment, and, when this was followed by Anglo-Egyptian disagreement over interpretation of the entire paragraph on the Sudan, negotiations were broken off entirely in January 1947.

On 8 July 1947, Egypt asked the UN Security Council to order total and immediate evacuation of British troops from Egypt and the Sudan, and asked for unification of Egypt and the Sudan. The British replied that the matter should not be considered by the UN, since the 1936 treaty was still valid, and there was no threat to international peace. Since neither Egypt nor Great Britain was able to arouse sufficient support in the UN, the matter was allowed to die without action. The British, meanwhile, anxious to show their conformance with the 1936 treaty, had evacuated their troops from Upper Egypt and the Nile Delta, leaving only forces in the Suez Canal area.

The Palestine War of 1948 replaced the Anglo-Egyptian dispute as a major theme in that year. On 15 May, Egyptian and other Arab armies entered Palestine, and fighting continued until early 1949. This served to heighten nationalist feelings in Egypt, while at the same time, because of Egyptian military setbacks, increased discontent with King Farouk. Although the British warned Israel against any invasion of Egypt proper, Great Britain at the same time refused to supply Egypt arms from the British Canal base, an action which Egyptians regarded as a breach of the 1936 treaty (even though they were simultaneously contending that this treaty had outlived its purpose). On 15 July, also, the British introduced governmental reforms in the Sudan, over the protests of Egypt, and on 15 November elections for a Legislative Assembly in the Sudan resulted in a majority for the anti-Egyptian Independence Front. By 24 February 1949, when Egypt signed an armistice agreement with Israel, Anglo-Egyptian

15 May 48
Egyptian
troops enter
Palestine

15 Nov 48
Sudanese
election

24 Feb 49
Armistice
with Israel

antagonisms had heightened considerably. They were helped to remain bitter by Egyptian restrictions on Suez Canal traffic, imposed in an attempt to blockade Israel.

The return of the Wafd government in 1950 resulted in a reopening of the negotiations for Anglo-Egyptian treaty revision. At the same time, an Egyptian declaration of neutrality on 21 July 1950 in regard to the Korean War was seen in some quarters as an indication that British acceptance of Egyptian demands was to be the price for Egyptian support of the West in the Cold War. Negotiations dragged on in 1950 and 1951 without any satisfactory conclusion. On 26 August 1951, the fifteenth anniversary of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, rioting broke out in Cairo as a result of the Iranian oil crisis, then at its height. This rioting culminated in attacks on both the British and American embassies, and it seemed clear that extremist elements in Egypt were weakening the Wafd control of the government and would soon dictate a complete break with England.

15 Oct 51
Egypt rejects
Middle East
Command

On 15 October 1951, Egypt rejected a bid to join a Middle East Command proposed by the British, French, Americans and Turks. Twelve days later, as anti-British rioting increased in Egypt and the Wafdist government sought to please extremist elements, Egypt formally abrogated the 1936 treaty with Great Britain. The Egyptian government also called for the reunion of the Sudan with Egypt, and proclaimed Farouk "King of Egypt and the Sudan"--an action which the Sudanese Legislative Assembly promptly rejected. The British reply to the Egyptian step was a statement that unilateral denunciation of the 1936 treaty was illegal, and a move to

27 Oct 51
Egypt
abrogates
1936 treaty
with UK

reinforce British troops in the Canal Zone. Anti-British riots continued, and clashes occurred almost every day between British forces and Egyptian rioters, guerrillas, and, later, even police. On 18 January 1952 a British cruiser fired on Port Said, and two days later British troops entered Ismailia. Violence continued, climaxing in great riots in Cairo on 26 January, finally suppressed by the Army, and the fall of the Egyptian government the next day.

The riots of 26 January 1952 came at the end of a prolonged period of unrest and opposition to the Egyptian government. This was a result of Egyptian failures in the Palestine war, the corruption of the Wafd government and, especially, of the monarchy under King Farouk, and a growing anti-Western feeling throughout the country. A national front government formed on 28 January eased internal as well as Anglo-Egyptian tensions somewhat, and this was continued under a successor government formed early in March and another formed at the end of June. Continued interference by the King, however, in the running of the government led to a coup d'etat on 23 July by young army leaders who were convinced that the monarchy was the main obstacle to reform.

23 Jul 52
Coup d'etat
against
Farouk

The military junta, calling itself the Council of the Revolution, was headed by General Mohammed Naguib. It hoped to establish a reform government and support it from behind the scenes. On 24 July, Ali Mahir Pasha became Prime Minister in a civilian government, and two days later Naguib forced Farouk to abdicate. Ali Pasha's attempts at political reforms were unsuccessful, however,

26 Jul 52
Farouk
abdicates

7 Sep 52
Naguib
Prime
Minister

and evoked considerable opposition, and on 7 September Naguib himself became prime minister. A Regency Council, established to replace Farouk after the king's abdication, was dissolved on 14 October, and a rubber-stamp regent appointed, who could be more easily controlled by the Council of the Revolution. Naguib continued with political and economic reforms, and made some progress. In December, however, he formally abolished the Constitution, and in January, 1953, dissolved all political parties and announced a three-year transitional period before the restoration of parliamentary government. In June, the Council of the Revolution proclaimed a republic, with Naguib as both President and Prime Minister.

Jun 53
Egypt a
Republic

Under the new government, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, now the dominant figure in the Revolutionary Council, became deputy premier. In the period that followed, there was increasing conflict between the conservative Naguib and the more radically-minded members of the Council led by Nasser. This came to a head on 25 February 1954 when Naguib was overthrown and Nasser became prime minister, with the post of president being left open. In the face of popular opposition, however, Naguib was restored as president two days later, and as prime minister on 8 March. But Nasser did not give up easily. In another coup on 18 April he replaced Naguib as prime minister again, and on 14 November also replaced him as president. By the end of 1954, Nasser's dictatorship over Egypt was firmly established, and could boast of growing popular support.

25 Feb 54
Nasser Prime
Minister

8 Mar 54
Naguib
restored

18 Apr 54
Nasser again
Prime
Minister

During the two years since the disturbances of January 1952, considerable steps had been taken toward

the resolution of Anglo-Egyptian difficulties. The expulsion of Farouk allowed Egypt's claim of a joint monarchy of Egypt and the Sudan to be dropped, and negotiations with the Sudanese were eased by the fact that Naguib was himself half-Sudanese, and was highly regarded in the Sudan. On 12 February 1953, an Anglo-Egyptian agreement was signed providing for the ending of the condominium and giving the Sudanese the ultimate choice of independence or union with Egypt. An agreement on Suez was signed on 19 October 1954, providing for the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt within twenty months--although giving Great Britain the right to reoccupy its former Suez base in the event of an attack on any Arab League state or Turkey--and transferring the Suez Canal Base to Egypt. The last British troops left on 13 June 1956.

12 Feb 53
UK and Egypt
agree on
Sudan

19 Oct 54
They also
agree on
Suez

13 Jun 56
Last UK
troops
leave
Egypt

Under Nasser, Egypt began to assert her importance in world affairs, and especially as a leader in the cause of Arab unity.³⁴ On 19 June 1956, Nasser ended

³⁴. See the section on relations between the Arab states.

the martial law that had existed in Egypt since 1952. Four days later a new Egyptian constitution that provided for a strong presidency was almost unanimously accepted in a national election. On 7 July, Nasser was elected President for a six-year term by an equally strong vote. Secure in his position at home then, Nasser was ready for the first major international crisis of his career.

23 Jun 56
Egyptian
Constitution

In December 1955 the United States and Great Britain had extended offers of financial aid for the building

Dec 55
Aswan Dam
offers

of a High Dam at Aswan that would greatly increase irrigation in Egypt, and thus ease many of the problems arising from the large growth in Egyptian population.

19 Jul 56
US withdraws
offer on Dam

On 19, 20, and 23 July 1956, the US, Great Britain, and the World Bank withdrew their offers to finance the dam. Aside from a general statement by the Soviet ambassador in Cairo, there was no compensating Soviet move.

26 Jul 56
Egypt nation-
alizes Suez
Canal

Nasser's response was to nationalize the Suez Canal on 26 July. In turn, Great Britain on 28 July and the US on 31 July froze Egyptian assets in the two countries.

16 Aug 56
London
Conference
on Canal

On 16 August, an international conference met in London to consider the situation. Although Egypt refused to attend, there was general concurrence among the eighteen participating nations in a plan for the internationalization of the Canal, based on a plan offered by Secretary of State Dulles.

9 Sep 56
Nasser
rejects
Canal plan

The plan evolved at the London conference was submitted to President Nasser, who turned it down on 9 September with the statement that it was intended to take the Canal out of Egyptian hands. Three days later, Prime Minister Eden announced the formation of an organization to enable the users of the Canal "to exercise their rights." On 15 September, most of the foreign pilots left Egypt, and the movement of ships was left to the direction of Egyptian pilots. The Suez Canal Users Association was formed at a second

19-21 Sep 56
SCUA formed

London conference, 19-21 September, and sixteen nations ultimately joined it. On 13 October, an Anglo-French resolution in the UN Security Council that requested approval of SCUA and urged Egyptian cooperation was vetoed by the USSR.

29 Oct 56
Israel invades
Egypt

The invasion of Egypt by Israel on 29 October 1956 gave Great Britain and France the opportunity to move in on the Canal. After Egyptian refusal of an Anglo-French ultimatum, on 31 October British and French aircraft and warships began bombarding Egypt, and on 5 November Anglo-French forces landed in the Canal Zone. The consequent UN-supervised cease-fire and evacuation from Egypt of British, French, and Israeli troops left the Egyptians in complete control of the Canal. Nasser had weathered a storm that at first had threatened his destruction, and he now stood in a much stronger position than ever before.³⁵

31 Oct 56
UK and
France enters
conflict

35. For the effects of the Suez crisis, see above, the section on relations between Arab states.

Nasser was far more successful in his foreign policy than in solving Egypt's internal policies. Egypt is still a dictatorship, with only a single party and a government completely in the grasp of Nasser. The freedoms of the press, assembly, speech, worship, and private ownership of property--all guaranteed under the new Egyptian constitution--are exercised only at Nasser's discretion. The Communist Party is still illegal in Egypt, and Nasser has made a great show of putting down the Communists. In fact, however, powerful factions of the Communist Party provide welcome support for the Nasser government, and, Nasser to the contrary, Radio Cairo and the controlled Egyptian press use glowing adjectives to describe the Communist paradise within the Soviet bloc.

In economic affairs, Egypt is still a poor country, and greatly in need of funds. Egyptian farmers

still live in poverty, and even the building of the Aswan Dam will not provide enough irrigation to support the country's growing population. Land reform, enthusiastically championed by Nasser, has proven a hoax, and the amount of land redistribution carried out and still planned is very small indeed. Some industry is projected, but Egypt lacks capital, skilled labor, sufficient power resources, and an adequate internal market.

Egypt's problems at home have been hidden to the casual observer by the excesses of Nasser's foreign policy. Whether a dangerous foreign policy can offset a weak internal situation is a matter for speculation. Egypt's latest venture into the UAR³⁶ does not seem

36. See above, the section on relations between Arab states.

to offer any initial internal benefits to the country. But if it leads to further Arab unity and increased Egyptian prestige and strength, it may, ultimately, provide the funds and resources needed for a resurrection of the Egyptian economy. It seems doubtful, however, that the long-touted political reforms of the Egyptian revolution will come to light under the regime of Nasser.³⁷

37. Lenczowski, The Middle East, pp. 326-337; The Middle East (RIIA), pp. 189-253; The Middle East, 1957, pp. 87-101; Walter Z. Laqueur, Nasser's Egypt (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1956); Mekki Abbas, The Sudan Question: The Dispute over the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 1884-1951 (London: Faber and Faber, 1952), Pt. III; Paul L. Hanna, "The Anglo-Egyptian Negotiations, 1950-1952," MEA, Aug-Sep, 1952, pp. 213-233; Marcel Colombe, "Egypt From the Fall of Farouk to the February 1954 Crisis," MEA, Jun-Jul 1954, pp. 185-192; Atyeo, "Egypt Since the Suez Crisis," MEA, Jun-Jul 1958, pp. 197-208. See also the chronologies in MEJ and MEA.

The Sudan

The problem of the Sudan has, of course, been linked closely with the whole question of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian relations. The fall of the Farouk regime in 1952 opened the way to a solution of this problem. The Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 12 February 1953, made possible by the disappearance of the Egyptian monarchy, meant that for the Sudan independence was not far off.

The agreement of February 1953 provided for a transitional period of not more than three years, during which time the Condominium Administration was to be liquidated. At the end of this period, the Sudanese were to determine their future status: independence or union with Egypt. During this transitional period, there would be a Sudanese government, although the Condominium Administration would appoint a Governor General, whose position approximated that of a constitutional monarch. The Governor General was to be assisted by an international commission, with a Pakistani chairman, and representatives of the Sudan, Great Britain, and Egypt.

In November 1953, Sudanese elections were held under the supervision of an international Electoral Commission (three Sudanese, and one member each from the US, UK, and Egypt, under an Indian chairman). These elections brought victory to the pro-Egyptian National Unionist Party (NUP), and Ismail Al Azhari became prime minister in January 1954. The election had been marked by Egyptian interference and considerable emotional heat. The ceremonial opening of Parliament, planned for 1 March 1954, had to be postponed when the arrival of Egyptian President Naguib touched off a huge riot.

Nov 53
Sudanese
election
won by pro-
Egyptian
NUP

Despite the victory of the NUP, the opposition party, the Ummah, remained strong, and was in the forefront of opposition to any union with Egypt. The anti-Egyptian riots of 1 March 1954 were indicative of the strength of independence sentiments within the Sudan. Partly as a result of this opposition, partly because of the overthrow of half-Sudanese Egyptian General Naguib by Nasser, partly because of Nasser's persecution of the Moslem Brotherhood, and partly because the loosening of the British hold on the Sudan had removed the need for Egyptian support, Prime Minister Al Azhari began to move steadily but cautiously toward a policy favoring independence. In December 1954, he began to oust from his government those NUP ministers who were most adamant in their stand for union with Egypt. As friction with Egypt grew in the following months-- negotiations over the Nile waters broke down in April, 1955--Al Azhari came out openly for independence, and increased his attempts to eliminate opposition to this policy.

19 Dec 55
Sudanese
declare
republic

On 19 December 1955, the Sudanese parliament, sidestepping Anglo-Egyptian plans for a plebiscite and other protracted procedures, declared the Sudan an independent republic. Britain and Egypt had no choice but to accept this fait accompli. The Governor General resigned, and British and Egyptian garrisons that had begun withdrawing on 15 November 1955 hastened their exodus. On 1 January 1956, British and Egyptian flags were ceremoniously lowered, and the Republic of the Sudan was formally established.

During the first years of its existence, the Sudanese Government has been mainly concerned with its

recognition abroad and its participation in international conferences. On 19 January 1956, Sudan joined the Arab League, and in November was admitted to full membership in the United Nations. On 4 July 1956, a vote of no confidence defeated Prime Minister Al Azhari, and a new government was formed by the Ummah party, with Sayed Abdullah Khalil as Prime Minister. On 21 May 1957, Foreign Minister Mahjub stated in Parliament that the Sudan would not enter into any military pacts, nor into a defensive alliance with any other Arab nation, and that the country intended to follow a policy of positive neutrality. The inability of Egypt and the Sudan to reach agreement on a formula for the revision of the Nile Waters Agreement of 1929 has left that problem unsolved, and has helped to maintain Egyptian-Sudanese frictions.³⁸

38. The Middle East, 1957, pp. 293-294; Peter M. Holt, "Sudanese Nationalism and Self-Determination," MEJ, Summer, Autumn, 1956, pp. 239-247, 368-378, passim. See also chronologies in MEJ and MEA.

Saudi-Arabia

Another country with important links with Egypt is Saudi Arabia. That state has sided with Egypt in most of the splits in the Arab world, although for a while in 1957 it appeared that Saudi Arabia might pull free of its ties with Egypt. Recent events, however, seem to indicate that Saudi Arabia is once more back in the Egyptian camp.

Saudi Arabia since 1945 has presented the curious picture of a country fluctuating between the Egyptian-led movement for Arab unity, and friendship with the

West through ties with the United States. Neutral in World War II, Ibn Saud was nevertheless friendly and helpful to the Allies, and in 1945 his talks with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill led to his declaration of war on Germany on 1 March 1945. At the same time, his outspoken opposition to Zionism, and his position as a charter member of the Arab League, put him in the position of opposing the West on the Palestine issue.

Saudi Arabia was linked to the United States by economic and military considerations, the major one being, from Saud's point of view, the complete dependence of his state finances on the royalties received from ARAMCO. The spectacular development of Saudi Arabian oil resources has made that country one of the two largest producers of oil in the Middle East. Commercial production, begun only in 1945, had by 1950 reached the impressive figure of 25 million tons, and is still increasing as new fields are opened and production mounts. The extent of Saud's dependence on oil revenues was indicated clearly in 1948 when he resisted Arab League proposals to suspend foreign oil concessions, a move that was probably the most powerful political weapon the Arabs possessed. The Saudi Arabian force sent to fight in Palestine, also, was only a token one.

During World War II, when oil investments in Saudi Arabia were curtailed, King Saud received financial aid from Great Britain and the United States in the form of loans and lend-lease. In 1946, the Export-Import Bank granted Saudi Arabia a \$10 million loan. The same year, the \$40 million Dhahran air base was completed, and gave the United States a major military link with

18 Jun 51
US-Saudi
defense
agreement

Saudi Arabia. In the spring of 1951, the US extended Point Four technical aid to Saudi Arabia and on 18 June 1951 a US-Saudi defense agreement was signed. This extended the US lease on Dhahran, enabled Saudi Arabia to buy military equipment in the US, and provided for military training of the Saudi Arabian army by US instructors.

American aid and, especially, the income from oil revenues has enabled Saudi Arabia to embark on large programs for the improvement of the country. These have emphasized technical advances rather than attempting to raise the extremely low rate of literacy among Saudi Arabians. Technological progress has introduced certain social problems to the country, with the development of a class of industrial and white-collar workers. Increased prosperity and contacts with the outside world through foreign technicians stationed in Saudi Arabia have also had their effect. While the government clings to the old traditions, it would not be surprising if progress and prosperity did not eventually force some changes in the absolute monarchy of Saudi Arabia.

Oct 52
UK-Saudi
agreement
on Buraimi

Saudi Arabian relations with Great Britain, similar to those with the United States, have been marred in recent years by a dispute over the ownership of territory around Buraimi, on the frontier between Saudi Arabia and Oman. An agreement in October 1952 was disturbed by Saudi complaints in March and September 1953, and in July 1954 the matter was submitted to arbitration. Arbitration failed, however, and in October 1954 British forces reoccupied the Buraimi oasis despite protests by Saudi Arabia and the Arab League. The problem is still unsolved, although further conversations were initiated in the spring of 1956.

Oct 54
UK reoccupies
Buraimi

9 Jul 53
Death of
Ibn Saud

On 9 July 1953, King Saud died and was succeeded by his son, Crown Prince Saud. Under the new king, Saudi Arabia continued to play a growing role in relations between Arab states.³⁹ During 1957, Saudi

39. For this role, see above, the section on relations between the Arab states.

24 Mar 58
Crown Prince
Faisal gains
control

Arabia appeared to be splitting away from the Egyptian-led bloc, but in the summer of 1958 the country appears to be sliding back into its former position along side of Egypt. On 24 March 1958, King Saud turned over to his brother, Crown Prince Faisal, complete control of the country's affairs, and then left for a tour abroad. Reputedly pro-Egyptian, Faisal has clearly been working with Egypt's Nasser for a rapprochement between the two states. On 17 August 1958, after a conference between the two in Cairo, Faisal stated that "previous differences" between them had been cleared up, and, in a communique issued on the 18th, the two heads of state reaffirmed the "brotherhood and friendship" between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic.⁴⁰

40. The Middle East, 1957, p. 27; Lenczowski, The Middle East, pp. 347-356; The Middle East (RIIA), pp. 89-99; K. S. Twitchell, Saudi Arabia (2d ed.; Princeton University Press, 1953), pp. 178-212; New York Times, 10 Aug 58, E5:6, 19 Aug 58, 8:4; Perlman, "Fusion and Confusion," MEA, April, 1958, p. 130. See also chronologies in MEJ and MEA.

The Other States of the Arabian Peninsula

Grouped around Saudi Arabia in a huge semicircle, and blocking that nation from the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf, are a series of small states or principalities. Beginning with Yemen, at the southwest tip

of the Arabian peninsula, and moving counter-clockwise, they are the Aden Protectorate, Muscat and Oman (a single state despite the dual name), and the Persian Gulf principalities or sheikdoms of the Trucial States, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait.

Yemen at the end of World War II began to emerge from its traditional isolation and seek ties with the outside world. It was a charter member of the Arab League, and entered the United Nations in August 1947. In April 1946 the first US diplomatic mission to Yemen concluded a treaty of commerce and friendship, which led to the establishment of regular diplomatic relations on 11 May. On 24 May 1947, the US and Yemen signed an agreement granting Yemen credit up to \$1 million for the purchase of US surplus property.

Apr 46
US-Yemen
treaty

In February 1948, the aged Imam Yahya was murdered in an attempted coup d'etat. This led to a brief civil war in which his eldest son, Seif el-Islam Ahmed, was successful in recapturing the throne. This change helped to further Yemen's willingness to move into the arena of world affairs.⁴¹

41. For Yemen's participation in inter-Arab relations, see the section on relations between the Arab states.

In January 1951, British, American, and French technical aid was brought into Yemen to assist in the development of the country. During 1953, agreements were made with German and Italian firms for the development of Yemen's mineral resources, including oil, coal, and iron. In 1955, an oil and mineral concession was granted to an American firm. There has been little

industrial development in Yemen, and the country still seems mainly dependent on agriculture.

In April 1955 an attempted coup d'etat against the Imam Ahmed was defeated, but it apparently had some influence on Ahmed's decision to establish a formal cabinet in August of that year. During 1956 diplomatic relations were established with the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany.

At the end of 1953, Yemen, with the support of other Arab states, began pressing before the United Nations its claims to territories in the Aden Protectorate, and throughout the summer of 1954, and again in 1955, there were numerous frontier incidents. In March 1956, also, Yemen protested against the grant by Great Britain of an oil concession on the Red Sea island of Kamaran (just off the northern part of Yemen's coast), which Yemen claimed. The frontier dispute continued, with frontier incidents in 1956 and 1957. British-Yemeni negotiations have so far been unsuccessful in attempts to settle the issue. Yemen signed a federation agreement with the UAR on 8 March 1958, which will doubtless tend to increase her unwillingness to back down on the question.⁴²

8 Mar 58
UAR-Yemen
federation
agreement

42. The Middle East, 1957, pp. 27-28; Lenczowski, The Middle East, pp. 361-363; The Middle East (RIIA), pp. 103-110. See also chronologies in MEJ and MEA.

Aden Protectorate, which includes the colony and port of Aden, is controlled by the British, and still consists of small, independent states linked by protective treaties with Great Britain. There has been

a movement toward some form of federation, but so far no concrete steps have been taken to implement this.⁴³

43. The Middle East, 1957, pp. 48-50; The Middle East (RIIA), pp. 110-118.

Muscat and Oman is an independent sultanate. Its traditional association with Great Britain was confirmed in 1951 by the conclusion of a new Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the two countries. There is some oil in Muscat and Oman, though none has been discovered in commercial quantity. The likelihood of oil deposits led to the dispute with Saudi Arabia over the Buraimi oasis, as yet unsettled.⁴⁴

44. Discussed above, under Saudi Arabia. The Middle East, 1957, p. 38; The Middle East (RIIA), pp. 91, 134, 137.

The Trucial States, on the southern shore of the entrance to the Persian Gulf, are also under British protection. Foreign relations and relations between the seven sheikdoms are administered by Great Britain. There is some oil, though not of commercial importance, and the principal local industries are still pearling and fishing. The area will only become one of international importance if Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast), Ltd., which holds the oil concession, can make a successful strike. So far it has not.⁴⁵

45. The Middle East, 1957, p. 47; The Middle East (RIIA), p. 134.

Qatar has the same relationship with Great Britain as the Trucial States. It is differentiated from them, however, by the presence of oil in large quantities

within its borders. The land border of Qatar with Saudi Arabia has never been actually fixed, and as more oil is discovered, may develop into something of a problem.

Qatar's oil development dates back only a few years, under what is now known as the Qatar Petroleum Company, and did not begin to amount to much until after World War II. Oil production rose rapidly between 1947 and 1950, and since that time has more than doubled. The great income from oil production has enabled the sheik of Qatar, with British advice, to embark on a major development program for his country, which hitherto had been extremely primitive. Since 1949 major steps have been taken to modernize the country and improve living conditions.⁴⁶

46. The Middle East, 1957, p. 45; The Middle East (RIIA), pp. 132-133; Benjamin Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers (New York: Praeger, 1955), pp. 397-399; Sir Rupert Hay, "The Impact of the Oil Industry on the Persian Gulf Shaykhdoms," MEJ, Autumn, 1955, pp. 368-370; Herbert J. Liebesny, "Administration and Legal Development in Arabia: The Persian Gulf Principalities," MEJ, Winter, 1956, pp. 40-41.

Bahrain, a group of islands in the Persian Gulf off the coast of Saudi Arabia, is another British protectorate. It has large oil resources, and it was here that the first development of oil in this area was begun with its discovery by the Bahrain Petroleum Company in 1932. Large-scale production began in 1936 and, with the exception of the war years, when it fell slightly, has risen slowly since that time. As elsewhere in the Middle East, the oil revenues have enabled Bahrain to make many internal improvements, and have raised the

standard of living and resulted in other developments. There has been some demand for social reform--a general strike was called in late 1954 for this purpose--and there is room for improvement, but no drastic changes are foreseen.⁴⁷

47. Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers, pp. 370-383; Hay, "The Impact of the Oil Industry on the Persian Gulf Shaykhdoms," MEJ, Autumn, 1955, pp. 362-365; Liebesny, "Administration and Legal Development in Arabia," MEJ, Winter, 1956, pp. 37-39; The Middle East (RIIA), pp. 130-132.

Kuwait possesses what is perhaps the largest oil field in the Middle East, if not in the world. The country, another British protectorate, is the fourth largest oil-producing state in the world, with a daily yield in 1953 of about a million barrels. Since 1946, when oil was first exported, under the auspices of the Kuwait Oil Company, production has risen steadily, and the country has enjoyed an unprecedented boom based entirely on its oil revenues. Not only is current production high, but the estimated oil reserves are constantly being revised upwards.

The sheikdom of Kuwait is small in population and territory, and it has the unique "neutral zones" to its west and south. These areas, created in 1922, were the only means of solving contesting claims by rival tribes for territories in the areas where Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq come together. Oil rights in the southern of these two "neutral zones" have been divided between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. As in other countries, oil revenues have permitted internal development. Kuwait, with British advice, has established higher standards

of health, education, sanitation, and general welfare than any of the other Persian Gulf principalities.⁴⁸

48. Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers, pp. 384-397; Hay, "The Impact of the Oil Industry on the Persian Gulf Shaykdoms," MEJ, Autumn, 1955, pp. 365-368; The Middle East (RIIA), pp. 121-132 passim; The Middle East, 1957, p. 42

Iraq

World War II had brought Iraq more closely in contact with the Western world than ever before. As a result of these and prior Western contacts, Iraq emerged with a higher degree of technological development and, among the better educated, a greater number of more politically-sophisticated Iraqis than before. These Iraqis were now eager and willing to take the reins of government in their own hands, rather than leave them to the professional politicians or army officers. The public in general grew restless under the rule of the landed aristocracy, and demanded democratic reforms.

As these influences began to permeate Iraqi politics, the country saw for the first time the organization of true political parties in the Western sense of the word, with differing social and economic aims. These parties, however, were kept under tight control by the government. The political situation was somewhat chaotic, with cabinets succeeding each other at a fast rate between 1945 and 1948. Communist organizers began to appear in many villages, agitating for land and social reforms.

Iraq's internal development had its effect on Iraqi foreign policy, which was dominated by the problem

of Anglo-Iraqi relations. Iraq was one of the charter members of the Arab League in 1945, and in 1946, following a similar move by Egypt, Prime Minister Tewfik es-Suweidi asked Great Britain for a revision of the treaty of 1930, in order to remove those remnants of British control still manifest in the country. Iraq did not, however, display such strong anti-British sentiments as were evident in Egypt. This may probably be attributed to the potential threat of the Soviet Union, and the tendency of the Hashimite monarchy to favor British-Arab understanding. Indicative of Iraq's willingness to remain on close terms with non-Arab states was the Turco-Iraqi treaty of friendship, concluded on 29 March 1946, which, among other things, called for joint control over the waters of the upper Tigris and Euphrates. The danger of Soviet subversive activities in Iraq was stressed in January 1947, when a number of leading Iraqi Communists were arrested and tried. On 26 October of that year, Great Britain announced the withdrawal of British troops, other than two RAF detachments, from Iraq, and subsequent negotiations for treaty revision were successfully concluded with the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth on 16 January 1948. The treaty gave Great Britain the right to send troops to Iraq in the event of war or the imminence of war, but, in return, Britain surrendered her right to occupy air bases in Iraq. Also, the Iraqi army would be trained and equipped by the British.

While ratification of the Treaty of Portsmouth seemed a safe assumption, news of its signing was greeted in Baghdad with great riots. The Palestine question had aroused strong sentiments in Iraq, and the treaty

29 Mar 46
Turco-Iraqi
Treaty of
Friendship

26 Oct 46
UK announces
troop
withdrawal

16 Jan 48
Treaty of
Portsmouth
signed

21 Jan 48
Iraq refuses
to ratify
Treaty of
Portsmouth

had been signed just after the United Nations General Assembly had recommended partition of that area between Jews and Arabs. So strong, therefore, was the anti-Western feeling in Iraq, that, on 21 January, Iraq announced that the treaty could not be ratified since it failed to "realize the national aims" of the country. The Iraqi cabinet was forced to resign, and the prime minister barely escaped assassination. Anti-British sentiments remained strong throughout Iraq's participation in the Palestine War of 1948.⁴⁹

49. For the Palestine War, and Iraq's relationship in general with other Arab states, see above, the section on relations between the Arab states.

It was not long, however, before Iraqi leaders realized that a revision of the 1930 treaty would still have to be made. Despite anti-British feelings, to denounce the treaty unilaterally was unthinkable, for Iraq badly needed Western aid. The expense of the Palestine War, bad harvests, the considerable loss of revenue growing out of the closure of the oil pipeline to Haifa, and the general unrest throughout the country were problems for the solution of which the British would have to be cultivated. The Iraqi Government soon stopped all official talk of an anti-British nature. The first result of this was a British loan, in 1949, for irrigation and other public works. Anti-British politicians gradually dropped out of the Cabinet, and for most of the period from January 1949 until the summer of 1952 the pro-British Nuri es-Said headed the Iraqi Government.

The period from late 1950 through mid-1952, when Nuri headed the government without interruption, was one of political stability unprecedented in modern Iraqi history. Nuri ruled with an iron hand, and his cabinet had perhaps the longest existence since the establishment of the Iraqi Government after World War I. Not only did he enforce order and stability, but he made possible the establishment of a Development Board, charged with carrying out projects for irrigation, construction, and other economic plans, in cooperation with United States aid programs. He also brought about the signing of an important agreement on Iraqi oil, a revision of the so-called "Red Line" agreement of 1928, that resulted in increasing oil production and revenues for Iraq.

The development of Iraqi oil, beginning in 1925 with the granting of the first oil concession, had made considerable progress. After World War II, most of the oil concessions in the country were held by the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), and associated firms. From 1945, production increased, more pipelines were built, and, in 1951, Iraq achieved the long-held aim of the establishment of major refineries on Iraqi territory. The Iraqis, however, were dissatisfied with the size of their royalties, the numbers of their nationals in the higher positions of oil production operations, and the lack of training facilities for Iraqis. Many felt, moreover, that the foreign oil companies were not as interested in expanding Iraq oil production as they were in production in other countries.

On 11 November 1950, Iraq announced that IPC had agreed to raise oil royalties. This, in turn, led to

an agreement between Saudi Arabia and Aramco in early 1951 which replaced the Saudi royalty agreement with a 50-50 profit sharing arrangement. Agitation in Iran, at the same time, led to the nationalization of that country's oil industry in April 1951. These developments provided impetus for further Iraqi demands, and, two weeks after the Iranian nationalization move, Premier Nuri threatened the oil companies with loss of their concessions if they did not provide Iraq with an arrangement similar to the one concluded in Saudi Arabia.

Negotiations for a new oil agreement began immediately. On 13 August 1951 it was announced that IPC and its subsidiaries had reached agreement with the Iraq Government, and on 3 February 1952 the new accord was signed. This arrangement gave Iraq a 50-50 share of profits (before foreign taxes) on Iraq oil. The oil companies also agreed to increase production, to assist in the development of Iraqi refineries, and to help train Iraqis for specialized positions in the oil industry. The 1952 oil agreement resulted in greatly increased production, and, of course, a tremendous rise in the oil income of the Iraqi Government. This led, in turn, to internal developments and improvements in Iraq, although not to the extent possible. It also, in combination with the rise of Western influences in Iraq, fostered social discontent, and increased dissatisfaction with the dominant role of the Iraqi land-owning class in the administration of the country.

Political tensions and popular unrest in Iraq in the summer of 1952, highlighted by demands for electoral reforms, brought about the fall of the Nuri Government and resulted in rioting that was only halted by the

1952
Fall of Nuri
Government

Army and the establishment of martial law. A temporary government was established late in the year under the leadership of General Nur ad-Din, the Chief of Staff. His cabinet dissolved all political parties, but gave in to the demand for single-stage elections. When elections were held in January, 1953, however, most of the former opposition parties boycotted them and, as a result, Nuri's party won a large majority.

2 May 53
Faisal II
King

On 2 May 1953, young King Faisal II formally ascended the throne. In the latter half of the year, martial law was gradually ended, press censorship was halted, and political parties were permitted to resume their activities. Unrest still continued throughout the country, however, and large bodies of public opinion were clearly dissatisfied with the continued rule of the landed aristocracy and its alleged alliance with Western imperialists.

During 1954, the Iraqi Government moved closer to the West. On 25 April, it was announced in Baghdad that US military aid would be given to Iraq. General unrest and dissatisfaction continued, meanwhile, and opposition to ties with the West was especially evident. Elections on 9 June, held under tight restrictions that insured a victory for Nuri's party, nevertheless showed a strong and growing opposition. The opposition called for abrogation of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty, for a rejection of other "imperialist" alliances and of US military assistance, and for a broad program of land reform. Accordingly, when Nuri formed his government, he moved to eliminate opposition and unrest. On 22 September, he announced the dissolution of all parties, including

his own, on the ground that political parties had been responsible for violence and street riots. On 16 November, about 300 newspapers were closed and tight controls placed on those remaining. At the same time, with the help of troops, Nuri was mercilessly restoring order throughout the country. From this time until the summer of 1958, Iraq continued to be held under tight controls.

Secure in his control of Iraq, and satisfied the anti-Western elements were being held in check, Nuri, in late 1954, initiated talks that led, ultimately, to the formation of the Baghdad Pact.⁵⁰ The Turco-Iraqi

50. For the Baghdad Pact, see above, the section on relations between the Arab states.

treaty of 24 February 1955 opened the way for Great Britain to agree to terminate the Anglo-Iraqi treaty. On 4 April 1955, Great Britain signed a treaty with Iraq that brought the British into the Baghdad Pact and ended the treaty of 1930. Under this new accord, Great Britain agreed to surrender her last remaining air bases in Iraq.

Iraq's role in the organization and development of the Baghdad Pact increased the growing schism between that country and Egypt. During 1955 and 1956, Egypt and Syria aimed a growing amount of propaganda at Iraq, in an attempt to incite dissident elements within Iraq to overthrow the government and detach the country from the Baghdad Pact.

The Suez crisis and Israel's invasion of Egypt at the end of 1956 raised more problems within Iraq. Violent anti-Western rioting, the worst in nine years,

24 Feb 55
New Turco-
Iraqi
Treaty

4 Apr 55
UK-Iraqi
Treaty

Nov-Dec 56
Anti-Western
Riots

1 Dec 56
Parliament
suspended;
martial law

broke out in many areas in November and December, and was even supported by mutinies in the Army. Nuri was hard put to restore order. On 1 December 1956, King Faisal suspended Parliament and further tightened restrictions on Iraqis by decreeing martial law throughout the country. Opposition to the "anti-Arab" policies of the government increased, nevertheless, and Iraq's continued adherence to the Baghdad Pact was a particular target of criticism.

During 1957 and 1958, Iraq was increasingly restive under the tight controls imposed by the government. Nuri es-Said, either in office or exerting power from behind the scenes, became more and more an object of hate. The flames of dissent were fanned by increased Egyptian and Syrian propaganda efforts. These efforts served to point up the growing tensions between Iraq and the Egyptian-Syrian axis. During the Suez crisis at the end of 1956, both Iraq and Syria had sent troops into neighboring Jordan, ostensibly to defend that country against Israel, but actually to prevent any move by the other to take over Jordan. Iraqi fortunes were graced in April, 1957, when Jordan's King Hussein moved vigorously to free his country of Egyptian influences, and to re-establish the close association formally existing between Jordan and Iraq.

14 Feb 58
Arab Feder-
ation formed

The strengthening of Iraqi-Jordanian ties heightened the split in the Arab world and led, indirectly, to the Iraqi revolt of July, 1958. On 1 February 1958, Egypt and Syria announced the formation of the United Arab Republic. Almost as if acting on cue, on 14 February Iraq and Jordan announced the creation of an Arab Federation of the two countries.

The vigorous, frustrated opposition within Iraq stirred even more restlessly now. Not only were Iraqi oil revenues not being spent to the extent possible on the improvement of the lot of Iraqis, but now, it appeared, they would go to strengthen the shaky Kingdom of Jordan. Jordan, moreover, was the child of Western imperialism, and federation with Jordan was convincing proof that, despite opposition within Iraq, Nuri was determined to maintain an unswerving course alongside the West. Thus, to the already strong flame of violent anti-Nuri feelings in Iraq was added still more fuel. Radio Cairo also did its best to stir up trouble. Increasingly it urged Iraqi dissidents to revolt and rid Iraq of the hated symbols of the West. On 8 May, the Iraqi Government sent Egypt a strong note of protest, which was subsequently rejected and which probably had no effect whatsoever.

14 Jul 58
Military
coup d'etat;
Republic
proclaimed

On 14 July, finally, the growing dissension in Iraq, continuously encouraged by UAR propaganda, reached a climax. On that day, a military coup overthrew the Iraqi government. Nuri es-Said, King Faisal, and Crown Prince Abdul Illah were killed, and a republic was proclaimed.⁵¹

51. The Middle East (RIIA), pp. 266-292 passim; The Middle East, 1957, pp. 161-163; Lenczowski, The Middle East, pp. 227-230; Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers, chaps. IX-X; Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, Iraq, 1900 to 1950 (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), chap. X; Iraq (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files [Johns Hopkins University, Subcontractor's Monograph HRAF-58 J. Hop.-2], 1956), pp. 27-31, 316-326, and passim; Coral Bell, Survey of International Affairs, 1954 (London: Oxford University Press [RIIA], 1957), pp. 207-212; Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1956 (New York: Harper and Brothers [Council on Foreign Relations], 1957), pp. 383-384; S. Yin'am, "Iraqi Politics--1948-1952," MEA, Dec, 1952,

pp. 349-359; Gabriel Baer, "The Agrarian Problem in Iraq," MEA, Dec, 1952, pp. 381-391; "Can Iraq Reply?" The Economist, March 29, 1958, pp. 1110-1111; Malcolm N. Quint, "Iraq: A New Class in the Making," The Reporter, Aug. 7, 1958, pp. 15-17. See also chronologies in MEA and MEJ.

Jordan

The end of World War II brought with it the independence of what was then called Transjordan. On 22 March 1946 a new Anglo-Jordanian treaty replaced the agreement of 1928 under which Transjordan had been governed by the British. The 1946 treaty established an independent Transjordan, with Abdullah as king, under the close direction of Great Britain, which agreed to accept responsibility for Jordan's defense. Although Transjordan was thus ostensibly independent, its ties with Britain were still strong, the kingdom was dependent on British aid and defense, and the country was, in many ways, still a British base in the Middle East. This continued link with Great Britain was unpopular with many Jordanians, as it was with several of the members of the Arab League, of which Transjordan was a charter member.⁵² Nevertheless, Jordanian ties

52. For Jordanian participation in the Arab League, and Jordan's role in the Arab world in general, see above, the section on relations between the Arab states.

with the West were underscored by a pact of friendship concluded with Turkey on 11 January 1947 and a treaty of alliance signed with Iraq on 14 April of that year. By March, 1948, pressures within Transjordan for revision of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty, and the fact that Great Britain was negotiating for treaty revision

22 Mar 46
New Anglo-
Jordanian
Treaty

11 Jan 47
Turco-
Jordanian
Treaty

14 Apr 47
Iraqi-
Jordanian
Alliance

15 Mar 48
New Anglo-
Jordanian
Treaty

with both Egypt and Iraq, led to the signing of a new treaty on the 15th of that month. The new agreement reduced British military prerogatives in Transjordan, but gave Britain the right to maintain two air bases within the country, and established an Anglo-Transjordanian Joint Defense Board. Transjordan still, however, looked to Great Britain for economic aid.

20 Oct 47
First
elections

Meanwhile, on 20 October 1947, Transjordan had held its first parliamentary elections. The government party won handily, but opposition was not well organized and the election was not firmly contested. Consequently, opposition to the King's pro-British policy, and his preoccupation with plans for a "Greater Syria" to the exclusion of social problems in Transjordan, was not clearly evident in the results of the election. The new Cabinet, responsible to Abdullah rather than to Parliament, seemed to indicate a united nation, but appearances were not entirely in accord with actuality.

15 May 48
Jordanian
troops enter
Palestine

Abdullah's Palestine policy and his plan for a "Greater Syria" brought him into continuing conflict with Egypt and Egyptian supporters among the other Arab states.⁵³ On 15 May 1948, Transjordanian troops

53. Discussed above, in the section on relations between the Arab states.

13 Dec 48
Transjordan
approves
union with
Arab Pales-
tine

entered Palestine, intent as much on territorial aggrandizement as on preventing Israeli gains. This was underlined on 1 December, when pro-Jordanian Arabs in Palestine proclaimed Abdullah "King of Palestine," and on 13 December, when the Transjordanian Parliament approved a future union of Arab Palestine and Transjordan. Abdullah's representatives signed an armistice

3 Apr 49
Armistice
with Israel

3 Jun 49
Hashimite
Kingdom of
Jordan estab-
lished

agreement with Israel on 3 April 1949 and, on 3 June, it was formally announced that Transjordan had become "The Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan." Representatives of Arab Palestine were taken into the Jordanian Cabinet. In April, 1950, elections were held, on both sides of the river, for a new and greatly enlarged House of Representatives. The new Parliament, on 24 April, promptly voted for the official incorporation of Jordanian-held Palestine into Jordan.

For Jordan, the results of the Palestine War were paradoxical. On the one hand, the incorporation of a large part of Palestine into Jordan had enlarged Abdullah's kingdom--more than doubling its population--and had taken him a step closer to his dream of establishing a "Greater Syria." On the other hand, this very incorporation had increased Abdullah's problems. The loss of markets in Israeli Palestine and of an outlet to the Mediterranean was economically crippling, and it was much in Jordan's interest to make a permanent peace with Israel. Yet the very presence of Palestinian Arabs in the Jordanian Government, and of large numbers of Arab refugees in Jordan, raised obstacles to any permanent settlement with Israel that would seem to confirm the status quo in Palestine. Moreover, in Jordanian Palestine were to be found large numbers of Arabs who opposed the union with Jordan, and who longed for an independent Arab Palestine. These Arabs were a potential fifth column for Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and to some extent Syria. An increase of the British subsidy to the Arab Legion--from £2 million to £3.5 million--in March, 1949, and the extension of

US Point Four aid two years later, were of some help in alleviating Jordan's economic problems, but did nothing to ease the growing political problems in that country.

The 1950 Jordanian elections, which had brought large numbers of Palestinian Arabs into the Jordanian government, opened the way for continuous criticism of Abdullah's policies. His failure to do more for the Palestinian refugees, his "Greater Syria" ideas, his supposed pro-Israeli propensities, and the reputed power of the Englishman Glubb Pasha (Chief of Staff of the Arab Legion) all were targets for attack. In September 1950, Abdullah imposed press censorship and, the following month, reconstructed the Cabinet to include more of his supporters. But, with apparent confidence in the strength of these supporters, he permitted a strong opposition party to exist. The opposition party proved so powerful, however, that in March 1951 he closed its newspaper, which had been strongly critical of him. During the spring of 1951, the new budget proposed by Abdullah was the target of more criticism, and in May, finally, he dissolved parliament, and announced that new elections would be held in August. In an apparent attempt to quiet opposition, he promised that after the elections the constitution would be amended to make the Cabinet responsible to Parliament rather than to the King.

Abdullah, unfortunately, did not live to see the elections. On 20 July 1951, he was shot to death in Jerusalem by pro-Egyptian Palestine Arabs, almost certainly incited to their deed by the activities of

20 Jul 51
Abdullah
assassinated

the former Mufti of Jerusalem and others who had been agitating for Abdullah's overthrow. The King's death did not solve any of Jordan's problems, and, indeed, served only to weaken the country.

5 Sep 51
Talal
King

For more than a month, Jordan was split over the problem of a successor to Abdullah. Both of Abdullah's sons wanted the throne and it was not until 5 September that the anti-British Prince Talal was proclaimed King. Talal agreed to constitutional reform proposed by the

8 Jan 52
New
Constitution

new government elected that August, and on 8 January 1952 approved a new constitution that made the Cabinet responsible to Parliament rather than the King. Talal also began a program of improving Jordan's relations with the Egyptian bloc of Arab states, dropping the idea of a "Greater Syria," and moving gradually away from British and Iraqi influences. Jordan's signing of the

16 Feb 52
Jordan signs
Arab League
Collective
Security Pact

Arab League Collective Security Pact on 16 February 1952 underlined the shift in national policy.

11 Aug 52
Talal
replaced by
Hussein

Talal had been on the throne of Jordan less than a year when he was so incapacitated by illness that, in an extraordinary session of the Jordanian Parliament on 11 August 1952, he was dethroned and his son Hussein declared king. A regency council governed the country until 2 May 1953, when Hussein ascended the throne on his eighteenth birthday. Talal's short reign had considerably weakened the British position in Jordan. Moreover, the change in the constitution that he had approved greatly strengthened the role of Parliament-- and the position of the pro-Egyptian Palestinian Arabs in the Jordanian Parliament was becoming increasingly stronger.

During the regency that preceded Hussein's accession to the throne, an effort had been made to initiate a program for the improvement of the standard of living within Jordan. The projected program was to include irrigation projects and other schemes for which Jordan needed foreign capital, and in the spring of 1953 loans were arranged with Great Britain and with the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. The financial arrangements were unsuccessfully opposed by anti-Western elements in Jordan who called for reliance on Arab states rather than the West. Anti-Westernism was growing stronger, and on 21 October 1953 rioters in Amman smashed windows in the US Information Service building and demonstrated before the American Point Four offices.

Young King Hussein was apparently trying to steer a middle course between Iraq and the Egyptian bloc of Arab states. While maintaining friendly ties with Iraq, he also made friendly overtures to King Saud. During 1954, however, it seemed that popular sentiment was growing stronger in favor of a rapprochement with the Egyptian bloc. The Jordanian budget approved in March, 1954, included a large British subsidy, but a month later the premier was forced to resign, reportedly because of his cooperation with the British. On 13 June, a visit of King Saud to Amman was the signal for anti-British and anti-American demonstrations, and the growing prestige of Egypt in the Arab world was reflected in continued popular anti-Western sentiment in Jordan. On 5 September, at the conclusion of a visit by Egyptian Minister of State Salah Salim, it was announced that Egypt and Jordan had reached agreement on foreign policy and on military cooperation among the Arab countries.

The anti-Western riots of June had led to the dissolution of Parliament, and when elections were held on 16 October the opposition parties withdrew, charging that the government was interfering in the elections. Riots again took place in Amman, directed at the USIS library, spread to other cities, and continued for several days before they were finally put down by the Arab Legion.

On 7 November 1954, Jordan announced that it desired a revision in the Anglo-Jordanian treaty of 1948. Negotiations took place in London in December, but failed, apparently because of British insistence that Jordan participate in arrangements for a Western-sponsored Middle East defense organization then under development. All that resulted from the talks was another financial agreement, under which Great Britain extended to Jordan a large grant and an even larger interest-free loan.

The formation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955⁵⁴ left

54. Discussed above, in the section on relations between the Arab states.

Jordan in the middle, between the Egyptian bloc of Arab states and pro-Western Iraq. Throughout the year, both sides exerted pressure on Jordan, and finally, in November, Jordan declared that it would join neither the Baghdad Pact nor the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Arabian military alliance. There was also continued pressure inside Jordan for a revision of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty, and the Jordanian Government again raised the question with the British. Early in December, Great

Britain, pointing to the Anglo-Iraqi treaty concluded that April,⁵⁵ offered to supply the Arab Legion with

55. See above, the subsection on Iraq.

jet planes and heavy arms in return for Jordan's agreement to join the Baghdad Pact. While it appears that the Jordanian Government at first decided to accept this offer, a split in the Cabinet soon developed, and several members resigned. The government fell on 14 December. A new one was quickly formed, but when sharp anti-Baghdad Pact demonstrations broke out in western Jordanian cities on the 16th, the new Premier, a strong advocate of the Pact, was forced to postpone negotiations. Anti-Western rioting continued with increasing intensity, and Parliament was dissolved preparatory to an election which would determine Jordan's decision on the Baghdad Pact.

As rioting finally stopped on 21 December, the election campaign began in earnest. Those instrumental in setting off the anti-Western riots formed a National Committee to oppose pro-Pact influences. The Committee called for the end to British influence and the ouster of General Glubb; Jordan's entrance into the Egyptian-Saudi Arabian-Syrian military alliance; and no peace with Israel except on Arab terms. This well organized campaign was backed by the powerful voice of Radio Cairo.

26 Dec 55
Egypt, Syria,
and Saudi
Arabia offer
to replace
UK subsidy

On 26 December, moreover, Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia announced that they were ready to provide Jordan with financial aid in place of that being received from Great Britain. The British replied with an offer to increase their subsidy.

As 1956 began, the King and his advisers apparently realized that the anti-Western group might well win the projected elections. Suddenly it was discovered that the King's dissolution of Parliament had not been in accordance with all legal technicalities, and that, consequently, the old Parliament was still in existence. With this, violent anti-Western rioting broke out on 7 January, and the Jordanian government again fell. A new one, formed on the 9th, announced that Jordan would not join the Baghdad Pact, and imposed a nationwide curfew. On 10 January, Jordan charged that Egyptian and Saudi Arabian broadcasts had helped to instigate the latest wave of violence. Foreign observers in Jordan generally agreed that the rioting had been instigated by Egyptian propaganda, Saudi Arabian gold, Communist activities, and Arab nationalism.

The situation in Jordan in early 1956 was highlighted by two important facts: Egyptian-led pressure had prevented that country from joining the Baghdad Pact, and the Egyptian bloc had offered to replace the British subsidy. To save face among Arab nationalists, King Hussein had to prove that he was free of British influence. On 2 March, he announced the dismissal of General Glubb and two other top-ranking British officers. He informed the British Government that Jordan intended to respect its treaty obligations, and that he hoped friendly relations would continue between the two countries. The British, although naturally upset, hoped that even without Glubb they might exercise control of the Arab Legion through their financial aid. On 23 March, Great Britain announced it would spend about £10 million in support of Jordan's armed forces and in economic aid in Fiscal Year 1957.

2 Mar 56
Glubb Pasha
dismissed

Hussein's dismissal of Glubb had the desired effect of winning the approval of the Arab world. The step was hailed as a victory for neutralist elements and a defeat for Britain and Iraq. But rather than quieting anti-Western agitation, the dismissal only provoked new pressure for Jordan to sever her last ties with the British--the financial subsidy and the treaty of alliance.

During the remainder of 1956, Jordan came increasingly under the influence of the Egyptian bloc. Hussein tried, but could not resist this pressure. On 9 April, he visited Damascus, and in a joint communique with Syrian authorities declared the intention of the two countries to remain free of foreign pacts, coordinate their defense plans, and repulse anti-Arab aggression.

Less than a month later, on 6 May, Egypt and Jordan announced that they had agreed to coordinate the activities of their armed forces. On the 24th, Lt Col Ali Abu Nuwar, a leader of anti-Western elements, was made commander of the Arab Legion. A week later, after a visit by Syrian President Quwatli, a joint communique announced the establishment of a permanent Syrian-Jordanian military consultation board for joint action in case of war.

In late June, at the request of his Prime Minister, who complained of growing opposition to the cabinet, Hussein dissolved Parliament. Elections were scheduled for October. Before they were held, however, came Nasser's startling nationalization of the Suez Canal. The prestige of the West in the Arab world fell to a new low, and when the Jordanian elections were held on 21 October, the anti-Western party of Suleiman Nabulsi won the largest bloc of votes, and Nabulsi became Prime Minister.

6 May 56
Egypto-
Jordanian
agreement to
coordinate
armed forces

21 Oct 56
Nabulsi wins
election;
becomes Prime
Minister

Meanwhile, Jordanian-Israeli relations had deteriorated during 1956. A series of frontier incidents beginning in July lasted well into autumn. On 7 July, Jordanian army commander Ali Abu Nuwar warned the British that they must come to Jordan's aid in case of an Israeli attack, or else face abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty. At the same time, he announced that Iraqi and Syrian troops would assist Jordan if necessary. On 15 October, an Iraqi-Jordanian announcement declared that Iraqi troops were to be stationed on Jordan's border, ready to come to the aid of Jordan. Israel's Prime Minister Ben Gurion, despite warnings from the British, promptly announced that his government reserved freedom of action if Iraqi troops took over Jordan. On the next day, the 16th, Syria announced that its troops were ready to move into Jordan in case of need. Both Syria and Iraq, then, were ready to race in and take over the country should Hussein's regime collapse.

The elections that took place on 21 October seemed to give Syria the lead. Four days after Nabulsi formed his government, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria signed a military agreement placing their forces under an Egyptian commander in case of war. Hussein's struggle to maintain Jordan's neutrality had ended, and the country seemed securely in the Egyptian camp.

Israel attacked Egypt on 29 October. Iraqi troops entered Jordan on 3 November, and Syrian forces the next day. Although Jordan announced that its obligations under the pact with Egypt and Syria would be fulfilled, the country was hardly in a position to do anything until the situation vis a vis Syria and Iraq could be

25 Oct 56
Military
agreement
with Egypt
and Syria

settled. At the end of November, Prime Minister Nabulsi announced that Jordan was determined to abrogate its treaty with Great Britain, that abrogation would take place as soon as Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia fulfilled their offer of financial aid, and that Jordan was working toward establishing diplomatic relations with the USSR. On 8 December, Iraqi troops were withdrawn from Jordan at the request of the Jordanian Government; Syrian forces, and Saudi Arabian troops, which had also entered Jordan, were not requested to leave. The Nabulsi government pursued a pro-Nasser policy, instituting a purge of pro-Western officials. On 17 December a two-hour general strike in Amman protested Nuri es-Said's policy of suppressing opposition elements in Iraq. Four days later, Jordan requested immediate negotiations on the future of Anglo-Jordanian alliance.

The year 1957 opened auspiciously for the fortunes of the Egyptian bloc. On 19 January, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria signed an agreement with Jordan to supply that country with £E12,500,000 (\$35 million) annually for ten years, to replace the British subsidy. The way was now open for ending the Anglo-Jordanian treaty. On 12 February, after a week of negotiations in Amman, Britain agreed to cancel the treaty, end its subsidy, and evacuate British troops and bases from Jordan. The subsidy would be cancelled as of 1 March, with a possible final extension to 1 April.

Meanwhile, despite Jordan's apparent break with the West, King Hussein had been working to prevent his country from becoming an Egyptian satellite. On 17 January 1957, Jordan asked the US for a guarantee of \$30 million a year in economic aid with no strings

19 Jan 57
Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, Syria
agree to
supply
subsidy

12 Feb 57
UK agrees
to cancel-
lation of
treaty with
Jordan

attached, a revision of the agreement under which the US aid program had been operating since early 1951. During February, Hussein twice publicly warned Prime Minister Nabulsi against the dangers of Communist infiltration, and, as relations between the two grew strained, it was reported at the end of the month that the king was in danger of assassination.

On 3 April, Nabulsi announced that his government had definitely decided to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR. The next day he declared that Jordan would accept Soviet aid if offered, but not American assistance. He asserted that the US had threatened to withhold aid unless Jordan severed its ties with Egypt.

On 10 April, finally, Hussein asked for the resignation of the Nabulsi government. Within the next few days he also removed other pro-Egyptian leaders, including General Nuwar, from the army and the government. But he was not able to establish a new government completely free of pro-Egyptian elements, and the Cabinet of the new Prime Minister, Hussein Fakhri Khalidi, included Nabulsi as foreign minister. Moreover, there were pro-Egyptian riots in Jordanian Palestine and in Amman, and only the quick action of loyal Bedouin soldiers prevented dissidents in the Army, as well as pro-Egyptian mobs, from taking action against the king. To further darken the picture, Syria increased the size of her garrison in Jordan.

While Hussein was struggling to maintain control, President Eisenhower, on 17 April, declared that the US would assist Jordan if that country should become the victim of aggression. And a few days later came a

10 Apr 57
Hussein
removes
Nabulsi

20 Apr 57
Saud gives
support to
Hussein

surprise from Saudi Arabia. At the end of January, King Saud had visited Washington, where the US-Saudi Arabian agreement on the Dhahran airfield had been renewed, and where, apparently, Saud's need for continued cooperation with the US was stressed to him. On 20 April, he offered military aid to Jordan, and placed Saudi Arabian forces in Jordan under Hussein's command.

Despite the fact that the Khalidi Cabinet had not demonstrated that it intended to act any differently than had the Nabulsi Cabinet, leftist elements in Jordan were determined to end Khalidi's government. On 24 April demonstrators in Amman demanded the Cabinet's resignation. The same day, President Eisenhower issued a statement declaring that the US regarded the independence and integrity of Jordan as "vital." A British statement echoed this announcement.

25 Apr 57
Hussein
removes
Khalidi
Cabinet

The climax came on 25 April. As the Sixth Fleet steamed toward the eastern Mediterranean, Hussein replaced the Khalidi Cabinet with a new one, headed by Ibrahim Hashim, and composed entirely of the King's supporters. Hussein also declared martial law, abolished all political parties, and imposed a curfew on many parts of the country. He accused international communism of attempting to undermine Jordan's security. On 26 April, as the new government of Jordan arrested large numbers of leftists and Communists, King Saud sent Hussein a congratulatory telegram. The Jordanian King continued to consolidate his position by strong and vigorous measures throughout the country. On 29 April, after talks with Saud, Hussein requested economic aid from the United States, and, in a matter of hours, the US

granted him \$10 million with practically no conditions attached. On the next day, Hussein declared that Jordan's crisis had ended. He continued to strengthen his position during the next month, and by 24 May, when Syria announced it was withdrawing its troops from Jordan, the young king appeared to have the situation in Jordan well under control, at least for the time being.

During the remainder of 1957, Hussein maintained his hold on Jordan. There were still many dissident elements within the country, and relations with Egypt and Syria continued strained. At the same time the West continued to assist Hussein. On 29 June it was announced in Amman that the US would supply Jordan with \$10 million worth of military equipment, and the next day the State Department announced an additional grant of \$10 million in economic aid. On 6 August, Great Britain announced it was granting Jordan an interest-free loan of £1,130,000 (\$3,164,000). A US airlift began delivering arms to Jordan on 9 September, and on 6 October a second consignment of military aid, including tanks and other heavy equipment, was unloaded at Aqaba. On 30 November, Jordan announced another \$10 million US grant for economic development projects. During the fall, Jordan accused Egypt and Syria of conspiring against Jordan, and attempting to bring about the overthrow of Hussein's regime. Hussein declared the Syrian border region a restricted and closed area, and denounced his defense agreement with Syria and Egypt as worthless. As the year ended, the Jordanian foreign minister declared that his country would need

an average of \$50 million a year in US aid for five to ten years to help finance Jordan's economy and armed forces. He also said that martial law in Jordan would be ended when Syria and Egypt ceased their intrigues to incite a revolt.

14 Feb 58
Arab Federation
created

On 14 February 1958, following the announcement of the formation of the UAR, Jordan and Iraq announced the creation of an Arab Federation of the two countries. The Jordanian Parliament ratified the new constitution of the Arab Federation on 26 March, and on 15 April agreed to the transfer to Iraqi King Faisal, as head of the Arab Federation, of some of Hussein's powers. Formal federation of the two countries occurred on 12 May.

Egypt's President Nasser, meanwhile, had denounced the Arab Federation as a "London-inspired" move against the UAR, and Radio Cairo had been sending a mounting wave of propaganda at Iraq, urging its people to revolt. On 14 July, finally, while the attention of the Middle East was taken up by the revolt in Lebanon, a military coup overthrew the Iraqi government. On 16 July, one day after US forces had landed in Lebanon, British paratroopers were flown into Jordan. On this force now rested the future of Hussein's regime.⁵⁶

56. The Middle East (RIIA), pp. 354-361; The Middle East, 1957, pp. 225-226; Lenczowski, The Middle East, pp. 305-309; Esmond Wright, "Abdallah's Jordan: 1947-1951," MEJ, Autumn, 1951, pp. 439-460; Shwadran, "The Kingdom of Jordan: To Be or Not to Be," MEA, June-July, 1957, pp. 206-225, Aug-Sep, 1957, pp. 270-288; New York Times, 27 Jul 58, E1:2. See also chronologies in MEA and MEJ.

Syria

22 Mar 45
Syria in
Arab League

Syria's signature, as a sovereign state, to the pact establishing the Arab League on 22 March 1945 was indicative of the gradual end of French control in that country. The Syrians slowly took over the administration of their own country, and balked consistently at French demands for a Franco-Syrian alliance. By 15 April 1947, the last French troops had left Syria, and the full independence of the nation was at last achieved.

15 Apr 47
Last French
troops leave

The Nationalist Party of President Shukri el-Quwatli and his Premier, Jamil Mardam, had won Syria's independence and still controlled the country. There were, however, strong criticism and charges that the leaders of this party were interested only in reaping personal rewards for their victory over the French and in perpetuating their rule. The first elections after the end of World War II were held on 2 July 1947, and brought protests of government interference. Despite this interference--or because of it--the Nationalists won only a minority of seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Nevertheless, at Quwatli's request, Mardam retained his place as Premier, and for another year skillfully controlled the Chamber. Indicative of his ability was the re-election of Quwatli as President by this body on 18 April 1948.

The Nationalist Party--whose political philosophy has been compared to that of late eighteenth-century liberals--seems to have been mainly concerned with maintaining Syrian sovereignty and integrity as a nation. It opposed, consequently, all plans for the

unification of the Arab world that would submerge Syria's independence, and it particularly opposed the "Greater Syria" concept, which would have placed the country under a Hashimite monarch.⁵⁷

57. Discussed more fully in the section on relations between the Arab states.

Until the end of 1948, the Nationalists were able to control Syria, but the country's military failure in the Palestine War of that year, the rising cost of living, and a general increase in popular discontent with the government led to the fall of the Mardam Cabinet in December. Khalid el-Azem, leader of the opposition Populist Party, took over the premiership.

The fall of the Mardam Cabinet had been attended by widespread rioting which had brought the country to a state of near anarchy. Law and order were only restored by Colonel Husni Zaim, chief of staff of the army, who toured the country and, by means of a mixture of force and persuasion, ended the disruption and brought back a measure of public confidence.

Zaim's role seems to have awakened in him a feeling that Syria needed more forceful leadership, and apparently brought him to the conclusion that he, himself, could provide the answer to the problem of Syria's welfare and security. When it was clear that the assumption of the premiership by Khalid el-Azem had done nothing to reduce popular dissatisfaction, Zaim decided to act.

On 30 March 1949, in a bloodless coup, Zaim arrested President Quwatli, the Premier, and other politicians. When Parliament refused to sanction his actions, he

30 Mar 49
Government
overthrown
by Zaim

dissolved it, and took for himself the title of Head of State. His actions had widespread popular approval. With this support, he instituted a number of reforms, among which were: extension of the suffrage to literate women; virtual separation of church and state, accompanied by curbs on the clergy; introduction of a civil code based in large part on European models; and inauguration of extensive public works. In quest of foreign support, Zaim entered into negotiations with Iraq and Jordan, which encouraged backers of the "Greater Syria" movement. He changed his course, however, when it seemed that he could gain more by a close association with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. A visit by Zaim to Cairo at the end of April brought Egyptian and Saudi recognition, and far-reaching pledges of military and financial aid.

Zaim's switch, plus his growing arrogance and infatuation with his own importance, began to arouse opposition to him at home. An election on 25 June brought him resounding support, but there were widespread charges that his victory had been anything but legal. There was also a growing suspicion that in his search for foreign recognition Zaim was prepared to draw close to France. A final factor in the growing disillusionment with Zaim was his unwillingness to build a political party system behind him. Without it, he was unable to carry out many of his projected reforms and public works projects, and these unfulfilled promises were still another source of dissatisfaction.

There was little public opposition then, when, on 14 August 1949, Colonel Sami Hinnawi, in a sudden coup, executed Zaim and his premier. Hinnawi did not have

14 Aug 49
Zaim over-
thrown by
Hinnawi

Zaim's ambitions, and left the country in the hands of a civilian caretaker government. Hinnawi's coup had not been aimed at restoring the Quwatli government, but merely at preventing the establishment of a military dictatorship. The new government began preparing the way for a new constitution, while Hinnawi reopened negotiations with Iraq and Jordan. The returns of general elections held in November seemed to approve this policy, and, by so doing, opened the way for a third coup.

The leading clique in the Army was strongly opposed to any union with the Hashimites, and to forestall this union, on 19 December 1949, Lt Col Adib el-Shishakli removed Hinnawi and his influence from the government. A number of officials, accused of plotting for a union with Iraq, were arrested, but left in office were President Hashim al-Atasi and Premier Khalid el-Azem, who had been installed by Hinnawi. The new Cabinet apparently contained representatives of both major parties.⁵⁸

58. The Middle East (RIIA), pp. 472-475; Lenczowski, The Middle East, pp. 251-256; The Middle East, 1957, pp. 319-320; Carleton, "The Syrian Coups d'Etat of 1949," MEJ, Jan., 1950, pp. 1-11. This section on Syria is also based, throughout, on the chronologies in MEA and MEJ.

Colonel Shishakli declared that the Army would no longer interfere in politics, and that government by civilians would be maintained. It was clear, however, that the Army would continue to resist any policy counter to its wishes, especially any movement for adoption of the "Greater Syria" scheme. Khalid el-Azem's Cabinet

19 Dec 49
Shishakli
comes to
power

5 Sep 50
New Consti-
tution

was in a sense a caretaker government, since work was started almost immediately on drawing up a new constitution. The Cabinet, without any real common policy, resigned in June 1950, and a new one was formed consisting entirely of members of the Populist Party. Early in July, debate began on the new constitution, and it was approved and promulgated on 5 September. While the new constitution made no fundamental changes in the form or structure of the government, it contained some interesting provisions. It paid lip service to the principle of Arab unity, but seemed to block effectively any hopes for a "Greater Syria" by stressing Syria's independence and the fact that the nation was "fully sovereign." It also stressed the principles of republicanism, and included a long Bill of Rights, defining in considerable detail the fundamental principles of freedom and the social and economic rights of individual citizens.⁵⁹

59. Majid Khadduri, "Constitutional Development in Syria," MEJ, Spring, 1951, pp. 151-160; The Middle East (RIIA), p. 476.

The new constitution did not bring stability to Syria. Its promulgation was followed, indeed, by a marked instability in Syrian politics. In the fall of 1950, a number of assassinations took place, including an attempt on Shishakli's life, which indicated that internally Syria was far from undivided. This confused state of affairs continued throughout 1951. The government fell several times during that year, and, Colonel Shishakli's statement to the contrary, the Army continued to interfere in politics--a situation that

2 Dec 51
Shishakli
gains
virtual
dictator-
ship

brought strong opposition from the Chamber of Deputies. On 29 November, finally, Shishakli executed another coup, which led to the establishment of a military dictatorship on 2 December. The Syrian president resigned, the Chamber of Deputies was dissolved, and many politicians were imprisoned. Colonel Fawzi Silu was appointed chief of state ad interim, but Shishakli was the real power behind him.⁶⁰

60. The Middle East (RIIA), p. 476; The Middle East, 1957, p. 320.

During 1951, Syrian foreign affairs were dominated by hostility toward Israel, especially during the period March-May, when a series of frontier incidents occurred between the two states in connection with Israel's proposed drainage of the Huleh marshes. Fighting threatened to assume serious proportions, but a UN cease-fire was arranged before the conflict got out of hand. Syria's antipathy toward Israel, however, was reflected in Syrian relations with the United States. The US was denounced as a friend of Israel, there were popular anti-US demonstrations, and the government made it clear that American aid was unwanted. While some Syrian politicians declared themselves in favor of a pro-Soviet policy, Syria made no definite move toward aligning itself with the USSR.⁶¹

61. Lenczowski, The Middle East, pp. 257-258; The Middle East, 1957, p. 320. For Syrian foreign relations insofar as they concerned the other Arab states, see above, the section on relations between the Arab states.

From the end of 1951 until early 1954, Colonel Shishakli controlled the Syrian government. In April 1952, all political parties were dissolved, and in July decrees were issued permitting the dismissal of judges and the suppression of newspapers in the national interest. On 27 August, Shishakli announced the formation of the Movement of Arab Liberation, apparently intended as a national political party, to the exclusion of all others. In September, more stringent controls on newspapers were established. Shishakli stated in November, however, that he would soon restore free parliamentary rule.

In March and April, 1953, plans were announced for a new constitution and for the election of a new Syrian president. The proposed constitution was approved in July, and Shishakli, now a general, was elected president. He immediately issued a decree amalgamating the premier's office with that of the president. One of the first actions of his new government was to promulgate a new electoral law, on 1 August. In September, another decree opened the way for formation of political parties on condition that officials of the government, the Army, and the police, and also students, should be ineligible for membership, and that the parties should not correspond to ethnic or religious divisions within the country.

Elections held in October 1953 gave Shishakli's Movement of Arab Liberation a decisive majority in the new Chamber of Deputies. The victory was due, however, to the fact that all of the former political parties dissolved in April 1952 boycotted the contest. In November, nearly 150 politicians opposed to the Shishakli

Jul 53
New Consti-
tution
Shishakli
President

regime met in Damascus to organize a Front of National Opposition. Led by many former government officials, they refused to recognize as legal the results of the October election, and declared their intention to end Shishakli's autocratic rule and restore democracy. Student demonstrations in Damascus and Aleppo during December pointed up the anti-Shishakli sentiment and provoked strong military countermeasures. At the end of January 1954, many prominent opposition political leaders were arrested, and Shishakli imposed martial law on a number of areas. On 25 February, however, an Army revolt forced Shishakli to flee, and, after a few days of fighting, his supporters were suppressed. Former President Hashim al-Atasi was proclaimed president again, and immediately promised the restoration of civil government and new elections.⁶² Despite these

62. The Middle East, 1957, p. 320.

moves, foreign political observers reported that Syria was still in a state of political turmoil, that no pattern of progress was indicated, and that the country still appeared to be "a long way from either democracy or stability."⁶³

63. Joseph G. Harrison, "Middle East Instability," MEA, March, 1954, p. 75.

During the spring and summer of 1954, Syria revoked many of the autocratic decrees promulgated by Shishakli, and attempted to restore democracy to the country. Elections were held in September, giving independent candidates the largest bloc of seats. After some difficulty, Faris al-Khoury formed a new government on 31 October.

31 Oct 54
al-Khoury
forms Govern-
ment

The end of the Shishakli regime meant a return to the constitution of 1950, but the elections of September 1954 provided no clear-cut solution to the unstable situation in the country. The large number of independents or semi-independents elected to office made for difficulties in establishing a smoothly working government. There was, moreover, constant friction between those favoring union, or at least close cooperation, with Iraq, and those who looked for establishment of a close and effective arrangement with Egypt. Among the latter was former President Quwatli, who returned to Syria in August 1954, from Egypt, where he had fled after his release from arrest by Colonel Zaim in 1949. The Army also continued to make its presence felt, still able to exert a strong influence from behind the scenes on the conduct of national affairs.

The first months of 1955 were filled with evidence of unrest in Syria. Demonstrations against the Baghdad Pact and other anti-Western signs were evident. Premier Faris al-Khouris government fell and was replaced by another headed by Sabri al-Asali. Meanwhile, the country was moving closer to Egypt,⁶⁴ and the assassi-

1955
al-Asali
replaces
al-Khouris

⁶⁴. See above, the section on relations between the Arab states.

nation of a pro-Egyptian Army leader brought wide arrests. On 18 August, Quwatli was elected president, sharp indication of Syria's new pro-Egyptian orientation.

18 Aug 55
Quwatli
President

This orientation was accented by a simultaneous improving of Syrian-Soviet relations. In the period 1954-1956, Syria, the only Arab state in which the

Soviet
penetration

European market. In November 1955, the two countries raised their mutual diplomatic missions to the status of embassies. And in early 1956 the first reports began to circulate that Syria had joined Egypt in looking to the Soviet bloc for military equipment. Within another year, Soviet bloc arms shipments were reported reached Latakia in large amounts, Communist trade missions had been established in Damascus, and technical experts and instructors from the Soviet bloc were increasingly evident in Syria.

Syrian antipathy to the West, and especially the United States, was maintained. In 1956, for example, Standard Oil offered to build a refinery in Syria at its own expense, to be operated as a commercial enterprise, paying taxes and selling its products at competitive prices. Although an oil refinery had been a hope of Syrians for several years, the Standard Oil offer was refused. Syria finally decided to build a refinery at Syrian expense, and early in 1957 a contract was given to a Czech firm, although better terms could have been had from American concerns. The implications of this arrangement are made even clearer by the fact that Syrian finances were not in the healthiest condition, and the country would have done well to drive the best bargain it could.⁶⁵

65. The Middle East, 1957, pp. 320-325 passim; New York Times, 2 Apr 57, ME-2:4-5; Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers, p. 416.

... alliance with Egypt, and Syrian activities in regard to Jordan during this period have already been discussed.⁶⁶

66. See above, the section on relations between the Arab states.

The most dramatic indication of Syria's pro-Egyptian, anti-Western orientation came after the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt, when the IPC oil pipeline in Syria was sabotaged and repairs not permitted to be begun until March 1957. Since Syria earned a considerable income from the two pipelines (Tapline and IPC) running across its territory--Syria has no oil itself--such action was but another indication of the strong anti-Western sentiment prevalent in Syria.⁶⁷

67. New York Times, 2 Apr 57, ME-2:4; Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers, p. 416.

Early in 1957, forty-seven Syrian politicians and army officers were tried, some in absentia, on charges of plotting with Western, Israeli, and Iraqi conspirators against the Syrian state. On 26 February, twelve were sentenced to death, and thirty to prison. This trial effectively pointed up the fact that Syria was firmly controlled by anti-Western forces. The influence of the Communist party, moreover, was unquestionable. While it had no official role in Quwatli's government, it nevertheless played a substantial part in the formation of policy. Especially was it strong in the Army, where

... power was held by Lt. Col. Abdul Hamid Serraj, the pro-Soviet intelligence chief, who headed a clique of leftist officers. While apparently not a Communist himself, Serraj believed firmly that cooperation with the USSR was best for Syria's interests. Former Premier Khalid el-Azem, the Minister of Defense at this time, was also believed to be strongly allied with the Communists.

In October 1956, President Quwatli had visited the Soviet Union, and in July 1957 the Defense Minister and Chief of Staff paid another visit to the USSR. The two negotiated better terms for Soviet arms and were promised further military and economic aid and political support. On their return, the Chief of Staff resigned without explanation, and was replaced by a strong leftist. This was immediately followed by a sharp purge of pro-Western or pro-Iraqi officers. At the same time, the discovery of an allegedly US-inspired plot to overthrow the Syrian government was announced. The Syrian-Turkish crisis in the fall of 1957,⁶⁸ emphasized still further

68. Discussed above, in the section on relations between the Arab states.

Syria's anti-Western orientation.⁶⁹

69. J. S. Raleigh, "The Middle East in 1957-- A Political Survey," MEA, March, 1958, pp. 93-95, 99; New York Times, 2 Apr 57, ME-2:4-5.

The culmination of Syria's romance with Egypt came with the marriage of the two countries in the formation of the United Arab Republic, announced on 22 February 1958. President Quwatli gave way as head of state to

22 Feb 58
Syria merges
with Egypt

Egypt's Nasser, who became the first UAR president. UAR foreign policy was described by Nasser as "positive neutralism." Internally, Syria banned all political parties, and announced the suppression of Communist activities.⁷⁰

70. Perlmann, "Fusion and Confusion," MEA, April, 1958, pp. 126-127; New York Times, 10 Aug 58, E5:4.

On 10 May, revolt broke out in Lebanon, a revolt which Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik charged was being supported by men and arms from Syria. Syria has rejected these charges, and in this has been supported by the report, on 4 July, of a UN observers group. This report has been strongly disputed by the United States and Great Britain.⁷¹

71. New York Times, 6 Aug 58, 6:1.

In the summer of 1958, Syria, which a dozen years earlier had established its independence and which had since consistently asserted that it would remain independent, was linked in a firm union with Egypt. Syrian hopes and aspirations were tied with Egypt's, Syria's immediate future, it appeared, had become dependent on the clever and ambitious Colonel Nasser.

Lebanon

In Lebanon, as in Syria, French control gradually lessened at the end of World War II. By 31 December 1946, the last foreign troops had left Lebanon, and the little republic--which had been acting semi-independently

Dec 46
Complete inde-
pendence of
Lebanon

since the US and USSR recognized it in 1944--had now achieved complete political emancipation.⁷²

72. Lenczowski, The Middle East, pp. 247-248.

Independent Lebanon continued its traditional political pattern, by which the presidency remained in the hands of a Christian and the post of prime minister was allotted to a Moslem. Bishara al-Khourī, as president, and Riyadh as-Sulh, as prime minister, were high in public opinion, since--like their counterparts in Syria--they had been in office when the French departed and took much of the credit for this departure. When elections were held on 22 May 1947, less than six months after the French had left, Khourī and Sulh recorded such a triumph that the new Chamber of Deputies became known as the "Puppet Parliament." The elections were so corrupt and controlled, however, that the prestige of the two declined considerably. In September of that year opposition groups met in the Lebanese city of Tripoli to demand the dissolution of the Chamber and the holding of new elections. Nothing came of these proposals, and, indeed, President Khourī soon scored another triumph. In May 1948 it was suddenly proposed to suspend the constitutional provision that a president could not succeed himself, and, although Khourī still had a year to go on his six-year term of office, to re-elect him for another term (1949-1955). On 22 May, the Chamber approved the necessary constitutional change, and, on the 27th, re-elected Khourī.⁷³

73. Ibid., p. 248; George Britt, "Lebanon's Popular Revolt," MEJ, Winter, 1953, pp. 1-7 passim; Raphael Patai (ed.), The Republic of Lebanon (2 vols.; New Haven: Human Relations Area Files [HRAF-46 Patai-6], 1956), II, 552; The Middle East (RIIA), pp. 478-479. This section on Lebanon is also based, throughout, on the chronologies in MEA and MEJ.

Khouri's re-election by his "Puppet Parliament," on the heels of an obviously rigged election, brought immediate public reaction and destroyed most of the prestige he had built up. Resentment was strong throughout the country, and it was charged that his next step would be to have himself confirmed in office for life, perhaps with the title of king. His personal political machine, through which he ran the country with all the resourcefulness and dishonesty of some of the less savory American political bosses, was now revealed fully for what it was, and opposition was growing swiftly. Disillusionment with the government was further intensified by the results of the Palestine War--in which Lebanon fared poorly as a member of the Arab League⁷⁴--

Governmental
corruption
economic
difficulties

74. For the Palestine War and other aspects of Lebanon relations with other Arab states, see above, the section on relations between the Arab states.

by economic difficulties arising from French devaluation of the franc in January 1948, and by the loss of trade with Palestine.

Beginning in the fall of 1948, the Lebanese government took stern measures against the more extremist of the opposition groups. Surveillance, arrests, and short jail terms were the weapons used by the government, but they failed to stop opposition. In mid-1949,

an attempted coup by the so-called Syrian People's Party (which favored a union with Syria) failed, and on 7 July the government arrested the leader of the group and promptly executed him. Measures to restrain other opposition groups were also taken, including the suppression of all newspapers with a circulation of less than 1,500, as well as a large number of political newspapers. As the year ended, the moderate opposition, led by Camille Chamoun (a Christian) and Kamal Jumblatt (a Moslem), was rapidly gaining popular support.

In March 1950, an unsuccessful attempt was made on the life of Prime Minister Riyadh as-Sulh. Khouri might have wished the assailant more luck, for the president and Sulh were soon engaged in a dispute over patronage. As a result of this disagreement, the Sulh cabinet resigned on 13 February 1951, and new elections were scheduled. These were held on 15 April, and, while Khouri's forces were overwhelmingly victorious, a small number of opposition deputies managed to retain their seats through a bitter fight in a contest somewhat fairer than that of 1947. These deputies continued to protest against the government, amidst rising popular support. Lebanese refusal, in March 1950, of a Syrian offer for full economic and financial union had caused a rupture in Syrian-Lebanese economic relations, resulting in further economic difficulties in Lebanon, and increased popular discontent.

The new Prime Minister in April 1951 was Abdullah al-Yafi, an immediate target for opposition demands for reforms. When he attempted to initiate reforms, he lost favor with Khouri's supporters, and when he failed

in his attempt, the opposition returned to the attack. Eight months after its formation then, the Yafi Cabinet stepped down, to be replaced by one headed by Sami Solh in February 1952. The instability thus indicated in the Lebanese government would soon lead to the downfall of the Khouri regime.⁷⁵

75. Britt, "Lebanon's Popular Revolt," MEJ, Winter, 1953, pp. 2-11 passim; The Middle East (RIIA), pp. 479-480; Lenczowski, The Middle East, pp. 248-249; The Middle East, 1957, pp. 246-247.

During 1952, Chamoun and Jumblatt took advantage of rising popular discontent to press their opposition. Their political newspapers continuously attacked Khouri, and in mid-June the president suspended nine newspapers for printing anti-Khouri articles--an action which caused a protest strike by most of the remaining papers. In August, Chamoun and Jumblatt formed a new opposition party, the Socialist National Front, and that month led a mass meeting of 10,000, who shouted their opposition to Khouri as few would have dared a short while earlier. The president hastily announced his own program of reforms, but it was now too late. In early September, even Prime Minister Solh joined the attack on Khouri, and then resigned.

The end followed quickly. While Khouri attempted to set up a new government, opposition groups called a general strike on 15 September. Planned for only two days, the strike continued past its scheduled end as a result of the great popular opposition to Khouri. So far, all had been peaceful, but on 18 September, in the face of rising calls for his resignation, Khouri

realized that riots and bloodshed might soon occur. While the president still controlled a majority of the Chamber, the decisive influence obviously lay with the Army and its commander, General Fouad Chehab. Summoned by the president that evening, Chehab advised him to resign, which he did late that night. His last act was to appoint Chehab prime minister.

Fall of
Khouri

In a performance strikingly similar to his actions in 1958, Chehab refused to allow the Army to become involved in politics, and firmly declined the job of president. When Chamoun was elected to that position on 23 September, Chehab also resigned from the post of prime minister. Not without some difficulty, by early October Chamoun had formed a new cabinet under Khaled Chehab, a distant relative of the general, and a man with few political affiliations to be challenged by the divergent groups that had opposed Khouri.⁷⁶

23 Sep 52
Chamoun
becomes
President

76. Britt, "Lebanon's Popular Revolt," MEJ, Winter, 1953, pp. 12-17; Patai, The Republic of Lebanon, II, 553; The Middle East (RIIA), p. 480.

During the fall and winter of 1952, the new Lebanese government introduced reforms, including changes in the electoral law. On 12 January 1953, Lebanon signed an agreement with the US for technical assistance to agriculture, and on 17 February another for aid on an irrigation and hydroelectric power project. Attempts to achieve some sort of economic accord with Syria broke down, however. A one-year agreement signed the previous February was renewed for six months on 25 February 1953, as a temporary measure.

Jan 53
US aid

The Chehab Cabinet resigned on 28 April 1953, after a heated debate by the deputies over the government's powers of appointment and reorganization. Saeb Salem formed a new cabinet on 1 May, but on the 30th President Chamoun dissolved Parliament and called for general elections in mid-July. These elections, the first under the new electoral laws, were marked by violence as the various independent groups that had united in opposition to former President Khouri fought among themselves. No group won a majority of seats, and the new Cabinet formed in mid-August, with Abdullah al-Yafi as Prime Minister, consisted mainly of non-controversial members.⁷⁷

77. The Middle East, 1957, p. 247; The Middle East (RIIA), p. 480; Patai, The Republic of Lebanon, II, 559.

One of Yafi's first steps was to attempt to increase the government's income from the oil pipelines (Tapline and IPC) running across Lebanese territory. New agreements had been signed with the oil companies in 1952, but the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies refused to ratify them, and called for immediate negotiations to obtain better terms. In September 1953, Yafi attempted to open new negotiations with the oil companies, but met with refusal. No new agreements had been signed by the beginning of 1955, but a new arrangement was apparently worked out during that year. In 1956, a dispute took place between IPC and the Lebanese government over a proposed new pipeline that IPC wanted to build across Lebanese territory. No solution had been reached when the sabotage of the pumping stations in Syria in

November 1956 threw the pipeline question into further disorder. New talks were begun between IPC and the Lebanese government in December of that year.⁷⁸

78. Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers, pp. 416-417; The Middle East, 1957, p. 250.

During the period from 1953 to 1956, Lebanon's financial and economic relations with Syria remained on a provisional basis, based on a series of short-term agreements. The Lebanese government was unable to reach a permanent agreement satisfactory to both countries. It was more successful, however, in its efforts to promote internal development. In August 1955, for example, the World Bank granted Lebanon a \$27-million-loan for a hydroelectric scheme expected to more than double the amount of electric power in Lebanon and also to provide increased irrigation. A number of commercial treaties with Soviet bloc countries were indicative of the growing penetration of Soviet influence. Pacts were signed with the USSR in April 1954, with East Germany in November 1955, with Red China in December of that year, and with Poland in January 1956. In 1956, also, the Soviet Union bought large quantities of Lebanese citrus fruit and began discussions on the purchase of Lebanese tobacco. Soviet financial and technical assistance was subsequently offered to Lebanon, and an official Lebanese trade mission visited Moscow in October 1956. Trade with Czechoslovakia was also considerably increased, a commercial agreement was signed with Bulgaria in mid-1956, and the Chinese Communists expressed interest in trade with Lebanon. The

Soviet
influence

country, however, still is linked commercially to the United States because of the oil pipelines and the tourist trade. Moreover, in the diplomatic field, Lebanon has not allowed its relations with the Soviet bloc to pass beyond the limits of normal commercial intercourse. The country has attempted to remain neutral between conflicting interest groups in the Middle East, shying clear of both the Egyptian bloc and the Baghdad Pact.⁷⁹

79. The Middle East, 1957, pp. 247, 249-250.

Lebanese politics during the years immediately following the election of Chamoun remained unusually stable for a Middle East country.⁸⁰ Prime Minister

80. Except where indicated, the remainder of this section is based on the chronologies in MEA and MEJ.

Yafi's government remained in power until September 1954, with only one interruption, in February of that year, when Yafi had submitted his resignation and then quickly formed a new government. On 18 September 1954, Sami Solh formed a new government, re-formed it on 9 July 1955, and then finally resigned on 13 September after a dispute in his Cabinet, apparently over the question of cooperation with Egypt. A new government under Rashid Karami was quickly formed and lasted until mid-March 1956, when former Prime Minister Yafi again established a Cabinet. Yafi re-formed his government in early June, and retained his position until shortly after Israel's invasion of Egypt in the fall of that year.

31 Oct 56
Reaction
to Israeli
invasion of
Egypt

On 31 October 1956, two days after the Israeli attack, Lebanon declared a state of emergency. Censorship was put into effect in Beirut on 1 November, and National Guard reinforcements were rushed to Tripoli on 5 November after an oil pipeline there was cut. On the 16th, Prime Minister Yafi's government resigned, to be replaced two days later by a Cabinet headed by Sami Sohl. In recognition of the danger of war, General Chehab was given the post of defense minister in the new cabinet. Meanwhile, Beirut was rocked by a series of anti-Western riots and bombings, reportedly aimed at forcing the government to break relations with Great Britain and France. After several days of these demonstrations, on 20 November, the Army moved in and took control of the city. Lebanese security authorities linked the disturbances with Egypt. By the beginning of the year, with tensions in the Middle East somewhat eased, General Chehab resigned from the government and once more assumed his position as head of the Army.

On 7 January 1957, Foreign Minister Malik left on a foreign tour that included a stop in the US for talks on the Eisenhower Doctrine. On his return, he reported that President Eisenhower had been sympathetically impressed with a Lebanese appeal for increased military aid. On 16 March, the US and Lebanon issued a joint statement to the effect that the US had agreed in principle to supply Lebanon with certain equipment needed to strengthen the Lebanese armed forces. On 4 April, Prime Minister Sohl asked Parliament for formal approval of the Cabinet's decision to work with the US for mutual defense against Communism, and received an almost unanimous vote of confidence on this question.

1957
Relations
with US

Lebanese alignment with the West was not, however, as clear cut a matter as this might indicate. There was a growing opposition to such an alignment, with former Prime Ministers Yafi and Salem leading this opposition. The two were not, strictly speaking, pro-Soviet or anti-Western, but were intent on neutralism as the best course for their country. That their course led them to join with others of a more extreme view, however, was probably inevitable. These two, then, headed the opposition to Sohl's policy, and were the outstanding leaders against the Prime Minister in the Lebanese election campaign that opened on 12 May.⁸¹

81. For the Lebanese elections, see also Raleigh, "The Middle East in 1957," MEA, March, 1958, p. 99; "Developments of the Quarter," MEJ, Summer, 1957, p. 284.

The campaign was a violent one. The opposition supported a platform that was extremely pro-Egyptian, anti-Western, and neutralist. It was also intent on preventing enactment of any constitutional amendment that might permit Chamoun to succeed himself, like Khouri, when his term ended in 1958. On 30 May, rioting broke out in Beirut when government security forces attempted to break up an anti-Sohl mass meeting. Former prime minister Salem was beaten and arrested. Much of the blame for the rioting was placed by Sohl on Syrians and Palestinian refugees, and on 6 June Lebanon closed its frontier with Syria and confined all Palestinian refugees to their camps. Three days earlier, the opposition groups had called off a general strike after Sohl had agreed to accept two "neutral" ministers in

the Cabinet, and General Chehab had given assurances that the election would be fair. On 8 June, the day before the election, Lebanon received from the US 40 jeeps equipped with anti-tank rifles, the first material sent to the Middle East under the Eisenhower doctrine.

The elections began on 9 June, and voting was to take place on four successive Sundays. The government had taken stringent precautions against further election rioting, suspending arms permits and putting a temporary ban on alcohol sales and political meetings. There were, nevertheless, a number of armed clashes during this general period. As the election progressed, pro-Government candidates were leading. On 17 June, the two "neutral" ministers appointed earlier in the month resigned on the ground that, while the elections appeared to be fair, the "general atmosphere" was such as to mitigate against a free contest. By the end of the month, when the elections were completed, the government had won a resounding victory. Acts of sabotage and terrorism, however, continued to plague the country.

On 18 August, Prime Minister Sohl formed a new Cabinet, and on the 29th declared Lebanon's intention of continued cooperation with the US and the Free World. During the summer and fall, acts of violence continued to take place throughout the country. These acts were more and more charged to Syria by the Lebanese Government, and to cope with them the government took increasingly stronger measures. As violence continued and increased in early 1958, the Sohl Cabinet resigned on 12 March, but, two days later, at the request of

President Chamoun, Sohl formed a new Cabinet. On 25 March, the Lebanese Government announced that Lebanon would join neither the UAR nor the Arab Federation, nor any other group that would limit its independence, sovereignty, or freedom.

The increasing violence reached a climax in May.

May 58
Beginning
of revolt

On 8 May the owner of an anti-Government, pro-Nasser newspaper was assassinated in Beirut. The next day, armed rioters, reportedly instigated by a call for a general protest strike, demonstrated against the Government and, in the process, sacked and burned the USIS library in Tripoli. Reports indicated that 15 people were killed and well over 100 wounded. As the riots developed into a revolt on 10 May, the Army moved into Tripoli to restore order. By 12 May, however, an armed insurrection had spread to most of the country. The USIS library in Beirut met the fate of the one in Tripoli; an IPC pipeline was blown up; and a general strike was called in northern Lebanon. The Government decreed a state of alert and imposed a curfew in Beirut.

On 13 May, Foreign Minister Malik accused the UAR of massive interference in Lebanon, and of providing men and arms to the rebels. A note to this effect was sent to the UAR and promptly rejected. At the same time, on 14 May, the US announced that, at Lebanon's request, it was rushing shipments of police equipment to that country. During the next week, fighting continued in Lebanon and the Government repeated its charges against the UAR.

22 May 58
Lebanon asks
UN con-
sideration

On 22 May Lebanon called for UN consideration of UAR interference in Lebanon. The next day, however, Malik announced that the question was to be considered

11 Jun 58
UN Obser-
vation Group
established

by the Arab League Council, and on the 27th requested that consideration by the UN be deferred. The League Council met early in June, but took no action, and on 6 June, speaking before the UN Security Council, Malik accused the UAR of "massive, illegal, and unprovoked intervention" in Lebanese affairs. On 11 June, the Security Council adopted a Swedish proposal and established a UN Observation Group "to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other material across the Lebanese borders." The Observation Group began arriving in Lebanon on 12 June and made its first report on 4 July. This report stated that there was no evidence of massive infiltration. The Lebanese Government expressed its dissatisfaction with these conclusions, and the US and Great Britain strongly disputed the report.

Jul 58
US sends
troops

A new element was introduced to the situation on 14 July, when a military coup overthrew the royal government of Iraq. The next day, 15 July, President Eisenhower announced that the US was sending troops to Lebanon at the request of President Chamoun. At a meeting of the UN Security Council, an hour after Mr. Eisenhower's announcement, US Representative Henry Cabot Lodge stated that American troops were not in Lebanon to engage in hostilities, and that they would be withdrawn when the United Nations took steps to protect the independence and integrity of Lebanon.⁸²

82. New York Times, 6 Aug 58, 6:1.

SECTION III

THE "NORTHERN TIER" AND PALESTINE

- A. Turkey
- B. Iran
- C. Pakistan
- D. Palestine

TURKEY, 1910 TO THE PRESENT

The history of Turkey from 1910 to World War I consists, in brief, of the efforts of the Western-minded Young Turks to revitalize the decadent Ottoman Empire by means of Turkish nationalism and a governmental system imitating the forms and techniques of the leading European powers, and of the difficulties the Young Turks encountered, including political and religious opposition, armed insurrections (encouraged, in one case, by the Sultan), a war with Italy, two Balkan wars, and the assassination of the head of one of their Cabinets.

The Young Turks, who worked through an organization called the Committee of Union and Progress, secured the restoration of the Constitution of 1876 by Sultan Abdul-Hamid II in July 1908 after a successful revolt against his despotic rule. The Committee of Union and Progress had as its chief aim to prevent the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, and the revolt against Abdul-Hamid resulted from fear that three Macedonian provinces in which disorders were occurring would be lost to the Empire if a British reform scheme for the provinces approved by Tsar Nicholas II in talks with Edward VII of Britain in Revel, Estonia, in June 1908, were put into effect.

Abdul-Hamid saved himself from deposition on this occasion by restoring the Constitution and adopting the role of a good father who had been misled by his ministers. In the ensuing elections for a National Assembly, or Parliament, the Young Turks received a large majority, and their organization now became the Party of Union and Progress.¹ The Party was dominated

Jul 1908
Restoration
of Constitu-
tion of 1876

¹G. L. Lewis, Turkey (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1955), p. 43; William L. Langer, ed. and comp., An Encyclopedia of World History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1948), p. 731.

by Turkish nationalists, between whom and deputies of the subject nationalities of the Empire a rift soon developed over the desire of the Turkish nationalists for a strong central government, as opposed to decentralization in favor of the various nationalities, and the establishment of Turkish as the only official language. As a result of the Young Turks' admiration for Western institutions and methods, the army was soon placed under German instruction and the navy under instructors led by Admiral Sir Douglas Gambles, while a French expert was brought in to help organize the finance department.²

²"Turkey," Encyclopedia Britannica (1942), XXII, 605.

The Western predilections of the Young Turks aroused conservative, especially religious, opponents, who demanded government in conformity with the sacred law of Islam.³

³Lewis, Turkey, p. 43.

It was principally the religious and other conservative elements, joined by the First Army Corps (chiefly Albanian), who made the first insurrection against the Young Turkish government, on 13 April 1909, at Constantinople. The Sultan, overestimating the strength of the revolt, endorsed it. But the Party of Union and Progress called in troops from Macedonia, under Mahmud Shevket Pasha, put down the revolt, and executed the

13 Apr 09
Insurrec-
tion
against the
Young Turks

leaders. On 26 April, by unanimous vote of the Parliament, Abdul-Hamid II was deposed. (He went into exile at Salonika.) His brother succeeded him as Mohammed V, a weak and helpless ruler.

In the course of the next three years, the Young Turkish government had to contend with two Albanian revolts, aggression by Italy in opening the Tripolitan war, a tremendous amount of criticism at home, and dissolution of the Parliament by the Sultan. The first of the two Albanian revolts was put down in the spring of 1910 by a large Turkish army, but only after much bloodshed. Italy chose the fall of 1911 on 28 September, to send a 24-hour ultimatum to the Turkish government on the pretext of Turkish interference with peaceful Italian penetration of Tripoli. While the war with Italy was in progress, and after criticism of the government had swollen to extraordinary volume, Mohammed V dissolved the Parliament, on 18 January 1912. In the elections for a new Parliament held the following April, the Party of Union and Progress again won a large majority, but apparently only after having brought every form of pressure to bear on the electorate. This new government of the Young Turks was short-lived, however; for the Albanians revolted again, and this time were joined by a faction in the army. The Cabinet was forced to resign, to be replaced, on 21 July 1912, by a Cabinet representing moderate groups.

This government of the moderates dissolved the Turkish-nationalist-dominated Parliament by force on 5 August and proclaimed martial law. It then barely ended the Tripolitan War with Italy before Turkey was

Spring 1910
Suppression
of Albanian
Revolt

28 Sep 11
Italian
ultimatum

Beginning
of Turko-
Italian War

21 Jul 12
Fall of
Young Turk
Cabinet

15 Oct 12
Treaty of
Ouchy

plunged into the First Balkan War. By the Treaty of Ouchy, 15 October 1912, Italy retained Tripoli but agreed to accept there a representative of the Sultan in his capacity as Caliph (i.e., the spiritual leader of Islam), and Turkey regained those islands of the Dodecanese group occupied by Italy during the war. These terms were made definitive by the Treaty of Lausanne, 18 October.

18 Oct 12
Treaty of
Lausanne

Beginning
of Balkan
War

On the last-mentioned date Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece declared war on Turkey, joining Montenegro, which had declared war ten days earlier. The motivation of the Balkan countries is indicated in the ultimata issued on 14 October by Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece which demanded reforms and the demobilization of the Turkish army in the Balkans. After a series of victories by the Balkan countries, the European powers opened a peace conference at London, on 17 December; but the conference broke down, on 6 January 1913, because of Turkey's refusal to give up Adrianople, the Aegean Islands, and Crete. Finally, however, the powers prevailed on the Turkish government to agree, on 22 January, to abandon Adrianople.

17 Dec 12
to 6 Jan 13
London
Conference

22 Jan 13
Turks give
up Adrianople

23 Jan 13
Coup d'etat
of Enver

The next day a coup d'etat in Constantinople by extreme nationalists, led by Enver Bey, overthrew the government of the moderate groups. The Turkish Nationalists resumed the Balkan war on 3 February, but were unable to save Adrianople, which fell to the Bulgarians on 26 March. Bulgaria and Turkey concluded an armistice on 16 April, in which they were joined by the other belligerents.

16 Apr 13
Balkan
Armistice

30 May 13
Treaty of
London ends
first Balkan
War

The big powers now insisted on overseeing the territorial settlements. The London Peace Conference was reopened on 20 May, to be followed by the Treaty of London on 30 May, ending the First Balkan War. By its terms Turkey gave up all territory west of a line drawn from Enos to Midia, and also Crete. (Enos--subsequently Inoz--is a town on the coast of the Aegean Sea, east of the mouth of the Maritsa River; Midia--now Midye--is a town on the coast of the Black Sea, northwest of Istanbul.) The status of Albania and of the Aegean Islands was left to the decision of the great powers.

29 Jun 13
Second
Balkan War

The Second Balkan War soon followed the end of the First, but with a different line-up of belligerents. Serbia and Greece, dissatisfied with their spoils from the First Balkan War, signed a treaty of alliance on 1 June against Bulgaria. War broke out on 29 June, and Turkey (as well as Rumania) seized this opportunity to retrieve territory lost to Bulgaria in the First Balkan War. Bulgaria, rapidly defeated, signed the Treaty of Bucharest with Serbia, Greece, and Rumania on 10 August, giving up parts of Macedonia to Serbia and Greece and the Northern Dobrudja to Rumania. By the Treaty of Constantinople, on 29 September 1913, Turkey regained Adrianople and the line of the Maritsa River.

29 Sep 13
Treaty of
Constantin-
ople

The Young Turk government of extreme nationalists that had come to power by the coup d'etat of January 1913 continued to govern Turkey until that nation's collapse at the end of World War I. However, the grand vizier (equivalent of prime minister) installed by the coup, Mahmud Shevket Pasha, was assassinated on 11 June 1913. He was succeeded by Talaat Bey, and a period of

Young Turk terrorism followed, lasting until World War I. Probably the most influential man in the Cabinet was the Minister of War, Enver Pasha. He was a great Germanophile; and though he was not uncommon in this respect, he was probably more responsible than any other individual for Turkey's entering World War I on the side of Germany.

World War I

At the height of the July crisis among the great powers in Europe in 1914, the Turks themselves suggested an alliance between Turkey and Germany, directed at Russia. The Germans accepted, and the result was a secret alliance, with Austria also adhering to the agreement, binding the Turks to enter the war as soon as hostilities should begin between Russia and either Germany or Austria. This commitment, which was concluded about 1 or 2 August, was known to only a few of the Turkish ministers. As matters turned out, Turkey was permitted by Germany and Austria to maintain the appearance of a neutral for some time after the beginning of the war, in order to make the necessary military preparations.

Aug 1914
Secret
Alliance
with
Germany

Great Britain, not knowing about the arrangement between Turkey and Germany, made numerous efforts, from August to October, to persuade Turkey to agree to remain neutral. Among the inducements offered were a guarantee of Turkish independence and integrity, and proposed modifications of the capitulations.⁴

⁴The capitulations had been granted by the Turkish sultan, in accordance with existing practice, to the various foreign powers having relations with Turkey, beginning in the 16th century. The capitulations

exempted the subjects of foreign powers from Turkish law and Turkish taxation. Foreigners enjoying the benefits of the capitulations could be arrested and deported only by order of their own Ambassador, and disputes between them and Turks were settled by the consular courts of the foreigners, in accordance with their own laws. At the time the sultan had granted the capitulations he had been at the height of his power; the capitulations were then considered in no way a sign of weakness, and they were rarely abused in the earlier period. With the decline of the Ottoman Empire, however, abuses became common, and the capitulations came to be regarded as Turkish acknowledgment of the right of foreigners to privileged treatment. See G. L. Lewis, Turkey, pp. 28-29.

But Britain had commandeered two battleships being built for Turkey in British shipyards when the war began, an act that caused much Turkish resentment. Germany offered the cruisers Goeben and Breslau to replace the vessels taken by Britain, and these German vessels succeeded in eluding the British naval units in the Mediterranean and making their way by mid-August, to Constantinople, where they were officially bought by the Turkish Government and turned over to the German commander of the Turkish Navy, Admiral Limpus. On 7 September, Turkey declared the capitulations abolished; and on 29 October, Turkish warships, including the Goeben and Breslau, bombarded Russian ports on the Black Sea. Thus Turkey entered the war, though war was not declared on Turkey by the Allied powers for several more days.

7 Sep 14
Turkey
enters WWI

The only action of note during World War I on what is now Turkish soil was the Gallipoli Campaign, by which the Allies sought to capture the Dardanelles and Constantinople, thus opening a supply route to Russia from the Mediterranean. Naval attacks on the Turkish positions began in February 1915. An army force of about 75,000 men, under Sir Ian Hamilton, arrived in

April, and efforts to break the resistance of the Turks continued until the fall. By this time Hamilton had been replaced by Sir Charles Munro, and preparations were made for evacuation, which was carried out in December and the first part of January. The Turkish forces in this campaign were commanded by General Otto Liman von Sanders, a German, but the hero of the Turkish resistance was Mustafa Kemal, then commanding a division, but destined to lead the Turkish nation in the period between the two World Wars.

Though what is now Turkey, except for the Gallipoli Campaign, was not the scene of any important fighting in World War I, it figured prominently in Allied plans for after the war. The four principal agreements on Allied division of the Ottoman Empire and their main provisions were as follows: (1) The Constantinople Agreement of 18 March 1915, between Britain, France, and Russia, allotted to Russia Constantinople and the western coasts of the Bosphorus, Sea of Marmora, and the Dardanelles, plus Thrace south of a line between Midye and Enez, the northeastern part of Asia Minor (Anatolia), and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos and those in the Sea of Marmora. Under this agreement Arabia was to become an independent Moslem state. (2) The Secret Treaty of London, dated 26 April 1915, gave the approval of the same three powers to Italy's receiving the area around Adalia (in southwestern Anatolia). (3) The Sykes-Picot Agreement, signed by Britain and France on 16 May 1916, assigned to Russia the vilayets of Erzurum, Trabzon, Van, and Bitlis, all in the northeastern part of Anatolia; gave

18 Mar 15
Constantinople
Agreement

26 Apr 15
Secret
Treaty of
London

16 May 16
Sykes-Picot
Agreement

17 Apr 17
St. Jean de
Maurienne
Agreement

France Syria and the southeastern part of Anatolia; and assigned Britain the southern part of Mesopotamia, including Baghdad, and the ports of Haifa and Acre. The agreement provided for an Arab state, or confederation of Arab states, between the French and British areas, divided into French and British spheres of influence.

(4) The St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement, dated 17 April 1917, between Britain, France, and Italy, which clarified the Italian and French shares of Anatolia under the Secret Treaty of London and the Sykes-Picot Agreement by assigning Adana to France and the remainder of southern Anatolia, including the city and vilayet of Smyrna, to Italy. (This agreement lapsed because it was never ratified by Russia.)⁵

⁵The material on Allied agreements for partitioning the Ottoman Empire is all taken from Lewis, Turkey, pp. 48-49, 50.

Settlements After World War I

By mid-October of 1918, it was plain that the Turkish forces could not hold out much longer. The British, assisted by the Arabs, were pushing northward through Syria, Damascus having fallen to them on 1-2 October. On the 7th of the month, French naval forces had taken Beirut. The Sultan, now Mohammed VI (who had succeeded Mohammed V on 3 July 1918), dismissed his Young Turk ministers Talaat and Enver on 13 October and appointed Izzet Pasha as grand vizier. The new government, after appealing to President Wilson to arrange an armistice and receiving no reply, liberated a British general who had been taken prisoner and sent him with a request for armistice talks to the

British naval commander in the Aegean Sea, Admiral Calthorpe.

30 Oct 18
Armistice

Admiral Calthorpe met with the Turkish Minister of Marine on the Island of Mudros. On 30 October they concluded an armistice, effective the following day. By its terms Turkey was to open the Straits, repatriate Allied prisoners, demobilize the Turkish armies, sever relations with the Central Powers, and place Turkish territory at the disposal of the Allies for military operations. The Allied fleet arrived at Constantinople on 13 November. Shortly afterward, the city was placed under Allied military administration.

Mohammed VI appears to have decided on a policy of complying with the wishes of the Allies in their carving up of the Ottoman Empire so long as he was allowed to be Sultan of what was left. To implement this policy, he appointed as grand vizier Damad Ferid Pasha, who, on 7 March 1919, formed a Cabinet disposed to cooperate with the victorious powers.

14 May 19
Greeks
occupy
Smyrna

That the peace settlement was not going to be easy for the Turks soon became apparent. On 29 April 1919, the Italians landed on Adalia, the first step in the Allied taking over of southwestern Anatolia. But the first serious violence occurred when the Allied naval units sent a Greek force ashore to occupy Smyrna. Having been welcomed by the native Greeks and blessed by the Metropolitan of Smyrna, the Greek soldiers proceeded to carry out a systematic massacre of Turkish residents of the city and province. The Allies were shocked, but felt that there was little they could do in the circumstances.

The embryo of the new Turkey now began to form. Five days after the landing of the Greeks at Smyrna, Mustafa Kemal arrived at Samsun (on the shore of the Black Sea, northeast of Ankara), where he had been appointed by the Sultan as inspector of the Third Army. Kemal was an outstanding hero of the war just ended, because of his distinguished conduct at Gallipoli and because, when it appeared that the Turks had only the alternatives of surrender or complete rout in the face of Allenby's advance northward through Syria, Kemal was able to organize a fighting retreat to the mountains north of Aleppo, where he was preparing to make a stand when news of the Mudros Armistice arrived.⁶ Kemal was

⁶Lewis, Turkey, p. 53.

known as an ardent nationalist, and his appointment as inspector of the Third Army was thought to be a good way, by removing him from the capital, to prevent him from interfering with the Sultan's policy of cooperation with the Allies.⁷ But as soon as he arrived

⁷Ibid., p. 54.

at his new post, Mustafa Kemal began organizing nationalist resistance to the dismemberment of Turkey.

As a result of his efforts, two congresses of nationalist delegates were held in the summer of 1919-- one at Erzurum, from 23 July to 6 August, for the eastern provinces of Turkey, and one at Sivas, in September. Out of these congresses came the National Pact. Of its six provisions, the most important ones called for a free vote to settle the destinies of the

Arab-populated portions of the Ottoman Empire that were under enemy occupation on 30 October 1918, while stipulating that the remaining portions, inhabited by an Ottoman-Moslem majority, should not be divided for any reason; agreed to the opening of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus to the commercial traffic of the world on such terms as might be negotiated between Turkey and the interested powers, provided that Constantinople and the Sea of Marmora remained immune from harm; stated that the rights of minorities, including Moslem minorities, were to be guaranteed; rejected any restriction that would hamper the political, judicial, or financial development of Turkey.⁸ The Declaration

⁸Ibid., pp. 58-59.

of Sivas, issued 9 September 1919, affirmed the unity of Turkish territory and opposed Allied occupation and the formation of an Armenian state. Mustafa Kemal, who had been officially dismissed by the Sultan on 8 July, and outlawed on 11 July, presided at both congresses.

One of the conclusions of the Sivas Congress was that the National Assembly should meet at once to settle the nation's destiny. A message was sent in the name of the congress to the government, calling for the resignation of the Cabinet of Damad Ferid Pasha and the immediate convening of the Assembly. When no response of any kind had occurred by 11 September, Mustafa Kemal sent an ultimatum, threatening the closing of telegraph offices to communications traffic from the government. The threat was made good when the government ignored the ultimatum, and on 2 October Damad Ferid Pasha resigned.⁹

⁹Ibid., pp. 56-57.

An attempt at reconciliation with the nationalists was now made. A new Cabinet, under Ali Riza Pasha, was formed, and elections were held, in which the nationalists received a large majority. The National Assembly met on 12 January 1920, and on 28 January it adopted the National Pact. At the same time, arms were being stolen in sizable quantities from Allied dumps. The Allies became alarmed at the trend of affairs and forced the resignation of Ali Riza Pasha's Cabinet. On 16 March, an Allied force, under a British general, occupied Constantinople. Denying any intention of depriving the Turks of the city, the Allies announced that the object of the military occupation was to keep open the Straits and protect the Armenians. When Ali Riza Pasha's successor as grand vizier refused to disavow the nationalist movement, he too was forced to resign, and Damad Ferid Pasha was again appointed. Damad Ferid Pasha now declared the nationalists to be rebels against the Sultan. On 11 April 1920, the Sultan dissolved the National Assembly, and many of the deputies were arrested and sent into exile. The approach of the Sultan and that of the nationalists to Turkey's postwar problems had proved irreconcilable.

Mustafa Kemal, though elected a deputy for Erzurum to the National Assembly in the elections of October 1919, had considered it prudent to remain in Ankara while the National Assembly was in session in the early months of 1920, and so was not in Constantinople when the break between the Allies and the Sultan, on

16 Mar 20
Allies
occupy
Constantin-
ople

23 Apr 20
Schismatic
Government
under Kemal

the one hand, and the nationalists, on the other, had occurred. Those deputies who escaped arrest upon the dissolution of the Assembly joined Kemal in Ankara. There they formed the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, which began its first session on 23 April 1920, with Mustafa Kemal as President. The GNA announced that sovereignty belonged unconditionally to the nation, and that the Grand National Assembly was the "true and sole representative of the nation."¹⁰

¹⁰Lewis, Turkey, p. 61.

For the next two and one-half years, two governments contended for the right to speak for Turkey in the postwar settlements: that of the Sultan, at Constantinople, backed by the Allies and with such Turkish forces as it could command, strengthened by the Greek forces in Turkey; and, opposing the Sultan's government, the nationalist provisional government, headed by Mustafa Kemal.

In the beginning, the nationalists suffered reverses; for, besides fighting the Sultan's forces, they found themselves engaged with the Armenians in the northeast and with the French in Adana.¹¹ In August 1920,

¹¹Ibid.

20 Aug 20
Treaty of
Sevres

the Allies felt the situation was well enough in hand to conclude the Treaty of Sevres with the Sultan's government (the treaty was signed on the 20th). By its provisions the Turkish government renounced all claims to non-Turkish territory; the Kingdom of Hejaz was

recognized as independent; Syria became a mandate of France; Mesopotamia (with Mosul) and Palestine became British mandates; Smyrna and its hinterland were to be administered by Greece for five years, after which a plebiscite was to be held; the Dodecanese Islands and Rhodes went to Italy; Thrace and the remaining Turkish islands in the Aegean went to Greece; Armenia was recognized as independent; the Straits were to be internationalized and the adjoining territory demilitarized; Constantinople and the strip of territory to the Chatalja lines remained Turkish, as did the remainder of Anatolia.

Mustafa Kemal and the nationalist government did not recognize the Treaty of Sevres.

As the winter of 1920 approached, the nationalist government victoriously concluded its hostilities with Armenia. On 3 December, it signed a treaty by which Turkey received Kars and Ardahan, leaving Armenia reduced to the province of Erivan. Forces released from the Armenian front were now able to join those fighting the Greeks, and on 10 January 1921, Ismet, the nationalist government's chief of staff, threw the Greeks back to Bursa after a fierce engagement at Inonu. Ten days later, the Grand National Assembly adopted the Fundamental Law, which provided for sovereignty of the people, a parliament elected by manhood suffrage, a ministry responsible to the parliament, and a president with extensive power.

The Allied powers now called a conference of the contending forces in Turkey, with a view to effecting a settlement. Representatives of both Turkish governments and of Greece met in London, in February, but

20 Jan 21
The Funda-
mental Law

the efforts to reach an adjustment broke down.

On 1 April 1921, Ismet threw the Greeks back again at Inonu, after a new Greek offensive. But the superior numbers and equipment of the Greeks now began to tell, and they succeeded in making a menacing advance toward Ankara. To deal with this crisis, the Grand National Assembly made Mustafa Kemal commander in chief of the nationalist forces, with all its authority vested in him personally. In the last week of August and the first half of September the Battle of the Sakarya raged; but at last the Greeks withdrew, and Ankara was saved.

In this year of 1921, the nationalist government was busy on the diplomatic, as well as the fighting, front. On 13 March, the Italians agreed to evacuate Adalia (in southwestern Anatolia) in exchange for promises of extensive economic concessions (the last Italian forces left in June). On 16 March, Soviet Russia had recognized Turkey's possession of Kars and Ardahan in return for Turkey's retrocession of Batum. The nationalist government signed the Treaty of Kars on 13 October, by which Turkey formally recognized the Armenian Soviet Republic. And on 20 October, France and Mustafa Kemal's nationalist government concluded the Franklin-Bouillon agreement, which ended hostilities with the French in Cilicia (area around Adana) and provided for French evacuation of the area in return for economic concessions.

The year 1922 brought complete victory for the arms of the nationalist government. In March of that year the nationalist Turks rejected an effort of the Allied

powers to mediate between them and the Greeks, saying that there could be no settlement until the Greeks got out of Anatolia. A second Allied effort at mediation was rejected in June. In August, the Turks began their counteroffensive against the Greeks; and early in September, having been driven out of Bursa, the Greek army broke and fled in rout toward the coast. On 9-11 September, the Turks took Smyrna--which, remembering the massacres perpetrated here by the Greeks in May 1919, they almost destroyed by fire. On 15 September, Lloyd George, who had encouraged the Greeks in their campaign in Turkey as a means of forcing the terms of the Treaty of Sevres on the Turks, appealed to the other Allied powers and the British Dominions to join in defense of the Straits against the Turks. But France and Italy, which had concluded agreements with Mustafa Kemal the previous year, took a negative attitude, and among the dominions only Australia and New Zealand showed any interest. An armistice was arranged, and at the Conference and Convention of Mudanya, 3-11 October, the Allies agreed to the return of Eastern Thrace and Adrianople to the Turks, while the Turks accepted the neutralization of the Straits under international control.

3-11 Oct 22
Conference
and
Convention
of Mudanya

Mustafa Kemal now made it clear who would speak for Turkey in negotiations for revision of the Treaty of Sevres. On 1 November 1922, he proclaimed the abolition of the sultanate. Mohammed VI fled from Constantinople on 17 November in a British ship, and the next day his cousin, Abdul-Mejid, was proclaimed Caliph (spiritual leader of Islam).

1 Nov 22
Sultanate
abolished

24 Jul 23
Treaty of
Lausanne

The Lausanne Conference met on 20 November 1922 to conclude peace between the Allies and the Turks. On 4 February 1923, it broke up temporarily after heated discussions concerning the status of Mosul and abolition of the capitulations, but resumed sittings on 23 April and completed the Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July. Its provisions included the following: Turkey gave up all claims to non-Turkish territories lost in World War I but recovered Eastern Thrace to the Maritsa River, with Karagach (suburb of Adrianople south of the Maritsa River); Turkey got the islands of Imbros and Tenedos, but the other Aegean Islands went to Greece; Italy retained the Dodecanese; Great Britain retained Cyprus; the capitulations were abolished in return for a promise of judicial reforms; Turkey accepted treaties to protect minorities; Turkey paid no reparations; the Straits were demilitarized, with a zone on each bank, and were to be open to ships of all nations in time of peace and also in time of war if Turkey was neutral, and were to be open to all but enemy ships if Turkey were at war. A separate Turkish-Greek agreement provided for compulsory exchange of populations; i.e., Greeks in Turkey were to be moved in Greece, and Turks in Greece were to be moved to Turkey.

The Turkish Republic to World War II

Only after the Treaty of Lausanne had been safely signed and the Allies had evacuated Constantinople did the Grand National Assembly vote to make Angora (now Ankara) the permanent seat of the capital, on 13 October 1923. This action had been delayed by Mustafa Kemal to avoid any possible difficulty in the return of

Constantinople, which, while the Allies regarded it as the Turkish capital, would be considered by them as virtually essential to Turkey.¹² The formal proclamation

¹²Lewis, Turkey, p. 76.

29 Oct 23
Turkish
Republic
proclaimed

of the Turkish Republic came on 29 October 1923, with Mustafa Kemal as President and Ismet Pasha as Prime Minister.

From this time until his death, on 10 November 1938, Mustafa Kemal remained President and guided the destiny of Turkey. Though the government had the form of a republic and it was necessary for Kemal to be re-elected by the Grand National Assembly every four years, his personal prestige and authority were so great that he was able to exercise dictatorial powers throughout his tenure of the presidency. In the elections of 1927, he was empowered to name all candidates for the Assembly, and, as a result, his party (The People's Party) had a monopoly, making his unanimous re-election a foregone conclusion. Prior to the next elections, however, the formation of an opposition party was permitted--the Liberal Republican Party, headed by Ali Fethi Bey. This party, organized in 1930, favored a more moderate nationalism and greater cooperation with the West. It did very poorly in the elections, whereupon Ali Fethi Bey dissolved it, but an independent group of deputies continued to exist in the Assembly. Mustafa Kemal was re-elected in 1931, and again in 1935. The day after his death, Ismet, who had taken the family name Inonu in 1935 (see below), was unanimously elected President by the Grand National Assembly.

3 Mar 24
Caliphate
abolished

The core of Mustafa Kemal's domestic program was the Westernization of Turkey. The opposition to this program centered in the religion that pervaded every aspect of life for Moslems--Islam. A necessary first step in his program, Kemal believed, was the abolition of the caliphate. This he succeeded in accomplishing on 3 March 1924, with all members of the House of Osman banished. For the time being, however, Islam remained the state religion, and was so described in the constitution adopted on 20 April the same year. But the adoption of the constitution was preceded by a law placing all school instruction directly under government control, and by another abolishing religious courts.¹³

¹³Lewis, Turkey, p. 82.

1925
Kurdish
Revolt
suppressed

In the years that followed, the two revolts worthy of mention were both religiously motivated. The first, occurring early in 1925, was a great insurrection in Kurdistan. The Kurds sought autonomy because of their dislike for the government's religious policy. The insurrection was put down, much blood being shed in the process, and the leaders were executed. On 2 September of that year, religious orders were suppressed. The other revolt was a rising of dervishes near Smyrna in December 1930. As a result, 28 leaders of the Moslem opposition to Kemal's program were executed.

Dec 1930
Dervish
Revolt
suppressed

In the decade from 1925 to 1935, introducing his measures gradually, Kemal went far toward achieving his object of a Westernized Turkey. In August of 1925, polygamy was abolished and divorce was introduced, and the following November the wearing of the fez was

9 Apr 28
Islam no
longer the
state
religion

prohibited. At the beginning of 1926, new civil, criminal, and commercial law codes were introduced, based, respectively, on Swiss, Italian, and German systems. At the same time the Gregorian calendar was adopted, effective 1 January 1926. Civil marriage was made compulsory on 1 September of the same year. The article of the constitution making Islam the state religion was dropped on 9 April 1928, and on the following 3 November the Latin alphabet was introduced by a decree requiring it to be in universal use within 15 years and compelling all Turks under 40 years of age to attend school to learn it. In 1934, women were given the vote in general elections and permitted to sit in the Assembly, to which 17 women were elected in 1935. On 1 January 1935, family names became compulsory. Mustafa Kemal, at the suggestion of the Assembly, adopted the name Kemal Ataturk (Kemal, meaning perfection,¹⁴ was a name he had acquired in school as a boy

¹⁴ Webster's Biographical Dictionary (1949), entry "Kemal Ataturk."

because of his proficiency in mathematics; Ataturk means father of the Turks). Ismet, the Prime Minister, took for his family name Inonu, the name of the place where he had twice defeated the Greeks in the war of Turkish nationalism.

The names of cities were also changed in Kemal's program; but here the result, though exemplifying Turkish nationalism, seemed to go counter to the Westernizing current as names long familiar to the West disappeared and were replaced by Turkish names. To mention some of the chief examples, Constantinople

became Istanbul, Angora became Ankara, Smyrna became Izmir, Adrianople became Edirne, and Adalia became Antalya. These changes were made in March 1930.

Economically, as well as politically, Kemal aimed at Turkish independence. Under him the country steadfastly rejected all foreign investments while gradually buying up foreign concessions. In June 1929, a high tariff was introduced to encourage the development of Turkish industry. Steps benefiting Turkey's foreign credit were taken in 1928 and 1933 in the form of agreements with bondholders of the Ottoman public debt.

Kemal Ataturk's principal international agreements, designed to promote the security of Turkey, consisted of a treaty of alliance with the USSR, the Balkan Entente, the Montreux Convention, and the Saadabad Pact.

Kemal had been on friendly terms with Soviet Russia since 1920, when, under a military agreement, the Bolsheviks had furnished him supplies in his war to prevent the Allied dismemberment of Turkey. On 17 December 1925, the Republic of Turkey concluded a treaty of friendship and non-aggression with Soviet Russia, establishing close political and economic collaboration. This treaty was extended and amplified four years later; it was renewed for five years on 30 October 1931, and for an additional ten years in November 1935.

The Balkan Entente, including Turkey, Greece, Rumania, and Yugoslavia (Bulgaria refused to join), was signed on 9 February 1934. The four contracting powers mutually guaranteed the security of their Balkan

frontiers and promised to take no action with regard to any Balkan non-signatory without previous discussion among themselves. Turkey entered this pact mainly as a safeguard against possible aggression on the part of Fascist Italy.

20 Jul 36
Montreux
Convention

It was Turkey's fear of Italian aggression that led also to the Montreux Convention, dated 20 July 1936. On 11 April of that year, fearing possible reprisals by Mussolini because of her support of League action against Italy in the Ethiopian crisis, Turkey had requested the signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 for permission to refortify the Straits. In the conference that followed at Montreux, the powers concerned had agreed, with Italy abstaining.

8-9 Jul 37
Saadabad
Pact

The Saadabad Pact, concluded on 9 July 1937,¹⁵

¹⁵ Langer, Encyclopedia of World History, p. 1097, gives 9 July, but 8 July is given in Lewis, Turkey, p. 115.

was designed to secure Turkey on her Asiatic side in the way the Balkan Entente did on the European side. The participating countries, besides Turkey, were Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan.

Besides its treaty of friendship with Soviet Russia, Turkey signed a naval agreement with that country, on 8 March 1931, under which neither party was to add to its Black Sea fleet except after six months' notice to the other. Turkey also signed bilateral agreements with various other countries during the 1920's and 1930's. One of these was a nonaggression pact with Italy for five years, signed on 30 May 1928 and extended for five years on 25 May 1932.

A treaty with Bulgaria on 6 March 1929 settled many outstanding questions, and a frontier dispute with Iran was ended by an agreement dated 23 January 1932. A nonaggression pact with Greece for ten years was concluded on 14 September 1933, some five months before conclusion of the Balkan Entente, to which, as already indicated, both Turkey and Greece adhered. Turkey joined the League of Nations on 18 July 1932.

As World War II approached, Turkey and Great Britain concluded an agreement providing for mutual assistance in case of aggression or war in the "Mediterranean area." Though Turkey had close economic relations with Germany, its government sided with British efforts to check German expansion into the Balkans.

The agreement with Great Britain was soon followed by a nonaggression pact with France, signed on 23 June. This marked the settlement of difficulties between Turkey and France over the Sanjak (district) of Alexandretta on the northeastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea, west of Aleppo, Syria. In the settlements following World War I, Alexandretta had been included in the state of Syria, which was mandated to France; but since about 40 per cent of the population was Turkish, France had assented to a special regime for the district in the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement of 20 October 1921, by which France had agreed to evacuate the Adana area of Anatolia. Turkey expressed concern for the future security of the Turkish population of the sanjak when the Franco-Syrian Treaty of Alliance, dated 9 September 1936, provided for Syrian

independence within three years. Turkey claimed the Turkish population to be a large majority; French figures indicated it to be the largest single ethnic element, but amounting to only 39 per cent of the whole.¹⁶ A fundamental law for the Sanjak of

¹⁶ Avedis K. Sanjian, "The Sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay): Its Impact on Turkish-Syrian Relations (1939-1956)," MEJ, Autumn, 1956, p. 380.

Alexandretta was drawn up by neutral experts under the auspices of the League of Nations, and, after its acceptance by both Turkey and France, was adopted by the League in 1937. The regime thus prescribed called for demilitarization, autonomy, and special rights for the Turkish population. Disorders in the area, which had been chronic for some years, continued in connection with the forthcoming elections for choosing deputies in a legislative assembly for Alexandretta. On 3 July 1938, Turkey and France agreed that each would send 2500 troops into the sanjak to supervise the elections, which were scheduled for September. The Turks secured 22 of the 40 deputies elected; and, on 2 September 1938, by vote of the new Assembly, the Sanjak of Alexandretta became the autonomous Republic of Hatay. The republic had only a pro forma existence, being obviously controlled by Turkey, and ceased to exist after the Hatay Assembly voted, on 29 June 1939,¹⁷ for

¹⁷ Lewis, Turkey, p. 116.

union with Turkey, six days after the nonaggression pact between Turkey and France.

19 Oct 39
Treaty with
UK and
France

On 19 October 1939, after Germany and the USSR had made their pact of the previous August and Great Britain and France were already at war with Germany, Turkey entered a tripartite agreement with the two democracies. This Anglo-Franco-Turkish Treaty provided that Turkey would render all aid in her power to Britain and France if aggression by a European power should lead to a war in the Mediterranean area involving Britain and France, or if they had to go to war to honor their guarantees given Greece and Rumania in April 1939. Britain and France were to aid Turkey to the limit of their power if Turkey were the victim of aggression by a European state, or became involved in a war in the Mediterranean area resulting from aggression by a European state.

World War II

22 Feb 45
Turkey
enters
WWII

Turkey remained neutral during World War II until shortly before the end, finally declaring war on Germany and Japan on 22 February 1945, effective 1 March 1945. Her entering the war resulted from the decision of the Yalta Conference that only those nations that had declared war on the Axis by 1 March 1945 would be invited to participate in the inaugural conference of the United Nations at San Francisco.¹⁸

¹⁸ Lewis, Turkey, p. 121.

It would appear that Italy's declaration of war on France and Great Britain on 10 June 1940, with no provocation except the apparent opportunity to share the spoils of victory with Germany, constituted aggression by a European power that brought a war to

the Mediterranean area involving Britain and France. Under such circumstances, Turkey was bound by the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Treaty of October 1939 to come to the aid of Britain and France. A quite specific condition binding Turkey under that treaty to come to the aid of her allies was met when Britain was called upon by, and honored her guarantee of 13 April 1939 to, Greece after that country was attacked by Italy on 28 October 1940. However, Turkey continued to be officially neutral, though her press, for the most part, favored Britain and France from the start.¹⁹

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 117.

It was agreed at the Casablanca Conference, in January 1941, and again at the Tehran Conference, in December 1943, that Turkey should be brought into the war. The Allied leaders particularly desired the use of air bases in Turkey. Negotiations to bring the Turks in were delegated by the Conferences to the British. Besides communicating with the Turks through the normal diplomatic channels, Churchill met President Inonu at Adana, Turkey, in January 1943, for personal talks, and again in December of that year in Cairo; the British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, met with the Turkish Foreign Minister in Cairo in November 1943. The Turks, though friendly, remained very cautious, and wished to avoid any appearance of provocation that might result in German retaliation.²⁰

²⁰ See Churchill's Hinge of Fate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), pp. 699, 705, 713-714, and his Closing the Ring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1951), pp. 352-353, 355, 357-358, 367-368, 371-372, 389-393, 415.

Churchill at first took an indulgent attitude towards the Turks' failure to honor their treaty obligations. At the time of the Casablanca Conference, Churchill considered it "obviously impossible" to regard the treaty as binding in the altered circumstances following the events of May 1940, which revealed that Turkey's army, though excellent by World War I standards, was not equipped for warfare employing modern aircraft and tanks in blitzkrieg tactics.²¹ But by the time of

²¹Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), p. 36.

the Tehran Conference, he was ready to tell the Turks that if they refused to come into the war, they would forfeit their chance to sit at the peace conference and would be treated like other neutrals, and Great Britain would tell them that she had no further interest in their affairs and would stop the supply of arms.²²

²²Closing the Ring, p. 392.

However, as indicated in the first paragraph of this section, Turkey bided her time.

Two acts on the part of Turkey during the war reveal, by their timing, a good deal about her caution and her motivation. In June 1941, three days before the German assault on the USSR, Turkey signed a non-aggression pact with Germany (it was ratified on 6 July). Three years later, on 14 June 1944, after the successful Anglo-American cross-Channel invasion of Normandy, the announcement was made that Turkey had consented to close the Straits to the thinly disguised German naval

auxiliaries that she had long been permitting to go through to the Black Sea, not only in violation of the Montreux Convention of 1936, but also of the 1939 treaty with Britain and France.²³

²³Lewis, Turkey, 117, 120.

Turkey Since World War II

The principal domestic developments in Turkey since World War II have been (1) the successful organization of an opposition party to counter the People's Party (or Republican People's Party); and (2) the modification, or even reversal in some cases, of various important parts of Kemal Ataturk's political and economic program.

In September 1945, an attempt to found an opposition party, called the National Recovery Party, with a program of free enterprise on the American model and the establishment of close ties with the Moslem states of the east, failed. A few months later, however, on 7 January 1946, the Democratic Party was successfully founded. Its organizers were Adnan Menderes, Mehmed Fuad Koprulu, Refik Koraltan, and Celal Bayar. All had been members of the Republican People's Party, but had split with it on the issues of statism in economic policy and concentration of political power in the hands of the executive.²³

²³Lewis, Turkey, 122-123.

The elections of July 1946 brought the new party's first test at the polls. Standing for 273 of the 465 seats in the National Assembly, Democrats won 62 places.

7 Jan 46
Founding
of
Democratic
Party

It was improbable that the Democrats would have won a majority in a fair election, but, because of widespread intimidation of voters and dishonesty in counting the ballots, their showing was not an accurate reflection of the preferences of the electorate.

To prevent a repetition of the rigged election of 1946, the Grand National Assembly passed a new electoral law in February 1950, a few months before the next general elections. This new law, which had been drafted with the approval of both major parties (there was now a third party, called the National Party, an offshoot from the Democratic Party in favor of a more decisive break with Kemalism), provided for secret ballots and public counting of votes--the reverse of the previous procedure. The new law also provided that the parties should receive equal allocations of political-broadcast time and that the elections should be supervised by the judiciary.²⁴

²⁴Lewis, Turkey, p. 127.

14 May 50
Democrats
win
election

The elections were held on 14 May. The result was a tremendous victory for the Democrats, who won 408 seats as compared with 69 for the Republican People's Party, 1 for the National Party, and 9 won by Independents. The magnitude of the Democratic majority was interpreted as registering a desire for change by all with a grievance of some kind against the Republican People's Party during its long tenure of power. In their electioneering, the Democrats had promised all things to all groups. The most numerous group was the pietists, who had been promised relaxation of

anti-Islamic ordinances. Farmers had been assured they would get higher prices for their produce if the Democrats won. And so it went. The most remarkable immediate consequence of the elections was an outbreak of fez-wearing in the eastern provinces.

22 May 50
Bayar
President
and
Menderes
Prime
Minister

On 22 May 1950, the new Assembly elected Celal Bayar President of Turkey, and Adnan Menderes became the new Prime Minister.

Shortly after taking power, the Democrats paid a first installment on their debt to the pietists. The first day of Ramadan, the month of fasting, came on 17 June in 1950; so the Democratically controlled Grand National Assembly passed a law permitting, from the salient date forward, the call to prayer to be recited in Arabic instead of Turkish. In March 1952, religious instruction was added to the curriculum of the Village Institutes (schools whose primary function is to prepare teachers for rural areas).

In August 1951, the new government took some initial steps toward carrying out its economic philosophy. The State Maritime Administration was handed over to a new corporation known as the Maritime Bank. Private investors were allowed to subscribe 49 per cent of the capital of this Bank, the remaining 51 per cent being subscribed by the government. Another law enacted the same month permitted private firms to participate in the manufacture of alcoholic drinks. Also in the same month, the Grand National Assembly passed a bill to encourage foreign investment, a reversal of Kemal Ataturk's policy. Under the new legislation, foreign investors were permitted to transfer profits out of Turkey--and, in case they

liquidated their holdings, their capital too--in the original currency.

The policy of the Democrats in agriculture produced remarkable results. Turkey's production of cereals, which in 1950 had totaled under 8 million metric tons, rose in 1953 to 14 million metric tons, and Turkey became a major wheat-exporting country. The rise in productivity was accompanied by an increase in mechanization. Whereas there were about 6,000 tractors in use in 1950, this figure had grown to 40,000 by the end of 1953. Though much credit was due American aid, both in technical advice and the supply of equipment, the Democrats took the necessary interest in agriculture to bring about the results achieved.

Though the Democrats had begun as an opposition party, as of 1955 there were few signs that Turkish politicians saw any point in having a parliamentary opposition, as such. In July 1953, the Democrats accused the National Party of being subversive because, so the accusation went, it was working for a restoration of the Islamic state and a return to Arabic script and the veiling of women; on 27 January 1954, the National Party was dissolved. However, it was reconstituted, as a "new" organization called the Republican National Party, on 10 February 1954, ostensibly accepting the principle of division between religion and state (as it had done under its former name) but demanding "full religious liberty." The Republican People's Party was also attacked. On 14 December 1953, the Assembly passed a bill confiscating all property of that party on the ground that it had embezzled large sums during

its long tenure of power. On 16 December, the premises and plant of the leading Republican paper were taken over by the government, and 200-odd branch headquarters of the party were closed. The following March a press law defined libel broadly enough to hamper opposition journalists.

2 May 54
Democrats
retain
power

In the elections of 1954, which took place on 2 May, two additional parties vied for votes with the three mentioned heretofore. These were the Democratic Workers' Party and the Peasants' Party of Turkey. These were minor, however, and the real contest was between the two major parties. The principal issue was the economic policy of the Democrats: the Republicans objected to the encouragement of foreign investments and to the participation of private capital in the ownership of industry. The Democrats again won a great victory, with 503 seats out of the new total (because of increased population) of 541. The Republican People's Party won 31 seats, the Republican National Party 5, the two new parties none, and independent candidates won 2 seats.²⁵ Celal Bayar was re-elected as President,

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 108-136.

and Adnan Menderes was continued as Prime Minister.

After its second victory at the polls, the Democratic Party embarked on a spending program for public improvements. More than the economy could stand was spent in this way, and as a result inflation and a shortage of consumer goods became serious problems. As of late summer in 1957, coffee and chocolate, knives and forks, writing paper and ink, and appliances and

spare parts had all disappeared from regular supply on the market. Only US aid prevented flour and oil from being in the same category.

Faced with the prospect that this situation would be worse the following May, when the next elections would ordinarily be held, Prime Minister Menderes decided, in September 1957, that the next elections should be held the following 27 October. His party took other steps designed to aid it at the polls. Using its large majority in the Grand National Assembly, it pushed through last-minute appropriations for highways and schools, and even for repairs on mosques in farm villages. A further bid for farm votes, which constitute 80 per cent of the total and are the core of Democratic Party strength, took the form of a one-year moratorium declared by the Assembly on \$345 million owed by farmers to the government.

But the most surprising legislation produced a law that forbade the other three parties to form a coalition against the Democratic Party in the elections, and also prohibited the changing of parties by candidates and barred mixed tickets.²⁶

²⁶Time, 23 Sep 57, p. 23.

When the returns were in, the Republicans had won 178 seats. Though this was a great increase over their 1954 showing, it left the Democrats in firm control of the Grand National Assembly, with 424 seats. There were Republican charges of fraud and theft of votes at the polls, and a few local riots of protest. Unofficial counts gave the opposition 51.6 per cent of

the vote, but the government refused to release the popular-vote totals. No less a person than Inonu charged that there were "serious illegalities" in the elections.

Prime Minister Menderes, for his part, dismissed these charges and indicated that he intended to continue with his programs as in the past.²⁷

²⁷Time, 11 Nov 57, p. 40.

In the field of foreign relations since World War II, Turkey has taken her place unequivocally with the non-Communist nations.

After the end of the war, Britain resumed deliveries of equipment and material to build up Turkey's defenses, and by the beginning of 1947 had given the Turks 400 aircraft and, in addition, naval vessels and equipment worth more than 2½ million pounds.²⁸ Britain had also been aiding the Greek

²⁸Lewis, Turkey, p. 140.

government, which, besides the more usual postwar problems, had on its hands a Communist-led insurrection, constantly receiving aid and reinforcements from Communists in Greece's neighboring states and undoubtedly carrying out Soviet policy.

Turkey, too, stood in danger from the Soviet Union, though not in the same way. In March 1945, the USSR had given notice that it would not renew its treaty of friendship with Turkey, due to expire in November of that year. The following June the Kremlin

Mar 1945
USSR
Announces it
will not re-
new Treaty
of Non-
aggression

had offered to renew the treaty if Turkey would give Kars and Ardahan to the USSR and accept a modification of the Montreux Convention of 1936 putting the USSR on an equal footing with Turkey in the defense of the Straits. Turkey refused. After the war, on 8 August 1946, the USSR again pressed for a modification of the Montreux Convention, and Turkey again refused.²⁹

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 121, 141.

Feb 1947
UK ends
Turkish
subsidy

In February 1947, Britain informed the US that she could no longer carry the burden of postwar aid to Turkey and Greece. Since, without continued aid from the West, it appeared that both countries would speedily be subverted and become Soviet satellites, President Truman asked Congress, on 12 March 1947, for \$400,000,000 for military and economic aid for Greece and Turkey. On 22 May 1947, an act of Congress authorized the expenditure of \$100 million in military aid to Turkey, and \$300 million in military and economic aid to Greece. The act also authorized the President to send military and civilian experts as advisers to the Turkish and Greek governments. The policy of aid thus initiated, called the Truman Doctrine, was subsequently placed on a continuing basis in the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, which is still current.

12 Mar 47
Truman
Doctrine
aid to
Turkey

Turkey formally applied for admission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on 1 August 1950. Britain, France, and the Scandinavian countries were at first opposed, and for a time Turkey was "associated" with the work of NATO. Britain withdrew her opposition in July 1951, after Turkey had agreed to enter a Middle

18 Feb 52
Turkey
Joins NATO

East Defense Pact, all other opposition was subsequently withdrawn, and on 18 February 1952 Turkey became a full member of NATO. The following August, Izmir (formerly Smyrna) was chosen to be the headquarters of the Southeastern European Command, under NATO, and on 14 October 1953, the 6th Allied Tactical Air Force was also established at Izmir.³⁰

³⁰ Lewis, Turkey, pp. 141-142, 149.

18 Oct 50
Turks aid
in Korea

The role played by Turkey in the Korean conflict may have helped remove some of the opposition to her becoming a member of NATO. When the UN sent out its call for troops with which to counter the North Korean aggression, Turkey responded promptly. Over 5,000 Turkish troops reached Pusan on 18 October 1950, and the strength of the Turkish Brigade was subsequently raised to 7,000. Some 20,000 Turks served, at one time or another, in the Brigade; and of these, 617 were killed in action, 100 died from other causes, and 2,156 were wounded.³¹ Anyone who read the papers while

³¹ Ibid.

the hostilities were in progress knows that the Turks made an enviable record for their fighting qualities.

To guard against a possible Soviet drive through the Balkans, and with the approval of Britain and the US, representatives of Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey signed a Tripartite Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation at Ankara on 28 February 1953. This preliminary treaty was converted into a military alliance the following year when the same three countries signed a Treaty of

28 Feb 53
Tripartite
Treaty of
Friendship
with Greece,
Yugoslavia

9 Aug 54
Tripartite
Treaty of
Alliance

Alliance, Political Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, at Bled on 9 August. Any aggression against one of the parties is to be considered aggression against all.³²

³²Ibid., 145-146.

The growth of friendly and cooperative relations between Turkey and Greece to replace the fading memories of the Turco-Greek War of the 1920's has been somewhat jeopardized by the situation on the island of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots, who constitute about 80 per cent of the population, have for many years demanded enosis, or union, with Greece, and this is also desired by Greece, though she talks officially of self-determination for the Cypriots. Turkey is concerned in the matter, not only because of the location of Cyprus off her shore, but also because about 18 per cent of the island's population is Turkish. Greece is opposed to any form of partitioning of the island; Turkey is opposed to the island's falling into Greek hands. The situation has been extremely serious for the last several years because of the bombings, murders, and other acts of terrorism committed by extremists. The British, who still govern the island and value it as a base, have developed a series of plans to establish a regime acceptable to all parties, but all have been rejected by Greece or Turkey, or both. The latest plan, sponsored by Prime Minister Macmillan, was acceptable to Turkey but was flatly rejected earlier this month by Archbishop Makarios, the exile leader of the Greek Cypriots. After this became known, according to a current newsmagazine, "Cypriots--both Greek and

Turkish--braced themselves for a renewal of blood-letting."³³

³³ Hollis W. Barber, The United States in World Affairs, 1955 (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), pp. 157-159; Time, 25 Aug 58, p. 26.

Turkey's relations with the Arab nations of the Middle East since World War II have not been cordial. This is partly due to the traditional lack of sympathy between Turks and Arabs in general: the Turks tend to regard Arabs with thinly veiled contempt because they consider them poor fighting men and because the Arabs are unable to unite, whereas the Arabs have disagreeable recollections of the years of Turkish rule. Turkey's recognition of Israel, on 28 March 1949, provided a new and more immediate reason for general Arab ill will.³⁴ And Turkey's conclusion of the Baghdad Pact

28 Mar 49
Recognition
of Israel

³⁴ Lewis, Turkey, pp. 143, 192-193.

24 Feb 55
Baghdad
Pact

with Iraq, on 24 February 1955, was regarded by the Arab League as a threat to the system of Arab security.³⁵

³⁵ J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, a Documentary Record: 1914-1956 (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., c. 1956), II, 390.

IRAN, 1910 TO 1958

The history of Iran¹ after 1910 cannot be properly

¹Iran was adopted as the official name of the country on 22 March 1935, before which time the name Persia prevailed (see Webster's Geographical Dictionary (Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Co., 1949), entry "Iran.") For convenience, the currently official name will be used throughout in this account. (One notable holdout for Persia instead of Iran was Winston Churchill, who required the British Government in World War II, after he became Prime Minister, to use the name Persia in all correspondence except formal correspondence with Iran; the reason he gave was that the similarity of the names Iran and Iraq might otherwise lead to confusion. See his The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1951), p. 479.)

understood without some preliminary mention of its earlier relations with Russia and Great Britain, and the constitution granted in 1906.

In 1828, by the Treaty of Turkoman Chai, Russia received from Iran, among other gains, a grant of capitulations; in a subsequent annex to the same treaty, Russia was given special economic and tariff rights. During the latter half of the 19th century, Russian influence became entrenched in Iran. In 1879, the reigning Shah, Nasr-ed-Din, assented to the creation of a brigade of Persian Cossacks, following the Russian model and commanded by Russian officers, and forces were soon established in Tehran and other northern towns. In 1891, the Discount Bank of Persia, a Russian institution, opened its doors in Tehran.

In the same period, Britain was gaining similar concessions. Britain and Iran signed the Treaty of Paris in 1857, by which, among other things, Britain was granted capitulations and special commercial privileges. In 1889, a British banker received a

concession for the creation of the Imperial Bank of Persia.²

²Donald N. Wilber, Iran: Past and Present (4th ed.; Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1958), pp. 76-78.

A New Zealander named W. K. D'Arcy received a 60-year concession in 1901 to explore for oil throughout most of the country. The government was to receive £20,000, the same amount in stock, and 16 per cent of annual profits. D'Arcy's operations were unfruitful until he discovered the field at Masjid Sulaiman in southern Iran, in 1908. The next year the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was organized to exploit the oil deposits. A pipeline was built from the oil fields to Abadan Island, in the mouth of the Shatt el-Arab, and Iran was soon a leading producer of oil.³

³William L. Langer, An Encyclopedia of World History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., c. 1948), p. 864.

Early in the 20th century, being uneasy about German policy and activities in the Middle East, the Russians and British concluded an understanding about Iran, which they incorporated in the Anglo-Russian Entente, 31 August 1907. The northern half of the country was to be a Russian sphere of influence, the southeastern portion was reserved for the British, and a central band was to be open to either country. Iran was not consulted in the foregoing arrangements, but the agreement affirmed the principle of the independence and the integrity of Iran.⁴

⁴Langer, p. 865.

About a year before the Anglo-Russian Entente, Shah Muzaffar-ed-Din had been forced to yield to popular demand and agree to the convocation of a national assembly. The first national assembly, called the Majlis, met at Tehran on 7 October 1906 and drew up a liberal constitution. Shortly after signing the constitution, Muzaffar-ed-Din died, and was succeeded by his son, Mohammed Ali.

Mohammed Ali was hostile to the new form of government from the outset. On 15 December 1907, he was unsuccessful in an attempted coup d'etat; but on 23 June 1908 he succeeded, with the secret support of the Russian legation and the aid of the Persian Cossack Brigade, in closing the Majlis, having many of the liberal leaders killed, and establishing martial law in Tehran. A Russian force crossed the border to help the Shah's forces put down a popular revolt in the area around Tabriz, in the northern part of Iran.

The cause of constitutional government now found a champion in Ali Kuli Khan, a leader of the Bakhtiari, a powerful nomadic tribe in Iran. Ali Kuli Khan took Tehran on 12 July 1909, and deposed Mohammed Ali on 16 July. The 12-year-old son of Mohammed Ali, Ahmad Shah, succeeded to the throne. Ahmad Shah was controlled by the more radical elements, who set up a regent to rule the country.

In 1911, the government sought the aid of an American financial expert, W. Morgan Shuster, in setting Iran's finances in order. Shuster arrived on 12 May, and having been invested by the Majlis with almost dictatorial powers, entered vigorously upon his task, which included the organizing of a treasury

gendarmery. The Russians opposed Shuster's work and did all they could to put obstacles in his way. They connived with the ex-Shah in an attempt on his part to regain power in the summer of 1911, but this effort was defeated by the first week of September. Other methods having failed, the Russians sent two ultimata to the Iranian government in November 1911, aimed at securing Shuster's dismissal, and followed them up by occupying a number of towns in northern Iran. The Majlis rejected both ultimata; but on 24 December, its doors were suddenly closed and locked by a group of politicians, who formed a directory to govern the country. Shuster left Iran, and the country remained largely under Russian influence from this time until World War I.⁵

24 Dec 11
Iran ruled
by Directory

⁵Langer, p. 865; Wilber, Iran, p. 82.

World War I

Early in World War I--on 1 November 1914--Iran proclaimed neutrality; but since she was too weak to enforce neutrality, her territory was freely violated during the war. The Turks invaded the northern part of the country but were stopped by the Russians. To meet the exigencies of war, the British granted the Russians a free hand in the Russian sphere under the 1907 agreement, at the same time adding the neutral zone to the British sphere. German agents--notably one named Wassmuss, the former German consul at Bushire--were very active in the interior. Wassmuss organized tribes around Bushire to harass the British, who were occupying that town; other German agents were trying

1 Nov 14
Iran
declares
neutrality
in WWI,
but becomes
a field of
conflict

to open a route across Iran to Afghanistan, in preparation for a Turko-German advance on India. In the British zone, in 1916, Sir Percy Sykes organized the South Persia Rifles to protect British interests, including the oil fields, and, with the aid of the Russians from the north, to counteract German influence.

1917 Turks
withdraw

By the end of the war, only the British were left with forces in Iran. The Turks fell back in the early part of 1917, after their defeat at Baghdad; and after the Bolshevik Revolution in the autumn of that year, the Russians also began to withdraw. In 1918, a British force under General Dunsterville moved up to northwestern Iran to encourage the Armenians against the Turks and to counter a possible German advance from the Ukraine, while another British force under General Sir Wilfrid Malleon took a position in northeastern Iran to bar a possible Bolshevik move toward India in that direction.⁶

⁶Langer, pp. 1106-1107; Wilber, Iran, p. 82.

Between the World Wars

1919 Iran
demands end
of Anglo-
Russian
spheres of
influence,
capitula-
tion

The Iranian government sent a delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 to make the following demands: abrogation of the 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement, abolition of the capitulations, and restoration of various pieces of territory formerly possessed by Iran to the north and west. However, British influence prevented this delegation from being officially recognized.

9 Aug 19
Anglo-
Iranian
Agreement,
unratified

On 9 August of the same year, the British concluded the Anglo-Persian Agreement, negotiated by Sir Percy Cox. Though this document once more reaffirmed the

independence and integrity of Iran, its object was to ensure British dominance. Clauses obligated Britain to furnish advisers and officers, to supply munitions for a force to preserve order, to make a loan to Iran, and to render aid in railroad and road construction. There was widespread opposition to the agreement in Iran, and the Majlis refused to convene to ratify it.

10 Jan 20
Iran joins
League of
Nations

On 10 January 1920, Iran joined the League of Nations as one of the original members.

1920 Soviet
invasion,
occupation
of Gilan

Near the middle of 1920, Soviet Russia began pushing south again. The Bolshevik fleet took Enzeli (now Pahlevi) and Resht, both located on the southwestern shore of the Caspian Sea, and occupied most of Gilan. The British forces in northern Iran now moved back to Kazvin.

At this juncture, an effort to repulse the Bolsheviks was made by the Persian Cossack Brigade. On 24 August, the Cossack Brigade recaptured Resht, but in its subsequent attempt on Enzeli (Pahlevi), it was defeated and driven back.⁷

⁷Langer, pp. 107-1108.

The man destined to remake Iran now came to the fore. This was Riza Khan, who was born in 1878 in Mazanderan, a province between the Elburz Mountains and the Caspian Sea. His father and grandfather had been officers in the Persian Army, and Riza Khan himself, as a young man, joined the Persian Cossack Brigade and rose rapidly on the basis of ability and force of character.⁸ In the reorganization of the Cossack

⁸Wilber, Iran, p. 97.

21 Feb 21
Coup d'etat
of Riza Khan

Brigade after its defeat by the Bolsheviks at Enzeli in 1920, Riza Khan became its commander and succeeded in expelling the Russian officers. Then, concerting plans with a prominent writer and reformer named Sayyid Zia ed-Din, Riza Khan marched on Tehran with the Cossack Brigade and executed a coup d'etat on 21 February 1921. In the resulting new government, Sayyid Zia ed-Din was Prime Minister, and Riza Khan was Minister of War and Commander in Chief.⁹

⁹Langer, p. 1108.

Treaty
with USSR

Five days later, having dropped the unratified agreement of 1919 with Britain, the new government signed a treaty with Soviet Russia in which the latter reversed the trend of Tsarist policy toward Iran. Under this treaty, Soviet Russia declared all former treaties between Iran and Russia void, and also any treaties between Russia and a third party that were not in the best interests of Iran; canceled all outstanding Iranian debts to Russia; relinquished all concessions made to Russia, and Russian assets connected with such concessions, including the Discount Bank of Persia, the railroad from Julfa to Tabriz, the port of Enzeli (Pahlevi), and roads and telegraph lines; denounced capitulations; and gave Iran equal navigation rights on the Caspian Sea. The treaty also provided that each country should prohibit activity within its borders designed to harm the other, and Soviet Russia reserved the right, in case Iran were unable to cope with a threat to the USSR posed by a

third power's activities within Iran, to send troops into Iran to counter such a threat.¹⁰

¹⁰ Wilber, Iran, p. 86.

Riza Khan and Sayyid Zia ed-Din clashed after the first hundred days, and the latter was forced to resign and leave Iran. After serving as Minister of War in several succeeding Cabinets, Riza Khan took over the Prime Ministership himself on 28 October 1923. A few months later, Ahmad Shah left the country--never, as it happened, to return.¹¹ There was some agitation for a

28 Oct 23
Riza Khan
head of
government

¹¹ Wilber, Iran, p. 97.

republic in March 1924 when it was rumored that the Shah was coming back; but, having been persuaded to the view of the religious leaders, who opposed the establishment of a republic, Riza Khan was able to bring the popular excitement to an end. On 25 February 1925, the Majlis invested Riza Khan with dictatorial powers. The following 31 October it deposed the absent Shah, thus ending the Kajar dynasty. Riza Khan was proclaimed Shah by the Majlis on 13 December 1925, and crowned 25 April 1926 with the title Riza Shah Pahlavi.

25 Feb 25
Riza Khan
dictator

13 Dec 25
Proclaimed
Shah

Between this time and the beginning of World War II, Riza Shah made notable progress in his program for rebuilding Iran. In broad terms, this called for the throwing off of foreign intervention and influence, for industrialization, and for economic and social reform along Western lines.

10 May 28
Capitula-
tions
abolished

One of the more objectionable forms of foreign privilege in Iran was that conferred by the capitulations, the essential feature of which was the immunity granted foreigners from Iranian law, allowing them to be tried in consular courts according to the law of their own land. In 1927 Riza Shah established a new judicial system, based on the French system, and gave notice that in a year's time the capitulations would be abolished. On 10 May 1928 the announced action took place, with the consent of all nations concerned.¹²

¹²William S. Haas, *Iran* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), p. 153; Langer, pp. 1108-1109.

1931-1932
Measures
against
foreign
influence
and
economic
interests

Other steps against foreigners followed in the economic sphere. In January 1931, foreigners were prohibited from owning agricultural land in Iran. The next month the government took over the Iranian lines of the Indo-European Telegraph Company. In 1932 the National Bank of Iran, which had been founded in 1927, took over from the British Imperial Bank the right to issue currency.¹³ The concession granted D'Arcy in 1901

¹³Wilber, *Iran*, p. 264. Langer, p. 1109, gives the date of founding of the National Bank as September 1928.

relating to oil, which formed the basis of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's operations from 1909, was canceled on 26 November 1932. After a period of negotiations, the terms of a new concession were agreed on, on 29 May 1933. The principal provisions were as follows: (1) the terminal year of the new contract was to be 1993, as against 1961 in the old concession; (2) the area

covered was to be 250,000 square miles, as against 500,000 previously, and after 1938 was to be 100,000 square miles; (3) the minimum royalty paid the government was to be £750,000 annually.¹⁴

¹⁴Langer, p. 1109.

After 1930, foreigners were no longer given positions of authority, but were employed as technicians or engineers.¹⁵

¹⁵Wilber, Iran, p. 99.

In the field of industry, the end of World War I found Iran with only a few electric light plants and some match factories. Efforts on an important scale to make the country as economically self-sufficient as possible began with the session of the Majlis that opened in December 1930, and by the time World War II interrupted Riza Shah's program of industrialization, Iran had some 30 moderately large factories owned and operated by the government, and nearly 200 other industrial plants. Textile weaving was first in importance, with food materials and vegetable products next.¹⁶

¹⁶Wilber, Iran, pp. 246, 248-249.

Governmental supervision and control was exercised through regulatory laws and through ownership. In 1931 a law was passed requiring the registration of all stock companies, and their compliance with certain regulations. A new commercial code was put into effect in 1932, and

under it the government took the lead in organizing new companies, owning some outright but possessing only a controlling interest in others and less than that in still others. In August 1936 a law was passed requiring application to the Bureau of Industry and Mines by any person or persons desiring to form a new company, and formation of new companies in certain categories of industry was encouraged. Foreign participation was not invited.

Because of the important relationship between foreign trade and domestic industries, the government took steps to control imports and exports, using a system of monopolies and controls. In 1936, as a result of its controlling interest in or outright ownership of firms enjoying various import or export monopolies, the government had direct control of 33 per cent of all imports and 44 per cent of all exports. Since the prices of monopolized imports tended to be high, the Iranians paid for their country's industrial development by a form of indirect taxation.¹⁷

¹⁷Wilber, Iran, pp. 246-249.

Financial reforms had begun in 1922, the year following Riza Khan's coup d'etat, with the arrival of a mission headed by Dr. A. C. Millspaugh, an American expert. Within the next five years, the mission succeeded in establishing a balanced budget and in assuring the efficient collection of fair taxes. The government maintained a balanced budget for several years after the departure of the mission, in 1927, but the problems caused by the world depression necessitated

the government's taking over the control of trade and industry.¹⁸

¹⁸Ibid., p. 263.

The importance of a railway connecting the Persian Gulf with the Caspian Sea in promoting the commercial life of the nation was obvious, and steps looking to the construction of such a line had been taken even before Riza Shah became the ruler of Iran, but no real progress had been made. Having authorized survey work in 1926, Riza Shah had a law passed in 1927 authorizing construction of the railway. In 1928 a syndicate of American and German engineering firms was awarded a contract to survey the entire line and to construct segments south from the Caspian and north from the Gulf, but this contract was canceled in 1931. The job was turned over in 1933 to Swedish and Danish firms, who subcontracted various stretches of track, and in 1938 the line was in operation. A single-track standard-gauge railway, it ran from Bandar Shapur, on the Persian Gulf, to Bandar Shah, on the southeast corner of the Caspian Sea, a distance of 865 miles.¹⁹

¹⁹Wilber, Iran, pp. 273-274. Langer, p. 1109, gives January 1939 as the date of opening of the line.

The effects of Riza Shah's program on the social order were profound. Nobles lost prestige and power, and the use of titles was abolished. The merchant class became virtually a class of government employees because of the controls exercised by the government and its extensive participation in the ownership of industrial

and commercial firms. The Shiite clergy, undermined economically, lost its independence along with control of much of its vast trust funds. The principal forms through which Shiism (the heterodox branch of Islam prevailing in Iran) influenced or manifested itself in public life were eliminated as religious law gave way to civil and criminal codes, civil marriage and divorce registers were established, passion plays were prohibited, and dervishes were barred from appearing in towns. The secular authority was further asserted in the requirement of licenses for the wearing of clerical garb, the opening of mosques to non-Moslem visitors in Iran, and the substitution of state schools for religious teaching. Riza Shah's approach was not essentially antireligious, but he was determined to rid Iran of those aspects of Shiism that seemed incompatible with the nature of a progressive modern state.²⁰

²⁰Wilber, Iran, pp. 98-99; Haas, Iran, pp. 152, 157.

This program of revolutionary changes was not accomplished without attempts at opposition, but none of these seriously challenged Riza Shah's supremacy in the state. Special attention was given to breaking the power of leaders of such tribes as the Qashqa'i, the Mamasanis, the Lurs, and the Bakhtiari. In 1934, after trial in Tehran, four Bakhtiari leaders were executed, four more were given life imprisonment, and 16 others lesser prison terms. As late as 1936, however, the Qashqa'i were in revolt against the Shah's government.²¹

²¹Wilber, Iran, p. 99.

In the field of foreign relations under Riza Shah Pahlavi, two principal treaties may be noted, and certain events leading from the one to the other.

22 Apr 26
Mutual
Security
Treaty with
Turkey and
Afghanistan

The first of these, dated 22 April 1926, was the Persian-Turkish-Afghan Treaty of mutual security, which was concluded under Soviet auspices. It failed to prevent considerable trouble between Iran and Turkey over the Kurdish populations in the boundary area, but these difficulties were subsequently settled in an agreement between the two countries revising the boundary in the vicinity of Mt. Ararat, on 23 January 1932. The same Kurdish question caused friction between Iran and the new, post-World War I state of Iraq; but the way was paved for better relations when Iran finally recognized Iraq, on 11 August 1929, and relations were further improved by a visit of King Faisal of Iraq to Tehran on 26 April 1932. Iran and Turkey drew closer as the result of a visit of Riza Shah to Ankara and Constantinople in June and July of 1934.²²

²²Langer, pp. 1108-1109.

In 1937, the better understanding that had developed in the intervening decade led to a new agreement to replace the one of 1926, with Iraq joining the signatories of the earlier agreement. The new agreement, often called the Saadabad Pact (from the name of the Shah's palace near Tehran, where it was signed), concluded on 9 July 1937, linked Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan in an Oriental Entente comparable

9 Jul 37
Saadabad
Pact

to the Balkan Entente. By its provisions, which are still operative, the signatories agreed to refrain from interference in each other's internal affairs, to respect their mutual frontiers, to refrain from aggression against each other, and to consult together in case of an international conflict threatening their common interests.²⁴

²³ Langer, p. 1109; Haas, Iran, 219-220; Wilber, Iran, p. 146. Haas tells why the Saadabad Pact was so called; Wilber states that it is still in effect.

Relations
with USSR

Riza Shah regarded Soviet Russia with suspicion and fear, and ruthlessly suppressed all manifestations of communism or socialism within Iran. A law enacted by the Majlis in 1931 was designed to deal with persons disseminating a foreign ideology. It provided imprisonment for anyone advocating forcible overthrow of the political, economic, and social order, endeavoring to separate territory from Iran, or trying to weaken the patriotism necessary to the independence and unity of the country. However, Riza Shah maintained rather close economic and commercial relations with the USSR. He concluded five pacts with that country in 1927, and several more in 1935, relating to fishing rights in the Caspian Sea, the return to Iran of installations at the Caspian port of Pahlevi, commercial matters, customs tariffs, and guarantees of mutual neutrality and security. Between 1935 and 1940 trade between Iran and the USSR steadily increased because of barter agreements.²⁴

²⁴Wilber, Iran, pp. 98, 261; Haas, Iran, pp. 141-142.

Riza Shah's relations with Britain before World War II had among their chief incidents the modification or abolition of concessions granted by former Shahs. The abolition of the capitulations, the withdrawing of the right of currency issue from the British-owned Imperial Bank of Iran, and the cancellation and renegotiation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's concession on more favorable terms for Iran--all mentioned above--are cases in point. On 22 November 1927 the Iranian government advanced claims to the Bahrein Islands, in the Persian Gulf off the Saudi-Arabian coast. The ruler of these islands, though nominally independent, is closely dependent upon the British government. The British rejected the claim. It remains a currently unsettled question. In spite of the Bahrein claim, the British accepted and supported Riza Shah.²⁵

22 Nov 27
Iran claims
Bahrein

²⁵Wilber, Iran, p. 98; Haas, Iran, p. 141; Langer, p. 1108; Webster's Geographical Dictionary, entry "Bahrein Islands."

As for Germany, after the Nazis came to power that country steadily improved its position in Iran. Using a combination of economic penetration and propaganda, Nazi Germany achieved first place in both the industrialization and the foreign trade of Iran. Germany had the advantage over both Britain and the USSR, in Riza Shah's mind, of a past record free of any apparent design on Iran, which made her assistance

especially welcome; and the numerous German engineers and other experts employed in Iran all doubled as Nazi propagandists. But what appealed to the Iranian ruler most of all in regard to Nazi Germany was that country's fanatical hostility to Communism, a feeling he shared.²⁶

²⁶Haas, Iran, pp. 221-222.

World War II

Iran
declares
neutrality
in WWII

At the beginning of World War II, Iran declared her neutrality and attempted to carry on normal relations with all the powers. She particularly wanted to continue her trade relations with Germany because of their importance to her industrial and economic programs. After Germany declared war on Soviet Russia, however, Britain and the USSR saw at once that Iran would have to be kept out of German hands and from serving German purposes. From 1940, German secret agents had been operating there, organizing fifth columns and support among the tribes of the southwest and at Isfahan and Tehran. The British and the Russians called on Riza Shah to live up to his neutrality. When he failed to comply effectively, they marched in, on 26 August 1941.²⁷

26 Aug 41
UK and USSR
occupy Iran

²⁷Wilber, Iran, 101-102.

To save his dynasty, Riza Shah decided to abdicate, and did so on 16 September.²⁸ He was succeeded by his

16 Sep 41
Riza Shah
abdicates
in favor
of present
Shah

²⁸Webster's Geographical Dictionary, entry "Iran."

son, the present Shah, Mohammed Riza Pahlavi.

29 Jan 42
Alliance
with UK
and USSR

On 29 January 1942, Iran, Great Britain, and Soviet Russia signed the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance. The two Allied powers agreed to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence of Iran, and to use their best efforts to safeguard the economic existence of the Iranian people against the contingencies of the war. They specified the facilities to be granted them on Iranian soil, but stated that their forces were not in military occupation of the country and would be withdrawn from Iranian territory within six months after the cessation of all hostilities between the Allied powers, on the one hand, and Germany and her associates on the other.²⁹

²⁹Wilber, Iran, pp. 102-103.

The value of Iran to the Allied war effort would be hard to overestimate. In the course of the war, the Allies moved over five million tons of war materials from the Persian Gulf across Iran to the Soviet army, mainly by means of the Trans-Iranian Railway, but supplementing the railway with truck convoys.³⁰ Iranian

³⁰Ibid., p. 103.

oil was vital to the Allied war effort.³¹

³¹Haas, Iran, p. 223.

9 Sep 43
Iran
declares
war on
Germany

On 9 September 1943, Iran declared war on Germany, and announced her adherence to the Declaration of the United Nations. Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt held one of their wartime conferences at Tehran, 27 November

to 2 December, 1943. Out of this conference, among other things, came the Tehran Declaration, in which the Allied leaders recognized Iran's role in the war and her resulting problems, promised full consideration of these problems by international conferences or agencies after the war, and again expressed their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iran.³²

³²Wilber, Iran, p. 103; Webster's Geographical Dictionary, entry "Iran."

Nov 1945
Troubles in
Azerbaijan

In November 1945, there was open disorder in the province of Azerbaijan, mainly brought about by the radical Tudeh ("Masses") Party, which had been nominally replaced by the so-called Democratic Party of Azerbaijan. Government reinforcements were sent from Tehran, but were stopped short of their destination by Soviet forces. In December, the Democratic Party of

Jan 1946
Iran takes
case
against
Soviet
interference
in
Azerbaijan
to UN

Azerbaijan announced the establishment of the autonomous state of Azerbaijan. Iran placed this matter, in January 1946, before the UN Security Council, which unanimously adopted a resolution calling on Iran and the USSR to inform it of the results of their negotiations on the matter. The date previously agreed on by the Allies for complete evacuation of troops from Iran, 2 March 1946, came and passed, and only the US and British troops had left. Iran's Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam, who had taken office in February 1946, negotiated an agreement in Moscow, made public on

4 Apr 46
Soviets
agree to
leave Iran

4 April, calling for the withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Iran within six weeks, for the presentation to the next session of the Majlis of a proposal for

forming a joint Irano-Soviet oil company to exploit the oil resources in northern Iran, and for the peaceful internal settlement of differences between the central government and the revolutionary movement in Azerbaijan. The Soviet troops finally left Iran.³³

³³Wilber, Iran, pp. 104-105.

After long negotiations with the leaders of the so-called government of Azerbaijan, the Iranian government obtained its agreement to certain general points. In October 1946, the Shah issued a decree providing for elections for the new Majlis, and the Prime Minister announced that the elections would be held as soon as security forces were positioned throughout the country to supervise the voting. The insurgent government in Azerbaijan now refused, though it had previously agreed, to permit such supervision. Thereupon, the central government sent troops to Azerbaijan early in December. The capital, Tabriz, was taken at once, the Azerbaijan regime promptly collapsed, and some of its leaders fled across the Soviet frontier.³⁴

Dec 1946
Collapse of
insurgent
government
in
Azerbaijan

³⁴Ibid., p. 106.

15 Mar 51
Bill for
nationaliza-
tion of
Anglo-
Iranian
Oil Co.

On 15 March 1951 the Majlis passed a bill providing for the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and on 20 March the Senate approved the same bill. Rioting broke out, with three British nationals being killed at Abadan. Britain announced her readiness to "act as we see fit to protect British lives and property." The National Front deputies in the Majlis

reproached Prime Minister Hosein Ala, who had taken office on 11 March, for his alleged unwillingness to carry out nationalization, and were backed by the public. Hosein Ala resigned on 27 April.

29 Apr 51
Mossadeq
Prime
Minister

Mohammed Mossadeq was elected Prime Minister on 29 April, after the Majlis had voted unanimously for immediate seizure of the oil industry.

A series of fruitless negotiations now took place. On 11 June 1951 an Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) negotiating mission, headed by the Deputy Chairman of the company, arrived in Tehran, but left after ten days of unsuccessful talks. In mid-July, W. Averell Harriman arrived in Tehran as President Truman's personal representative to try to find a common ground for renewing negotiations. He was followed by an official British mission headed by Richard Stokes, Lord Privy Seal and Minister of Materials, early in August. In December 1951, the International Bank offered its services as intermediary, and in March 1952 it sent a mission to Tehran, which proved unsuccessful. President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill sent a joint note to Mossadeq on 30 August 1952, outlining a broad formula for settlement of the dispute, but Mossadeq formally rejected this on 24 September.³⁵

³⁵Wilber, Iran, pp. 112-114.

22 Oct 52
Iran severs
relations
with UK

On 22 October 1952, Iran severed relations with Britain.

Throughout the first half of 1953, the oil issue was quiescent. On 29 June, President Eisenhower answered a letter received from Mossadeq the previous

month in which the Iranian Prime Minister had called attention to the dangerousness of the situation in Iran. In his reply, President Eisenhower stated that so long as the oil issue was not settled, the United States would not be in a position to extend more aid to Iran or to purchase Iranian oil.³⁶

³⁶Wilber, Iran, 119-120.

Matters at length came to a head in August 1953.

13-16 Aug 53
Mossadeq
dismissed

On the 13th of that month, the Shah signed a firman (decree) dismissing Mossadeq, and another naming General Fazlollah Zahedi Prime Minister. The firman of dismissal was delivered to Mossadeq at 1 a.m. on 16 August. He held an emergency session of his Cabinet, but said nothing about the firman. On the afternoon of the 16th, a mass meeting arranged by the National Front received word that the Shah and his wife had gone to Baghdad by air, and there were shouts of "Down with the dynasty," and "Death to the Shah." The next day rioting crowds at Tehran pulled down statues of Riza Shah and the reigning Shah. The violence of the abuse poured out on the Shah in Nationalist Front newspapers, and excesses like the pulling down of the statues, provoked a ground-swell reaction in favor of the Shah. It started early on 19 August in Tehran, and by the end of the day General Zahedi had taken over the government and quiet reigned. On 22 August the Shah returned to a tumultuous welcome.³⁷

³⁷Ibid., pp. 122-124.

Mossadeq and his chief of staff, General Riahi, were placed on trial, on 9 November, before a military court, charged with, among other things, having failed to obey imperial firmans and with having plotted to overthrow the constitutional monarchy. They were sentenced on 21 December: Mossadeq to three years in prison, and Riahi to two years.³⁸

³⁸ Ibid., p. 125.

The oil issue remained to be settled. In October 1953, Herbert Hoover, Jr., made the first of several trips to Iran to help in arrangements looking toward an agreement. On 10 April 1954 an oil consortium was formally established in London, including the following eight companies: Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (name changed to The British Petroleum Company Ltd. in December 1954), Gulf Oil Corporation, Socony-Vacuum Company, Standard Oil of California, Standard Oil of New Jersey, The Texas Company, The French Petrol Company, and Royal Dutch Shell. The Consortium sent representatives to Iran, and on 5 August the Iranian delegation and the International Consortium announced full agreement in principle, subject to putting the agreement into legal form and having it ratified by all parties concerned. It was the belief of the companies that in the first three full years of operation under this agreement Iran would receive a total direct income of £150,000,000. The agreement was approved by the Majlis on 21 October, after consideration

10 Apr 54
Oil
consortium
established

5 Aug 54
Oil
agreement

lasting a month, and soon afterward was also ratified by the Senate. In February 1956 the oil consortium announced satisfactory progress in an atmosphere of full cooperation during its first year of operations in Iran.³⁹

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 125-126, 129.

11 Oct 55
Iran joins
Baghdad
Pact

On 11 October 1955 Iran adhered to the Baghdad Pact, which had been initiated in February of that year by Turkey and Iraq, and thereafter joined by Great Britain and Pakistan. Early in January 1957 Iran enthusiastically subscribed to the Eisenhower Doctrine.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 129, 130.

The present Prime Minister of Iran is Dr. Manuchehr Eqbal, who was appointed by the Shah in April 1957.⁴¹

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 130.

PAKISTAN

15 Aug 47
Pakistan
created

After nearly a half century of struggle for independence, Pakistan and the Indian Union became simultaneously sovereign Dominions in the British Commonwealth on 15 August 1947. Before partition the entire Indian Subcontinent, containing the two major communities of Hindus and Moslems, had been one administrative unit divided into eleven provinces under the British Crown. Since the early years of the 19th century the Moslem League had fought for a Moslem state, free of either British or Hindu control. Britain had accepted, in June 1947, Moslem demands for a separate homeland as the basis for partition. In many ways, Pakistan was an anomaly in the history of nation-states, lacking geographical and economic unity, a uniform culture, a common language, and a history of national unity. The concept of nationhood stemmed largely from the desire of the Moslem peoples, a one-to-three minority on the Indian Subcontinent, to preserve their Islamic way of life.¹

1. Callard, Keith, Pakistan, N.Y., 1957, pp. 11-12.

Partition and Transfer of Power

Not until three days after the formal transfer of sovereign powers to the co-heirs of British India were the details of partition announced.² Mohammed

2. Department of State, Background Pakistan, March 1953, p. 4. Eppstein, J. (ed), Pakistan, London, 1957, p. 6.

Ali Jinnah, "Father of Pakistan," later remarked that the partition left him with "a truncated, moth-eaten" Pakistan.³ The Punjab and Bengal provinces were

3. Quoted in Atlantic Monthly, Sep 57, p. 4.

Riots during
fall of '47

divided between India and Pakistan. Trouble broke out in Punjab, where the Sikhs had a long-standing vendetta with Moslems. Riot, chaos and slaughter spread across the peninsula. Moslems fled India, while Hindus and Sikhs left Pakistan. The two new governments took measures to stop the rioting by speeding the evacuation. At the end of 1948 some 6,500,000 persons had entered Pakistan, while about 5,563,000 had gone to India.

Problems of Partition

1947-1948
Chaos
resulting
from
Partition

As a result of these mass evacuations, Pakistan faced a Herculean task of refugee relief and resettlement. To make matters worse, there was no nucleus of trained administrators on which the government could depend. Trade and commerce were at a standstill. Communications had broken down and serious food shortages existed. Nor were there adequate armed forces to maintain law and order.⁴

4. Department of State, Background, pp. 4-5.

1947-1951
Early
leadership

During the first thirteen months, Jinnah, by exercising virtually absolute power, managed to hold the young nation together. After his death in September 1948, his Lieutenant, Liaquat Ali, for three years maintained effective control of the government. The effect of these gigantic problems was to slow down democratic development and to foster political instability. A constitution was not drafted until May 1955.

1947-1958
Slowness of
democratic
evolution

The Constitution Bill was passed in February 1956, at which time Pakistan became an Islamic Republic within the British Commonwealth.⁵

5. See Callard, op. cit., Ch III, pp. 77-124.

The political parties face their first critical test of a national election in balloting scheduled for November of this year (1958).⁶

6. NYT, 9 Apr 58, 8:3.

The Kashmir Issue

At the time of partition, the principality of Jammu and Kashmir had the option of joining India or Pakistan, or of remaining independent. Although the population of Kashmir was over 80 per cent Moslem, it was ruled by a Hindu prince, who had a "stand-still" agreement with Pakistan. The Maharaja's Moslem subjects, however, refused to "stand still" and rose in revolt, hoping to insure union with Pakistan. Stories of persecution by the Maharaja's troops aroused the fiery tribesmen in Pakistan, and they invaded the state to protect their coreligionists. The Maharaja hurriedly requested the Delhi Government to accept his accession to India and to dispatch military assistance. First India and then Pakistan sent in troops, and by May 1948 fighting was widespread.⁷ Through the efforts of the UN Commission

7. Eppstein, John (ed.), op. cit., pp. 15-17.

Fall-1947
Moslem
Revolt in
Kashmir

May 48
Fighting
Widespread

Jan 49
UN Negoti-
ates a
cease-fire

for India and Pakistan a cease-fire agreement was obtained in 1949. A series of UN and Commonwealth efforts have to date failed to solve the dispute.⁸

8. Levi, Werner, "Kashmir and India's Foreign Policy", in Current History, June '58, pp. 340-341.

Pakistan's
viewpoint

Pakistan's claim to Kashmir, apart from the religious bonds between the two peoples, is based upon economic, geographic and strategic considerations. Many Pakistani rivers, required for the development of power and irrigation, rise in Kashmir, and Karachi is the natural port to this region. The occupier of Kashmir outflanks the already weak defenses of West Pakistan. Because of these and other factors, Pakistan holds that Kashmir is rightfully hers. No other solution can be tolerated. Since a plebiscite would in all probability be in her favor, Pakistan has backed this means as a basis for settling the dispute.⁹

9. Ibid., pp. 341-342.

India's
claim

India is equally adamant, pointing to the Maharaja's decision to join the Union as legal and final. Pakistan's membership in the Baghdad Pact and SEATO has been used by India as an argument against holding a plebiscite. India maintains that Pakistan's participation in these defense pacts has brought the "cold war" to India's border.¹⁰

10. Eppstein, op. cit., p. 17.

This continuing dispute has created tensions between Pakistan and India which affect regions and issues far beyond the two countries immediately involved.

The Pakhtunistan Question

Trouble with and among the hardy Pathan tribesmen of the northwest frontier was a perennial problem for the British rulers of India. In a 1947 referendum the Pathans voted to join Pakistan.¹¹ Since the Afghans

Fall 1947
Pathan
Referendum

11. Ibid., pp. 13-15.

had long advanced claims to a large area inhabited by the Pathans, Karachi acquired both Pakhtunistan ("home of the Pathans") and a border controversy with Kabul.

Afghanistan's attitude toward Pakistan was revealed in September 1947 when its UN delegate cast the only negative vote on Pakistan's petition for UN membership. Afghanistan, apparently with the encouragement of the USSR, engaged in a campaign to create disaffection among the Pushto-speaking tribes within Pakistan. The agitation reached a peak in late 1954 after Karachi decided to consolidate the units of West Pakistan into a larger political entity. Public demonstrations and attacks on Pakistani diplomatic property occurred in Kabul and Jalalabad. After a brief reconciliation the dispute flared up again in 1956, and each nation withdrew its diplomatic envoys. At the end of the year, normal diplomatic relations had been resumed and the situation eased. The tribesmen on the whole have been unreceptive to this agitation.¹²

1954
Peak of
Afghan
Agitation

Dec 56
Dispute
Eases

12. Ibid., p. 15. Callard, op. cit., pp. 316-318.

Foreign Relations

Support for
Moslem Causes
1947-1957

Pakistan's belief in the essential unity and purpose of the Moslem world has been reflected in her foreign policy. At the UN, Pakistan normally has thrown her influence on the side of any Moslem cause. She has constantly supported the Arab World in the Palestine dispute and has strongly favored independence for Tunisia, Morocco, Malaya, the Sudan, and Indonesia. Although the official government attitude was more restrained, public demonstrations during the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute and during the opening stages of the Suez Crisis indicated strong sympathy for the cause of fellow Moslems. However, Pakistan's membership in the Baghdad Pact has cooled somewhat her relations with Egypt and Syria.¹³

13. Callard, op. cit., pp. 314-316.

The
"Northern
Tier" 1954

From the first days of her national existence, Pakistan's foreign (and domestic) policies have been strongly conditioned by the serious tension arising from her disputes with India - the most serious being the Kashmir issue. This was one of the reasons for Pakistan's readiness to fall in with Mr. Dulles' concept for the defense of the "Northern Tier." Mr. Dulles wanted pacts; Pakistan wanted money and arms. In 1954 Pakistan signed a Mutual Defense Agreement with the US, signed an agreement with Turkey (which was supplanted by the Baghdad Pact the following year), and adhered to the Manila Treaty (SEATO). Shunning neutralism, Pakistan had declared for the West.¹⁴ However, recent

14. Ibid., pp. 320-321.

reports have indicated a growing resentment in Pakistan because of Western reluctance to back her completely in the dispute with India.¹⁵

15. NYT, 7 Apr 58, 3:1.

In March 1958 Prime Minister Malik Noon, criticizing Western nations for supplying arms to India, warned that Pakistan might have to revise her policy towards the West unless the UN aids in a Kashmir settlement.¹⁶

Noon's
statement
Mar 1958

16. NYT, 9 Mar 58, 27:1.

One expert on the subject has this to say concerning Pakistan's foreign policy: "It is still obsessed by Kashmir, but no longer to the virtual exclusion of all other issues. It would, however, be idle to pretend that domestic changes or the possibility of settlement with India might not bring about a sudden and drastic alteration in Pakistan's world view."¹⁷

17. Callard, op. cit., p. 324.

PALESTINE-ISRAEL, 1910-1958

29 Aug 97
Beginning
of Zionist
Organization

Zionism, to which the modern state of Israel owes its existence, first achieved a definite and purposeful organization in 1897. In that year, on 29 August, in the Swiss city of Basel, the First Zionist Congress assembled, under the leadership of Theodor Herzl. This Congress adopted the Basel Program, which stated that the aim of Zionism was to create for the Jewish people a publicly recognized and legally secured home in Palestine, and provided for certain measures designed to realize this aim. These measures were: To promote the settlement of Palestine by agricultural and industrial workers, to organize the whole Jewish people by local and international institutions, to strengthen Jewish national sentiment and consciousness, and to seek the concurrence of the powers so far as necessary in achieving the Zionist goal.

Other Congresses followed the first, and under Herzl's guidance Zionism became a firmly established mass movement. He died in 1904, but his work was carried on by others.¹ In 1914 there were 12,000

1. Joseph Dunner, The Republic of Israel: Its History and Promise (New York: Whittlesey House, c. 1950), pp. 23-24, 26-27.

Zionist settlers in Palestine. (Not all, however, had immigrated as a result of the work of the Zionist Organization founded by Herzl; many were indebted to the generosity of Baron Edmond de Rothschild.) The total number of Jews in Palestine in 1914 was a little under 100,000.²

2. James Parkes, A History of Palestine from 135 A.D. to Modern Times (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 275.

World War I and the Postwar Settlement

Though considerable fighting occurred in Palestine in World War I, with the British taking Jerusalem on 9 December 1917, the period of the war is of interest chiefly because of the various agreements and commitments made by the European powers, particularly Britain, for the disposition of Palestine after the war.

British
promises
to Arabs

The Arabs considered that a commitment regarding Palestine had been made to them in correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Cairo, and Hussein, the Grand Sherif of Mecca. The latter, in setting forth his terms for joining the British in fighting the Turks, stipulated in a letter dated 14 July 1915 that independence should be recognized for the area including the whole of the Arabian peninsula (except Aden) and all of what is now Iraq, Palestine, Jordan, and Syria, running up to the borders of Iran on the east and slightly into the present Turkey on the north.³

3. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1945 (Information Papers No. 20, 4th ed.; London, 1946), p. 5.

In Sir Henry's reply, dated 25 October 1915, he stated that the "two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo

cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded." Subject to this modification, he said, the British would accept the limits specified by Hussein.⁴

4. Ibid.

The Arabs have insisted that, since Damascus is the farthest south of the districts specified by Sir Henry to mark the eastward boundary of the excepted portions of Syria, the line running from Aleppo, on the north, to Damascus, on the south, should extend no farther south than Damascus. Thus, Palestine would not be excluded by Sir Henry's language from the boundaries set forth by Hussein. The British, on the other hand, have steadily maintained that it was their consistent intention to exclude Palestine from the independent area, and there is evidence that this was made clear in an interview between Commander D. G. Hogarth of the Arab Bureau in Cairo, and King Hussein of the Hejaz in January 1918. But the Palestine Arabs have never been willing to accept this view.⁵

5. Ibid., p. 6.

Palestine figured in the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of 9 May 1916, between Britain and France, in a way not incompatible with the British interpretation of their understanding with Hussein. The portion of the Sykes-Picot Agreement applying to Palestine stated that it was to be "separated from Turkish territory and subjected to a special regime to be

9 May 16
Sykes-Picot
Agreement

determined by agreement between Russia, France and Great Britain."⁶ The terms of this treaty were kept

6. Quoted in RIIA, Great Britain and Palestine, p. 7.

secret from Sherif Hussein, but after the Russian Revolution the Bolsheviks published them, on 24 November 1917.⁷

7. RIIA, Great Britain and Palestine, pp. 7-8, 8 n.

Before the last-mentioned date, the Balfour Declaration had been issued. As long as Tsarist Russia, which did not view Zionism with favor, was among the Allies, the latter did not encourage the Zionists. But in February 1917 the Russian Revolution began, and during the same month Sir Mark Sykes established close relations with Dr. Chaim Weizmann, then a member of the chemistry faculty of Manchester University on leave to the Admiralty for special research, but destined to become the first President of Israel. Weizmann and Arthur Balfour, representing the Zionist Organization and the British government, respectively, carried on negotiations during the summer of 1917, with the approval of the US, and these negotiations resulted, on 2 November, in the Balfour Declaration. Having the form of a letter written by Balfour to Lord Lionel Walter Rothschild, the Declaration made the following statement:

2 Nov 17
Balfour
Declaration

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish Communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by the Jews in any other country.⁸

8. RIIA, Great Britain and Palestine, pp. 8-9.

On 7 November 1918, an Anglo-French declaration defining war aims and promising "administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations, in Syria and Mesopotamia," was regarded by the Arabs as superseding, or at least qualifying, the Sykes-Picot Agreement. To the Arabs, the name Syria included Palestine, the last being a term not in use among them.⁹

9. Ibid., p. 10.

At the Peace Conference there was optimism that the promises to the Jews and Arabs could be carried out simultaneously; for the Jews agreed that nothing should be done to prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and Faisal, the son of Sherif Hussein, speaking for the Arabs, said that they would "wish for the effective super-position of a great trustee" in Palestine, "so long as a representative local administration commended itself by actively promoting the material prosperity of the country." (In January 1919, it chanced that Faisal and Dr. Weizmann, of the Zionist Organization, met in London, and on that occasion they committed to

paper an agreement promising "the most cordial goodwill and understanding"--Faisal still feeling entitled at that time to speak for all the Arabs, and both he and Weizmann being convinced that the terms of their agreement could be carried out. But the Arab lands were subsequently divided, with Faisal eventually becoming King of Iraq and answerable only for that country, a contingency covered by a general reservation he had written into the agreement with Weizmann to relieve himself of responsibility in such circumstances.)¹⁰

10. Ibid., pp. 10-12.

The status of Palestine as it emerged from the settlements following World War I was that of a mandated territory allocated by the League of Nations to Great Britain on 25 April 1920. This allocation to Britain was accompanied by a rider making Britain responsible for implementing the Balfour Declaration. The terms of the mandate were not approved until 22 July 1922, and it was then deemed undesirable to promulgate them until those of the French mandate for Syria were ready also. As a result, it was not until 29 September 1923 that Britain's mandate for Palestine finally went into effect. The terms made the mandatory nation "responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative, and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion." The

25 Apr 20
British
receive
Mandate

Balfour Declaration was further implemented by provision for a recognized Jewish Agency to advise the Mandatory Administration on the establishment of the National Home, and for the encouragement of Jewish immigration and settlement on the land, subject to the rights and position of other inhabitants. The mandatory power also was to encourage local autonomy and assume all responsibility connected with rights and access to the Holy Places.¹¹

11. Ibid., pp. 13-14.

By the terms of the mandate, Britain thus had a threefold obligation to fulfill: to safeguard Arab rights, to provide a National Home for the Jews, and to secure self-government for the joint community. The prospect that she would be able to meet these obligations was good, though clouded somewhat by the difference between Britain and the Palestinian Arabs in the interpretation placed upon the McMahon letter to Sherif Hussein, and the consequence that many Arabs therefore denied the validity of the mandate.¹²

12. Ibid., p. 14.

As set up by the League of Nations, the Mandated Territory of Palestine included Transjordan. But this area was regarded by Britain as falling within the limits agreed upon between McMahon and Hussein. Accordingly, Britain obtained from the League Council,

Sep 1922
Transjordan
excluded
from certain
provisions
of the
Palestine
Mandate

in September 1922, exemption of Transjordan from those clauses of the mandate dealing with the Holy Places and the Jewish National Home. An agreement recognizing the Emir Abdullah, second son of Sherif Hussein and one of the two older brothers of Faisal, as "administrator" of Transjordan under the mandate had already been negotiated, in February 1921, by the British authorities in Jerusalem, and this arrangement was approved by the British Cabinet in 1922. After the exemption of Transjordan from those clauses of the mandate relating to the Jewish National Home, Jews were refused the right to acquire land there. They protested this exclusion as a violation of the article of the mandate prohibiting discrimination on grounds of race, religion, or language--but without success.¹³

13. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

Between the World Wars

Jul 1920
British
Civil
Administra-
tion in
Palestine

Until the middle of 1920, Palestine was governed by British military authority. The allocation of the Palestine mandate having been made in April of that year, a civilian administration took over from the military as of 1 July, with Sir Herbert Samuel as High Commissioner. For a time Sir Herbert worked with the aid of a nominated Advisory Council consisting of ten British officials and ten Palestinians (seven Arabs, including four Moslems and three Christians, and three Jews), with good results. In August 1922 he proposed a Constitution which, as a first step toward self-government, would have substituted for the Advisory Council a Legislative Council consisting of the High

Commissioner and 22 members, 10 official and 12 elected. Of the elected members, 10 were to be Arabs (8 Moslems and 2 Christians) and 2 Jews; and all 12, as an additional function, were to form a standing committee to advise the Government on all questions of immigration.¹⁴

14. RIIA, Great Britain and Palestine, pp. 39, 41.

The Palestinian Arab Executive (see below) refused to accept this Constitution unless the Arab representation were a clear majority of the total membership of the Legislative Council. They boycotted the elections to the Council, and Sir Herbert was forced to give up the proposed Constitution. He returned to the nominated Advisory Council, but the Arab members now refused to cooperate with that body any further, all resigning within a short time. After 1923, therefore, legislation originated with the High Commissioner after consultation with an Advisory Council composed entirely of British officials; but, except in emergencies, all ordinances were published sufficiently in advance to enable interested persons to discuss them and, if necessary, request amendment.¹⁵

15. Ibid., p. 41.

The failure of Sir Herbert's proposed Constitution, which had attempted to bring representatives of the Jewish and Arab communities together in a single governmental body, left the two communities separately organized, with only the British Administration providing liaison between them.

Arab non-
cooperation
in govern-
ment

The Jewish
Agency

All negotiations with the Palestine Government on matters concerning the Jewish community were carried on by the Jewish Agency. This entity was provided, as we have seen, by the terms of the mandate, to advise the Administration on the establishment of the National Home. From 1922 until 1929 the Zionist Organization acted as the Jewish Agency. In the latter year, after negotiations had been going on since 1924 with non-Zionist Jews, including the non-Zionist American Jews, and after consultation with the Mandatory, the Jewish community created a new and enlarged Jewish Agency. It consisted of a Council on which Zionists and non-Zionists were equally represented, and of a standing executive in Palestine, with the President of the Zionist Organization the ex officio President of the Jewish Agency.

The Jewish community was also organized into political parties, at least from 1927 on, when it was granted a certain measure of self-government. The community had an elected Assembly and a General Council, which worked through an Executive of five members. Most of the political parties supported the Zionist Organization. The largest and most powerful party was (and is) the Mapai, the Socialist Labor Party, headed by David Ben Gurion.¹⁶

16. Ibid., pp. 19-21.

The Arabs were not so well organized as the Jews. They had no Arab Agency comparable to the Jewish Agency, having refused it when it was offered. Their position on this point was that their sole object was

independence~~***~~ not an Arab Agency analogous to the Jewish one, for that would only tend to put them on an equal footing with the "alien" Jews. Religiously, they fell into two main groups: the Christian Arabs, who numbered approximately 87,000 in the 1940's and of whom the majority were members of the Greek Orthodox Church under the leadership of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch; and the Moslems, whose religious affairs were governed by the Supreme Moslem Council. The Council, which had no counterpart among the Christian Arabs, wielded considerable power until, suspected of sedition, it was deprived of its funds and leader in 1937 by the British.

1920-1936
The Arab
Executive

The body that usually handled the Arab case against the Government, until 1936, was the nationalist-minded Arab Executive, which was elected by the Palestine Arab Congress. The first Congress was held in 1920 as a result of the growth of the joint Moslem-Christian associations led by leaders of the Husseini family. The Arab Executive denied the validity of the mandate, and for that reason followed a policy of noncooperation with the Government until 1925. After that year, it began demanding the establishment of a democratic parliamentary system of government, and later added a demand that Jewish immigration cease.¹⁷

17. Ibid., pp. 25-27.

Apr 1936
Arab Higher
Committee

In 1935, six Arab political parties composed their differences and consolidated. In April 1936 their leaders combined to form the Arab Higher Committee. This body superseded the Arab Executive as the chief mouthpiece for the Arab cause.¹⁸

18. Ibid., pp. 27-28.

The period of the 1920's, except for an Arab attack on the Jews in 1921 and again in 1929, passed peacefully.

After the 1921 attack, a Committee of Inquiry reported the cause was Arab hostility "connected with Jewish immigration and with their conception of Zionist policy as derived from Jewish exponents."¹⁹ The

19. Cmd. 1540, p. 54. Quoted in RIIA, Great Britain and Palestine, p. 40.

Churchill Memorandum, issued by the British Government on 3 June 1922, was designed to reassure the Arabs by clarifying the Government's interpretation of the Balfour Doctrine. By that document, Churchill wrote, Britain did not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine.²⁰

3 Jun 22
Churchill
Memorandum

20. RIIA, Great Britain and Palestine, p. 40.

The 1929 action was far more serious, being the first large-scale attack of the Arabs on the Jews. It grew out of controversy over use of the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem and spread to other cities. As a result, 133 Jews were killed and 339 wounded, and six Jewish colonies were completely destroyed. There were 116 known Arab deaths.²¹

1929
Attack on
Jews

21. Ibid., pp. 44-45.

A Commission of Inquiry, headed by Sir Walter Shaw, having investigated the outbreak, concluded that its fundamental cause was the Arab feeling of animosity and hostility towards the Jews because of their fear that, by Jewish immigration and land purchase under the Jewish National Home project, the Arabs might be deprived of their livelihood and eventually pass under Jewish domination. The Shaw Report recommended, among other things, that the British Government lay down more explicit directions for the conduct of policy on such vital issues as land tenure and immigration.²²

22. Ibid., pp. 45-46.

The Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations held an extraordinary session on the 1929 Palestine disturbances, in June 1930, and published a report on the following 25 August. The report held that Britain, as the mandatory, was fundamentally responsible for the trouble, because the exercise of a little foresight could have prevented many of the incidents and because, despite warnings from the Mandates Commission, inadequate police forces had been maintained in Palestine.²³

23. Ibid., pp. 48-49.

From this time until the outbreak of World War II, Palestine continued to be the subject of studies and inquiries by governmental commissions as the British Government sought a solution to the conflict between the Arabs and the Jews. In its efforts to deal with the problem by implementing some of the recommendations

resulting from these various inquiries, Britain found it impossible to please both sides, or even one side much of the time.

To implement one of the recommendations of the Shaw Report, the Government appointed Sir John Hope Simpson, in May 1930, to inquire into land settlement, immigration, and development. The Hope Simpson Report was published on 20 October 1930, along with a government statement of policy, in the form of a White Paper, based on the report. The White Paper stressed the plight of the growing Arab landless proletariat and the increasing land hunger, and stated as principles that Jews should be forbidden to acquire more land while Arabs were landless and that account should be taken of Arab as well as Jewish unemployment in estimating the absorptive capacity of Palestine for determining the rate at which Jewish immigration should be permitted.²⁴

20 Oct 30
Hope Simpson
Report and
White Paper

24. Ibid., pp. 50, 53-56; William L. Langer, ed. and comp., Encyclopedia of World History (rev. ed.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1948), p. 1101.

The Jews erupting in a storm of protest, argued that the principles set forth in the White Paper were inconsistent with the terms of the mandate. Chaim Weizmann resigned as President of the Zionist Organization and President of the Jewish Agency. There was acrimonious debate on the White Paper in Parliament. Finally, on 14 February 1931, the publication of a letter from Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald to Weizmann changed the whole situation. MacDonald's letter, which was to be regarded as an authoritative interpretation

14 Feb 31
MacDonald
Letter

of the White Paper, indicated that "landless Arabs" would be only those who could be shown to have been displaced as a result of certain land's having passed into Jewish ownership and who had not subsequently obtained other holdings or a satisfactory occupation; it was not the policy of the Government to prohibit the additional acquisition of land by Jews; and the stoppage of Jewish immigration, in any of its categories, was not contemplated.²⁵

²⁵. RIIA, Great Britain and Palestine, pp. 56, 81-83; Langer, p. 1101.

It was the turn of the Arabs to protest. And though the event was nearly three years later, the first manifestation of Arab feeling against the Government, rather than against the Jews only, appears to have stemmed from the despair of the Arabs at what seemed to be the entrenched Jewish influence in London, as evidenced in Ramsay MacDonald's letter "interpreting" the principles announced in the White Paper to mean nearly the reverse of what was at first generally understood by those most concerned. The immediate cause for the expression of Arab resentment against the Government was published accounts of the plans for continued Jewish immigration into Palestine discussed at the Zionist Congress at Prague in 1933. In 1932, 9,553 Jews had immigrated into Palestine; but 1933, the year in which Hitler came to power in Germany, had seen such an acceleration that the total for the year was to be 30,327. Alarmed by the news from Prague, the Arab Executive called on the Arabs to demonstrate against the Government, and in October 1933 they did

1933 Rise
in Jewish
immigration
leads to
Arab
violence

so, in riots, shootings, and strikes.²⁶

26. RIIA, Great Britain and Palestine, pp. 63, 85.

In 1934, 42,359 Jews immigrated into Palestine; in 1935, 61,854.²⁷ In November of the latter year,

27. Ibid., p. 63.

the Arab leaders presented the Mandatory Administration with various demands, among them the establishment of democratic government, the prohibition of the transfer of land to Jews, and the immediate suspension of Jewish immigration pending study, by a competent committee, of the absorptive capacity of Palestine, and the laying down of a principle for immigration.²⁸

28. Ibid., p. 86.

The following month the High Commissioner communicated to the Arab and Jewish leaders a new proposal for a Constitution, which had been in preparation for some time. It called for a Legislative Council of 28 members, including a large majority of nonofficials, made up as follows: 5 officials, 2 commercial representatives, 8 elected and 3 nominated Moslems, 3 elected and 4 nominated Jews, and 1 elected and 2 nominated Christians, plus an impartial president from outside Palestine who would neither debate nor vote.

Soon afterward, on 1 February 1936, the Colonial Office¹ replied to the November 1935 demands of the Arab leaders. Speaking through the High Commissioner,

it stated that the proposed new Constitution was a practical step toward democratic government; regarding sales of land, it intended to enact a law prohibiting such unless the Arab landowner retained a "viable minimum"--i.e., sufficient land to support himself and his family; as for immigration, the rate of Jewish immigration was carefully gauged according to the country's capacity, and a new Statistical Bureau was being established for estimating this.

Arab reaction was mixed, some of the more moderate favoring the acceptance of the new Legislative Council and the adoption of a policy of cooperation without racial bias, whereas others regarded the powers left to the High Commissioner by the new Constitution were far too great. The Jews, on the other hand, unanimously condemned both the proposed Legislative Council and the Government's reply to the Arabs. The Arab majority on the Council would, they contended, frustrate the establishment of the promised National Home; and they charged that the "interference" with sales of land was contrary to the clause in the mandate requiring the encouragement of Jewish land settlement.²⁹

29. Ibid., pp. 87-88.

The debates in Parliament, in February and March 1936, on the proposed Legislative Council for Palestine, in which the proposal was severely criticized, seemed to the Arabs one more manifestation of the extent of Jewish influence in Britain, and also made the prospect of satisfactory action by the British on their demands

Apr 1936
Arabs
strike for
demands -
organize
Arab
Higher
Committee

seem very remote. This helped put them in the mood for the Arab general strike that followed. Disorders began on 15 April, when a Greek Jewish immigrant was killed in a holdup of Jews by Arabs on the road from Nablus to Tulkarm, and soon became widespread. On 26 April the Arab Higher Committee was formed, as has been stated previously; it once more presented the demands of November 1935, and a general strike was declared, pending granting of the demands. Local committees, a new development, backed the Arab Higher Committee. Demonstrations and riots reached the dimensions of open warfare, and the British were forced to bring in additional troops.³⁰

30. Ibid., pp. 88-89; Langer, p. 1101.

The British Government now appointed another Royal Commission, on 29 July. This one, headed by Earl Peel, was directed to inquire into the cause of the Arab disturbances beginning in the middle of April, and also to inquire into the general question of the manner in which the mandate was being implemented in Palestine, and make recommendations if any changes seemed desirable.

Before the Commission arrived in Palestine, on 15 November, the Arab general strike had ceased. Economic hardship, combined with the prospect of an excellent orange season (owing to the civil war in Spain, the chief competitor) beginning in November, appears to have been the principal reason. Since the main object of the strike had not been achieved--i.e., the suspension of Jewish immigration--the Arab Higher

Committee needed a face-saving pretext for calling it off. This was provided by the continued attempts at mediation on the part of the rulers of Iraq, Trans-jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Similar attempts at mediation by the same rulers in August had been to no avail. But on 11 October the Arab Higher Committee published a message from the four rulers calling on their "sons the Arabs of Palestine" to "resolve for peace in order to save further shedding of blood," and indicated that it believed the community should comply.³¹

31. RIIA, Great Britain and Palestine, pp. 92-97; Langer, p. 1101.

The Peel Commission held hearings in Palestine from the middle of November 1936 until 18 January 1937. An Arab boycott of the Commission was called off only 12 days before the Commission left Palestine. In its report, which was published on 8 July 1937, the Commission declared itself convinced that the Arabs and Jews could not get along together, and recommended a scheme for partitioning the mandate, making three states: (1) a Jewish state (about one-third of the whole area) embracing the coastal territory from the northern boundary to just south of Jaffa, populated by about 300,000 Jews and 290,000 Arabs, with most of the land held by the Arabs; (2) a territory mandated to Britain, comprising a strip from Jaffa along the railway to Jerusalem, with both cities, and also Bethelhem, included within its boundaries; (3) an Arab state, united with Transjordan.³²

32. Langer, p. 1101.

Nov 1936 -
Jan 1937
Peel
Commission

8 Jul 37
Peel
Commission
recommend
partition

The immediate reaction of both the Jewish and the Arab community in Palestine to the partition scheme was disapproval. The Arabs never wavered thereafter in their condemnation of partition. However, at the 20th Zionist World Congress, which met at Zurich 3-17 August, Dr. Weizmann pointed out to his fellow Jews that for the first time the world was discussing the problem in terms of a Jewish state, and appealed for support of a modified partition proposal. The resolution finally adopted by the Congress denied that the mandate had become unworkable, but authorized the Executive to enter into negotiations "with a view to ascertaining the precise terms of His Majesty's Government for the proposed establishment of a Jewish State."³³

33. RIIA, Great Britain and Palestine, pp. 102-106. The source of the quotation is cited as New Judea, Aug-Sep 1937, p. 227.

On 16 September 1937, the Council of the League of Nations authorized the United Kingdom Government to explore the idea of partition, while pointing out that the mandate must remain in effect "until such time as it may otherwise be decided."³⁴

34. League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplements, No. 169 (Records of the 18th Ordinary Session of the Assembly). Cited in RIIA, Great Britain and Palestine, p. 108.

To explore the idea of partition, the British Government decided to send a technical commission to Palestine. The terms of reference of the commission, by which it was to work out a detailed scheme of

partition on the basis of the scheme recommended by the Peel Commission, but with full liberty to suggest modifications, were published on 4 January 1938. The personnel of the commission, headed by Sir John Woodhead, was announced the following March.³⁵

35. RIIA, Great Britain and Palestine, p. 108 and 108 n.2.

Meanwhile, in Palestine, a gradual but noticeable increase in tension following the publication of the Peel Report led up to the renewal of a terrorist campaign of murder and intimidation by the Arabs, starting with the murder of the Acting District Commissioner for Galilee, and of his police escort, on 26 September 1937. Striking back hard, the British published an official communique on 1 October announcing the dissolution of the Arab Higher Committee and all National Committees, and the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the six members of the Arab Higher Committee. At the same time, the Mufti of Jerusalem was deprived of his office as President of the Supreme Moslem Council and of membership in the General Waqf Committee, of which he was chairman. Five of the members of the Arab Higher Committee were arrested and subsequently deported to the Seychelles Islands; but one of these escaped and fled to Syria. The Mufti left Palestine secretly for Lebanon. The dismissal of the Mufti from his office prevented him from further administration of funds of the Supreme Moslem Council and the Waqf Committee amounting to £60,000 annually, and also from exercising the extensive rights of patronage and the local influence connected with the office.³⁶

Sep-Oct
1937 Arab
violence
leads to
severe
British
reaction

36. Ibid., pp. 112-113.

Since disorders continued to increase rather than to decrease, the British took two further steps. They set up military courts through Palestine with authority to impose death sentences for such offenses against the law as carrying firearms or bombs, and they brought more forces into Palestine. Whereas there had been only two British infantry brigades in Palestine throughout 1937, by July 1938 two additional infantry battalions, two squadrons of the Royal Air Force, an armored car and cavalry unit, and a battle cruiser were trying to suppress terrorism, which, since April, had become open rebellion. The main military campaign culminated during the first weeks of October 1938, and by the end of that month Palestine was under military control. The country was divided into four districts, each under a military governor, for the purpose of restoring order and capturing or driving out the armed rebel bands.³⁷

37. Ibid., pp. 114, 116-117.

It was estimated that there were about 1,000 to 1,500 permanent active rebels, split up in small bodies and mixed among peaceful citizens, most of whom probably sympathized with them. Two elements of the population went beyond general sympathy in rendering support: the educated effendi, who were chiefly engaged in organizing supplies and finance, and terrorist thugs. The two principal rebel leaders were in touch with and largely directed by the Mufti

and the Arab Higher Committee from outside Palestine.

By the middle of May 1939, the "combing out" operations of the British were beginning to produce signs of their effectiveness. About the same time, there were indications that the terrorists in Palestine suspected the members of the Arab Higher Committee in Damascus of using for their own benefit funds that were supposed to be for the rebellion. Thus, the rebellion, as the British military forces were bringing it under control, was also disintegrating from within.³⁸

38. Ibid., pp. 117-119.

It was while the Arab rebellion was at its height that the Woodhead Commission went to Palestine. The Commission took evidence from April until August, 1938, but was systematically boycotted by the Arabs.³⁹

39. Langer, p. 1102.

Oct 1938
Woodhead
Report

The Woodhead Report was published in October 1938. According to it, the Commission had examined three plans of partition--the Peel Plan, and two others of the Commission's own devising--and had found all of them impractical.⁴⁰

40. Ibid., pp. 108-109.

Feb-Mar
1939
Conference
in London

The British Government then proceeded to invite the following to a Round Table Conference in London: the Palestinian Arabs; the neighboring states of Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen and Transjordan; and the Jewish Agency. The conference met on 7 February until 17 March, 1939, but without being able to bring about agreement on a course of action.⁴¹

17 May 39
White Paper

41. Ibid., pp. 119, 124; Langer, p. 1102.

On 17 May 1939, the British Government published its final proposals, in the form of a White Paper. These provided for an independent Palestine state in ten years, in treaty relationship with Great Britain. Arabs and Jews were to share in the government "in such a way as to ensure that the essential interests of each community were safeguarded." During a transitional period, Arabs and Jews were to serve as heads of departments (but with British advisers), and to take part in an advisory executive council according to population. After five years, a representative body was to draft a constitution, which was to provide for the different communities and for a Jewish home. In the matter of Jewish immigration, the principle of the absorptive capacity of the country was discarded. Immigration was to cease after five years unless the Arabs agreed to its continuation. Within that period 75,000 might be admitted, giving the Jews one-third of the population of Palestine in 1944. The government, henceforth, was to prohibit or regulate transfer of land.⁴²

42. Langer, p. 1102.

This plan was approved (on 23 May) by a smaller majority in Parliament than the Government usually commanded--89 as against the normal 200 or more. It was rejected by both the Arabs and the Jews. The reason for the Arab rejection is not altogether clear,

since the plan provided for an independent Palestinian state in the reasonably near future, and at the same time removed the possibility that Jewish immigration would cause the Arabs to be outnumbered in that state. Probably the waiting period of ten years for independence figured in their action, and possibly tactical considerations also. The Jews considered the plan a breach of faith with the promise given in the Balfour Declaration, and a surrender to terrorism. The Jewish community in the United States, in particular, was incensed, and it tried to persuade the United States Government to make representations to the British Government for modification of the plan.⁴³

⁴³. RIIA, Great Britain and Palestine, pp. 125-126; Langer, p. 1102.

In June 1939, the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations considered the policy for Palestine contained in the British White Paper. Four of the members of the Commission did not believe the White Paper was in accordance with the mandate; three thought existing circumstances would justify it if the Council of the League did not oppose it. The British filed a statement with the Commission on 5 August, defending the White Paper policy. They affirmed again that continued immigration of Jews up to the absorptive capacity of the country, regardless of all other considerations, would perpetuate a fatal enmity between Arabs and Jews, and pointed out that this would defeat the provision of the Mandate requiring the British to provide such political and economic conditions as would secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home.

The outbreak of war on 3 September prevented the League Council from considering the report of the Permanent Mandates Commission and the British comments on the report.⁴⁴

⁴⁴. RIIA, Great Britain and Palestine, pp. 126-128.

World War II and After

Jewish
support for
the Allies
in WWII

The Palestinian Jewish leaders pledged their loyalty to Britain at the beginning of World War II, and affirmed their intention to fight on the side of the democracies. These promises were made good as thousands of Jewish men and women volunteered for national service; many of the men served with the British armed forces.⁴⁵

⁴⁵. Ibid., pp. 128-130.

However, the Jews in Palestine did not believe loyalty to Britain required acquiescence in the implementation of the White Paper of 1939. At least one prominent leader, David Ben Gurion, several times made such a statement. The Jews therefore resisted when, on 28 February 1940, the British announced the Land Transfers Regulations, implementing one part of the White Paper. These regulations severely limited the areas in which Jews could acquire land. The Jews also set their faces against the provision of the White Paper that Jewish immigration should cease altogether after five years (i.e., on 31 March 1944). At the World Zionist Conference in New York, in May 1942, Ben Gurion succeeded in winning endorsement for the so-called Biltmore Program, which was published on

11 May. This called for unlimited Jewish immigration into Palestine under the supervision of the Jewish Agency, the establishment of Palestine as a Jewish Commonwealth, and the creation of a Jewish Army. This Program, in whole or in part, received considerable support in the United States. At its Conference in September 1943 in Ohio, the Zionist Organization of the United States pressed strongly for the withdrawal of the White Paper and the carrying out of the Biltmore Program. Resolutions were introduced in both Houses of Congress in 1943 and in 1944 calling for the United States Government to use its good offices to obtain freedom of entry into Palestine for Jews and, ultimately, the reconstitution of Palestine as a Jewish Commonwealth. (However, the resolutions were not brought to a vote in either year.) As the Hitlerite persecution of Jews in Europe proceeded in the course of the war, there was a great deal of illegal immigration of Jews into Palestine. Jewish organizations, notably the Irgun Zvai Leumi (Revisionist Defense Corps) and the Stern Group (named for its leader, Abraham Stern), engaged in bombings, shootings, and other terrorist activities in Palestine, but violence of this sort was denounced and disavowed by the leaders of the Jewish community there. Although Britain announced in November 1943 that the 32,000 immigration certificates remaining unused from the 75,000 allotted for the five-year period would be good at any time, even after the end of the period, terrorist activities showed no significant abatement until the fall of 1944. With the appointment of Lord Gort as High Commissioner, on 31 October 1944, there was a relaxation of tension.⁴⁶

46. Ibid., pp. 131-138.

A notable development of the war was the growing identification of interest between the Arab States and the cause of the Palestine Arabs. This was helped along to some degree by the fact that the only leader apparently enjoying general acceptance among the Palestine Arabs, Jamal Husseini, was detained in Rhodesia while petitions for his release and return to Palestine were consistently refused by the Palestine authorities. For this reason, the Palestine Arabs had to depend on the Arab leaders outside their country to take their part. In February 1944, the Arab States, among them Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon, protested the US Congressional resolutions calling for unlimited entry of Jews into Palestine, and the Emir Abdullah of Transjordan sent a strong personal cable of protest to President Roosevelt. The President replied that no decision altering the basic situation in Palestine should be arrived at without consultation of both Arabs and Jews. A year later, in March 1945, the League of Arab States was formed at Cairo. The Charter of the League stated that one of its aims was the strengthening of relations between members and the organization of political plans for the protection of the independence and integrity of the Arab world. An Appendix to the Charter declared that Palestine was an Arab country that had been promised independence by the Treaty of London, and that the mandate for Palestine might properly delay but could not withhold that independence.⁴⁷

47. Ibid., pp. 135-136.

Nov 1945
Anglo-
American
Committee
of Inquiry

After the war, US interest in the question of Jewish immigration into Palestine led to the creation of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, on 13 November 1945. This action resulted from a British suggestion, after a protracted period of negotiations had followed President Truman's proposing to Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee that 100,000 certificates be issued immediately for Jewish immigration into Palestine. Six Americans and six Britishers constituted the Committee, with Judge Joseph C. Hutcheson of Texas and Sir John Singleton as alternating chairmen. After the Committee had held hearings in Washington, London, and the principal countries of the Middle East, including Palestine, Judge Hutcheson submitted its report to President Truman on 24 April 1946 (the report was published two days later). Among its recommendations were the following (1) 100,000 certificates for admission to Palestine should be authorized immediately for Jews who had been victims of Nazi or Fascist persecution, and (2) the restrictive land regulations under the White Paper of 1939 should be rescinded and replaced by regulations based on a policy of freedom in the sale, lease, or use of land, irrespective of race, community, or creed.⁴⁸

48. Joseph Dunner, Republic of Israel (New York: Whittlesey House, c. 1950), pp. 63-65.

The British Government was unenthusiastic. Feeling that the difficulties of implementing these recommendations were not sufficiently appreciated by those not

1946-1947
Round-table
Conference

charged with the responsibility, it negotiated for a British-Jewish-Arab round-table conference like the one in 1939, but this time with a US "observer." After convening in September (1946), and adjourning in October because the Palestine Arabs had refused to attend, the conference reconvened on 27 January 1947, with all parties present.

The British presented a memorandum suggesting a British trusteeship over Palestine for a transitional period--as long as necessary--leading to complete independence. During the transitional period, it was remarked, the Arabs and Jews would have an opportunity to demonstrate their ability to work together for the good of Palestine. This proposal the Arabs rejected outright; for any concession to Zionism, they said, constituted a "new aggression." The Jews, for their part, stated that they would not press for immediate statehood if Britain were prepared to return to the original mandate; if not, the Jews would carry out the provisions of the mandate themselves by establishing a Jewish state. The conference closed on 14 February 1947 with a decision by the British, in the absence of agreement on any of their proposals, to refer the question to the United Nations.⁴⁹

49. Ibid., pp. 68-74.

28 Apr 47
UN gets
problem

A special session of the United Nations met on 28 April 1947 to deal with the problem. The Jewish case was presented before the Political and Security Committee of the General Assembly by Ben Gurion, Moshe Sharett, and Abba Hillel Silver; members of the

Arab Higher Committee presented the Arab case before the same body. On 14 May the Soviet delegate, Andrei Gromyko, surprised everyone by proposing, in a departure from Soviet Russia's anti-Zionist past, that a binational Arab-Jewish state be established, with equal rights for both sides, and, if that proved impractical, partition of Palestine into two states, one Arab and one Jewish. The next day, by an affirmative vote of 46; with Turkey, Afghanistan, and the five Arab states having UN membership (Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia) voting "no," the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for the creation of a special committee to make a study of all matters relevant to the problem of Palestine and to report thereon to the Secretary General not later than 1 September 1947. The membership of the committee was to consist of the representatives of Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia.⁵⁰

50. Ibid., pp. 75-77.

1947
UN Special
Committee
on
Palestine

The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine completed its assignment on 31 August, handing in a majority and a minority report. The majority report, signed by the representatives of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, and Uruguay, called for partition of Palestine into two politically independent states, one Arab and one Jewish, with special safeguards for the Holy Places. The city of Jerusalem was to be placed under a UN trusteeship. During a transitional period of two years, 150,000 Jewish immigrants were to be permitted to enter the

Jewish state; if the transitional period was longer, 60,000 Jewish immigrants were to be admitted annually thereafter. India, Iran, and Yugoslavia (Australia's delegate did not sign either report) proposed in the minority report the creation of an independent federal state of Palestine. Britain announced that she would support neither plan. The Soviet delegate indicated that he would favor the majority proposal. The US took this position also, and, prompted by President Truman, succeeded in persuading enough other countries to follow its lead that the majority plan was adopted by a two-thirds majority on 29 November 1947.⁵¹

51. Ibid., pp. 77-80.

On 11 December 1947 the British Government announced that it would terminate its mandate over Palestine on 15 May 1948, and complete the evacuation of troops and civil servants by 1 August.⁵²

52. Ibid., p. 81.

On 29 January 1948 the Palestine Commission, which had been created by the UN General Assembly to supervise the setting up of the Arab and Jewish states, reported that strong Arab elements were making organized efforts to prevent the implementation of the Assembly's partition plan and that certain elements of the Jewish community continued to commit irresponsible acts of violence. At the same time, the Commission further reported, the mandatory power was preparing to leave, and all indications were that the situation would get worse rather than better. On

16 February the Commission added that it would need "military forces in adequate strength" when the responsibility for the administration of Palestine was transferred to it. At the next meeting of the Security Council, on 24 February, Warren R. Austin, the US delegate, indicated that the US was having second thoughts about the wisdom of the partition arrangement in view of the reported conditions in Palestine; on 19 March he proposed that the Security Council instruct the Palestine Commission to suspend its efforts to implement the partition plan and that, pending the establishment of peaceful conditions, Palestine be placed under a temporary UN trusteeship.⁵³

53. Ibid., pp. 82-83.

14 May 48
Jews pro-
claim
Republic of
Israel

Austin's proposal was still awaiting action by the General Assembly when the Jews presented the UN with a fait accompli. At 4:06 p.m., 14 May 1948, the Republic of Israel had come into existence. On the same day, President Truman extended de facto recognition of the Provisional Government of Israel.⁵⁴

54. Ibid., pp. 88-89, 95.

15 May 48
Palestine
War

The day after Israel was proclaimed as an independent nation, it was attacked by Egypt, Transjordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, with the invasion conducted principally by Egypt and Transjordan. The advantage seemed to be clearly with the Arab States because of their superior numbers and ample quantities of British planes, tanks, and armored cars. However, it soon appeared that the only Arab forces that could fight on

even terms with the Israelis were those of Transjordan's Arab Legion, under the command of British Brigadier J. B. Glubb ("Glubb Pasha"). These forces were able to seize and hold the old portion of the City of Jerusalem, but the remaining Arab forces were, in the course of the war, badly defeated. Within the first month Israel had conquered a large portion of the territory assigned by the UN partition resolution to the Arab State in Palestine.⁵⁵

55. Ibid., pp. 98-100.

From virtually the beginning of the war, there were efforts in the UN to arrange a truce, led by the US. Britain at first, because of her ties with the Arab League, did not support these efforts. However, Count Folke Bernadotte, who had accepted on 21 May 1948 the position of Mediator in behalf of the United Nations, was able to bring about a cease-fire of 30 days expiring on 9 July 1948.

During the truce he presented to the Arabs and Israelis a proposal for solving the Palestine problem, a plan providing for the union of the Jewish State and Transjordan for such common matters as customs and defense but leaving immigration under the individual control of the member states for two years, after which either member could request the council of the union for a review of the other's immigration policy. If the council could not reach a decision, the matter was to be referred to the Economical and Social Council of the United Nations.⁵⁶

56. Ibid., pp. 100-101.

The Bernadotte Plan proved unacceptable to both sides. The London New Statesman and Nation characterized it as "the 1939 White Paper translated into 1948 language with the full approval of the Foreign Office and the State Department."⁵⁷

57. Quoted in ibid., p. 101.

On 8 July, one day before expiration of the truce, Egypt renewed the war. But matters did not go well for the Arab League, which was rent with suspicions and rivalries among the member states, especially with regard to acquisition of additional territory in Palestine. A second truce was arranged on 18 July, this time with the support of Britain, in accordance with a UN resolution dated 15 July, but there were numerous violations. On 17 September 1948, Count Bernadotte was assassinated by Israeli terrorists of the "Fatherland Front," an offshoot of the Stern Group, and was succeeded as Acting Mediator by Dr. Ralph J. Bunche. The Provisional Council of Israel denounced the murder of Bernadotte as insane and the work of traitors, and pledged every effort to apprehend those responsible. In October, in one of the clashes that punctuated the truce, Israel administered a sound defeat to the Egyptian forces in the Negev. The Transjordan forces, which could have done so, did not go to the aid of the Egyptians.⁵⁸

58. Ibid., pp. 101-104, 108, 110-112, 177.

1949
Armistice
Agreements

In 1949 the war was ended by a series of Armistice Agreements between Israel and the various Arab States. Egypt was the first to notify Dr. Bunche that she was ready to discuss armistice arrangements. This was on

6 January 1949. The Agreement was signed on 24 January. Under its provisions, among other things, Israel received more than 700 square miles of the Negev area that had been seized by the Egyptian forces in May 1948, and Egypt retained a coastal strip of about 135 square miles from its border to Gaza. A month later, on 23 March, Lebanon became the second Arab State to sign an Armistice Agreement with Israel. Transjordan signed on 3 April, for herself and Iraq, and Syria concluded an Armistice Agreement with Israel on 20 July. Saudi Arabia, though a member of the Arab League, had refrained from military participation in this war.⁵⁹

59. Ibid., pp. 177, 180, 184, 185.

On 29 November 1948, the first anniversary of the UN partition resolution regarding Palestine, and while the Arab-Israeli war was still in progress (though a truce was technically in effect), Israel applied for membership in the United Nations. The US favored the application, but Britain and enough other countries were opposed to cause delay in acceptance of the new nation as a member. This finally came about on 11 May 1949.⁶⁰

60. Ibid., pp. 188, 194.

Between 14 May 1948 and 14 February 1949, Israel was under a Provisional Government, with Dr. Chaim Weizmann, long a Zionist leader, as Provisional President. On the latter date, the 120 members of the first elected Constituent Assembly, called the Knesset (or Knesseth), met in Jerusalem. On 17 February, Dr.

14 Feb 49
Provisional
Government
replaced by
ministerial
system

Weizmann was elected the first President of Israel. He immediately called on David Ben Gurion to form a Cabinet, and this was completed on 3 March 1949. Weizmann remained President until his death, on 9 November 1952, when he was succeeded by Yitzhak Ben Zvi. Ben Gurion, after remaining Prime Minister for a time, retired to his farm in the desert; but early in 1955 he again became Prime Minister, and has continued so since that time.⁶¹

61. Ibid., pp. 137-138; World Almanac and Book of Facts for 1958 (New York, 1958), p. 365; Guy Wint and Peter Calvocoressi, Middle East Crisis (Penguin Books, 1957), p. 57.

The Arabs refused to convert the Armistice Agreements of 1949 into definitive peace treaties, and relations between them and the Israelis remained tense and full of ill feeling, marked by occasional border violence. In February 1955, within ten days of Ben Gurion's return to the Prime Ministership, the Israeli Army delivered the most crushing reprisal raid of its history. It was directed against the Egyptian forces in the Gaza Strip, and it not only defeated them, but humiliated them. The Israeli justification was that the Arabs were continuing warlike acts under the shield of the armistice, and though offered peace by Israel, would not accept it. But after this, Nasser wanted revenge.⁶²

62. Wint and Calvocoressi, Middle East Crisis, pp. 57-58.

Various other factors were at work, also, in the Middle East during 1955 and 1956, building up an explosive situation. There was the Soviet arms deal with

Nasser in August 1955. There was the Aswan Dam affair, which led to Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956. There was French resentment of Egyptian instigation of rebellion in Algeria, and Egyptian aid sent to the Algerian rebels.⁶³ These events, and the

63. Ibid., pp. 59, 66, 69-70.

intensification of border raids between Israel and the Arab States in 1955 and 1956 led finally to a new war involving Israel, but this time with that country receiving the armed assistance of Britain and France.

Arrangements between the three countries were made in secret in the summer and fall of 1956, and on 29 October Israel suddenly invaded the Sinai Peninsula. A few days later Britain and France also attacked Egypt, aiming at seizure of the Suez Canal. UN action, led by the US, forced them to stop short of their object and to withdraw. The Israelis did not withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Sharm el Sheikh, on the Gulf of Aqaba, until the first week of March 1957. In the meantime a United Nations Emergency Force had been formed and airlifted into Egypt. When the Israelis withdrew, the UNEF moved into Gaza and Sharm el Sheikh. Israel had been reluctant to withdraw from these places because, she charged, Egypt had been using the Gaza Strip as a place from which to mount border raids on Israel, and had been using Sharm el Sheikh for gun emplacements to prevent Israeli access to the new Israeli port of Elath, on the Gulf of Aqaba.⁶⁴

64. The Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in the autumn of 1956, and subsequent events to the end of March 1957, are covered in detail in "Chronology of Significant Events Relating to the Current World Crisis," installments 2 through 7, prepared by the Historical Section, JCS.

29 Oct 56
Israel
invades
Egypt

SECTION IV
SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS
THE MIDDLE EAST

SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST

Within the general framework of Soviet foreign policy the states of the Middle East fall into two categories: (1) the adjacent countries, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan (2) the non-neighboring Arab states and Israel. Soviet geo-politicians, as Czarist strategists before, have maintained a clear distinction between Russia's immediate neighbors and other states of the Middle East. It is along this "northern tier" that Soviet security is most immediately involved. Conversely, adjacent territories, rather than sea-lanes, have traditionally served as avenues for Russian expansion. For most of the period covered by this study the Kremlin displayed scant interest in the states not adjacent to her borders, but her concern for developments in the countries of the northern tier has been direct and constant. For these reasons, this study will divide Russian Middle Eastern Policy into two major sections, organized chronologically and consisting of: (1) Turkey and Iran (2) The Arab Nations and Israel.

Policy towards Iran to 1946

After a century of Czarist penetration and interference in the internal affairs of Persia, the Soviet government executed an abrupt about-face and inaugurated vis-a-vis Persia a friendly, non-intervention policy. A preview of the new-look in Russo-Persian relations was given as Bolshevik representatives negotiated at Brest-Litovsk in the late fall of 1917. Although it was part of the propaganda campaign launched in the first flush of revolutionary ardor against all

7 Dec 17
Soviets
annul
"Spheres of
Influence"
Treaty

capitalistic imperialism, the proclamation issued 7 December 1917 by Lenin and Stalin, then Commissar of Nationalities, declared that the agreement on the partition of Persia into spheres of influence "between Great Britain and the Czar's Empire (31 August 1907) is torn up and annulled."¹

¹Fischer, L., The Soviets in World Affairs, London & N.Y., 1930, pp. 28-29.

In the following month, Trotzky, as Commissar for Foreign Affairs, reaffirmed this declaration and informed Teheran of his government's willingness to abolish all special privileges accorded previous Russian Governments by Persia.

These statements of Soviet intentions encouraged the Shah's ministers to seek similar concessions from Great Britain. But instead of renouncing her "sphere of influence" in the south, England proceeded to occupy the former Russian sphere in Northern Persia, which, beginning in the spring of 1919, served as a British base of operations against the Bolsheviks in Turkistan and Baku. After a series of successful operations in the Caucasus, the Soviets occupied the Persian province of Gilan. Supported by Bolshevik troops, Kuchik Khan, the local rebel, proclaimed the Soviet Republic of Gilan. The British Army began a gradual withdrawal from the country.²

1919 UK
occupies
Northern
Iran

Soviets
occupy
Gilan

UK begins
withdrawal

²Ibid., p. 287.

26 Feb 21
Soviet-
Persian
Treaty

The Soviet-Persian Treaty

England's prestige in Persia waned rapidly after the retirement of British troops, thus creating a situation which permitted in February 1921 a coup d'etat by nationalist elements headed by Riza Khan. The new cabinet immediately authorized its representative in Moscow to sign the Soviet-Persian treaty. The one-sided Anglo-Persian treaty of 1919 was formally denounced by the new regime in June of the same year.³

³Beloff, M., The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, London, 1949, vol II, pp. 200-201.

Condemning the "tyrannical policy carried out by the colonizing Governments of Russia," the treaty declared null and void the whole body of treaties and conventions concluded with Persia by the Tsarist Government. The Soviets promised to respect Persian independence and territorial integrity. Nevertheless, articles V and VI provided that if any third power should attempt to use Persia as a base for an attack upon the Soviet Union, the USSR would have "the right to advance her troops into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out defensive military operations."⁴

⁴Davis, H. M., Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of the States of the Near and Middle East, Durham, 1947, pp. 90-97.

In 1941 Article 6 was invoked when the Soviets and Britain occupied Iran. Again in May 1952, the USSR charged that US military aid to Iran violated the provisions of this 1921 treaty.⁵

⁵Patemi, N. H. Oil Diplomacy, N.Y., 1954, p. 100.
85th Congress, 1st Session S., Events in the Middle East, Washington, 11 Jan 57.

Soviet-Iranian Relations 1921-1936

Soviet-Iranian relations in the decade following the signing of the February 1921 treaty may be described as "correct but not cordial." Soviet troops and support for Kuchik Khan were withdrawn from Gilan in October 1921 thus permitting the return of that province to

Oct 1921
Gilan
evacuated

Persian control. However the "Gilan Episode" was not quickly forgotten by Tehran, and later rebellions in Iranian Baluchistan and Khorasan (1929) in close proximity to the common border gave Riza Khan good grounds to suspect the sponsorship or connivance of Soviet authorities. Riza Khan's rigorous repression of Communism in Iran irked Moscow. Soviet renunciation of Czarist type imperialism in the Northern Provinces did not signify a lack of interest in that area nor did it prevent the Communists from pursuing economic policies directed toward similar ends. The dependence of the Northern provinces upon Soviet markets gave the Soviets an economic weapon which was used more than once in her dealings with Iran. And on several occasions, the USSR protested vigorously when Iran attempted to grant oil concessions in the Northern provinces to Western Capitalists.⁶

⁶Lenczowski, G. The Middle East in World Affairs, Ithaca: 1952, pp. 156, 164-165. Beloff, op. cit., II, p. 202.

The USSR's economic policies toward Iran during the 20's and early 30's did not prevent the continuance of fairly cordial political relations between the two countries. This was in line with the USSR's general policy of attaching to herself by treaty arrangements the countries of the northern tier. Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan were encouraged to conclude bilateral pacts with each other and to seek solutions to territorial and other controversies. A Soviet-Iranian treaty of guarantee and neutrality, which reproduced essentially the provisions of the February 1921 treaty, went into effect on 31 January 1928. The USSR tacitly supported Iran during the latter's controversies with Britain over Bahrain and the Anglo-Persian Oil company's concession in late 1932-early 1933, while Iran backed the Soviet-inspired "Convention for the Definition of an Aggressor" by signing that document on 3 July 1933.

31 Jan 28
New Soviet-
Iranian
Treaty

Reacting to the resurgence of German military might, the emphasis of Soviet foreign policy in the period 1933-36 shifted to considerations of defense. Commercial questions, though not neglected, became less decisive in determining Soviet policy.⁷ The

⁷Beloff, *op. cit.*, I, 89, 93.

27 Oct 35
Soviet-
Iranian
Commercial
Treaty

Soviet-Iranian Commercial Treaty of 27 October 1935 was favorable to Persian interests and stimulated trade between the two nations. Soviet engineers, technicians, and military experts appeared in unusually large numbers. Soviet propaganda of a cultural type and Soviet interest in Iranian culture increased as sharply

as the expanded commercial relations.⁸

⁸ Beloff, op. cit., II, pp. 204-205.

Saadabad Pact

8 Jul 37
Saadabad
Pact

Although there appeared on the surface no major change in Soviet policy towards Iran, the latter took the initiative in proposing the Saadabad Pact which established an Eastern Entente between Iran, Turkey, Iraq and Afghanistan. Providing for non-aggression, consultation, and mutual cooperation in eliminating subversive activities, the pact was viewed with displeasure by Moscow. To the Communists it had all the earmarks of another Cordon Sanitaire.⁹ During the

⁹ Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 163; Beloff, op. cit., p. 205. Text given in Davis, op. cit., pp. 433-436.

three years after the signing of the Saadabad Pact, Iran's trade with Germany increased until in 1939 it was greater in volume than Soviet-Iranian trade, although the latter continued at a substantial level. German technical personnel followed German trade in Iran, and propaganda activities were in full swing. It was undoubtedly clear to Moscow that Riza Shah was seeking in Germany a counter-weight to Soviet influence in Iran.¹⁰

¹⁰ Beloff, op. cit., II, p. 207.

German-Soviet Conversations, November 26, 1940

The Soviet-German Pact of August 1939 and the outbreak of war in Europe permitted Stalin to revive the Czarist dream of expansion towards the Persian Gulf.

In November 1939 Moscow requested of Iran air base rights and the release of jailed communist leaders. Tehran temporized.¹¹ During the Nazi-Soviet conversations

¹¹Fatemi, op. cit., p. 186. .

the following autumn, Molotov listed as one of the requirements of Soviet adherence to the Three Power Pact (Germany, Italy & Japan) the stipulation that the "focal point of the aspiration of the Soviet Union [was] south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf."¹²

¹²Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941, the U.S. Dept of State, Washington, 1949, p. 259.

The Tripartite Treaty of 29 January 1942

The German invasion of Russia in June 1941 made Great Britain and the USSR comrades-in-arms and prepared the way for a joint occupation of Iran. The first Anglo-Soviet Forces moved into Iran 25 August 1941. Shortly thereafter Riza Shah was forced to abdicate. Moscow and London concluded with the new regime a treaty of alliance pledging themselves "to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence of Iran." The forces of the Allied powers were to be withdrawn from Iranian territory not later than six months after the suspension of hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany.¹³

¹³Davis, op. cit., pp. 100-104.

Just prior to the signing of this treaty Stalin had declared: We have not, and cannot have, such war aims as the seizure of foreign territories and the subjugation of foreign peoples and territories of

25 Aug 41
UK and USSR
occupy Iran

Europe or peoples and territories of Asia, including Iran." Despite these assurances there was ample evidence that the Soviets were laying the groundwork for the future annexation of their zone to the USSR.¹⁴

¹⁴Quoted in Fatemi, op. cit., p. 203.

1 Dec 43
Allied
Declaration
on Iran

On 1 December 1943, Premier Stalin joined President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at the Tehran Conference in a declaration regarding allied policy towards Iran. The Allies pledged their support for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran.¹⁵

¹⁵Davis, op. cit., pp. 104-105.

Policy Towards Turkey to 1946

The first months following the end of World War I witnessed the establishment of an entente between Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey. The Communist government, standing virtually friendless in a hostile world, found it advantageous to renounce traditional Russian ambitions for control of the Turkish Straits and to seek friendship with her southern neighbor, who at that time was also regarded as an outcast by the international community. Having repudiated the humiliating treaty of Sevres (10 August 1920), forced upon the Sultan of the Ottomans by the victorious Allies, Kemal's Nationalist government faced five enemies: The Armenians in the east, the French in Alicia, the Italians in Adalia, the Greeks in Smyrna, and the British in Constantinople.¹⁶ After the defeat of

¹⁶Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 105.

April 1920
Soviets
supply arms
to Kemal

Denikin's White forces in April 1920, the Soviets supplied Kemal with arms and munitions, and undertook simultaneous operations against the Armenians. This close cooperation lead to the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the Soviets and rebel Kemal.

Soviet-Turkish Treaty of 16 March 1921

16 Mar 21
Soviet-
Turkish
Treaty

On 16 March 1921 Soviet Russia and Nationalist Turkey concluded a treaty of collaboration and friendship. Under its provisions the Soviets ceded Kars and Ardahan, thus confirming the Treaty of Alexandropol (3 December 1920) which had been concluded between Turkey and the Soviet Armenian Republic. In return the USSR received Batum. Besides settling the vexatious boundary problem, the treaty pledged each signatory not to recognize any international instrument not recognized by the other and to deny the use of its national territory to groups operating to the detriment of the other. In addition to agreeing to the abrogation of all treaties and special privilege arrangements between Czarist and Ottoman governments, Moscow specifically denounced the validity of the Treaty of Sevres.¹⁷

¹⁷Hurewitz, J. C., Middle-East Dilemmas, N. Y. 1953, pp. 173-174. Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 106.

The Treaty of Lausanne

24 Jul 23
Treaty of
Lausanne

Moscow's interest in the Lausanne Conference and Treaty, which defined the terms of peace between the Allies and Nationalist Turkey, centered in the

provisions governing the regime of the Straits. Moscow viewed Lord Curzon's Straits program, aimed at curtailing traditional Turkish perogatives in that waterway, as directed principally against the USSR.¹⁸

¹⁸Fischer, L., op. cit., I, p. 412.

Thus, Commissar Chicherin championed, though to no avail, the principle of Turkish sovereignty in that strategic area.¹⁹ Subsequently, the USSR refused to

¹⁹Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 378.

ratify the treaty. Moscow became somewhat irritated with what it regarded as Ankara's willingness to accede to the demands of the Western Powers in the Strait's matter. Had the USSR been in a stronger international position, her relations with Turkey might have cooled appreciably. But the isolation of the two powers as well as Soviet disinclination to pick a quarrel with the keeper of the Straits prevented a serious estrangement between the two nations.²⁰

²⁰Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 378-379.

Russo-Turkish Treaty

In spite of differing political ideology Russia continued her policy of close collaboration with Turkey. On 16 December 1925 the Council of the League of Nations awarded Mosul, which Turkey claimed, to Iraq with the stipulation that Britain was to exercise for at least 25 years a Mandate over that state.²¹ The next day

²¹Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 130.

17 Dec 25
Russo-
Turkish
Nonaggression
Pact

Russia concluded with Turkey a broad treaty of friendship and nonaggression. Besides amounting to a virtual political alliance, this treaty, interpreted in the light of the Lausanne Treaty, guaranteed Russia freedom of passage in the Straits. However, the provisions of the Lausanne document made it impossible to deny the Straits to Russia's enemies.²² The

²²Beloff, op. cit., II, p. 39-40.

provisions of the December 1925 Treaty were extended by protocols of 17 December 1929, 30 October 1931, and 7 November 1935, while a protocol on naval armaments was concluded on 7 March 1931.²³

²³Texts given in Davis, op. cit., pp. 370-377.

Soviet Policy from 1925 to the Montreux Convention
20 July 1936

The treaty of December 1925 and a common front against the "Status-quo" nations of Europe failed to remove all points of friction between USSR and Turkey. Moscow was not fully assured that Kemal's formal repudiation of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Turanianism signified the end of such ambitions on the part of Turkey. And, notwithstanding the trade treaty of 11 March 1927, there was a certain amount of economic conflict between the two nations. Suppression of Turkish Communists did not endear the Kemalist regime to Moscow. Nor could Ankara overlook the existence within the USSR of an Armenian Republic which might under

the right circumstances provide a pretext for raising again the question of Kars and Ardaban. In spite of these mutual suspicions, Soviet-Turkish relations continued on the whole, good. Moscow succeeded, during this period, in keeping Turkey within the Soviet Security System.²⁴

²⁴Beloff, op. cit., II, pp. 39-41.

Russia's entry in the League of Nations in September 1933 reflected her new policy of closer cooperation with non-communist states. Fearing a new drang nach Osten under Hitlerian auspices and believing many conservative elements in the Western Democracies were not unwilling to divert the tide of Nazism eastward, the Soviets sought guarantees within the framework of "Collective Security".²⁵ In May 1935 Russia renewed

²⁵Beloff, op. cit., I, 89, 91, 128.

her old tradition of a French Alliance. The Alliance put an additional premium on the maintenance of cordial relations with Turkey in as much its effectiveness in war or threat of war would depend, partly, at least, on keeping open the line of communications through the Straits.²⁶

²⁶Ibid., II, 41-42.

The Montreux Convention

Russia backed Turkish demands for a revision of the Lausanne Straits Convention at the Meeting of the League Council in May 1935. The tense situation in the

Mediterranean resulting from Mussolini's Abyssinian adventure, and the imposition of sanctions in the fall and winter of 1935 put new urgency on the Turkish-Soviet proposal. A conference of the Lausanne signatory powers convened in June 1936.²⁷ Russia supported, in

²⁷Beloff, op. cit., II, p. 42-43.

the main, Turkish demands for a restoration of her sovereign prerogatives in the Straits area and recognition of her right to control passage through the waterway under conditions involving Turkish security. Although Britain, as at Lausanne, was Turkey's main antagonist, her adamancy had diminished. And on some issues Anglo-Turkish collaboration clearly irked the Soviets. On other questions Turkey appeared concerned over the Soviet attitude and veered towards Great Britain. Under the new Treaty Turkey gained much greater freedom of action in the Straits. Russia, too, obtained an important advantage in the reduction in maximum tonnage allowed nonriparian powers in the Black Sea. The Soviets, what with increased Turkish Control in the Straits, had even greater reason than before to court Turkey's good will.²⁸

²⁸Beloff, op. cit., II, pp. 43-47. Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 381.

Turkish Rapprochement with the West - 1939

In May 1939, Turkey and Britain concluded a mutual assistance pact in the case of war in the Mediterranean. In the following month Turkish and French representatives signed a nonaggression pact. Turkey had taken her stand

20 Jul 36
Montreux
Convention

with the Western Democracies.

Russia Changes Partners - 23 August 1939

With general breakdown of the Versailles System in Europe and failure of the Western democracies to enforce collective security, Stalin turned to a policy of collaboration with Hitler. After the conclusion of the Soviet-Nazi nonaggression pact in August 1939, Moscow, failing to bring Turkey into the new coalition, pursued the policy of inducing Turkey "to adopt full neutrality and to close the Dardenelles. . . ." ²⁹ In

²⁹ Nazi-Soviet Relations, p. 120.

the face of Turkey's unwillingness to repudiate the provisions of the Montreux Convention, Soviet-Turkish relations progressively deteriorated. ³⁰

³⁰ Hurewitz, Middle-East Dilemmas, p. 186.

Nazi-Soviet Conversations (Nov 1940)

Soviet-German negotiation in fall of 1940 revealed the extent to which the Kremlin had revived Czarist policy towards Turkey and Straits. As one inducement for Russia to become a full military ally of the Axis, Hitler proposed a revision of the Montreux Convention. Under the proposed revision Russian warships would have the right of unrestricted passage through the Straits. All other countries except Germany, Italy and the riparian nations were to renounce the right of passage for their naval vessels. But Hitler's proposals stopped short of Russian desiderata on the question of the Straits. Stalin, seeking real rather than paper

guarantees, demanded "the establishment of a base for land and naval forces of the USSR within range of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. . . ." Disagreement on this point was one of the factors that led ultimately to the break-up of the Nazi-Soviet alliance.³¹

³¹Hurewitz, J. C., Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, 1956, vol II, pp. 228-230.

World War II Developments

After the German invasion of Russia in June 1941, the Kremlin waited only two months to join Britain in assuring the Turks of its "fidelity to the Montreux Convention" and the absence on its part of "aggressive intentions or claims with regard to the Straits."³²

³²Hurewitz, Middle-East Dilemmas, p. 190.

Nevertheless, at the Tehran Conference in November 1943, and again during the Stalin-Churchill meeting at Moscow in October 1944, the Soviet Premier raised, but without obtaining definite commitments, the question of revising the Montreux Convention. Finally at Yalta in February 1945, the Big Three agreed that the Foreign Secretaries would consider Soviet proposals for revision at their next meeting in London. At Yalta Stalin observed that he could not accept a situation in which Turkey "had a hand on Russia's throat."³³ In the following month

³³Hurewitz, Middle-East Dilemmas, p. 194.

March 1945
USSR
denounces
Turko-Soviet
Nonaggression
Pact

the USSR took unilateral action and denounced the Turko-Soviet nonaggression treaty of 1925. In June 1945 Moscow notified Tehran that friendly relations

between the two countries depended upon: (1) revision of the Straits regime, (2) the return of Kars and Ardahan to the USSR, and (3) conclusion of a Treaty of Alliance.³⁴ In July at Potsdam the conferees resolved

³⁴ Ibid.

"that the Convention concluded at Montreux should be revised as failing to meet present day conditions. It was agreed that as the next step the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three Governments and the Turkish Government."³⁵

³⁵ A Decade of American Foreign Policy, 81st Congress, Senate Doc No. 123, Washington, 1950, p. 46.

Post World War II Policy Towards Iran and Turkey

Iran, The Crisis of 1946

After failing to obtain an oil concession in northern Iran during the closing months of World War II, the USSR gave vigorous support to the separatist movement in Azerbaijan and the creation of the puppet government of Kurdistan.³⁶ Soviet interference with Iranian

³⁶ Fatemi, op. cit., p. 260. See also Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, II, p. 241.

attempts to restore order in the troubled regions in the north and the non-withdrawal of Soviet troops in accordance with the provisions of the Tripartite Treaty of 1942 and of the Tehran Declaration were the subject of an Iranian appeal to the Security Council in January 1946.

Jan 46
Iran appeal
to UN on
Soviet inter-
ference

In the face of the strong opposition in the UN Security Council and what was apparently a virtual ultimatum on the part of President Truman, Soviet forces were withdrawn from Iranian Territory in May 1946. Azerbaijan was speedily brought under control of the central government. In the fall of the year following, the Majlis, encouraged by President Truman's new departure in American policy, refused, in spite of strong Soviet pressure, to ratify an oil agreement which had been concluded in 1946 while Russian troops were still in Iran.³⁷

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 290-327.

Soviet Activities in Iran 1946-1953

Although Soviet troops had been talked out of the northern provinces of Iran in the late spring of 1946, the Kremlin apparently regarded that action as a tactical withdrawal rather than a complete rout. Moscow still retained under the provisions of the 1921-1927 treaties with Iran the unusual privilege of judging whether Iranian territory was being used as a place d'armes against the Soviet Union, and if its interpretation were affirmative, of sending its troops back into that country. The Shah's government felt that it was living in the shadow of the Soviet gallows and accordingly moved cautiously in securing an extension of the services of the small US military mission which had been in Iran since late 1942. In 1950 this advisory assistance was supplemented by US military grant aid.³⁸

US aid

³⁸ Hurewitz, op. cit., II, pp. 275-276. D.J. Dallin, The Changing World of Soviet Russia, New Haven, 1956, p. 273.

Soviet opportunities for mischief-making were greatly multiplied by the development of a strong anti-British movement led by the tearful, popular Dr. Mossadeq and directed primarily against British oil concessions. In the early stages of the dispute the Soviet government adopted an official attitude of non-intervention although Pravda supported Iran's fight against foreign imperialism and the Soviet UN representative supported Iran on certain procedural matters.³⁹

³⁹Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 188.

Soviet Interest Quickens (1953-1954)

After the Spring of 1953 Mossadeq received the support of the Tudeh (Iranian Communist Party) as well as of Moscow. Jailed Iranian communist leaders were freed, and the Soviet government, in an attempt to bolster Mossadeq, whose regime was in serious financial straits because of the loss of oil revenues, offered to unblock credits which had accrued to Iran during World War II. The Soviet government also agreed to minor border rectifications.⁴⁰ Soviet hopes reached a new

⁴⁰Hurewitz, op. cit., II, pp. 385-390.

high when the Shah, the Kremlin's bete-noire, left the country under duress and the nationalists prepared to proclaim a republic. However in August 1953, General Zahedi rallied anti-Soviet elements and after gaining the upper hand incarcerated Dr. Mossadeq. Working hard behind the scenes, Moscow tried to prevent the conclusion of an oil agreement between the Zahedi cabinet

and the new consortium of eight Western countries. Then a month prior to the ratification of the new oil agreement in October 1954, the Soviet embassy in Tehran actively supported a plot contrived by communist elements in the army to overthrow the anti-Soviet government. The attempted coup failed.⁴¹

⁴¹Dallin, op. cit., p. 374. Hurewitz, op. cit., II, pp. 348-349.

Oct 55
USSR reaction
to Baghdad
Pact

Tehran's announcement on 11 October 1955 that Iran would accede to the Baghdad Pact evoked immediate recriminations from Moscow. In an editorial of 13 October Pravda warned that Iran was entering a "dangerous path," while Molotov told the Iranian Ambassador that such an action "is incompatible with the interests of peace and security in the Near and Middle East and is in contradiction to the good neighbor relations between Iran and the Soviet Union and the well-known treaty obligations of Iran."⁴² Molotov's

⁴²Quoted in Dallin, op. cit., p. 374.

reference to the "well-known treaty obligations of Iran" was specifically identified in a formal note of protest the following month as Article 3 of the 1927 Soviet-Persian Treaty. "The situation," the note stated, "created by Iran's accession to the aggressive Baghdad bloc is fraught with dangers for the borders of the Soviet Union. . . . The Iranian Government is entirely responsible for any possible consequences ensuing from its decision to join the Baghdad military bloc."⁴³

⁴³Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 418.

Iran stood firm. And in the period that followed, the USSR, changing its methods and shifting its main effort of Middle East penetration further West, seemed temporarily at least, to have postponed its plans for direct intervention in Iranian affairs. In the meantime, Iran drew closer to the West.

Turkey Rejects Soviet Demands

Although the US and the British had at Potsdam been willing to go along with what they believed at the time were legitimate Soviet demands concerning maritime commerce into and from the Black Sea, they opposed Soviet attempts to gain a virtual monopoly of the Straits area. By the Fall of 1946, when the US government rejected a revision of the Montreux Convention a la Moscow, the pattern of aggressive Soviet expansion had become clear. Bolstered morally by the Truman Doctrine and materially by the funds made available to her by the US Congress, Turkey resisted Soviet pressure for territorial revisions. In April 1950 Ankara "finally and conclusively" rejected Soviet demands for joint control of the Straits.⁴⁴

Apr 50
Turkey
rejects USSR
demand for
joint
control of
Straits

⁴⁴Hurewitz, op. cit., II, pp. 268-270; Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 146-148.

Soviet Turkish Relations 1951-1956

Relations between Moscow and Ankara continued to be strained. It was logical that in 1951 Turkey should seek and be accepted to membership in the NATO Alliance.

1951
Soviet reacts
to Turkey's
joining NATO

And it was natural that the Kremlin with its Bismarckian complex about "encirclement" should protest violently in the press and through diplomatic channels. This policy of the Turkish government, Moscow declared, "will cause serious damage to the relations of Turkey and the Soviet government."⁴⁵

⁴⁵Quoted in Dallin, op. cit., p. 371.

Mar 53
Death of
Stalin and
short-lived
change in
Soviet
policy

During the brief period of the "soft-sell" immediately following the death of Stalin in early March 1953, Mr. Molotov, in a surprising, unsolicited statement, renounced the 1945 territorial claim against Turkey.⁴⁶

⁴⁶Hurewitz, op. cit., II, p. 343.

He also stated in regard to the Straits problem that "the Soviet Government has reconsidered its opinion on this matter and holds that it is possible to insure the security of the USSR from the side of the Straits on conditions equally acceptable both for the USSR and Turkey."⁴⁷

⁴⁷Dallin, op. cit., p. 372.

The USSR's invitation to effect a Turko-Soviet rapprochement was received with scepticism by the Turks. Turkey did not respond. Three months later Moscow was protesting, while Ankara was defending the right of the US and British Fleets to visit Turkish ports in the Straits.⁴⁸ Soviet Turkish relations became strained in

⁴⁸Hurewitz, op. cit., II, p. 343. Dallin, op. cit., p. 372.

April of the following year (1954) when Turkey, with US encouragement, became with Pakistan a founder of the Baghdad Pact. As the Kremlin moved toward closer collaboration with the Cairo-Arab-Bloc, the lines between Turkey and the USSR became more sharply drawn.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ See Hurewitz, op. cit., II, p. 345.

The USSR and the Syro-Turkish Tension (Fall 1957)

During the Syro-Turkish crisis in the summer and fall of 1957, Soviet spokesmen supported Damascus fabrications which accused Turkey of menacing her borders.

Mr. Gromyko on 10 September warned Turkey that "it may land in an abyss" and that "a great disaster awaits itself." Premier Bulganin in his message of 11 September to Premier Menderes of Turkey warned indirectly of a Soviet attack and asserted that "great calamities" awaited Turkey if it did not heed these warnings.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Department of State Bulletin, 18 Nov 57, p. 779.

A month later, Nikita Khrushchev continued the campaign of threats against Ankara. He also charged that "the U.S. is pushing Turkey into a war with Syria," and promised, "We will do everything to prevent it."⁵¹

⁵¹ Quoted in CHRONOLOGY, Middle Eastern Affairs, November 1957.

Since Syria is now joined with Egypt in the UAR, the Kremlin has succeeded in closing further the Communist and crypto-Communist ring around Turkey with

10-11 Sep 57
USSR threatens
Turkey in
Syrian crisis

Russia to the north, Bulgaria to the west, and Syria to the south.⁵² Deep resentment against Turkey persists

⁵²Foreign Policy Bulletin, June 1, 1958, p. 142.

in Moscow. Since the ever frail Baghdad Pact has been seriously debilitated if not rendered defunct by the revolution in Iraq, Turkey must put her faith in Allah and the NATO Alliance.

Soviet Relations with Non-neighboring States of the Middle East

The Arab States and Palestine (1918-1940)

In the interval between the two World Wars, Moscow displayed scant interest in those Middle Eastern States not adjacent to her borders. Although the USSR could not ignore entirely the spiritual bond connecting her millions of Moslem citizens with the Arab world nor resist the occasional opportunity for a propaganda foray against capitalist imperialism in the Middle East, there was practically no direct relationship between the Soviets and the Arab countries during this period.⁵³

⁵³See Fischer, op. cit., II, p. 528.

The Arab east and Palestine were controlled directly or indirectly by Britain and France, who could be counted upon to do their utmost to isolate their colonial wards from the blandishments of communist propaganda. In the main, Anglo-French efforts in this matter succeeded, although small, somewhat inefficient Communist parties and Comintern agents did operate in some of the Arab States and in Palestine. The Soviets

1926, 1928
Relations
established
with Saudi
Arabia and
Yemen

established diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia in 1926 and with Yemen in 1928 but appear to have had no success in establishing a foothold or in fomenting revolution among the Islamic "proletariat" of those remote regions.⁵⁴

⁵⁴Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 418-419.

Soviet Activities Increase - World War II

1943-1944
Diplomatic
relations with
Egypt and
other Arab
states

Anglo-Russian collaboration during World War II resulted in Britain's lifting the ban which she had formerly placed on Soviet diplomatic missions in the Arab States under British control. Moscow resumed diplomatic relations with Egypt in 1943 and in the next year established legations in Iraq and the Levant states.⁵⁵ Cairo, Baghdad, Beirut, and Damascus received

⁵⁵Speiser, op. cit., p. 185.

not only diplomatic personnel but also large numbers of Soviet commercial and cultural representatives. Soviet agents established contacts with trade unions, organized Soviet friendship societies, and opened "houses of culture" (bookstores dispensing Communist literature). Soviet political activity frequently assumed a religious guise. From 1941 Soviet propaganda stressed the alleged freedom of religion in the USSR and emphasized its friendly feelings toward Islam. Soviet embassies were habitually staffed with a number of Soviet Moslems whose piety was publicly displayed by visits to the most-frequented Mosques.⁵⁶ In Palestine

⁵⁶ Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 419-421.

somewhat later the Soviet government, assisted by the Orthodox clergy, revived the Russian Palestine Society, while Russian priests established contact with the Syrian and Armenian "Sister Churches." In the Middle East, as elsewhere, the Soviet government used the Orthodox Church as one of the arms of its Foreign policy.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ Dallin, op. cit., pp. 280-281.

The USSR and Western Proposals for a Middle East Defense Command (1951-1952)

While the hand of Moscow fell heavily on Turkey and Iran, leaving those nations the alternatives of becoming satellites or enemies, the Kremlin made no serious attempt before 1955 to interfere directly on the governmental level in affairs involving other countries of the Middle East.⁵⁸ The principal exception

⁵⁸ Lewis, B., The Middle Eastern Reaction to Soviet Pressures, MEJ, Spring, 1956, vol 10, p. 125.

was the Kremlin's effort to oppose the creation of a Middle East Defense Command.

After the outbreak of the Korean War, the West intensified its attempt to develop a "situation of strength" in the Middle East. In view of Anglo-Egyptian frictions and the need to keep the Suez Canal base within the Allied orbit, the US proposed an Allied Middle East Command which would associate Egypt with

Britain, France, Turkey and the United States.⁵⁹ The

⁵⁹Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, II, pp. 329-332.

plan foundered later on Egypt's determination to rid herself of foreign controls. Moscow, in notes addressed to the Four Western powers (but aimed at the states of the Middle East) presented the USSR as the protector of the Middle East against Western colonialism and pictured the initiators of the MEDC as violators of the UN Charter. The aim of the West in "attempting to draw the countries of the Near and Middle East into aggressive military undertakings of the Atlantic bloc," was, according to the USSR, to transform those countries into a "place d'armes."⁶⁰ In spite of Stalin's reputed

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 333.

"hands off" policy towards the Middle East after 1947, the USSR would react, and react strongly, when it believed its immediate strategic objectives were threatened. Besides obvious security considerations, these objectives included the elimination of British and French preferential rights and military bases and the thwarting of US attempts to fill the resulting power vacuum.⁶¹

⁶¹Ibid., pp. 332-335. Martin, H. G., "The Soviet Union and the Middle East," MEA, Feb, 1956, p. 49.

Soviet Middle Eastern Strategy in the UN (1948-1954)

The tensions arising from the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict have been reflected on the agenda of every UN General Assembly since 1948 and have been debated frequently before the Security Council.⁶² In

⁶² Peretz, D., Israel and the Palestine Arabs, Washington, 1958, p. 3.

contrast to a pre-war attitude of favoring Arab nationalism against Zionism,⁶³ the Soviet press denounced

⁶³ Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 419.

the Arab League, when it emerged after the war, as a "strong-hold of reaction."⁶⁴ Later in November 1947,

⁶⁴ Dallin, op. cit., p. 376.

the Soviet UN representative voted for the partition of Palestine, a measure generally favored by Israel and opposed by the Arabs. A review of the successive, seemingly-inconsistent, positions taken by the USSR in UN deliberations on Middle-Eastern questions suggests strongly that in reality the Kremlin was following in this period a consistent, thrifty policy of keeping the entire area in a state of unrest. The Soviets implemented this policy in the UN by two basic strategems. The first, in refusing to align herself on the side of stopping the fighting, to let the fight continue. The second, subsumed under the first general head, to limit, if not destroy, the effectiveness of any UN efforts to settle the dispute.⁶⁵

Nov 47
USSR votes to
partition
Palestine

⁶⁵Ludlow, J., "Soviet Strategy in the Arab-Israel Problem." Department of State Bulletin, 23 Dec 57, vol XXXVII, No 965, pp. 994-998.

Effects of Anti-Semitism on Soviet Policy

These Soviet tactics in the UN required progressively greater feats of parliamentary gymnastics as Moscow moved patently closer to a pro-Arab policy. As "cold war" pressures mounted, foreign policy toward Israel became interwoven with domestic issues. Stalin's government became seized of an old plague, anti-semitism. The Kremlin came to regard the Jewish population of the USSR as potential carriers of Western ideas and even as partisans of democratic forms of government. Persecutions followed. All pro-Israeli trends at home and in the satellites were vigorously suppressed. Shortly before his death in the spring of 1953, Stalin broke off diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv. A slight shift in Soviet policy towards Israel occurred during the first months of confusion following Stalin's death. Diplomatic relations with Israel were resumed in July 1953, and the campaign against Zionism in the satellites slackened. However, the events which followed made it abundantly clear which side the Kremlin had chosen.⁶⁶

1953
Anti-Jewish
and Anti-
Israeli policy
leads to
break in
relations
with Israel--
Resumed
Jul 53

⁶⁶Dallin, op. cit., pp. 378-379.

Soviet Economic Offensive - 1953-1957

The Soviet bloc economic offensive had its beginnings in the brief "era of peaceful coexistence" inaugurated by Georgi Malenkov shortly after Stalin's death. But

from the outset this offensive had a dual purpose: in part economic; in part, political, psychological and cultural. In the beginning, the economic factor was most apparent. By 1953 increased industrialization behind the Iron Curtain was creating ever greater requirements for imports of raw materials. Since credits were needed to cover an export-import imbalance the new Soviet leaders decided to launch a modest export drive directed at the Middle East and South East Asia.⁶⁷

⁶⁷Martin, H. G., "The Soviet Union and the Middle East," MEA, vol VII, Feb, 1956, p. 49.

Jan 54
USSR opens
economic
offensive in
Middle East

The broader dimensions of the trade offensive began to appear in January 1954 when the Soviet Union extended to Afghanistan a loan totaling \$3.5 million for economic and technical assistance. By the end of 1955, loans to less developed countries outside the bloc totaled \$305 million; and at the end of 1957, over \$1.9 billion. Of this \$1.9 billion, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan had received nearly \$1 billion. With the exception of \$10 million credit extended to Turkey, no countries of the Middle East other than the above four have received Soviet loans. With bloc aid go Soviet technicians. And a considerable number of students and technicians from these four Middle East countries have been brought to bloc centers for study and training. At the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference at Cairo in December 1957, the Soviet representative presented the economic package of aid, trade, and technical assistance in these terms:

We do not seek to get any advantages. We do not need profits, privileges, controlling interest, concession or raw material sources. We do not ask you to participate in any blocs, reshuffle your governments or change your domestic or foreign policy. We are ready to help you as brother helps brother, without any interest whatever, for we know from our own experience how difficult it is to get rid of need. Tell us what you need and we will help you and send, according to our economic capabilities, money needed in the form of loans or aid . . . to build for you institutions for industry, education and hospitals. . . . We do not ask you to join any blocs . . . our only condition is that there will be no strings attached.⁶⁸

⁶⁸Testimony by Douglas Dillon before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 3 Mar 1958. Printed in Department of State Bulletin, No 978, 24 Mar 58, pp. 469-475.

Soviet Political Offensives in the Middle East Resume on a Broader Base (1955)

Failure to establish a Middle East Defense Command in 1951-1952 did not deter the West from later attempts to organize the defense of the "northern tier." Conclusion of the Turco-Iraqi (later known as the Baghdad Pact) on 25 February 1955 put an end to the Soviet official three year silence on the collective affairs of the Middle East. The publication by the Soviet government on 16 April 1955 of its Statement on the Middle East marked the start of a new large-scale political and diplomatic offensive in that area. By this time the conciliatory Malenkov had confessed his errors. The Kremlin, spurred by the vigorous leadership of Khrushchev was taking a new line which, while avoiding direct military involvement, competed actively with the West in the economic development and arming of backward countries.⁶⁹ In its statement of 16 April 1955 the

16 Apr 55
USSR outlines
Middle East
policy

⁶⁹London, op. cit., p. 171. Dallin, op. cit., p. 378.

Foreign Ministry declared its concern for the situation developing in such close proximity to Soviet territory. Contrasting the policies of the "imperialist powers" which aimed "once again to force the peoples of these countries under the yoke of colonial oppression and exploitation," the Soviet Union for the first time presented in great detail its many acts of friendship toward the states of the Middle and Near East. Finally, the note threatened that "The Soviet Government, supporting the cause of peace, will defend the freedom, independence and non-interference in their internal affairs of Near and Middle Eastern States."⁷⁰

⁷⁰Text of Statement is published in MEA, May, 1956, pp. 191-193.

While the Kremlin had on previous occasions said most of the things covered in its statement of 16 April 1955, the statement read in the light of Moscow's successful efforts in the same month to accentuate the anti-Western Slogans at the Bandung Conference of the nations of Asia and Africa indicated a major change in Soviet policy in the Middle East.⁷¹

⁷¹Dallin, op. cit., pp. 332, 378.

The Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal (September 1955)

Although there were signs that the Soviet Union had broadened its interest and expanded its economic offensive in the Middle East, until September 1955 the Western

Sep 55
USSR arranges
Czech-
Egyptian
arms deal

Powers believed they were the dominating elements in that area through their control of the arms supply. Trading on Egyptian sensibilities concerning the Baghdad Pact and Nasser's failure to meet American terms for a grant in military aid, the Soviet Government in the Summer of 1955 arranged for extensive trade operations favoring Cairo. Peking purchased Egyptian cotton, and Prague traded Czech arms for Egyptian cotton and rice.⁷²

⁷²Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, II, p. 401-402.

The Czech arms, which included tanks, jet aircraft and submarines, went to Nasser without the condition that they not be used for aggressive purposes. Moscow replied to heavy criticism of the arms deal in the world press with the bland assertion that Egypt possessed the "sovereign right" to buy whatever arms she required from whomever she desired. The Soviet bloc used the arms deal to establish a political bridgehead in the Middle East. Facing the threat of Communist competition in the supply of arms and in the economic development of certain Arab nations, the Western Powers could no longer hope to settle Middle Eastern problems without "the help" of Moscow.⁷³

⁷³Dallin, op. cit., pp. 379-380. London, op. cit., p. 178. Hurewitz, op. cit., II, pp. 401-402.

Soviet Reaction to the Eisenhower-Eden Statement
(February 1956)

That the Soviets had no intentions of being left out of any arrangements contemplated for the settlement

of Middle Eastern problems was sharply demonstrated by the Kremlin's reaction to the Eisenhower-Eden statement of 1 February 1956 which envisaged the contingency of acting within the spirit of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 to preserve peace in the Middle East. Two weeks later Moscow vehemently disputed the basic tenet of the declaration that the Western powers could "take arbitrary action outside the United Nations." Any dispatch of troops by the West to that region, without UN sanction or an invitation by the Arab States or Israel, would be considered by the Soviet government as a "threat to the peace" and "the object of legitimate concern."⁷⁴ In this as in statements issued on 17 April

⁷⁴85th Cong, 1st Sess. S., Events in the Middle East, Washington, 11 Jan 1957, p. 12.

and 26 April, the Soviet Union pictured itself as protector not only of the national sovereignty of the Arab States but also of the UN Charter.⁷⁵

⁷⁵London, op. cit., pp. 173-178. The 17 April statement is printed in MEA, May, 1956, pp. 193-195.

The World Crisis (Fall and Winter 1956-1957)

With unrest in Poland and revolution in Hungary, the Kremlin was not unhappy to have the attention of the world partly diverted to the Suez crisis. In spite of Soviet difficulties in the Satellites, Moscow rallied quickly to the support of Cairo. Moscow threatened France and Britain with annihilation by missiles and talked ominously of sending "volunteers" to fight for Egypt if the invading troops were not immediately

withdrawn. After a futile attempt to separate the US from its European allies by proposing that the USSR and the US join forces "backed by a UN decision" and put an end to the Israeli and Anglo-French aggression, Moscow propaganda pictured the US as a selfish schemer plotting to replace European imperialism with an American brand of the same product.⁷⁶

⁷⁶Campbell, J., Defense of the Middle East, N.Y., 1958, pp. 112-113. NYT, 6 Nov 56, 1:3, 8, 10:2-6.

Soviet Reaction to the Eisenhower Doctrine (Spring 1957)

The crisis of 1956 accentuated the waning of British influence and the rise of Soviet prestige in the Middle East. The crisis also served to spur US efforts to seek a new formula to counteract Soviet moves in that area. On 5 January 1957, President Eisenhower addressed a joint session of Congress and requested authority to use economic and if necessary, military measures to develop and to protect those nations of the Middle East requesting aid "against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism."⁷⁷ Marshal Zhukov gave succinct expression

⁷⁷Quoted in Events of the Middle East, 85th Cong, 1st Sess. S., Washington, 11 Jan 1957, p. 25.

to the position which the Kremlin took in respect to the Eisenhower Doctrine by saying that it "undoubtedly is a step toward war" and "a new edition of the old colonialist policy."⁷⁸ Although cooperation in the

⁷⁸London, op. cit., p. 174. AP Wire Service, 9 Feb 57.

Middle East was perhaps one of the things least desired by the Soviet Government, it did oppose the unilateral "Eisenhower doctrine" with a proposal for a quadripartite solution.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ See Department of State Bulletin, 1 April 1957, Press Release 131, dated 11 Mar 57, pp. 523-524.

In its note of 11 February 1957 (subsequently rejected by the three Western Powers) Moscow envisaged a pledge on the part of the US, Britain, France and the USSR to follow in their policy toward the Near and Middle East the following six principles:

1. The preservation of peace in the Near and Middle East by settling outstanding questions exclusively by peaceful means and by the method of negotiations;
2. Noninterference in the internal affairs of Middle Eastern countries, and respect for their sovereignty and independence;
3. Renunciation of all attempts to involve these countries in military blocs with the participation of the Great Powers;
4. Liquidation of foreign bases and withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of Middle Eastern countries;
5. Reciprocal refusal to deliver arms to Middle Eastern countries;
6. Promotion of the Middle Eastern nations' economic development without attaching any political, military, or other terms incompatible with the dignity and sovereignty of these countries.⁸⁰

⁸⁰ Printed in Department of State Bulletin, 1 April 57, pp. 524-525.

The basic strategic decision to back Arab nationalism against Israel and the West had been made at least as early as the Czech-Egyptian Arms deal in

September 1955. The Suez crisis, developments in Syria, and most recently in Lebanon and Iraq indicate that there has been no major change in this fundamental decision. While the USSR may be as reluctant as the West to set the stage for global nuclear war, the Kremlin policies in the Middle East have continued to generate emotions over which it may lose control.

SECTION V
US POLICY TOWARDS THE
MIDDLE EAST

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST

Protestant missionaries, archaeologists and entrepreneurs in oil were the only Americans to manifest much interest in the Middle East prior to World War II, except for the American Zionists who lent support from afar to the foundation of a Jewish national home in Palestine. Institutions such as Robert College in Istanbul and the American Universities in Beirut and Cairo, which were established by missionary groups, helped to make the United States popular in the eyes of Middle East students who benefited from them, but they did little to encourage American political interest in the area. Nor did American acquisition of oil concessions in Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrein in the 1920s and 1930s produce any immediate political involvement in Middle East affairs; the State Department limited itself to support of the principle of equal economic opportunity for all countries - an "open door" in the Middle East.

1920s -
1930s Oil
concessions
acquired

Expansion of Interests in World War II

World War II, of course, brought the United States dramatically out of its hemispheric isolation and thrust it into areas of the world which it had hitherto ignored--including the Middle East. Nearly 30,000 United States troops were stationed during the war in Iran, which was a major funnel for the supply of lend-lease material to the Soviet Union. Numerous United States missions were established there, including military missions attached to the Iranian army and to the gendarmerie, an internal security force.

Agricultural, financial and military missions were

also sent to Saudi Arabia, which late in the war agreed to United States construction of a large military air base at Dhahran. American military personnel, mainly technicians, were stationed also in Egypt and Palestine, and the American navy and merchant marine played an important part in providing supplies to the Middle Eastern theater. Most of the Middle Eastern countries received lend-lease.¹

1. George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (Ithaca, N.Y.: 1952), 425-426; J. C. Hurewitz, Middle East Dilemmas: The Background of United States Policy (New York: 1953), pp. 21-24.

With the expansion of US military forces during World War II came also a new interest of the US Government in the tremendous oil reserves of the Middle East. In July 1943, President Roosevelt issued an executive order creating the Petroleum Reserves Corporation, which was authorized to negotiate for the purchase of the stock of the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) and the Bahrein Petroleum Company, the major American oil concessionaires in the Middle East. The companies refused to sell, but the Government's interest was slow in waning. On 6 February 1944, the President of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, announced a tentative agreement with ARAMCO and the Gulf Exploration Company whereby the PRC would construct and operate a pipeline connecting the Saudi Arabian and Kuwait oil fields to a port on the eastern Mediterranean. The terms of the proposed agreement made it clear that the government's purpose was not merely to provide a means

1943-1944
Government
attempts to
purchase oil

of transporting the oil, but also to assure that all of the oil produced by US concerns in these two concessions would be sold in conformity with United States foreign policy.² The proposed agreement found

2. Raymond F. Mikesell and Hollis B. Chenery, Arabian Oil: America's Stake in the Middle East (Chapel Hill, N.C.: 1949), pp. 90-95.

no favor either in the oil industry or in Congress, and was dropped. After the war, the companies built their own pipeline (the Tapline) across the Arabian peninsula.

The Cold War and Containment

United States involvement in the Middle East--having been deepened by World War II--deepened further rather than diminishing when the war ended. Anglo-Russian rivalry, which had dominated the diplomatic history of the area, was replaced by Russo-American rivalry, and the Middle East became one of the first frontiers of the cold war. It was in fact in the Middle East--in Iran's mountainous northern provinces, in the Turkish peninsula and in Greece--that the issues of the cold war were first dramatized, and the doctrine of containment born.

The Soviet Union overtly threatened Turkey in March 1945, when it denounced the Soviet-Turkish neutrality treaty. In June it notified Ankara that the restoration of friendly relations depended on revision of the Straits regime, the grant of land and naval bases in the Straits area, the "return" of the districts of Kars and Ardahan to the Soviet Union, and the conclusion of an alliance. At Potsdam,

President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill took issue with Stalin's demand for a Soviet share in defense of the Straits, and the two sides began tense and fruitless negotiations. Determined to resist the Soviet pressure, Turkey turned increasingly to the West for assistance, but adequate assistance was no longer available at the accustomed source--the United Kingdom. Faced with the declining power of Great Britain and the menacing growth of Soviet Russia, the United States responded with the Truman Doctrine, a pledge of support to free peoples who were resisting Soviet aggression. A major program of aid to Turkey and Greece was started.

Mar 1947
Truman
Doctrine

A smaller aid program, consisting of the extension of credits, meanwhile was undertaken as at least a token of support to Iran, which was also threatened by Soviet expansion. Soviet troops, which had been stationed in Iran along with British and American forces during World War II, remained in the northern provinces of the country for several months past the agreed deadline for withdrawal, and finally did withdraw only after Iran had consented to the formation of a joint Soviet-Iranian oil company to develop the petroleum resources in the northern provinces. Coming to the support of Iran, the United States exerted pressure within the UN to obtain withdrawal of the Soviet troops, and it publicly supported Iran's freedom of choice on the question of the oil concession. In October 1947 the Iranian parliament (Majlis) rejected the draft Soviet-Iranian agreement, and throughout the country the assistance of the United States was acknowledged with gratitude. US prestige in Iran, then at its

1946-1947
Aid to
Iran

peak, was not, however, destined to endure.³

3. Hurewitz, Middle East Dilemmas, pp. 26-30.

The Greek-Turkish aid program raised Iranian hopes for large amounts of US assistance, but aid was slow in coming (not until May 1950 did Iran become eligible under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act for grant military aid), and it came in disappointingly small amounts by comparison with the grants to Turkey. Hence the US reservoir of prestige in Iran was already running low when, in the spring of 1951, the fanatically nationalist Premier Mossadeq came to power and led his country into crisis by carrying out the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. For the next two years the United States was forced to play the uncomfortable role of impartial middleman in the continuing dispute between Britain and Iran.

1951
Anglo-
Iranian
oil crisis

The United States refused to provide Iran with the technicians and tankers necessary to keep the oil flowing, thus confounding Mossadeq, who had thought that Iranian oil was indispensable to the West and that the United States would provide assistance through fear of Soviet cooperation with Iran. The United States also helped the United Kingdom to offset its oil and dollar deficits; rejected Iranian requests for loans; and even halted military aid to Iran for a brief period early in 1952 when the Iranian Government refused to meet certain conditions prescribed by the Mutual Security Act of 1951. On the other hand, the Point Four program in Iran was considerably expanded in 1952, and the United States exerted pressure on the British to be more moderate in their demands for compensation from Iran and to refrain from the use of armed force.

United States good offices were tendered in the dispute, and W. Averell Harriman, as President Truman's personal representative, went to Tehran and succeeded in arranging a series of meetings in August 1951 between Premier Mossadeq and a British negotiator. A year later, in August 1952, with the dispute still unsettled, the United States joined with Britain in an offer of a settlement that would have included an immediate US grant of \$10 million to Iran, but Mossadeq's government continued intransigent. A reasonable settlement of the dispute was required in the interests of the United States, for the internal situation in Iran was becoming more unsettled and a Communist coup seemed possible. Nevertheless, it seemed certain that no reasonable settlement could be achieved as long as Mossadeq remained in office.

The Palestine Question

United States objectives in Turkey and Iran, the states bordering the Soviet frontier and hence vulnerable to direct Soviet penetration, were at least easy to define if sometimes difficult to execute. The same was not true in the rest of the Middle East, which was further removed from the cold war and which presented unique by complex problems of its own. In the face of the violent contest between Arabs and Jews for control of Palestine, the United States was uncertain, equivocal, and obviously at a loss for either a definite objective or the means to achieve it.

The pre-World War II record of US involvement in the Palestine issue was slight but symptomatic of the problems to come. President Wilson, true to his

principles, tried to support self-determination for all peoples in the area, and it was only the absolute refusal of the United States to become directly involved in the Palestine issue at that time that saved it from the embarrassment of an obviously untenable position. Wilson publicly in 1918--and both houses of Congress in a resolution passed in 1922--lent support to Zionism, but Wilson also supported self-determination for the Arabs in his famous Fourteen Points and at the Peace Conference. Secretaries of State in the isolationist era that followed kept their hands strictly off the explosive Palestine issue, despite pressures from Zionist groups that were active in the United States.

As World War II drew to a close, the United States could no longer remain indifferent to the Arab-Zionist rivalry, for the trouble intensified as persecuted Jews fled from Europe to Palestine and British hegemony in the area progressively disintegrated. Beginning with the Presidential election of 1944, the Palestine question became a lively political issue in the United States, with Jewish pressure groups and Congress favoring the Zionists, and oil interests, the State, War and Navy Departments tending to favor the Arabs. Both groups competed for the support of the President, and the group of pro-Zionist interests usually won. President Truman publicly called on the British to relax their restrictions on immigration to Palestine and immediately admit 100,000 Jews. But although the United States, for reasons largely domestic, was ready to engage in oratory over the Palestine question, it refused absolutely to help maintain order in Palestine itself.

1947
Support for
Palestine
Partition

After the British failed to reconcile Arabs and Jews through negotiations and declared that they would pull out of Palestine, the United States announced its unqualified support of a United Nations proposal for partition of the area into Jewish and Arab states. It was not a "perfect" solution, the United States delegate acknowledged, but it was "humanly just and workable and . . . will make a genuine and notable contribution to the solution of one of the most thorny political problems in the world today."⁴ Four months later the

4. Hurewitz, Middle East Dilemmas, p. 132.

United States startled the United Nations by switching its policy completely, announcing its opposition to the partition plan and suggesting instead a temporary UN trusteeship over Palestine.

May 1948
Recognition
of Israel

The UN having failed to provide a solution in Palestine, war broke out in mid-May 1948 between the Arab states and the newly-proclaimed state of Israel, which immediately received de facto recognition from the United States. Within the UN, the United States took the leadership in attempting to stop the war. It strongly supported the General Assembly's establishment of a Mediator for the dispute and later the creation of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, of which the United States has been a member. During 1948 and ever since, the United States has initiated or cosponsored virtually all Security Council resolutions calling for the establishment of cease-fires, truces, and Council action supporting the General Armistice Agreements, which were negotiated during the first half of 1949. In

general, it has taken the position that the parties to the Armistice Agreements must comply with The Agreements, and must resort to the remedial procedures provided therein.⁶

6. State Department Bulletin, XXXVII (23 Dec 57), pp. 995-996.

The United States has also tried through action outside the UN to reduce the dangers of Arab-Israeli hostility and inject a stabilizing element into the Middle Eastern chaos. In May 1950, when a full-scale renewal of the Arab-Israeli war threatened, it joined with Britain and France in issuing a declaration condemning the use of force in the area and stating that requests for arms from the Arab states and Israel would be considered in the light of their needs for internal security and legitimate self-defense. The three powers reaffirmed their opposition to an arms race. The declaration concluded:

25 May 50
Tripartite
Declaration

The three Governments take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest in and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area and their unalterable opposition to the use of force between any of the states in that area. The three Governments, should they find that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation.⁷

7. J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record, Vol. II, 1914-1956 (Princeton, N.J.: 1956), pp. 308-309.

The United States has also sought to relieve the problem of the 850,000 or more Arab refugees who were uprooted from Palestine by the war--one of the worst sores of the ailing Middle East area. Within the United Nations the United States supported the establishment of agencies to help care for the refugees, and from 1949 through 1957 it contributed nearly \$200 million for their relief and rehabilitation.⁸

8. State Department Bulletin, XXXVII (23 Dec 57), p. 996.

Jan-May
1951
Point Four
Aid begins

Besides providing aid for the Palestinian refugees, the United States began in 1951 a program of economic and technical assistance to a number of countries in the Middle East. Between January and May 1951, Point Four agreements were concluded with Israel and all the Arab states except Syria and Yemen. Examples of U.S.-sponsored projects were the construction of a grain elevator in Jordan, establishment of an agricultural college and experiment station in Iraq, and provision of expert fiscal advice to Saudi Arabia. Arab governments were, however, suspicious of United States motives in providing aid, especially because significant amounts of aid were also going to Israel. Jewish philanthropic organizations in the United States were contributing importantly to the maintenance of the Israeli state, and the United States government in 1949 loaned Israel \$135 million through the Export-Import Bank--a sum that far exceeded the total of small post-World War II loans to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. United States grant aid to Israel was initially made late in

1951 under the Mutual Security Act, which authorized \$50 million for the relief and resettlement of immigrants, \$13.5 million for economic development and \$1.45 million for technical assistance.⁹

9. Hurewitz, Middle East Dilemmas, pp. 151, 243-248; Harry N. Howard, "The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, 1945-1951," State Department Bulletin, XXV (19 Nov 51), pp. 814-816.

Although the United States attempted, through these aid programs and its conciliatory actions in the UN, to maintain friendly relations both with the Arab states and with Israel, it found that Arab hostilities toward the West mounted rather than died. Weakened by internal turmoil, the Arab states often sought to escape responsibility for their perilous situation by accusing the Western powers and the United Nations of conspiring to create and protect the Israeli state. Increasingly they turned from the West towards neutralism.

Only in Israel and Saudi Arabia did the United States position seem promising late in 1951. Israel, after following a policy of neutrality in its infancy as a nation, steadily identified itself more closely with the West, and in 1950 supported UN action against the Communist invasion of South Korea. In Saudi Arabia, relations with the United States improved perceptibly in 1951--in large part, no doubt, as the result of ARAMCO's agreement in December 1950 to share oil profits equally with the Saudi Arabian government. On 18 June 1951 the Saudi government signed an agreement continuing US rights at the Dhahran air base for five years. In return, the United States undertook to carry out a

18 Jun 51
MDAP and
Base Agree-
ments with
Saudi Arabia

training program for the Saudi army as well as for technicians to operate the Dhahran field. Thus, Saudi Arabia became the first Arab country to conclude an agreement with the United States under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.¹⁰

10. Hurewitz, Middle East Dilemmas, p. 151; Harry N. Howard, "The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa," State Department Bulletin, XXVII (15 Dec 52), p. 941.

Taking stock of its Middle Eastern policies in 1951, in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war, the United States could console itself with the thought that although it had not won many friends, it had at least minimized the opportunities of its enemy. By assuming the responsibility of leadership on the Palestine issue in the UN, the United States was able to exclude the USSR from direct participation in the area. Neither the Soviet Union nor any of its East European satellites took part in the supervision of the truce, nor in the armistice negotiations, nor the conciliation talks, nor the refugee and economic rehabilitation programs. Despite its own efforts, however, the United States was still left with the problem of building the region's internal strength and erecting a stable alliance with the West.

Egypt and the Failure of the Middle East Command

The key to Western influence in the Middle East lay in Egypt, most populous of the Arab countries and the most important strategically because through the Suez Canal it linked the Asian subcontinent with Europe and the Mediterranean. The United States looked on with mounting concern from June 1950 to July 1951 as

Egypt and the United Kingdom negotiated over the rights of the British to station troops in the Canal Zone. Egypt was determined to eject the British completely, not only from the Canal Zone but also from the Sudan; the British, while offering to withdraw their troops by 1956, sought rights of reentry and a share in the control of the Suez base. Struggling to maintain their former supremacy in the Middle East, the British could not afford to yield unconditionally the major source of their strength in the region. Because of Britain's acknowledged primacy of interest in the Middle East, the United States did not seek to intervene directly in the Anglo-Egyptian talks until they reached an impasse in July 1951. Then it took the initiative with a proposal for an Allied Middle East Command with which Egypt would be invited to associate itself as a founding member. It was hoped that this plan, by substituting a joint allied for an exclusive British base in the canal zone, would meet Egyptian demands for the elimination of British hegemony and allied needs for continued access to the base in time of emergency. It failed completely. Proposed to the Egyptians on 13 October 1951, it met not only with an outright rejection but also with a unilateral denunciation by Egypt of its 1936 treaty with the United Kingdom and the 1899 Sudan agreements. Sporadic fighting broke out between Egyptians and British troops in the canal zone.

Oct-Nov
1951
Middle
East
Command
Proposal

On 10 November the United States and the other sponsors of the regional command proposal--the United Kingdom, France and Turkey--issued a statement reaffirming their intention to form a Middle East Command and

offering to provide Middle Eastern states with advice, training and arms if they would cooperate in defense of the area. As an earnest of United States intentions, the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (which became law in October) authorized the appropriation of \$396 million for military assistance to Greece, Turkey, and Iran, and permitted the President to allocate up to ten per cent of this sum to countries of the Arab-Israel area if he determined, among other things, that the strategic location of the recipient country made it of direct importance to the defense of the area and that such assistance was of critical importance to the defense of the free nations. None of the Middle Eastern countries joined the command and before long the plan had become defunct, but the offer of aid apparently helped to frustrate an Egyptian effort to organize the Arab League states in united opposition to the Western proposal.¹¹

11. Hurewitz, Middle East Dilemmas, pp. 92-97; Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Vol. II, 329-332; Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1951 (New York: 1952), pp. 281-293.

The futile attempt to ally Egypt with the West demonstrated that American diplomacy would henceforth have to pay greater heed to nationalistic feeling in the Middle East and to local conceptions of national interest, however mistaken those conceptions might seem to the United States in the light of the ubiquitous Soviet threat. A realistic assessment of the inflamed Egyptian temper would have clearly shown that the Middle East Command proposal was doomed in

advance; but without such an assessment and without adequate diplomatic preparation, the first Western attempt to create a Middle Eastern alliance had ended in failure.

The Eisenhower Administration and the Baghdad Pact

When the Eisenhower Administration took office in 1953, its Secretary of State lost little time in demonstrating that he intended to continue the US effort to create an alliance in the Middle East but to avoid the mistakes that had doomed the Middle East Command idea. Returning late in May 1953 from a trip through the Middle East, Mr. Dulles reported to the nation that although many of the Arab League countries were engrossed in the quarrels with Israel, France, or Great Britain, the "northern tier of nations" was showing awareness of the Soviet danger. The Secretary continued:

There is a vague desire to have a collective security system. But no such system can be imposed from without. It should be designed and grow from within out of a sense of common destiny and common danger.

While awaiting the formal creation of a security association, the United States can usefully help strengthen the interrelated defense of those countries which want strength, not as against each other or the West, but to resist the common threat to all free peoples.¹²

12. State Department Bulletin, XXVIII (15 Jun 53), pp. 831-835.

The Secretary also reaffirmed the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950 and sought to dispel the notion that in the Arab-Israeli conflict the United States was partial to the Israelis.

May 1953
Dulles
trip to
Middle
East

In the Secretary's trip and statement, the Baghdad Pact had its beginnings. The United States apparently was now ready to abandon attempts at a defense organization that would embrace the entire region and to work instead with the northern tier nations, which were not as embroiled as their southern neighbors in the Palestine and Suez questions.

Turkey, the one consistently dependable Western ally in the region, took the initiative in formation of the northern tier. Having joined NATO in 1952, Turkey offered a secure base from which the Western alliance could be extended south and eastward. On 2 April 1954 Turkey signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Pakistan. It was not a military alliance, but it marked the beginnings of one. Less than a year later, on 24 February 1955, Turkey signed a military alliance with Iraq (the Baghdad Pact), which replaced the Turco-Pakistan agreement as the basic instrument of the northern tier collective security arrangement.

While Turkey had been building an alliance with bilateral agreements, the United States had been making arrangements to supply that alliance with arms. Late in 1953 it became known that the US government was negotiating some kind of military agreement with Pakistan. Despite the damage that would be done to its relations with India, the United States proceeded to conclude a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Pakistan on 19 May 1954, under which Pakistan would receive military equipment and training assistance.¹³

April-May
1954
Aid to
Pakistan
and Iraq

13. State Department Bulletin, XXX (31 May 54), 850-851.

Equally bold was the United States decision to provide grant military assistance to Iraq--a move that risked the furor of Iraq's Arab rival Egypt and also, quite naturally, of Israel. The agreement with Iraq was concluded on 21 April 1954. Although neither Pakistan nor Iraq made formal commitment with respect to regional defense when the aid agreements were concluded, it was nevertheless clearly understood that the United States expected the two countries to join in regional defense against the Soviet Union.¹⁴ Unlike Egypt in 1951,

14. John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Foreign Policy (New York: 1958), pp. 50-54.

Pakistan and Iraq were quite willing to do so, although their motives in seeking and accepting American aid stemmed only in part--and perhaps in small part--from their fear of Soviet communism. Pakistan sought to strengthen itself against India, Iraq against Egypt, its rival for Arab leadership. Both wanted the international prestige and internal stability that Western arms could produce.¹⁵

15. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East, pp. 51, 53.

If the northern tier was to be complete, it must include Iran. That Iran might ally itself with the West had seemed altogether impossible during the Mossadeq regime, but in 1953 a coup d'etat swept

1953-1954
Iranian
Coup and
Oil
Settlement

Mossadeq from power and left in his place a government more stable and far more friendly to the United States and Great Britain. With the assistance of an American intermediary, Herbert Hoover Jr., the British and Iranians reached a settlement of their oil dispute in 1954, and a major obstacle to American-Iranian cooperation was removed. Encouraged by the hope of an increase in US military assistance, the Shah's government climaxed its move away from Iran's traditional neutrality by adhering to the Baghdad Pact on 25 October 1955.

1955-1958
Relations
with
Baghdad
Pact

By late 1955 the Baghdad Pact was complete. The original pair of signatories had been joined not only by Iran, but also by Pakistan and by the United Kingdom, which had at first opposed US efforts to build the alliance but later found it a useful device for maintaining a preferential position in Iraq. The five members met at Baghdad in November 1955 to set up a permanent organization. An observer from the United States attended to give the pact an American blessing, but not to offer membership. For a variety of reasons, the State Department hesitated to join. It did not want to further antagonize Israel or Iraq's Arab rivals in the Middle East, nor to provoke any new Soviet move in the area.

Since then, however, under steady pressure from Baghdad Pact members and in the light of political developments in the Middle East, the United States has moved consistently towards closer association with the pact, until today it is a member in all but name. In April 1956 it announced that it would participate in

the economics and countersubversion committees. In June 1957 it joined the military committee. And in January 1958, following adoption of the Eisenhower Doctrine, Secretary Dulles told a Pact Council meeting that "our commitments coincide with the treaty commitments." At the latest meeting of pact ministers, held in late July without a representative from Iraq, the United States joined in a declaration stating that it would cooperate with the other signatories (Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and the UK) for their security and defense, and would promptly enter into agreements designed to give effect to this cooperation. This was the strongest possible diplomatic substitute for formal adherence to the pact.¹⁶

16. State Department Bulletin, Vol. XXXVII (17 Feb 58), pp. 250-254; ibid., Vol. XXXIX (18 Aug 58), pp. 272-273.

Deterioration of Relations with Egypt

The creation of the Baghdad Pact and the provision of arms to Iraq provoked a violent reaction from Egypt, which, under the leadership of Colonel Nasser, launched a campaign to organize its own coalition of Arab nations in opposition to Iraq.

Cairo's defiant attitude towards the Baghdad Pact was a serious disappointment to the United States, which was to suffer more than one disillusionment in its relations with the Egyptian dictatorship before 1955 ended. Throughout 1953 and 1954 the United States had encouraged the British to reach an agreement with Egypt on withdrawal of troops from the Suez Canal, obviously in the hope that elimination of this stubborn problem

Oct 1954
Suez
Agreement

would open the way for Egyptian cooperation with the West. The US ambassador in Cairo, Jefferson Caffery, played a considerable role in the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, and US newspapers, as a British author has rather caustically observed, "sometimes tended to include [the Suez agreement] in the list of Mr. Dulles's major successes."¹⁷

17. Coral Bell, Survey of International Affairs, 1954 (London: 1954), p. 198.

After the Suez agreement was concluded in October 1954, the United States provided Egypt with \$40 million in economic aid and made clear that it was willing also to grant military aid. The conditions required by the United States--including supervision by a MAAG--were, however, not acceptable to Colonel Nasser, and after some delay Egypt and the United States undertook desultory negotiations over the possibility of a sale of US weapons. These negotiations were still in progress when Nasser suddenly announced, on 27 September 1955, that he had agreed with Czechoslovakia to barter Egyptian cotton for Communist arms. In one bold stroke he had declared his independence from the West and immeasurably increased his prestige among the Arabs.¹⁸ The United States dispatched an Assistant

18. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East, pp. 67-69, 72-73; Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Vol. II, pp. 401-402.

Secretary of State to Cairo to express official concern, but the damage to United States interests could neither be disguised nor easily repaired.

1955
Failure of
Arms Talks
with Egypt

With the dramatic success of the arms deal behind him, Nasser proceeded to construct alliances with Syria and Saudi Arabia, which joined with Egypt in December 1955 in the creation of a joint military command. Lebanon and Jordan for the time being resisted Nasser's pressure, but Egyptian influence could be seen in the anti-Western riots that broke out in Jordan in December.

The United States was thus confronted late in 1955 with a hostile Arab bloc not yet powerful but rapidly growing in prestige. However, despite its close identification with the Baghdad Pact group, the United States was not prepared to write off all hope of friendly relations with the Egyptian bloc. In an attempt to forestall further Soviet penetration in Egypt and salvage some good will towards the West, it began late in 1955 to take an interest in aiding Egyptian construction of a mammoth dam and hydroelectric power station at Aswan. On 17 December the United States and the United Kingdom officially announced that they would make an initial grant for preliminary work, with assurances of sympathetic consideration of later support.¹⁹

Dec 1955
Promise of
aid for
Aswan Dam

19. Hollis W. Barber, The United States in World Affairs, 1955 (New York: 1957), pp. 185-188.

Breakdown of the Arab-Israeli Armistice

The division of the Middle East into Baghdad bloc and Cairo counter-bloc, both receiving arms, further aggravated the long-standing hostilities between the Arab nations and Israel. Arms in the hands of

Arabs--whether shipped from the Soviet countries or the West--could only heighten Israeli apprehension, for even in their moments of most bitter rivalry, the Arab nations kept in common their hatred of the Jewish state.

Beginning late in 1953, border violations, bombings, and minings multiplied along the Israeli frontiers, as armed Arab and Israeli groups engaged in an endless series of raids of provocation and retaliation. The United States, following its announced policy of impartiality, consistently supported the UN in condemning truce violators, and at one time suspended economic assistance to Israel because of its refusal to heed a request by the UN Truce Supervision Organization to cease work on a hydroelectric project on the Jordan River. But even with diplomatic support from the United States, the UN lacked the strength to punish or prevent violations.

The United States also continued efforts outside the UN to bring about an Arab-Israeli reconciliation. In 1953 President Eisenhower, acting on the assumption that economic cooperation might ease political conflict, dispatched to the Middle East a special envoy, Eric Johnston, to try to obtain agreement on a common plan for development of the Jordan River Valley. In two years Mr. Johnston appeared to make some progress, but not enough to bring the project to fruition before fighting again broke out.

1953-1955
Johnston
Mission

26 Aug 55
Dulles
proposals
for Arab-
Israeli
settlement

One other major diplomatic effort was made by the United States to sustain the tenuous truce. On 26 August 1955, in a speech before the Council on Foreign Relations, Secretary Dulles appealed to the Arab States and Israel to settle their differences, and offered American inducements in the form of financial aid to facilitate resettlement of the Palestinian refugees, assistance in the negotiation of permanent boundaries, and formal treaty engagements to prevent alteration of those boundaries by force. The plan met with warm praise and open support from the UN Secretary General and the government of the United Kingdom--but not, unfortunately, from those to whom it was addressed. On 9 November 1955 its contents were reaffirmed by President Eisenhower and buttressed by an offer of mediation from the United Kingdom, but still the Arabs and Israelis were uncompromising.

1955-1956
Refusal
of Arms
for Israel

The diplomatic aim of the Israelis was to obtain arms and a guarantee of security from the United States, without making any concessions in the conflict with the Arab states. After the announcement of the Egyptian deal for Communist arms, that aim became more urgent than ever, but no more easy to attain, for the United States steadfastly declined to join the side of the Israelis in a Middle Eastern arms race with the Soviet Union. Despite mounting pro-Israeli pressures at home, the Eisenhower Administration declined to give Israel the unilateral guarantee that it sought, reaffirming instead the principles of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, and stating, in April 1956, the determination of the United States, "in accordance with its responsibilities under the charter of the United

9 Apr 56
Presidential
statement
on Middle
East
Aggression

Nations," to observe its commitments "within constitutional means" to oppose any aggression in the Middle East area. The United States would, the President added, "support and assist any nation which might be subjected to such aggression."²⁰ These

20. State Department Bulletin, Vol. XXXIV (13 Feb 56), 233; ibid. (23 Apr 56), pp. 668.

statements were no substitute for shipments of arms, and Israel's fears for its own security continued to mount, unrelieved by US policy, until they reached a climax in the crisis of October 1956.

Beginnings of the Middle East Crisis of 1956

19 Jul 56
US withdraws
Aswan Dam
offer

On 19 July, only a few days after the Egyptian Ambassador had indicated unofficially that Egypt was ready to accept support in building the Aswan High Dam, the US withdrew its offer to participate in the project. According to the State Department Press Release, this action was based on the fact that agreement with the other riparian states had not been reached and that the ability of Egypt to devote adequate resources to the project had become uncertain. The UK followed the US lead, withdrawing its support the next day, and, on 23 July, the World Bank announced the automatic expiration of its offer. The US-UK actions were obviously a severe blow to Nasser's prestige, since the dam had figured largely in his promises of economic rehabilitation of Egypt.²⁰

20. State Department Bulletin, 30 Jul 56, pp. 185, 188. MEJ, Autumn 1956, p. 408.

The reasons advanced by Secretary Dulles as justification for withdrawal of the Aswan Dam offer were three in number: 1) That the Appropriations Committee of the Senate had unanimously passed a resolution providing that none of the 1957 funds could be used for the Aswan Dam; 2) The US had "come to the feeling" that it was dubious if a project of such magnitude, a billion and a half dollars, could be carried through with mutual advantage; 3) That Egypt had been developing ever-closer relations with the Soviet bloc countries; Egypt had been the first Arab nation to recognize Communist China; and "stalwart allies" were watching to see if a nation that played both sides against the middle got better treatment than nations which worked closely with the United States.²¹

21. State Department Bulletin, 22 Apr 57, p. 642.

26 Jul 56
Egypt
nationalizes
Suez Canal

In retaliation for the US-UK actions, Nasser proclaimed the nationalization of the Suez Canal, promising reimbursement of all stockholders at the prevailing Cairo stock market price. He also stated that Egypt would honor the Convention of 1888 and the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1954 regarding freedom of navigation for the Canal.²²

22. MEJ, Autumn, 1956, p. 408.

United States Policy and Actions on the Control and Operation of the Suez Canal

The effect of Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal was a grievous blow to the West and in particular to the UK and France. The summary expropriation of the

US, UK and
French
Positions on
Nationaliza-
tion of the
Suez Canal

Company's assets was not the chief issue. More serious was the question of how this waterway, which, as a short cut between Asia and Europe, had become so important to nearly every maritime nation in the world, was to function in the future. Prime Minister Eden, when he was in Washington in January 1956, had declared that Great Britain would fight if necessary to preserve its access to Middle Eastern oil. Following Egypt's nationalization of the Canal, he promptly informed the House of Commons that this situation was completely intolerable. As for France, Nasser's support of the Algerian rebels had already convinced French statesmen that they could never breathe easily while he remained in authority. Consultations looking toward an Anglo-French military action were begun immediately, and Britain dispatched warships to the Middle East, announced various mobilization measures, and blocked Egyptian financial accounts. But France and the UK halted short of outright intervention.²³

23. Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1956 (New York: 1957), pp. 257-259.

The perhaps decisive obstacle to military action was the attitude of the United States, which immediately after the nationalization of the Canal had made clear its opposition to the use of force against Egypt. The Egyptian action, Secretary Dulles conceded on 29 July, had struck "a grievous blow at international confidence." Egyptian assets in the United States were frozen, and the State Department formally protested against Nasser's "many intemperate, inaccurate, and misleading statements" about this country. Washington, however,

had no intention of supporting action of the type that was being openly discussed in London and Paris. Throughout the troubled weeks that followed, the primary US objective appeared to be that of preventing the conflict from degenerating into armed hostilities. While recognizing the important interests at stake for its allies and willing to support them up to a point, Washington placed its main hope in moderating the positions of both parties so that a nonviolent solution would be possible.²⁴

24. Ibid., p. 260.

The first move in Washington's long and ultimately unsuccessful campaign to substitute negotiation for force was a flight to London by Secretary Dulles for conferences with the British and French leaders on August 1 and 2. The first essential, he thought, was to get the interested governments together to discuss the matter; and he persuaded the British and French to put off any military action pending the outcome of a twenty-four-power international conference, which they agreed to convene in London. Great Britain and France agreed to try to settle the matter by negotiation, without renouncing the right to use force if negotiation failed. The United States, while agreeing with them that the Egyptian action merited severe censure, carefully refrained from committing itself to support them in any steps they might wish to take in case the conference failed. "We would hope," said Secretary Dulles on 3 August, "that out of this would come a solution which all the

US efforts
to reach
amiable
agreement
on future
status of
the Canal

nations, including Egypt, will respect so that the danger of violence may be averted." To the Egyptians, however, the notion of "international" interference in any form was thoroughly abhorrent. Nasser had no sympathy for the attempt to set up an "international system" to secure rights which, as he pointed out, Egypt had already undertaken to respect of its own volition. In his opinion, the announced aim of the conference was nothing but "a polite form of . . . international colonization" designed to "deprive Egypt of one of her essential rights and her sovereignty."²⁵

25. Ibid., pp. 260-262.

Under such circumstances the twenty-two delegations which eventually met in London from August 16 to 23 had little hope of bridging the gap between the Egyptian and Anglo-French positions, and in the end the conference produced only one majority proposal (outlined by the United States) supported by eighteen nations. The majority plan proposed to take the operation of the Canal out of the hands of Egypt and entrust it to an internationally responsible "Suez Canal Board." This plan was turned down flatly by Nasser.

The situation was rapidly reaching emergency proportions when on 12 September 1956, Prime Minister Eden, following urgent communication with Secretary Dulles, announced a plan for the formation of an intergovernmental "Suez Canal Users' Association" which would "undertake responsibility for coordination of traffic through the Canal", including the collection of tolls.²⁶

26. Ibid, pp. 263-265.

The idea of the Users' Association marked a further stage in the progressive alienation of the Arab world from the West and of France and Britain from the United States. In the eyes of the Egyptian and other Arab governments, the new plan was nothing less than a device to provoke war.

Although all of the eighteen nations endorsing the London majority plan agreed to attend a second conference to discuss the Users' project, all that could be agreed upon when they met in London on September 19-21 was a broad declaration of purposes and organizational principles. A third conference, also in London, actually set up a Users' Association as of October 1 with a membership of fifteen nations, which were said to account for three-fourths of the net tonnage passing through the Canal. But few, if any, of the participating nations expected the organization to solve the Suez problem.

The deflation of the Users' Association left the U.N. Security Council as virtually the only remaining agency which might conceivably produce a solution or at least facilitate the opening of negotiations.²⁷

27. Ibid, pp. 266-268.

The mood in which Great Britain and France approached the Security Council sessions was strongly colored by dissatisfaction with the support they had been receiving from the United States. It seemed to

US diver-
gence from
UK-French
position on
the Canal

them that Washington was too ready to follow the Soviet example in treating the matter as a conflict between "colonial" and "anticolonial" interests. This view of the case was, in fact, quite clearly brought out by Secretary Dulles at his news conference on October 2. Asked for clarification regarding the differences with our allies, he did not deny that such differences were related to, if not a reflection of, a wider difference on "the so-called problem of colonialism."

The London Daily Telegraph, reporting "a growing anti-American feeling not only in this country but throughout Europe," complained that the United States in thus attempting to play the middleman had "shirked risks inherent in her loyalty to her allies and her leadership of the West."

Such imputations were naturally not accepted in Washington. President Eisenhower insisted at his next news conference (October 11) that US policy throughout the Suez affair had been "clear and firm," that no one in "British officialdom" had expressed any dissatisfaction to him or to Mr. Dulles. "We certainly want to be fair to our great allies in the West," the President added next day. "We want to be equally fair to the Arab world."²⁸

28. Ibid., pp. 269-270.

In the substantive discussion of the UN Security Council which began on 5 October the US adopted what appeared to be a middle position.

5-13 Oct
UN Security
Council
delibera-
tions
regarding
Suez Canal

The United States, Mr. Dulles said, was going to vote for the Anglo-French resolution, with its endorsement of the full eighteen-power plan developed in London. At the same time, he suggested that only one of the broad principles enumerated in the London plan was really vital--namely, "that the operation of the Canal should be insulated from the influence of the politics of any nation." "If Egypt accepts that simple and rudimentary principle of justice," he said, "then I believe that the subsidiary problems can be resolved." By this comment Mr. Dulles appeared to many to abandon the principle of international operation of the Canal which had hitherto been regarded as the heart of the London plan and of the Anglo-French position.

In the end all that Egypt would agree to was the acceptance of six broad principles which, it was understood, would govern any settlement of the Suez question. These principles included Mr. Dulles' "insulation" principle, but said nothing of who was to control and operate the Canal or how Egypt was to be made to live up to its obligations.

The six principles fell far short of satisfying Britain and France. Thus, after the USSR had vetoed a UK-French resolution based on the eighteen-power plan, the stage was set for France and Britain to resort to violent means to protect their Suez "lifeline". In the next two weeks France and the UK were in close and secret consultation. In contrast, their contact with Washington was extremely lax. At the end of October came the Israeli attack on Egypt closely followed by British and French intervention. During

the next two months the question of the future status of the Suez Canal was held in abeyance while the Western Powers, led by the US, exerted themselves to reach agreement with Egypt on clearing the Canal, blocked by Egypt. With the withdrawal of French and British troops from Egypt in December negotiations through the UN were reopened between the Western Powers and Egypt on the control and operation of the Suez Canal. Despite repeated efforts of the Western Powers to arrive at a compromise solution, Egypt continued to insist that the granting to another power of a voice in management or control of the Canal would be an infringement of Egyptian sovereignty.

Egyptian
Declaration
of 24 April
1957

Finally, on 24 April 1957 Egypt announced that the Suez Canal was formally open for normal traffic and deposited with the UN a declaration on the principles, system, and procedures for its control and operation of the Suez Canal.

Although the Egyptian Declaration did not in the view of the US meet the six requirements accepted by the UN on 13 October 1956, the US gave "provisional de facto acquiescence" to the declaration, reserving the right to express itself further on the matter in the future. In conclusion, Mr. Lodge stated that the Security Council should remain seized of this matter while the system proposed by Egypt was given a trial.

Similarly, the Canal Users Association added that "insofar as use of the Canal is resumed by the shipping of member states, this does not imply their acceptance of the Egyptian Declaration as a settlement of the Suez Canal question."

Ultimately the compensation question was resolved on 29 April 1958 by an agreement between the United Arab Republic and the Universal Suez Canal Company covering the terms of a final settlement. On 1 May 1958, two days after the United Arab Republic and the Universal Suez Canal Company signed the compensation agreement, the US released the Egyptian assets, which had been "frozen" on 31 July 1956.²⁹

²⁹. State Department Bulletin, 19 May 58, p. 830.

Control and operation of the Suez Canal has remained exclusively in the hands of the Egyptian Government.

United States Role in Restoring Peace in Egypt during
the Suez Crisis

With the Israeli attack on Egypt, and the subsequent invasion by the UK and France, the US bent every effort to restore peace in the Middle East. The US channeled its major efforts in this direction through the UN, insisting again and again that the UN was the only proper and legally empowered organization to end the conflict and resolve the issues at stake. This position did not, however, prevent the US from taking unilateral action designed to force the contending powers to settle their differences through the UN.

US Action on
29 Oct 56

When Israel invaded Egypt on 29 October 1956 top administration officials were called to an emergency meeting during the evening to discuss the Israeli-Egyptian situation. A statement issued by the White House after the meeting said the President had recalled that the US was committed to assisting any victim of aggression in the Middle East and had said the US would honor this pledge. The statement announced that the US was consulting with Britain and France under the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 and planned, "as contemplated by that declaration that the situation shall be taken to the United Nations Security Council tomorrow morning." The statement concluded that the President would decide, "in light of the unfolding situation," "whether and when" a special session of Congress would be called. On the same day Secretary Dulles requested the President of the UN Security Council to call an immediate meeting of the Council to consider "The Palestine Question: Steps for the Immediate Cessation of the Military Action of Israel Against Egypt." At the UN, Ambassador Lodge

contacted Hammarskjold and members of the Security Council to urge calling a meeting for 30 October to consider the Israeli attack on Egypt. Hammarskjold and most of the members supported Lodge's proposal.³⁰

30. NYT, 30 Oct 56, 1:5. (U) Msg, SecState (Dulles) to USUN, 220, 29 Oct 56, CJCS files.

US reaction
to the British
and French
ultimatum of
30 Oct.

On 30 October, without any advance notice, the British and French Governments delivered joint declarations to Egypt and Israel. The declarations, similar but not identical, stated that the UK and France were determined to do all in their power to bring about an early end to Israeli-Egyptian hostilities and to safeguard the free passage of the Suez Canal. They called on both Egypt and Israel to cease "all warlike action" and to withdraw their forces to a distance of ten miles from the Canal. Egypt was also asked to allow the "temporary occupation" by Anglo-French forces of key points at Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez in order to guarantee freedom of transit through the Canal and to separate the belligerents. Egypt and Israel were given twelve hours to answer the Anglo-French declarations; if by then one or both governments had not taken steps to comply with the stated requirements, British and French forces would intervene in whatever strength might be necessary to insure compliance. President Eisenhower learned of the British-French ultimatum from press reports and immediately sent "urgent and personal messages" to Eden and Mollet calling on them to reconsider their proposed action. According to the White House, these messages stated the President's belief that an armistice could be secured by peaceful means

and expressed his earnest hope that the UN would be given full opportunity to settle the controversy. The New York Times reported that the Administration had also accepted in principle a policy of stopping economic aid to Israel until that state withdrew its troops from Egypt. At a morning session of the UN Security Council, Ambassador Lodge introduced a resolution calling on Israel to withdraw its forces behind the established armistice line. It further called upon the members of the UN to refrain from the use or threat of force in the area, and to refrain from giving military, economic, or financial assistance to Israel as long as it failed to comply with the resolution. In his supporting speech, Lodge alluded to the Anglo-French ultimatum. It was unjustified, he said, and in any event the basis for it would be removed by passage of the Security Council resolution. The USSR introduced a similar resolution. Britain and France vetoed both resolutions, arguing that the Security Council could not move fast enough to deal with the crisis.³¹

31. (U) Msg, USARMA London to DEPTAR, UX 100, 301730Z Oct 56, DA IN 694045, CJCS files. AP Wire Service at 301647Z Oct 56. NYT, 31 Oct 56, 1:4, 15:1-5. AP Wire Service at 302150Z Oct 56. (U) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 452, 30 Oct 56, CJCS files. NYT, 31 Oct 56, 1:2-3, 6:3-5.

On 31 October an official White House statement announced that the US would stand by its pledge to assist any victim of aggression in the Middle East. In a television address that evening President Eisenhower, while making clear that the US would not become involved in the hostilities, condemned the use of force by Israel, the UK, and France. He sought to explain, however,

that tension between Egypt on the one hand and Israel, Britain, and France on the other had been seriously aggravated by Egypt's seizure of the Suez Canal, considered by the UK and France as their "lifeline". The President reaffirmed his faith in the UN and disclosed that the US would bring the whole question before the UN General Assembly, where no veto operated.³²

32. AP Wire Service, 31 Oct 56, NYT, 1 Nov 56, 1:8.

The UN
cease-fire
Resolution of
2 Nov 56

As promised by President Eisenhower, the US on 1 November introduced a resolution designed to meet the crisis in the Middle East. The resolution called for a cease-fire by all military forces engaged in hostilities and withdrawal to the armistice lines, recommended that all UN members refrain from introducing military goods into the area of hostilities, urged that steps be taken to reopen the Canal as soon as the cease-fire was arranged, requested the Secretary General to observe and report on compliance with the resolution, and extended the emergency session pending compliance with the resolution. The vote, taken on 2 November, was 64 to 5, with the UK, France, Israel, Australia, and New Zealand opposing, and Belgium, Canada, Laos, the Netherlands, Portugal, and South Africa abstaining. The resolution was rejected by the UK, France, and Israel.³³

33. NYT, 2 Nov 56. AP Wire Service 3 Nov 56.

In accordance with this resolution, the US immediately suspended the provision of economic aid to Israel.³⁴

34. Events in The Middle East, A Select Chronology 1946-57. Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 85th Cong. 1st Sess. January 11, 1957. Hereinafter: Senate Middle East Chronology.

US Support
of UN
Resolutions
of 3-4 Nov 56

At the 3-4 November night session of the UN General Assembly, the US supported two resolutions adopted by the Assembly. The first was a Canadian resolution requesting Hammarskjold to submit within 48 hours a plan for setting up an emergency international UN police force to secure and supervise cessation of hostilities in accordance with the cease-fire resolution of 2 November. The second resolution, sponsored by 19 Asian and African countries, called on the belligerents to comply immediately with the cease-fire resolution. The US also introduced two resolutions but did not press for a vote. The first was to form a UN commission to seek a permanent settlement of the major outstanding problems between the Arabs and Israel. The second resolution proposed creating a special UN commission to prepare recommendations, in consultation with Egypt, France, and the UK, for restoring transit through the Canal and for operating and maintaining the Canal in accordance with the Convention of 1888 and the six principles agreed to by the Security Council and Egypt on 13 October. The two US resolutions were never voted on.³⁵

35. NYT, 4 Nov 56, 1:2, 29:8.

US reaction to
the Soviet
Proposal of
5 November

On the next day the USSR released the texts of messages sent by Bulganin to Eisenhower, Eden, Mollet, and Ben Gurion. The message to Eisenhower condemned the UK and France for launching aggression in the Middle

East to restore colonial rule, and proposed that the US and USSR join forces and, "backed by a United Nations decision," put an end to the Israeli and Anglo-French aggression by military force. A White House statement, issued on receipt of this message, labeled the Soviet proposal an "unthinkable suggestion" contrary to the UN cease-fire resolution. In a subsequent press conference the President stated that the US would oppose any Soviet military intervention in the Middle East.³⁶

36. NYT, 6 Nov 56, 1:3, 8, 10:2-6. AP Wire Service, 5 Nov 56. NYT, 15 Nov 56, 1:8.

In the next two days, however, President Eisenhower personally addressed himself to Prime Minister Eden and Prime Minister Ben Gurion to urge British and Israeli compliance with the UN Resolution of 2 November. Eden replied on 6 November that the UK and France had already decided to accept the resolution. Ben Gurion replied on 8 November stating that Israel was ready to withdraw from Egypt as soon as "satisfactory arrangements" concerning the proposed UN Force were achieved.³⁷

37. AP Wire Service 6 Nov 56. NYT, 7, 8, 9 Nov 56; (U) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 36, 8 Nov 56; (U) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 561, 9 Nov 56.

On 9 November the British and French Governments let it be known that they were ready to take part in a "Summit Conference" to deal with the dangers in Europe and the Middle East. This feeler was firmly rejected by President Eisenhower on the next day. The President stated that the US preferred to deal with current international crisis through the UN. Less than a week later,

The President's personal appeals to the UK and Israel 6-7 Nov 56

US rejection of tentative UK-French proposal for a "Summit Conference".

on 14 November, a British Foreign Office spokesman stated that Great Britain had decided to seek its policy objectives through the United Nations.³⁸

38. AP Wire Service 9 Nov 56. NYT, 10 Nov 56, 1:6; NYT, 11 Nov 56, 1:6-7; Senate Middle East Chronology.

US support of
UN Resolutions
of 7 and 24
Nov

On 7 and 24 November the US supported three additional resolutions on the Middle East. Two of these reiterated the 2 November call for Britain, France and Israel to withdraw their forces from Egypt. The third resolution, vigorously supported by the US, was designed to rush completion of the UN police force to supervise the armistice in prospect.³⁹

39. AP Wire Service 7 Nov 56. NYT, 8, 25 Nov 56.

US action in
securing
withdrawal
from Egypt

With the declaration of UK and French intentions to withdraw their forces from Egypt, the US on 3 December called for the prompt reopening of the Suez Canal. In the next three weeks British and French troops did in fact withdraw, but Israel remained adamant in its stand that Israeli troops would not evacuate the Gaza Strip and the Sharm El Sheikh area until its security from attack from the Strip was assured and the free navigation of the Gulf of Aqaba guaranteed. Egypt, however, refused to consider any solution other than a return to the status quo ante in both Gaza and Sharm El Sheikh. In this impasse the US played a leading role in breaking the deadlock. Firmly supporting the UN position that Israel withdraw to the 1949 armistice line, the US also exerted strong unilateral pressure on Israel to withdraw without guarantee from "Fedayeen" activity

originating in the Gaza Strip or free navigation of the Gulf of Aqaba. The US did, however, make it clear that it would act through the UN to assure the security of Israel and support free navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba after Israeli withdrawal. By the end of the third week of January 1957, Israel had withdrawn from all of the occupied territory except the Sharm El Sheikh area and the Gaza Strip. There was no indication, however, that Israel contemplated withdrawing from these areas without guarantees. The US therefore, supported by five other nations, introduced two resolutions on the Middle East. The first called attention to five previous UN requests for Israel to withdraw, deplored Israel's failure to comply with these requests, and called on Israel to complete its withdrawal without further delay. The second resolution recognized that an Israeli withdrawal must be followed by action aimed at the creation of peaceful conditions in the Middle East, and called on both Egypt and Israel to observe the provisions of the 1949 armistice agreement between the two countries. These resolutions were approved on 2 February.⁴⁰

40. NYT, 2 Feb 57, 1:2, Text 2:3-4. NYT, 3 Feb 57, 1:8.

When on the next day Israel still refused to consider evacuation of the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba area because the UN resolutions did not include guarantees, President Eisenhower sent a personal letter to the Israeli Prime Minister urging Israeli compliance with the resolutions. Following Israel's rejection of this appeal, Secretary Dulles on 11 February handed the Israeli Ambassador an aide-memoire setting forth the US

position and certain proposals on Israeli withdrawal. The US position and proposals were set forth as follows:

- 1) The UN General Assembly had no right to modify substantially the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement, which gave Egypt the right and responsibility of occupation of the Gaza Strip; hence the Israelis should promptly and unconditionally withdraw from that area, "leaving future of Gaza Strip to be worked out through efforts and good offices of UN." The UNEF should be stationed on the boundary between the Gaza Strip and Israel to prevent recurrence of the border-crossing raids and reprisals of the past.
- 2) The US believed that the Gulf of Aqaba constituted international waters and that no nation had the right forcibly to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf or through the Strait giving access thereto. The US recalled having been informed by Egypt on 28 February 1950 that Egyptian occupation of the islands of Tiran and Sanafir at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba had been undertaken to protect these islands from possible violation and was not designed "in any way" to obstruct "innocent passage" through the adjacent waters. Therefore, barring an "overriding decision" to the contrary, as by the International Court of Justice, the US was prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage in these waters and join with others to secure general recognition of this right. Israel, however, would have to withdraw its forces to be eligible to exercise such a right. The UNEF, as a precautionary measure, should move into the Strait area as Israeli forces were withdrawn.
- 3) The US believed that Israeli withdrawal should precede the other measures called for by the UN resolutions. The US was prepared to declare publicly that it would use

its influence, in concert with other UN members to the end that, following Israel's withdrawal, these other measures would be implemented.⁴¹

41. State Dept Bulletin, 11 Mar 57, pp. 392-393.

When the Israeli reply, 15 February, proved to be "not responsive" to the US position, President Eisenhower on 20 February, delivered a special radio-TV address in which he stated that the UN now had "no choice but to exert pressure upon Israel to comply with the withdrawal resolution." The President also declared that to give Israel guarantees as a condition of such withdrawal, however, would be to countenance the use of force as a means of settling international differences or gaining national advantages. It should not be assumed that Egypt would violate the Armistice Agreement "or other international obligations." But, if such a violation should occur, the matter should be firmly dealt with by "the society of nations."⁴²

42. AP Wire Service 15, 20 Feb 57. State Department Bulletin, 11 Mar 57, pp. 387-390.

The President's address seems to have been the turning point in the long negotiations to secure Israeli withdrawal. For another week Israel attempted to negotiate a compromise, but the UN and the US, which in the withdrawal issue were in complete accord, refused to consider any compromise. Finally, following another in a series of US-Israeli meetings, the Israeli Ambassador on 28 February publicly announced that the Israeli Government intended to withdraw from the Gaza and the Gulf of Aqaba areas.⁴³

43. NYT, 22 Feb 57, 1:8. AP Wire Service 27, 28 Feb 57.

On the next morning, with Israel expected to announce during the afternoon its decision to withdraw from the Gaza and Gulf of Aqaba areas, Secretary Dulles met with representatives of nine Arab states in an effort to forestall an adverse Arab reaction to the assumptions on which Israel was basing its withdrawal. Mr. Dulles told the Arabs that "no promises or concessions whatever" had been made by the US to induce Israel to withdraw. On the afternoon of 1 March the Israeli Foreign Minister announced to the UN General Assembly Israel's plan for a full and prompt withdrawal from Sharm El Sheikh and the Gaza Strip. By 13 March Israel did in fact evacuate the last of its troops.⁴⁴

13 Mar 57
Israeli
troops with-
drawn

44. AP Wire Service 1, 8, 13 Mar 57. NYT, 2, 8 Mar 57.

The Eisenhower Doctrine

The gravely unsettled situation resulting from Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal and the subsequent conflict in the Middle East revealed the serious vulnerability of that vital area to Communist subversion and aggression. The US took drastic steps, therefore, to redress the situation and the most dramatic of these steps was the evolution and implementation of the so-called "Eisenhower Doctrine". In a special message to Congress on 5 January 1957, the President after pointing out that the Middle East was seriously threatened by the USSR, described certain proposals designed to promote peace and stability in the Middle East. These proposals,

5 Jan 57

Introduction
of the Presi-
dent's pro-
posals re
Middle East

popularly called the "Eisenhower Doctrine," were introduced in Congress on the same day in the form of a House joint resolution. The resolution was passed by Congress on 7 March and signed by the President on 9 March. The most pertinent parts of the resolution are as follows:

That the President be and hereby is authorized to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East desiring such assistance in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

Sec. 2. The President is authorized to undertake, in the general area of the Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring such assistance. Furthermore, the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism: Provided, That such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Constitution of the United States.

Sec. 3. The President is hereby authorized to use during the balance of fiscal year 1957 for economic and military assistance under this joint resolution not to exceed \$200,000,000 from any appropriation now available for carrying out the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended. . . .

Sec. 4. The President should continue to furnish facilities and military assistance, within the provisions of applicable law and established policies, to the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East, with a view to maintaining the truce in that region.⁴⁵

45. State Department Bulletin, 28 Jan 57, p. 128, 25 Mar 57, p. 481.

Middle East
Countries and
Soviet re-
action to
"Eisenhower
Doctrine"

Public announcement of the "Eisenhower Doctrine" was greeted with general approval in the Middle East countries except in Syria and Egypt. In an official statement Syria on 10 January declared that defense of

the Middle East was solely the responsibility of its "inhabitants". The statement rejected the "artificial theory" of a Middle East power vacuum and asserted that the area was threatened only by "imperialism and Zionism." Egyptian reaction was also unfavorable. From Moscow Soviet Premier Bulganin and Communist Chinese Premier Chou-En-Lai on 18 January issued a joint declaration condemning the Eisenhower Middle East policy and pledging that the USSR and China would "continue to give any necessary support to the peoples of the Near and Middle East in order to avert aggression and interference in the affairs . . . of that region." Probably in reaction to the Eisenhower Doctrine, the USSR on 11 February presented to the US, UK, and France a note on the Middle Eastern situation and the text of a proposed six-point joint declaration of principles to be made by the four great powers. Exactly a month later the Western powers in separate notes rejected the Soviet proposal. In its note the US stated that it declined "to be party to an attempt by the great powers, as suggested by the USSR, to arrogate to themselves decisions on matters of vital importance to the nations of the Middle East"; the Middle Eastern states were "fully capable" of making for themselves decisions affecting their collective security. The Soviet proposal, "clearly based on a false premise," stemmed "presumably" from a "distorted interpretation of the nature and purpose of United States policies."⁴⁶

⁴⁶. (U) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1671, 11 Jan 57. AP Wire Service 18 Jan 57, State Department Bulletin, 27 May 57, pp. 841-845. State Department Bulletin, 1 Apr 57, pp. 523-525.

The Richards Mission, purpose and results.

To explain to the countries of the Middle East the implications of the resolution, James P. Richards was appointed on 7 January 1957 as special assistant to the President to undertake a mission to the area. Ambassador Richards was authorized to make agreements in principle regarding economic and military assistance to further the purposes and objectives of the resolution. He departed on March 12 and during the ensuing months traveled some 30,000 miles on visits to fifteen nations, not including Syria, Egypt, and Jordan. Thirteen of the countries visited issued public statements endorsing the purposes and objectives of the resolution. Foreign governments were assured by Ambassador Richards of the intent of the United States to come to their help if requested in the event of armed aggression by international communism. At the same time it was made clear that the resolution specifically conferred on the President discretion to determine what action should be taken by the United States in any given circumstances, and that the resolution did not carry with it any advance commitment by the United States to take any particular course of action.⁴⁷

⁴⁷. State Department Bulletin, 26 Aug 57, pp. 339-343.

Economic assistance programs were approved by Ambassador Richards under the terms of the resolution in the following countries: Lebanon, Libya, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Ethiopia. In addition, a regional economic assistance program was approved, under the auspices of the Baghdad Pact, involving the cooperation of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey. The total amount of economic assistance funds negotiated by

Ambassador Richards was \$67.7 million, of which \$52.7 million was on a grant basis and \$15 million was on a loan basis.

Ambassador Richards made agreements in principle for military assistance totaling \$51 million, consisting principally of additional military hardware (tanks, vehicles, electronics equipment, etc.), expendable items, such as ammunition, and military construction. Of this amount, \$24.1 million was obligated under the regular authority of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and \$23.2 million was estimated to have been obligated under section 3 of the resolution.⁴⁸

48. Ibid.

President's
report on
progress
under the
"Eisenhower
Doctrine",
5 Mar 58

On 5 March 1958 President Eisenhower transmitted to Congress a report on the progress achieved in promoting peace and stability in the Middle East. In his report the President stated that "The policy embodied in Joint Resolution 117 to promote peace and stability in the Middle East . . . continues to be a cornerstone of United States foreign policy in this vital area." The commitments for assistance made by Ambassador Richards had reinforced the internal strength of the nations which had welcomed US assistance. The determination of the United States, explicit in the resolution, that it was prepared to use armed forces, if requested, to render assistance in the event of armed Communist aggression in the Middle East, had been particularly heartening to the members of the Baghdad Pact. It had unquestionably contributed to the steadfastness with which they, and other states of the Middle East, had resisted the campaign of intimidation and disruption

conducted by the Soviet Union and its agents. The full force of the Communist propaganda apparatus has been brought to bear throughout the Middle East in an attempt to portray the resolution as an effort by the United States to extend its domination over the area, to split the Arab world, and to reinstate a form of colonialism. The recent Afro-Asian Conference in Cairo, where the Communists played a major role, had asserted in a resolution on "Imperialism," that--

both the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower doctrine interfere with the independence of the Arab countries, infringe on their sovereignty, and endanger their security.

By the beginning of 1958 the US had committed a total of \$123 million of funds available under the Mutual Security Act for the fiscal year of 1957 for nonmilitary aid programs in implementation of the joint resolution.⁴⁹

49. State Department Bulletin 31 Mar 58, pp. 524-526.

US Policy in the European Oil Crisis, Winter 1956-1957

The Anglo-French use of force against Egypt not only failed in its purposes, but raised almost immediately the specter of a severe oil crisis for Europe, and in particular for the UK and France. Unlike the US, which is not dependent on Middle East oil for domestic use, the UK and France rely heavily on such oil for industrial and consumer use. In 1956, for example, Western European requirements were 3,000,000 barrels daily, and seventy per cent of this oil came from the Middle East. When the UK and France launched their military operations against Egypt, despite strongly voiced US opposition to a violent solution to the Canal problem, Egypt reacted by obstructing the Canal, and Syrians sabotaged the

pipeline bringing oil through Syria from Iraq to the Mediterranean, thus cutting off the two major sources of oil from the Middle East to Europe. The UK and France soon found themselves in the position of having to turn to the US for 1) oil to alleviate the shortages which were now a foregone conclusion, and 2) assistance in restoring the flow of oil through the Suez Canal and the sabotaged pipeline. Though angered by the Anglo-French attack on Egypt, the US Government responded with assistance. Through the UN, the US moved to hasten the reopening of the Suez Canal, and it also exerted diplomatic pressure on Syria to repair the pipeline and permit the movement of oil from Iraq to the Mediterranean.

The US decision to assist its European allies in their hours of trial was a logical and necessary one; for as long as Western Europe's strength and stability is important to the US, and it is today of vital importance, the US must consider any oil problem of Europe virtually as its own. At the same time it was also important in the view of US policy makers that the US placate the Arab States, aroused by the attack on Egypt, and secure to the maximum extent possible their cooperation and friendship, for not only was the oil of the Middle East essential to Europe, but Soviet designs on that strategic crossroads of the globe had already been apparent for some time. In the resolution which it introduced in the UN General Assembly on 1 November, and which was adopted on the following day, the US called for not only a withdrawal of forces, but prompt measures "to reopen the Suez Canal." Egypt refused, however, to permit work on canal clearance until all

British and French troops were withdrawn. And Syria insisted that all UK, French and Israeli forces be withdrawn before it would permit repair of the pipeline.⁵⁰

50. NYT, 2 Nov 56.

In the following weeks the US worked unceasingly to secure the withdrawal of British, French and Israeli troops, the reopening of the Canal, and the repair of the pipeline. To the discontent of not only Britain and France but of other European countries which had played no part in the attack on Egypt, the US delayed activating the emergency committee on oil supplies for Europe set up soon after the Canal was nationalized. The US did, however, allow some relief to Europe by permitting the increase of oil shipments from Gulf of Mexico ports to be increased. Finally on 3 December 1956 the British Foreign Secretary announced that French and British forces would be withdrawn without delay, in the expectation that steps would be taken immediately to clear the Canal and restore navigation. In anticipation of this announcement, the US Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization on 30 November, with the approval of the President, had already authorized fifteen US oil companies to coordinate their efforts on the "oil supply problem resulting from the closing of the Suez Canal and some pipelines in the Middle East." On 3 December, the day of British Minister's announcement, the fifteen oil companies met with federal officials to complete plans for rushing oil to Europe. On the same day the State Department released a statement, approved by the President, calling for the prompt reopening of the Canal in view of the announced British and French

30 Nov 56
US acts to
relieve oil
shortage

intention to withdraw from Egypt. The last Anglo-French troops were evacuated from Egypt on 22 December and by the end of month work on Canal clearance was begun. But it was not until 29 March 1957 that the first convoy was able to transit the Canal, and it was May 1957 before operations through the Canal were back to normal.⁵¹

51. NYT, 23 Dec 56, AP Wire Service 28, 29 Dec 56, 29 Mar 57. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East, p. 320.

Syria, however, refused to permit repair of the pipeline until the second week of March 1957, after the final Israeli contingent had pulled back to the 1949 Armistice line. Thereafter, repairs were quickly accomplished, and on 11 March 1957, after an interruption of more than four months, oil once more flowed through the pipeline.⁵²

52. NYT, 7 Mar 57, AP Wire Service 11, 12 Mar 57.

In conclusion, during the oil crisis, lasting almost a year, Western Europe was able to maintain total oil consumption at about 80% of normal, with a somewhat higher figure for basic transportation and urgent industrial requirements. Although the loss of Middle East oil was neither lasting nor total, in the final analysis the crisis was surmounted, and most severe economic dislocation averted, only through the role played by the US in providing large oil shipments from the Western Hemisphere. It is, however, a matter of uneasy speculation as to how long Western Europe could stand the financial strain of meeting its requirements from the Americas or how long the US could meet these requirements.⁵³

53. Campbell, *Defense of the Middle East*, p. 230.

United States Relations with the Arab States, 1957-58

US relations with Egypt and its leftist partner, Syria, continued tense and strained even after the display of US opposition to the Anglo-French invasion of Suez, but in the early months of 1957, the United States appeared to meet with considerable success in its search for friendships with other Arab nations.

Jan-Feb
1957
Saud's
visit to
Washington

On 30 January 1957, King Saud arrived in Washington for a visit of a little more than a week, during which he not only agreed to a five-year renewal of the Dhahran base lease, which had expired in June 1956, but also issued a public endorsement of the Eisenhower Doctrine. In return he received promises of military assistance. As explained in April, following formal confirmation of the US-Saudi agreement, the United States was to provide military equipment on a reimbursable basis, improve civil aviation facilities at Dhahran, and provide air and naval training for Saudi armed forces.⁵⁴

54. NYT, 8 Apr 57.

Saud's endorsement of the Eisenhower Doctrine brought to three the number of Arab states which had publicly welcomed the President's statement, endorsements having already been issued by Iraq, as a member of the Baghdad Pact, and by Lebanon, through its pro-Western Foreign Minister, Charles Malik. All three countries welcomed the Richards Mission and joined with the United States in communiqués expressing support of the Doctrine, either explicitly as in the Lebanese

communiqué of 16 March 1957, or implicitly as in the Saudi communiqué of 11 April. From Syria and Egypt came statements hostile towards the Doctrine, and from Jordan, on the brink of turmoil, came conflicting voices--one that of the young King Hussein, warning against the danger of Communism, the other that of his leftist premier, Suleiman Nabulsi, denying that the danger existed.

April 1957
Crisis in
Jordan

In April, the conflict between king and cabinet leader reached a climax, threatening to disrupt the Jordanian state and putting the Eisenhower Doctrine to its first real diplomatic test. The crisis broke on 10 April when Nabulsi resigned at the request of Hussein. Backed by the loyal Arab legion, the king dismissed pro-Egyptian officers from the army, deported his chief of staff, Major General Ali Abu Nuwar, to Syria, and appointed a pro-Western premier. The success of Hussein's sweeping action remained in doubt for two weeks, while his regime was threatened from within by pro-Egyptian mobs and from without by the troops of neighboring nations, deployed along Jordan's borders to await a division of spoils. Hussein found one staunch Arab ally in King Saud, who placed his 3,500 troops in Jordan under the king's command for the duration of the emergency.⁵⁵ His strongest support came from the United

55. New York Herald-Tribune, 24 Apr 57.

States, which took quick action both diplomatic and military.

On 24 April, at the height of the crisis, the President's press secretary called attention to the provision of the Eisenhower Doctrine that states that

the US regards as vital to its national interests and to world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East, and stated that he had been authorized by the President and the Secretary of State to say that they regarded the independence and territorial integrity of Jordan as vital. On the same day it was reported that the Sixth Fleet had been ordered to the Eastern Mediterranean. Two days later the State Department disclosed that it had advised the governments bordering Jordan against moves that would precipitate trouble. Three days after that, the United States granted Jordan \$10 million. On 30 April, Hussein could declare that the crisis was at an end.⁵⁶

⁵⁶. NYT, 25 and 27 Apr 57; MEA, vol. 8 (June-July 1957), pp. 264-265.

Since then, Jordan has continued to receive aid from the United States, which has assumed the burden of the financial subsidy that once was a responsibility of Britain and later jointly of Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, an undependable trio of subsidizers. Through this period, Jordan has been a faithful ally of the United States but not a strong one, for the internal dissensions that were revealed in the April crisis have never been healed, but were only hidden by Hussein's victory.

Aug-Oct
1957
The Syrian
Crisis

The Jordanian situation had been stabilized only a short time when another crisis in Middle Eastern affairs arose, this one involving the United States, Turkey, Syria, and the Soviet Union. Syria touched it off by ousting three US Embassy officials on charges of plotting

to overthrow the Syrian Government. The US responded with a strong protest against the Syrian slander campaign and with the expulsion of the Syrian ambassador to the US.

The situation worsened with the resignation on 15 August of the Syrian chief of staff and his replacement shortly thereafter by General Afif Bizri, a man with a record of pro-Soviet activity. Coming less than two weeks after an announcement that the USSR would begin an economic and technical aid program to Syria, these events seemed to indicate that Syria might soon become an out-and-out Soviet satellite. Again the Eisenhower Doctrine was called into question.

Statements of the President and the Secretary of State in succeeding days at times seemed to presage intervention and other times not. On 21 August the President declared that the "ultimate aim" of the USSR was to control Syria, but that the situation did not "at present justify any kind of action at all under the Mideast Doctrine." On the other hand, the government appeared to adopt a graver tone after receiving the report of Deputy Under Secretary of State Loy Henderson, who was dispatched to the Middle East on a quick "fact-finding mission." Returning to the US on 4 September after talks with high officials of Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, Mr. Henderson stated that the situation in Syria was "extremely serious", and on the next day the Defense Department announced that it would start airlifting arms to Jordan. Following a conference at the White House on 7 September, Secretary Dulles issued a statement noting that some Middle East countries were deeply concerned over "the apparently growing Soviet

Communist domination of Syria and the large build-up there of Soviet-bloc arms," and declaring that the President had affirmed his intention "to carry out the national policy, expressed in the congressional Middle East resolution."⁵⁷

57. MEA, vol. 8 (Oct 1957), pp. 361-363; State Department Bulletin, vol. XXXVII (23 Sep 57), p. 487.

Press speculation about armed intervention in the Middle East then mounted, but it was quieted by Mr. Dulles on 10 September, when he stated that such intervention would take place only if there was an act of aggression in the Middle East by a country found by the President to be dominated by international communism, followed by a request for US assistance from the country attacked. Mr. Dulles thought these conditions not likely to occur.⁵⁸

58. State Department Bulletin, vol. XXXVII (30 Sep 57), p. 527.

Indeed, they did not occur, but the Syrian situation was still to get worse before it began to get better. Turkey, by concentrating troops near the Syrian border, alarmed Arab states such as Lebanon and Saudi Arabia that were not always sympathetic towards Syria, and incited a letter of protest from the USSR. US policy statements, indicating sympathy for the Turks, continued to emphasize the danger of the Soviet arms build-up in Syria.

Soon the United States found itself in embarrassing isolation from all of its erstwhile Arab friends, which one by one rallied to the support of Syria with promises

that they would join in its defense in case of attack. Even King Hussein, who had been most vociferous in his complaints about a threat from Syria, eventually fell in line following Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Lebanon, and Egypt. Attempting to aggravate Arab fears, the Soviet Union charged that the US was pushing Turkey into war with Syria, and Khrushchev observed that Turkish leaders had shown themselves "not very sensible" by concentrating troops near Syria and leaving their northern frontier "almost bare." The State Department responded with a denial of the Soviet charges and a declaration that the US would fulfill its treaty obligations towards Turkey.⁵⁹

59. MEA, vol. 8 (Nov 57), pp. 397-399.

In mid-October, the crisis reached its peak, as Syro-Soviet charges of a war plot were carried to the UN. On 16 October, in a letter to Secretary General Hammarskjold, the Syrian foreign minister asked that a complaint about threats to Syria and to international peace be put on the General Assembly agenda and that a commission be set up to investigate the situation on the Syro-Turkish border. The Soviet Union sent a letter on the same day to the President of the General Assembly, declaring that reliable information indicated that the Turkish General Staff, with US advisers, had elaborated plans for an attack on Syria following the Turkish elections on 27 October. Again Soviet promises of support to Syria and US promises of support to Turkey were issued, as well as informal US and Turkish denials that any attack was being planned. The Soviet charges were "nonsensical lies," a Turkish spokesman said. In the UN, the United States declared that it welcomed

Assembly consideration of the Middle East question.⁶⁰

60. MEA, vol. 8 (Dec 57), pp. 430-431; State Department Bulletin, vol. XXXVII (4 Nov 57), pp. 708-714.

The Assembly debate began on 18 October and ended on 1 November, without any action having been taken. For three days, from 22 to 25 October, debate was suspended while King Saud sought to mediate the dispute, but failed for want of cooperation from Syria. Both Syria and the West introduced resolutions into the Assembly--Syria's calling for creation of an investigating commission, the West's for an effort by the Secretary-General to settle the dispute--but both resolutions were withdrawn and the Soviet-inspired scare appeared to evaporate quite suddenly. On 19 November, Ankara announced a general withdrawal of Turkish troops from the Syrian border.⁶¹

61. MEA, vol 8 (Dec 57), pp. 430-434; ibid., 9 (Jan 58), p. 44; State Department Bulletin, vol. XXXVII (25 Nov 57), p. 829.

While trouble was on the wane between Syria and Turkey, it was growing, farther south, in Lebanon, scene of the next of the 1957-58 series of Middle Eastern crises. One of the first and most unequivocal endorsers of the Eisenhower Doctrine, Lebanon was to receive \$10 million in economic aid and \$4,700,000 million in arms aid from the US in Fiscal Year 1958, according to a Beirut announcement in July. Yet Lebanon was wavering from its pro-Western position. On 22 October 1957, Lebanon's Acting Foreign Minister, Jamil Mikkawi, confirmed that his country had asked for a

1957-58
Unrest in
Lebanon

revision of the 16 March communique on the Eisenhower Doctrine. Internal unrest grew during succeeding months and culminated in May in armed insurrection. On 9 May the USIA library in Tripoli was sacked and burned by armed rioters demonstrating against the government, and on 12 May the USIA library in Beirut was destroyed, an Iraq Petroleum Company pipeline was blown up, and a strike declared in the northern part of the country. The United States announced that it was rushing shipments of police equipment to Lebanon and strengthening Marine forces with the Sixth Fleet. On 17 May the State Department said that the US was considering the dispatch of troops to Lebanon if the President should request them.⁶² The request came and

⁶². NYT, 23 Oct 57, 18 May 58; MEA, vol 9 (Jun-Jul 58), pp. 239-240.

the dispatch of troops followed when, on 14 July 1958, the Iraqi Government was overthrown. The US faced another crisis in its relations with the Arab world, this one by far the most serious of all.

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SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST,
JULY 1958-JULY 1964

Soviet Policy Toward
M.E. (Jul 58-Jul 64)

Historical Division
Joint Chiefs of Staff
2 September 1964

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST,
JULY 1958-JULY 1964.

Soviet Near Eastern Policy.

After the close of World War II, Arab nationalism gathered momentum throughout the Near East. The Arab Muslim, who tended to look upon the Arab world as the victim of Western imperialism, came to regard the West as his deadly enemy. In this emotional context, even the most innocuous Western action could be interpreted as an attack on Muslim civilization. As a professor at Beirut's American University phrased it, "The Muslims, therefore, became understandably jubilant at the ills of the West, their hearts often bursting with gratification whenever the West faltered or suffered a setback."¹

¹Nabih Amin Faris, "The Islamic Community and Communism," in Walter Z. Laqueur, ed., The Middle East in Transition (New York: 1958), p. 359.

The Russian government was aware of what was happening in the Near East. Observers in Moscow could detect "the considerable growth of national consciousness," a phenomenon "expressed in the rise of the national liberation movement, which has assumed wide proportions" This movement, one of Russia's Near Eastern scholars observed, "is directed against colonialism and reaction, against the involvement of Arab countries in military blocs alien to their interests." Nor was Arab nationalism an isolated movement. According to L. N. Vatolina, a Soviet specialist on Near Eastern affairs, it was "occurring at a time when millions of people in the colonial world are breaking the chains of slavery, when the liberation struggle of the Arab countries fuses with the struggle of the whole of progressive humanity for peace,

independence, and democracy."²

²L.N. Vatolina, "The Growth of National Consciousness among the Arab Peoples," in Walter Z. Laqueur, ed., The Middle East in Transition (New York: 1958), pp. 495-496.

Russia's access to the turbulent Near East was barred by the British-sponsored Baghdad Pact, of which Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan were members. Viewed from the Russian point of view, this mutual defense organization may have seemed ominous. The member nations could, for instance, use the pact as an excuse for the establishment of bases along the southern borders of the Soviet Union. More disturbing to the Soviets was the fact that Great Britain, one of the major world powers, was committed to the support of the pact, a factor limiting "the freedom of action of the Soviet Union in dealing with its neighbors."³

³J.M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: 1963), p. 127.

Thus did the Soviet Union find one aspect of its foreign policy temporarily thwarted. What was needed was a means of neutralizing the Baghdad Pact so that Russia could proceed with its long-term campaign of economic and cultural penetration, a campaign designed to stamp out Western influence in the Near East. The obvious answer was to build up a rival to Iraq, one of the strongest of the treaty partners, whose capital, Baghdad, lent its name to the pro-Western organization. The most likely rival, however, was Egypt, whose military potential compared unfavorably with that of Iraq. Since the Soviet Union wanted to move quickly against the pact, "Mr. Khrushchev," according to a British observer, "decided upon the sale of arms to Egypt. . . . a political reaction by limited military means designed to raise Egyptian prestige and build up

Egypt as the focal point for Arab loyalties, and consequently lower Iraq's position in the Arab world

... "4

⁴Ibid.

In spite of its protestations of sympathy for the Arab peoples in their fight against imperialism, the Soviet Union aided Egypt primarily to advance its own interests. After examining the decision to provide Czech armaments to Egypt, Walter Z. Laqueur, a British editor and journalist who has written numerous books and articles on the Near East, decided that Soviet policy in the Near East was "almost entirely free from ideological motivation." He believed that the Russian government aided Egypt in 1955 for the same reason that it had supported Israel in 1948: to ride the tides that were disturbing the political balance in order to disrupt Western defensive alignments and become the dominant power in the Near East. Soviet policy, according to Laqueur, was "power politics pure and simple."⁵

⁵Walter Z. Laqueur, "New Interest in the Middle East," in Arthur E. Adams, ed., Readings in Soviet Foreign Policy, Theory and Practice (Boston: 1961), p. 363.

The Soviet Union continued after 1955 to follow a policy aimed at gaining ascendancy over the Near East by eradicating Western influence through economic and cultural penetration.⁶ In pursuing this policy,

⁶Mackintosh, p. 127.

the Soviet Union, to the accompaniment of slogans calling for peaceful coexistence and noninterference in the affairs of sovereign states, joined her European

satellites in offering low-interest loans, trade agreements, economic assistance, cultural exchange programs, and modern weapons.⁷

⁷George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 3d ed. (Ithaca: 1962), p. 665.

All of the various Russian or satellite undertakings were intended to enhance Soviet power and weaken Western influence. The cultural programs were, according to Professor Frederick C. Barghoorn, part of the Soviet Union's "systematic utilization of information, artistic, scientific, and other cultural materials, symbols and personnel, and ideas, as instruments of foreign policy."⁸ The economic and military

⁸Frederick C. Barghoorn, The Soviet Cultural Offensive (Princeton: 1960), p. 11.

assistance also served to advance Russian interests by making the recipient nations increasingly dependent on Communist sources for equipment, trained technicians, and replacement parts.⁹

⁹J.S. Raleigh, "The Middle East in 1959 -- A Political Survey," Middle Eastern Affairs (January 1960), p. 3.

Such were the general objectives and normal tactics followed by the Soviet Union in dealing with the nations of the Near East from 1958 to 1964. The intensity of Soviet effort and the subtlety of approach varied from country to country, but the goal remained always the eventual elimination of Western influence from this region. Those Near Eastern countries in which the USSR appears to have made the most intensive efforts to attain this goal were the United Arab Republic, Syria (at one time a member of the UAR), Yemen (for a time an associate of the UAR),

and Iraq (at present a confederate of the UAR). Although the Soviet Union attempted to use the American and British landings in Lebanon and Jordan to discredit the West in the eyes of Arab nationalists, only a slight effort was made to increase the Soviet effort in Lebanon, and Jordan was even less affected by the Russian policy of economic and cultural penetration. To the Sudan the Communist powers offered trade and assistance, while on the opposite fringe of the Near East, along the so-called "northern tier," the USSR employed threats as well as economic and cultural programs in its dealings with Turkey and Iran. Saudi Arabia did not as yet seem to figure prominently in Russian policy, and the USSR remained hostile toward Israel.

The United Arab Republic in Soviet Policy

As early as 1947, the Soviet Union took its first tentative steps toward cultural penetration of Egypt when Russian journals began going out of their way to comment favorably on Egyptian history and culture. The Russian program of cultural diplomacy expanded to keep pace with the growth of Egyptian nationalism, and in 1955 the purchase of arms from Czechoslovakia heralded the beginning of an intensive Communist effort at economic penetration. Thus, Soviet cultural and economic influence was being felt in Egypt before that nation merged with Syria to form the United Arab Republic (UAR).¹⁰

¹⁰ Barghoorn, p. 211.

Early in 1958, the UAR signed a cultural agreement with the Soviet Union that seemed likely to provide the Russians an excellent opportunity to spread Communist doctrine. As a result of this agreement,

the study of Russian was introduced in certain secondary schools and at Cairo University, a delegation of Russian scientists visited the UAR to work out scientific and technical curricula, and 20 educators from the UAR journeyed to Russia to study Soviet methods of education.¹¹

¹¹Ivar Spector, The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, 1917-1958 (Seattle: 1959), p. 266.

From the Soviet point of view, the campaign of economic penetration seemed off to an equally promising start. By 1958, both regions of the UAR, Syria and Egypt, (the latter of which retained the title UAR after the dissolution of its union with Syria) had purchased from Communist sources at least one-half billion dollars worth of new weapons. As a US Senate report pointed out, "over a period of years a substantial portion of the principal crops of Egypt and Syria" would be "pledged for the cost of materials and services -- however much desired for defensive and prestige purposes -- that have nothing whatever to do with the fundamental need of increasing economic production."¹² The UAR's growing economic de-

¹²US Congress, Senate, 86th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document no. 58, Soviet Economic Penetration in the Middle East, p. 18.

pendence on the Soviet Union and its satellites gave rise to fear that Russia had succeeded in vaulting the barrier raised by the Baghdad Pact and was in the process of establishing in the UAR an ideological base from which the entire Near East could be won over to Communism.¹³

¹³Lenczowski, p. 665. Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1963 (New York: 1964), pp. 147-148.

By the end of 1958, however, it was becoming increasingly apparent that Nasser was not about to become a willing agent of Communism. In December of that year, within a few weeks after the inauguration of air service between Moscow and Cairo and the signing of a trade agreement between the UAR and China, President Nasser denounced the Syrian Communists for opposing both union between Egypt and Syria and Arab nationalism.¹⁴ This denunciation was accompanied by

¹⁴Middle Eastern Affairs (January 1959), p. 51, (February 1959), pp. 91-92.

arrests of Communist leaders throughout the UAR. When Khrushchev himself denied that Communists were undermining Nasser's efforts toward Arab unity, the Egyptian press replied that the Nasser government had not attacked either Communism as an ideology or foreign Communists, but only those divisive Communist elements within the UAR.¹⁵ Although willing to accept assistance

¹⁵Walter Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East (New York: 1959), p. 357.

from the Communist bloc, Nasser was suspicious of domestic Communism.

Russian and satellite assistance programs continued in spite of the repression of Communists in the UAR. During January 1959, the UAR signed a cultural agreement with Czechoslovakia and an undertaking whereby the Soviet Union would provide plans, equipment, material, and technical aid for the construction of a shipyard at Alexandria.¹⁶ These pacts were followed

¹⁶Middle Eastern Affairs (March 1959), p. 131.

by a 30-day visit by Soviet rocket technicians and the signing of a trade agreement with Czechoslovakia.¹⁷

¹⁷Ibid.

The Soviet Union, it seemed, was willing to continue its support of the UAR regardless of Nasser's attitude toward domestic Communists. The Soviet First Chairman said as much on 10 November 1959, when he told the editor of a semi-official Egyptian newspaper that Nasser's attitude on local Communists would not stand in the way of Soviet friendship for Egypt.¹⁸ As

¹⁸Middle Eastern Affairs (December 1959, pp. 406-407).

if to underscore Khrushchev's words, the first contingent of the Soviet technicians who were to work on the Aswan dam arrived at Cairo on 26 November.¹⁹

¹⁹Middle Eastern Affairs (January 1960), p. 34.

The withdrawal of Syria from the UAR, the result of a coup d'etat that occurred on 28 September 1961, was a blow to Nasser's prestige in the Arab world. The UAR leader responded with "Arab Socialism," a domestic program that called for the redistribution of wealth through nationalization and expropriation. In the field of foreign affairs, he tried to maintain close relations with the Soviet Union while at the same time encouraging the friendship of the West.²⁰

²⁰Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1962 (New York: 1963), p. 170.

Syria's defection did not result in any shift in the Russian attitude toward the surviving partner

in the shattered Arab union. Although the USSR did veto a UAR resolution sponsoring Kuwait for membership in the UN, this move was probably made to gain favor with pro-Communist Iraq, which had laid claim to Kuwait; as events proved, it did not indicate any abandonment of Nasser.²¹ Cairo newspapers were

²¹ Middle Eastern Affairs (January 1962), p. 63. Don Peretz, The Middle East Today (New York: 1963), p. 415.

reporting before the end of the year that naval units supplied by Russia and Czechoslovakia had been added to the UAR fleet. In June of the following year, the UAR and USSR signed a three-year trade agreement, and the UAR received the first of 40 Soviet MIG-21 fighters. On the heels of these transactions came a Polish report that it had loaned \$20 million to the UAR. Finally, in May 1963, after the Soviet-supported government of Iraq had been overthrown, the USSR reversed its earlier stand and acquiesced in Kuwait's becoming a UN member.²²

²² Middle Eastern Affairs (October 1962), pp. 255-256. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1963, p. 377.

Russia obviously had not abandoned Nasser. Neither the setback he suffered when Syria separated from the UAR nor his opposition to Egyptian Communists persuaded the Soviet Union to halt the economic aid, trade, military equipment, and cultural programs with which it hoped to bring the UAR under its influence. Nasser, however, continued to go his own way.

In 1963, the UAR President attempted to revive the earlier Arab union. In April he conferred with

the nationalist leaders of the governments that recently had seized power in Iraq and in Syria.²³ The

²³Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1963 (New York: 1964), p. 151.

suggested tripartite union did not come to pass, however. Instead, Nasser entered into a loose political and military confederation with the revolutionary government of Iraq, which had overthrown the Soviet-supported Kassim regime and suppressed the Iraqi Communists.²⁴

²⁴Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1963-1964, p. 20156.

After the announcement of the formation of this confederation, First Chairman Khrushchev visited the UAR and reaffirmed Russia's support of Arab nationalism.²⁵ The Soviet Union seemed willing to support

²⁵Ibid.

Nasser even though he suppressed the local Communist party, allied himself with anti-Communist regimes, and tried to remain on good terms with the West. In short, the USSR would put up with Nasser's Arab nationalism in order to retain in the Near East a beachhead capable of future exploitation.²⁶

²⁶Lenczowski, p. 668.

Soviet Policy toward Syria.

Russia's attempts at economic and cultural penetration of Syria began before that nation joined Egypt in forming the UAR. In December 1957, after the Syrian parliament had voted for merger with

Egypt, the Soviet government received a delegation of Syrian leaders; and later that month Czechoslovakia granted Syria a loan of 60 million pounds for economic development. The Syrian Communist party, whose influence these actions were designed to foster, was suppressed by Nasser shortly after the formal establishment of the UAR in February 1958.²⁷

²⁷Mackintosh, p. 232.

During the period of unification Nasser dealt harshly with the Syrian Communists, denouncing the organization and jailing its leaders, but the Soviet Union nevertheless remained on good terms with the UAR. Syria's withdrawal from the UAR in September 1961 did not alter Moscow's attitude toward either Cairo or Damascus. The Soviet Union extended recognition to the new Syrian government within two weeks of its seizing power and attempted to increase its influence in both Syria and the UAR, as Egypt chose to be called.²⁸

²⁸Middle Eastern Affairs (December 1959), pp. 406-407; (January 1962), p. 28.

After Syria had regained its independence, the Soviet Union resumed the policy it had followed prior to the formation of the UAR. Once again against Russia and her satellites dealt directly with the Syrian government rather than through the Egyptian-dominated UAR. The resumption of direct dealings between Moscow and Damascus was heralded by a cultural agreement signed on 19 August 1962. This pact covered scientific, artistic, and educational exchanges.²⁹

²⁹Middle Eastern Affairs (November 1962), p. 287.

Soviet Policy Toward Yemen.

Another scene of Russian economic and cultural penetration was Yemen, one of the more backward countries in the Arab world. Since the kingdom of Yemen was engaged in a longstanding dispute with Great Britain over the Aden Protectorate, the nation was particularly receptive to Soviet overtures of friendship. In 1955, Yemen and the Soviet Union concluded a cultural agreement that enabled Yemeni students to attend schools in Russia and the European satellites. This pact was followed in 1957 by the purchase of Soviet military equipment, an action that resulted in the introduction of Russian instructors and technicians into the kingdom's armed forces.³⁰

³⁰William R. Brown, "The Yemeni Dilemma," The Middle East Journal (Autumn 1963), pp. 353-354.

Russian influence, however, seemed insignificant compared to that exercised by Nasser's UAR. As early as 1954 Egyptian military missions had advised the Yemeni armed forces, and a few Yemeni officers were selected from time to time for training in Egypt. Nor was the army the only segment of Yemen's populace that was exposed to Nasser's revolutionary nationalism, for hundreds of youths attended Egyptian universities and secondary schools. An indication of the growing ascendancy of Egyptian political thought was Yemen's decision in 1958 to become an associate of the UAR, a status that did not infringe on Yemeni independence.³¹

³¹Ibid.

President Nasser apparently grew impatient with the indifference of Yemen's rulers toward Arab

nationalism. On 26 December 1961, Nasser severed the ties between the UAR and Yemen. There was nothing in the "nature of the Governments of the United Arab Republic and Yemen," he declared, "to make the federation between them an effective political instrument able to contribute positively in strengthening the Arab struggle."³²

³²Middle Eastern Affairs (January 1962), p. 63.

The Yemeni monarchy was overthrown in September 1962 by a revolutionary regime that seemed deeply influenced by Nasser's Arab nationalism. The Soviet Union recognized the new regime on 29 September, and the United States followed suit on 19 December. The monarchists, however, refused to come to terms with the new government and, assisted by Jordan and Saudi Arabia, waged civil war. Nasser dispatched troops to Yemen to support the republican cause, and for a time it appeared that fighting might break out between Saudi Arabia and the UAR. The crisis, however, gradually eased. The UAR and Saudi Arabia restored normal diplomatic relations, and the republicans with continuing aid from Nasser succeeded in strengthening their hold over Yemen. The dissident monarchists, who refused to surrender, were driven into the wilderness.³³

³³Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1962, pp. 175-178; The United States in World Affairs, 1963, pp. 148-149, 153-155. Middle Eastern Affairs (December 1962), p. 315.

The revolt in Yemen did not disturb that nation's relations with the Soviet Union. In March 1964, the two countries renewed the treaty that they had concluded in 1955 and also agreed upon several

economic aid and technical assistance programs to be undertaken by the Russian government.³⁴ Thus it

³⁴Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1963-1964,
p. 20006.

would appear that the Soviet Union was continuing to use economic and cultural agreements to overcome Western influence in Yemen.

Soviet Policy toward Iraq.

The Iraqi revolt of 1958 swept away a pro-Western regime and replaced it with one whose leader, Abd al-Karim Kassim, was, in the opinion of the editor of Middle Eastern Affairs, "no less anti-Western and no more anti-Communist" than Nasser. The emergence of the Kassim regime, this same scholar believed, offered the Soviet Union an opportunity to develop "a second force in the Middle East" that would cooperate with Russia and in doing so serve as a counterweight to Nasser, by discouraging any tendency the UAR leader might have toward "playing the blackmail game."³⁵

³⁵Benjamin Shwadran, The Power Struggle in Iraq
(New York: 1960), p. 80.

Unlike Nasser, Kassim at first allowed the local Communist Party to operate openly; but the Iraqi leader was not a Communist puppet, for he tried at the same time to remain neutral in the struggle between East and West and to follow a program of moderate domestic reform. This desire for moderation and neutrality placed Kassim in an awkward position; within a few months he found himself competing for the loyalty of the people with two groups whose programs seemed more dynamic than did his own. To the right of Kassim were the admirers of Nasser, and to the

left were the Iraqi Communists.³⁶

³⁶J.K. Banerji, The Middle East in World Politics (Calcutta: 1960), p. 132.

First to challenge the Kassim regime were the rightists, and in November 1958 Iraq's leading advocate of union with the UAR was arrested for plotting rebellion.³⁷ Following the discovery of this pro-Nasser

³⁷Ibid., p. 122. Shwadran, "The Power Struggle in Iraq," pt. I, Middle Eastern Affairs (April 1960), p. 106.

plot, Kassim became more friendly toward local Communists and more favorably disposed to accept assistance offered by the Soviet Union and other Communist states. Among the compacts signed during the first eight months of 1959 were cultural exchange pacts with Yugoslavia, China, and Bulgaria, a trade agreement with North Korea, and an agreement whereby the Soviet Union would construct a shipyard at Basra.³⁸

³⁸Middle Eastern Affairs (May 1959), pp. 208-209, (August-September 1959), p. 310, (October 1959), p. 346.

During this period, when Soviet offers of aid were being accepted by Kassim's government the Iraqi Communists staged a "peace march" on the town of Mosul that triggered a revolt led by the commander of the local garrison. The suppression of this rebellion was followed by Communist demands for a more active role in the government, and in mid-July Communist agitators touched off rioting in the town of Kirkuk, not far from the Iranian border. By this time, Kassim had begun to realize that the Iraqi Communists were too intractable to be used as a counterweight

to the rightists; he therefore turned against the party and sought to curb its activities and influence.³⁹

³⁹Lenczowski, pp. 304-306. Shwadran, The Power Struggle in Iraq, pp. 41-46.

Kassim's changing attitude toward the Iraqi Communists had no immediate effect upon Soviet policy. In spite of Kassim's attitude, Russian relations with Iraq were for the time being undisturbed. In April 1960, for example, Anastas I. Mikoyan, Soviet Deputy Prime Minister, arrived in Baghdad to open a Russian industrial exposition. His visit was followed by the announcement of an agreement granting the USSR the right to search for oil in southern Iraq.⁴⁰ In

⁴⁰Middle Eastern Affairs (May 1960), p. 169, (June-July 1960), p. 210.

October Czechoslovakia granted a credit of 12 million dinars (\$33.6 million) under a new economic and technical cooperation agreement.⁴¹ Not until 4 November

⁴¹Middle Eastern Affairs (December 1960), p. 355.

did the Soviet Union mention the plight of the Iraqi Communists, and on that day the USSR merely cautioned Iraq against repressing the local party and its supporters.⁴²

⁴²Middle Eastern Affairs (January 1961), p. 29.

In spite of the continuing support and assistance from the Communist states, Kassim tried to maintain normal relations with the West. He delayed, for example, in formally withdrawing from the Baghdad Pact until March 1959, some eight months after the

revolution that brought him to power; and he waited until May of that year before renouncing the protection afforded by the Eisenhower Doctrine.⁴³

⁴³Banerji, p. 132.

Further evidence that Kassim had not turned his back on the West was his negotiation in 1960 of cultural agreements with the US and Great Britain.⁴⁴

⁴⁴Lenzowski, p. 307.

Late in June 1961, however, Kassim launched Iraq on an aggressive foreign policy that brought Iraqi ambitions into conflict with British interests and treaty obligations. The crisis began when Kassim laid claim to Kuwait, a neighboring shiekdom to which the British had just given independence. Kuwait, which the United Kingdom was treaty-bound to support, appealed for aid. Great Britain responded by calling upon the various Middle Eastern states to use their influence in restraining Kassim and by dispatching British forces to the shiekdom, an action provided for in the treaty between the two nations. Kassim promptly urged his Arab neighbors to rally around him and help drive out the British. Nasser, the strongest of these neighbors, agreed the British would have to go, but he refused to cooperate with Kassim, whom he considered responsible for the UK intervention.⁴⁵

⁴⁵M. Capil, "Middle East 1961: A Political Review," Middle Eastern Affairs (February 1962), p. 38. Benjamin Shwadran, "The Kuwait Incident," pt. 1, Middle Eastern Affairs (January 1962), pp. 10-13.

The arrival of British troops in Kuwait raised the issue of Western imperialism, something to which

a denunciation of Western imperialism. The rebellion of Iraq's Kurdish tribesmen, however, presented the Soviet Union with a dilemma. On the one hand, Iraqi Communists, in spite of Kassim's increased hostility, still had some influence in Iraq, and Iraq seemed to offer better prospects than the UAR for Communist exploitation. On the other hand, the Russians, by encouraging what appeared to be a manifestation of Kurdish nationalism, could stir up discontent among the almost autonomous Kurdish tribes in Iran and Turkey. Faced with this choice, the Soviet Union seems to have attempted to follow both lines of action at the same time.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Lettie M. Wenner, "Arab-Kurdish Rivalries in Iraq," Middle East Journal (Winter-Spring 1963), pp. 79-81.

While Kassim struggled to suppress the Kurds, Soviet economic assistance to his regime continued at an impressive rate. In January 1962, for example, the USSR and Iraq signed an agreement whereby the Soviets would provide additional equipment and technical aid to Iraqi industry. The following month, a permanent display of Soviet export goods opened in Baghdad, and Russia entered into a cultural agreement that provided for assistance in the development of Iraqi radio and television and the exchange of technicians and students. These were followed in July by the signing of a protocol according to the terms of which Russia would help construct a rail line.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Middle Eastern Affairs (March 1962), p. 92, (April 1962), p. 124, (October 1962), p. 250.

This assistance coincided, however, with the appearance in the Communist press throughout the

satellites and in Russia of articles supporting the Kurds. Kassim was criticized by these Communist journalists for failing to respect the rights of the Kurdish minority.⁵⁰ By September 1962, according

⁵⁰Wenner, "Arab-Kurdish Rivalries in Iraq," pp. 80-81.

to the American journal Middle Eastern Affairs, rumors were circulating in Moscow that the Iraqi Communist Party had received Soviet permission to form a popular front with Kurdish rebels.⁵¹ Whatever the

⁵¹Middle Eastern Affairs (December 1962), p. 310.

accuracy of this particular report, it fitted the theory that the Russians, while avoiding a break with Kassim, were expressing "approval of the Kurdish cause through the Iranian and Iraqi Communist Parties rather than through direct Soviet action."⁵²

⁵²Wenner, "Arab-Kurdish Rivalries in Iraq," p. 79.

As the campaign against the Kurds dragged on, Kassim grew more and more dependent on Russian aid, and as a result he seemed increasingly willing to allow the Communists a greater voice in the government. Partly in reaction to this apparent drift toward Communism, a group of Arab nationalists engineered a coup in February 1963. Kassim was overthrown, and one of the first actions of Iraqi's new ruler, Colonel Abdel Salam Arif, was to suppress the local Communist Party.⁵³

⁵³Ibid., pp. 80-81.

Although the new Iraqi government resembled the Nasser regime in its attitude toward Communism, the Soviet Union, as was true of its policy toward the UAR, continued its efforts at economic and cultural penetration. In February 1964, for example, Baghdad agreed to exchange 5,000 tons of dates for Czech agricultural equipment, and a similar barter deal involving 10,000 tons of dates was made in April of that year.⁵⁴

⁵⁴Middle East Journal (Summer 1964), p. 328.

In its dealings with Iraq, the Soviet Union seemed willing to accept temporary inconvenience, including a tentative confederation of Iraq with the UAR, because of the possibility the country might serve as a base for the future spread of Soviet influence in the Near East.

Soviet Policy toward the Sudan.

The Sudan is another Near Eastern state in which the Soviet Union has been willing to ignore the suppression of local Communists in order to introduce cultural and economic influences that could eventually bring the nation within the Soviet orbit.

Although illegal since before the Sudan became independent, the Sudanese Communist Party was tolerated until 1958. Prior to that year, the party had succeeded in infiltrating the labor movement and also had come to exert a strong influence among Sudanese students. In November 1958, however, a military council led by Ibrahim Abbud staged a bloodless coup, and once in power Sudan's new rulers suspended the trade unions, imprisoned known Communists, and sought to purge the army of

any taint of Communism.⁵⁵

⁵⁵P.M. Holt, A Modern History of the Sudan (London: 1961), pp. 181-183.

The difficulties faced by Sudanese Communists did not discourage Poland from agreeing in December 1958 to a \$2.8 million barter agreement involving the exchange of Polish manufactured goods for Sudanese cotton.⁵⁶ This deal was the first of a series between

⁵⁶Middle Eastern Affairs (February 1959), p. 59.

the Sudanese military regime and various Communist states. In March 1959, the USSR and Sudan entered into a one-year, automatically renewable agreement whereby the Sudanese would exchange cotton, hides, nuts, and sesame for machinery, rolled steel, timber, and sugar.⁵⁷ A technical assistance agreement was signed

⁵⁷Middle Eastern Affairs (May 1959), pp. 210-211.

in November 1961, when the Soviet Union pledged to assist the Sudanese to develop light industry.⁵⁸

⁵⁸Middle Eastern Affairs (January 1962), p. 27.

Soviet interest in Sudan has not resulted in the emergence as yet of any Communist revolutionary movement, nor has the Sudanese government turned its back on the West. The anti-imperialist pronouncements of the USSR, the European satellites, and China have, however, found acceptance in Sudan. For example, in the spring of 1964, during a visit by President Abbud to China, the Chinese and Sudanese governments issued a joint resolution condemning "imperialist collusion with Israel against the Arab

coincidence, whether intended or not, lent credibility to subsequent Russian claims that it was a foe of Judaism and therefore a true friend of Arab nationalism. To substantiate this claim still further, the USSR charged Israel with such varied crimes as using the Arab refugees, who had fled Palestine, as a source of friction in the Near East and organizing a spy network among the Jewish population of the Soviet Union.⁶²

⁶²Middle Eastern Affairs (January 1961), p. 32, (January 1962), p. 26, (March 1962), p. 92.

In its self-chosen role as champion of Arab nationalism, the Soviet Union frequently made allegations such as these against the Israeli government, but it nevertheless refrained from prodding the Arabs into open hostility. In May 1964, for example, First Chairman Khrushchev, in a communique issued jointly with UAR President Nasser, reaffirmed his support for Arab nationalism, but the two leaders also agreed that territorial disputes between nations should be settled by peaceful means. No exception was made to this rule in the case of Israel.⁶³

⁶³Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1963-1964, p. 20130.

A journalist familiar with Near Eastern affairs, in an article written in 1955, predicted that Russia would avoid "an openly hostile stand vis-a-vis Israel," because of "Jewish public opinion in the West -- and perhaps behind the Iron Curtain too"⁶⁴ Whether for this reason or from some

⁶⁴Laqueur, "New Interest in the Middle East," p. 363.

other motive, the Soviet Union has refused to approve armed action against Israel. The Jewish state has, however, served as a convenient whipping boy for Russian propagandists intent upon preparing the way for Communist economic, military, or cultural mission to Arab lands.

Soviet Policy toward Iran.

Iran was among the first Near Eastern nations in which the Soviet Union attempted to gain ascendancy by working through an anti-Western nationalist party rather than through the local Communist Party. Russian financial support was given to Iranian nationalists; and the Tudeh, the Iranian Communist organization, was ordered to support the nationalist program which was being advocated by Muhammed Mossadeq.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ A.V. Sherman, "Nationalism and Communism in the Arab World: A Re-appraisal," in Walter Z. Laqueur, ed., The Middle East in Transition (New York: 1958), p. 453.

The upsurge of anti-Western nationalism failed, however, to sweep Iran into the Soviet camp, and Russia, beginning about 1956, chose to make a great show of friendship for the avowedly pro-Western Shah Reza Pahlavi. During this period Soviet economic missions, cultural groups, and athletic teams visited Iran, while Russian propagandists lauded the Shah and his father. In the opinion of an American scholar, who was at one time an official of the American Embassy at Teheran, the Soviet Union was willing to support the Shah because time seemed to favor the Communist cause. After Communist riots had undermined confidence in Mossadeq and, in the opinion of his followers brought about his overthrow, the Iranian nationalists had veered to an anti-Communist

course; but the nationalistic faction had grown weak and apathetic under the Shah's absolutism. Should the Shah, whose advisers might be influenced by the friendly Soviet policy, relax his grip on Iran, the Tudeh rather than the nationalists would become the nation's dominant party. According to this scholar, Richard W. Cottam, these were the reasons why the USSR believed that continued economic and cultural penetration would weaken Iran's ties with the West.⁶⁶

⁶⁶ Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh: 1964), pp. 238-239.

The Iranian regime appeared secure, but the revolt in pro-Western Iraq--with Iran, a partner in the Baghdad Pact--dramatized what might happen to a government that lacked genuine popular support. The Shah, who was in Turkey when the Iraqi revolution occurred, was reported to have said that just such a coup was possible in Iran, and he waited for several days before returning to his heavily guarded palace at Teheran. "Iraq," according to Cottam, "had demonstrated that even the strongest-willed regime with all-out foreign backing could be toppled" and had proved "the Shah's vulnerability for all who thought that his regime was indestructable because of American-British support."⁶⁷

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 239.

The United States now sought to reassure the worried Shah and the other members of the Baghdad Pact who wished to retain their ties to the West. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles undertook to negotiate bilateral mutual defense agreements with Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan. The prospect of having

the United States committed to the defense of a state bordering on the Soviet Union and the possibility that offensive bases might be constructed on Iranian soil were distasteful to the USSR. To forestall any such occurrences the Soviet Union proposed that Iran refuse to sign the agreement offered by the United States, in return for which the USSR would enter into a non-aggression pact that would specifically renounce the article in a 1921 Soviet-Iranian agreement that, according to the Soviet interpretation, permitted the movement of Russian troops into Iran if Iran was used as a base by foreign troops who seemed likely to attack the Soviet territory.⁶⁸

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 240.

The Shah agreed to discuss the Russian proposal, and a Soviet diplomatic delegation journeyed to Teheran. The talks, however, were broken off in a rude fashion -- the Shah announced he was ill, and his prime minister left the city; and Iran entered a bilateral defense agreement with the United States. In his analysis of the Shah's motives for entering and then breaking off the discussions, Cottam suggests that the Shah was worried about both the domestic situation in his country and the USSR's apparent determination to prevent Iran from signing the agreement. Although Khrushchev later accused the Shah of using the incident to wring additional military assistance from the United States, Cottam holds that "the clumsiness of the maneuver . . . indicates that the Shah was vacillating, as he often does in the face of a serious Soviet threat."⁶⁹

⁶⁹Ibid., pp. 240-241.

Stung by this rebuff, the Soviet radio and press attacked the Shah, and Iran was branded by propagandists as an enemy of the Soviet Union. The vilification died away in mid-summer, shortly after the Shah, in reiterating Iran's loyalty to the Baghdad Pact, declared that Iran would never grant military bases to any foreign power.⁷⁰

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 241; Middle Eastern Affairs (August-September 1960), p. 259.

The USSR in May 1960 accused Iran of committing a hostile act by permitting CENTO air exercises under Iranian auspices, and in January 1962 the Iranian government accused Soviet diplomats of inciting Teheran students to riot against the government.⁷¹ Along with

⁷¹Middle Eastern Affairs (June-July 1960), p. 211, (March 1962), p. 92.

these instances of pressure and possibly of attempted subversion, the Soviet Union continued efforts at economic penetration. In June 1962, the USSR and Iran initialed a trade agreement providing for the exchange of goods valued at \$5.5 million.⁷²

⁷²Middle Eastern Affairs (August-September 1962), p. 219.

Caught up in the struggle to develop Iranian industry, to provide land to the nations' peasants, and to cure the sustained economic depression that plagued Iran, the Shah sought no quarrels with the Soviet Union.⁷³ In 1962, for example, Iran's

⁷³Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, pp. 308,317-319.

foreign minister sent a note to the Soviet Ambassador at Teheran in which he assured the USSR that Iran would not allow any foreign countries to establish land or missile bases on Iranian soil. The Soviet government expressed satisfaction at this declaration (which was nothing more than an elaboration of a statement made by the Shah in 1959) and hailed it as an important contribution to the easing of international tensions.⁷⁴

⁷⁴Middle Eastern Affairs (December 1962), p. 310.

In its dealing with Iran, the Soviet Union appeared willing to play a waiting game. Except during the months that followed the organization of CENTO, Russian propagandists have generally been friendly toward the Shah since 1956, and the two nations have maintained economic and cultural ties. It would seem that Soviet leadership shares Cottam's view that the desire for rapid social revolution combines with other factors to provide favorable "long-term prospects" for the Communists.⁷⁵

⁷⁵Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, pp. 307-318.

Soviet Relations with Turkey.

The spectacular manner in which the Soviet Union courted favor with the Arab states to the south tended somewhat to obscure the Russian attempts at economic and cultural penetration of Turkey. No dramatic arms deals nor offers of large-scale technical assistance were made in an

effort to weaken Western influence in Turkey. Instead, the Soviet Union used threats, promises of cooperation, cultural programs, and modest trade agreements in an effort to induce Turkey to adopt a "neutralist" policy.

The earliest Soviet attempts at cultural and economic penetration occurred between 1956 and 1959 when the USSR undertook the construction of a number of industrial facilities, dispatched cultural representatives (among them soccer players and wrestlers), engaged in expanded trade, and offered the promise of still greater trade and technical assistance.⁷⁶

⁷⁶Barghoorn, pp. 216-217.

This cultural and economic campaign did not dissuade Turkey from membership in the Baghdad Pact and in its successor, the Central Treaty Organization.

Another opportunity for the expansion of Russian influence in Turkey occurred in May 1960, when a military junta headed by Cemal Gursel seized power from the pro-Western regime led by Adnan Menderes. On 28 June of that year, First Chairman Khrushchev sent a note to Gursel in which he urged Turkey to abandon membership in NATO and CENTO and follow a neutral foreign policy, courses of action that would improve relations with the Soviet Union. Gursel replied on 8 July that, though Turkey wished to improve relations with the Soviet Union, it would continue to honor its obligations to NATO and CENTO.⁷⁷

⁷⁷Middle Eastern Affairs (November 1960), pp. 317-320.

In September of the following year, immediately after the execution of Menderes (who had been judged

guilty of corruption and abuse of power while chief of state), the Soviet Union protested against "provocative" NATO exercises in the Black Sea area and warned the Turkish government that it would have to assume "full responsibility for the consequences of such actions."⁷⁸ The Turks, however, were unmoved by

⁷⁸Middle Eastern Affairs (December 1961), p. 316.

the Soviet warning. On 4 October, Turkey replied that the NATO exercises, which were held periodically, were no threat to any nation. Both Soviet forces and troops of the Warsaw Pact, the Turkish reply pointed out, had been conducting military exercises similar to those carried out by NATO.⁷⁹

⁷⁹Middle Eastern Affairs (January 1962), p. 29.

Although the USSR frequently resorted to bluster or threat, it did not abandon the tactics of economic penetration. In January 1962, Turkey and the Soviet Union signed a trade agreement that provided for the exchange during 1962 of goods with a value of up to \$25 million.⁸⁰ A short time later, Yugoslavia and

⁸⁰Middle Eastern Affairs (March 1962), p. 95.

Turkey signed a trade protocol providing for the exchange of goods valued at \$15 million.⁸¹

⁸¹Middle Eastern Affairs (May 1962), p. 158.

These trade agreements seemed to be symptoms of a relaxation of tensions. A further indication of improved relations came in August 1962 when the two governments settled amicably a dispute that

arose when Turkish and Russian border guards fired on each other.⁸² The era of friendliness ended, however,

⁸²Middle Eastern Affairs (November 1962), p. 287.

when the USSR began trying late in 1963 to take advantage of Greek-Turkish rivalries over Cyprus in order to disrupt the Western system of alliances and increase Soviet influence in the eastern Mediterranean.

In February 1959, when the negotiations began that resulted in the withdrawal of British forces and the establishment of an independent Cyprus, the Soviet Union denounced the opening of talks and charged that US pressure and "colonialist collusion" had forced Turkey and Greece to "stab in the back" the people of Cyprus, who were struggling against British oppression.⁸³ Once Cyprus had received its independence,

⁸³Middle Eastern Affairs (April 1959), p. 17.

Russia attempted to reap the benefits of its earlier declaration of sympathy for the people of the island. Again the technique was economic penetration, which got underway in December 1961 when Cyprus signed a reciprocal trade agreement with the USSR.⁸⁴

⁸⁴Middle Eastern Affairs (February 1962), p. 60.

In December 1963, the system of checks and balances that had been built into the Cyprus constitution in order to protect the rights of the Turkish minority collapsed completely. Archbishop Makarios, leader of the Greek majority as well as the head of the island's government, accused the Turkish minority of misusing a veto power contained

in the constitution to frustrate the will of the majority. He then proposed constitutional reforms, which the Turks considered tyrannical, and fighting broke out on the island. Greece and Turkey made preparations to go to war on behalf of their kinsmen on Cyprus, and Britain, which sent troops of its own to maintain order, joined the US in seeking through the UN or NATO to restore peace on the island.⁸⁵

⁸⁵Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1963, pp. 162-163.

The Soviet Union made it clear from the beginning of the crisis that it supported the Makarios regime, a position that could not help but be unpopular with the Turks. On 31 December 1963, for example, the USSR announced that it would support the Greek Cypriots if their leader chose to lodge a complaint against Turkey with the UN.⁸⁶ On 7 February 1964,

⁸⁶Middle East Journal (Spring 1964), p. 212.

Khrushchev advised the US government, which was urging the establishment of a NATO or UN peace-keeping force on the island, that the Soviet Union considered the government of Cyprus "fully capable of taking care of its own internal affairs"⁸⁷

⁸⁷Department of State Bulletin (23 March 1964), p. 447.

This pronouncement was followed on 29 February by the signing of a commercial air agreement calling for weekly service between Moscow and Nicosia.⁸⁸

⁸⁸Middle East Journal (Spring 1964), p. 215.

In spite of its declaration that Makarios could handle the situation, the Soviet Union in March agreed to the establishment for three months of a UN force on Cyprus, an undertaking that was acceptable to Archbishop Makarios. Later the Russians approved extending the life of the peace-keeping force for an additional three months until 26 September 1964.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ Keessing's Contemporary Archives, 1963-1964,
pp. 20113-20125. Department of State Bulletin
(13 July 1964), p. 67.

Thus far, the pattern of Soviet policy remains unclear. It seems possible, in the light of previous Russian actions, that the USSR, by supporting the Makarios government, hopes to clear the way for future economic and cultural penetration that eventually will increase Soviet influence in the eastern Mediterranean. In the meantime, Soviet support of the Greek Cypriots may create dissension within the NATO alliance, thus weakening Western influence in Turkey.

Soviet Reaction to the Landings in Lebanon and Jordan, 1958.

The USSR's initial reaction to the dispatch of American forces to Lebanon and British units to Jordan was to announce that military maneuvers would be held first in the Trans-Caucasus and Turkestan Military Districts and later in Bulgaria. The announcement was intended as a warning to Turkey and Iran who, along with Pakistan and revolution-torn Iraq, were members of the British-sponsored Baghdad Pact. Once this threat had been made, the Soviet Union embarked on a series of diplomatic maneuvers designed to make use of the landings in

the campaign to undermine Western influence in the Near East.⁹⁰

⁹⁰Mackintosh, p. 234.

At the United Nations, the Soviet delegate described the landings as aggression and left no doubt that the Soviet Union would use its veto to prevent the Security Council from approving the Anglo-American action. The US delegate argued that the landings were, in the words of President Eisenhower, "to protect American lives and . . . to encourage the Lebanese government in the defense of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity." The American position, however, was undermined by the release of a report by a UN observer group indicating that it had turned up no evidence of UAR infiltration or other foreign interference in Lebanese affairs.⁹¹

⁹¹G. Barraclough, Survey of International Affairs, 1956-1958 (London: 1962), pp. 374-375.

The Russian delegate called attention to the contradictory position which the US was trying to maintain. Although supporting the observation group, the United States ignored its findings and sought to justify the landings by citing a Lebanese claim, made almost a week before the group's report, that the UAR was supporting Lebanese rebels. Not only did the USSR hold a veto over the Security Council, it at this time seemed to have sufficient support in the General Assembly to prevent a two-thirds vote in support of the Anglo-American landings.⁹²

⁹²Ibid.

While this discussion was going on at the UN, President Nasser, who had been visiting Yugoslavia when the landings occurred, hurried back to Cairo and on 17 July left for Moscow where he conferred with First Chairman Khrushchev. After the meeting, Nasser returned to Cairo and predicted that Beirut and Amman would see violent revolutions such as that which had toppled the government at Baghdad. These inflammatory speeches, however, were not echoed at Moscow.⁹³

⁹³Mackintosh, pp. 235-236.

Instead of seeking to inflame anti-Western sentiment in the Near East, Khrushchev on 19 July proposed a meeting of the USSR, the US, France, Great Britain, and India to put an end to the strife that had afflicted the region by stopping the delivery of arms and by finding some way to reconcile Western commercial rights with the sovereign rights demanded by the Arab states. Once the conferees had prepared practical recommendations, Khrushchev suggested that they "submit those recommendations to the Security Council in order that the United Nations . . . may examine them together with the representatives of the Arab countries."⁹⁴

⁹⁴Barraclough, p. 378.

Upon receipt of the Russian proposal, Nehru of India accepted outright, de Gaulle accepted in principle, and UN Secretary General Hammarskjold indicated that he would accept if the heads of government decided to do so. The UK, however, suggested a meeting, of the sort Khrushchev desired, be held at the UN rather than at Geneva as suggested in the

original proposal. The United States rejected the proposed Geneva meeting, for it by now appeared that a two-thirds majority could be obtained in the General Assembly in support of the American landings; but President Eisenhower's reply did indicate a willingness to discuss the matter at the Security Council.⁹⁵

⁹⁵Ibid., pp. 379-380.

On 23 June, Khrushchev accepted the idea of discussing the Near East within the Security Council. The UK responded with a suggestion that the discussion be held at a regular Security Council meeting at which the heads of state would be present as observers. De Gaulle, however, opposed such a meeting, and the United States indicated it would attend, provided the meeting was held at a date later than 28 July, the time suggested by Mr. Khrushchev. The Russian leader protested that the United States and UK were backing down from their earlier statements, which he interpreted as showing a willingness for a meeting of the heads of state within the framework of the Security Council, but he declared that he was willing to postpone the meeting as the United States desired.⁹⁶

⁹⁶Ibid., pp. 385-386.

By the end of July, armed conflict in the Near East no longer seemed imminent. The Iraqi rebels were securely in control; there appeared to be no likelihood of either counter-revolution within Iraq or invasion from Jordan. As the prospects of military action against Iraq diminished, the USSR showed progressively less enthusiasm for a meeting of the heads of state to deal with the Near East. Since neither

the United States nor France had displayed much interest in such a meeting, Khrushchev abandoned the idea and began calling for a summit conference to deal with a variety of topics, rather than just the Near East.⁹⁷

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 387.

At the UN, the Soviet Union obtained approval for a special session of the General Assembly to deal with the crisis in Lebanon and Jordan. At this session, the Sudanese delegate introduced a resolution sponsored by the ten Arab member-states and calling upon the Secretary General to make practical arrangements for the application in Lebanon and Jordan of the principles of mutual respect of national sovereignty and noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations. The resolution was adopted by unanimous vote.⁹⁸

⁹⁸Ibid., pp. 391-392.

In fulfillment of the mission set forth in this resolution, the UN Secretary General visited the Near East and obtained from the Arab states pledges of cooperation that enabled both the United States and Britain to withdraw their forces during October.⁹⁹

⁹⁹Ibid., pp. 392-393.

The Soviet Union failed in its attempt to bring about a meeting of the heads of state and was unable to persuade the UN to denounce the landings; but, although thwarted in its effort to attain these goals, the USSR continued to cultivate its influence in Lebanon. The economic campaign resumed in January 1959, when the USSR and Lebanon agreed to increase

their annual trade from \$3 million to \$4.5 million.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰Middle Eastern Affairs (February 1959), p. 89.

Jordan and Lebanon remained on better terms with the West than did their Arab neighbors. Within Lebanon, however, there was a growing division between the Christians, whose interests were oriented toward the West, and the Muslim population, which was being drawn toward Nasser and Arab nationalism. Jordan was dependent for its existence on Western assistance, for it lacked the resources to support its population; but even here there was popular enthusiasm for Nasser.¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹Don Peretz, The Middle East Today (New York: 1963), pp. 315-316, 336-337.

Soviet Progress in the Near East, 1958-1964.

Throughout the period 1958-1964, the Soviet Union continued to carry out economic and cultural programs designed to undermine and eventually eliminate Western influence in the Near East. Soviet tactics called for economic, cultural, and finally political penetration of the Near Eastern states.¹⁰² In its efforts

¹⁰²Mackintosh, p. 127.

to increase its influence in the Near East, the USSR encountered numerous obstacles and setbacks. According to J.M. Mackintosh, the Soviet Union was "constantly taken by surprise by local Arab policies, plots, and crises." Mackintosh believed that the USSR, "for reasons of prestige or fear, . . . felt obliged to intervene as each crisis occurred, but her part was always that of an alarmed, puzzled, or

even exasperated protector, who would have preferred a period of political stability in which her long-term plans could gradually mature."¹⁰³

¹⁰³Ibid., pp. 231-232.

As an instance of Soviet confusion, Mackintosh cites the Near Eastern crisis of 1958, from which the USSR failed to derive all the advantages that it sought. The UN General Assembly did not accept Russia's charges of aggression and therefore failed to condemn the United States and Britain for intervening in Lebanon and Jordan, and the West rejected, though after some hesitation, Khrushchev's proposal for a meeting of the heads of state. These disappointments, however, were offset by the UN's refusal to accept the American allegation that the UAR had supported the rebellion in Lebanon, by the overthrow of the pro-Western government in Iraq and the resultant weakening of the Baghdad Pact, and by the willingness of the new Iraqi regime to allow the nation's Communist Party to operate openly, a concession to Communism that the UAR's Nasser refused to make. In the opinion of Mackintosh, "Soviet tactics . . . once again revealed an understandable lack of confidence in a very delicate situation"; and consequently, the USSR did not react with sufficient vigor or decisiveness to prevent Turkey and Iran, two of the three Near Eastern members of the Baghdad Pact, from renewing their defensive ties with the West.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁴Ibid., pp. 232-234.

During the years that followed, the Soviet Union suffered various tactical reverses other than the

formation of CENTO. Nasser, for example, refused to allow UAR Communists to participate in domestic politics, and a revolt in Iraq toppled a regime friendly to Communism and led to the suppression of the party. Nowhere in the Near East did unalloyed Communist ideology seem deeply rooted.

Marxism, according to historian Albert Hourani, was spreading "mainly in the diluted form which has become part of the semi-official ideology of Egypt and other countries Wherever Marxism and nationalism have been in conflict, so far it is the latter which has proved to be the more successful."¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵Albert Hourani, "Near Eastern Nationalism Yesterday and Today," Foreign Affairs (October 1963), p. 136.

Arab nationalism remained the dominant movement throughout the Near East; and the Soviet Union, for the time being at least, had no choice but to seek influence by allying itself with this movement, if necessary ranging itself alongside nationalist leaders who refused to become Communist puppets.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶Lenczowski, p. 668.

The ideological victory of nationalism over Communism was, in Hourani's phrase, "fragile at best."¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷Hourani, "Near Eastern Nationalism Yesterday and Today," p. 136.

Although the progress of Communism seemed checked for the moment, inasmuch as no Communist-inspired revolutionary movement had appeared in the Near East, further Communist penetration of the region seemed likely. The Soviet Union had established an

economic beachhead in the Near East and caused certain nations, such as the UAR, to become increasingly dependent on Communist states for markets as well as for materials, technical assistance, and armaments. The Soviet Union also won Arab favor because of its propaganda campaigns against Israel. Finally, student exchange programs and other cultural agreements could serve as vehicles for the further spread of Communist theories.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸ Lenczowski, p. 667.

The expansion of the Communist beachhead would not be without its difficulties. The United States continued to maintain trade, cultural, and in some cases military assistance programs that could counteract Soviet efforts at penetration. Russian economic programs were hampered by distance, by the comparatively narrow range of finished products available for export, and by the absence of a need for vast amounts of imported raw materials. In short, the Soviet Union could not hope to dominate the regional economy and as a result it had to be selective in its offers of aid, choosing only the programs from which it could derive the greatest political advantage. Finally, the USSR faced the problem of either coordinating its efforts with those of the Chinese in the interests of efficiency or competing with the Chinese if disputes between the two nations had made such coordination impossible.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 668. Laqueur, "New Interest in the Middle East," pp. 359-360.

Appendix II

Total Soviet Economic credits and grants extended to the Middle East
(in millions of US dollars) 1 Jan 54-31 Dec 64⁴⁸

| | |
|----------|-----|
| UAR | 833 |
| Iraq | 184 |
| Syria | 150 |
| Yemen | 66 |
| Pakistan | 44 |
| Iran | 39 |
| Turkey | 10 |

48. US Cong., Jt. Economic Cmte., 89th Cong., 1st Sess., Cmte. print,
"Current Economic Indicators for the USSR," June 65, p. 174.

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST

(JULY 1964 - JULY 1965)

Historical Division
Joint Secretariat
Joint Chiefs of Staff
18 February 1966

Soviet Policy Toward
M.E. (Jul 64-Jul 65)

Russian Relations with the Middle East

This is an annex to the Historical Division study "Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East, July 58 - July 64," dated 2 September 1964. This annex surveys the main events since the earlier study and brings trade figures up to 1963 and credit/grant figures up to 1964, the latest years for which these figures are available.

Soviet Aid to the Middle East

Sometimes characterized as the "kind uncle phenomenon," Russian aid to Middle East nations has been primarily in credits and trade rather than grants. As appendix I shows, Russian trade with the Middle East has grown considerably since its inauguration in 1955. From 1955 to 1962 it accounted for 44% of total Soviet trade with noncommunist countries.¹ Yet the

1. Frank O'Brien, Crisis in World Communism, p. 192.

total Russian outlay is still small compared to Western assistance; and as shown in appendix II, highly selective, the lion's share going to Egypt.

Many observers have noticed a growing skepticism about the efficacy of Soviet aid to underdeveloped countries, among both the recipients and the Russians themselves.² The Russians are

2. See, e.g., Victor Lasky, The Ugly Russian.

certainly finding many of the same frustrations that the Americans found before them: the quicksand effect of credit to poor countries, the volatility of Middle Eastern governments, the fact that aid to one country is usually denounced by its neighbor, and finally the competition, not only with the West, but also with the Chinese. One of the most painful Soviet lessons learned in the past decade must have been the discovery that mistakes in foreign aid are not an American monopoly.³

3. Marshall Goldman, "A Balance Sheet of Soviet Foreign Aid," Foreign Affairs, vol. 43 (Jan 65), pp. 349-60.

One writer sums up the Soviet score in the Middle East as one win (Egypt) and two losses (Iraq and Syria).⁴ Another

4. Leo Heiman, "Moscow's Export Arsenal," East Europe, May 64, pp. 3-10.

observes that the recipients of Soviet aid have often shown themselves

much more interested in playing off the Soviet Union against the US, so as to get more help from both, than in becoming politically subservient to either.⁵

5. Harry Schwartz, The Soviet Economy Since Stalin, ch. 6.

If his thesis is true that the Russians have been disappointed by the headaches and lack of spectacular results from their aid program, then the Arabs might expect future Russian aid to become more economical and less political.

The following country-by-country summary will try to illustrate some of the problems facing the Russians in the Middle East.

Egypt

Egypt is probably the best example in the Middle East of the quicksand effect in foreign aid. After sinking hundreds of millions into Egypt since 1955, the Russians extended another \$277,000,000 in credits in May 1964, because "the Egyptians were unable to pay existing debts and were in dire need of additional funds."⁶ The credit grant was announced during one

6. Goldman, p. 360.

of the great events in recent Soviet-UAR relations, Khrushchev's first visit to the Middle East. Probably the most important aspect of this visit was Khrushchev's "ideological and practical" endorsement of the Nasser regime, which he described as being "embarked upon the road of socialist development."⁷ The First

7. Uri Ra'anan, "Moscow and the Third World," Problems of Communism, Jan-Feb 65, p. 27.

Secretary also took advantage of the occasion to condemn Israel for diverting the waters of the Jordan and to promise more arms to the UAR.

There is some indication that the \$277,000,000 credit was granted over the objections of Soviet economic advisers.⁸

8. Goldman, p. 360.

Official Soviet versions of Khrushchev's pledge on weapons, for instance, added significantly: "There will be no delay over arms should they be necessary to rebuff aggressors."⁹ Neverthe-

9. Ra'anan, p. 27.

less, the Soviet course in Egypt under Brezhnev appears to be holding steady. Although Nasser is now only referred to as being "on the noncapitalistic path of development,"¹⁰ practical

10. Mikoyan speech, Pravda of 1 Sep. Cited in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 22 Sep 65, p. 19 (hereafter cited as Current Digest).

relations appear to be about as usual. The Russians ratified a \$100,000,000 trade agreement in December 1964 and at the conclusion of Nasser's state visit of 27 August - 1 September 65

agreed to October talks on a long-term trade agreement for 1966-70.

Despite recent second thoughts about it, the Russian investment in Egypt is probably the USSR's most successful venture in the Middle East. As a result of its arms shipments and the constant need for maintenance, training, and resupply, Moscow exercises what Heiman calls "remote Soviet control" over the Egyptian armed forces.¹¹ A recent US ambassador to

11. Heiman, p. 8.

Cairo agrees. The Russian monopoly on the Egyptian military establishment, he says, gives them "an absolute veto on certain Egyptian policies if they care to use it."¹²

12. John S. Badeau, "USA and UAR," Foreign Affairs, vol. 43 (Jan 65), p. 290.

Syria

Syria is a good example of the volatility of Middle East governments. A Russian outlay of perhaps \$150 million in military assistance since 1957 and that much more in grants and credits was insufficient to prevent a takeover in 1963 by a "virulently anticommunist"¹³ element of the Baath party. The Soviets froze

13. Heiman, p. 9.

military aid and, according to Heiman, sent just enough spare parts, ammunition, and replacement equipment to keep the Syrian army from disintegrating.¹⁴ Beginning in November 1964 there

14. Ibid.

were some signs of a thaw in Russia's Syrian policy. In that month the two countries signed a cultural agreement, which included student exchanges and scientific and journalistic missions.¹⁵ Then in February 1965 they signed a £5 million

15. Middle East Journal, (winter 65), p. 88.

agreement for the construction of a steel rail factory and an assembly plant for railway equipment.¹⁶

16. Middle East Journal, (spring 65), p. 210.

Yemen

Nasser's support of the "republican"¹⁷ regime in Yemen

17. One observer says the words "republican" and "royalist" often mean Egyptian and Arab in the Yemen. See Vincent Sheean, "King Faisal's First Year," Foreign Affairs, vol. 44 (Jan 66), p. 311.

was possible only because of the flow of Soviet arms aid to Egypt. In addition direct Soviet aid, especially since the revolution of 1962, had grown until by 1965 Yemen was fourth on the list of aid recipients in the Middle East (see appendix II). In March 1964 republican President Sallal visited the USSR and signed a treaty of friendship and two assistance agreements providing for cement plants, fish canneries, roads, aid to agriculture, a hospital, a health center, and three schools. A month later the Russians granted a loan (reported as both 73.4 and 65 million rubles) for the exploration of natural resources.

Vice-President Amri visited Moscow in May, reportedly to secure Russian aircraft, but the results are unknown.¹⁸

18. Mizan (April 65), p. 11.

Iraq

Russian policy in Iraq was another victim of governmental instability in the Middle East. The Soviets stopped all arms shipments after the Baathist coup of 1963 and the assassination of Kassem. As a result Iraq's air force was grounded and her SA-2 missiles became "a pile of rusty junk."¹⁹ By 1965 Iraq's

19. Heiman, pp. 9-10.

armed forces had deteriorated to the point where they could hardly cope with Kurdish guerrillas, let alone threaten Israel.²⁰

20. Ibid., p. 10.

But recently Soviet help seems to have resumed. An arms shipment was reported on 18 August 64,²¹ in December the two countries

21. Deadline Data, 18 Aug 64.

signed an economic agreement, and in May 1965 the Russians offered to help finance a dam on the Euphrates River.²² Soviet support

22. Middle East Journal, (spring 65), p. 198; (summer 65), p. 341.

for the "Kurdish national-democratic movement in Iraq," however, continues to complicate Iraqi-Soviet relations. Pravda calls for a peaceful solution "on the basis of respect for and a

guarantee of the national rights of the Kurds within the framework of a united Iraqi state. . . ."23

23. Pravda, 13 May 65, from Current Digest, 2 June 65, p. 27.

Israel

In their pronouncements the Russians continued the anti-Israel policy adopted before Stalin's death; but there were indications on the practical level that the USSR might be willing to do more business with Israel. The Soviets supported the Arab countries on such issues as diversion of the Jordan River water and the plight of the Palestinian refugees. Israel charged the Soviets with oppression and discrimination against Jews in the USSR and appealed to the UN Economic and Social Council. These political differences, though, did not prevent the two countries reaching two economic agreements in October 1964: 1) an agreement on the Israeli purchase for \$4.5 million of certain Russian property in Israel; and 2) a renewal of the agreement, suspended in 1956, on the exchange of Israeli citrus fruits for Russian oil.²⁴

24. New Republic, 6 Jun 64, p. 12; Spectator, 8 May 64, pp. 625-26; 22 May 64, p. 680; Keessing's 1963-64, p. 20404; Middle East Journal, (winter 65), p. 75.

Iran

By mid-1965 Soviet-Iranian relations were "developing auspiciously," according to the official communique on the Shah's visit to the USSR from 21 June to 3 July. There is no apparent reason to conclude otherwise. During 1964 the two neighbors opened air service between them; agreed to exchange technical and geological data, to explore the Qum region, and

to reassess oil deposits; and in October ratified an agreement granting mutual transit privileges across each other's territory.²⁵

25. Deadline Data, 6 Sep 64; Middle East Journal, (winter 65), p. 73.

In the communique of 4 July 65 they agreed that "relations between states with different social systems must be built on the basis . . . of peaceful coexistence."²⁶ The two countries

26. Pravda, 4 Jul 65, from Current Digest, 28 Jul 65, pp. 24-25.

also applauded: general and complete disarmament under effective international control, strengthening the UN, and the decisions of the UN Conference on Trade and Development; they condemned colonialism "in all its manifestations."²⁷

27. Ibid.

Lebanon

Under General Helou, who was elected president in August 1964, Lebanon continued to lean toward the west, but relations with the USSR appeared to be improving. On 23 January 1965 the two signed a trade agreement calling for a yearly volume of \$6.5 million.²⁸ The Russians agreed to increase their imports of

28. Middle East Journal, (spring 65), p. 202.

Lebanese apples, and the two countries explored the possibility of air service between them. (To date there is still no air service between Lebanon and the USSR.) In the fall of 1965,

for the first time, a group of Lebanese parliamentary leaders visited Moscow.²⁹

29. Mizan, (Oct 65), p. 18.

Jordan

The Russians continued their efforts to woo Hussein from his western attachments, and although the king refused an offer of jets, other contacts increased. In June 1964 the Jordanian government allowed a delegation of the Jordanian Communist Party to travel to Moscow.³⁰ The following month the Jordanians

30. Mizan, (Apr 65), p. 9.

reportedly asked for economic aid.³¹ In August the two countries

31. NY Times, 16 Jul 64, p. 16.

raised diplomatic representation, begun only in 1963, to the embassy level.³² In the fall Jordan turned down the Soviet arms

32. Keesing's 1963-64, p. 19602; NY Times, 1 Sep 64, p. 2; 7 Sep 64, p. 2.

offer, which included jets and other modern weapons, but allowed a group of 10 students to go to the USSR to attend Soviet universities.³³

33. Mizan, (Oct 64), p. 18.

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait

One of Faisal's first acts after assuming the throne in November 1964 was to explore the possibility of establishing

diplomatic relations with the USSR. He did not intend, he told Izvestia, to limit his relations to the Western nations.³⁴ On

34. Mizan, (Apr 65), p. 11; Middle East Journal, (spring 65), p. 207.

26 February 65 representatives of the two countries met in Amman, but as of the end of the year nothing had come of it.

Kuwait's minister of finance and industry headed a delegation to the USSR in November 1964. The economic and technical co-operation agreements arrived at covered aviation and wireless communications, improvement of the Shatt al 'areb water project, and reclamation of desert land. Russian experts visited Kuwait in December 1964 and in February 1965, and the two countries signed a cultural and economic cooperation agreement on 27 February. In the spring a team of Russian doctors arrived to organize a campaign against trachoma.³⁵

35. Middle East Journal, (winter 65), pp 77-78; NY Times, 4 Nov 64, p. 48; Mizan, (Mar 65), p. 15; (Apr 65), p. 10.

Pakistan

In Pakistan Soviet policy faces one of its greatest challenges. Without jeopardizing its huge investment in India, the USSR has somehow to wean Pakistan from China and prevent fighting over Kashmir, so close to its own frontier.³⁶ At the outbreak of the

36. Edmund Taylor, "The Soviet Bid for India," Reporter, 18 Nov 65, p. 21.

Indo-Pakistani war in September 1965 the Russians expressed their serious concern over the conflict "in an area directly contiguous

to the borders of the Soviet Union," and offered their good offices for a peaceful solution.³⁷ The recent settlement by Ayub Khan

37. Tass statement, Current Digest, 29 Sep 65, p. 12.

and Shastri in Tashkent was a triumph for Soviet peacemaking.

On another front, Pakistani resentment of Soviet aid to India did not prevent their accepting increased amounts of it themselves. President Khan visited the USSR from 3 to 11 April 1965 and signed three agreements covering a wide range of cultural and economic projects. Trade was to double by 1967; a Soviet loan of 150-250 million rubles was to be used for purchasing machinery and prospecting for oil; and the two countries were to exchange students, scientists, sportsmen, translations, and radio and TV programs.³⁸ In March 1965 Pravda stated that

38. Keesing's 1965-1966, p. 20797; Current Digest, 15 May 65, pp. 21-22.

relations with Pakistan were better than at any time in recent years.³⁹

39. Current Digest, 14 Apr 65, p. 30.

Cyprus and Turkey

The Cyprus crisis confronted Soviet diplomacy with another Kashmir. Gromyko has been likened to a man threading his way through a minefield. As far as Turkey is concerned, the USSR seems to have fared better than the US. Perhaps this was inevitable, since a basic Russian objective -- to bar NATO use of Cyprus -- was more compatible with the Turkish view (independence and federation) than with the US position; this position, the

principal feature of which was enosis, was presented at the UN-sponsored Geneva meetings in July 1964 by Dean Acheson.⁴⁰ At

40. Jules Davids, The US in World Affairs 1964, pp. 63-64.

any rate Turkey seems politically closer to the USSR now than at any time in recent history.

In February 1964, shortly after the flareup in Cyprus, Khrushchev warned against interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus and called on the Security Council to safeguard the country's independence.⁴¹ In August the USSR abstained on a

41. Ibid., p. 57.

resolution appealing to Turkey to halt her air raids. In September Russia and Cyprus signed a trade agreement.⁴² At

42. In March 65 the US Sixth Fleet turned back a Greek freighter carrying Russian missiles from Egypt to Cyprus.

the UN the Soviets voted for each extension of the peace-keeping force (UNFICYP), but refused any financial support.

In January 1965 Gromyko referred in an interview to the possibility of a federation of the two "national communities" of Cyprus, a position that caused the Greek CP to stray from the Moscow line for the first time in history.⁴³

43. Economist, vol. 214 (30 Jan 65), p. 424.

One result of the Cyprus crisis seems to have been Turkish disillusionment with its Western marriage and a corresponding

interest in its new "illicit flirtation" with the USSR.⁴⁴ In

44. Ibid., vol. 215 (29 May 65), pp. 1020-21.

the fall of 1964 the Turkish press began a hate-America campaign based on the Cyprus issue and alleged American favoritism toward Greece in military aid.⁴⁵ About the same time the Russians

45. Yilmaz Cetiner, Cumhuriyat, translated in Atlas, Aug 64, pp. 107-8.

promised to build a dam on the Arpacay River, signed new trade and cultural agreements, and abolished visa fees. In January 1965, during the visit of Nikolai Podgorny, the Turks announced they would refrain from participation in the MLF. Podgorny was followed by Gromyko in May, a visit that was reciprocated by Turkish Prime Minister Urguplu from 9-16 August. In the official communique on that visit the two sides agreed to maintain a high level of trade and expressed the belief that the Cyprus question

should be based on respect for the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, on the observance of the legitimate rights of both national communities -- Greek and Turkish -- ensuring them a peaceful life, and on recognizing the fact of the existence of two national communities on the island.⁴⁶

46. Pravda, 17 Aug; Izvestia, 18 Aug, from Current Digest, 8 Sep 65, p. 14.

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Appendix I

Russian Trade (in million US dollars) in the Middle East
(Imports + Exports) 1955, 1959-63⁴⁷

| | 1955 | 1959 | 1960 | 1961 | 1962 | 1963 | Total 59-63 |
|----------|------|-------|-------|--------------|-------|-------|-------------|
| UAR | 26.3 | 180.7 | 191.3 | 204.9 | 176.2 | 258.8 | 1,011.9 |
| Iraq | 0.3 | 25.6 | 23.6 | 41.9 | 55.8 | 48.6 | 195.5 |
| Iran | 41.5 | 36.8 | 37.0 | 36.4 | 32.5 | 41.6 | 194.3 |
| Syria | 0.3 | 21.2 | 18.8 | 21.4 | 12.0 | 27.3 | 99.7 |
| Turkey | 12.5 | 10.5 | 13.0 | 11.0 | 9.7 | 15.8 | 60.0 |
| Pakistan | 0.3 | 4.7 | 6.8 | 7.3 | 9.0 | 15.9 | 43.7 |
| Lebanon | 2.1 | 7.2 | 8.2 | 8.4 | 8.3 | 5.8 | 37.9 |
| Yemen | 0.0 | 3.5 | 4.9 | 3.5 | 3.8 | 4.9 | 20.6 |
| Cyprus | 0.0 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 2.9 | 2.6 | 3.1 | 9.8 |
| Israel | 8.5 | ----- | ----- | Not Reported | ----- | ----- | ----- |

47. US Cong., Jt. Economic Cmte., 89th Cong, 1st Sess., Cmte. print, "Current Economic Indicators for the USSR," June 65, pp. 172-3.

US Policy Toward
M.E. (1958-1 Jul 64)

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST
(1958 - 1 JULY 1964)

Historical Division
Joint Chiefs of Staff
2 September 1964

UNCLASSIFIED

Erosion of the US Position in the Middle East, 1958

The general US position in the Middle East had been in a state of decline for some years, owing principally to deteriorating relations with the Arab world. President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, the most important figure in this world, had been increasingly at odds with US (and Western) policy. Several years of hostility had been climaxed by the disruptive Suez crisis of 1956, the repercussions of which were still being felt at the end of 1957.

Throughout most of 1958 the tide of events continued to run against the United States. The year opened with what looked like a gigantic stride toward the realization of the overweening ambitions of President Nasser (and a corresponding blow to US interests). On 1 February 1958, Egypt and Syria formally combined into a "United Arab Republic," under Nasser's leadership. This new union was proclaimed as a first step toward the unification of all Arab peoples. Its magnetic attraction for nearby countries was at once demonstrated when Yemen agreed to associate with the UAR in a loose federation. Even Saudi Arabia, hitherto firmly resistant to Nasser, seemed shaken by the rising tide of Nasserism. King Saud's brother, Crown Prince Faisal, who was known to favor a more neutral course of action instead of the generally pro-Western orientation maintained by Saud himself, assumed the direction of both internal and external affairs.¹

¹Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1958 (New York, 1959), pp. 188-192.

These developments provided a somber backdrop for the two major crises of 1958: the civil war and US intervention in Lebanon, and the overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq (both of which are described below). The result in both countries was to sweep away two regimes which had been firmly allied with the West. The net effect of all these events was that "the United States reached the lowest point in its relations with the Arab states during the spring and fall of 1958."²

²Jules Davids, "The United States and the Middle East: 1955-1960," Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. XII (May 1961), p. 139.

Origin of the Lebanese Crisis

Unrest in Lebanon -- an inherently unstable nation at best, with its precarious population balance between Christian and Moslem -- sprang from a growing suspicion during late 1957 and early 1958 that President Camille Chamoun, a Christian, intended to seek a second term of office (in violation of the constitution) when his term expired in September 1958. The smoldering unrest created by this rumor burst into flame in May 1958 with the murder of a newspaper publisher who had been critical of the administration. Pro-Arab and Nasserite groups (joined by some Christians) led the uprising which flared into civil war. The burning of a US Information Agency library in Tripoli indicated an element of anti-Americanism in the revolt. Defying the opposition, President Chamoun refused either to resign or to disavow any intention to seek re-election.³

³Fahim I. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington: 1961), Chaps. III-V, pp. 28-88.

The gravity of this development, against the general background of Near Eastern political uncertainty, was at once recognized by the United States. Foreseeing a possible need for military action, the United States strengthened the Sixth Fleet and shifted it towards the Eastern Mediterranean. US forces in Europe were alerted and transport planes were dispatched to Germany, ostensibly to assist in evacuating American citizens from Lebanon.⁴ On 20 May 1958

⁴Ibid., pp. 113-114; Stebbins, pp. 195-196.

Secretary Dulles expressed the view that the "Eisenhower Doctrine" might be applicable to the Lebanese situation, although he hoped that US intervention would be unnecessary.⁵

⁵Paul R. Zinner, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1958 (New York: 1959), pp. 296-297.

The government of Lebanon ascribed the revolt to meddling by the UAR and lodged a formal complaint against that nation with the UN Security Council (22 May 1958). After postponing action in the vain hope that the Arab League might be able to resolve the difficulty, the Security Council took up the complaint on 6 June. The Lebanese representative, Dr. Malik, set forth the case against the UAR. He was supported by the Iraqi spokesman, Dr. Fadhil al-Jamali, who was even more specific in identifying Nasser's ambitions

as a source of peril to the entire Near East.⁶

⁶Qubain, pp. 89-92; Stebbins, pp. 196-197; Documents, 1958, p. 298.

The Lebanese case was supported by the United States, UK, and France, and violently opposed by the USSR. Since Lebanon had not asked for assistance in suppressing the revolt, the Security Council turned its attention to means of isolating the conflict to prevent it from spreading. On 11 June 1958 it voted to establish an "observation group" in Lebanon to prevent infiltration of arms or personnel across the Lebanese border. This resolution had the unanimous support of all Council members except the USSR, which abstained. Following this motion, the UN Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) was established under the direction of Secretary-General Hammarskjold, and began operating within two weeks.⁷

⁷Qubain, pp. 92, 143-144; Stebbins, pp. 198, 199-200; Documents, 1958, pp. 298-299.

The Lebanese government was highly skeptical of the efficacy of this action, especially in view of the small size of the group (consisting at first of less than 100 observers). Lebanese spokesmen indicated that, should it fail to achieve its purpose, Western countries would be asked to provide military assistance under Article 51 of the UN charter. Secretary Dulles, in a statement on 1 July 1958, did not rule out the possibility that US troops might be sent, but emphasized that the United States would prefer a UN solution.⁸

⁸Qubain, pp. 113, 150-151; Stebbins, pp. 200-201; Documents, 1958, pp. 300-301.

The United States Intervenes in Lebanon

The crisis might have continued to simmer indefinitely had it not been brought to a boil by an alarming new development. On 14 July 1958 the pro-Western monarchy of Iraq was overthrown by a coup d'etat engineered by a group of Army officers led by Brig. Gen. Abdel Karim al-Kassim. The royal family and the principal leaders of the royalist regime were brutally murdered. Though the ideology and scope of this revolution were not immediately clear, its results were a terrifying example of the danger of maintaining close ties to the West. President Chamoun at once made an urgent appeal to the United States, the UK, and France to send troops to protect his country's independence. King Hussein of Jordan made a similar request.⁹

⁹Stebbins, pp. 201-203; Qubain, p. 115.

Both requests fell upon willing ears. The United States began landing Marine units from the Sixth Fleet in Lebanon on 15 July. Within the next few days a total of over 14,000 US Marines and Army troops arrived in that country. On 21 July President Chamoun publicly expressed his gratitude for this prompt response. The UK assumed the burden of assisting Jordan and sent approximately 3,000 men, beginning on 17 July.¹⁰

¹⁰Qubain, pp. 115-116; Stebbins, p. 203; Documents, 1958, pp. 314-315.

In announcing this drastic action to the Congress and the people of the US on 15 July, President Eisenhower saw in the events in Lebanon "the same pattern of conquest with which we became familiar during the period of 1945 to 1950"--i.e., "taking over a nation by means of indirect aggression." The unspoken implication was that the Communists were behind the unrest in the Near East. The mission of the US forces in Lebanon, said Mr. Eisenhower, was both to protect the lives of the 2,500 Americans in that country and to preserve its "territorial integrity and political independence." The United States had acted unilaterally only with the greatest reluctance and because of the need for immediate action; there was no intention of replacing the UN.¹¹

¹¹Documents, 1958, pp. 302-311.

At the same time, the United States called the Security Council into emergency session (15 July). The US representative, Mr. Lodge, assured the members that the United States would prefer to see the UN assume responsibility for maintaining peace in Lebanon. He submitted a resolution asking other UN members to contribute contingents to an international force for that purpose. When this resolution was vetoed by the USSR on 18 July, Mr. Lodge proposed an emergency session of the General Assembly. But action was postponed for the moment, and the Council adjourned on 22 July.¹²

¹²Stebbins, pp. 204-206, 210; Qubain, pp. 92-95; Documents, 1958, pp. 312-314.

Despite the reassuring statements of the President and Mr. Lodge, the US action aroused wide misgivings among neutral and even Western countries, while the reaction of the Communist bloc and of most Middle Eastern countries was predictably violent. In letters to the heads of government of the three major Western powers, Khrushchev urged an immediate "summit" meeting to prevent a possible "military conflict." President Eisenhower denied any threat of war and suggested that the USSR support constructive action by the Security Council as a more prompt method of resolving the crisis. He was willing, however, to have direct discussions among heads of government along with a Security Council meeting, as provided by Article 28 (2) of the UN Charter. In the end, however, Khrushchev dropped his demand for a "summit" meeting. In another letter dated 5 August 1958, he urged a Special General Assembly meeting, a step which the United States had already suggested.¹³

¹³Stebbins, pp. 295-298; Qubain, pp. 95-96; Documents, 1958, pp. 325-350.

Meanwhile the temperature in the Near East crisis had noticeably cooled, as the situation proved less urgent than had at first been thought. The lower tension resulted partly from the commendable restraint with which the Lebanese civil disturbances were handled; both sides refrained from pushing the conflict to its utmost limits and left the way open for compromise and conciliation. As a result, Under-Secretary of State Robert Murphy, who had been in Beirut since 17 May

seeking a political settlement, persuaded Chamoun to step down in favor of a candidate who was acceptable to all factions and was elected by the Lebanese parliament on 31 July.¹⁴

¹⁴Stebbins, p. 208; Qubain, pp. 154-156.

Developments in Iraq were also reassuring. Although the new leader, Gen. Kassim, stressed "Arab unity" as an objective, it became clear that he had no intention of placing his country under Nasser's rule and that the old hostility between Iraq and Egypt was by no means absent from his outlook. Moreover, he assured the West that there would be no interference with the flow of oil from Iraq. Under-Secretary Murphy, who paid a flying visit to Iraq, conferred with Kassim and found him well aware of the danger of Communist aggression. The inspiration for the revolt, it appeared, was wholly internal. Thus reassured, the United States bowed to the inevitable and recognized the new Iraq regime on 2 August.¹⁵

¹⁵Benjamin Shwadran, The Power Struggle in Iraq (New York: 1960), pp. 22-28; Davids, p. 139; Stebbins, pp. 208-209.

The Outcome in Lebanon

The diminished urgency of the situation made it possible to look beyond the immediate crisis and to seek long-range solutions for the problems of the Near East, instead of mere palliatives for outward symptoms. These were sought at a special meeting of the General Assembly which opened on 8 August. By that time the

United States, as a token of good faith, had already withdrawn some of its forces.¹⁶

¹⁶Stebbins, pp. 211-213.

On 13 August President Eisenhower appeared at the Assembly and laid before it some proposals for a lasting pacification in the Near East. It was imperative, he said, to assure the security of Lebanon and Jordan against "indirect aggression." But he also recommended four other measures to assure peace and stability in that region. These were: (1) adoption of means to monitor radio broadcasts in the Near East to eliminate "inflammatory propaganda" directed at other nations (a practice freely indulged in by the Nasser regime); (2) establishment of a "standby United Nations Peace Force" capable of "prompt and effective action" to insure the independence of any country; (3) creation of an "Arab development institution" to promote economic, technological, and medical progress; and (4) arrangements to prevent "a continued wasteful, dangerous competition in armaments" among Near Eastern governments. These four proposals, together with action to protect Lebanon and Jordan, constituted a six-point program, which, the President said, should be "viewed as a whole."¹⁷

¹⁷Documents, 1958, pp. 350-360.

The first two items in Mr. Eisenhower's program -- Lebanon and Jordan -- were of course the most urgent. At first it appeared that the Assembly would be no more successful in reaching a solution than had the

Security Council. Any measure, to be effective, would require the assent of the Arab nations, especially the UAR. But President Nasser, with the support of the Communist bloc, sought the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of US and British troops as the sole objective. The United States and UK assured the Assembly that their troops would be withdrawn, but only after such action was requested by Lebanon or Jordan or after UN action had made their presence no longer necessary.

The solution was reached in a resolution worked out by the Arab governments themselves and passed by the Assembly on 21 August. It abandoned the demand for immediate withdrawal of troops and reaffirmed a provision in the Arab League Pact which required each member to respect the "independence and sovereignty" of all other members. The key provision called on the Secretary-General, "in consultation with the Governments concerned," to establish "such practical arrangements as would adequately help in upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter in relation to Lebanon and Jordan in the present circumstances, and thereby facilitate the early withdrawal of the foreign troops from the two countries." The nature of these "arrangements" was intentionally left unspecified; it was left to the proven diplomatic skill of Secretary-General Hammarskjöld to work them out.¹⁸

¹⁸ Qubain, pp. 98-108; Stebbins, pp. 213-215; Documents, 1958, pp. 360-361.

Mr. Hammarskjöld at once left for the Near East to carry out his mandate. On 29 September 1958 he reported that the UNOGIL could serve the need for a "practical arrangement" in Lebanon. In Jordan, King Hussein refused to accept a similar observation group, but he was willing to receive a special UN representative to guarantee the execution of the Assembly's resolution. By that time, the United States and UK, in discussions with Lebanon and Jordan respectively, had already promised to withdraw their troops.¹⁹

¹⁹Stebbins, pp. 216-217; Qubain, pp. 108-109; Documents, 1958, pp. 361-371.

The last US troops left Lebanon on 25 October 1958. British withdrawal from Jordan was completed on 2 November. On 17 November UNOGIL reported that its task was completed, and early in December the last of the observers departed. The United States granted \$10 million to Lebanon to assist in its rehabilitation.²⁰ "The Lebanese crisis died down as

²⁰Stebbins, pp. 218-219; Qubain, pp. 108-109.

suddenly as it had appeared on the international scene."²¹

²¹Qubain, p. 109.

Despite this happy ending, the United States suffered a net loss. The new Premier of Lebanon made it clear on 10 December that his nation was "neutral" and that it would no longer consider itself bound by

the Eisenhower doctrine. On the other hand, the United States could take some comfort from the fact that the USSR had made no gains.

²²

Stebbins, pp. 219, 221.

Although Mr. Eisenhower had urged the Assembly to regard his six-point Near Eastern program as an integrated whole and to adopt it in entirety, his long-range proposals were never put into effect. The Soviet bloc, along with most of the "uncommitted" nations, opposed any standby UN peace force as a vestige of "colonialism." The proposed "Arab development institution" failed in the face of hostility from the Arab nations themselves, which already had a similar plan under consideration in the Arab League. Nothing was done toward the monitoring of radio propaganda or the control of armaments. ²³ The underlying problems

²³

Stebbins, p. 220.

which had given rise to the crises of 1956-58 remained as a source of possible future irritation.

From the Baghdad Pact to CENTO

A major reason for US concern over the July 1958 revolt in Iraq was that nation's status as a member of the "Baghdad Pact" organization. This treaty had united the countries of the so-called "Northern Tier" -- Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan -- with the UK in a regional defense arrangement. The United States was not formally a member, but cooperated closely with the organization. US representatives attended the annual

meetings of its Ministerial Council and served as members of the Military Committee and Secretariat. American naval and air units participated in maneuvers conducted under the supervision of the Combined Military Planning Staff.²⁴

²⁴ CENTO Public Relations Division, The Story of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) (Ankara: 1959). For participation of US units in CENTO exercises, see New York Times, 14 Nov 59, 12 Nov 63.

For all practical purposes, Iraq ceased to be a member immediately after 14 July 1958, although the Kassim regime did not officially withdraw until 24 March 1959. The headquarters of the organization were moved from Baghdad to Ankara shortly after the Iraqi revolt. In August 1959 it was renamed the "Central Treaty Organization" (CENTO), and new name emphasizing its location midway between NATO and SEATO.²⁵

²⁵ Stebbins, pp. 202, 225, and The United States in World Affairs, 1959 (New York: 1960), pp. 225, 234.

The defection of Iraq was a practical as well as a psychological blow, exposing both Turkey and Iran to possible danger from the rear. Moreover, both of those countries had Kurdish populations which might be vulnerable to agitation launched by the Kurds in Iraq.²⁶ To repair the damage suffered by the loss of

²⁶ Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1959, pp. 230-231.

Iraq was the first task of the organization after 14 July 1958.

The Baghdad Pact Council held a regular meeting in London only two weeks after the Iraqi revolution (28-29 July 1958). Its members agreed that the need for the Pact was "greater than ever" and expressed "concern at the recent examples of aggression by indirect means." They praised the United States and UK for taking "a prompt action . . . in accordance with the principles of international law and in conformity with the United Nations Charter . . . in responding to the call for help of the lawful governments of Lebanon and Jordan." To the disappointment of the other members, the United States still declined to become a full member, though it offered to negotiate bilateral agreements with each country which would spell out existing commitments under Mutual Security legislation and the Middle East Resolution.²⁷

²⁷ Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1958, pp. 209-210; Documents, 1958, pp. 376-378.

At its next meeting, held in Karachi on 26-28 January 1958, the Council members expressed the belief "that the solidarity shown by the members of the Baghdad Pact had contributed to the increased stability which has prevailed in the Middle East" since their last meeting. Nevertheless they affirmed that "the threat of direct and indirect aggression had not diminished."²⁸ Shortly thereafter (5 March 1959) the

²⁸ Paul E. Zinner, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1959 (New York: 1960), pp. 393-395.

bilateral "agreements of cooperation" between the

United States and each of the three Asiatic members were signed in Ankara. The United States declared that the "independence and integrity" of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan were "vital to its national interest and to world peace," and pledged continued military and economic aid. The other nations agreed to cooperate with one another and to "participate in such defensive arrangements as may be mutually agreed" in the future.²⁹

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 396-397.

US interest in CENTO was reflected in the choice of Washington as the site of a meeting on 7-9 October 1959. Both President Eisenhower and Vice-President Nixon stressed to the Council their support for the organization. As a practical expression of this interest, the United States agreed to supply a chairman for the CENTO Military Committee for 1960 and a chief of staff for the Combined Military Planning Staff. The Council also voted to establish a "Permanent Military Deputies Group" in Ankara, and directed its Military Committee to study the establishment of a CENTO military command. The "violent and abusive" Soviet propaganda directed against Iran was condemned, and the Iranian government and people were commended for their "dignity and determination . . . in standing firm and united in the face of these attacks."³⁰

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 399-402; Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1959, pp. 234-235.

When President Eisenhower toured Asia in December 1959, he visited all three countries of the "Northern Tier" (while avoiding the more turbulent Arab countries, as well as Israel). In each nation, he was well received and stressed America's interest in the economic and social progress of the individual countries as well as US support for CENTO.³¹ By the

³¹Stebbins, pp. 240-241.

end of 1959, therefore, the United States could feel that everything possible to shore up the alliance had been done.

Nevertheless CENTO was not wholly reliable as a basis for a US position of strength in the Middle East. Evidence of this fact was provided by a political crisis in Turkey -- hitherto probably the most stable country in the region -- which broke out in April 1960. The revolt was wholly internal in inspiration and was directed at the repressive rule of the Menderes government; there was no trace of outside (e.g., Communist or Nasserite) influence. Several weeks later the Menderes government was overthrown. However, the new regime (headed by an Army officer, in the conventional Near Eastern fashion) promised to observe existing commitments to NATO and CENTO.³²

³²Stebbins, pp. 229-230.

Because of this crisis, Turkey was not represented at the CENTO Council meeting in Tehran on 28-30 April 1960. The US delegation was headed by Secretary of State Herter -- another evidence of US interest in the organization. The Council's customary closing

communique reflected the general improvement in the Middle Eastern picture since 1958. Though it reaffirmed the need for "strength and solidarity" of free nations, it said nothing about the dangers of "indirect aggression." The criticism of "hostile propaganda campaigns" was repeated. The members noted progress in military planning, although the study of a military command was not yet completed.³³

³³Richard P. Stebbins, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1960 (New York: 1961), pp. 403-405.

Improved Relations with the Arab Countries

The US position vis-a-vis the Arab nations, after reaching a low ebb in 1958, gradually improved during the next two years. This development resulted from generally favorable (or at least not unfavorable) trends within those countries, combined with a cautious US policy of watchful waiting.

The most important factor in this relative improvement was the increasing evidence that the West could "live with" President Nasser of Egypt. It became apparent that the ideological movement headed by Nasser was not as irresistibly attractive to other Arabs as had at first been feared and that "Arab nationalism" could take other forms than Nasserism. No new countries gravitated into the orbit of the UAR. Indeed, Nasser's relations with other Arabic countries -- e.g. Sudan, Tunisia, and especially Iraq -- were not always good. Such friction between Arab governments was undesirable from one point of view, since stability was a major US objective in the Near East,

but it was advantageous insofar as it checkmated Nasser's ambitions.

Nasser's outlook remained basically hostile to the West, and on many international issues, he (like other leaders of the "anti-colonialist" or "neutralist" nations) took a position similar to that of the USSR. Moreover, he consistently sought Russian economic assistance (e.g., in arranging a loan to finance the second stage of the Aswan Dam, announced in January 1960). But that he had no illusions about the objectives of Communism was shown by his actions in suppressing Communist groups in the United Arab Republic and in curbing the activities of Russian and Chinese missions, while on more than one occasion he and Khrushchev indulged in public recriminations.³⁴

³⁴Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1958, pp. 221-225, 228; US in World Affairs, 1959, pp. 220-225, 236-237; US in World Affairs, 1960 (New York: 1961), pp. 219-221; US in World Affairs, 1961 (New York: 1962), p. 179.

Moreover, Nasser had no intention of becoming economically dependent on the Communist bloc and took steps in 1959 to improve his relations with the United States and with the West generally. He reached agreements with the United States for the resumption of American economic and technical aid, including highway development and draining of marshes. Surplus US agricultural commodities were sold to both Egypt and Syria. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development agreed to lend Egypt \$58.6

million to improve the Suez Canal. Financial disputes between Egypt and the United Kingdom, growing out of the 1956 Suez crisis, were settled through the intermediary of the IBRD.³⁵

³⁵Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1959, pp. 220-221, 228-229; Davids, p. 139.

The government of Iraq also showed no disposition to disturb the status quo between 1958 and 1960. The political situation in that country remained somewhat fluid. Several upheavals during 1958 and 1959, though they left Kassim in power, showed that dissident elements had not been entirely suppressed. Opposition apparently came from both Nasserites and Communists, and it appeared that Kassim was attempting to play off these elements against one another. A period of growing Communist ascendancy was followed in 1959 by measures placing Communists firmly under control.

Like Nasser, Kassim maintained a neutral course in external relations, which led him in 1959 to terminate all US military and economic aid agreements. But he was willing to accept weapons from the UK, and the latter, with US approval, was willing to furnish them in order to keep Iraq from becoming wholly dependent on the USSR.³⁶

³⁶Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1958, pp. 222-223, 224-225; US in World Affairs, 1959, pp. 219-220, 224-228, 235-236; US in World Affairs, 1960, pp. 218-219; US in World Affairs, 1961, pp. 179-180; Shwadrin, pp. 32-60.

This generally favorable picture was counter-balanced by the persistence of basic suspicion of and hostility toward the United States on the part of the Arab nations, attitudes which resulted principally from the association between the US and Israel.³⁷

³⁷Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1961, pp. 181-182.

Moreover, the Communists remained as active as ever in their attempts to secure a dependable foothold in the Middle East. A portent of future trouble was observed far off upon the horizon in 1960. President Eisenhower's report to Congress (15 August 1960) on progress under the Middle East Resolution of 1957 noted that

An extensive effort is being carried forward by the Sino-Soviet bloc in Yemen where port facilities constructed by the Soviets are nearing completion, as is a road from the country's principal port to its largest inland city. For construction of the latter, Communist China has sent to Yemen over 800 engineers and skilled workmen.³⁸

³⁸Documents, 1960, p. 401.

Nevertheless the contrast between the actual course of events and the worst fears felt during 1958 was unmistakable. On 9 July 1959 Secretary of State Christian Herter, in his first news conference, was asked to comment on the current Near Eastern situation as compared with that of a year earlier, especially with reference to US relations with the UAR and with Iraq. "I would say," he replied, "that we are coming nearer to normalizing the situation in the Middle East, that from that point of view the signs are encouraging." Toward the two nations in question,

"we are obviously maintaining an attitude of friendliness and hopefulness that our relations will be normalized even more." In summary, he was "more optimistic than we have been on the turn the developments have taken in the Middle East."³⁹ On 17

³⁹ Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLI, No. 1048 (27 Jul 59), pp. III-112.

September 1959, in his first address to the UN General Assembly, Mr. Herter ascribed this improvement to the "enlightened actions" of the Middle Eastern states, as well as the "outstanding leadership and diplomacy of the Secretary-General."⁴⁰ From the other side

⁴⁰ Ibid., Vol. XLI, No. 1058 (5 Oct 59), p. 468.

of the political fence, Sen. J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, also drew a favorable contrast with the previous year. "The trend of events in the area offers a certain amount of cautious encouragement," he remarked. "He hoped that the leadership of both the United States and the Arab nations "may move imaginatively and boldly toward a new, more mature and realistic relationship."⁴¹

⁴¹ New York Times, 31 Aug 59.

President Eisenhower, in the semi-annual reports on implementation of the Middle East Resolution which he sent to Congress in 1960, commented on the "subsidence of the tensions and conflict which in mid-1958

facilitated possible aggression by international communism." Russian and Chinese efforts to penetrate the Middle East had not "enabled the forces of international communism to threaten seriously the independence and integrity of any countries of the region . . . Relations among the Arab countries continue relatively good and some lessening of tensions among them has tended to reduce opportunities for increased Soviet influence." The Middle East Resolution he characterized as "a safeguard in reserve, available to any country of the region desiring outside assistance against a possible threat to its independence and stability from the external forces of international communism."⁴²

⁴²Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIII, No. 1081 (14 Mar 60), pp. 424-426 (rpt of 15 Feb 60); Documents, 1960, pp. 400-402 (rpt of 15 Aug 60).

The Arab-Israeli Conflict

One glaring exception to the general improvement in the Middle Eastern scene was the complete failure of all efforts to resolve the long-continued and deep-rooted conflict between the Arab states and Israel. Nevertheless, if this hostility continued, it was at least not marked by any such serious threats to world peace as that represented by the Suez crisis of 1956.

Debate on this dispute was an annual feature of General Assembly meetings. The United States continued to seek a solution, but could find no basis for negotiation. The questions at issue were the

disposition of the refugees who had fled Palestine and the boundaries of Israel. The Israelis would negotiate only with the advance stipulation that they would take back no refugees and give up no territory. The Arab countries insisted that the refugees must be repatriated and that Israel must return to the frontiers laid out by the UN in 1947. Although the Arabs might disagree among themselves⁴³ on other issues, they were united on these.

⁴³ Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1958, pp. 235-236; US in World Affairs, 1959, p. 237; US in World Affairs, 1960, p. 223.

Border skirmishes between the Israelis and their hostile neighbors in Jordan and Syria also occupied the UN. Such clashes along Israel's southern boundary -- with the UAR -- were, however, rare or absent, thanks to the presence of the 5,300-man United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). Regularly each year, the General Assembly voted to keep this organization in the field as the best way to keep a difficult situation from growing worse. The financing of UNEF became increasingly a problem, since the USSR (and many other countries) refused to contribute to its expenses. The United States was forced to make⁴⁴ extra contributions to take up the slack.

⁴⁴ Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1958, pp. 233-234, 236; US in World Affairs, 1959, pp. 237-238; US in World Affairs, 1960, pp. 223-224, 245-246.

For the Palestinian refugees, the Assembly could accomplish nothing except to continue the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). The United States supported this expedient in the absence of a long-range

settlement of the refugees' status, and continued to provide approximately 70% of UNRWA's budget. In 1958 the Assembly drew attention to the Agency's uncertain financial situation and asked member nations to increase their contributions. In 1959 it was necessary to extend UNRWA's mandate, which would expire on 30 June 1960. The Arab countries suggested a five-year extension. The United States, which had hoped that no such action would be necessary, eventually agreed to a three-year extension which was approved by the Assembly. At the same time the latter called upon the UN's Palestine Conciliation Commission, established in 1948 but long inactive, to renew its attempts to return the refugees to their original homes.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1958, pp. 236-237; US in World Affairs, 1959, pp. 238-239; US in World Affairs, 1960, pp. 246-247.

An additional source of friction developed from President Nasser's refusal to allow Israel the right of free passage through the Suez Canal (a position which he justified on the basis of the state of war existing between Israel and the UAR). Israeli ships had always been excluded, but in 1959 the doctrine was broadened to apply to vessels of other registry carrying Israeli cargoes. A Danish vessel was detained in the canal in May 1959. While the Secretary-General conducted lengthy negotiations with Nasser seeking its release, a second freighter (of Greek registry) was similarly

detained (December 1959).⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1959, pp. 239-240.

The second incident occurred while the UAR's application for a loan to improve the Suez Canal was pending before the IBRD. Some US Congressmen urged the Bank to withhold the loan in reprisal for this action. Secretary of State Herter, who had upheld the principle of free navigation of the Canal in an address to the UN General Assembly on 17 September 1959, nevertheless declined to exert pressure for this purpose. It was, he said, a matter to be decided by the Bank, which was "essentially an economic medium and not a political medium" and should not be used for "diplomatic pressures."⁴⁷ President Eisenhower, in April 1960,

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 239-240; Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLI, No. 1058 (5 Oct 59), p. 468, and No. 1070 (28 Dec 59), p. 939.

pointed out that there was no way to require the UAR to admit Israeli ships to the Canal except by the application of force, and "I'm certain that we're not trying to settle international problems with force."⁴⁸ In the end, the two ships which had

⁴⁸ Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61 (Washington: 1961), p. 370.

been detained by the UAR were obliged to unload their cargoes before departing.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1960, pp. 225-226.

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⁴⁹ Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1960, pp. 225-226.

But the resentment engendered in the United States by this practice, and by other actions of the Arab states (e.g., blacklisting US vessels when they had previously called at Israeli ports, as part of the Arabs' economic warfare against Israel), led US longshoremen to institute a spontaneous boycott of the UAR ship Cleopatra in April 1960. In reply, the Arabic nations instituted boycotts of US ships. The Executive Council of the AFL-CIO pledged support of the longshoremen in this matter and forwarded a copy of its resolution on the subject to the Department of State "for such action as may be appropriate under the circumstances." Acting Secretary of State Douglas Dillon replied that the United States "neither recognizes nor condones the Arab boycott" and promised "appropriate diplomatic action with the foreign countries involved... to assure freedom of the seas and to protect the interests of our shipping and seamen." Satisfied with these assurances, US longshoremen discontinued picketing the Cleopatra, while in turn, the Arab unions dropped their boycott.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 226; DepState Bulletin, Vol. XLII, No. 1091 (23 May 60), pp. 834-835; New York Times, 7 May, 10 May 60.

Congressional resentment, however, was not so easily appeased. When the Mutual Security Act of 1960 was under consideration, an amendment was introduced declaring in favor of freedom of navigation and against "economic warfare . . . including such procedures as boycotts, blockades, and the restriction of the use of international waterways," and requiring

that US foreign aid "shall be administered to give effect to these principles." Mr. Dillon sought to dissuade Congress from adopting this amendment. US posts abroad, while concurring in the objective, believed it would create difficulties for US foreign policy as a demonstration of "favoritism for the State of Israel" and "an attempt to 'tie strings' to our economic aid." "Avoidance of coercive tactics against Israel's neighbors," he declared, "is in Israel's interest." Israel had made gigantic economic strides, and "it would be a grave mistake to have that progress disturbed by actions which can only stir up area tensions to Israel's detriment. As you know, it is the view of our Government that the tensions of the Middle East can more effectively be treated by concerted international action than by unilateral action on the part of the United States." Nevertheless the amendment was included in the act as finally passed.⁵¹

⁵¹ Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1960, p. 226; DepState Bulletin, Vol. XLII, No. 1091 (23 May 60), pp. 834-835.

A rising tide of armaments in the Near East was another matter of concern to the United States, which had sought without success to have the UN limit armaments in this area. The Eisenhower Administration recognized the need of the Israelis for self-defense, especially after President Nasser turned to the Soviet bloc for weapons. In September 1958, after the Iraqi revolution, the United States agreed to sell the Israelis helicopters and small arms for defensive purposes. But the United States declined to become too

deeply involved in supplying weapons to Israel. In February 1960 Mr. Eisenhower was asked to comment on a suggestion by Sen. Jacob Javits of New York that the US conclude a mutual defense pact with Israel, in view of the influx of Soviet weapons and military personnel into the UAR and Iraq. Declining direct comment on this suggestion, the President pointed out that "the United States, as a matter of policy, has never been a major supplier of arms for Israel and doesn't intend to be, nor to any other country in the area." He was aware that the Soviets were supplying arms to some of the Arabs, but pointed out that "Israel has also been getting arms from Britain and France for a long time. Frankly, I think we're sending arms to enough nations, really," he added. "I think somebody else ought to carry a little responsibility."⁵²

⁵² Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1958, pp. 232-233; US in World Affairs, 1960, p. 224; Public Papers of the Presidents, Eisenhower, 1960-61, p. 195.

The Kennedy Administration and the Middle East, 1961

Except for the perennial frictions between Arabs and Israelis, the new administration that assumed office in January 1961 found the Middle East relatively quiet. There was no occasion for any drastic reversals of US policies in this area.

As in past years, the general trend of political development in the Middle East during 1961, though uneven, was on the whole not unfavorable to the United States. An important setback occurred early in 1961 when Saudi Arabia announced that it would not renew its

agreement for the use of base rights at Dhahran which expired in 1962, justifying this refusal on the grounds of the "assistance furnished to the so-called Israel" by the United States.⁵³ On the other hand, the United

⁵³Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1961, p. 182; New York Times, 17 Mar, 16 Apr 60.

States could contemplate with pleasure the manifestations of Soviet hostility toward Iraq and the UAR (occasioned by actions taken against local Communists in those countries); the action of President Nasser in emphasizing his independence of the Soviet line in international affairs; and the evidence of improved relationship between the UAR and King Hussein of Jordan.⁵⁴

⁵⁴Stebbins, p. 181.

A minor crisis concerning the status of the sheikhdom of Kuwait fortunately posed no problems for the United States. When the United Kingdom recognized Kuwait as wholly independent (19 June 1961), Premier Kassim of Iraq laid claim to the territory, on historic grounds. After an appeal by the Sheikh, the UK (with US concurrence) sent in troops to protect Kuwait's independence. At the same time, the UK appealed to the Security Council on behalf of Kuwait. A resolution offered by the UK, asking all states to respect Kuwait's "independence and territorial integrity," was vetoed by the USSR because it did not demand immediate withdrawal of British troops. Although British military

intervention -- with its overtones of "colonialism" -- was not welcomed by the Arab states, most of the latter had no desire to further Iraq's territorial ambitions. Consequently the Arab League agreed to take over the task of protecting Kuwait. Troops from Saudi Arabia and the UAR arrived in September 1961, and the British troops were withdrawn the next month.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 184-185; Benjamin Shwadran, "The Kuwait Incident," Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (Jan 62), pp. 2-13, No. 2 (Feb 62), pp. 43-53.

A more startling alteration in the political picture in the Middle East was the disruption of the United Arab Republic in September 1961. The existing regime in Syria was overthrown by a coup d'etat, and a new, independent "Syrian Arab Republic" was established. Although the new Premier made the customary declaration of non-alignment, his general orientation seemed more favorable toward the West. The United States, to avoid offending Nasser, discreetly withheld recognition until 10 October, after some other countries (including the USSR) had recognized the new government. This development "unquestionably spelled a grave impairment of Abdel Nasser's ascendancy in the Arab world. Whether it represented a gain for the West appeared less certain than would have been in the case of a few years earlier."⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1961, pp. 186-187.

Arabs and Israelis Once More

Like their predecessors, President Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk sought a basic accommodation of the interests of Arabs and Israelis, only to encounter the same wall of obstinacy on both sides. In the end, they had to acquiesce in the same temporary expedients aimed at symptoms rather than causes.

The new Administration was at first handicapped in its relations with the Arab governments owing to the latter's conviction that it would show more bias towards Israel than its predecessor. This suspicion was confirmed by the US stand in a dispute between Israel and Jordan early in 1961. Jordan complained to the Security Council that a military parade in Jerusalem, planned by Israel to celebrate the 13th anniversary of its independence, would constitute a "threat to peace." The United States denied this allegation and supported a resolution (passed on 11 April 1961) which, though it adjured Israel not to use "heavy equipment" in the parade, also admonished Jordan to observe the armistice agreement.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ Stebbins, p. 182.

A further cause for Arab alarm was the announcement that Premier Ben-Gurion of Israel planned a visit to the United States and a conference with President Kennedy. Fortunately the latter was aware of possible Arab misgivings and took advance steps to allay them. In letters to the heads of government of the principal Arab nation, he assured them that the United States

sympathized with the desire of all Middle Eastern states "to control their own destiny" and was interested in finding solutions to the destructive and divisive problems of the area. Most important, he gave assurances that the US position on the question of the Palestinian refugees "is anchored and will continue to be anchored in the firm bedrock of support for General Assembly recommendations concerning the refugees" -- recommendations which had generally called for repatriation (as the Arabs desired). Largely because of Mr. Kennedy's foresight, his conversations with the Israeli Premier (unlike that of his successor three years later, described below) occasioned no outbursts of protest from the Arabs. Moreover, the President declined to provide Israel with any additional guarantees.⁵⁸

⁵⁸Stebbins, pp. 183-184; Richard P. Stebbins, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1961, (New York: 1962), pp. 281-284.

The Assembly's "recommendations" were expressed anew in 1961 and following years by annual resolutions which, like earlier ones, remained a dead letter. In April 1961 the Assembly also repeated an earlier request that the Conciliation Commission for Palestine continue to seek a solution. At the Commission's request, an official of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Dr. Joseph E. Johnson) went to the Near East to consult both sides in search of a solution, but his mission was fruitless. In December of that year the Assembly debated a new resolution calling for direct negotiations between Israelis

and Arabs on this issue; though supported by Israel, it was opposed by the United States and the Arab nations and died in committee. The United States favored an alternative (which was passed), calling for the Commission to continue its efforts and urging increased contributions to UNRWA in view of that Agency's "precarious financial position."⁵⁹

⁵⁹Stebbins, pp. 182-183, 189-190; Documents, 1961, pp. 284-286.

A year later the Assembly again had to decide whether to continue UNRWA in existence, since the Agency's mandate would end on 30 June 1963. The United States at first sought to limit the extension to one year, but eventually voted with the majority for an extension to 1965. In 1963 the Assembly merely reaffirmed its earlier resolutions for repatriation of the refugees and its requests for better financial support of UNRWA. During both of these years the Palestine Conciliation Commission continued its efforts, but without success.⁶⁰

⁶⁰Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1962 (New York: 1963), pp. 173, 178; The United States in World Affairs, 1963 (New York: 1964), pp. 160-161; Stebbins (ed.), Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1962 (New York: 1963), pp. 269-270.

The UN Emergency Force found itself in even more parlous fiscal condition during these years. The Assembly's annual discussion of UNEF became increasingly intermixed with that of the general financial plight of the UN, which, in fact, grew largely out of the failure of various governments (notably the Soviet

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bloc and the Arab states) to pay their assessments for UNEF. By December 1961 the unpaid backlog for UNEF totalled \$26.9 million. At that time, the Assembly voted enough money to keep UNEF in operation pending receipt of funds from the sale of a proposed \$200-million bond issue, and resolved also to seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice as to whether assessments for UNEF and for its Congo peace force were binding on UN members. The United States at once announced that (subject to Congressional approval) it would purchase one-half of the bond issue.⁶¹

⁶¹ Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1961, p. 190; US in World Affairs, 1962, pp. 317-318.

On 20 July 1962 the ICJ handed down a ruling which upheld the United States position that peace-keeping operations were properly chargeable to the UN's general expenses and that assessments for this purpose were therefore binding. Although the United States praised this ruling, its practical effect on UNEF remained to be seen. More important was the action of the US Congress, after prolonged debate, in authorizing the purchase of \$100 million in UN bonds (19 September 1962). Actual purchases by the US and other countries provided enough money to keep UNEF in operation through 1962 and 1963.⁶²

⁶² Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1961, p. 190; US in World Affairs, 1962, pp. 32-33, 317-320, 338; United Nations Review, Vol. X, No. 1 (Jan 63), p. 107, No. 7 (Jul 63), p. 62.

By the end of 1963 the UNEF had been so successful in pacifying the border between Israel and the UAR that Secretary-General U Thant, for the sake of economy, was able to propose a reduction in the size of the force (from 5,100 to 4,600). Accordingly, in December 1963 the Assembly appropriated funds to maintain UNEF for the next twelve months at this reduced figure.

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Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1963 (New York: 1964), pp. 160-161.

The value of UNEF was pointed up by the recurrent flare-ups along Israel's other borders, where no such force was stationed. Two such outbreaks on the Syrian border, in 1962 and 1963, came to the attention of the Security Council and forced the United States to risk displeasing one side or the other by taking a stand. The first was a retaliatory raid carried out by Israelis on the night of 16-17 March 1962, after Syrian provocation. The report of the UN Truce Supervision Organization laid most of the blame on Israel. The Security Council condemned Israel for violating the Armistice Agreement, and endorsed the proposals of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO for strengthening his organization.

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Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1962, pp. 172-173; Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLVI, No. 1192 (30 Apr 62), pp. 735-738.

In August 1963 Israel suffered another series of provocations by Syria. This time, however, the

new Premier, Levi Eshkol, instead of resorting to retaliation, took the case to the UN (for the first time in over ten years). This time UNTSO found Syria guilty. The United States supported a resolution condemning the "wanton murder" of two Israelis on 19 August 1963 and calling attention to evidence that the perpetrators entered Israel from Syria. But this resolution was vetoed by the USSR. US Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, in speaking for the resolution, emphasized the need to strengthen the machinery of UNTSO and urged both Syria and Israel to cooperate with the Organization for this purpose. ⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1963, p. 159; Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIX, No. 1266 (30 Sep 63), pp. 520-523.

More serious than the perennial border problem was the growing evidence in 1962 that President Eisenhower's fears about a spiralling race of arms might come true. In July 1962 it was revealed that the UAR was developing a missile capability which would ultimately pose a serious threat to Israel. Not unnaturally, the latter nation appealed to the United States for missiles which would restore the equilibrium. President Kennedy shared his predecessor's unwillingness to supply major weapons to Near Eastern countries, but he recognized the justice of the Israeli argument. In September 1962, therefore, the United States approved the sale to Israel of short-range ground-to-air missiles (HAWK).

Though this action served to arouse Arab resentment, it did not wholly satisfy the Israelis. Early

in 1963, after rumors had gained credence that German scientists in Egypt were working to develop nuclear missiles, Israel again sought American weapons. Mr. Kennedy remained adamant. "The United States has never been a supplier of military equipment directly to the Israelis," he pointed out on 3 April 1963. Instead, it had supplied economic aid, leaving it to the Israelis to purchase their weapons. But he expressed "strong opposition to the introduction or manufacture of nuclear weapons in the Middle East" and promised to be alert to any threat to the military balance of power which the United States wished to see preserved.⁶⁶

⁶⁶ Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1962, pp. 173-174; US in World Affairs, 1963, pp. 157-158; New York Times, 4 April 64.

After the tripartite Cairo declaration of 17 April 1963, in which the UAR, Syria, and Iraq pledged their unity (see below), Israel again sought security guarantees from the United States and the USSR as well, but was rebuffed by both nations. The President remarked on 8 May 1963 that he did not "think that the balance of military power has been changed in the Middle East in recent days." He added, however, that "this Government has been, and remains, strongly opposed to the use of force, or the threat of force, in the Near East. In the event of aggression, or preparation for aggression, whether direct or indirect, we would support appropriate measures in the United Nations and

adopt other courses of action on our own to prevent or put a stop to such aggression." In other words, the United States would, if necessary, act unilaterally, as it had done in Lebanon in 1958. As Mr. Kennedy added, this "has been the policy which the United States has followed for some time."⁶⁷

⁶⁷ Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1963, p. 158; New York Times, 9 May 64.

While unwilling to supply military aid to Israel, the United States sought to maintain friendly relations and to continue and extend economic and technical assistance. President Johnson entertained Prime Minister Eshkol when the latter visited Washington on 1-3 June 1964. After their conference, it was announced that the two countries would undertake joint studies of the problem of desalting water. Mr. Johnson also emphasized "the strong desire of the United States for friendly relations with all nations of the Near East, and its devotion to peace in the area and to peaceful economic and social development of all countries in the area," as well as "US support for the territorial integrity and political independence of all countries in the Near East and . . . firm opposition . . . to aggression and the use of force or the threat of force against any country."⁶⁸

⁶⁸ Department of State Bulletin, Vol. L, No. 1304 (22 Jun 64), pp. 958-960.

As usual, such a demonstration of good relations between Israel and the United States aroused the Arab nations to anger. On 1 June 1964 the press attaches of the Arab embassies in Washington issued a statement that the projected visit by Mr. Eshkol might have "serious implications for the future of Arab-American relations," and alleged that the purpose of his visit was to "ask the United States for arms and the conclusion of a bilateral security treaty." Acting Secretary of State George W. Ball denied these charges and criticized their statement as "an unwarranted intrusion into United States affairs."⁶⁹ The incident emphasized the difficulty

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New York Times, 2-3 Jun 64.

in achieving Mr. Johnson's objective of remaining on good terms with all Near Eastern countries.

CENTO and the "Northern Tier," 1961-1964

President Kennedy's administration continued to maintain close ties with CENTO while stopping short of actual membership. American interest was shown by the attendance of both Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the meetings of the CENTO Council and Military Committee in 1961 and 1962. Nevertheless the United States, with British support, resisted the efforts of the Asiatic members, led by Pakistan, to establish a permanent military command modelled after

that of NATO. A 1961 agreement to establish a "Commander -- CENTO Military Staff," to improve "the co-ordination of defence planning," fell through in 1962. The Asiatic members wanted an American officer to serve in this capacity, apparently hoping that the United States might thus be induced to provide stronger military support for the organization. Hence they declined to accept the British officer who had been nominated for the position.⁷⁰

⁷⁰ Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1961, p. 172; US in World Affairs, 1962, p. 163; Documents, 1961, pp. 280-281; Documents, 1962, pp. 262-263; New York Times, 27, 28, 30 Apr 62.

The failure of the plan to establish a full military command was especially disappointing to Iran -- the only member of the organization which had no formal alliance with the United States. Iran accordingly attempted to obtain increased military aid from the US. But the Shah's pleas, made on a visit to Washington in April 1962 and renewed the following year when Secretary Rusk passed through Tehran en route to the 1963 CENTO meeting, apparently had no result.⁷¹

⁷¹ Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1962, pp. 161, 163; US in World Affairs, 1963, p. 145.

The wisdom of the US policy of avoiding too close entanglement with CENTO was shown by the political instability which afflicted the Asiatic members of the organization. The upheaval in Turkey in 1960

has already been noted. In Iran, the failure of an election in 1961 to produce the kind of progressive-minded legislature sought by the Shah caused the latter to dismiss his cabinet and install a new prime minister committed to enforcement of a "revolution from above" to carry out needed reforms. But in July 1962 this minister resigned, charging that he had been hampered by inadequate US military and economic aid. There seemed little prospect of any early emergence of a stable, democratic society in Iran.⁷²

⁷²Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1961, pp. 175-176; US in World Affairs, 1962, pp. 163-164.

In Pakistan, there was a trend toward greater political stability when civilian government, after being overthrown in 1958, was restored in June 1962. On the other hand, that country's relationship with the United States took a definite turn for the worse in 1962 and 1963. One reason was the failure of the US to support Pakistan in the UN discussions on Kashmir in 1962, when Pakistan refused to accept as an accomplished fact the unilateral action of India in annexing part of this territory. Another was the action of the United States and UK in supplying military aid to India when that nation was attacked by Communist China. Showing that its hostility to India outranked its fear of Communist encroachment, Pakistan responded to the China-India border clash by seeking a rapprochement with China. During 1963 Pakistan and China concluded, in succession, a trade agreement, a provisional frontier settlement, and an

air transport agreement. Meanwhile, Pakistanis denounced the United States and UK for their failure to furnish that support against India to which they believed themselves entitled.⁷³

⁷³Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1962, pp. 164-167; US in World Affairs, 1963, pp. 172-174.

Pakistan's resentment of Western policy towards India marred the harmony of the 1963 CENTO meetings, which otherwise saw no major developments. The final communique announced agreement on the need for "constant vigilance, firmness and restraint," and the "importance of continuing economic development and social progress in the region."⁷⁴

⁷⁴Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1963, p. 145; Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLVIII, No. 1248 (27 May 63), pp. 843-844; New York Times, 2 May 63.

By 1964 the disastrous Cyprus crisis (described below) had arisen to trouble CENTO. When the Ministerial Council convened in Washington on 28-29 April, the Turkish delegate reportedly warned the others that Cyprus might become a "Mediterranean Cuba." There was some disagreement also over the precise nature and purpose of the organization. The Pakistan prime minister, in his opening address, had urged CENTO to guard against "all aggression," reflecting the view of some members that the alliance should offer protection against threats arising from any source. The United States, however, held to the narrower view of CENTO as a purely anti-Communist alliance. The final statement expressed "deep concern over the violence which has occurred in Cyprus

since December 1963" and an "erdest desire that the violence should be brought to an immediate end."

It also reported, but did not describe, "suggestions for further cooperation in the military sphere designed to strengthen the defense potential of the alliance."⁷⁵

⁷⁵New York Times, 29-30 Apr 64; Department of State Bulletin, Vol. L, No. 1299 (18 May 64), pp. 768-769.

The US and the Arabs, 1962-1963

The slow improvement in US relations with the Arab nations which had begun after 1958 continued in 1962 and most of 1963, though its course was uneven. The Arab-Israeli conflict remained as a basic source of hostility which broke out in frequent irritating incidents, as already described. It also affected the US military position through its adverse effect on the US Air Force base at Dhahran. King Saud's 1961 decision to cancel the base rights agreement has been noted above. In February 1962 Saud conferred with President Kennedy in Washington; though the meeting was described as amicable, he did not reverse this decision.⁷⁶

⁷⁶Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1962, p. 171.

President Nasser, the most important figure among the Arabs, made special efforts during 1962 to improve relations with the United States (perhaps as an offset to the additional military aid which he had recently obtained from the USSR). The willing US response reflected the disappearance of the early misgivings which had been felt toward Nasser. The United States stepped up its own economic aid to the UAR and assisted the latter in obtaining further aid from the International Monetary Fund.⁷⁷ By 1963 it was clear that the

⁷⁷Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1962, pp. 170-171.

apprehensions aroused by the events of 1958-1960 were "both exaggerated and oversimplified." Nasser and other Arab leaders "had proved quite unwilling to act as Soviet

tools or allow their countries to be taken over by Communist agitators and agents." Moreover, "Arab nationalism" was proving to be much more complex than it had seemed when Abdel Nasser first rode it to power in the 1950's. ⁷⁸

⁷⁸Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1963, p. 147.

The complexity of the movement designated by the deceptively simple phrase "Arab nationalism" was illustrated by the overthrow of the Kassim regime in Iraq on 8 February 1963. In the West, this coup was at first ascribed to Nasser's partisans. But it soon became evident that the successful conspirators belonged to another nationalist organization known as the Baath, or "Arab Socialist Renaissance" party, which pre-dated Nasser's rise by many years. Some of its aims were similar to those of Nasser, and the new government sought closer ties with the UAR. On the other hand, it was gratifying to the United States to see the regime curtail the influence of the Communists, renounce any claim to Kuwait, and seek an end to the revolt of its Kurdish population.⁷⁹

⁷⁹Ibid., pp. 149-150.

One month later the government of Syria also fell before a Baathist military coup. The new leaders at once sought closer relationship with both Iraq and the UAR. On 17 April 1963 the leaders of those three nations, meeting in Cairo, announced that they would unite in a federation as soon as a constitution could be written and adopted. But it was easier to announce unity than to achieve it, since "this seeming accord masked fundamental differences which were to delay its implementation for an indefinite period." The distrust between Nasser and the

Baath leaders outweighed their devotion to common aims.⁸⁰

⁸⁰Ibid., pp. 150-151.

Revolt in Yemen

Several years of cautious rapprochement between Nasser and the United States were interrupted in 1963 by a new outbreak of trouble in the kingdom of Yemen. The Yemeni crisis and its repercussions reawoke latent US suspicion of Nasser, provided fresh evidence of his imperialistic ambitions, and brought to the fore those inter-Arab hostilities which, though often temporarily submerged in a common hostility to Israel, remained to thwart schemes for greater Arab political unity.

The trouble began in September 1962. The autocratic Imam of Yemen died and was succeeded by his son, who was reputed to look with favor on both Nasser and the Communists. Although he promised reforms, he apparently did not go far enough to satisfy the more ardent Nasserites among the military officers, who ousted him and set up a republican government. Some elements, however, rallied to the support of the new Imam. There followed a civil war in which the UAR hurried in troops to uphold the "Free Yemeni Republic," while Saudi Arabia (and, for a time, Jordan) provided supplies to the royalists. The republican regime appealed to the United States for both aid and recognition, threatening to turn to the USSR if these were not forthcoming. Since Communist influence (in the form of both Russian and Chinese technicians) had been known in Yemen at least since 1960 (as noted above), this threat could not be dismissed as idle.

As usual in such crises, the only interest of the United States was in isolating the conflict and preventing the Communists from securing a foothold. President

Kennedy appealed to all concerned to maintain a "hands-off" attitude. Although Saudi Arabia rejected this appeal, the UAR announced that it would withdraw its forces in Yemen if the other nations would remain strictly neutral. Accordingly, the United States, believing that the worst of the crisis was over, announced on 19 December that it would recognize the republican government and would continue existing aid programs. It was presumed that the republicans would have little difficulty in consolidating their victory.⁸¹

⁸¹Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1962, pp. 174-177.

To the surprise of all, however, the royalists continued their resistance, making use of continuing aid from Saudi Arabia. The UAR, therefore, retained its forces in Yemen. An outbreak of hostilities on a wider scale was threatened when UAR aircraft attacked Saudi Arabian villages. The United States accordingly sought UN action to end or at least to limit the Yemeni civil war. Quick visits to the Near East by UN Under-Secretary Ralph J. Bunche and US Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker brought agreement on a formula for disengagement. The UAR would withdraw its troops from Yemen, while Saudi Arabia would discontinue its assistance to the royalists. A group of 200 observers, drawn from existing UN units in the Middle East, would be sent to Yemen to supervise the execution of this agreement. It was expected that these observers would be in the field for a maximum of four months, during which time most of the costs would be paid by the UAR and Saudi Arabia. Although these arrangements were announced by Secretary-General U Thant on 29 April 1963, the USSR insisted that they must first go before the Security Council, which

approved them on 11 June.⁸²

⁸²Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1963, pp. 149, 152-154; UN Review, Vol. X, No. 5 (May 63), p. 1; No. 6 (Jun 63), pp. 1-2, No. 7 (July 63), pp. 1, 16-20.

The terms of this agreement, however, were not carried out. The small United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM), which began operations in mid-June 1963, was unable adequately to police the frontier between Yemen and Saudi Arabia. U Thant's optimistic expectation that it could accomplish its task in four months proved quite erroneous; by mid-1964 it was still on duty, with the end of its task nowhere in sight. At one time, Saudi Arabia threatened to discontinue its contribution to the costs of UNYOM; it was necessary for the United States to exert pressure on the Saudis to continue their payments and thus to make it possible for UNYOM to continue. But on 4 May 1964, U Thant was forced to report to the Security Council that no progress had been made toward disengagement and that there seemed no prospect of an early end to the fighting. There had been no net decrease, and probably an increase, in the number of UAR troops in Yemen. Although Saudi Arabia had earlier asserted that it had ceased to aid the royalists, the republican regime charged that arms were still being smuggled in.⁸³

⁸³Stebbins, p. 154; UN Review, Jul 63, loc cit.; UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. I, No. 2 (Jun 64), pp. 51-52.

Nasser's failure to carry out his pledged word provoked another outburst of Congressional resentment in the 1963 debate on foreign aid. It took the form of a provision forbidding the granting of aid to any nation "engaging in or preparing for aggressive military efforts" against any other receiving assistance. President Kennedy opposed this effort to tie the

Administration's hands, but the bill, as passed after his death, included it.⁸⁴

⁸⁴Stebbins, pp. 154-155.

Greek Against Turk in Cyprus

The problem of Yemen was troublesome, but it was far overshadowed in importance by the destructive controversy concerning the status of the island of Cyprus, in the eastern Mediterranean, which began in late 1963 and soon found the governments of Greece and Turkey ranged against one another. The most alarming effect of the crisis was its possible effect upon NATO, but it also had implications for the United States in the Middle East, where it jeopardized the US goal of friendship with all nations and disturbed the solidarity of CENTO.

The status of Cyprus had ostensibly been settled by an agreement reached by Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom in 1959 and put into effect in 1960. This treaty recognized Cyprus as an independent republic within the British Commonwealth, and contained special guarantees for the Turkish minority population on the island.⁸⁵

⁸⁵Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1959, pp. 191-192; US in World Affairs, 1960, pp. 130, 141-142.

But in December 1963, Archbishop Makarios, president of Cyprus, proposed to amend the government to modify these guarantees, accusing the Turks of "obstruction." When the Turkish Cypriotes resisted, they were soon embroiled in sporadic conflict with their Greek compatriots -- a conflict which drew in the Greek and Turkish forces on the island. British troops, stationed in Cyprus under the treaty to help maintain order, had to be reinforced immediately. On 26 December the British succeeded in

negotiating a temporary cease-fire between the contending factions. The following day the Security Council was called into emergency session.⁸⁶

⁸⁶Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1963, pp. 132-133; New York Times, 22, 25, 26, 28 Dec 63.

The United States had a vital interest in seeing the issue settled as rapidly as possible, but was willing to leave the terms of settlement to be defined by the three powers directly concerned -- Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. "We feel that we ourselves should not inject ourselves into the specific points that need to be talked out," said Secretary of State Rusk on 2 January 1964, "but rather use our maximum influence to urge moderation upon the two communities, their leaders, and upon the governments most directly concerned, so that talks can be resumed, that tempers can cool, and some new paths to solutions might open up."⁸⁷ On 14 February Mr. Rusk announced that

⁸⁷Department of State Bulletin, Vol. L., No. 1282 (20 Jan 64), p. 87.

Under-Secretary of State George W. Ball was enroute home from discussions in which he had sought to mediate the dispute. "I think it will be primarily for the guarantor powers -- Britain, Greece, and Turkey -- to consider next steps," he said. "As far as the United States is concerned, we are prepared to be helpful in any way we can to find a solution to what could be a very dangerous problem."⁸⁸

⁸⁸Ibid., Vol. L., No. 1288 (2 Mar 64), p. 332.

Two separate objectives had to be sought: an end to the bloodshed on the island, which continued despite

the cease-fire, and a settlement of the permanent status of Cyprus in a manner satisfactory to all parties. It soon became evident that the small British force on the island could not maintain order, and the British government announced that it could no longer be responsible for attempting to do so. Ambassador Stevenson argued eloquently before the Security Council for an international force to keep the peace and an impartial mediator to seek a long-range solution. On 4 March 1964 the Council unanimously approved these suggestions. It was left to the Secretary-General to determine the size and composition of the peace-keeping force and the appointment of a mediator.⁸⁹

⁸⁹Department of State Bulletin, Vol. L, No. 1289 (9 Mar 64), pp. 374-376, No. 1291 (23 Mar 64), p. 466.

The first units of the international force, sent by Canada, arrived in Cyprus on 14 March. Finland, the Republic of Eire, and Sweden also agreed to contribute troops for the purpose. The United States agreed to contribute \$2 million, and the UK \$1 million, of the estimated \$6 million needed to maintain the international force for three months. The Finnish ambassador to Sweden (S. S. Tuomioja) was appointed mediator.⁹⁰

⁹⁰New York Times, 12, 15, 26 Mar 64.

In the search for a long-range settlement, the United States played the same role of the disinterested (but far from uninterested) "honest broker." "The United States has no position as to the form or the shape of a final settlement of the Cyprus problem," said Mr. Stevenson in the Security Council on 19 February 1964.⁹¹ President

⁹¹Department of State Bulletin, Vol. L., No. 1289 (9 Mar 64), p. 375.

Johnson bent every effort to resolve the dispute, which had thoroughly poisoned the relationship between America's Greek and Turkish allies. In May 1964 he sent Senator J.W. Fulbright to Greece and Turkey to emphasize to both nations America's concern over the Cyprus situation. In June 1964 Under-Secretary Ball undertook another such mission.⁹²

⁹²New York Times, 4 May, 11 Jun 64.

The President also talked personally with the prime ministers of Turkey and Greece, both of whom visited Washington. On 22-23 June 1964, Mr. Johnson and Premier Inonu of Turkey discussed "all aspects of the problem of Cyprus." Their "cordial and candid conversations . . . strengthened the broad understanding" which already existed between the two nations, but their closest approach to effective accomplishment was agreement on the "urgent necessity for . . . lasting solutions." During the next three days the President met with Prime Minister Papandreu of Greece "in an atmosphere of friendship and warm cordiality," and had "a sincere and useful exchange of views on the Cyprus situation," during which "both expressed full support of the efforts undertaken by the Security Council and the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the establishment of peace in the island and for rapidly finding a permanent solution."⁹³ Behind these

⁹³Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LI, No. 1307, (13 Jul 64), pp. 48-50.

pleasant but meaningless generalities, it was possible to discern a complete lack of progress toward any realistic and generally acceptable settlement, which clearly remained far in the future.

Conclusion

On 8 May 1963 President John F. Kennedy, replying to a question at a news conference, summed up US policy in the Middle East as follows:

The United States supports social and economic and political progress in the Middle East. We support the security of both Israel and her neighbors. We seek to limit the Near East arms race, which obviously takes resources from an area already poor and puts them into an increasing race which does not really bring any great security. We strongly oppose the use of force or the threat of force in the Near East. And we also seek to limit the spread of Communism in the Middle East, which would, of course, destroy the independence of the people.⁹⁴

⁹⁴New York Times, 9 May 63.

A more extensive description of US policy in this part of the world was given on 20 January 1964 by Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs. He stressed the "continuity of the main principles that have guided our Near Eastern policy during the past few years." Basic to this policy was a recognition "that the Near East belongs to the people of the Near East and that American interests and objectives must be consistent with those of the people of the area." The US objectives -- which, he said, "are clear and can be briefly stated" -- were as follows:

- (1) Political stability and economic progress, "both for the sake of the peoples involved and for strengthening the free world against expansion by those hostile to it."
- (2) Limitation of Soviet influence.
- (3) An accommodation between Israel and the Arab countries.
- (4) "The continued flow of oil at economically reasonable rates to Western Europe."

(5) "Access to the air and sea routes to and through the Near East."

In the pursuit of those objectives, he continued, it was necessary "to avoid taking sides in regional disputes" so as to "maintain constructive and balanced relationships with the area as a whole." But this statement "does not mean that we will stand idly by if aggression is committed. We have shown we will not. Nor does it mean that we will not use appropriate occasions to be helpful to disputing parties or to discuss frankly possible solutions to issues and problems as we see them."⁹⁵

⁹⁵Department of State Bulletin, Vol. L., No. 1285 (10 Feb 64), pp. 208-211.

Mr. Johnson's remarks about continuity apparently referred only to the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, but he might have extended them to cover the previous several years as well, since the objectives which he outlined had guided US policy at least since 1958. In that year, the general US position in the Middle East had so far deteriorated that military occupation seemed the only way to preserve political stability and prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining a foothold. From the low point reached in 1958, US relations with the Arab world had gradually improved. The United States responded favorably to overtures from those nations for better political and economic relations, and exploited the windfalls provided by rivalries among the Arab nations themselves and by hostility between the latter and the USSR. Meanwhile the United States sought tirelessly, though unsuccessfully, to make peace between Israel and her neighbors. At the same time, relations with the non-Arabic countries remained generally good, and US economic and technical aid was aimed at providing the economic improvement in

all Middle Eastern countries which was regarded as a prerequisite to political stability and democratic rule.

Unfortunately, after several years of slow improvement, US relations with the Middle East took a downward turn late in 1963. The irresponsibility of Abdel Nasser's interventionist policy in Yemen and the intransigence of Archbishop Makarios in wrecking the 1959-1960 Cyprus settlement seemed to betoken another turbulent period in which the United States would be hard-pressed to find a basis upon which to build a position of strength in that part of the world. But regardless of obstacles, the United States would continue patiently to seek the same well-established objectives which were supported by leaders of both political parties. "Since we sincerely believe there is no incompatibility between our interests and those of the peoples of the Near East," said Under-Secretary Johnson on 20 January 1964, "we shall pursue our policies in the full confidence that they are right and fair for all concerned."

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST
(1 JULY 1964 - 1 JULY 1965)

US Policy Toward
M.E. (Jul 64-Jul 65)

Historical Division
Joint Secretariat
Joint Chiefs of Staff
22 November 1965

General Developments in the Middle East

No major political or military changes took place in the Middle East between 1 July 1964 and 1 July 1965. Political instability, internal weakness, and hostility among neighboring countries continued to characterize the region and to handicap its progress. Long-standing trouble spots like Palestine and Cyprus still smoldered, though fortunately without reaching the flash point. If the overall situation did not significantly improve, US officials could perhaps take some satisfaction that it did not worsen.

Political developments included two steps on the long, erratic road toward Arab unity and one change of regime. On 13 August 1964 the United Arab Republic, Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan, and Syria agreed to establish an Arab common market.¹ On 16 October

¹Middle East Journal, Vol. XVIII, No. 4 (Autumn 1964), p. 451.

the United Arab Republic and Iraq decided to establish a "unified political command," with a view toward attaining constitutional unity within two years.² In Saudi Arabia, King Saud,

²Middle East Journal, Vol. XIX, No. 1 (Winter 1965), p. 90.

who had already been forced to yield effective power to his half-brother, Crown Prince Faisal, was formally deposed as King on 2 November 1964.³

³New York Times, 29 Mar, 3 Nov 1964.

The diplomatic situation became more complex in May 1965, when West Germany and Israel extended diplomatic recognition to

one another. In reprisal, ten Moslem nations severed relations with Bonn: the United Arab Republic, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Kuwait, and the Sudan.⁴

⁴Middle East Journal, Vol. XIX, No. 3 (Summer 1965), p. 338; Facts on File, 1965, p. 182.

The civil war in Yemen continued, despite an agreement in September 1964 by the supporters of the contending factions, the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia, to seek a settlement. A cease-fire arranged by representatives of the republicans and royalists in a conference in the Sudan became effective on 8 November 1964, but proved short-lived. A "national reconciliation conference" between Saudi Arabia and the republican regime in Yemen was scheduled for November 1964, but was postponed indefinitely.⁵ The United States played no part in these

⁵Middle East Journal, Vol. XIX, No. 1 (Winter 1965), p. 92; No. 2 (Spring 1965), pp. 213-214.

negotiations, and confined its role in Yemen to the support of technical assistance projects that it had already begun.⁶ The

⁶New York Times, 23 Oct 1964.

United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) was discontinued on 4 September 1964, after Saudi Arabia refused to contribute further to its support.⁷

⁷UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. I, No. 4 (Aug-Sep 1964), pp. 28-30; No. 5 (Oct 1964), pp. 35-36; No. 7 (Dec 1964), p. 62.

The overall US objective in the Middle East continued to be the promotion of peace and stability. The goal was sought

in various ways: Through diplomatic initiatives undertaken by special envoys sent by the Administration; through encouragement of the role of the United Nations in damping down potentially explosive situations; and through careful application of foreign aid, military as well as economic. These steps are described more fully below.

Arabs and Israelis

The oldest of the Middle Eastern crises--the running quarrel between Israel and her neighbors--was marked as usual by recurrent border clashes. Only one, however, was sufficiently serious to draw attention from the major powers. On 13 November 1964 armed patrols along the border between Israel and Syria engaged in a firefight of several hours' duration, which was finally terminated by a cease-fire arranged by UN observers. Both Israel and Syria appealed to the Security Council. The chief of the UN Truce Supervision Organization ascribed the clash to uncertainty about the location of the armistice demarcation line. A survey intended to fix the line had not been completed, he explained, because Israel had withdrawn its cooperation from the survey team. The US Representative in the Council, Adlai E. Stevenson, urged both nations to cooperate in the completion of the survey. In collaboration with the UK representative, he introduced a resolution to this effect. It received a majority of votes in the Council but was vetoed by the USSR on 21 December 1964. Earlier, the Council had rejected a resolution condemning Israel that had been supported by the USSR.⁸

⁸UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. I, No. 7 (Dec 1964), pp. 3-8; Vol. II, No. 1 (Jan 1965), pp. 28-32; Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LII, No. 1332 (4 Jan 1965), pp. 27-29, No. 1334 (18 Jan 1965), pp. 86-87.

On Israel's southern border, the United Nations Emergency Force continued to maintain peace. The action of the General Assembly in February 1965, in authorizing expenditures for 1965 corresponding to 1964 levels, made it possible for UNEF to remain in existence.⁹

⁹New York Times, 19 Feb 1965.

The Arab refugees from Palestine continued to constitute an insoluble problem. The United Nations could do nothing except to maintain its Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in operation. In February 1965 the General Assembly extended UNRWA's mandate for an additional year, i.e., until 30 June 1966.¹⁰

¹⁰UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. II, No. 3 (Mar 1965), pp. 4, 8.

The United States promised \$24.7 million to UNRWA for 1965, subject to stipulations that this amount would not exceed 70 percent of the total of all contributions and that, in order to reduce the soaring costs of the UNRWA program, the refugee rolls would be reviewed to eliminate ineligibles. However, the US Deputy Representative in the UN, Mr. Francis T. P. Plimpton, in announcing this decision, pointed out that the United States was bearing an "unduly high proportion" of the expenses of UNRWA and warned that next year's contribution would be reduced by \$1 million.¹¹

¹¹Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LIII, No. 1342 (15 Mar 1965), pp. 390-391.

US plans for cooperation with Israel in research on desalinization of sea water, sketched by President Johnson in

his meeting with Prime Minister Eshkol in June 1964, made progress. In July 1964 three experts from the US Department of the Interior and the Atomic Energy Commission went to Israel to discuss the project.¹² After several months of study, they

¹²Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LI, No. 1312 (17 Aug 1964), pp. 230-231.

reported that a dual-purpose nuclear plant, intended both to produce electric power and to supply fresh water, seemed practical. The two governments then agreed to appoint a joint board to supervise a preliminary engineering study of the project.¹³ On 9 April 1965 it was announced that a contractor

¹³Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LI, No. 1325 (16 Nov 1964), pp. 724-726.

had been selected to make the study which was expected to be completed by the following October.¹⁴

¹⁴Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LII, No. 1348 (26 Apr 1965), pp. 635-636.

US Weapons Policy in the Middle East

Guided by its desire to stabilize the Middle East, the United States had generally refused to supply arms either to Israel or to her Arab neighbors. Only rarely had exceptions to this policy been made, notably in the sale of ground-to-air missiles to Israel in 1962. But the steady influx of Soviet arms to the Arab nations (especially the United Arab Republic) impelled a reconsideration of the policy. If the United States continued to stand aside, it might inadvertently contribute to

a serious imbalance of military strength that might encourage aggression.

Israel, justifiably alarmed by the military build-up of the United Arab Republic, turned to West Germany to satisfy its needs for weapons. In January 1965 the two nations concluded an agreement for the purchase by Israel of various arms, including M-48 medium tanks of US manufacture. When the agreement was announced, the United States Government at first withheld comment, but later admitted that it had known of and approved the arrangement.¹⁵ "We have been interested in some sort of reasonable

¹⁵Middle East Journal, Vol. XIX, No. 2 (Spring 1965), p. 194.

balance in the armed forces in that area," said Secretary of State Rusk on 25 February 1965, in explaining the reason for US approval of the agreement. But he reaffirmed the desire of the United States to see "ceilings" placed on the "neighborhood arms race" in the Middle East.¹⁶

¹⁶Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LII, No. 1342 (15 Mar 1964), p. 367.

The reaction of the Arabic nations to the West German-Israel agreement was predictably hostile. Apparently for this reason, the Bonn government decided in February 1965 to suspend deliveries of weapons.¹⁷

¹⁷Middle East Journal, Vol XIX, No. 2 (Spring 1965) p. 195.

The consequences of this decision were discussed by US Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman with Israeli officials

in a visit to Tel Aviv in February and March 1965. Recognizing the justice of the Israeli demand for a source of weapons, the United States agreed to consider furnishing them itself.¹⁸

¹⁸New York Times, 24 Feb, 2 Mar; 3 Mar 1965.

Thus forced into a reconsideration of its "no-weapons" policy, the United States also studied the possibility of supplying arms to some other countries of the Middle East. When the news of US-Israeli arms purchase negotiations was revealed on 7 April 1965, it was also announced that the United States was nearing an agreement with Jordan to furnish weapons to that country.¹⁹ Shortly thereafter the State Department

¹⁹New York Times, 8 Apr 1965.

disclosed that it was considering the sale or gift of arms to Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia as well. Spokesmen for the Department made it clear that the United States retained its determination not to become a "major supplier" of weapons to the Middle East, but that it had become necessary to modify this policy, on a "case-to-case" basis, because of the flow of weapons from the Soviet bloc. The objectives were to preserve or restore a balance of military strength and to prevent Middle Eastern nations from becoming dependent upon the Soviet Union for arms.²⁰

²⁰New York Times, 14 Apr 1965.

Difficulties with Nasser

US relations with the United Arab Republic, the most influential of the Arab nations, continued on an uneven course.

Matters took a turn for the worse when, on 26 November 1964, African students in Cairo burned the USIA library in protest against US policy in the Congo. In another incident several weeks later, a private airplane owned by a US oil company, flying over UAR territory, was forced down by fighter aircraft and crashed, killing its two occupants.²¹

²¹Middle East Journal, Vol. XIX, No. 1 (Winter 1965), p. 91; No. 2 (Spring 1965), p. 212.

US reaction to these incidents, and to the manner in which they were handled by the UAR government, provoked Nasser to a public attack on the United States. On 23 December he denounced the US Ambassador for refusing to discuss a request for economic aid. His people, he proclaimed definitely, would tighten their belts and do without US aid rather than allow the United States to "dictate" policy.²²

²²New York Times, 24 Dec 1964.

In reply, the United States Government announced on 28 December 1964 a postponement of a decision on the allocation of \$35 million worth of surplus foods to the United Arab Republic. At the least, this action was calculated to cost the UAR government several million dollars, since even if the shipment were later to be allowed, a recently approved amendment to the governing law (the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954) required that recipient nations must pay shipping costs after 31 December 1964.²³

²³New York Times, 29 Dec 1964. The surplus foods involved in this action were to be furnished under an emergency agreement reached by the two nations in September 1964. They were over and above the \$140 million worth of agricultural surpluses being furnished annually under a three-year agreement concluded in 1962. The amendment referred to above was contained in PL 88-638, 88th Congress, enacted in September 1964.

When Congress met in 1965, the House of Representatives wrote into the foreign aid bill a prohibition against any aid to the United Arab Republic. President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk, and Under Secretary of State George W. Ball urged the Senate to remove this prohibition so as to allow the Administration flexibility in allocating foreign aid. The Senate heeded these pleas and amended the bill to allow the President to authorize aid to the United Arab Republic at his discretion. The House of Representatives accepted this amendment.²⁴

²⁴New York Times, 11 Jun, 23 Jun 1965; Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LII, No. 1339 (22 Feb 1965), pp. 262-263.

On 22 June 1965 President Johnson announced a finding that it would be "in the national interest" to allow shipments of surplus food to the United Arab Republic. He based this decision upon a "definite improvement" in relations with Cairo that had been visible in recent months. Nasser's government had promised to reimburse the United States for the destroyed library and had discontinued shipment of arms to the Congo rebels. It was noted also that Nasser's recent statements on the Israel issue had been unusually temperate and seemed to be inspired by a desire to avoid exacerbating tension.²⁵

²⁵New York Times, 23 Jun 1965. The President's decision applied only to shipments under the three-year agreement mentioned in note 23 above. The supplementary shipments under the September 1964 agreement were not requested by the United Arab Republic and hence were not resumed.

Cyprus

While the United States had a general interest in pacification of the Middle East, it was particularly concerned with the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus, which had grave

implications for NATO. In July 1964 the special UN mediator in Cyprus, Ambassador Tuomioja of Finland, sought a solution in conferences in Geneva with representatives of Greece and Turkey. President Johnson dispatched former Secretary of State Dean Acheson to participate in the discussions. But the attempt proved fruitless. Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus, announced on 30 July 1964 that Greece had rejected proposals advanced by Mr. Acheson to join Cyprus to Greece while leaving two cantons on the island under rule of Turkish Cypriotes. Mr. Acheson refused comment, but State Department officials denied that he had put forth any specific "plan" during the talks.²⁶

²⁶New York Times, 4 Jul; 31 Jul 1964; Middle East Journal, Vol. XVIII, No. 4 (Autumn 1964), p. 458.

The UN Security Council was called into session on 9 August 1965 when Cyprus complained that Turkish fighter planes had strafed Greek Cypriote positions on the previous day. The Council adopted a resolution introduced by the United States and the United Kingdom, which urged an immediate cease-fire and called on all parties to cooperate with the commander of the UN Peace Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in restoring peace. President Johnson also appealed to the heads of government of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus for a peaceful settlement of this new crisis. Fortunately, on 11 August Secretary-General U Thant was able to report that the cease-fire was being observed.²⁷

²⁷Middle East Journal, Vol. XVIII, No. 4 (Autumn 1964), pp. 459-460; Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LI, No. 1314 (31 Aug 1964), pp. 318-319; UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. I, No. 4 (Aug-Sep 1964), pp. 3-16.

The continuing presence of the UN Peace Force helped to keep the tense situation on the island from getting out of hand. With the approval of the US Representative in each case, the Security Council extended the mandate of UNFICYP for successive three-month periods in September 1964, December 1964, and March 1965.²⁸ The United States underwrote most of the costs of

²⁸Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LI, No. 1321 (19 Oct 1964), pp. 561-564; Vol. LII, No. 1332 (4 Jan 65), pp. 26-27; Vol. LII, No. 1346 (12 Apr 1965), pp. 551-554. UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. I, No. 5 (Oct 1964), pp. 3, 17; Vol. II, No. 1 (Jan 1965), p. 23; Vol. II, No. 4 (Apr 1965), pp. 3, 12.

operation of UNFICYP. Thus as of 31 October 1964, for the three-month period ending 31 December, the United States had contributed \$2.3 million out of a total of \$4.583 million from all countries.²⁹ For the ensuing quarter, as of 25 February, the

²⁹UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. I, No. 6 (Nov 1964), p. 14.

comparable figures were \$2 million and \$3.953 million.³⁰

³⁰UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. II, No. 3 (Mar 1964), p. 31.

In June 1965 the Council voted to extend UNFICYP for six months instead of for three. Secretary General U Thant had suggested this step in a report on the Cyprus situation on 10 June 1965. "Although there has been relative quiet on Cyprus for the past three months," said Mr. Thant at that time, "the basic situation remains unchanged and there has been no real progress in solving the fundamental problems."³¹

³¹UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. II, No. 7 (Jul 1965), pp. 11-12, 17.

As if to underscore this last remark, the Security Council was called into session early in August 1965, just as it had been a year earlier, to consider a complaint involving Cyprus. The occasion was the action of the legislature of Cyprus, which had a Greek majority, in amending the electoral laws to keep Greek legislators in office for an additional year without elections. A Turkish denunciation of this act as unconstitutional was met by a counter-complaint by Cyprus of interference in her internal affairs. In the Security Council, the US Representative, Charles W. Yost, upheld the Turkish complaint. The Council, however, merely reaffirmed its earlier request, made in its resolution of 4 March 1964, that all parties avoid "any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation."³²

³²UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. II, No. 8 (Aug-Sep 1965), pp. 3-10.

Relations with the Central Treaty Organization

The United States continued to support the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), but without becoming a member. The organization celebrated its tenth anniversary in February 1965 with appropriate ceremonies in Washington and in the capitals of the member countries (Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom). President Johnson and Secretary Rusk praised CENTO for its important contributions to the security and economic progress of the Middle East.³³

³³Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LII, No. 1342 (15 Mar 1965), pp. 389-390.

Secretary of State Rusk attended the thirteenth session of the CENTO Ministerial Council on 7-8 April 1965 in Tehran. He

seized the opportunity to seek the support of the members for US policy in Vietnam, but apparently with little success. The Council, in the words of its final communique, "conducted a review of international developments as a whole, with special reference to those questions that are of direct interest to one or more of the countries represented." There was no mention of Vietnam or of any other specific problem areas except Cyprus, which, in the words of the communique, was a source of "deep concern." The members noted progress in military and technical cooperation, but agreed that "a policy of preparedness and vigilance in self-defense" was still essential.³⁴

³⁴New York Times, 9 Apr 1965; Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LII, No. 1349 (3 May 1965), pp. 685-688.

Problems with Pakistan

Relations between the United States and Pakistan, formerly cordial, had deteriorated during 1962 and 1963 as Pakistan, angered by Western support of India, drew closer to Communist China. President Ayub of Pakistan predicted on 3 January 1965 that relations would continue to be strained so long as the United States supplied arms to India.³⁵ Nevertheless the United

³⁵Middle East Journal, Vol. XIX, No. 2 (Spring 1965), p. 205.

States continued to furnish technical assistance to Pakistan.³⁶

³⁶Middle East Journal, Vol. XVIII, No. 4 (Autumn 1964), pp. 470-471; Vol. XIX, No. 1 (Winter 1965), p. 80.

In April 1965 Pakistan and India briefly came to blows as a result of a border dispute in a region known as the Rann of

Cutch, on the boundary of West Pakistan. The United States supported the efforts of the United Kingdom to bring the disputants to the conference table. Through the efforts of British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, a cease-fire and withdrawal of arms forces was accepted by both nations on 29 June 1965.³⁷

³⁷Middle East Journal, Vol. XIX, No. 3 (Summer 1965), p. 345; New York Times, 2 May, 29 Jun, 30 Jun 1965.

A more intensive armed clash between the two nations broke out several months later in Kashmir, a region that had been the principal object of hostility between India and Pakistan ever since the two nations obtained their independence. In 1949, the United Nations had settled a dispute in Kashmir by a cease-fire along a line that placed most of the territory under Indian administration, although most of its inhabitants were Moslems. India had promised a plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants, but had never carried it out. In August 1965 Pakistan took alarm at Indian plans to replace the civil service in Kashmir with Indian employees, a move that seemed to threaten permanent annexation of the area. Pakistan's reaction took the form of an attempt to foment rebellion in Indian Kashmir by infiltrating armed invaders across the border. Most were promptly killed or captured, but India, in order to end the influx, crossed the cease-fire line with her armed forces, first in battalion strength, then in regiments and brigades, and established positions in Pakistani territory. In reply, Pakistan unleashed an armored invasion of Indian territory. By the beginning of September 1965 the border clash had escalated into a small but serious war, involving infantry, tanks, and aircraft.³⁸

³⁸Time, Vol. LXXXVI, No. 12 (17 Sep 1965), p. 48; New York Times, 9 Aug, 10 Aug, 16 Aug, 2 Sep 1965.

To the United States, it was obvious that a full-scale war between the two nations could set back their plans for economic and social development and create opportunities for Communist China to fish in troubled waters. Hence the United States sought to end the conflict while remaining on friendly terms with both nations. "Since the birth of India and Pakistan," said the new US Representative in the United Nations, Mr. Arthur J. Goldberg, on 4 September 1965, "my Government has developed close and friendly relations with their Governments, relations which we wish with all sincerity to continue."³⁹

³⁹Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LIII, No. 1370 (27 Sep 1965), p. 526.

Secretary of State Rusk, in a television interview three days later, explained the US objective even more explicitly. "If these two countries could find peace with each other," he said, "the subcontinent could be impregnable--from the point of view of defense and safety--from the outside, and then their resources and considerable talents could be committed to the economic and social development of their own people. They've made good progress on the whole in their economy, but all that could be brought back down to ruin if they were to become involved in military action against each other."⁴⁰

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 511.

In the hope of exerting pressure to end the clash, the United States suspended delivery of military supplies to both sides. In practice, this would affect Pakistan primarily, since that nation's armed forces had been largely supplied with American equipment and hence were dependent upon the United

States for spare parts. The United Kingdom matched this US move by cutting off its arms shipments to India. The United States also firmly resisted efforts by Pakistan to rally CENTO to its support.⁴¹

⁴¹New York Times, 8 Sep, 9 Sep 1965.

The principal arena of US effort, however, was the United Nations. On 4 September 1965 the United States called for a meeting of the Security Council. With US support, the Council on the same day enacted a resolution urging an immediate cease-fire. When Secretary General U Thant reported two days later that this resolution had not proved effective, the Council repeated its request for a cease-fire and urged both sides to withdraw to positions held before 5 August 1965. The Secretary General was requested to exert "every possible effort" to carry out this and the earlier resolution.⁴²

⁴²UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. II, No. 9 (Oct 1965), pp. 3-11; Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LIII, No. 1370 (27 Sep 1965), pp. 526-529.

Secretary General U Thant at once visited the capitals of India and Pakistan. Officials of both governments assured him that they were willing to accept a cease-fire, but attached qualifications concerning the nature of the ultimate settlement that Mr. Thant had no authority to approve. When he returned to New York and rendered his report, the Council on 20 September 1965 demanded a cease-fire by 0700 GMT on 22 September. It also agreed to consider steps looking toward a long-range solution of the basic conflict.⁴³

⁴³UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. II, No. 9 (Oct 1965), pp. 11-20; Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LIII, No. 1372 (11 Oct 1965), pp. 602-608.

India accepted this demand on 21 September. Early on the following day, Foreign Minister Bhutto of Pakistan, who had just reached New York, announced dramatically to the Council, just before the deadline, that his government had also accepted it.⁴⁴

⁴⁴UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. II, No. 9 (Oct 1965), pp. 21-22; Time, Vol. LXXXVI, No. 14 (1 Oct 1965), p. 36.

President Johnson immediately commended the "statesmanship and restraint" of the leaders of the two nations in accepting the cease-fire, and expressed "deep appreciation and gratitude" to U Thant for his efforts in the crisis. Representative Goldberg proclaimed 22 September "an important day in the history of the United Nations and in the history of the world. This Council and the United Nations," he said, "have addressed themselves to the gravest problem perhaps with which the United Nations has been seized in the course of its history." But he warned that the cease-fire was only a "first step." There remained the far more difficult task of creating "conditions of permanent peace" between India and Pakistan by resolving the "underlying political problem," i.e., the long-standing dispute over Kashmir.⁴⁵

⁴⁵Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LIII, No. 1372 (11 Oct 1965), pp. 606-607.

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST

(1 July 1965 - 1 July 1966)

Historical Division
Joint Secretariat
Joint Chiefs of Staff
24 August 1966

General Developments in the Middle East and US Policy

Major internal disorders continued to agitate the Middle East between July 1, 1965 and June 30, 1966. The year witnessed no serious increase in tensions or outbreaks of violence in the persistent and emotional dispute between the Arabs and Israelis, but this tangled matter continued to defy settlement. Much attention remained focused on the Yemen civil war-international dispute, as the agreement between King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and President Nasser of the UAR to settle the problem remained unimplemented. The Cyprus problem remained unsolved, although its urgency had abated. Despite continuing political instability and violent antagonisms among some of the states of the Middle East, however, most countries of the area became increasingly preoccupied with their own development and other internal problems.

US policy remained to support the independence and integrity of all the countries of the Middle East and the US avoided taking sides in any of the conflicts in the area. US policy emphasized in practice, supplying "selective" economic aid, helping to make it "possible for many Near Eastern countries to register real economic growth and thereby meet the aspirations of their people for greater opportunities and a higher standard of living."¹ US

¹Testimony of Raymond A. Hare, Asst SecState for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 22 Mar 66, in Hearings, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 89th Congress, 2nd session, on HR 12449 and 12450, pt. I, p. 93.

officials felt that any violence and instability constituted a threat to the US as well as to its friends. Defining US objectives and attitudes the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, Raymond A. Hare, said: "We continue to work with them in helping bring about the conditions of stability in which an enduring Middle East peace can be achieved and in aiding them to recognize Communist blandishments for what they are.

Most of these nations have shown the will and ability to resist Communist penetration."²

²Raymond A. Hare, "Charting the Future Course of U.S. Foreign Aid in the Near East and South Asia," State Dept Bulletin, LIV (25 Apr 66) pp. 668-671.

The key to the US aid effort in the region was "concentration" in a relative few of the countries in the region, "where the need is great, the environment fosters development, and the countries' own self-help effort deserves support from the free world." Pakistan, Turkey and Jordan were to receive the lion's share of US aid to the Middle East for FY 1967. Small programs were planned for Yemen, the UAR, Iran, and Cyprus. Most aid would be given in the form of loans--repayable in dollars and tied to US procurement.³

³Testimony of William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Administrator, AID Bureau for Near East and South Asia, 22 Mar 66, in House Hearings, pt. I, p. 98. (Four countries were eliminated from AID programs: Greece and Lebanon "because they had done pretty well; Syria and Iraq for quite different reasons Two graduated and two were dropouts.")

US Arms Policy in the Middle East

The US reopened arms negotiations with two Arab states and Israel in 1965-1966. Since 1948 the US had generally refused to supply arms to Middle Eastern countries, hoping thereby to "avoid contributing to an arms race . . . and becoming a major supplier in the area." However, beginning in 1955 with sales of weapons to Egypt, the USSR poured massive shipments into Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and Yemen--nearly \$2 billion worth by 1966. To help maintain an equilibrium, therefore, the US had begun to supply limited arms "designed to promote internal security and legitimate self-defense." The Deputy ASD/ISA for International Logistics Negotiations, Henry J. Kuss, Jr., said that the US reserved the right to consider limited sales of "defensive equipment" to

friendly states in the Middle East, but would maintain the "case-by-case" principle. "Every effort will be exerted to prevent both nuclear proliferation and the introduction of other sophisticated weapons systems into the area that may jeopardize the delicate balance of power."⁴

⁴Testimony of Henry J. Kuss, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) for International Logistics Negotiations, 19 Apr 66, in Ibid., pt. III, p. 480.

On 14 December 1965 the DOD announced that the Saudi Arabian government had signed a letter of intent to purchase \$300 million worth of arms--Lightning Mark 3 fighterbombers equipped with American Hawk missiles--and that Washington had approved the agreement. The US had participated in the preliminary bidding and continued to lend training personnel to the Saudis to support the sale of arms to that country.⁵

⁵New York Times, 14 December 1965; Testimony of Vice Adm. L. C. Heinz, Director of Military Assistance, Office of the ASD/ISA 22 Mar 66, in House Hearings, pt. II, p. 233.

On 29 December the State Department confirmed that the US had been supplying unspecified numbers of Patton tanks to Jordan; it refused to disclose publicly whether any other kinds of weapons had been shipped to Jordan. Three months later on April 2 the Department revealed that the US would also sell Jordan limited numbers of supersonic fighterbombers. The US agreement was based on "Jordan's defense requirements and . . . our policy of preventing instability developing" in the Middle East.⁶

⁶New York Times, 30 December 1965; 3 April 1966.

US announcements of arms sales in the Middle East triggered a chain reaction among leaders in the area. Speaking in the Israeli Knesset on 29 December 1965, Foreign Minister Golda Meir said that US and British arms sales threatened to upset the military

equilibrium in the Middle East. She said that Israel would "take all steps necessary in order to safeguard, nurture and even enhance the deterrent strength of the Israeli defense forces." On 5 February the State Department acknowledged that the US had sold Patton tanks to Israel. The sale, in effect, fulfilled the contract negotiated between West Germany and Israel in October 1964 which Bonn had subsequently cancelled because of the furor it created in the Middle East. The State Department said that the US "has made over the years repeated quiet efforts to encourage limitations on arms buildups in the [Middle East] area [But the US] cannot be indifferent to the potentially destabilizing effect of massive Soviet sales of arms to the area." President Nasser of the UAR called the US-Israeli arms deal a "policy antagonistic to the Arab nation and the Arab people." Speaking to a group of Iraqi newsmen on 20 February, he declared that if Israel made nuclear weapons "the only answer" would be a "preventive war" to "wipe out all that enables Israel to produce an atomic weapon."⁷

⁷New York Times, 6, 21 February 1966.

On 20 May 1966 the State Department announced that the US would also sell tactical military planes to Israel. The decision "reflects our due regard for security in the Near East, our wish to avoid serious arms imbalances that would jeopardize area stability and our general restraint as to military equipment supplied to that area."⁸

⁸New York Times, 21 May 1966.

Arabs and Israelis

Although the Arab-Israeli conflict did not flare into violence during the year, the basic problem remained unsolved. The US was especially concerned with the Palestine refugee problem. There

was no major breakthrough on the question of resettling the refugees, as the Arab governments remained adamantly opposed. The US continued to support the work of UNRWA, but despite UNRWA's financial difficulties it reduced its contribution to the organization by \$1.8 million to \$22.9 million in 1966. The US had given notice that it intended to do so in February 1965, in the belief that other countries, either European or Arab, should contribute more. The efforts of the Commissioner General of UNRWA to raise other funds had produced no solution by July 1966. The US strongly supported UNRWA's educational program, since it felt that the best way to encourage movement of refugees out of camps and into jobs was for UNRWA to give practical training to as many refugees as possible. In December 1965 the US asked that any reductions in UNRWA's programs necessitated by the Agency's financial difficulties not be at the expense of the educational program. The US government also continued to urge upon UNRWA the necessity of removing Palestine Liberation Army recruits from the ration rolls of the refugee camps.⁹

⁹Middle East Journal, Vol. XX, No. 1 (Fall 1965); State Dept Bulletin, LIII (15 Mar 65), pp. 390-391; Testimony of Raymond A. Hare, 22 Mar 66, in House Hearings, pt. I, p. 107, 109, 117, 128.

Cyprus

In July 1965 the prospects for peace and an equitable solution of the Cyprus problem dimmed perceptibly due to the actions of the Cypriot House of Representatives. By legislative resolution the Greek Cypriot members of the House overrode the constitutional provision governing terms of office by extending their own term and that of President Makarios without formal popular elections.¹⁰

¹⁰New York Times, 23, 25 July 1965.

The Government of Turkey lodged a complaint with the Security Council and declared the new arrangement "utterly void in form and

substance from a constitutional point of view." The Turkish delegate charged that Makarios intended to unite the island with Greece and that in such eventuality Turkey would take all measures to ensure the sanctity of the Cypriot constitution. In reply, the delegate of the Government of Cyprus denounced the 1959 treaties regulating the status of Cyprus and providing the basis of the Cypriot constitution. He said they were not valid because they were imposed on Cyprus. In the end the Security Council unanimously appealed for restraint on all sides.¹¹

¹¹New York Times, 4, 11 August 1965.

Heavy fighting broke out in Famagusta in early November but a truce was quickly arranged by UN observers on the spot.¹² When

¹²New York Times, 3, 4 November 1965.

the new session of the UN met in December the Security Council unanimously voted to extend the life of the peacekeeping force on the island (UNFICYP) for another six months, and the US pledged more funds for the maintenance of the force. To date the US had contributed \$15.8 million to the force, out of a total contribution of \$35 million.¹³

¹³New York Times, 14, 18 December 1965.

The US supported efforts by the UN and the Cypriot parties to find a solution to the basic problem. However, when the General Assembly approved a resolution on December 18 pledging its assistance to mediate, the US cast a negative vote. US opposition to the resolution arose from the fact that while it emphasized the sovereign rights of Cyprus, it did not mention the obligation to respect treaties. Cypriot and Greek circles took this as recognition of the Cypriot claim that the 1959 Treaty of Guarantee,

under which Turkey may protect the ethnic Turkish minority in Cyprus, was no longer valid. The US felt that this was more likely to hinder than to aid a settlement.¹⁴

¹⁴New York Times, 19 December 1965.

On 2 February 1966 Makarios and Greek Prime Minister Stephanopoulos jointly reaffirmed their rejection of any solution that did not entail union of the island with Greece. The affirmation of this position came at an inconvenient moment for the US and the UK. As one British editor suggested, "The United States and Britain would like to see the Greco-Turkish quarrel patched up as quickly as possible, at a time when NATO and CENTO are in disarray."¹⁵

¹⁵Economist, 14 May 1966, p. 685.

In mid-May, however, Greece and Turkey announced their foreign ministers would meet to negotiate a settlement,¹⁶ and the situation

¹⁶New York Times, 19 May 1966.

on the island quieted down. The UN extended UNFICYP for another half year on 16 June and Secretary-General U Thant reported that there had been no progress in mediation efforts to settle the dispute. The US continued to support UN efforts for a solution to the problem and urged the parties themselves to negotiate a lasting solution.¹⁷

¹⁷UN Monthly Chronicle, Volume III, No 7, (July 1966); Testimony of Raymond A. Hare, 22 Mar 66, in House Hearings, pt. I, p. 93.

Yemen

The second area of the Middle East where armed conflict continued to disturb international relations was Yemen. Begun as a

purely internal struggle between royalists and republicans, the war soon engaged the interests and participation of Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

By August 1965 the growing expense of Egyptian and Saudi Arabian involvement induced President Nasser and King Faisal to confer. From their conversations came a pact promising joint withdrawal of all troops from Yemen, and a plan to settle the republican-royalist dispute by establishing a coalition government which would hold a plebiscite to decide the form of government that would rule.¹⁸ This

¹⁸New York Times, 25 August 1965.

was the third compromise arranged in as many years and that it failed like the others was due to the fact that the two heads of state interpreted its terms to suit their own interests.

The discussions between republicans and royalists for a coalition government opened on 23 November. Within a few days, however, they reached a deadlock over the title of the state--whether it should be officially designated a republic or merely the "State of Yemen." In mid-December the talks were adjourned and were not resumed after the New Year.¹⁹

¹⁹New York Times, 24, 30 November 1965, 26 December 1965.

Nasser attacked Faisal for his erroneous interpretation of the August pact and said that withdrawal of his forces from Yemen was contingent on the formation of the coalition government. Further he hinted that he might keep his men in the country until 1968 when Great Britain was scheduled to grant independence to the South Arabian Federation.²⁰ On May Day, speaking in Cairo, Nasser took a more

²⁰New York Times, 23 February 1966.

threatening approach to the Yemeni situation. He demanded that the Saudis forbid the use of two towns on the Yemen border to the royalists. If the towns continued to be used as royalist bases the President of the United Arab Republic threatened to destroy or occupy them.²¹ The United States encouraged and supported neither

²¹New York Times, 2 May 1966; Economist, 7 May 1966, p. 578.

side although its economic aid continued and was directed toward small-scale urban and rural self-help projects as well as educational training programs. Speaking before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Secretary of State said, "We hope very much . . . that the main principles that were agreed at Jidda be given effect, that peace can be restored in that part of the world, that the Yemenis will be left to work out their own future. Our influence is exerted in that direction. But this is basically a problem which Yemen, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia will have to work out among themselves."²² In early May the US dispatched Assistant

²²Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, 18 Apr 66, in Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 89th Congress, 2nd session, on S. 2859 and 2861, p. 116.

Secretary of State Raymond A. Hare to Cairo and Riyadh to urge Nasser and Faisal to implement the August pact.²³ No progress

²³New York Times, 2, 3 May 1966.

was reported by the end of June.

Nationalism: Aden (South Arabian Federation)

The US supported the British government in its efforts to prepare the South Arabian Federation (Aden) for independence in 1968 although nationalist groups inside the Federation as well as in the United Nations demanded that Britain grant immediate sovereignty and withdraw all troops from the country.

During the period July 1965 to July 1966 terrorism increased in the Federation, directed not only against British police and military personnel, but also against high ranking Arabs within the Federal government. Thus, in July 1965 a member of the Federal Council was assassinated and in September the Speaker of the State Legislative Council of Aden.²⁴ A conference in London between the

²⁴New York Times, 5, 8 July, 30 August, 2 September 1965.

British and representatives of the Federation, led by Chief Minister Abdul Qawel Mackawee, quickly broke down after Mackawee announced his group was "not prepared to bargain or compromise."²⁵ When

²⁵New York Times, 9 August 1965.

disorders increased in September the Queen suspended the Aden constitution and placed Aden directly under the British High Commissioner.²⁶

²⁶New York Times, 27 September 1965.

During April 1966 the UN General Assembly condemned Britain for mass arrests made in the Federation as a result of the disorders. The US cast a negative vote because the draft resolution ignored the terrorist acts of some Aden nationalists and the efforts of the UK to solve the problem. The US felt that the resolution "would inevitably complicate the orderly processes leading to independence."²⁷

²⁷UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. III, No. 4 (April 1966), p. 16.

The US welcomed the announcement of the Federation government in May 1966 that it would convene a general conference of all

political groups within the country to consider steps preparatory to independence.²⁸

²⁸UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. III, No. 6 (June 1966), p. 23.

The Arab League and the U.A.R.

In mid-September 1965 the heads of state of the members of the Arab League met in Casablanca. Only President Bourguiba refused to attend because of what he called Nasser's search for "hegemony" within the Arab world.²⁹ After a week of discussions

²⁹New York Times, 14 September 1965.

the leaders agreed to pursue plans for the diversion of the Jordan River, promised to halt all propaganda and personal attacks aimed at one another by radio, pledged noninterference in the internal affairs of their neighbors, and dedicated themselves to the liberation of Oman and the South Arabian Federation from colonialism.³⁰ President Boumediene of Algeria suggested that the

³⁰New York Times, 15, 17 September 1966.

Palestine Liberation Army, composed of Arab refugees from the present state of Israel, be reorganized to act as a guerrilla force against Israel. However, nothing substantive was announced on behalf of the League.

Following the conference the Arab Defense Council, a subsidiary organ of the Arab League, stated that Arab armies would not be ready to fight Israel for at least four years.³¹ Nasser

³¹New York Times, 17 October 1965.

extended this date to 5-10 years.

A second summit meeting of Arab leaders met in Cairo in mid-March 1966. Again Tunisia did not participate. The final communique attacked the US for its arms deal with Israel, and Britain for political repression in the South Arabian Federation.³²

³²New York Times, 15 March 1966.

US relations with the UAR continued to be uneven during the year. A thaw in US-Egyptian relations ended abruptly in early July 1965 when Nasser accused the US of making "astonishing" claims on the UAR for the continuation of US aid. He claimed the conditions were that Egypt not develop nuclear weapons, produce more missiles, or improve the quality of its army. Then an Egyptian journalist was arrested and accused of being a CIA agent. The State Department promptly denied the charges.³³

³³Middle East Journal, Vol. XX, No. 1 (Fall 1965), p. 514.

In August a Congressional Conference Committee on US foreign aid agreed to drop an amendment stopping aid to the UAR as long as it pursued a policy of aggression. The final provision barred food-for-peace sales to the UAR (under PL 480) "unless the President determines that such sale is essential to the national interest" and limited those sales to one year.

By October US relations with the UAR had improved; the US library in Cairo was reopened and in November the President authorized new negotiations for aid under PL 480. On 3 January 1966 the UAR signed a six-month, \$55 million food agreement with the US. Other forms of aid, discontinued in 1964, were not resumed under the FY 1967 aid program.³⁴

³⁴Middle East Journal, Vol. XX, No. 2 (Spring 1966), p. 224; New York Times, 6 October 1965, 9 January 1966; Testimony of William B. Macomber, Jr., 22 Mar 66, in House Hearings, pt. I, pp. 103-104.

CENTO Relations

The members of the Council of Ministers of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) met in Ankara 20-21 April 1966. In his address to the Council, Secretary of State Rusk again emphasized the need for the alliance as a "defensive shield," not to "threaten anyone but to warn that efforts to molest or subvert the independence of the CENTO countries will be met with resolution and strength--and with growing confidence." In its final communique, the Council of Ministers called for settlement of the Cyprus turmoil "in accordance with the legitimate interest of all its people." It also established new guidelines for CENTO's economic activities, especially for the control of epidemic diseases.³⁵

³⁵State Dept Bulletin, LIV (16 May 66), pp. 775, 778-779.

Pakistan

Following acceptance of a ceasefire in Kashmir by India and Pakistan, the leaders of the two countries met in Tashkent and on 10 January 1966 signed an agreement to settle their dispute by peaceful means. In the meantime, President Ayub visited the US in December 1965 and urged President Johnson to resume aid to his country. On 15 February Vice-President Humphrey visited Karachi and announced the resumption of US economic aid to Pakistan. The Pakistani government, however, criticized the US for allegedly making economic aid dependent on "awareness of the threat of Communist China."³⁶

³⁶Middle East Journal, Vol. XX, No. 2 (Spring 1966), p. 217. (Events through 30 Sep 65 covered in previous chronology.)

Continued US economic aid to Pakistan, the director of the Near East-South Asia bureau of AID said, would be "viewed in the

light of the continuing development of peaceful relations on the subcontinent, the knowledge that economic assistance will not result in an arms race, and the expectation of self-help measures, which reassert the priority of economic development and will stimulate and accelerate economic growth."³⁷

³⁷Testimony of William B. Macomber, Jr., 22 Mar 66, in House Hearings, pt. I, p. 98.

By July 1966 the US had not resumed military aid to Pakistan, except for the sale of certain "non-lethal" types of equipment. Testifying before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in April, Secretary of Defense McNamara set forth the conditions for such aid if it were eventually resumed:

I think it should be conditioned primarily on an understanding that Pakistan would live at peace with her neighbor, India, and secondarily, upon an understanding that Pakistan would devote the majority of her own resources to what is and can be the only permanent foundation to stability in her own country--economic development. I think those two conditions should take priority over all others.³⁸

³⁸Testimony of Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense, 20 Apr 66, in Senate Hearings, p. 176.

United States Policy Toward the Middle East
(1 July 1966 - 1 July 1967)

Historical Division
Joint Secretariat
Joint Chiefs of Staff
25 October 1967

U.S. Policy Toward
M.E. (Jul 66-Jul 67)

General Developments in the Middle East and US Policy

The Year beginning July 1966 was one of violence in the Middle East. It was also a year in which the Middle East policy of the United States was unable to prevent political and military warfare. Along the northern tier, Iran and Pakistan strengthened their ties with their Communist neighbors. At the Arab core, the Yemen civil war and the armed clashes in South Arabia were renewed. Overshadowing these events, the Arab-Israeli hostility finally exploded into full-scale conflict that altered the balance of power in the area and introduced a host of new problems for the United States.

In 1966 the radical revolutionary regimes of Syria, Egypt, and Algeria found themselves in association against the more conservative governments of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia. The long-lived Yemen civil war was a focal point of this intra-Arab split, but the division had wider ramifications. On the eve of the Arab-Israeli war, for example, the Prime Minister of Syria announced that "though the prime objective of our popular war of liberation is Palestine, the war must pass through Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia to destroy reactionary rulers there."¹

¹New York Times, 2 May 1967.

Exacerbating these tensions, the Soviet Union had increased its military aid to the radical Arab governments and "peacefully penetrated" the northern tier by concluding an arms deal with Iran. In the decade beginning 1955 the USSR had supplied over \$2 billion of military assistance to Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and Yemen.² Communist China too attempted to project its

²US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 89th Congress, 2nd session, "New Directions in the Soviet Economy," 1965, pt IV, pp. 951-974.

influence into the area through an arms agreement with Pakistan and, reportedly, the initiation of a modest arms program to aid the Palestine Liberation Organization. In addition, it established political, cultural, and economic ties in several of the Arab states.³

³New York Times, 26 September 1966.

US policy toward the Middle East in 1966 remained much the same as in recent years. In order, primarily, to insure access to Middle East oil and to contain the USSR, the United States supported the territorial integrity and independence of the nations of the area, and attempted to fortify the economic growth and well-being of their peoples by a system of selective economic aid. At the same time the United States continued its neutral stance in the Arab-Israeli and intra-Arab conflicts, and tried to maintain a precarious peace by insuring a balance of power in the area. The major instruments of US policy in the Middle East were two: political and moral suasion, chiefly exercised through the United Nations; and a limited and selective program of military aid and arms sales.

Middle East problems remained a major burden of the United Nations, and the United States supported the "full utilization of UN machinery" in dealing with Middle East tensions. Addressing himself to the Arab-Israel dispute, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations Affairs Joseph Sisco told the Security Council in August 1966 that the UN should concentrate its efforts in the Middle East primarily upon measures to persuade the parties concerned to resolve their difficulties peacefully, to stimulate a movement on both sides to return to the relatively quiet and encouraging conditions that had prevailed during the previous years, and to support the efforts of the UN Truce Supervision Organization.⁴

⁴Joseph J. Sisco, "Statement of July 29," State Dept Bulletin, LV (29 Aug 66), pp. 313-315.

Although the United States was a principal proponent of UN action in the Middle East, it also conducted a unilateral program in the area. By the selective distribution of military equipment it tried to offset increases in the Soviet arms to the radical Arab governments, and thus preserve a balance of power. Increasingly, however, the US supplemented its military aid with a program of military sales. The decision to sell rather than give military equipment was based on the US desire to reduce its military aid program and on the opportunity afforded when the common objectives of the US and its customer nation could be accomplished within the capabilities of the customer nation without US grant assistance. For example, the oil revenues of Iran and Saudi Arabia placed those nations in an economic position enabling them to purchase arms. This, coupled with US obligations in Southeast Asia and the ubiquitous balance of payments problem, convinced the United States that the time had come to pursue a program of sales rather than grants with respect to these nations. In the case of Iran at least, this decision would introduce a host of new problems for the United States.⁵

⁵Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, "Arms Sales to Near East and South Asian Countries," June 1967, 90th Congress 1st session, pp. 1-20. Testimony of Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, in Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Congress, 1st session, 26 July 1967 on S. 1872, p. 248.

The Arab - Israeli Conflict and Arab Disunity

Terrorist raids and counter-raids continued along Israel's borders in the fall of 1966. In October four Israeli border guards were killed by Syrian raiders, and Israel took the issue to the UN Security Council. After long debate the Council

considered a resolution indicating Syria's responsibility and calling upon the two nations "to cooperate fully with United Nations machinery," but the Soviet Union promptly vetoed the resolution. Popular resentment and tensions swiftly developed in Israel over the futility of the UN debates, and the Israeli government warned that any more incidents of terrorism would result in Israeli retaliation. When early in November new incidents along the Jordanian border resulted in several Israeli casualties, the response was speedy, massive, and violent. Israeli columns, under cover of Mirage jets, crossed the Jordanian border on 13 November and destroyed the Hebron village of Es Sammu. The unprecedented severity of the attack shocked world opinion, and in a strongly worded rebuke on 24 November the Security Council censured Israel.⁶

⁶New York Times, 14 and 25 November 1966.

From the US standpoint, the gravest effect of the November raid was the erosion of King Hussein's position. His authority over his restive population, two-thirds of which regarded itself as more Palestinian than Jordanian, was unquestionably weakened. Public protests and riots took place in Amman, but the King was able to retain the loyalty of the Army, and thus remain in power. Popular resentment was especially high against the United States for selling arms to Israel.

Despite public clamor Hussein, regarded as a moderate in the Arab world, continued to resist pressure from his radical neighbors, Egypt and Syria, to accept Soviet arms as a step toward the standardization of Arab military equipment. To avoid the distinct possibility of military dependency on his Arab neighbors, and ultimately on the Soviet Union, Hussein preferred to rely on British and American arms sources.⁷

⁷New York Times, 18 November 1966.

In an effort to strengthen the position of King Hussein, both within his own country and within the Arab world, and to counter the Arab argument that the United States tacitly supported Israel, Washington announced on 23 December an additional grant of military aid to Jordan "to strengthen Jordan's defense against Israel and thereby create stability." The additional aid was for the most part in the form of trucks and armored personnel carriers. At the same time Washington promised to speed delivery of 36 F-104 Starfighters, already contracted for. In April 1967 the United States announced a supplemental aid request to Jordan of \$5.3 million.⁸

⁸New York Times, 1 and 23 December 1966 and 14 April 1967.

Consistent with its long-established policy, the United States strove to maintain the Middle East balance of power. Having joined in the UN censure of Israel and having allocated additional military equipment to Jordan, it announced on 20 November that no consideration had been given to curtailing military aid to Israel, and that the sale of A-4 jet attack bombers and M-48 tanks would continue.⁹ On 11 December Vice

⁹New York Times, 21 November 1966.

President Humphrey publicly acknowledged the US commitment to the integrity of Israel as a free and independent state, and pledged that the United States would "energetically oppose aggression" that threatened the peace of the Middle East.¹⁰

¹⁰New York Times, 12 December 1966.

In the weeks following the November raids, King Hussein warned the West that the Middle East was on the brink of an explosion "more dangerous to world peace than the Suez crisis of 1956."¹¹ In view of the continuing disunity of the Arab

¹¹New York Times, 30 November 1966.

world, however, a general Middle East holocaust seemed remote. The November raids underscored this disunity. Hussein, accusing the Arab League of failing to come to Jordan's aid, publicly blamed Arab disunity on the Communists and charged that his leftist neighbors were serving Communist ends by exploiting his country's crisis. Relations between Jordan and her Arab neighbors deteriorated to such an extent that on 23 January Hussein threatened to charge Syria and the UAR with sabotage before the UN. At the same time Hussein defended the purchase of US jets against the United Arab Command's charges that he was buying "old" US planes instead of new, and cheaper, MIGs. Hussein also came under attack by the Palestine Liberation Organization, which charged the King with attempting to suppress raids on Israel. Finally, on 23 May, Jordan expelled the Syrian Ambassador and shut its northern border to traffic from Syria.¹²

¹²New York Times, 21 and 29 November, 1 December 1966; 24 January and 24 May 1967.

Arab disunity ranged beyond the Israeli border nations. On 19 January 1967 Libya indicted its neighbor, Egypt for sabotage in the US-operated Libyan oil fields. Initially a nation of strong pro-Nasser sentiments, Libya had turned to the development of its natural wealth, and increasingly had come to fear Egyptian subversion. Further along the African littoral, the revolutionary government of Algeria continued its dispute

with its neighbors Tunisia and Morocco, both of which claimed parts of the Sahara held by Algeria. Algeria charged that the United States was menacing its security by building "bases of aggression" in Morocco. During the spring and summer of 1966 Moscow stepped up its military aid to Algeria. Included in this aid were long-range assault guns, missile parts, and other assorted arms; also included was an increase of 30 MIG aircraft, raising the total of Algerian MIGs to 70. In the face of this developing arms imbalance in North Africa the United States sold Morocco 12 F-5 interceptors and granted \$15 million of military ground equipment. On 2 March 1967 Morocco asked the UN to investigate the arms race in North Africa. Algeria, on 13 March, rejected the Moroccan request denying that there was an arms race and charging that Morocco was trying to "internationalize" a border issue between the two countries.¹³

¹³New York Times, 8 May, 19 June, 10 July, 26 September, and 18 November 1966; 20 and 23 January, 11 February, and 3 and 14 March 1967.

Arab Disunity: Yemen and Aden

The major intra-Arab conflict, significantly influencing the Arab-Israeli struggle, was being played out deep in the Arabian peninsula. On one side were Britain, preparing to grant independence to Aden and to evacuate its bases in South Arabia, and pro-Western, oil-rich Saudi Arabia, fearful of the radicalism that might fill the power vacuum resulting from the British departure. On the other side was Egypt, determined to bring the area under the sway of its revolutionary "Arab Socialism." In the middle were Yemen and Aden, countries whose own internal struggles in a corner of the peninsula had been caught up in the larger contest.

Initially, the Yemeni civil war was a Saudi-Egyptian power struggle. When pro-Nasser Yemenis formed a republic in 1962,

Egypt sent in troops to support the new government against the resisting tribes of the Imam. Saudi Arabia, itself endangered by Nasser-inspired insurrection, provided the Imam with bases and arms. A stalemate developed and in time both sides tired of the contest. A truce was finally signed in the fall of 1965. During 1966, however, the moderates within the Yemeni republican camp became increasingly restive under Egyptian domination, and, as a prelude to peace talks with the Yemeni royalists, began maneuvering for the replacement of the 70,000 Egyptian troops in their country by a pan-Arab force. Nasser reacted quickly. In September the government was overthrown, and Nasser became the de facto ruler of Yemen.¹⁴

¹⁴New York Times, 25 September 1966, IV.

King Faisal of Saudi Arabia was also clearly concerned that Nasser apparently intended to expand his revolutionary socialism from Yemen into the rest of the Arabian peninsula as soon as the British departed. In March 1967 Saudi Arabia asked the Security Council to circulate petitions from southern Arabia denouncing Egyptian political intervention in the area.¹⁵ When

¹⁵New York Times, 9 March 1967.

violence erupted in Saudi Arabia itself in April, Faisal charged that the saboteurs were Yemeni infiltrators trained and sent across the border by Egypt. According to the New York Times, informed sources reported that Saudi Arabia had given the Yemeni royalists permission to renew their war against the republican government.¹⁶

¹⁶New York Times, 27 January and 17 April 1967.

Meanwhile the British were trying to keep Nasserite terrorists from reducing the colony of Aden to chaos. Acts of terrorism tripled during 1966, and on 8 August Britain, supported by the United States, indicted before the Security Council, Egypt and the republican government of Yemen for their terrorist attacks, and especially for a 30 July air attack against a village in the emirate of Bahrein. On the same day the Council postponed debate in order to send a fact-finding team to the area.¹⁷

¹⁷New York Times, 9 August 1966.

US policy toward Arabia had two objectives: primarily it was interested in preserving for the West the good will and cooperation of the oil-rich kingdom of Saudi Arabia and, as a corollary, in keeping Yemen out of the Communist camp. The United States was one of only two Western powers to recognize the republican government of Yemen. To counter the influence of large Communist aid missions there, Washington had instituted an aid program that totaled \$2.1 million in FY 1967. To preserve its interests in Saudi Arabia, the United States had established a training mission there in 1951 and had been regularly selling military equipment to the Saudi government. In addition to the \$400 million Anglo-American arms agreement with Saudi Arabia in early 1966, the United States agreed in September to sell Saudi Arabia \$100 million worth of military vehicles to help modernize the Saudi army. The State Department justified these agreements as part of its effort to maintain a military balance in the Middle East in the face of large amounts of arms supplied by the Soviets to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.¹⁸

¹⁸New York Times, 28 September 1966, 28 May 1967. Telephone conv. w/Miss Elizabeth Cook, Statistics and Reports Div., AID, 10 October 1967.

In response to the terrorist attacks on Aden and the potential threat to Saudi Arabia, the State Department publicly extended US Middle East policy to include South Arabia. On 3 March 1967 the Department referred to President Kennedy's 1963 statement, in which he pledged US opposition to "unprovoked aggression against any country in the Middle East," and promised US support for appropriate UN measures, or unilateral US action to prevent or stop such aggressions. The Department for the first time specifically extended the President's general 1963 statement to the situation in South Arabia and, according to certain "informed sources," drew South Arabia under the protective umbrella of the United States. In the past, the United States had avoided making any specific commitment to South Arabia, hoping that Britain would extend some form of protection in the region even after independence. But London held to its plans for a "complete withdrawal."¹⁹

¹⁹New York Times, 4 March 1967.

Backed by Egypt, the republican government of Yemen forced the United States to withdraw its aid mission on 28 April. The Yemeni government, recognized in the Western world only by Italy and the United States (since 1962), forced the withdrawal by arresting several members of the US aid mission on a charge of sabotage--a charge branded "a total fabrication" by the United States. The withdrawal of the US mission led to suspension of the small US aid program already termed "not enough" by the Yemeni President. Sizable aid missions from the Soviet Union, Communist China, and several East European countries remained in Yemen.²⁰

²⁰New York Times, 27 and 29 April 1967.

The Arab-Israeli War

In the spring of 1967 Arab nations rallied under the leadership of Nasser to challenge Israel. Exactly why Nasser chose this particular time to force the issue cannot be defined precisely. It seems clear, however, that the November 1966 raid on Jordan provided Nasser with an opportunity to unite discordant Arab nations, particularly Jordan, in a military pact. The promise of this agreement and the numerical superiority in Arab troops and armaments probably convinced Nasser that the time was right to move against Israel. It must have seemed reasonable to Nasser that if Israel chose to fight, the united Arab armies would overrun that foreign enclave in the Arab world.

On 18 May Egypt asked the UN to evacuate its peacekeeping force from stations along the armistice line in the Gaza strip and at Sharm el Sheik overlooking the Strait of Tiran, where it had patrolled for ten years. Secretary-General U Thant ordered the withdrawal the next day, explaining that the UN was in the strip only with Egypt's consent, and could not remain if that consent were withdrawn. Meanwhile, Israeli and Egyptian troops massed on the border.²¹

²¹New York Times, 19 May 1967.

On 23 May Nasser announced that Egypt was closing the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli ships and those of all other nations carrying "strategic materials" to Israel. The Gulf of Aqaba was Israel's only maritime outlet to the south, and it would consider the closing of the Gulf an act of war. In the Security Council the United States quickly proposed that Egypt forego a blockade, but the stridently pro-Arab position assumed by the Soviet Union offered little hope that the UN would ease the crisis.²²

²²New York Times, 24 May 1967.

Also on 23 May the President in a public White House statement reaffirmed US policy toward the Middle East. He deplored the withdrawal of UN troops and called the blockade a violation of the vital interests of all nations. He did not say what the United States would do in case of aggression, but he did allude to the US reaction to aggression in Southeast Asia. The next day, the State Department privately warned the UAR that the United States considered the blockade an "act of aggression" and would oppose it by all means possible. The warning according to "informed Western sources," did not exclude the use of force if necessary, but did make it clear that force would be considered only after all other avenues both in and outside the UN had been explored. Meanwhile, the United States attempted to rally support among the Western nations to contest the blockade.²³

²³"Statement by President Johnson," State Dept Bulletin, LVI (12 Jun 67), pp. 870-871. New York Times, 25 and 31 May 1967.

One of Nasser's principal goals was achieved when on 30 May King Hussein, his former avowed enemy, signed a pact with the UAR, committing Jordan to attack Israel if Israeli forces tried to break Egypt's blockade. The King also agreed in the pact to joint military operations under Egyptian command. Even before the pact was signed Jordan had permitted Iraqi and Saudi troops to cross its borders and move toward the Israeli frontier. The pact followed hard on the heels of the Arab League's 12-Nation Resolution (Tunisia, as usual, boycotted the League) pledging that an attack against one would be considered an attack against all. Even Jordan and Saudi Arabia joined in the resolution that obliquely condemned the United States for allegedly encouraging Israel. Most observers agreed

that Hussein had instigated the pact and signed the 12-Nation Resolution in an effort to keep Cairo and the Egyptian-controlled Palestine Liberation Organization from capitalizing on the situation to remove him from his throne. Whatever Hussein's motives, the pact strengthened Nasser's hand militarily, and helped validate his claim to the leadership of the Arab world.²⁴

²⁴New York Times, 25 and 31 May 1967.

By the first days of June President Nasser had achieved several of his goals. He had created a joint military command joining the Arab nations of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, Libya, Sudan, Morocco, Kuwait, and Algeria with the United Arab Republic, and he had reinforced his position as leader of the Arab world. He had also become a central figure on the international stage, successfully dismissing the UN from the Gaza strip and establishing a blockade of an international waterway that no nation had as yet attempted to break.

Early in June with Arab military activity increasing and emotions high on both sides Israel became convinced it must act alone. On 5 June Israel launched an all out attack on Egypt and Jordan. Swooping in low from the Mediterranean to avoid Egyptian radar, Israeli planes destroyed the Egyptian air force on the ground, and quickly visited similar destruction on the air forces of Jordan and Syria. With complete control of the air, Israeli armor rolled across the Sinai peninsula and drove to the Suez Canal. Israeli forces broke the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, defeated the Jordanian army, and seized all of Jordan west of the historic Jordan river including the Old City of Jerusalem. In the north, Israel pushed into Syria even as the UN tried desperately to arrange a cease-fire. By 10 June Israel had completely routed the Arab forces on its

borders, and the Arab armies were unable to continue to struggle with any hope of victory. A UN cease-fire was quickly negotiated on that date.²⁵

²⁵New York Times, 11 June 1967, IV.

In the hours following the initial attacks south and east, the Arab nations rallied behind Egypt and Jordan. Algeria, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, and Kuwait declared war on Israel and promised troops. Saudi Arabia announced that its forces were already operating against Israel. Lebanon declared a state of emergency, and Tunisia announce that her borders were opened to the passage of troops through her territory. Morocco announced that her forces would soon be joining the battle. Libya also declared it support.²⁶

²⁶New York Times, 6 and 7 June 1967.

The UAR charge that the United States and Great Britain had supported Israel during the battle convinced many Arabs, and demonstrations against the Western powers broke out in several countries. Algeria, Syria, and Iraq severed relations with the United States and Britain, and both Kuwait and Iraq stopped oil shipments to the West. In the week following the war, Libya asked the United States and Britain to liquidate their Libyan bases and withdraw their troops as soon as possible.²⁷

²⁷New York Times, 9 June 1967.

US reaction to the war was cautious and restrained. The Administration sought to remain neutral in the conflict without formally committing itself to neutrality, directing its activity

primarily toward obtaining a cease-fire under UN auspices. The Department of Defense announced that the US Sixth Fleet had not been placed on any special "alert" status, and the activity of US forces was "unchanged."²⁸ The United States did, however,

²⁸New York Times, 6 June 1967.

formally suspend all assistance programs in those Middle East countries that had severed diplomatic relations with the United States and informally suspended all military and economic aid to the area as a whole.²⁹

²⁹Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, 12 June 1967, in Hearings, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Congress, 1st session, on S. 1872, p. 128.

The Arab-Israeli war reflected a failure of US policy and seemed at first glance to inflict a serious blow to US strategic interests. The Middle East's oil was cut off from the West; the Suez Canal was closed; US and British bases in Libya were ordered evacuated; and American clients and friends in the area joined in a military alliance against Israel. Not only had Israel's swift victory upset the power structure of the area, but the US commitment to support the territorial integrity of the Middle East nations, reaffirmed by President Johnson as recently as 23 May, had been eclipsed as Israeli troops stood unchallenged on the banks of the Suez Canal and the hills of Jordan.

Even before hostilities ceased, the President had set out to reshape US policy to accommodate it to the rapidly changing power structure in the Middle East. On 7 June he pledged to help translate the new Middle Eastern situation into a "more lasting settlement between Israel and her neighbors." He ordered the drafting of special policies for a "new peace" and set up new machinery to deal with the situation. To organize the

effort, he recalled his former Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, to become executive secretary to a special NSC subcommittee established to deal with the Middle East crisis.³⁰ Finally, on 19 June the President

³⁰New York Times, 8 June 1967.

announced that the United States was committed to peace in the Middle East based on five "great principles" paraphrased below:

1) Every nation has a fundamental right to live and to have its neighbors respect that right. Arab threats to eliminate Israel had become a burden to the peace of the world. But military success should not blind Israel to the fact that her neighbors also have rights and interests.

2) Justice must be obtained for refugees of the recent and prior wars. Both sides had resisted mediation to restore the victims to their homes or to resettle them elsewhere. Peace would come only after an energetic attack by all on this problem.

3) Maritime rights must be respected and must be preserved for all nations. If a "single act of folly" had been more responsible for war than any other, it was Egypt's "arbitrary and dangerous" blockade.

4) The Middle East arms race must be curbed. The US and USSR shared responsibility for the sale of arms with the Middle East purchasers. Now that the waste and futility of those sales were apparent, there was another moment of choice to find a better course. The UN should ask its members to reveal all arms shipments to the Middle East.

5) Respect must be maintained for the political independence and territorial integrity of all Middle East nations. The Arab nations and Israel needed "recognized boundaries and other arrangements" for their security.

The President neither endorsed nor challenged Israeli claims to the Jordanian half of Jerusalem, the Gaza strip, and the strategic high ground in Jordan and Syria. He pleaded for "adequate recognition" of the world's special interest in access to the holy places in Jerusalem, but offered no specific plan for assuring it. The President attacked the Soviet demand that Israel withdraw immediately and unconditionally from the conquered Arab territory. He called the demand "not a prescription for peace but for renewal of hostilities." The troops must "certainly" be withdrawn, he added, without saying how far. Finally, he promised that in "a climate of peace" the United States would help solve the refugee problem and, through the use of atomic energy, make the deserts bloom.³¹

³¹Lyndon Johnson, "Principles for Peace in the Middle East," quoted in State Dept Bulletin, LVII (10 Jul 67) pp. 31-34.

In the weeks following the war there was a gradual relaxation of tensions. US relations with most of the Middle East countries gradually returned to normal. On 12 June Secretary of State Rusk announced that economic assistance programs to Tunisia, Morocco, Israel, and Lebanon would be continued. US aid programs were also being resumed to Jordan "where more help will be needed."³² On 23 June, however, the State Department

³²Testimony of Dean Rusk, op. cit.

announced that the United States had cancelled all technical assistance to the UAR.³³

³³New York Times, 24 June 1967.

For its part, the Soviet Union limited itself to mounting a diplomatic offensive against Israel to force that country to

surrender occupied territories without compensation. Premier Kosygin met with President Johnson in Glassboro, New Jersey, and agreed at least that every state in the Middle East had "a right to live."³⁴ One reason for the gradual relaxation of tensions

³⁴Quoted in "President Johnson's Report to the Nation, June 25," State Dept Bulletin, LVII (10 Jul 67) p. 37.

was the fact that the Arab oil boycott was proving difficult to organize and maintain, and the closing of the Suez Canal seemed to be resulting in a greater hardship to Egypt than to most of the user states.³⁵

³⁵Testimony of Dean Rusk, op. cit.

Following the establishment of the cease-fire in the second week of June Egypt, with continued Soviet aid, stepped up its assault against the budding Federation of South Arabia. Coincidentally, Great Britain changed its policy and announced on 19 June that following South Arabian independence, planned for 9 January 1968, it would continue to provide military support for the Federation. A broad military program, including the stationing of a large naval force off Aden, would be established to support the Federation against the pro-Egyptian nationalists operating from Yemen.³⁶

³⁶New York Times, 20 and 25 June 1967.

Communist Penetration of the Northern Tier

The suspension of US military aid to Pakistan, begun following the Indo-Pakistani war in September 1965, continued into the fiscal year 1967. This embargo had been eased somewhat in March 1966 when the US Government permitted the sale of

"non-lethal" military equipment. Also in March 1966 Pakistan revealed for the first time that it had been receiving military aid from China in the form of Chinese built MIG 19s and T-29 tanks. This transaction posed a serious dilemma for the United States. Presumably, a renewal of US military aid might wean Pakistan from its budding friendship with China. Pakistani Foreign Minister Bhutto had implied as much in the March of 1966 when he said that Pakistan "had to go to China to find a means of defense against aggression," and that such a step had become necessary when the US suspended military assistance. It was also likely, however, that the renewal of US military aid to Pakistan might soon find itself contributing to an escalation of the Indo-Pakistani arms race.

After mulling over the problem for nearly a year, the United States finally chose a course it hoped would dampen the arms race even at the cost of some Chinese influence in Pakistan. On 12 April 1967 the State Department announced a major policy change:

We have concluded an extensive review of our policy with regard to the provision of military equipment to India and Pakistan, and have decided that we will not resume grant military assistance which has been suspended since September 1965.

The United States also made it clear that it did not intend to sell "lethal end items" for cash to India or Pakistan. The MAAGs in both countries would be withdrawn by 1 July 1967.³⁷

³⁷Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 11-18 June 1966, p. 21452, and 8-15 April 1967, p. 21966.

Reaction in Pakistan to the new policy was predictable. As a mark of its displeasure, Pakistan boycotted the SEATO military advisors' meeting in April, and President Khan arranged to visit China following a friendly exchange of greetings with the Chinese chief of state.³⁸

³⁸New York Times, 15 April 1967; 21 and 22 May 1967.

The year July 1966 through June 1967 also saw Iran loosen its ties with the United States. In recent years, to the disappointment of the Shah, the United States had shifted from outright grants to sales of arms to Iran at a discount, but on still relatively stiff terms. Partly because of financial reasons and partly because of Iran's \$600-million-a-year oil revenue, the United States had decided that Iran could and should buy rather than be given US arms. The Shah, however, did not think that Iran had yet reached an economic "take-off" point and could not afford to buy US arms at US prices.³⁹

³⁹Testimony of Henry J. Kuss, ibid. New York Times, 19 September 1966.

In early 1966 the Shah made clear that although he preferred to retain his military arrangement with the United States he was prepared to go elsewhere for military equipment if necessary. In June 1966 he announced that he was considering the purchase of surface-to-air missiles from the Soviet Union for defense of the Persian Gulf against a potential threat from the Soviet-equipped UAR air force. He explained that he was turning to the USSR because he could obtain the weapons on more favorable terms than from the United States.⁴⁰

⁴⁰New York Times, 19 September 1966.

Concerned, apparently, about possible Soviet penetration of the northern tier, the United States offered a supplementary grant aid program to modernize the Iranian air defense force; as part of this program in November 1966 the US agreed to give Iran at least one squadron of F-4 Phantom jets, the most advanced operational US jet fighters. This most recent grant

brought the total US arms aid to Iran since World War II to about \$1 billion.⁴¹

⁴¹New York Times, 8 and 25 February 1967.

The Soviet Union rejected Iran's request for surface-to-air missiles, but it did sign a military assistance pact in February 1967 that would bring \$110 million worth of military equipment to Iran in exchange for natural gas. Although the Shah explained that the deal included only trucks, anti-aircraft guns, and other such "secondary" weapons, the deal marked the first time that a "Western alliance member" had purchased arms from the USSR.⁴²

⁴²Ibid.

Cyprus

Little progress was made during the period toward solving the long-standing differences between Greeks and Turks over Cyprus. "Frequent breaches" of the cease-fire and other manifestations of tension caused the United States to call for corrective steps by the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The United Nations decided to retain the force on the island through the end of June 1967, in the hope that by that time a favorable solution would permit its withdrawal. The United States pledged to contribute \$4 million (out of a total of \$9,650,000 required) toward supporting the force for the extended period, depending on the willingness of other governments to contribute their share.⁴³

⁴³State Dept Bulletin, LVI (30 Jan 67) pp. 179-180.

Early in April 1967 the President of the Republic of Turkey, Cevdet Sunay, made a state visit to the United States. During the visit President Johnson and President Sunay, in a joint communique, emphasized that it was necessary for both sides in the dispute to refrain from taking any action that

might increase the existing tension. On his part President Sunay "reiterated Turkey's desire to arrive at a peaceful and agreed settlement." Both Presidents expressed the hope that the continuing and current secret talks between representatives of Greece and Turkey would "lead to an honorable solution reconciling the legitimate interests of all the parties concerned, including the communities living on the island."⁴⁴

⁴⁴Ibid., (26 Apr 67) pp. 656-657.

Appendix I

US MILITARY GRANT AID DELIVERED TO SELECTED NATIONS
(in \$ millions)

| | FY 1963 | FY 1964 | FY 1965 | FY 1966 | FY 1967 (est) | FY 1947-1967 |
|--------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------------|--------------|
| Algeria | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Iran | 66.0 | 27.3 | 49.9 | 41.1 | 48.6 | 718.8 |
| Iraq | * | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 46.7 |
| Israel | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Jordan | 2.5 | 8.1 | 4.6 | 2.8 | 15.6 | 51.7 |
| Lebanon | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.07 | 8.7 |
| Libya | 0.4 | 1.5 | 2.2 | 1.7 | 2.3 | 12.1 |
| Morocco | 6.1 | 6.0 | 2.3 | 3.1 | 6.6 | 28.1 |
| Saudi Arabia | 4.7 | 1.1 | 0.8 | 1.5 | 0.8 | 33.0 |
| Syria | -- | * | * | * | 0.04 | 0.08 |
| Tunisia | 5.7 | 3.5 | 0.9 | 0.5 | 1.2 | 16.8 |
| UAR | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Yemen | -- | -- | * | * | -- | * |

(* - less than \$50,000)

Data from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, September 1967.