



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400



PUBLIC AFFAIRS

07 1995
Ref: 95-F-1762

Ms. Veronica Shanley

5

Dear Ms. Shanley:

This responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of August 6, 1995, to former Deputy Secretary Deutch. Your request was received in this Directorate on August 10, 1995. Our interim response of August 17, 1995, refers.

The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs provided the enclosed documents and the following comments as responsive to your request. The Department of Defense has not held "hearings" per se, as those are within the purview of the Congress. As you are aware, the Senate Armed Services Committee held hearings on U.S. military involvement in Somalia, and we have enclosed the report resulting from the committee's investigation. While at present there is no DoD report available concerning the operation, General Montgomery's staff prepared an after-action report regarding the deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia, a portion of which discussed the events of October 3, 1993. However, the report is currently under review and we are unable to provide an estimated date of release. Additionally, we have enclosed a copy of Colonel Kenneth Allard's book entitled "Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned." While it does not represent the official views of the Department of Defense, it helps to place the October 3 operation in historical context. Finally, we have enclosed the press briefings held following the operation.

Your request was also referred to Central Command as a matter under their cognizance with the request that they respond directly to you. For your information their address is:

Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command
Attn: CCJ1/AG
MacDill AFB, FL 33608-7001

#778

We appreciate your interest in what happened to your friends and other Americans serving our country overseas. Assessable fees are waived for this response in this instance.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "A. H. Passarella". The signature is cursive and somewhat stylized, with the first and last letters being large and prominent.

A. H. Passarella
Director
Freedom of Information
and Security Review

Enclosures:
As stated

STROM THURMOND, SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN
 JOHN W. WARNER, VIRGINIA
 WILLIAM S. COHEN, MAINE
 JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA
 TRENT LOTT, MISSISSIPPI
 DAN COATS, INDIANA
 BOB SMITH, NEW HAMPSHIRE
 ORR KEMPTORNE, IDAHO
 KAY BAILEY HUTCHESON, TEXAS
 JAMES M. INHOFE, OKLAHOMA
 RICK SANTORUM, PENNSYLVANIA
 SAM NUNN, GEORGIA
 J. JAMES EXUM, MISSISSIPPI
 CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN
 EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASSACHUSETTS
 JIM BROWDER, NEW MEXICO
 JOHN GLENN, OHIO
 ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA
 CHARLES S. ROSS, VIRGINIA
 JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CONNECTICUT
 RICHARD H. BRYAN, NEVADA
 RICHARD L. REYNARD, STAFF DIRECTOR
 ARNOLD L. PUMARD, STAFF DIRECTOR FOR THE MINORITY

United States Senate
 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

September 29, 1995

Memorandum For Senator Thurmond and Senator Nunn

From: Senator Warner and Senator Levin

Subject: Review of the Circumstances Surrounding the Ranger Raid on October 3-4, 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia

Pursuant to your letter of October 25, 1993, we have conducted a thorough review of the operations of Joint Task Force Ranger and other U.S. military units in Mogadishu, Somalia, that resulted in the death of 18 U.S. military personnel. Our work required the interview of literally hundreds of U.S. and foreign military personnel, officials of the State Department, the CIA, the U.N., and other participating government agencies. In addition, we met with the President of Ethiopia and the heads of the two principal Somali factions: Mohammed Farah Aidsed, head of the Somali National Alliance; and Ali Mahdi Mohammed, head of the United Somali Congress. These meetings were held in the United States, Somalia and Ethiopia. Section I, Scope of the Review, provides additional information regarding the interviews conducted for the purposes of this report.

At the outset, it is important to note that statements which are attributed to various military and civilian officials are based upon hand-written notes taken during interviews. We have made a bona fide effort to accurately report the facts and opinions related to us.

In addition, we must stress that our military commanders in the U.S., at CENTCOM, and those deployed in Somalia, had to make their decisions "real time" under the pressure of battle -- threatened and actual. In contrast, we reach our findings and opinions looking back over the entirety of the decision process and military operations.

Those reviewing this report should not lose sight of the incontrovertible fact that the combined efforts of the military and diplomatic personnel involved in UNITAF and UNOSOM II saved thousands of Somali lives and untold personal hardships. The valor, professionalism and extraordinary discipline of the U.S. troops that carried out the orders of superiors throughout


95-F-1762
 #778

Somalia -- and particularly those involved in the Task Force Ranger raids of September-October, 1993 -- places these Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors and Marines in history with our highest military traditions. Moreover, the willingness of allied forces to respond in assuming a role with the U.S. troops is commendable. Foremost in this regard were Malaysian and Pakistani forces involved in the rescue effort of U.S. forces following the tragic October 3-4, 1993 operation.

We recommend immediate release to the public of this report.



Carl Levin



John Warner

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Attached to this report are the commentaries of:

Senator John Warner (R-VA)	p. 1
Senator Carl Levin (D-MI)	p. 11
Section I. Scope of the Review	p. 13
Section II. Background	p. 13
Section III. Mandate for, transition to, and early stages of U.N. Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)	p. 16
Section IV. Decision to attempt to apprehend Aided	p. 22
Section V. Decision to deploy U.S. Special Operations Forces	p. 24
Section VI. Joint Task Force Ranger Package	p. 28
Section VII. Request for Armor	p. 32
Section VIII. Conduct of Joint Task Force Ranger Operations	p. 37
Section IX. Intelligence Support	p. 42
Section X. Policy Issues	p. 42
Section XI. Conclusions	p. 46
Section XII. Final comment	p. 51

Commentary by Senator John Warner (R-VA)

Any investigation into U.S. military operations in Somalia must be accompanied by an examination of the policies of the United States and the United Nations which led to the involvement of U.S. and foreign military forces in Somalia. Critical to this analysis is the impact, I find, of the shifting, uncoordinated, unclear and inconsistent policies of both the United Nations and the Clinton Administration on the missions assigned to these joint military forces. Involvement by the U.S. in UNOSOM II, the first U.N.-commanded Chapter VII operation; and, in particular, the mission to capture Aideed; was based, not on a careful assessment of vital U.S. national interests, but rather on the Clinton Administration's desire to see this U.N. operation succeed -- not simply in peacekeeping or peace enforcement -- but in a mission of nation-building.

When U.S. forces were first deployed to Somalia in December 1992 by President Bush, they were sent on a humanitarian mission, pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 794, which called on these troops to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. Initially, during this U.S.-led UNITAF operation, over 25,000 well-equipped and well-trained U.S. troops, together with 13,000 troops from over 20 other nations, were in Somalia to assist in feeding thousands of starving Somalis. The world applauded this expression of compassion. There were guidelines in the operations order as to how to deal with threats from hostile, armed Somalis, and when and where to seize arms.

But, with the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II and the U.N. taking over command of the operation from the United States in May 1993, the goals of the international effort in Somalia were greatly expanded to include: forcibly disarming the warring factions; political reconciliation; and nation-building. In many cases, orders were given to use military force to achieve these goals. Regrettably, this U.N. policy, which was supported by the Clinton Administration, was being implemented at the same time that the Administration was pursuing a second policy track, which directed U.S. military leaders to reduce the U.S. military presence in Somalia. This policy was being implemented through daily withdrawals down to a level of 4,000 troops (of which only 2,000 were combat-trained troops).

U.S. troops were caught in the crossfire of decisions made by policy makers.

Eventually UNOSOM II forces of other nations proved less than capable and, in some cases, unwilling to perform the risky missions required by the new policy. In almost every instance, U.S. troops were called upon to carry the added burdens. Following an ambush of Pakistani forces on June 5, Admiral Jonathan Howe, the United Nations Representative in Somalia,

ordered the arrest and detention of Aideed and offered a \$25,000 reward for information leading to his arrest. Further, Howe requested U.S. forces to capture him. The Clinton Administration allowed U.S. troops to embark on this mission which clearly put the U.S. on one side in a civil war.

U.S. troops were tasked to provide force protection, assist in forcible disarmament efforts, and assume the major risks by leading the effort to capture Aideed -- missions for which U.S. forces were inadequately sized and equipped. The accompanying risks for U.S. troops in Somalia were, therefore, much higher than anyone in the Congress or the nation had been led to believe.

Policy makers within the Clinton Administration were determined to ensure that the United Nations nation-building efforts in Somalia did not fail. They, along with the U.N. Representative in Somalia, Admiral Howe, pushed incessantly for the U.S. to provide Special Operations forces to capture Aideed. This was at the same time that these Administration officials were directing the U.S. military to reduce the overall level of U.S. troops in Somalia -- an inconsistent, two-track policy. General Bir, the Turkish General who served as Commander of UNCSOM II forces and his Deputy Commander, General Montgomery, who was also Commander of U.S. Forces in Somalia, supported the request.

Although General Powell and the Commander of Central Command, General Hoor, strongly opposed and advised against sending U.S. Special Operations Forces to Somalia to attempt to capture Aideed, they eventually complied with "civilian control" and reluctantly implemented a deployment of additional U.S. forces for this purpose. On August 24, 1993, approximately 440 U.S. Rangers and Special Operations personnel deployed to Somalia with the mission to capture Aideed and his principal lieutenants.

The Clinton Administration's policy of reducing the overall U.S. military presence in Somalia to a minimal level, while at the same time agreeing to U.N. requests to perform a variety of high risk military operations for the United Nations mission, stretched the capability of U.S. forces in Somalia. This policy also resulted in two crucial policy decisions: the decision to omit the AC-130's from the August 24 Ranger Task Force package; and the decision to deny the September 1993 request for armor from General Montgomery, the U.S. commander in Somalia. In my opinion, these decisions on equipment should have been based on military requirements, not policy considerations. The desire to continue "lowering the profile" of U.S. forces in Somalia appears to have been the determining factor in each of these decisions. Both of these requests should have been approved.

We will never know for sure the impact that this additional

equipment would have had on the tragic October 3-4 raid. While it is true that General Montgomery's request for heavy armor was not specifically requested for the Ranger operation, it is clear that the armor could have been used decisively in the rescue operation of October 3-4, and, if available, might have been integrated into the Ranger ground elements that were an essential part of the forces conducting the October 3 raid.

When a commander in the field requests equipment for the protection of his forces, and that request is properly reviewed and approved by the Combatant Theater Commander (CINCPAC), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the request should be approved by "civilian control." Only compelling military -- not diplomatic policy -- reasons should ever be used to deny an on-scene military commander such a request.

Secretary Aspin has said that Congressional concerns about U.S. military involvement in Somalia were a factor in his decision to deny General Montgomery's request for armor. This represents a misreading of the mood in the Congress at the time. Congressional concerns with the operation in Somalia centered on the Clinton Administration's decision to take sides in a civil war, to assume combat missions -- particularly the mission to capture Aideed -- without adequate Congressional consultation. This was a major transition of policy, from a more traditional U.N. peacekeeping operation, to nebulous attempts at "nation-building". The following statements are several examples of Congressional attitudes regarding U.S. military involvement in Somalia prior to the October, 1993 raid:

o July 15, 1993 statement by Senator Byrd (D-WV): "Mr. President, this Senator and this Senate did not vote to send American forces to Somalia to go from house to house to disarm the participants in internecine battles between Somali warlords....to chase down competing warlords...to confiscate weapons. I thought I voted to allow United States forces to go to Somalia and feed hungry people."

o August 2, 1993 statement by Senator McCain (R-AZ): "In the case of Somalia, the winds have blown us from a narrow well-defined humanitarian mission to taking sides in a prolonged hunt for a Somalia warlord. We have moved from a relief effort to peace enforcement to taking sides, and we now seem to be on the edge of moving towards nation building."

o September 27, 1993 statement by Rep. Hyde (R-IL): "Now, the mission has broadened dramatically. Instead of feeding the hungry, we are nation building."

o September 28, 1993 statement by Rep. Mazzoli (D-KY): "What began as a laudable humanitarian mission has become,

03 23 99 09:13 AM FROM: VLM, JAMES LUTIN, DU

in my judgement, a combination peacemaking, peacekeeping and nation-building exercise."

These Congressional concerns argued for abandoning the mission to capture Aideed, not for denying the US forces in Somalia the equipment requested by their military commanders on the scene.

The Clinton Administration should not, in my opinion, have agreed to send additional U.S. troops to Somalia for the specific mission of capturing Aideed. The overwhelming majority of the military leaders who were consulted regarding this mission advised against it, pointing out that this was a very high-risk mission with a very low probability of success. Unfortunately, the significant professional advice of our most senior U.S. military leaders was overruled. The arguments of senior U.S. civilian policy makers, in coordination with U.N. officials, prevailed.

Was there a vital U.S. national interest which justified putting U.S. military personnel in danger for the mission to capture Aideed? I think not. At the very time the decision was made to deploy the Ranger Task Force, it was the Administration's policy that there should be a greater emphasis on a political -- rather than military -- solution to the problems in Somalia. According to Secretary Aspin, "At the same time that we were deploying the Ranger Task Force, we were also pursuing a two-track approach. We had determined in Washington that there was too much emphasis, almost exclusively, on the military force track and not enough on the political track." This argues in favor of denying the U.N. request, advocated by Admiral Howe, for U.S. special operations forces to pursue and capture Aideed.

U.S. forces were conducting these raids against targets in "Aideed territory" -- a known, limited geographic sector of Mogadishu clearly under his control. To the extent possible, the Task Force used diversified tactics and "feints" to keep their adversaries off balance. But the nature of the mission, to capture a "warlord" in a congested area of ramshackle buildings, while trying to minimize collateral damage to multitudes of innocent civilians, put severe limitations on the range of military tactics that could be used.

Aideed had been trained by the French military; at one time he had held the rank of General in the Somali military. Senator Levin and I met him, talked at great length with him in Addis Ababa during our trip to the region. He is no stranger to military tactics; he is, and was, no fool.

Who was making a daily assessment of the increasing risk of these missions due to the repetition of tactics? Who was assessing such increased risk against the end value of a capture

of Aided? Who was assessing the consequences of a failed mission, with possible U.S. casualties, on support at home? Who was assessing the impact of the possibility of a highly visible failure on future U.S. foreign policy? Did a team in Washington look at these repetitive operations, based on questionable policy, with increasing risk to troops, and say, "hold it, let's re-evaluate?" I was not able to find evidence that those in Washington, civilian and military, with the responsibility of evaluating the operations being conducted by our forces, did so in a timely, effective manner. Oversight was not carried out with the thoroughness, or care, that was justified by the daily personal risks being experienced by the U.S. forces conducting these combat operations.

For example, certain U.S. military units participating in the raid of October 3-4, 1993, unlike other U.S. units, have as part of their creed, the following:

"...Secrecy protects their missions and conceals their personal deeds..."

The Special Operations forces which comprised Joint Task Force Ranger depend heavily on the element of "secrecy", of surprise, for successful operations. Clearly, as the operations of this unit in Somalia achieved, in many respects, a repetitive pattern, the crucial elements of "secrecy" and surprise were being diminished. Aided was not just a political figure, but a professional soldier as well. Wasn't it only a matter of time until he and his troops devised tactics to defend themselves? They mastered the use of relatively unsophisticated weapons, and cleverly massed them in critical locations. They effectively used Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPGs) -- weapons designed for use against ground armored vehicles -- as crude surface-to-air missiles, shooting down four U.S. helicopters during the October 3 battle. Just 9 days before, a U.S. helicopter was lost to such a weapon!

Although U.S. military commanders were doing their best with flawed, changing policies, and a level of review by civilian authority that fall short, there remains the question of whether the on-scene commanders should have recognized the increasing risk to their troops, of a likely failed mission, due to the repetition of the raids. The element of "secrecy" was severely diminished, the adversaries had to have been on a learning curve, and yet our commanders pressed on.

Both military and civilian officials in the chain of command, as well as those in an advisory role, should have been carefully and continually re-evaluating the Task Force's mission and tactics after each raid, with an eye toward recommending that the operation be terminated if the risks were deemed to have grown too high. This was not done with the depth and care

required in my opinion either in Washington or, to some extent, in Somalia.

The policies which drove the military operations, formulated in the Clinton Administration and U.N. headquarters, and conveyed through two chains of command -- 1) a CINC, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM); and 2) a U.N. command under a U.N. General. In addition, one U.S. General in Somalia wore two hats, one as the Deputy to the U.N. Commander and one as Commander of U.S. Forces in Somalia, subordinate to Commander, CENTCOM. This created difficult -- if not unprecedented -- command arrangements. There will, forever, remain legitimate questions regarding the adverse impact these command arrangements had on the eventual outcome in Somalia.

In general, the policies of the Clinton Administration -- and the U.N. -- regarding the crisis in Somalia appear to have been characterized by abrupt shifts, a lack of clarity, and inconsistencies that placed a difficult burden of interpretation upon the deployed military commanders. Task Force Ranger was sent to Somalia with the mission to capture Aideed, against professional military advice.

Military operations are never conducted without risk, and when military forces are committed, we must expect that casualties, including loss of life, may occur. We must be careful not to give our military commanders, our troops, the impression that we expect them to carry out high risk missions without ever suffering casualties. However, in return for their willingness to accept risk, our military is owed a duty of constant re-evaluation of their missions by "civilian control." Most importantly, it is incumbent on the President and the Congress to ensure that U.S. forces are put in harm's way only when our clear national interests are involved. This was not the case in Somalia.

This review raises questions regarding whether such Chapter VII operations -- which are entitled "Actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression" -- should be undertaken by the U.N., an organization which does not have adequate military expertise or infrastructure. The Clinton Administration has now indicated a change in its position on this issue. As Assistant Secretary of Defense Ted Warner testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 3, 1995, "... We have come to believe that the United Nations is not the best organization to direct the conduct of large-sized Chapter VII peace enforcement operations that may involve substantial risk of combat. We believe such operations are best carried out by coalitions or capable regional organizations."

Additionally, the Clinton Administration's policy of

reducing the U.S. military presence in Somalia while simultaneously tasking U.S. forces to engage in combat operations with high attendant personal risks was inconsistent. Those officials who advocated and approved this policy must bear the ultimate responsibility for the events that followed. As Under Secretary of Defense Wisner correctly observed: "the single most serious flaw in our policy was that we tried to accomplish political objectives solely by military means."

Those reviewing this report should not lose sight of the fact that the combined efforts of the military personnel involved in UNITAF and UNOSOM II saved many thousands of Somali lives. The valor, professionalism and extraordinary discipline of the U.S. troops that carried out the orders of superiors in Somalia - - and particularly those involved in the Task Force Ranger raids of September-October, 1993 -- places these Soldiers, Airman, Sailors and Marines in history with our highest military traditions. Our nation will not forget their sacrifices. We owe them our deepest gratitude.

Commentary by Senator Carl Levin (D-MI)

The attached report comprehensively addresses a host of issues relating to the circumstances surrounding the Ranger raid of October 3-4, 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia. What follows is not an attempt to summarize the contents of that report, but rather to express a few brief personal thoughts about some of the key issues involved.

Many different actions and inactions contributed to the position that U.S. forces found themselves in at the beginning of October, 1993 in Mogadishu, at the time of the Ranger raid which resulted in American casualties.

Chief among these was the unanimous June decision of the United Nations Security Council to try to arrest and detain for prosecution those responsible for the June 5, 1993 armed attacks on United Nations peacekeepers. The fifteen members of the Security Council voted [UNSCR #837] for the arrest effort on June 6, 1993. The decision on June 17 of the Secretary General's Special Representative, Ambassador Howe, to offer a reward for Aideed's capture and to commence a major hunt for him in Mogadishu, was strongly supported by the U.S. commander on the ground, General Montgomery, and by the UNOSOM II force commander, Turkish General Bir, both of whom actually favored offering a higher reward for Aideed's capture.

The decision to hunt for Aideed involved the U.N. member nations and U.S. forces in the internal politics and clan rivalries of Mogadishu in a new way, with attendant dangers that were not immediately appreciated.

The decision to hunt for Aideed was public and widely reported in the press, as were attacks by U.S. forces against Aideed strongholds in the following week and again in August and September. Most Members of Congress at the time supported these efforts, as reflected in Congressional approval of a supplemental appropriation for DOD costs in Somalia on June 23, 1993. In July, several Members of Congress publicly voiced support for continuing U.N. operations in Somalia and U.S. participation in them; on July 13, Senator Byrd alone suggested that the U.S. should withdraw from the Somalia mission, but Congress took no action to require withdrawal. The Senate did not vote on a Byrd amendment to end U.S. forces' activities in Somalia within 30 days, but on September 9, 1993, the Senate did pass a non-binding resolution calling for the President to seek specific Congressional authorization by November 15 for the continued deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia.

Previously there had been a change of mission from the U.S.-led UNITAF effort to provide immediate humanitarian relief, to

the UNOSOM II effort to address the root causes of the famine, including national reconciliation and disarming the warring factions, and to prevent the famine from recurring. Although this change was present in UNOSOM II's written mandate when it took over in May, 1993, its implementation was inconsistent and unclear, and as the months passed, political and diplomatic efforts were increasingly at cross purposes with the actions of the military forces. The motives behind the mission change were good, but the conflicting tactics used created dissent, not cooperation among the warring Somali factions, and resentment, not trust, toward UNOSOM and U.S. forces. The Clinton Administration was engaged in a major effort to force better coordination of political and military tactics with the U.N. just prior to the incidents of Oct 3-4.

While press reports have placed much emphasis on the impact that armor denied to U.S. forces might have had upon casualties in Mogadishu had it been present on Oct. 3-4, General Garrison, who directed that raid, has stated that he had all the equipment he needed for his operation and might not have used tanks even if he had them. He also said he did not consider using more tanks and APCs from allied nations as backups in the Ranger Ground Reaction force. While more armor, in place and ready for a rescue effort, might have allowed a faster rescue of injured Rangers, it is impossible to determine whether any lives would have been saved since the vast majority of casualties occurred during the movement of forces to the first helicopter crash site, and probably would not have been affected by earlier arrival of tanks and armored vehicles in a rescue force.

The United Nations has had some notable successes in conducting "peacekeeping" operations but it is clear that it does not now have the wherewithal to conduct a peace enforcement operation. The United States and the other members of the United Nations should continue to work to improve the ability of the United Nations to carry out such operations in the future.

Finally, a portion of the final comment contained in this report bears repeating:

"The valor, professionalism and extraordinary discipline of the U.S. troops that carried out the orders of superiors in Somalia -- and particularly those involved in the Task Force Ranger raids of September - October, 1993 places these Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors and Marines in history with our highest military traditions. Our nation owes them a debt of gratitude." Commentary by Senator Carl Levin (D-MI)

I. Scope of the Review - We started our assignment with a Secretary of Defense briefing on November 30, 1993. Major General William Garrison, the Commander Joint Task Force Ranger, was principal briefer. Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command, General Wayne Downing and a number of other civilian and military officials participated or were present. We received briefings in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and Mogadishu from December 11 to 13, 1993. Additionally, Committee staff conducted field visits to the headquarters of Central Command (CENTCOM), Special Operations Command (SOCOM), Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) (Senator Warner joined in a second of two visits to JSOC), and to the units that participated in the October 3-4 raid at Fort Campbell, Kentucky; Fort Drum, New York; Fort Benning, Georgia and Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

We conducted separate and extensive interviews of Major General Garrison, Commander of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC); General Downing, Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and General Hear, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). We also met with Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Frank Wisner, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin.

II. Background

1. In January 1991, Somalia's president, Siad Barre, was deposed and civil war and clan infighting ensued, leading to famine and lawlessness throughout portions of the country.

2. On April 24, 1992, the United Nations Security Council, after the signing of a cease-fire between the warring Somali factions, approved United Nations Operation in Somalia, which has come to be referred to as UNOSOM I. The UN agreed to deploy 50 unarmed United Nations military observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu.

3. On August 28, 1992, the Security Council, in the face of sporadic outbreaks of hostilities in several parts of Somalia, approved the deployment of an additional 3,000 peacekeepers to perform a traditional peacekeeping mission under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter to observe cease-fire agreements and provide security to humanitarian relief efforts. The United States participation in UNOSOM I, called Operation Provide Relief, involved the provision of transportation to Pakistani troops, humanitarian aid workers and supplies.

4. On December 3, 1992, as the security situation in Somalia continued to deteriorate, the Security Council, acting under

Chapter VII of the UN Charter and in response to an offer by the United States to take the lead in organizing and commanding such an operation, authorized the use of all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. That multilateral operation, known as Unified Task Force or UNITAF and as Operation Restore Hope, included about 25,000 U.S. troops and 13,000 troops from 20 other countries. UNITAF was successful in accomplishing its mission of establishing a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations. The United States-led operation, however, did not involve the disarmament of the various Somalia factions and did not extend throughout all of Somalia.

5. On March 26, 1993, the Security Council authorized the establishment of United Nations Operation in Somalia II or UNOSOM II, which is the subject of this review. UNOSOM II was also a Chapter VII operation and had an expanded mandate in that the Security Council specifically emphasized the "crucial importance of disarmament" and called for the Force Commander of UNOSOM II to "assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia ... in accordance with the recommendations contained in his (Secretary General's) report of 3 March 1993." The Secretary General's recommendations referred to by the Security Council included, *inter alia*, the following military tasks:

"(c) to maintain control of the heavy weapons of the organized factions which will have been brought under international control pending their eventual destruction or transfer to a newly-constituted army;

(d) to seize small arms of all unauthorized armed elements and to assist in the registration and security of such arms...."

The Security Council also requested the UN Secretary General, through his Special Representative, retired United States Admiral Jonathan Howe, to provide assistance to the Somali people in rehabilitating their political institutions and promoting national reconciliation.

6. On May 4, 1993, command of the operation was formally turned over from the United States to the United Nations Force Commander for UNOSOM II. The UN Force Commander was a Turkish general and the United States provided the Deputy Force Commander, Major General Thomas Montgomery. The United States also provided approximately 2,800 logisticians who were under the operational control of the UN Force Commander, Turkish Lieutenant General Bir, and approximately 1,300 combat troops in a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) who remained entirely under U.S. command and control, under Major General Montgomery in his role as Commander of U.S. Forces. The mission of the QRF was to act as an interim

force protection supplement to UN forces in emergencies.

7. On June 5, 1993, there was a scheduled inventory by UNOSOM II of five weapons-storage sites belonging to Aideed's faction, one of which was collocated with the radio transmission relay facility north of the city, with another at the radio broadcast studio in the city itself. Prior written notice of the inspection had been given to the staff of General Aideed. Pakistani units returning from the inventory sites encountered a three-sided ambush and sustained 25 killed, 53 wounded, and 10 missing in action.

8. On June 6th, the Security Council reaffirmed the authorization to take all necessary measures against those responsible for the armed attacks on UNOSOM II forces, including "to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment."

9. On June 17, 1993, Admiral Howe announced a \$25,000 reward for information that would lead to Aideed's arrest. This action was supported by the UNOSOM II Force Commander, Turkish Lieutenant General Bir, and the Deputy UNOSOM II Force Commander and Commander of U.S. Forces, U.S. Major General Montgomery. Both of those officers thought the amount of the reward should have been much greater.

10. On August 24, 1993, the United States deployed approximately 440 troops as part of Joint Task Force Ranger, whose mission was to apprehend General Aideed and his senior lieutenants. Joint Task Force Ranger was under the command of Major General William Garrison. General Garrison reported directly to General Joseph Hoar, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command. The Task Force was not under the operational control of the UN Force Commander and was not under the operational control of Commander U.S. Forces, Somalia. Task Force Ranger conducted seven raids during its deployment, three at night and four in the daytime. These missions yielded valuable contributions to the overall mission. On the seventh and last raid, which commenced in daylight on October 3rd and lasted through the 4th, the Ranger Task Force tragically sustained 16 killed in action and the relief force which went to the assistance of the Ranger Task Force sustained 2 killed in action. A total of 84 were wounded in the operation.

11. Shortly after October 4, 1993, the United States deployed 3,000 additional Army combat personnel, including heavy armor, a Marine Expeditionary Unit off shore with 3,600 Marines embarked, a Navy aircraft carrier, and Air Force AC-130 gunships based in a neighboring country.

III. Mandate for, transition to, and early stages of United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)

At the time of the commencement of the U.S.-led operation to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia, then President Bush stated that the United States would send a substantial force of troops to Somalia "with a limited objective: to open the supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a U.N. peacekeeping force to keep it moving."

U.S. troop levels reached a peak of 25,800 in mid-January 1993 in and around Somalia. The operation was known by its U.S. name as Operation Restore Hope and by its UN name as Unified Task Force or UNITAF. 20 other countries contributed more than 13,400 troops to UNITAF.

President Bush initially publicly stated that U.S. troops would be home within a couple of months. UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali urged the United States to disarm the Somali warring factions but the United States declined to do so. This difference in policy was reviewed by our committee during a hearing on January 29, 1993.

In his March 3, 1993 report to the UN Security Council, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali wrote that "(m)y firm view, as stated in my letter to President Bush of 8 December 1992, remains that the mandate of UNOSOM II must cover the whole territory of Somalia and include disarmament."

On March 26, 1993 the UN Security Council passed resolution 814 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter emphasizing "the crucial importance of disarmament" and requested the Force Commander of UNOSOM II "to assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia" and "to organize a prompt, smooth and phased transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II." As noted above in section II of this review, the military tasks for UNOSOM II included the maintenance of control of the heavy weapons of the organized factions and the seizure of small arms of all unauthorized elements.

During testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 25, 1993, Ambassador David Shimm, the State Department Coordinator for Somalia, stated that "(T)he military transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II has been slow because there has been, until recently, so few interlocutors in Somalia with whom to speak. This situation is changing now that the senior UNOSOM II leadership has arrived in Mogadishu." He further stated that Admiral Howe, the Secretary General's personal representative for Somalia was in Somalia and that the "UNOSOM II Force Commander, General Bir, and his Deputy, General Montgomery, have been in Somalia for the past 2 weeks working on transition plans, and are

rapidly bringing the UNOSOM command staff's structure up to full strength. A U.N. planning team arrives in Mogadishu this weekend to coordinate and advance the transition planning."

On May 4, 1993, UNOSOM II formally took over the mission from UNITAF. During UNOSOM II, U.S. troop strength had been reduced to about 4,000 (of which only about 2,000 were combat troops). U.S. combat forces were intended to be used only as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF), which would come to the aid of the forces of other nations if they became involved in situations that they were unable to handle. The plan was for the QRF to move off-shore as soon as possible and eventually to return to the United States. United States policy was to keep the U.S. force in Somalia as small as possible while at the same time not allow the UN operation to fail.

The QRF, however, became involved in force protection operations and disarming Somalis because the UNOSOM II forces were increasingly reluctant to leave their enclaves without U.S. forces participation, particularly after the June 5th ambush of Pakistani forces that resulted in 24 Pakistani deaths.

We met with Admiral Howe, LTGEN Bir and MGEN Montgomery in Mogadishu, Somalia and with the other witnesses in the United States.

ADM Howe - I argued against turning the operation over to UNOSOM on May 4th. Not only because the Pakistanis had just arrived but because they were not properly equipped (no flak jackets) to take over from the U.S. forces in Mogadishu. Aideed may have sensed a relatively weak force.

Nobody knows when Aideed decided to attack the UN. Did it start at Addis Ababa in March? Towards the end of UNITAF, Aideed's radio put out bad information about the United States and called the United Nations good. By mid-May, his propaganda had turned against the United Nations. For example, he said that "Governor" Howe would turn Somalia into a UN trusteeship. The selection of judges, the formation of district councils, and the establishment of other institutions sanctioned by the Addis conference, were opposed by Aideed as he perceived them as a threat.

The June 5th ambush of the Pakistani troops occurred during a pre-notified inspection. It is our view that this was so large an attack that it had to have been carefully planned.

LTGEN Bir - For the first operations under Chapter VII, there was not sufficient time to plan the takeover from UNITAF. -It was impossible to establish the UNOSOM headquarters with so few people. We never had a 5 brigade force, which is what was pledged and what we needed. We

were not given broad political guidance, so there was no military plan. We tried to lay down military guidance but the June 5th Pakistani massacre forced us to go after the militia. Nations were here for a humanitarian mission and when forces started to take casualties, they stopped cooperating with negative consequences.

If there are to be Chapter VII peace enforcement operations in the future, the responsibility to conduct the operation must be given to either a leading nation, like Operation Desert Storm, or at the most to two leading nations. But even in those cases, there must be specific agreements with the nations contributing forces. It could be conducted by a regional organization, but even NATO would have problems carrying out a Chapter VII operation.

MGEN Montgomery, Deputy Commander, UNOSOM II and Commander, U.S. Forces, Somalia - The mission changed from humanitarian relief as a result of the switch to UNOSOM II in May and the broad UN Security Council mandate. The mission also changed after the June 5th massacre of the Pakistanis. It changed to a hunt for Aided. My broad mission, however, hadn't changed.

The United Nations is not currently equipped to conduct Chapter VII peace enforcement operations. Desert Storm is the correct model for Chapter VII operations.

MG Fresman, Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command - We had two inconsistent policies: support the UN and don't let it fail in Somalia; and get U.S. forces out of Somalia as soon as possible.

GEN Hoar, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command - The Addis Ababa agreement was a good start. A lot of ground work was laid for the UN to take over. We were not having any real problems. My expectations for the UN were too high. I didn't think it would be as hard as it was.

In mid-June when the Malaysians and Italians blocked an area and the Pakistani troops went in on the ground, Aided and his henchmen broke through the Malaysians. The lesson I learned from the operation was that you need to be careful and state clearly that you are trying to disarm and not trying to get a particular person.

We had a continuing problem that grew over time, to use the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) for force protection. I didn't believe that the coalition forces would do the job to meet our force protection requirements. So we used the QRF to do some search-for-weapons sweeps and escort for convoys; work that we hadn't anticipated at first.

Over the summer, it became apparent that the allies couldn't be depended upon. As a result, over time we lost control of Mogadishu. Things certainly went down hill when the Pakistanis were ambushed. In September, Howe requested more U.S. troops. I said no! We lost control of Mogadishu absolutely in May. No one in the UNOSOM headquarters was in charge of Mogadishu. When the U.S. was in charge, the Marines ran Mogadishu. During UNITAF, MOEN Wilhelm met with Aideed and talked to all the allies, held their hand, and got them to take missions they could handle. I talked to Howe about setting up a Division headquarters (not the U.S.).

General Colin Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - I always said that disarming the factions was stupid. I was not involved in any way with the vote in the UN on the Security Council's March 26, 1993 resolution that called for disarming the factions. Disarmament is not possible in a country where everyone has a weapon and, while it might be successful for a while, would only serve to make money for arms dealers in neighboring states.

I went to Somalia on April 5th and asked all concerned when they could accomplish the hand-off. They were all confident that they could do so by the end of May. They beat that date. I wasn't being driven by the White House or Congress. No one ever said that it was done too fast.

Secretary Aspin: The decision concerning the Security Council's mandate for UNOSOM II was worked in interagency forums. There was no resistance in DoD to the mandate for UNOSOM II. We were in a jam as the original mandate for UNITAF was to feed the people and then leave. As long as we had 25,000 troops there was no problem. We did not believe there would be a problem once we left. General Powell was concerned about getting our forces out of Somalia and UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali was begging us to leave our forces there. The push to leave Somalia was not due to any Congressional pressure, rather it was due to the impact on our budget and the fact that the deployment was tying up 25,000 troops and its rotation base. The U.S. military was agitating to get us out.

At the time of the turnover to UNOSOM II, our assessment was that the UN forces would be able to handle the situation. In retrospect, we either underestimated the warlords or we overestimated the capability of the UN forces.

Report of the UN Secretary-General to the Security Council of July 1, 1993

"At 4 p.m. on June 4, 1993, UNOSOM II sent letters to the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (UNC/SNA)

faction informing the latter of its plan to conduct on the following day, weapons verification inspections of the authorized weapons storage sites in four locations in south Mogadishu and one site (Afgooy) on the outskirts of the city. The weapons sites had been established voluntarily by the armed factions after the arrival of UNITAF and were entirely under the control of the factions. The last inspection had been conducted by UNITAF in January and February 1993. The UNOSOM II officer who officially informed a UNC/SNA officer, who was one of Aideed's closest associates was advised that the inspections must not be performed and that, if they were, it would lead to 'war.'

"Despite the statement of the UNC/SNA officer, the inspection began on the morning of June 5. The inspection on the outskirts and two of the inspections within Mogadishu were conducted without incident. The inspection at the 'Mogadishu Radio (Aideed)' site went smoothly until it was near completion when several agitators arrived on scene and began to incite the crowd that had gathered. The inspectors at the Aideed radio transmission site were subjected to sniper fire throughout the day. At that site, a large number of weapons were found, including 62 tow missiles, 2 Milan missiles and 1 SA-7, which were later removed. Thirteen technical vehicles and a number of machine guns previously in storage at the site were no longer present."

"Later in the day, Pakistani units returning from incidents elsewhere in Mogadishu transitted 21 October Road, where they encountered a large, carefully prepared three-sided ambush that resulted in extensive casualties. Other attacks took place elsewhere in the city in the afternoon and the U.S. Quick Reaction Force was deployed to assist the Pakistani forces. As a result 25 Pakistani soldiers were killed, 10 listed as missing, and 53 Pakistani and 3 U.S. soldiers were wounded."

"UNOSOM II will continue its initial disarmament efforts until satisfied it has neutralized all known UNC/SNA weapons and ammunition storage sites and caches in and around Mogadishu and any others that threaten the city. After this is complete, UNOSOM II will undertake an orderly sector-by-sector disarmament of the city. However, this emphasis will shift to cooperative efforts involving Somalis and UNOSOM II as soon as feasible."

Congressional Testimony of October 14, 1993, of Professor Farar: - Professor Farar had served in the early 1960s as advisor to the head of the national police force of Somalia and he conducted the investigation into the June 5, 1993 ambush of the Pakistani troops as the legal consultant to UNOSOM II. Excerpts from his testimony follows:

"As the time for substituting a force under the policy direction of Boutros-Ghali for the U.S. force drew near, the Security Council adopted an enabling resolution which gave to the replacement force, a force both in form and fact much weaker than the one about to leave, gave to it a paradoxically broader mission. Rather than simply maintaining the security of humanitarian operations, it was to assist the Somalis in rebuilding a democratic state. This broad and vague mandate was, however, open to two quite different constructions. It could have been construed conservatively to authorize the UN to provide a security envelope for the existing power holders, while leaving largely to them the task of designing a new political structure and allocating among their clans and subclans the associated opportunities for power and gain. But with the enthusiastic backing, indeed apparently at the urging of U.S. diplomats in Mogadishu, Washington and New York, the main strategists and operational directors of the mission -- the Secretary-General himself, the Under Secretary for Peacekeeping, Mr. Kofi Anan, and Retired U.S. Admiral Jonathan Howe, the Secretary-General's man on the scene -- chose a far more ambitious interpretation. They chose to give to the UN operation the central role in guiding the evolution of Somali politics, they chose to make it the mentor and disciplinarian, the main creative force. They chose an active tutelary role, one in which they would hand out white and black hands respectively to favored and disfavored Somali politicians. Thus they made the UN a player rather than an honest broker in the country's unruly political life, and thus they set the stage for confrontation." (Underlining in original text)

"Aided may actually have believed, at the time of the first confrontation with UN forces, that he was acting in legitimate self-defense of his clan from seizure of the radio station it controlled and from the first stage of the clan's forced unilateral disarmament. Both the US Liaison Mission in Somalia and UNOSOM must accept a measure of responsibility for sending signals, however inadvertently, that could have produced such a belief."

Assistant Secretary of Defense Ted Warner, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 3, 1995: "...We have come to believe that the United Nations is not the best organization to direct the conduct of large-sized Chapter VII peace enforcement operations that may involve substantial risk of combat. We believe such operations are best carried out by coalitions or capable regional organizations."

Congressional action: The United States Senate passed S.J.Res. 45 on February 4, 1993 authorizing Operation Restore

Hope. The House of Representatives amended and adopted the resolution on May 25, 1993. The amended resolution also authorized U.S. forces to remain for one year to implement UN Security Council resolution 814 (UNOSOM II). The House version was never considered by the Senate.

IV. Decision to attempt to apprehend Aided

On June 6, 1993, one day after the Pakistani troops were ambushed and suffered 25 killed in action, the UN Security Council passed a resolution reemphasizing "the crucial importance of the early implementation of the disarmament of all Somali parties, including movements and factions . . . and of neutralizing radio broadcast systems that contribute to the violence and attacks directed against UNOSOM II" and reaffirmed the authorization "to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks . . . , including those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia, including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment." A UN investigation into the ambush commenced on June 12th.

On June 12th, newly arrived U.S. AC-130s attacked selected targets, including heavy weapons, ammunition depots, and a radio station, all associated with Aided in Mogadishu. On June 13th, Pakistani troops were attacked again and U.S. aircraft attacked additional targets associated with Aided. U.S. attacks continued on June 14th and 15th.

On June 17th, Admiral Jonathan Howe, the UN Secretary General's personal representative for Somalia, ordered the arrest and detention of Aided and offered a \$25,000 reward for information leading to his arrest. In his July 1, 1993 report to the UN Security Council, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali stated with respect to Admiral Howe's order that:

"General Aidid's militia continues to attack United Nations personnel with sniping, premeditated confrontations violating international humanitarian law, and provocative rhetoric. Moreover there is increasing evidence that General Aidid deliberately and personally directed the use of women and children for attacks on UNOSOM II soldiers; and that he directed his militia to shoot into the crowd on June 13 in order to create casualties and embarrass the Pakistani forces and UNOSOM II before the assembled world press. For these reasons, he is considered by UNOSOM II to be a menace to public safety. Therefore, his detention will ensure safety, including that of the Somali people. Others will be arrested if evidence is developed implicating them in the same or similar crimes or in related illegal activities

subsequent to the June 5 attacks."

The actual UN investigation, which was conducted by an independent expert, Professor Tom Farer of the American University, Washington D.C., was submitted on August 12, 1993. Professor Farer concluded that "(t)he claim that General Mohammed Farah Hassan Aided authorized the 5 June attack on Pakistani forces serving under the United Nations flag and that the attack was executed by elements known as SNA is supported by clear and convincing evidence."

Admiral Howe, United Nations - Nobody knows why Aided saw it in his interest to attack the UN. Did it start at Abbis Ababa? He has been antagonistic all along. Towards the end of UNITAF, Aided's radio put out bad information about the U.S., and called the UN good. By mid-May, his propaganda had turned against the UN. For example, he said that "Governor" Howe would turn Somalia into a UN trusteeship. We had to say what it was - Aided was a menace to society. The \$25,000 reward was cleared by New York. I said then and subsequently that Aided would not be the focus.

LTCEN Bix - With respect to Howe's reward for Aided's capture, all of the decisions were coordinated with me. My only problem with the reward related to the amount. (LTC Bix believed the amount of the reward should have been much greater.) It was important to arrest Aided.

MGEN Montgomery - I agreed with the mission to get Aided. He was the Somali National Army's (SNA) center of gravity. There are not a lot of strong contenders around him. It is hard to see how the SNA could be effective without him. If you're fighting the SNA, go after Aided. I was not surprised when a reward was put on Aided's head. I would have put a \$1 million price on his head. The Somalis in power are in it for greed and riches.

GEN. Hoar - The UN decision to go after Aided was a dumb thing to do.

DoD Answer to a comprehensive series of questions submitted by the Senate Armed Services Committee - "With regard to UNSCR 837, an interagency meeting in which both the Joint Staff and OSD participated was held on June 5, in the wake of the attack on the Pakistani peacekeepers. At that meeting it was agreed that USUN would work towards a strong diplomatic response from both the U.S. government and the UN. UNSCR 837 was drafted at UN headquarters in New York on Sunday, June 6, and voted on that day."

Congressional action: On June 23, 1993, the Senate approved a \$1.2 billion supplemental appropriation for DoD, of which \$750

million was for Somalia. During a floor statement on the bill on June 17, 1993, Senator Byrd, one of the few members of Congress to comment on the floor on Somalia, after noting press reports that the United States was sending a Marine Expeditionary Unit to the area stated that "I would caution the administration to beware of enhancing U.S. participation in a mission which seems to be beyond that which was originally agreed to by this body." Senator Byrd also stated "the contribution of the United States to the UN-led operation in Somalia needs to be kept at a level which does not put the United States back into the position of shouldering a disproportionately large part of the costs and risks. Doubling U.S. forces over the weekend will add to both, and should be considered very carefully."

V. Decision to deploy U.S. Special Operations Forces

The day after the ambush of the Pakistani troops, Admiral Howe, Secretary General Boutros Ghali's personal representative for Somalia, commenced a persistent effort to obtain the deployment of U.S. special operations forces to attempt to seize Aided. At that time and for sometime thereafter, Aided was seen often in public. The civilian and military leadership of the Department of Defense resisted the effort to use U.S. special operations forces for this purpose. However, under continually increasing pressure from both the United Nations in New York and U.S. Administration officials, as well as from Major General Montgomery, who was both the Commander of U.S. Forces in Somalia and the Deputy United Nations Commander, the leadership in the Pentagon reluctantly yielded and recommended the deployment.

ADM Howe - On June 6th, the day after the Pakistani massacre, I submitted a list of things that were needed to the Secretary General. It included special forces, tanks for the Pakistanis, and more APCs. Montgomery and Bir agreed. That was the start of a long campaign to get what was needed. We ultimately got everything. Special forces were central.

MG Montgomery - I supported getting special forces for this operation; it didn't have to be our special operations forces, it could have been the British SAS.

GEN Hoar - Admiral Howe pushed hard for it in mid-June (June 17th) when the Malaysians and the Italians blocked an area and the Pakistanis went in on the ground. Aided and his henchmen broke through the Malaysians. The lesson I learned from that operation was that you need to be careful and state clearly that you are trying to disarm and not trying to get a particular person or faction. The U.S. role in that operation was helicopter gunship support.

I knew the mission to get Aided was heating up. On June 30th, when I was in D.C., I told the policy guys that it was a bad thing to do. I thought there was a 50% chance of getting the required intelligence, and, once gotten, only a 50% chance that we would get Aided. So it was a 25% chance of success and it would be high risk.

General Powell agreed with me and felt even more strongly than I did. I felt it was OK to get Aided as an incidental result of an operation with the forces on hand, but Montgomery felt that the QRF was not properly trained for such a mission.

In early July, I felt that we had killed the idea. There was continuing interest on the part of some people, but they were not carrying the day. But things heated up again and when I was in D.C. on August 9 to 11, I made the same points to the policy people.

On August 17th, the Chief of Station came back and said there was an ability to get actionable intelligence. What was needed, in his view, was a SWAT team to snatch Aided.

On August 18th, Ambassador Shinn's report was submitted. Shinn carried Howe's request that U.S. special operations forces were needed. During that week, I told Powell it was a bad idea. As long as everyone understands this is a high risk mission and there is a good chance it will not come off, I viewed it as a policy decision. Powell's dilemma was that with Boutros-Ghali, Montgomery, and Howe pressuring us to do it, how does he resist. The normal way I did business with General Powell was by telephone. We talked virtually every day. To the best of my knowledge, I got the call from Powell on August 21st that it was a go.

The policy group made the decision. I'm not sure how the decision was made. My conversations were with Aspin, Wisner, and the NSC. Powell told me that the people involved in the decision were Lake, Wisner, and Aspin. I believe that Powell was even more skeptical about the mission than I was.

It was a bad decision. We put the prestige of the U.S. and President Clinton on the line to take on a high risk operation. There is a whole new universe of unintended consequences. The policy of going after Aided was a flawed policy.

LTG Sheehan - (in response to a question for the record submitted by Senator Kempthorne after the testimony of LTG Sheehan and RADM Cramer on October 7, 1993 before the Senate Armed Services Committee) - "Throughout the summer of 1993,

many in the Department of Defense, including the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and USCINCCENT resisted deploying additional U.S. forces to apprehend and detain Aided. However, UNOSOM was unable to vigorously reenergize the political and humanitarian programs and efforts to de-emphasize the military confrontation became increasingly difficult as Aided increased his attacks on UNOSOM personnel and facilities."

Under Secretary Wisner - The Defense Department held out for some time against deploying U.S. special operations forces to arrest Aided. Finally in August, when 4 Americans were killed by a command detonated mine, we realized that unless Aided was neutralized, there would be more American deaths. Faced with a field recommendation that we deploy U.S. special operations forces and with the potential for additional American casualties, General Powell, Secretary Aspin and I concluded that we should deploy the forces as the least objectionable of a series of options. I thought General Hoar was in favor of the deployment or, at least, had acquiesced in it. I came to the conclusion in August that we needed a new direction in policy; that we needed to engage Aided politically. "The single most serious flaw in our policy was that we tried to accomplish political objectives solely by military means." Bob Oakley reached the same conclusion independently.

DoD Answer to a comprehensive series of questions submitted by the Senate Armed Services Committee - "The matter of how to deal with Aided and whether to use U.S. forces to capture him was the subject of extensive discussions both within DoD and in various interagency forums, especially after the June 5 attack. Interagency participants were almost certainly aware of a general reluctance on the part of the Department of Defense to use special operations forces to undertake this mission, but it is not known whether they were aware of the personal support or opposition of the combatant commander. It was generally known that MG Montgomery supported deployment of special operations forces for this purpose." "The final decision was made by the Secretary of Defense, upon the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Hoar, and other senior policy advisors."

GEN. Powell - We sent Task Force Ranger in with the greatest reluctance. We received a steady drum beat from Howe and Ambassador Gosande (who incidentally was a USIA, not State Department, officer), pushing us to perform the mission to get Aided. After the Shinn briefing, a push by my J-5 (McCaffrey - who had a rep on the Shinn team), and a push by SOCOM who wanted to do the job, Hoar and I talked. Hoar viewed it as a high risk, less than 50-50 chance of success

(I viewed it as even less than 50%). The agency said we have all these agents whom we can use to locate Aideed. My view was that these agents, who were being paid for information, would not finger Aideed because once they did and we snatched him, they would be out of a job. I also wanted the agency to demonstrate what their agents could do, but they said we can't endanger them for a test and will only use them if the Task Force is deployed. In the third week of August, I talked to Hoar and said, since Garrison, Montgomery, the UN and Shinn all are pushing us to do this, I will go along since as a general principle I believe in supporting the commander in the field.

Secretary Aspin: The split in opinion on this issue was between the people in Somalia and those of us in Washington. Admiral Howe made his original request on June 6th, the day after the ambush of the Pakistani troops. There were many discussions in Washington about the request. We were reluctant to support the effort to arrest Aideed for two reasons. First, it would raise the visibility of Aideed and make him a hero in Somalia. Second, there was the difficulty in acquiring intelligence to determine Aideed's location. So we were reluctant to send in special operations forces.

The interagency group led by Ambassador Shinn returned to Washington in August. Meanwhile, we were being influenced by attacks on U.S. forces by command detonated mines. I was on vacation in Wisconsin and received a call from General Powell on Sunday, August 21st. He said that he had had a long discussion with General Hoar and thought that we ought to deploy special operations forces for this mission. I said OK. I thought that General Hoar had changed his mind. General Powell and I certainly did.

Congressional action: In a Senate floor speech on July 13, 1993, Senator Byrd talked about Somalia stating in part that:

"The time has come to remove United States forces from Somalia whether or not they are part of the UN operation. I know some people may not like what I am saying, but I do not see anywhere in our U.S. Constitution that this Senate is bound to go along with a UN operation that appears to be getting us deeper and deeper into a war in which we have no business. Getting food to starving people is one thing. But this is something else."

"The United States has been in Somalia for over 6 months. The duration of our stay was expected to be a short time at the beginning. Now, 7 months down the pike, we are introducing new combat forces and conducting gunship attacks on warlords' camps. We are going to lose some men."

"And the United Nations is talking about national reconciliation. What does that mean. Has the Senate bought onto that?"

"Further U.S. action and participation in the newly expanded mission should either be specifically endorsed by the Congress, or we should pack up and go home. My vote is for the latter."

On July 13, 14, and 16, 1993, however, Senators Kassebaum, Levin, Pell, and Simon spoke on behalf of the UN operation in Somalia and supported continued U.S. participation in the operation.

VI. Joint Task Force Ranger Force Packages

Three optional force packages for the composition of Joint Task Force Ranger were submitted up the chain of command. Each of these optional force packages included AC-130 gunships. The task force conducted training exercises several times in the United States prior to deployment and each time did so with the support of the gunships. None of the force packages included tanks or Bradley fighting vehicles.

GEN Hoar - The AC-130s were dropped in view of the number of capabilities available to the task force. That was my recommendation up the line. My position was to give them what they needed and no more. If we weren't careful, we would have had 1,000 troops over there. I was aware of the AC-130s psychological impact. I was concerned with collateral damage. We were hit in June and July (AC-130 strikes and arms sweeps) with allegations of causing collateral damage (some were true, some were false). Aided always exaggerated. This weapon system was never designed to fire into civilian populated areas. Its use against storage sites was Ok since the sites were walled off from the population. It had tremendous psychological impact.

In talking to Generals Powell and Downing, I was trying to give the Ranger task force the kind of capability it needed to do the job, while not deploying more people than they needed. There was a three way discussion among Downing, Powell and me about the deployment of little birds, troop carriers, etc. I felt and Downing agreed (he certainly told me he did) that we didn't need AC-130s or an extra platoon (for local security - a job I definitely would not allow them to do). Local security was outside our mission and was in the areas under allied responsibility. We talked in terms of 400 troops. 460 troops deployed, which was the subject of a long discussion. If you say the number is 400, why deploy 460. They said we forgot to add

this or that. My position was to give them what they needed and no more. If we weren't careful, we would have had 1,000 troops over there.

We had a continuing problem that grew over time, to use the QRF for force protection. I didn't believe that the coalition forces would do the job to meet our force protection requirements. So we used the QRF to do some sweeps and escort for convoys; work that we hadn't anticipated at first.

Over the summer, it became apparent that the allies couldn't be depended upon. As a result, over time we lost control of Mogadishu. Things certainly went down hill when the Pakistanis were ambushed. In September, Admiral Howe requested more U.S. troops. I said no! We lost control of Mogadishu absolutely in May.

GEN Downing - The AC-130s were part of every package we looked at. They would have had a great psychological impact - but they would have required another 250-300 people, although they would have been outside Somalia. We were under incredible pressure from JCS to keep the numbers down. I don't know of any good reason for that.

We talked about the force package. I advised that I would like to have the AC-130s. General Powell advised that we needed to keep the numbers down. The AC-130s would not have prevented October 3-4, but they would have been useful once the battle started. I said that I thought the AC-130s should be included and I so recommended since they were an integral part of the package. But I also advised that the force could do the mission without them. I had the option to say don't send the force without the AC-130s, but it was then and is now my professional judgment that they would have been useful but we could do the job without the AC-130 gunships as long as the helo gunships went with the force. I decided not to fall on my bayonet. I believe my voice was the most influential with respect to the force package. The force deployed with 450 people. We were told the force limit is 400 people and we had to get rid of 50 people. We finally got them to agree to 450 people. As a result we had to take numbers of people, not whole units. We had to break up units.

The numbers were driven by the aircraft load. We were to be deployed with 5 C-141s and 2 C-5s. There is some logic to that. We drove the Joint Staff nuts, seeking some middle ground. If the AC-130s were there, we absolutely would have used them.

My sense was that OSD and the NSC staff were fairly supportive and understanding. The problem was differences within the Joint Staff.

General Garrison wanted to get out and do active patrolling and do more for force protection. The JCS found out and went ballistic. They said that we were not there to do

that, do not send out patrols. That is the mission of UNOSOM and the ORF. Let me defend the Joint Staff. General Montgomery would say they had the situation in hand - the Egyptians had the force protection mission for the air field. It requires getting out there and patrolling. The Joint Staff was concerned that the Task Force would get away from its mission. Garrison wanted the Rangers to conduct ambushes and to patrol adjacent to the airfield. I agree that convoy escort is a force protection mission and the Task Force had to do that. Hoar and I talked about it. This provoked a firestorm - it was not a minor issue. It was not a negotiable issue. Powell was concerned about mission creep. People were very emotional during this time.

MG Garrison - I don't know why the AC-130s were disapproved. But I thought the mission was doable without them. It is highly debatable that the AC-130s would have made a difference. The following factors are relevant:

- (1) The Somalis were only petrified of one machine (the AC-130) so psychologically it would have been beneficial.
- (2) Its capability to see a lot of things would have been duplicative of other platforms. We would have had sensory overload.
- (3) As for its shooting capabilities, i.e. pouring lead on the target, I don't know how much more lead could have been applied. On October 3-4, we could have used the AC-130s to have pulverized the Olympic hotel, but don't know how much of an impact it would have had, except psychologically. I did not have an appreciation for the AC-130's psychological impact prior to deployment.

The AC-130s could have shot up obstacles placed on the streets of Mogadishu, but it could have created larger obstacles in the process. I did not submit a request for the AC-130s once we were over there - I don't believe I ever considered it.

I did not see the AC-130s as being essential to our mission, even in retrospect and even after seeing the psychological impact of the AC-130. If we had the AC-130s, we would have had an airspace problem with the little birds. If we had it, I am not sure the AC-130s would have gotten a shot off.

Brigadier General Giles, Asst Div Cdr, 10th Mtn Div: - The air threat had the Somalis petrified. AC-130s would have made a major contribution.

COL Boykin (Cdr, Special Operations Forces): - The single biggest void was the absence of AC-130s. They would have

made a big difference. They would have provided fire support, eyes, and psychological impact. They could have told us of any massing of forces. They could have levelled the Olympic hotel and could have broken the back of the SNA.

LTC McKnight, Cdr. 3d Bn. 75th Rangers - The AC-130's were critical, although they did not deploy. We had trained and rehearsed with them. In addition to their fire support capabilities, they can also "glint" (illuminate an area with an Infra-red searchlight). They would have been useful to get the QRF through roadblocks.

LTC David, Cdr. 2d Bn. 14th Inf (Cdr. U.S. Response Force) - AC-130s would have been very helpful. They had been withdrawn before the 10th Mountain Division arrived on August 1st.

Under Secretary Wisner stated that as a general matter, we did not want to have a large profile in Somalia and did not want to take on an increasing share of UNOSOM II's mission. We wanted Task Force Ranger to have as "sparing a number as possible." MGEN Garrison said that he had sufficient resources to perform the mission and at no time stated that the number of personnel or the type of equipment prevented them from carrying out their mission. As for the AC-130s, I was aware of and supported the Joint Staff's recommendation that AC-130s not be included in the force package because they were unnecessary and inappropriate for the mission, especially considering the extensive collateral damage they could be expected to cause in an urban environment. I still believe that they were inappropriate for the mission due to the risk of collateral damage. Additionally, I relied on the field commander's view that he had enough capability in hand to do the mission. I do not recall anyone ever raising the issue of the AC-130s' psychological impact. I do not believe the deployment of AC-130s after October 3rd was inconsistent with the earlier decision as we needed them after October 3rd to protect the force and to deter further attacks on U.S. troops. It is quite different to deploy the AC-130s to participate in an operational mission to arrest Aided than it is to deploy them to protect the force.

General Egnell: Admiral Howe never wanted to give up the AC-130s that we sent in in early June. They wrecked a few buildings and it wasn't the greatest imagery on CNN. I do not have any recollection of the AC-130s being a part of the Ranger Task Force package. If Under Secretary Wisner recalls reviewing it, I must have done so too. I do recall that we sent additional Cobras to augment the QRF, despite opposition from the policy shop. I can only speculate that it was a question of how much do you need.

Secretary Aspin: I was never aware that AC-130 gunships were ever in a Ranger Task Force package. They must have been pulled out before the request came to me.

LTG Sheehan: Director of Operations (J-3), Joint Staff, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on October 4, 1994 regarding the deployment of additional U.S. forces in the wake of the October 3-4 Ranger Task Force raid stated that "we are going to send two AC-130 night gunships because, frankly, to provide the type of firepower that is necessary when this thing occurs, had it been available, I don't think we would have taken the number of casualties in that kind of environment up at crash site number one."

VII. REQUEST FOR ARMOR

General Montgomery's request:

The request was submitted on September 14th and was occasioned by Montgomery's increasing concern "with timid behavior of the coalition with which our security rests."

It called for tanks "with blade devices for road blocks" and was characterized by General Montgomery as necessary to "provide a critical road block clearing capability." He also stated that "I believe that U.S. forces are at risk without it."

General Hoar's endorsement:

It was submitted on September 22nd and noted that the "capability to break through road blocks is not available in the coalition today."

General Hoar also noted the downside of enhancing Aideed's position; domestic political baggage of another plus-up in U.S. strength in Somalia; and the potential for increased collateral damage.

Hoar concluded, however, by stating "on the other hand, we need to give our soldiers every measure of protection feasible."

MGEN Montgomery essentially stated that I needed and didn't have armor and APCs since we have been here. It is needed for city fighting to get in and get out. The request for armor had no relationship to the special operations forces. I wanted to use armor to back-up the QRF if needed. I would have used it on Oct 3-4 for the rescue. If we had it, we would have gotten there faster. We would have taken fewer

casualties. I made a proposal for a mechanized tank force on August 22nd. The first command detonated mine incident occurred on August 8th. I became increasingly concerned about protection of Sword and Hunter bases. The QRF went by foot or 5-ton trucks.

It wasn't a formal request in August. On September 9th, General Hoar visited and we discussed it. We discussed the business of the political environment of downsizing the U.S. presence and he told me that the request would not be supported and I needed to design a minimum (smaller) force. I submitted that request by "personal for" message.

MORR Garrison essentially stated that I was aware of General Montgomery's request for armor but did not participate in it. I never considered it useful to integrate armor into a raid. My overriding concern was speed, surprise, and violence of action. I had what I needed to conduct the operation. As for using 5-tons (trucks) with sand bags for the October 3-4 raid, if Bradleys were available, of course they would have been better and I hope to hell I would have used them for the Ranger Ground Reaction force. But I did not consider them essential to the operation. You have to remember, I had sixteen killed in action that day. Eight were lost in helicopter crashes. Of the remaining eight, I don't know how many others would have been killed. I just don't know. I don't know what difference armor would have made in terms of casualties. If I had tanks, I don't know if I would have used them. I never thought of a contingency plan for backups of equipment like tanks and APCs.

Col Boykin essentially stated that tanks and armor would have been great. Their absence was clearly a bad mistake, but less of a factor than the absence of the AC-130s. If tanks and armor had been there, unless they were assigned to us and trained with our Rangers, their use would have required additional training. We needed tanks and armor that night - but in order to have saved a life, they would have to have been integrated into our force. We would have sent tanks and armor in as part of the Ranger Ground Reaction force.

Gen. Hoar essentially stated that General Montgomery and I talked about it. My concern was to do what was required - our mission was already creeping - I did not favor bringing armor to clear the city. In September, when a U.S. engineer company got in trouble, Montgomery said we need armor to push through roadblocks. I said give me a piece of paper, there is no stomach in D.C. for new forces, but I think I can get something. The prevailing mood in OSD was that we were trying to get the size of U.S. troops under control and to get the UN to do what they were supposed to do. It was clear that we did not want the mission of purging Mogadishu.

DoD Answer to comprehensive series of questions submitted by the Senate Armed Services Committee - "The request was first brought to the attention of Secretary Aspin by General Powell on September 23 and was the subject of later discussions between the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He made the Secretary of Defense aware that General Hoar had deleted the request for artillery. In accordance with Goldwater-Nichols, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the request be approved after receiving recommendations on both sides of the issue from appropriate members of the Joint Staff. As mentioned, General Powell also discussed the issue with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, especially General Sullivan, the Chief of Staff of the Army, who concurred."

"After consulting with General Powell, Secretary Aspin elected not to approve the request at that time. At the time, U.S. policy in Somalia was to reduce its military presence and its role in UNOSOM, not increase it. This particular request was characterized as providing additional troops and equipment primarily for force protection tasks such as escorting logistics traffic, relief convoys, and conducting road-block clearing."

"The presence of a 'pure' U.S. response force consisting of armor and mechanized infantry might have arrived to assist the Ranger Task Force in less time (U.S. units might have been more readily available and less planning time might have been needed than that which was necessary for coalition operations). However, much of the delay in getting the armor to the crash site was due to a command decision to have it first assemble at the new port area in order to complete planning and coordination so that it could be most effectively deployed in a careful and deliberate assault."

"Even if they had arrived earlier at the target, the tanks and armored vehicles would not have significantly affected the operation or reduced the number of casualties, since the vast majority of Ranger Task Force casualties occurred within the first half hour after the first helicopter was shot down."

"It is also not reasonable to assume that fewer U.S. casualties would have resulted if US armor and mechanized infantry were available. Since U.S. forces would have been responsible for all aspects of the operation, more U.S. casualties might have resulted."

GEN Powell essentially stated that Secretary Aspin did not want to increase our presence in Somalia, he was sensitive to Congressional pressure to get us out as soon as possible. In my talks with General Hoar, I kept asking for the justification. I didn't want MIA tanks to blast buildings in Mogadishu. General Montgomery felt strongly. The situation was becoming more tense in Mogadishu. Despite my

reservations, I took the request to Aspin and recommended we support the commander in the field. I gave it to Aspin and told him of Howe's support about September 20th and said for him to just reflect on it for a day or two. Two days later, I asked him about it and he told me he had given it to Under Secretary Wisner and company. I was upset since I thought the matter was just between he and I. The policy shop was a mess with all those assistant secretaries overlapping each other. Nothing happened. That Saturday at the White House, I raised the whole issue of reinforcing our forces or changing our policy. In my last week as Chairman, I went to Aspin and said we needed a decision. He said, this isn't going to happen. Aspin was looking at the broader implications of this decision and wasn't willing to approve it just because the commander wanted it. I took Aspin's decision as being not now rather than never. I don't know if armor would have made a difference on October 3rd. If the Bradley's had been there, they could have been part of the Ranger Ground Reaction force. There were plenty of APCs in Mogadishu - we had sent them in for the Malaysians. Neither the QRF nor the 3rd country forces would have been involved in the raid. The commander should have expected the swarming of Somalis if the raid took more than 20 minutes and he did.

Under Secretary Wisner essentially stated that he viewed the requested armor as the means for the QRF to break through the main supply routes that Aideed's militia had blocked, which was the mission of UNOSOM II, not the mission of the QRF. He also was concerned about the use of tanks in an urban environment. In his view there was no need to increase the violence nor to increase the aggressiveness of the U.S. Quick Reaction Force. This request must also be viewed in the context of the attempt to shift the UN's focus to a greater degree of political engagement. There also was Congressional opposition at the time to increasing our military involvement in Somalia. It was in this context that he supported Secretary Aspin's decision to defer the request for armor.

Secretary Aspin - General Montgomery's armor request came to me in September - on the 23rd I believe. General Powell came to me and presented the request which he endorsed. I felt at the time, remember we were under pressure from Congress to get our forces out of Somalia, that the appearance of U.S. tanks in Mogadishu would be contradictory to our policy. The request was described to me as needed to protect convoys and knock down roadblocks. The Ranger raids were not mentioned to me in connection with the request for armor. General Powell thought that we should grant the request. I did not decide the issue that day, but I eventually told him that we couldn't do it. I didn't

consult with anyone outside the Pentagon. I don't recall General Powell telling me that there was any disagreement within the Joint Staff. General Hoar, in his forwarding endorsement recommending approval, listed both downsides and benefits for granting the request.

LTC Larry Joyce, USA (ret) (father of Sgt James Casey Joyce, killed in Somalia, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 12, 1994.): "Why were they denied armor, these forces?... and I am glad to hear General Garrison and General Montgomery's testimony that it was not just the Reaction Force that could have used the armor, but in fact the extraction force that was supposed to take the 22 people who were captured back. Had there been armor, had there been Bradleys there, I contend that my son would probably be alive today, because he, like the other casualties that were sustained in the early stages of the battle, were killed enroute from the target to the downed helicopter site, the first helicopter site. I believe that this was an inadequate force structure from the very beginning."

Congressional action: On September 8, 1993, Senator Byrd introduced an amendment to the Department of Defense Authorization bill for Fiscal Year 1994 that would have cut off funding for the support of operations of U.S. forces in Somalia 30 days after enactment of the Act unless the Congress so authorized. It also would have requested and urged the President to inform the United Nations that the U.S. would neither fund nor participate in UNOSOM II after October 31, 1993 unless the Congress so authorized. That amendment precipitated a Senate debate that resulted in the passage, by a vote of 90 to 7, of a compromise Sense of the Congress amendment to the Fiscal Year 1994 Department of Defense Authorization bill on September 9, 1993 that was sponsored by Senators Byrd, Mitchell, Dole, Nunn, McCain, Levin, Cohen, Warner, Cochran, and Kerry. That amendment, after expressing Congressional policy that the President should consult closely with the Congress regarding United States policy with respect to Somalia, including in particular the deployment of U.S. forces in that country and noting that the mission of U.S. forces in Somalia appears to be evolving from the establishment of a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations to one of internal security and nation building, included a statement of Congressional policy that called for the United States to facilitate the assumption of the functions of U.S. forces by the United Nations; called for the President to submit a report to the Congress by October 15, 1993 concerning a number of items relating to the U.S. forces' deployment to Somalia; and stated the Congress' belief that "the President should by November 15, 1993, seek and receive Congressional

authorization in order for the deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia to continue."

VIII. Conduct of Joint Task Force Ranger Operations:

Joint Task Force Ranger had conducted 6 operations previous to the raid of 3 October -- 3 at night and 3 in daylight. The raid on 3 October began in daylight. After the first raid, which was launched following a Somali mortar attack on the Ranger compound, the Task Force launched operations only on actionable intelligence and had to react to such intelligence whether day or night. Each report was carefully evaluated, corroboration sought; consequently, many missions were not undertaken. They received information 42 times on which they could have acted; 30 of these looked possible; they launched 7 operations. To the extent possible, operations were conducted differently to limit establishing a pattern. Helicopters flew frequent "signature flights" to confuse the Somalis as to when an actual operation was to be launched. No operation was launched for 2 weeks prior to the operation on 3 October.

The Task Force assault force launched at about 3:30 in the afternoon on October 3d. The suspects were apprehended about 30 minutes later and were being loaded on board five-ton trucks, which had been sandbagged to provide additional protection from incoming fire, for return to the airfield. An MH-60 Blackhawk helicopter, that was providing covering fire for the assault force, was shot down at about 4:20. The shootdown of the helicopter dramatically changed the course of the operation. A combat search and rescue (CSAR) helicopter, which was resupplying the forces that had moved to the scene of the downed Blackhawk, was also hit by fire at about 4:48 but was able to return to base. Shortly thereafter, a second MH-60 Blackhawk helicopter was shot down. Attempts by a Ranger Task Force reserve platoon and later by a quick reaction company of the Quick Reaction Force to reach the crash sites were aborted when they encountered significant fire and roadblocks. At about 7:30 the entire Quick Reaction Force, 2 Malaysian Mechanized Companies and a Pakistani Armor Platoon linked up at the New Port area. After mapping out plans and arranging the rescue convoy, the assembled force moved out enroute to the crash sites at about 11:20. The rescue force linked-up with the Ranger Task Force at the first crash site at about 2:00 a.m. on October 4th. The rescue force, after experiencing great difficulty in extracting the body of the pilot from the Blackhawk helicopter, finally began to return to base at 5:30 a.m.

MG Garrison (Commander JSOC) - I launched the first raid because the mortar attacks were the first time that the majority of our troops were ever in combat. I didn't want them to develop a "bunker mentality" and I knew how important it was to get my guys up and operating. So I went

to UNOSOM headquarters and said give me your number one target that Aideed has reportedly been at within the last 24 hours. It was the Lig Ligato house. We launched on that target.

After the first raid, General Hoar gave me specific guidance that I had to have current, actionable intelligence, i.e. I had to know the guy was actually at the target - it had to be verified. That is why we "spun up" (prepared to conduct the operation) more than 40 times but only conducted 7 raids. One time, we had intelligence that Aideed went into a building and wasn't seen coming out. We launched reconnaissance helos but there was nothing to be seen associated with Aideed, i.e. no extra guards. I was fairly confident he was there, but we did not launch because of our guidance.

As for the risks rising with each raid, I was concerned, but I had not arrived at the point where I felt we had to stop. The intelligence wasn't getting any better.

I knew that the closer we got to the Bakara market, the faster we had to get in and get out. The bad guys' reaction time was well known. When the helo was downed, we lost the initiative. Once the assault force reached the crash site, over the next 11 hours, they suffered 3 minor wounds. The little birds were constantly over the site and U.S. personnel were in a defensive position and were not under stress.

I always said that if we ever got into a firefight, we would win the battle but would lose the war.

Col. Boykin - Did our risks go up with each operation? Yes, I personally felt our risks were going up as the enemy was figuring out how to stop us, but we always achieved surprise on the target. It did become a matter of concern over time, but I did not believe that our chances of success were going down. I believe they were increasing because we were destroying Aideed's infrastructure, which should force him into the open.

LTC Matthews (Commander, 1st Bn, 160th SO Aviation) - We lost secrecy as to the force and the mission. The cover story of a Ranger deployment was no cover at all. But although we lost strategic surprise, we had not lost tactical surprise.

The National Command Authorities waited too long to decide on the mission. We could have taken him down in June. We were set up for disaster. We would have gotten him eventually if we stayed. But we might have sustained more casualties.

We planned to do it as we train. We got direction to make

it smaller. We resisted - we wanted to do it as we train.

MG Montgomery - (In response to a question for the record submitted by Senator Levin after the October 7, 1993 testimony of LTG Shashan and RADM Cramer before the Senate Armed Services Committee) - After notice of the execution of the raid and, after ensuring that the U.S. QRF was already posturing to support TF Ranger should they need help (which was standard procedure between USFORCOM and TF Ranger), I monitored the raid through a liaison officer in my headquarters on a minute-to-minute basis. When I perceived that the U.S. QRF would be required, I began to ensure further backup would be available. First, a call was made to the UNOSOM QRF (first call for U.N. operations before any U.S. involvement), the Malaysian contingent. Its commander immediately agreed to move his unit to a staging area in the new seaport and was in position by approximately 1830 hrs. Next was a check on the availability of Pakistani tanks should we need them. There were eight in the city, four of which were operational. They were not part of any QRF since such valuable limited assets cannot be left sitting for emergencies only and normally are employed in pairs supporting strong points. The Pakistani commander immediately agreed and moved his tanks to the staging area to join the Malaysians arriving at about the same time. Both elements were available to the QRF commander if needed before the situation was clear with regard to TF Ranger's ability to extract its forces with the U.S. QRF.

GEN Downing - I kept telling General Garrison not to do anything crazy. I told him to wait Aided out, be careful, this is a tough mission, but we can do it, be patient, be careful, eventually you will get a shot at Aided. Going after Aided's lieutenants was designed to keep pressure on Aided, force him out of hiding, make him start taking chances.

I talked directly to Garrison. I was sensitive to not getting between General Hoar and the Task Force Ranger Commander. Hoar is a consummate gentleman. So is Garrison. Garrison would call me and we would talk. Hoar let me see all the message traffic. He didn't have to, but he did. I tried to keep a finger on the pulse. Garrison and I probably talked once or twice a day most days, then we would go 2 or 3 days without talking. We probably talked 5 or 6 times a week.

Hoar and I were not concerned about losing a helo. The folks in DC were - they wanted to avoid press coverage.

GEN Hoar - The risk I always thought of was the risk of failure, i.e. not capturing Aided alive. I thought we would kill him, which would be a failure, because he was a national hero. I never addressed in my own mind the October

3-4 result. I thought that it would turn out we would have a fleeting opportunity to catch Aided on the road, so I was not concerned about U.S. casualties. I assessed the risk to our forces later on. In the wake of Osman Atto raid, the post-mortem concluded that it was a near thing, i.e. it could have been a disaster. We killed 15 Somalis that day. So I talked to General Garrison about going into populated areas. I didn't think in terms of shutting the operation down. I wish now that I had.

The Lig Ligato raid was retaliation by Garrison in response to being mortared. I was a little unhappy with it. I didn't know about it beforehand. My guidance to Garrison was that he had authority to go without my approval before a specific operation. I want to say that in every case, I was in on it. But because there was no predictive intelligence, the intelligence he received had to be responded to quickly. I never disapproved of a raid. I decided that the decision needs to be made on the scene. To interpose myself would have required a faxing of papers, photos, etc. I did require that for QRF sweeps that were carried out in the guise of force protection, but I couldn't do so in the case of Ranger raids that required quick response. I'm not sure that I would do either any differently today.

After we had successfully captured Osman Atto, we discussed the risk of going into heavily populated areas. Garrison would send me a memo, copy to Downing, after a conversation that involved any substance. It was his record of what guidance he believed had been given to him. On this particular day, I told him that (1) he needed to be careful in populated areas, and (2) in certain circumstances not to go near the Bakara market. We talked about what went badly when they picked up the fellow whom they mistakenly thought was Aided (former police chief). I sent these memos to General Powell.

We had phased options; phase I - get settled; phase II - get Aided; phase III - get his tier II lieutenants. These phases were agreed to before the deployment. Garrison told me that he thought if we could get intelligence on Aided's lieutenants, we should go after them. I said that makes sense to me as long as you remember that Aided is still the first goal. And we might get Aided at a meeting with his lieutenants. I went to Powell and told him what I told Garrison and he agreed. In due course, I got back to Garrison and told him OK.

I also talked to Garrison on weekends. On October 3rd, I had just called him when he said it looks like we just got good intelligence. We talked only in the most general sense because the intelligence data was just beginning to come in. We had the best guys in the world to do the mission and the most knowledgeable guy to command the force. They were the right guys, but it was a high risk operation. I made seven trips to Somalia and had secure voice communications with

both Montgomery and Garrison. I did not feel that I had to put restraints on Garrison regarding any raid. He shared my view regarding not going into populated areas. The October 3 raid was a high risk operation. I had and still have absolute confidence in Garrison. Downing felt the same way. Garrison thought he was going to get Aidaed. I did not abdicate my responsibilities to Garrison. We talked every day; he knew my thoughts and had my guidance; and he was on the scene.

It was Garrison's decision to launch on October 3rd. I didn't want to interfere when I talked to him that day. I don't think surprise and concern was in my mind as we talked that day. I don't think I thought at the time that it was not somewhere he should have gone.

How many times can you go back to the wall? We had no illusions about that part of the city. Almost everyone was under arms. Resupply was going on all the time, from Ethiopia, Sudan, and the North. There were reinforcements from Galcaio. We did not have good intelligence about that part of the city. We didn't have any presence there or good human intelligence.

DoD Answer to comprehensive series of questions submitted by the Senate Armed Services Committee - "Based upon the previous successful completion of six similar missions, the operational commanders were confident that the operation could be completed successfully and any risk was considered to be manageable."

General Powell: The first raid was an embarrassment and I had to unscrew myself from the ceiling. I laid down the rule that they had to have actionable intelligence. They didn't do too badly. They got Atto. Aidaed saw how they worked. I kept talking to Generals Hoar, Downing, and Garrison. Helicopter operations always make me nervous. I believe that you have to do this type of operation at night and get out in 20 minutes. The first helicopter that we lost was not from the Task Force. If you want a perfect operation, then never go to war. You never have a 99% success rate for that kind of operation. I was not aware of what was going on on October 3rd. It was bad luck. The overall policy for Somalia should have been reviewed long before October 3rd. I was not involved in any way with the vote in the UN on the Security Council's June 6, 1993 resolution to arrest the perpetrators of the June 5th ambush of the Pakistanis.

Secretary Aspin: We were worried about the repetition of Ranger raids. It looked to us like each raid was a cookie cutter of every other raid. General Hoar assured us that each raid was different and that they were using feints (signature flights) on a daily basis. But we were worried.

General Powell was very upset with the first Ranger raid. He was angry that they had done it without good intelligence and had shown how they would operate.

IX. Intelligence Support

Intelligence resources in country and the assets that came with Task Force Ranger appear to have been effectively integrated, and the perception of those providing the intelligence was that it was more than adequate. At the user level, however, the intelligence was limited, specifically in the area of human intelligence (HUMINT). The users' views are mixed.

COL Peak (Deputy J-2, CENTCOM) - There were no intelligence failures and no intelligence surprises.

Col Boykin - Intelligence support was very poor. There was no U.S. or third country HUMINT. The Somalis who provided information were very untrustworthy. We don't have a good HUMINT program, certainly not for crisis or unanticipated situations.

MG Montgomery - the surprise was the intensity and the number of RPGs.

MG Garrison - I was totally satisfied with the intelligence effort - never saw anything better from the intelligence community or architecture. It was totally fused - we got everything we asked for. It was a superb intelligence effort and architecture. As for the results, HUMINT was extremely difficult. The results were sketchy at best.

Gen Downing, Commander in Chief, SOCOM - Technically, intelligence support was outstanding. The long pole was HUMINT. On October 3, it worked well.

Gen. Hear - You have real problems with HUMINT. - The people who provided information lacked credibility. I am not in a position to be critical of the HUMINT effort. I felt the possibility of getting predictive intelligence regarding Aideed was poor; it was. But we did everything favorable to produce the intelligence.

X. Changes in Policy Issues

In general, policies pursued in Somalia by the United Nations and the United States appear to have been characterized by a lack of clarity and inconsistency. When the U.S. had over 25,000 well-equipped and trained

troops in Somalia, policies and military strategy were primarily focused on maintaining open lines of communications to facilitate the principal objective of feeding the starving Somalis. Following the completion of UNITAF and the commencement of UNOSOM II when the U.N. took over responsibility for the operation, the U.N. policy was changed to include disarming the warring factions throughout all of Somalia. UNOSOM II forces were incapable and, in some cases, unwilling to perform the missions required to implement the military operations inherent in the new policy.

During UNOSOM II, U.S. troop strength had been reduced to about 4,000 (of which only about 2,000 were combat troops). U.S. forces, which were intended to be used only as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF), became involved in force protection operations, attempts to capture Aided, and disarming Somalis, because the UNOSOM II forces were increasingly reluctant to leave their enclaves. This was particularly true after the June 5th ambush of Pakistani forces where 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed.

U.S. commanders were coping with a dual policy which required that U.S. forces be kept small while at the same time conducting military operations to ensure that the U.N. would not appear to fail. This policy stretched the capabilities of U.S. forces and put stress on the limited number of U.S. combat troops.

Following the Task Force Ranger raid and battle of October 3-4, when U.S. commanders in Somalia believed that the casualties inflicted on Aided's forces (estimated upwards of 1,000) had significantly weakened him, the U.N. declared a ceasefire. Within weeks, Aided himself, was a passenger on a U.S. military plane which carried him to engage in negotiations in Addis Abba, Ethiopia.

While the U.S. significantly reinforced its forces in Somalia with armored forces following the battle of October 3-4, U.S. forces essentially followed thereafter a passive, "hunkered-down" policy, remaining primarily within their compounds.

In the August-September time frame, there were differences of views, both within the Administration and between the United States and the United Nations, as to whether there should be increased diplomatic effort or more aggressive military action. In fact, the administration began to follow a two-tracked approach--employing both diplomatic activity as well as military action. It does not appear, in retrospect, that the diplomatic activity and the military efforts were well-coordinated within the Administration nor between the U.S. and the U.N.

Major General Frazer Deputy Cdr. CENTCOM: - We had two inconsistent policies - support the U.N. and don't let it fail in Somalia; and get U.S. forces out of Somalia as soon as possible.

General Montgomery: The mission changed from humanitarian relief as a result of the switch to UNOSOM II in May resulting from the broad UN security council mandate. The

mission also changed after the June 5th massacre of the Paks. It changed to a hunt for Aideed. My broad mission hadn't changed.

October 3d was a bad day for Aideed. He sustained lots of casualties. I think that the U.S. gave Aideed a victory he didn't win.

General Garrison: As for the consideration of a change in U.S. policy prior to October 3rd, I had read everything that related to our policy. Ambassador Gosende was saying things like "I don't agree with this, and I think ..." His bottom line was that there should be a greater military effort. He wanted more security, more troops. I knew the policy was being debated, but I didn't know how the debate would come out. I also knew that General Hoar had written a letter.

LTC Sheehan: (Responding to a question for the record submitted by Senator Kampthorne after testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Somalia on October 7, 1993) - "As I stated in my testimony, the mission assigned to U.S. forces remained the same. It was the execution of the mission by the QRF that changed. Often the United States was the only country capable of undertaking a task within a reasonable timeframe. Our choice was to allow the mission to fail or to take on the job. We attempted to be as judicious as possible within our commitment to making UNOSOM II a success."

General Powell: We had a hard time getting clear guidance from the inter-agency process. We got messages from Ambassador Gosende, but nothing from State. There were many meetings, but no results. It took too long to get a policy review accomplished. In my last few weeks as Chairman, I pushed for it. I aggressively pushed Secretary Aspin for such a review and on Saturday, September 25th when we had a meeting at the White House on Bosnia, I said at the end of the meeting that we need to do something about Somalia - either reinforce our forces or change our policy. In my final meeting with President Clinton, I urged him to make sure a review was conducted. I didn't know about the policy paper that Secretary Christopher was taking to the UN.

Under Secretary Wisner: essentially stated that he had come to the conclusion in early September that the United States needed a new policy direction and had to shift our focus towards a greater degree of political engagement. The single flaw in our policy was that we tried to accomplish a political objective by military means. We needed to maintain an appropriate level of pressure on Aideed to induce him to cooperate. In September, we were pushing the UN to give priority to the political track.

Secretary Aspin: At the same time that we were deploying the Ranger Task Force, we were also pursuing a two-track approach. We had determined in Washington that there was too much emphasis, almost exclusively, on the military force track and not enough on the political track.

In my speech to the CSIS on August 27, 1993, I commented on this issue. I sent a copy of my speech to all Senators by letter dated September 3, 1993 in which I stated that "Our purpose now is to help restore to all of Somalia, including south Mogadishu, a foundation of stability and security upon which Somali's themselves -- with the help of the UN -- can turn to the tough work of political reconciliation and economic reconstruction." The speech included the following:

"The President's decision to deploy an additional 400 troops to Somalia has focussed renewed attention on the security aspect -- indeed on the U.S. military aspect -- of what is happening there. That focus is much too narrow. There is much more to what is happening in Somalia than the story of military conflict in Mogadishu. And if there is to be a solution to Somalia's problems, it must be more than a military solution."

"In South Mogadishu, the Aideed stronghold, we have a major challenge to the whole UN enterprise. I believe the current crisis there was initiated because Aideed's power base was being eroded politically and militarily by UNOSOM. It may be small comfort today, but our present difficulty is the result of previous success. The danger now is that unless we return security to south Mogadishu, political chaos will follow the UN withdrawal. Other warlords will follow Aideed's example. Fighting between the warlords will ensue, which is what brought the famine to massive proportions in the first place. The danger is that the situation will return to what existed before the United States sent in the troops."

"On economics and the political reconstitution of the country, some progress has been made but more work needs to be done."

"(W)e should continue removing heavy weapons from the militias and begin planning for implementation -- in conjunction with Somali police -- of a consistent weapons control policy. Such a policy will give those who cooperate some confidence that their enemies cannot rearm. The policy could begin in areas of the country where some disarmament success has been achieved."

"For U.S. combat troops, I think there are three items on

the checklist. First, the security issue in south Mogadishu must be settled. Second, we must make real progress toward taking the heavy weapons out of the hands of the warlords. Third, there must be credible police forces in major population centers. When these three conditions are met, I believe we can remove the U.S. Quick Reaction Force from Mogadishu."

Secretary Christopher took up the campaign at the beginning of the UN session. He lobbied with Secretary General Boutros-Ghali regarding our concern of too much emphasis on a military solution. It was a major effort. I believe Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff and Under Secretary of Defense Frank Wisner went to New York before Secretary Christopher to reemphasize the political effort. We did not want to let up on the military track. But we wanted to ensure that if the military effort succeeded, we needed something to carry on the political side and allow us to withdraw our forces. There was no discussion at my level to let up on the military track.

LTC Larry Joyce, USA (ret) (father of SGT James Casey Joyce, killed in Somalia, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 12, 1994): "I shared with President Clinton my dismay at the October 3 raid after he had already obviously embarked on a course of diplomacy. I asked him to confirm what I had heard and was pretty sure it was true that President Carter had met with Aided and had in fact reported back to the President that truly a diplomatic solution was the only solution, and he confirmed that. So I said, well, Mr. President, if that is the case, why the October 3 raid. And the President shared my dismay. He said when he got the reports of the casualties, that was his first question: What in the world are they doing conducting a raid? That is not the environment in which we should be operating today. We should in fact be seeking a diplomatic solution. So that was enlightening for me, that the President shared my dismay and basically said he thought that was the key question that had to be addressed."

XI. Conclusions

Before stating our conclusions, it is important to repeat the substance of an earlier caution - we are reaching these conclusions with the benefit of hindsight, with time for careful thought, and with knowledge of the facts, and the views of a number of individuals.

Mandate for transition to, and early stages of UNOSOM II

UNOSOM II was the first UN conducted peace enforcement operation, i.e. an operation that is authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to use all necessary means to accomplish its mandate, that was launched with high potential for combat. The assessment of the UN Security Council, including the United States, was that UNOSOM II could expand on the mission of the predecessor UNITAF operation by disarming the Somali factions, covering the entire country, and, in effect, embarking on a nation building effort. That assessment failed to consider the possibility that several nations would not meet their previously agreed upon troop levels in a timely fashion or to take into account the difficulty of achieving unity of command in a force from so many nations, including a number who were not willing to allow their commanders to obey orders without checking with higher national authorities.

During UNITAF, Ambassador Oakley properly realized that the warlords, who played such a significant role in toppling former President Siad Barre, had to be handled very carefully and had to be included in efforts toward heavy weapons disarmament and nation building. UNOSOM II decision makers apparently chose, instead, to marginalize the warlords, particularly in response to the early June attacks on Pakistani and U.S. forces.

We believe that the following conclusions can be logically drawn from the situation described above:

- a. The United Nations was not and is not now the best organization to direct the conduct of large-scale Chapter VII peace enforcement operations that may involve substantial risk of combat.
- b. Chapter VII peace operations with substantial risk of combat should be carried out by well-organized coalitions with clear agreements on contributions of forces, command arrangements, and limitations on commitment of forces by the contributing nations. United Nations commanders should have authority to ensure that leaders of national contingents who fail to comply with agreements are replaced.
- c. A greater effort should have been made to follow-up on the Addis Ababa agreements and to coordinate closely with the warlords in implementing those agreements. It was a mistake to seek to marginalize the warlords who had played such a key role in deposing Siad Barre. More emphasis should have been placed on political negotiations prior to deciding to use military force to carry out the UN mandate.
- d. The Security Council should have provided policy guidance to UNOSOM II once it was clear, as a result of the anti-UN

d. The Security Council should have provided policy guidance to UNOSOM II once it was clear, as a result of the anti-UN propaganda of Radio Aideed and the removal of Somali National Alliance (SNA) weapons from weapon cantonment sites, that Aideed was unwilling to cooperate with UNOSOM II. Such guidance was particularly important when Aideed's associate advised the UNOSOM II representative that inspections of the weapons cantonment sites would lead to "war."

e. The U.S. policy to keep the U.S. forces in Somalia as small as possible while at the same time not allowing the UN operation to fail should have been revisited when some national forces that were pledged to UNOSOM II did not arrive on time, some national contingents refused to follow General Bir's orders, Aideed refused to cooperate, and the U.S. Quick Reaction Force (QRF) had to be used for tasks outside their original mission.

f. The Administration should have been more forthcoming in advising the Congress on the implications of various UN resolutions and UNOSOM II decisions and policies on US military units. Congress should have been more aggressive in insisting on information relating to UNOSOM II and in acting on the information that was available to it to raise its concerns with "mission creep."

Decision on request for armor

The mood in the Congress at the time that the request for armor was being considered was one of dissatisfaction with the situation in Somalia and a desire to see the deployment of U.S. forces brought to an end as soon as possible. Nevertheless, the Secretary of Defense should have given more consideration to the requests from his military commanders and the recommendation from the Chairman, JCS and approved the request for armor.

If U.S. armor had been available in Mogadishu on October 3, 1993, it would have been available for inclusion in the Ranger Ground Reaction force that was positioned several blocks away from the assault site. Given the inclusion of 5-ton trucks with sandbags in the Ranger Ground Reaction force, it is likely that Bradley fighting vehicles, if present, would have been used instead. The inclusion of Bradley fighting vehicles in that force might have resulted in reduced U.S. casualties but it is impossible to reach an informed judgement on the extent of that reduction, if any. U.S. Bradley fighting vehicles and tanks definitely would have been used in the rescue effort, would have allowed a faster rescue, and possibly resulted in fewer casualties in the rescue force. It is impossible to quantify the number. It is important to note that once the forces at the site of the first downed helicopter had been resupplied, they sustained only three minor wounds. One of the Rangers who

downed helicopter and who subsequently died, might have survived if he had been rescued from that site quickly and received expert surgical care soon after rescue.

Decision on Joint Task Force Ranger force package

It is difficult to understand the decision to omit the AC-130 gunships from the Joint Task Force Ranger force package. The AC-130s were part of all of the force package options and were included in all of the training exercises. This decision is inconsistent with the principle that you fight as you train. Everyone interviewed in the course of this review stated that the AC-130s had a great psychological impact and were feared by the Somalis. The concern about collateral damage was appropriate but could have been met with carefully crafted rules of engagement that would have precluded use of the AC-130s in the city except in "in extremis" circumstances, such as occurred on October 3-4. The appearance of the AC-130s and the firing of its guns - even towards the horizon and away from the city - on that day might have served to discourage the massing of the Somali militia in view of the psychological impact of the AC-130s. On the other hand, it is not certain that the AC-130s would have been used given General Garrison's view that there would have been an airspace problem and since there was sufficient air power to put bullets on targets to protect the first helicopter crash site without the AC-130s.

Decision to deploy Joint Task Force Ranger and the conduct of raids

The failed attempt to use an element of the Marine Expeditionary Unit to apprehend Aided on June 23rd, served to alert Aided to the threat, allowed him to go into hiding, and made the task even more difficult. It is ironic that apprehending Aided might have been much easier if attempted by properly equipped and trained special operations forces in June rather than in September.

It is difficult to understand the rationale for the first raid that General Garrison ordered. That raid, which he ordered in order to avoid the development of "a bunker mentality" by his troops, served to announce the presence and mission of his Task Force, if they were not already known, and to reveal some of the tactics that the Task Force would use. The lack of a valid rationale for launching the raid should have alerted superiors in the chain of command to the need to carefully reevaluate the Task Force's mission after each operation. One of the weaknesses of a unit like Task Force Ranger, whose combat capabilities are unparalleled, is the belief by the unit members and its commanders that they can accomplish any mission. Because of the supreme confidence of special operations forces, the chain of

command must provide more oversight to this type of unit than to conventional forces.

The continued use of Joint Task Force Ranger in a series of raids, which enabled Aided's forces to assess the Task Force's tactics and to develop counter-measures, is questionable.

There should have been greater awareness of the potential for the kind of military situation that resulted from the raid of October 3-4 and the reaction of the American people and the Congress to that situation. U.S. policies in the region were drastically altered as a result of the events surrounding that raid, especially the shock of the number of U.S. casualties and the abuse by Somalis of a U.S. soldier killed in action. U.S. foreign policy was and will be affected for years as a result of the raid of October 3-4.

It is clear that both civilian officials and military leaders should have been carefully and continually re-evaluating the Task Force Ranger mission and tactics after each raid, with an eye toward recommending that the operation be terminated if the risks were deemed to have risen too high. As secrecy and surprise were degraded and the risks of conducting these operations increased, the safety of our troops was a vitally important consideration and the effect of a military setback on our foreign policy was critical.

Moreover, the decision to continue the raids should have been better coordinated within the Administration with the concurrent U.S. effort to revitalize the political process to produce a two-track approach.

Intelligence support

The intelligence support to Joint Task Force Ranger was a major effort and demonstrated a high degree of cooperation and pooling of efforts by the several agencies involved. Human intelligence (HUMINT) was expected to be and proved to be the most difficult aspect of this effort. It did not succeed in locating Aided but it did locate his lieutenants. There were also difficulties in precisely assessing the strength of Aided's hard-core militia support.

Policy Issues

Both United Nations and United States policies in Somalia were uncoordinated and unclear. Military operations were difficult to plan and conduct as a result of such policies. Before U.S. forces are committed to combat, we must ensure that the policies under which they will operate and the military missions derived from these policies are appropriate, clear, supportable for a reasonable period of time, within the capabilities of the forces committed, and in the interests of the United States.

The change in policy that was being pushed by the United States in August-September, 1993 was intended to bring about a revitalization of the political process to produce a two-track approach. It was not intended, however, to end the other track, i.e. the military pressure track. In retrospect, it might have been wiser to have sought to suspend the attempt to apprehend Aided to give the political track an opportunity to work, such as was done in the aftermath of the October 3-4 raid.

The U.N.'s mandate was approved by the Security Council and many diplomatic and military actions in Mogadishu received press attention. However, there was apparently no formal attempt to inform the Congress of the policy differences between the United States and the UN Secretary General. Then Secretary of Defense Aspin's August 27, 1993 speech to the Center for Strategic and International Studies highlighted for the first time for many Members of Congress the breadth of UNOSOM II's mandate. As U.S. forces became increasingly involved in internal security, and stabilizing Somalia, these concepts came to be identified as elements of "mission creep" on the Senate floor during the debate on the Byrd amendment.

XII. Final comment

We would be remiss if we did not make a final comment concerning the performance of the U.S. forces, both Joint Task Force Ranger and the Quick Reaction Force, on October 3-4, 1993. We are unable in an unclassified report to describe in detail the events of those days as we would run a serious risk of divulging special operations forces' tactics and doctrine. For the same reason we are unable to report in appropriate detail the many acts of courage and heroism that we know were the standard of our forces. The fact that the rescue convoy could take the time to integrate the Malaysian and Pakistani forces and carefully plan the rescue operation because the forces at the first helicopter crash site were able to coolly and calmly defend their position and administer to their wounded comrades while suffering only three minor wounds during this period is a testament itself to the courage and professionalism of these forces.

We also should not lose sight of the fact that the combined efforts of the military personnel involved in UNITAF and UNOSOM II saved many thousands of Somali lives. The valor, professionalism and extraordinary discipline of the U.S. troops that carried out the orders of superiors in Somalia -- and particularly those involved in the Task Force Ranger raids of September - October, 1993 places these Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors and Marines in history with our highest military traditions. Our nation owes them a debt of gratitude.

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL THOMAS M. MONTGOMERY

FORMER DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE MILITARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

OPERATION IN SOMALIA II

FORMER COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES SOMALIA

BEFORE THE U.S. SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

12 MAY 1994

THANK YOU FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS YOU HERE TODAY.

RECENTLY RETURNED TO THE UNITED STATES AFTER SERVING 13 MONTHS WITH THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA, COMMONLY CALLED UNOSOM II, AS THE DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE UNOSOM II MILITARY FORCE, AND AS COMMANDER OF UNITED STATES FORCES SOMALIA.

WITH YOUR PERMISSION, I THINK THE BEST MESSAGE I CAN GIVE YOU TODAY IS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME ONE I GAVE UPON MY RETURN TO ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE ON MARCH 28. IT IS AN ASSESSMENT OF WHAT WE DID AND HOW WELL WE DID IT.

LET ME BEGIN BY SAYING THAT I KNOW YOU ARE AS IMMENSELY PROUD OF HOW WELL THE MEN AND WOMEN OF AMERICA'S ARMED FORCES PERFORMED IN SOMALIA AS I AM. THEY OPERATED THERE UNDER THE HARSHTEST CONDITIONS, MUCH OF THE TIME IN COMBAT, AND OVERCAME DIVERSITY DAY IN AND DAY OUT. I WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT THERE ARE STILL SEVERAL DOZEN MARINES SERVING IN SOMALIA PROVIDING SECURITY FOR THE UNITED STATES LIAISON OFFICE. WE WISH THEM A SAFE RETURN SOON.

WE ARE ALL MINDFUL TODAY THAT A NUMBER OF OUR COMRADES DID NOT LIVE TO COME HOME AND THAT MANY RETURNED WITH WOUNDS. WE GRIEVE FOR THOSE BRAVE MEN -- SOLDIERS, AIRMEN AND MARINES -- WHO GAVE THEIR LIVES IN SELFLESS SACRIFICE TO OUR NATION. THESE MEN WILL LIVE ON IN OUR HEARTS AND IN OUR MEMORIES SO LONG AS EACH OF US LIVES. WE WILL ALWAYS HONOR THEM AND OUR NATION MUST ALWAYS HONOR THEM FOR THEIR INCREDIBLE BRAVERY AND SACRIFICE.

WE ALSO ACKNOWLEDGE THE TREMENDOUS SUPPORT WE RECEIVED FROM FAMILIES, FRIENDS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WHO STOOD FIRMLY BEHIND US, WHO WROTE TO US, AND SENT MANY GIFTS OF ENCOURAGEMENT. OUR FAMILIES, TOO, FACED ADVERSITY IN OUR ABSENCE AND WE OWE THEM OUR DEEPEST THANKS.

MOST OF US, IT'S SAFE TO SAY, LEFT SOMALIA WITH MIXED EMOTIONS, BUT WE ARE PROUD OF WHAT WE ACCOMPLISHED -- AND WE ACCOMPLISHED A LOT. HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF SOMALIS ARE ALIVE TODAY THROUGH THE TIRELESS EFFORTS OF ALL WHO SERVED THERE UNDER UNOSOM II AND THE UNIFIED TASK FORCE THAT PRECEDED US. AMERICA'S SERVICE MEN AND WOMEN PERFORMED WELL UNDER THE UNITED NATION'S FIRST CHAPTER SEVEN PEACE ENFORCEMENT MISSION AND SHOWED THE INCREDIBLE COMPASSION TO THE SOMALI PEOPLE THAT THE WORLD HAS COME TO KNOW AS AMERICA'S HALLMARK.

DESPITE THE UNPREDICTABLE AND DANGEROUS ENVIRONMENT, AMERICA'S SERVICE MEN AND WOMEN IN SOMALIA BUILT AND REPAIRED ORPHANAGES AND ROADS; DISTRIBUTED FOOD, WATER AND SCHOOL SUPPLIES AND BOOKS; TAUGHT CLASSES TO SOMALI CHILDREN; AND TREATED TENS OF THOUSANDS OF SOMALI PATIENTS WHO FLOCKED TO THE HEALTH-CARE CENTERS WE ESTABLISHED. THIS WAS THE STORY YOU RARELY READ ABOUT, BUT IT HAPPENED ALMOST DAILY.

BY DOING THESE THINGS, OUR SOLDIERS, SAILORS, AIRMEN AND MARINES LEARNED FIRST HAND THE TRUTH OF THE SAYING THAT PEACEKEEPING IS NO JOB FOR A SOLDIER, BUT ONLY A SOLDIER CAN DO IT. AND THEY, ALONG WITH OUR COALITION PARTNERS, DID IT EXTREMELY WELL.

THE IMPORTANT THING TO REMEMBER IS THIS: THE TENS OF THOUSANDS OF AMERICAN SERVICE MEN AND WOMEN, ALONG WITH THEIR COUNTERPARTS FROM 28 NATIONS OVER THE PAST 20 MONTHS, HAVE GIVEN THE SOMALI PEOPLE A CHANCE TO RECOVER FROM A DISASTROUS CIVIL WAR AND A TERRIBLE FAMINE. HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF SOMALIS ARE ALIVE TODAY BECAUSE WE CAME TO THEIR RESCUE. WE HAVE GIVEN THEM A CHANCE TO BUILD A NEW FUTURE FOR THEMSELVES.

THERE IS STILL MUCH TO DO AND THE UNITED NATIONS COALITION WILL CONTINUE TO HELP. BUT THE FUTURE OF SOMALIA IS CLEARLY IN THE HANDS OF THE SOMALI PEOPLE. THAT IS THE BOTTOM LINE OF WHAT WE'VE DONE THERE. WE HAVE GIVEN THE SOMALI PEOPLE ANOTHER CHANCE. TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THAT CHANCE IS SOLELY UP TO THEM.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I KNOW THAT YOU HAVE A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS FOR ME TODAY, BUT I ALSO KNOW THERE IS SPECIFIC INTEREST IN THE RATIONALE BEHIND MY REQUEST FOR ARMOR IN THE SEPTEMBER TIME FRAME.

IN AUGUST, WE EXPERIENCED AN INCREASE IN THE OPTEMPO OF MILITIA ATTACKS AND IN THE NATURE OF THESE ATTACKS. SPECIFICALLY, WE SAW THE USE OF MINES FOR THE FIRST TIME WHICH RESULTED IN THE LOSS OF OUR FOUR MILITARY POLICEMEN AND IN AN INCREASE IN THE USE OF ANTI-TANK WEAPONS. I WAS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE VULNERABILITY OF THE LIGHT, TRUCK-MOUNTED FORCES, BOTH LOGISTIC AND QUICK REACTION FORCE.

THE CLEAR INTENT BEHIND MY REQUEST WAS TO IMPROVE MY ABILITY TO PROTECT THE ENTIRE FORCE AND TO BE ABLE TO REACH OUT AND ASSIST ANY ELEMENT OR BASE IN TROUBLE. WHILE THIS REQUEST WAS NOT MADE EXPLICITLY FOR TASK FORCE RANGER'S SUPPORT, IT IMPLICITLY INCLUDED THE QUICK REACTION FORCE'S ABILITY TO BACK UP TASK FORCE RANGER SHOULD THAT BE REQUIRED.

WE CAN ONLY SPECULATE WHAT DIFFERENCE THIS ARMOR WOULD HAVE MADE HAD IT BEEN AVAILABLE. IT IS MY OPINION THAT, HAD IT BEEN AVAILABLE, IT WOULD HAVE REDUCED THE TIME IT TOOK TO REACH TASK FORCE RANGER. THE M1-A1 TANK WOULD HAVE BEEN INVULNERABLE TO ROCKET-PROPELLED GRENADE FIRE OF THE TYPE USED BY THE MILITIA, AND THE BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLES WOULD HAVE BEEN LESS VULNERABLE THAN THE MALAYSIAN VEHICLES. THIS FORCE WOULD HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED FIRE POWER AND SPEED.

THERE IS A MISPERCEPTION THAT TASK FORCE RANGER'S CASUALTIES MOUNTED WHILE THEY WERE IN THE DEFENSIVE POSITION AROUND THE DOWNED AIRCRAFT. IN FACT, THAT IS NOT THE CASE. THE RANGERS' CASUALTIES WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN FEWER. BUT THE RELIEF FORCE HAD TO FIGHT ITS WAY IN AND IT IS POSSIBLE THEY MAY HAVE HAD FEWER CASUALTIES.

OF COURSE, NO MATTER HOW IMPORTANT THIS BATTLE WAS TO THE UNITED STATES, THE WHOLE OF THE U.S. EXPERIENCE IS MUCH BROADER THAN THIS BATTLE. THE STORY OF U.S. FORCES IS, I FIRMLY BELIEVE, A POSITIVE ONE.

WE ARE PROUD OF OUR SERVICE TO AND WITH THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN SOMALIA. I HAVE EXPRESSED MY GREAT ADMIRATION AND BEST WISHES TO ALL WHO SERVED. NO COMMAND, NO COMMANDER, HAS EVER BEEN BETTER SERVED.

WE ARE COMMITTED TO WORKING THROUGH OUR LESSONS LEARNED TO PROVIDE FUTURE U.S. MISSIONS THE BENEFIT OF OUR EXPERIENCE. TO THIS END, WE HAVE JUST CONVENED A SPECIAL WORK GROUP OF THE KEY PARTICIPANTS AT THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE IN CARLISLE, PENNSYLVANIA, THIS WEEK. WE WILL COMPLETE OUR WORK BY MONTH'S END AND PROVIDE OUR DETAILED AFTER-ACTION COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE JOINT STAFF. WE ARE DETERMINED TO LEARN BETTER WAYS WHERE POSSIBLE TO ENSURE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND SECURITY OF FUTURE MISSIONS AND TO HELP THE U.N. AS IT WORKS TO IMPROVE ITS OWN CAPABILITIES.

THANK YOU FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS YOU HERE THIS MORNING. I AM NOW PREPARED TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS.

Background Briefing

**Attributable to: Senior Pentagon Officials
Monday, October 4, 1993**

Ms. deLaski: This is a background briefing attributable to Senior Pentagon Officials. They will give you a little bit of a lay-down of the events of this past weekend, and then take some of your questions. They do have another appointment out of the building that they have to go to, so we don't have a whole lot of time, but they'll try and run through it as quickly as possible.

Briefer 1: We have three charts here. We'll start on Friday's events that occurred up at the Pasta Factory against the target area, then we'll talk about Saturday's events, and then we'll discuss the specifics of the raid on the Olympic Hotel. But first, what I'm going to do is turn it over to _____ who will talk about the general security situation that exists in Mogadishu to help frame this discussion. Then, we'll get into the other two charts.

Briefer 2: First of all, what I'd like to try to do is characterize the current situation that exists in Mogadishu, and not what existed before or what might exist in the future, but where we are now. This chart pretty well, in a color-coded way, lays out who controls what, and which major faction is controlling in what area. Just going through the numbers here, most of the bases here are outlined. For example, Hunter Base, which is our U.S. base, in addition to the University Compound, the UN Compound, Sword Base is another major U.S. base, the airfield, the new port, the old port, and the stadium are the principal UN facilities that we're talking about now.

Earlier, we had various interfactional control, but where we are today, is essentially east of Balad Road. Al Ahmadi and his faction pretty well control that area with the exception of there's still some confrontation between the tribes in the area and this location.

Beyond that, everything that you see in red, and principally along 21 October Road, the main line of communication going down to the airfield, the airfield and the port area, and these larger red boxes, are areas where Aideed, or Aideed-associated forces, pretty well have control. Or at least we've had multiple attacks against either U.S. or UNOSOM convoys or activity in that area. So these in red, if you will, are probably the highest threat areas.

Those, which are now outlined in orange, are the areas where Aideed, again, or his supporters, control principally. Those, in yellow, are where interfactional fighting, particularly between Aideed and Ahmadi still continues at this point. So, really, kind of what you see is Aideed controlling, to the degree to which he can, the main lines of communication. Also, this area which is important is the area of the Pasta Factory, which gives them a line of communications and a logistics line out so that he can bring in the additional personnel and arms that he requires. So, this area is important to his overall strategy.

That, essentially, is the current situation on the ground. There haven't been any new classes of weapons. There haven't been any particular new strategy or tactics exhibited, really, over the last 90 days or so. But we have seen clearly within the last two months -- in August and September -- Aideed using, perhaps, the weapons that he's had in a little more creative way. The use, for example, of command-detonated mines, where he is actually not just putting mines out on a road and hoping that a UNOSOM or UN force would drive by, but actually, is doing it with a spotter and actively using that command-detonated mine because when he did random mining before, a lot of Somalis and a lot of local traffic ran over those mines. So, a little more sophisticated use there. Also, the use of spotters with his mortar attacks, rather than the random kind of mortar attacks that we had seen earlier. Then, of course, we have seen him really continue to use this notion of human shields in demonstrations, with women and children, backed by his own forces.

His notion, basically, is to try to control major intersections like the K-4 Circle, like Village Somalia, like the Pasta Factory. These areas _____ will be talking about later in the presentation.

With that background, I'd like to turn it over now then to _____ to talk to the specifics of the operations, beginning last weekend.

Briefer 1: As _____ indicated, the situation in Somalia has been requiring some attention. So UNOSOM, what they intended to do starting Friday, was that up here at the Pasta Factory, there was a tower that had a 23mm anti-aircraft gun mounted on it. The QRF went after the Pasta Factory with TOW missiles... fired TOW missiles into the building. They did not go into the building, because, very frankly, the object of the game was to destroy the tower, and they knocked that down.

At the same time, on the next day, you see the Paks and the Bangladeshis went up here to Checkpoint 32. The object of this event on Saturday was to convince Aideed that we were going to operate up in this area against one of his enclave areas. As was indicated, this is where most of the people, supporters and resupplies are coming into town.

The UAE also was conducting a search in the Irish Compound area here, in this area here. This is a strong point. What it was demonstrating was the forces were getting out, doing patrolling, and conducting arms sweeps. There were no casualties. Shots were fired at UAE, but there were no casualties during the course of this operation. That was Friday and Saturday's events. Let's talk about events on the 3rd.

The day started out, as most of you know, with the Humvee down by the new port area... down in this area, going across a command-detonated mine. Three Marines were wounded and one Somali was killed. Then what happens, is that near the Olympic Hotel, there was human intelligence that Aideed supporters were meeting. I'll turn it over to _____ now to discuss this particular event and what we knew and why we went after it.

Briefer 2: Without getting into the real specifics of the intelligence, here's the Olympic Hotel, and a few hundred meters away, there was a known Aideed -- and Aideed's lieutenants, actually -- were meeting in this facility. Two of his primary lieutenants on the famous Tier One List, as it's

referred to, were known to be in that facility. The intelligence was very good, it was very timely. I'll have _____ talk about the operation, but suffice it to say, when our Rangers and so on arrived on scene, and took down the facility, there were 19 detainees who were captured immediately by our forces. Two of these were on the Number One Tier List. One was Aideed's principal political officer; the second a major foreign minister, or that is what he's called on Aideed's staff. So it was really a pretty successful operation in its early phases during the take down.

The intelligence was good. QRF reacted to it well, although it clearly was, again, one of Aideed's stronghold areas. _____ will go on with the rest of...

Q: What time was that?

A: That occurred 1533 Charlie, which is seven hours time difference.

Q: Can you identify those two people who were detained?

A: Yes. One was Omar Salad who was the Minister of Interior. (Correction, Political Officer). Let me get the names for you. Awale, I believe was his name, Awalle Hassan. He was a foreign minister on Aideed's staff. (Correction, Col. Abdi Hassan Awale, Interior Minister). But let me try to get the proper names back for you on those.

Q: Can you define Tier One, how many people does it include?

A: There's about half a dozen, or seven or eight names that Ambassador Howe has put on this Tier One List which are Aideed's principal lieutenants. Osmond Atto clearly was another example of this Tier One list. So a true Aideed principal supporter, principal list, the principal list of lieutenants, if you will, that we are there to try to neutralize.

Q: What time was the Humvee?

A: About 7:15 in the morning, Somalia time.

Q: You've essentially got three of his top people.

A: That's correct.

Let me just walk this thing through chronologically, and try to explain the events as they occur, and kind of where we are. As _____ indicted, the Rangers drop onto the Olympic Hotel site area and pick up the detainees. There was, at the same time, a Ranger ground force coming in to pick these people up and bring them out. As the helicopters were hovering over the area, and maneuvering around the area providing cover for the force that was on the ground, a helicopter was hit by ground fire. That helicopter went down at the crash site that we'll call number one.

Q: What kind of ground fire, do we know?

A: We don't know for sure. There's speculation that runs all the way from RPGs to 23mm. Obviously, debriefs are still going on, but we don't know with a degree of specificity that I can tell you.

The first helicopter that went down, the ground force that was going to the Olympic Hotel area to pick up the detainees, the detainees were kind of flown out, arrived on scene. About 70 to 90 ground troops, mostly Rangers, surrounded the helicopter for security reasons. Just after this occurred, a second helicopter that was operating in this area was hit. So again, the question becomes,

what type of ground fire? Again, we don't know, but clearly, it is not normal AK weapon systems, etcetera.

Q: Any idea if there were Stinger shoulder-type missiles? We don't know that?

A: We do not think they were. There is no indication that that was the case. It was more likely AAA, but again, it wasn't SA-7 or something. No reports of that.

This helicopter went down in approximately the same place, about 2,000 meters or so apart. This helicopter had a pilot, co-pilot, two door gunners when it went down. As the helicopter went down, a third helicopter came along and fast-roped two soldiers down to the crash site to provide security. That third helicopter received ground fire and was hit. It flew down to the New Port area and had a controlled crash landing in the New Port area. So there were actually three helicopters that we're talking about with battle damage.

Q: All three Black Hawks?

A: All UH-60s.

Now what we have developing on the ground during the course of the day is, we have one helicopter down with its crew and about 70 to 90 people defending it; we've got six people at crash site number two. The QRF operating down in this area, and the UAE and the other people operating in this area, mounted a rescue operation. Again, these are people from different nations with different capabilities. The time to here, 1615, (inaudible) and so you're now talking 1645 timeframe. This is all Charlie time, so again, subtract seven.

Q: Local time in Somalia.

A: Yes.

Now what you're looking at is the QRF coming down here to (inaudible) the area. At the K-4 circle, there was a five-ton truck ambushed by RPGs. The five-ton truck was destroyed. It was hit, and three U.S. were WIA at that particular location.

It took a period of time -- by this time it's now dark -- so the rescue force operating out of the New Port area, again, the three different nations we already discussed, the Malaysians, UAE, actually Paks, and the QRF operating down here, mounted an operation up towards checkpoint 207 and to the crash site.

While this is going on, the 90-plus Rangers, soldiers that are from the UH-60s operating here, are under intense fire. The bulk of the casualties took place up at crash site number one. It took until about 2 o'clock in the morning to get this force assembled in crash sites one and two, evacuating down National Road, subsequently up to the soccer stadium where the Pakistanis are, and evacuated. The results of this we've already talked about. We have 12 killed and 78 wounded in action and a handful missing, one of whom you've seen on TV.

Now in terms of battle damage, we have actually three helicopters down, two at the crash sites, one a controlled crash in the New Port area, and two others that have minor damage that will be repaired in country.

So where we are now? Let me just finish, and then we'll talk about it. What we are sending over there, as the Secretary indicated, are four M1 tanks. The M1 tanks have dozer blades on the front. The reason for that is the 21 October Road network, as was indicated, in the middle of Aideed country, is constantly roadblocked. The M1 tank can clean that road out almost impervious, quite frankly, to whatever they have over there. You need that to resupply people and to keep this road open.

The Bradley Fighting Vehicles, are needed, first off, because they can see at night. They can travel fast around town. One of the problems that we had is that the 113s that the Pakistanis have do not have a night vision capability. There were three Pakistani APC 113s that were damaged in this rescue operation in the fight.

Q: What are 113s?

A: Armored personnel carriers. We also had one Malay killed, nine wounded, and two Pakistanis wounded in this fight also.

Q: If I read you correctly here, you're saying there are up to 90 Rangers who were caught at the crash site and came under heavy fire; and you said 78 wounded and 12 killed. That's 90. So everybody...

A: No. I'm giving you the three Marines who were wounded at the mining site, the one Somali killed; the three wounded at the QRF checkpoint, and the other people at crash site two, plus crash site one.

Q: I understand now, but these are highly trained elite troops. Why were the casualties so heavy? What did they face? Overwhelming numbers, overwhelming fire power?

A: For those of you who have never participated in combat in a built-up area, that is one of the toughest places you will ever be. As a rule, when we fought in Hue City, our casualty rates were extraordinarily high because when you fire RPGs, throw hand grenades, and do that type of activity, the fragmentation patterns that come off walls, pick up additional fragmentation patterns. As a result, your casualty rate, instead of being a kind of three-to-one ratio in normal land combat, you're talking about six and seven-to-one. So number one, you're in a confined area; number two, they're surrounded by a whole bunch of the Somalis. And as ___ indicated, this area is an SNA compound stronghold, so it was a firefight that lasted from dusk until about 2 o'clock in the morning.

Q: I wanted to ask you why the Quick Reaction Force didn't have armor before now?

A: The battlefield equation, very frankly, didn't require it. But, as indicated, what we're seeing is that number one, there were more Aideed supporters coming into town; they were more aggressive in terms of what they were doing; and number three, very frankly, they're getting better at what they were doing. We had Pakistani tanks there, M-48 tanks; we had Pakistani 113s, and they were good enough for that particular mission at that point in time. But where we are now, you need night fighting capability.

Q: Since the Rangers got there, obviously, they were looking for Aideed as part of their mission. It seems to me that that would have changed the battlefield equation at that point.

A: Again, the Ranger operation, up to the point that the helicopter went down, was a very successful operation. What caused the helicopter to go down is what the subject in question is. Have

they changed the equation in terms of the caliber of systems they've got in the country? I don't know the answer to that, we need to sort that out.

Q: Would there have been less casualties if they had armor during this battle?

A: Clearly.

Q: Could you clarify, since you have 78 wounded and 12 killed, about out of how many individuals were involved in the operation then?

A: I don't know what the total number was. When you include the Malays, the Pakistanis, the QRF, and the total range of force, I can't give you a total number.

Q: Are you saying 78 wounded Americans?

A: Yes.

Q: How many Americans were involved then?

A: In total, there were 300 to 400 involved.

Q: What's your assessment of the impact of the capture of these three people on this now Tier One List? What impact will that have on Aideed?

A: In some ways, in the case of Osmond Atto, for example, he was one of Aideed's principal financiers. So there's no question that Aideed has already lost access to money and resources that previously he was able to get after. The two gents that were picked up on this particular raid were not battlefield commanders, although there are battlefield commanders on the list, so, in this particular case, they may not cause a diminution in the combat field capability. However, all these gents have access to his plans, have access to where he stows weapons, where he operates, where he meets, where he has routine activity, so there's no question from a security standpoint that this is, again, a setback for him.

Q: Can you clarify exactly how many are being deployed now? How many troops total. You have the 200 for personnel. Clarify how many people are going in now.

A: The Secretary said we're sending in four M1 tanks...

Q: But how many people, in other words, is this going to add up to?

A: The company team has about 220 in it. The rotation force that we're talking about, the Ranger rotations, is probably another 200. Then we'll bring some forces out, obviously, as the Secretary indicated. We've already brought one plane load of the wounded out, and we're sending some replacement helicopters in with some maintenance capability to fix some of the helicopters that have been battle damaged.

So the question is, there is going to be a temporary spike in terms of the number of people who are over there above what we've got right now, but that will level off again.

Q: But how much of a spike?

A: Two hundred to 220, once the numbers level back out.

Q: What do we have right now?

A: 4,700 in round numbers.

Q: Is that enough?

A: The thing that you need to understand is that the mission all along was when we turned this over to UNOSOM back in May, the situation was very secure in Somalia. The object of the mission was to get out of Mogadishu, to turn this thing over, to create a police force, to create the political process, and kind of revitalize a nation, allowing the food to continue. Our intent all along was to move out over the horizon, to get the QRF out of country. So if that is our objective and that's our strategy, then 4,600 was the right size force. Where we are today, though, as the Secretary indicated, we have a requirement to protect those kids that are on the ground. That's what we're going to do.

Q: Is one company enough to do that? The situation seems to be deteriorating pretty fast.

A: In the judgment of the CINC, that's what we need at this particular point in time.

Q: Which helicopter crash site was Chief Warrant Officer Durant, which helicopter was he in?

A: My guess is that he was at crash site number two. When the relief force arrived at crash site number two, as I indicated, there were six people on that aircraft that we know of, and there was nobody recovered.

Q: Was he the pilot, General?

A: My guess is, as a Chief Warrant Officer, he probably is, but that's my guess. I'd have to defer to the Army on that one.

Q: This is the beginning of a new phase with armored deployment and an eight-hour firefight. How long do you expect this new phase to last?

A: First off, armor has been there before. As I said before, there are M-48 tanks in country, and there are 113 armored personnel carriers. This is a qualitative difference in your ability to see at night, and you get better armor protection, and we didn't have the blade capability. If you remember, I guess it was two weeks ago, ten days ago now, we sent American engineers down 21 October Road. We sent them down with open bulldozers and they were subject to sniper attack. They're not going to sniper attack an M1 tank with a blade.

Q: Can you talk a little bit about the small number missing? Can you say whether you've had any communication with, or anyone through...

A: We're not going to discuss, as Major Stockwell said in country. It's a small handful. It's an ongoing operation, so rather than get into discussion as to how many the Somalis have, etcetera, we're not going to talk about it.

Q: Do you know if they are alive? Have you had any communication from the Somali forces at all?

A: I defer to UN...

Q: What are the U.S. troops facing? Are these ragtag irregulars, or are they well disciplined troops, are they pretty well trained? What are we facing over there?

A: Clearly Aideed's forces and the SNA forces historically, have been among the better fighters of any of the coalition. They've also had several months now to work on guerrilla tactics, to improve their techniques. Aideed was a fairly well schooled general during the Siad Bary regime.

It's interesting to note, he ran a very similar operation just like this out of Biagadan, the Ethiopian border area, against Siad Bary, and frankly, marshalled his soldiers very well. I would have to say given the tactics and the results of what we're dealing with now, the force regrettably is becoming more capable.

Q: Can you tell us if the six that were not recovered from the crash site two were part of the KIA or the MIA? You didn't say that.

A: We don't have that completely sorted out. I would just tell you right now on our numbers, we have 12 killed in action, 78 WIAs. We still have some more notifications to do, and very frankly, I'm not going to discuss the number of MIAs that we have at this point.

Q: You said no recovered, on that.

Q: Does the six include the two who fast-roped down? Is that what you're saying?

A: That's correct. But that, again, is an evolution... What we're characterizing right now is six and 78, and there are operations ongoing right now as we speak, so rather than get into the details of that, I'd much rather just leave that question.

Thank you very much.

(END)

No. 217-P

October 5, 1993

welcome
ceremony will
begin today.

Bob Ward at

SEC. CHRISTOPHER: Good afternoon. You've just heard the president explain the reasons why American forces went to Somalia, what they have accomplished, and the reasons why the forces will remain there.

From the standpoint of American foreign policy, the steadiness of purpose that the president showed is absolutely essential for the effective conduct of a foreign policy. Any less resolute a course would certainly have been damaging, and I am very pleased that this determined course has been set.

In a few minutes Secretary Aspin will describe the military aspects and Admiral Jeremiah will speak to an aspect of that as well, but first I'd like to discuss our diplomatic strategy under the policy that the president laid down today.

We've been pressing the United Nations to refocus the Somalia operation on the political process of national reconciliation. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali will travel to the region later this month, and he has indicated that the U.N. will pursue rapid progress on the political track. At the same time, we're sending messages to 30 countries that contribute various kinds of support to the UNOSOM effort, asking that they remain in the country until it's secure.

The United States has carried the heaviest part of the load in Somalia. We're now asking certain other countries to increase the number of their troops there to finish the job. We have also asked Ambassador Oakley, who served as special envoy to Somalia from December through March, to meet with leaders in the region to obtain their support for the political strategy.

He is leaving for the region tonight.

We've sent a message to President Meles of Eritrea asking him to - I'm sorry - of Ethiopia asking him to help bring about an early cease-fire. We'll be working with President Meles to establish an independent international commission to

investigate and resolve the issues stemming from the attacks on UNOSOM and from the other acts of violence in Somalia.

We're also sending messages to the leaders of Eritrea, Kenya, and Djibouti asking for their help in achieving a political settlement in Somalia. We're asking the Organization of African Unity to take an active role in bringing together the different factions in Somalia. We've solicited the support of Egyptian President Mubarak who is this year president of the OAU. We'll be sending a similar message to the OAU secretary-general, Salim Salim (sp). The United States intends to work with - particularly closely with President Meles, the OAU, and the Somalis to try to arrange a Somali leadership conference as soon as possible.

Almost a year ago, when the United States responded heroically to the question of mass starvation in Somalia, now we together with the United Nations and neighboring countries in the OAU must work urgently to help the Somalis find a settlement to the problem and to mobilize the humanitarian rescue. We're looking to the African leaders to help us find an African solution to an African problem. We're going to be relying heavily on such leaders as President Meles, President Issaias, and others in the region to help fashion a solution to the problem which is - goes along with the military track that Secretary Aspin and General Jeremiah will be talking about.

As I look back, one of the things that happened over the last several months is that we focused very heavily on a military track, and we lost focus on the political track. We're now asking the U.N. to refocus on the political track and to try to seek a national reconciliation in Somalia so that that country can get on with its life and well-being.

Secretary Aspin.

SEC. ASPIN: Thank you, Chris.

Let me just do a brief statement and then let me talk a little bit about the military deployments and then turn it over to Admiral Jeremiah, who's also got some information on the deployments.

But, first, I want to say that the American men and women that we have sent to Somalia have performed their mission with unmatched distinction. They represent the very best that this nation has to offer. There are no words to describe our pride in the bravery they demonstrated under fire, our agony over the loss of their precious lives and the suffering of our wounded and detained.

There are, however, words available to send a clear message to those who are illegally detaining an American serviceman. The message to Mr. Aidid is

this, "Do not underestimate American resolve. Do not think that any harm you do to our servicemen will be forgotten by me, the president or by the American people. We intend to have our man back. And we hold you personally responsible for his safety."

Let me just -- besides that statement, let me just say a few words about the situation as far as the military deployments goes. First, the numbers. After this deployment has been completed and including the people that are already in country, the total number of American servicemen in Somalia will be in the order of 7,100 people. In addition to that, there will be an offshore Marine presence, which will total 3,600. So, that's the numbers that are relevant. There is an onshore presence that will go from roughly, what is it now, 4,500, 4,800, up to 7,100, and the number will be augmented by an offshore Marine presence which may be added to the number in-country of another 3,600.

In addition to that, there will, of course, be a naval presence in the area, but none of them will be onshore in Somalia. In particular, of course, there is the aircraft carrier, Lincoln. Abraham Lincoln is coming into the area, and that adds about 6,000 people on board that ship, all by themselves.

What this added capability will allow. What this added capability will allow is three things. First, it will allow moving the QRF to its old mission. The QRF, as you remember, was to -- essentially designed to be a quick reaction force if somebody got in trouble somewhere in the fighting within -- within all of Somalia. The QRF was a quick reaction force to reinforce somebody somewhere in Somalia. What happened, though, unfortunately, is the drawdown of the U.S. forces, the QRF got involved in day-to-day operations in Mogadishu. This added military presence will allow the QRF to go back to its originally designed mission as a quick reaction force.

Second, we will be adding almost a second QRF in the offshore Marines. The Marines will add another capability that can be inserted at a particular time with a particular mission, and that would add to the capability. So there's almost a second QRF available on the offshore.

The final thing that it does is it allows -- this capability here includes some air power that we did not have before. In particular, there are going to be four AC-130 gunships, and there are going to be the aircraft off of the carrier Abraham Lincoln which are available for air strikes in the area.

Those are the capabilities. It will allow the United States military to conduct the mission as described in the president's speech. It will allow a

greater presence. It is thought that it will be a force multiplier because with more American presence and more American activity, we believe the allies will also show more activity, so I think it will be a force multiplier. It will, I think, have an impact on the security situation in Mogadishu and in the -- the hope which is that behind all of this is essentially to bring about the political agenda which we're laying out.

The military mission here is in support of the political agenda. The military mission is in support of the political agenda. There is -- to carry out a military solution to this problem would require a number of people and a number -- an amount of time and an amount of commitment of money which is beyond all reasonable expectation. We are putting our efforts into a political solution here, but we have a military component which supports that political process.

Let me now call upon Dave Jeremiah --

Q Mr. Secretary --

SEC. ASPIN: We'll have some questions in a minute. Let me ask Dave Jeremiah for a second.

ADM. JEREMIAH: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I thought it would be useful to put some texture on some of these terms that we've thrown around, the logistic support group and the QRF.

When the American forces went into Somalia last December, Marines went ashore, were subsequently joined by soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division in Mogadishu, and fanned out across a depth and range of Somalia, southern Somalia with the objective of restoring order and of permitting the transportation of food to famished people throughout this country. That was done. At the same time, we had allies who came in and supported that effort under UNITAF.

Over time, we stabilized the situation in Somalia, and it came time with the introduction of additional troops and with the stable situation and a secure situation to move out and bring back American soldiers, the 20,000 that the president referred to earlier, 20,000 soldiers and Marines. They were replaced by soldiers from other countries. Those countries are listed up here in the book: Koreans, Nigerians, Kuwaitis, people from the UAE, Botswana, Norway, a host of nations.

Many of those nations do not have the ability to handle the logistics to supply them in places like Gialalassi and Belet Huen and Oddur. In order to do that, as the United States came out, as part of the continuing effort that the president referred to to give the Somali people a chance, we agreed to

provide the
I've
nowhere. I
all by you
up to you
bugs com
30-man ou
allowed us
quickly to
the event t
We have
who are i
carrying i
logistic su
support th
elements
mission to
nation ha
No
show you
forces int
Every da
last 3-
have bro
armed
Mountair
Mechani
some for
Marines
brought
see the c
organiza
nuclear-
Persian
the se
amphibi
amphibi
ships ju
S
order o
mission
that Se
mentior
placed
enough
in here
Mogad
18,000
the M
Sunday
from t

provide the logistics network to support these folks.

I've been in Oddur. It's a long way from anywhere. It's a pretty scary place if you're out there by yourself and a bunch of folks come running at you with a technical, a bunch of these teen-age thugs come up and start to overrun a 20- and a 30-man outpost: thus, the quick reaction force that allowed us to fly helicopter-borne American troops quickly to the scene and reinforce a post or outpost in the event that we had that kind of thuggery going on. We have not had the occasion to do it. Our allies who are in that area have been very successful in carrying it out, but the requirement remained and the logistic support force - the logistic command to support this whole United Nations effort, those two elements were our contribution to the United Nations mission to continue the effort in Somalia to let this nation have a chance to survive as a nation.

Now, let me turn to the other chart and simply show you the range of forces and how we draw forces into a particular situation around the globe. Every day that we have dealt with crises over the last 3-4 years that I've been the vice chairman, we have brought to bear the men and women of the armed forces of the United States: the 10th Mountain Division from New York, the 24th Mechanized Division from Georgia. We've brought some forces in from the Mediterranean where we had Marines deployed on Navy amphibious ships. We've brought in some Air Force AC-130s, and you can see the composition, the numbers of people and the organizations that they represent. We've brought the nuclear-powered carrier Lincoln down from the Persian Gulf in order to provide the firepower that the secretary mentioned. And we brought the amphibious forces embarked - the Marine amphibious forces embarked on our amphibious ships just off Malaysia. They are en route as well.

So, we have drawn a total force of on the order of 20,000 people together to carry out this mission in Somalia to support the political objectives that Secretary Christopher and Secretary Aspin mentioned and that the president of the United States placed upon us as we discussed this current problem.

Thank you.

Q Admiral Jeremiah, do you think this is enough? Do you think there are enough folks going in here to protect Americans?

ADM. JEREMIAH: On the ground in Mogadishu today there are on the order of 16,000 to 18,000 troops from allied nations. The Pakistanis, the Malaysians have contributed to the action on Sunday; a number of others - the Egyptians, forces from the UAE; Nepalese will soon be there. There

are a number of nations, and I don't want to offend them by omitting one, but there are a number of nations there. They have contributed, with our support, to protect our troops in their logistics function. This will go well and I think we have the necessary troops on the ground to do our function and to protect our forces on the ground.

But I'll tell you that if there is a problem, there is enormous fire power in ways that are quite different than anything that the people who oppose the U.N. effort in Somalia have not seen before except when we first put troops on the ground in Somalia here and then the amphibious forces off shore. Plus, there are people that they are familiar with; they've seen some of the troops in the 10th Mountain Division, they've seen the Marines. There are a lot of people in Somalia who owe their lives to those forces and I think it will be a help.

Q Secretary Christopher, could you answer the question, what happens on April 1st if there is not a political structure in place in Somalia to really maintain the government there and their food operation? Will the United States pull out by then anyway?

SEC. CHRISTOPHER: The president said there was no assurance of success. We're putting in place a plan that we think maximizes the opportunity for success on the political track, but there's no assurance of success. And the commitment the president gave for the withdrawal of virtually all of our troops by that time is one that will be met.

Q Secretary Aspin, will the Marine force, the 3,600 Marines, will they remain off the coast after the other troops, the inland troops, have been withdrawn? Is that the plan?

SEC. ASPIN: No. That would part of the withdrawal - I don't think it's worked out, the timing of all of this. We hope that part of the 7,100 can be removed before March 31st deadline. I would expect the Marines to stay there until the end. But I don't expect them to be there beyond that.

(Cross talk.)

Q Mr. Aspin, one question, sir?

SEC. ASPIN: Please.

Q Recently we understand that Secretary Powell (sic), on behalf of General Montgomery in Mogadishu, had requested armor and that you had turned it down. Is that true? And, if so, why, sir?

SEC. ASPIN: Let me tell you that the decision as to deploy any troops anywhere in the world is the job of the secretary of defense, and that's the job that I carry out. General Montgomery and - made a request for some additional armor: four tanks and about 14 Bradley fighting vehicles,

plus some artillery. He made that request. General Hoar looked at the proposal. He scrubbed it, took out the artillery part, and sent the proposal forward. General Powell and I discussed it on several occasions. I found that the views in the Pentagon were kind of mixed on the issue as to whether we ought to grant that. And I think they were mixed for good reason. We were, at that time, talking about a withdrawal of our presence in Somalia. We were beginning to think in terms of our - withdrawal of our presence. This was about the end of September. And -

Q Mr. Secretary?

SEC. ASPIN: Let me finish, if I might. To finish the end of withdrawal, the end of - we were already thinking about withdrawing the forces and trying to reduce our presence. This would have been a great additional presence. In addition, it would have been a very visible part of it. In addition, we were already looking at the possibility also of deploying forces to Bosnia. We had just increased the forces in Somalia about a month earlier with the Rangers. All in all, the decision was deferred at the time that it came to my attention. I did not - the presentation of that data was - or the presentation of the need for that mission was in protecting the logistic supply lines. It was -

Q Well, Mr. -

SEC. ASPIN: Wait. Let me finish. Please. Well, hold it. Was to protect the logistic supply lines. We did not think of it in terms of any use as a possible rescue operation as we saw that might have been used on Sunday. Had I known -

Q Sir -

SEC. ASPIN: If I could - please, just let me finish this statement.

Q Well, when are you going to finish it?

SEC. ASPIN: Well, I'll let you know.

Q Will you wave a handkerchief or -

SEC. ASPIN: I'll wave a handkerchief. But had I known at that time what I knew after the events of Sunday, I would have made a very different decision. I saw that the - that they could have been used very usefully after the events on Sunday. As I say, this is my decision. Somebody has to make the decision. This is the decision that I get paid for. And I made the decision as best I could with the information and the knowledge that I had at the time.

Yes -

(Cross talk.)

SEC. ASPIN: One at a time. One at a time. This gentleman - one at a time. This gentleman here.

Q Secretary Christopher, will the leadership conference that you spoke of involve Mr. Aidid? Who will the cease-fire be arranged with in the country of Somalia? How does he factor in the nation- building that you are now embarked on?

SEC. CHRISTOPHER: That'll be up to President Meles and the other African leaders in the region. We'll leave it to them as to how they want to organize the conference of those in Somalia. I think it's particularly appropriate that that decision be taken by the leaders in the region.

With respect to General Aidid, let me remind you what the president said. The president said that we would try to depersonalize the situation, but nevertheless we would keep the pressure on any of those who would interrupt the humanitarian supplies or otherwise cause trouble for the United Nations forces there. General Aidid will not be the principal focus of our activities in the future, but we certainly don't rule anything out in the context of keeping the pressure on anyone who would interfere with the humanitarian efforts or the U.S. troops or any of the UNOSOM troops.

Q Mr. Aspin, some Republican members of Congress, including Senator D'Amato of New York, are suggesting that you resign because of that decision. What's your intention?

SEC. ASPIN: Not to resign.

MODERATOR: Yes, sir. Over here.

Q I'd like to ask you, do you know how many American troops are being held by the forces of Farrah Aidid?

SEC. CHRISTOPHER: It really wouldn't serve a good purpose for me to try to identify anything further than the fact that we know that one American serviceman is being held, and beyond that I think it's unwise for me to try to give any precision to the number who might be held as detainees. Yeah.

operation which was highly successful. I think it's time for the burden to be shared with others. But the president is determined that we'll have the maximum opportunity for others to participate in this endeavor, and that's why we're staying, that's why we're not leaving immediately. We want to leave in a responsible and prudent way.

STAFF: One more question. Last question.

Q Mr. Secretary, you just said you're going to keep the pressure up on people who would interfere in future operations, but the United Nations Security Council has put out an arrest order on General Aidid. Are we going to ignore that in an effort to depersonalize this?

SEC. CHRISTOPHER: We certainly won't ignore the arrest order. As I say, we have opportunities. We don't rule out anything.

STAFF: Thank you. Thank you very much.

Q Secretary Christopher, could you please explain to us what it is that you said to the other nations? As the president is announcing that we're getting out on March 31st, you said you've sent letters asking them to stay. Why should they stay if we're leaving?

SEC. CHRISTOPHER: One good reason for them to stay is that we've done the heavy lifting up to this point. We had 28,000 troops in there at the beginning. We conducted a major humanitarian

me. One at a time
ne. This gentleman

will the leadership
involve Mr. Aidid?
anged with in the
he factor in the
embarked on?

That'll be up to
ican leaders in the
to how they want
se in Somalia. I
at that decision is

id, let me remind
resident said that
he situation, but
pressure on any of
nitarian supplies

United Nations
t be the principal
but we certainly
xt of keeping the
terfere with the
ops or any of the

can members of
o of New York,
ecause of that

er here.
you know how
1 by the forces

eally wouldn't
try to identify
know that one
nd beyond that
e any precision
detainees.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LES ASPIN
 STATEMENT ON SOMALIA, AS QUOTED BY THE PRESS (OCTOBER 8, 1993)
 OCTOBER 7, 1993

WASHINGTON TIMES Oct. 8, 1993 Pg. 16

'I accept responsibility,' says Aspin

THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Secretary of Defense Les Aspin issued the following statement late yesterday in response to questions about his decision not to send additional armor to Somalia despite requests from senior military commanders:

"In the aftermath of the terrible loss of American lives in Mogadishu Sunday, questions have arisen about earlier requests for U.S. armored forces to augment U.S. troops already there. Such a request was made by Major General Montgomery, the on-scene U.S. commander.

"It came to my attention September 23. The United States had re-

cently increased its presence in Somalia by 400 Rangers. The discussion on the new request was conducted in both military and civilian staffs in the department in the context of an evolving policy in Somalia aimed at reducing American presence, not increasing it further. The request was not rejected, but no action was taken on it at that time.

"Beyond these considerations, the ultimate responsibility for the safety of our troops is mine as secretary of defense. I was aware of the request and could have directed that a deployment order be drawn up. I did not, and I accept responsibility for the consequences of that decision."

Secretary of Defense Les Aspin
Charlie Gibson, ABC - Good Morning America
Friday, October 8, 1993

Q: President Clinton has laid out his vision now, of a workable policy, on Somalia but the question, obviously, is can it work. The man responsible for executing the military side is joining us now from the Pentagon in Washington, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, who himself has been somewhat on the defensive in the past 24 hours. Mr. Secretary, it's good to have you with us.

A: Good morning.

Q: There are former colleagues of yours in Congress calling for your scalp right now.

A: That's the usual process. I think that will die down after a while.

Q: But it does involve this issue of your overruling a request from the military commanders in Somalia for more armor. Do you now think that's a mistake?

A: If I'd known how they were going to be used in the situation that happened last Sunday, I certainly would have made a different decision. But on these issues, you make the choices as you see them, and you make the decisions in the best light of the time. At the time the request came in, the focus of our discussion was reducing our visibility, reducing our presence in Somalia, and this would have been a big, visible increase in the presence.

Q: But did we not get into a situation on Sunday last of committing those Rangers, knowing that we didn't have enough armor to come in and save them if they got in trouble?

A: No, the people who were doing that did not anticipate that either. There was armor on the ground. There was allied armor, and they were not prepared. They never got them involved in the battle until after the events had actually taken place. So it's fair to say, Charles, nobody anticipated a situation like that. If I'd have anticipated that, I clearly would have authorized the sending of the tanks and the armored personnel carriers. If the military on the ground had anticipated it, they would have lined up the tanks and the armored personnel carriers of our allies before the battle took place.

Q: Are you convinced now, with the troops that we are sending to Somalia, and the armor that we are now sending to Somalia, that there cannot be a repeat of the kind of incident that we had last weekend?

A: You never want to rule out entirely something going wrong. That's always a good idea, and you can never pledge that something isn't going to happen. But one of the purposes of the increase in troops was added protection for the American forces.

Q: As I understood your comments last night on Nightline when you were talking to Ted, that we want to use the six months, now that we are saying we will keep this expanded force in

Somalia, we want to use it to get all factions, all warlords to negotiate, hopefully, some kind of peace, some kind of governmental structure in Somalia.

A: Correct.

Q: Does that include General Aideed?

A: Well, it depends on the people putting it together. The people who are going to be at the focal point of drawing this group of clan leaders together is essentially the African presidents. They have experience with the area, they know the people, they're the best people to do it. That's who Ambassador Oakley has been sent out to talk to. Essentially, we ought to leave that up to them. Whatever process needs to make this government get up and running, we ought to say to the African presidents, "You decide who has to be there, you decide what kind of meetings you have, you decide the protocol."

Q: But given the strength that he's showing, my question really says can you have peace, can you have a structure there without General Aideed?

A: Talk to the African presidents.

Q: The reason I asked, obviously, is because we're talking now about perhaps including someone in a governmental structure in Somalia who butchered U.S. troops, dragged them through the streets, etc.

A: That's why we're asking the African presidents to get involved in the issue. We essentially asked them to do it, let them take a look at it, let them decide how to structure it, let them decide who's to be there.

Q: You have the African presidents operating on one end. You also have still a UN command force there. And as I still understand their mission, they still talk about "getting" Aideed.

A: It's a two track policy, and it's always been a two track policy. You want to get a political settlement, and that means talking to them, working with the clan leaders -- not just Aideed. We're talking about all of the clan leaders. Talking to them, but at the same time pushing them towards it. In other words, adding some kind of pressure. Carrots and sticks. It's a combination of carrots and sticks to get the results.

Q: In your own mind, would you be willing to accept, given what happened last weekend to our troops, any kind of a settlement that included Aideed in running Somalia?

A: I think we're looking at asking the African presidents to put together an outcome, and essentially, not telling them, or laying down to them, conditions.

Q: So it would be all right with the United States if they wanted to include Aideed in a governmental...

A: I think what we've asked is, we've asked the African presidents to put together a proposal to work with the local Somali clans, see what it looks like, and then we'll take a look at it.

Q: How sure are you that we can be out of there by March 31st? What if chaos still reigns six months from now?

A: I think that deadline is as firm as anything can be. I don't think there's any question in the minds of this Administration that the purpose of the six month deadline is to give everybody a chance to make something work so that it does not return to the famine and anarchy that existed before last

December. We give them a fair shot, and that's all we're obligated to do. If it doesn't happen by then, it doesn't happen by then.

Q: If the situation is the same six months from today as it is today, we still leave?

A: Oh, absolutely.

Q: Mr. Secretary, we appreciate your being with us. Thank you.

A: Thank you.

Q: It's always good to have you here.

(END)

Secretary of Defense Les Aspin
CBS - Paula Zahn
Friday, October 8, 1993

Q: More troops are now headed to Somalia. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin now admits he should have approved a request for reinforcements earlier. But Aspin says he didn't know troops would be ambushed last weekend. That answer did not satisfy his critics. [Film clip played]

Defense Secretary Aspin joins us this morning from the Pentagon. Secretary Aspin, thank you very much for joining us.

A: Good morning.

Q: You have said that you will not resign. How much of an effect did politics play on your decision not to send in reinforcements when they were requested?

A: The decision not to send in those reinforcements was... and the reinforcements were a small number of tanks, four, and 14 Bradley vehicles. The request at the time was that they needed those to continue to do the logistics protection function that all of the other troops were doing. None of us foresaw the possibility of having to use them to go after downed American pilots. If we'd have known in retrospect what the events were after last Sunday, clearly, that would have changed the decision.

But at the time, and what we're talking even now, of course, is downsizing the American presence, downsizing the American visibility in the area. When you downsize the presence and downsize the visibility, you really don't want to put in tanks and armored personnel carriers which greatly increase the mission and increase the visibility in the public view.

Q: Is that what you viewed as the downside at the time of sending in these additional vehicles?

A: Yes. We have been, for some time now, talking about reducing our presence in Somalia and getting an exit strategy, and reducing our visibility. If you reduce the visibility and you reduce the presence, to send in tanks and armored personnel carriers, which would be new on the scene, would be in exact opposite of that.

Q: Your critics have charged that that's exactly what you were worried about -- a furor on Capitol Hill...

A: No, this is not to do with the furor on Capitol Hill. It has to do with basically, what is our policy? Our policy has been, and included through the President's speech yesterday, is a policy of how do we reduce the American's involvement and get other institutions and other militaries and other things into that country working that problem.

Q: The President, yesterday, pledged to end our military deployment in Somalia by the end of March of next year. Secretary of State Christopher said he expects that to happen even if there is no functioning government in place in Somalia at that time. How is that timetable any different than cutting and running now?

A: It gives a six month period to give the forces in Somalia, the people of Somalia, a chance to put this thing together.

Q: What if they don't?

A: Then, as Secretary Christopher has said, the United States will withdraw.

Q: So there's really no assurance that...

A: Not at all. The President said that. The President said that the policy is to give the Somali people a reasonable chance. Frankly, I think a reasonable chance is about six months. You can debate, and indeed we did, in the discussion with the members of Congress yesterday that met with the members of the Administration. There was discussion about the particular timetable. But I think that you do need to give a reasonable chance, and six months seems to us to be a reasonable chance. If at the end of that time they have failed to do it, then it's essentially, we at least go away in our conscience, that we at least gave them a chance, a shot at it.

Q: I wanted to move on to the question of hostages. Right now we know that U.S. helicopters are flying over Somali strongholds, broadcasting messages of hope to potential prisoners. How many prisoners is General Aideed now holding, and can you give us a confirmation this morning of how many soldiers are missing in action? We've not seen firm numbers on that.

A: I think it's the kind of thing that we're very reluctant to speak of. You can understand. There is a lot of activity having to do with the hostages, there's a lot of planning having to do with it, a lot of calculation about who may be detainees, what detainees there may be, and who they may be and where they may be. But we really shouldn't talk about it publicly.

Q: Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. Thank you so much for being with us this morning.

A: Thank you.

(END)

Secretary of Defense Les Aspin
NBC - Bryant Gumble
Friday, October 8, 1993

Q: On Closeup this morning, Somalia, and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin this morning, from the Pentagon briefing room. Mr. Secretary, good morning.

A: Good morning.

Q: Let me start, if I might, by talking about Michael Durant, the U.S. serviceman who's in captivity right now and, as you know, has been visited by the Red Cross. Have you yet initiated any kind of discussions aimed at his release?

A: I think it's tough to talk about it. There is a lot of planning going on, there's a lot of activity going on in connection with the issue of the American detainees, but I really don't think I can talk about it.

Q: You called him a detainee. Are you viewing him as a POW or as a hostage?

A: A detainee, I think, is the technical term which is correct in this case.

Q: I'm not trying to quibble with words here, but one indicates a non-combatant, the other one suggests a combatant. One says there are discussions aimed at his release, the other says we don't talk with his captors. Which does a detainee fall in the category of, a POW or a hostage?

A: Basically, he has a category all of his own, and we can't talk about it, really, in public.

Q: Let me move, if I might, to your decisions of late. You have said that you will not resign over events and decisions of the past week. What's your view of those on Capitol Hill who it seems are trying to make political gain by calling for your scalp?

A: I think it's the politics of Capitol Hill. I was a member of Congress for 20 years, and that's the way business is done. That's the process. So I think that's what's going on.

Q: Implying that your competence may have cost some American lives, do you think people like D'Amato are cheap-shooting you?

A: Everybody has to know that you make the choices in this business as the information is available at the time you make it. There are always choices that you might make differently in the hindsight of future events. I made the best choice that I could at the time, given the information that was available.

Q: Is that choice going to haunt you personally for a long time?

A: Well, I think we just have to see how it plays out. But basically, I don't know what else to do, and I think that's the way everybody does the job and that's the way I do the job. You look at the evidence at the time that you have to make the decision, and you make the best choice you can.

Q: Let's move on to the President's plan. To what extent was the President's speech and his new plan an admission that to date the Somalia operation has been mismanaged?

A: I think it was much more of a forward looking plan. I think people were asking, where do we go from here, not what has happened in the past, and I think the President laid out a good plan. The basic policy of the plan is we will give a reasonable interval of time here for people to work this problem, particularly the Somali people to work the problem. The policy is to give them a fair chance to have something happen on their own. I think that's a very good plan.

Q: Is that to say you don't think it's been mismanaged?

A: There's always a chance to go back and re-examine the issue afterwards. I think at the end of the whole thing, it would be profitable to go back and take a look and ask ourselves. Indeed, if you look at the policy that this Administration is pursuing in terms of peace implementation forces in Bosnia, and the peace implementation forces that are going into Haiti, those are not peace implementation, but the forces that are going into Haiti. We've learned from this experience. I think that's important.

The President said we're sending in more troops and we're staying on to finish the mission.

A: Correct.

Q: If it's imperative to finish the mission, why are we setting a withdrawal date?

A: The mission is to give people a fair chance. That's why we believe six months is the right amount of time. I think you have to ask yourself, what is a reasonable amount of time to give people a chance for this political track to work, for some kind of a meeting among the clan leaders and work out a basic system? We're not trying to work out a brand new government for Somalia, but to work out a basic operating policy there. Six months seems like the right amount of time.

Q: But Mr. Secretary, if you set a target date of March 31, doesn't it stand to reason that Aideed and other factional leaders would simply lay low until March 31, wait until you were gone, and then go back to business as usual?

A: That's why we picked March, a longer six month period. If he were to essentially go to (inaudible) here for six months, we believe he would lose out in the competition with his rivals. The other clans would gain. That wouldn't be true if the period were only for three months, for example. But with a six month period, that's a long enough period that we believe that Aideed needs to get into the political system at play.

Q: The President said he wanted our forces to stop personalizing the war. Does that mean you'll stop hunting Aideed?

A: I think we want to continue the pressure on Aideed. We want to make sure that if Aideed hits us, we'll be able to hit back. And of course, I wouldn't rule out an operation against Aideed if the opportunity presented itself.

Q: Final note. In your mind, how flexible is the withdrawal date of March 31?

A: I think under the plan the Administration put together, March 31 is etched in stone.

Q: Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

A: Thank you.

(END)



NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301

PLEASE NOTE DATE

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

October 25, 1993

No. 507-93

(703) 695-0192 (media)

(703) 697-3189 (copies)

(703) 697-5737 (public/industry)

DEPUTY SECDEF PERRY GREETES RETURNING SOLDIERS

Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry greeted returning soldiers of the 75th Ranger Regiment at Fort Benning, Georgia on October 22. On October 24, he travelled to Fort Campbell, Kentucky to welcome home members of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.

Deputy Secretary Perry praised the soldiers for "taking on a tough job... and performing it with great skill and courage."

Attached are copies of Deputy Secretary Perry's remarks.

-END-

Remarks by Deputy Secretary Perry Welcoming of Task Force 160

24 October 1993

SOLDIERS OF THE 160TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION REGIMENT, NIGHT STALKERS, 75TH RANGER REGIMENT, AND OUR HOSTS FROM THE 101st

IT'S A REAL PRIVILEGE TO SPEAK FOR SENATOR SASSER, CONGRESSMAN TANNER, GENERAL SULLIVAN, SECRETARY ASPIN, AND PRESIDENT CLINTON, TO WELCOME YOU BACK HOME AND TO THANK YOU. I ESPECIALLY WANT TO CONVEY A HEARTFELT "THANK YOU" FROM PRESIDENT AND MRS. CLINTON, WHO ARE MEETING THIS MORNING WITH YOUR WOUNDED COMRADES AT WALTER REED HOSPITAL.

THANK YOU FOR TAKING ON A TOUGH JOB. AND THANK YOU FOR PERFORMING IT WITH GREAT SKILL AND COURAGE.

I ALSO WANT TO EXPRESS MY THANKS TO THE FAMILY MEMBERS. YOU HAVE ENDURED THE SEPARATION AND THE AGONIZING UNCERTAINTY OF HAVING LOVED ONES ON A HAZARDOUS MISSION IN A FAR AWAY LAND.

WE WENT TO SOMALIA LAST DECEMBER TO DELIVER HUMANITARIAN AID. AT THAT TIME, INNOCENT PEOPLE WERE DYING ON A MASSIVE SCALE. THE NATION WAS RAVAGED BY YEARS OF BRUTAL CIVIL WAR AND FAMINE. AN ESTIMATED 1,000 PEOPLE WERE DYING A DAY, AND 800,000 REFUGEES WERE FORCED INTO EXILE.

IN A FEW MONTHS, WE WERE ABLE TO BRING ORDER TO THE COUNTRY AND RELIEVE THE FAMINE. WE SAVED UNTOLD THOUSANDS OF LIVES.

THEN, IN JUNE, THE MILITIA FORCES UNDER AIDEED BEGAN ATTACKING U.N. FORCES IN MOGADISHU, KILLING 28 IN A FEW DAYS. ALL THAT WE HAD ACCOMPLISHED AT THAT POINT WAS IN DANGER OF BEING LOST, SINCE THE U.N. FORCES IN MOGADISHU WERE UNABLE TO DEAL WITH THE GUERRILLA WARFARE THAT HAD BEGUN. SO OUR MILITARY COMMANDER IN MOGADISHU ASKED FOR HELP. THE MISSION WAS A TOUGH ONE, SO WE SENT IN THE BEST — NIGHT STALKERS AND RANGERS.

PERSONAL HARDSHIP IS NOT A STRANGER TO FORT CAMPBELL, AND THE NATION JOINS WITH YOU ONCE AGAIN IN YOUR SUFFERING.

WHEN GENERAL SULLIVAN PRESENTED THE PURPLE HEART TO CHIEF DURANT LAST WEEK, AND TOLD HIM THAT HE WAS PROUD OF HIM, THE CHIEF REPLIED, "I AM PROUD TO BE AN AMERICAN". I CAN TELL THE CHIEF AND THE OTHER NIGHT STALKERS AND RANGERS, THAT ALL AMERICANS ARE PROUD OF YOU, AND ADMIRE YOUR PROFESSIONALISM AND SKILL. AND ALL AMERICANS ARE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COURAGE AND YOUR SERVICE TO OUR COUNTRY.

GOD BLESS YOU, AND GOD BLESS AMERICA.

*** * ***

THEN, WHEN TWO OF YOUR HELICOPTERS WERE SHOT DOWN AND THE CREWS WERE ENDANGERED, YOU NEVER HESITATED, NEVER REFLECTED ON THE DANGERS, BUT WENT TO DEFEND YOUR FELLOW RANGERS, EVEN THOUGH YOU WERE OPERATING IN A HOSTILE URBAN ENVIRONMENT, AND WERE VASTLY OUTNUMBERED.

FROM THIS DAY FORWARD, NO ONE WILL THINK OF THE RANGER'S CREED, "NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES," WITHOUT THINKING OF THE RANGERS' DISPLAY OF COURAGE ON OCTOBER THIRD IN MOGADISHU.

IN THE FIERCE FIRE FIGHT THAT FOLLOWED, YOU SUFFERED HEAVY CASUALTIES. BUT BECAUSE OF YOUR SKILL, YOUR DISCIPLINE, AND YOUR COURAGE, YOU STOOD FIRM WITH YOUR COMRADES AND YOU INFLICTED CASUALTIES ON YOUR ATTACKERS MANY TIMES GREATER THAN WHAT YOU SUFFERED. IN FACT, YOUR ACTIONS THAT DAY EFFECTIVELY DISABLED AIDEED'S MILITIA AND HAS LED DIRECTLY TO HIS WILLINGNESS TO CALL FOR A CEASE FIRE AND NEGOTIATE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

I CAME HERE TODAY TO PAY TRIBUTE TO YOUR COURAGE AND TO EXPRESS MY DEEP PERSONAL SENSE OF LOSS AT THE DEATH OF YOUR FELLOW RANGERS. I ESPECIALLY WANT TO EXTEND MY SYMPATHY TO THE FAMILIES OF THE RANGERS WHO GAVE THEIR LIVES.

ALL OF YOU KNOW THAT WE NEVER SEND RANGERS ON A NORMAL MISSION. WE ONLY SEND THEM ON THE MOST DIFFICULT. ONE MORE TIME, WE SENT RANGERS ON A DIFFICULT MISSION. ONE MORE TIME, YOU CAN PROUDLY SAY, "RANGERS LEAD THE WAY."

ALL AMERICANS ARE EXTREMELY PROUD OF YOUR PROFESSIONALISM AND SKILL. AND ALL AMERICANS ARE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COURAGE AND YOUR SERVICE TO OUR COUNTRY.

THANK YOU.

*** * ***



NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301

PLEASE NOTE DATE

No. 507-93

(703) 695-0192 (media)

(703) 697-3189 (copies)

(703) 697-5737 (public/industry)

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

October 25, 1993

DEPUTY SECDEF PERRY GREETES RETURNING SOLDIERS

Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry greeted returning soldiers of the 75th Ranger Regiment at Fort Benning, Georgia on October 22. On October 24, he travelled to Fort Campbell, Kentucky to welcome home members of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.

Deputy Secretary Perry praised the soldiers for "taking on a tough job... and performing it with great skill and courage."

Attached are copies of Deputy Secretary Perry's remarks.

-END-

Remarks by Deputy Secretary Perry Welcoming of Task Force 160

24 October 1993

SOLDIERS OF THE 160TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION REGIMENT, NIGHT STALKERS, 75TH RANGER REGIMENT, AND OUR HOSTS FROM THE 101st

IT'S A REAL PRIVILEGE TO SPEAK FOR SENATOR SASSER, CONGRESSMAN TANNER, GENERAL SULLIVAN, SECRETARY ASPIN, AND PRESIDENT CLINTON, TO WELCOME YOU BACK HOME AND TO THANK YOU. I ESPECIALLY WANT TO CONVEY A HEARTFELT 'THANK YOU' FROM PRESIDENT AND MRS. CLINTON, WHO ARE MEETING THIS MORNING WITH YOUR WOUNDED COMRADES AT WALTER REED HOSPITAL.

THANK YOU FOR TAKING ON A TOUGH JOB. AND THANK YOU FOR PERFORMING IT WITH GREAT SKILL AND COURAGE.

I ALSO WANT TO EXPRESS MY THANKS TO THE FAMILY MEMBERS. YOU HAVE ENDURED THE SEPARATION AND THE AGONIZING UNCERTAINTY OF HAVING LOVED ONES ON A HAZARDOUS MISSION IN A FAR AWAY LAND.

WE WENT TO SOMALIA LAST DECEMBER TO DELIVER HUMANITARIAN AID. AT THAT TIME, INNOCENT PEOPLE WERE DYING ON A MASSIVE SCALE. THE NATION WAS RAVAGED BY YEARS OF BRUTAL CIVIL WAR AND FAMINE. AN ESTIMATED 1,000 PEOPLE WERE DYING A DAY, AND 800,000 REFUGEES WERE FORCED INTO EXILE.

IN A FEW MONTHS, WE WERE ABLE TO BRING ORDER TO THE COUNTRY AND RELIEVE THE FAMINE. WE SAVED UNTOLD THOUSANDS OF LIVES.

THEN, IN JUNE, THE MILITIA FORCES UNDER AIDEED BEGAN ATTACKING U.N. FORCES IN MOGADISHU, KILLING 28 IN A FEW DAYS. ALL THAT WE HAD ACCOMPLISHED AT THAT POINT WAS IN DANGER OF BEING LOST, SINCE THE U.N. FORCES IN MOGADISHU WERE UNABLE TO DEAL WITH THE GUERRILLA WARFARE THAT HAD BEGUN. SO OUR MILITARY COMMANDER IN MOGADISHU ASKED FOR HELP. THE MISSION WAS A TOUGH ONE, SO WE SENT IN THE BEST — NIGHT STALKERS AND RANGERS.

PERSONAL HARDSHIP IS NOT A STRANGER TO FORT CAMPBELL, AND THE NATION JOINS WITH YOU ONCE AGAIN IN YOUR SUFFERING.

WHEN GENERAL SULLIVAN PRESENTED THE PURPLE HEART TO CHIEF DURANT LAST WEEK, AND TOLD HIM THAT HE WAS PROUD OF HIM, THE CHIEF REPLIED, "I AM PROUD TO BE AN AMERICAN". I CAN TELL THE CHIEF AND THE OTHER NIGHT STALKERS AND RANGERS, THAT ALL AMERICANS ARE PROUD OF YOU, AND ADMIRE YOUR PROFESSIONALISM AND SKILL. AND ALL AMERICANS ARE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COURAGE AND YOUR SERVICE TO OUR COUNTRY.

GOD BLESS YOU, AND GOD BLESS AMERICA.

*** * ***

THEN, WHEN TWO OF YOUR HELICOPTERS WERE SHOT DOWN AND THE CREWS WERE ENDANGERED, YOU NEVER HESITATED, NEVER REFLECTED ON THE DANGERS, BUT WENT TO DEFEND YOUR FELLOW RANGERS, EVEN THOUGH YOU WERE OPERATING IN A HOSTILE URBAN ENVIRONMENT, AND WERE VASTLY OUTNUMBERED.

FROM THIS DAY FORWARD, NO ONE WILL THINK OF THE RANGER'S CREED, "NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES," WITHOUT THINKING OF THE RANGERS' DISPLAY OF COURAGE ON OCTOBER THIRD IN MOGADISHU.

IN THE FIERCE FIRE FIGHT THAT FOLLOWED, YOU SUFFERED HEAVY CASUALTIES. BUT BECAUSE OF YOUR SKILL, YOUR DISCIPLINE, AND YOUR COURAGE, YOU STOOD FIRM WITH YOUR COMRADES AND YOU INFLICTED CASUALTIES ON YOUR ATTACKERS MANY TIMES GREATER THAN WHAT YOU SUFFERED. IN FACT, YOUR ACTIONS THAT DAY EFFECTIVELY DISABLED AIDEED'S MILITIA AND HAS LED DIRECTLY TO HIS WILLINGNESS TO CALL FOR A CEASE FIRE AND NEGOTIATE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

I CAME HERE TODAY TO PAY TRIBUTE TO YOUR COURAGE AND TO EXPRESS MY DEEP PERSONAL SENSE OF LOSS AT THE DEATH OF YOUR FELLOW RANGERS. I ESPECIALLY WANT TO EXTEND MY SYMPATHY TO THE FAMILIES OF THE RANGERS WHO GAVE THEIR LIVES.

ALL OF YOU KNOW THAT WE NEVER SEND RANGERS ON A NORMAL MISSION. WE ONLY SEND THEM ON THE MOST DIFFICULT. ONE MORE TIME, WE SENT RANGERS ON A DIFFICULT MISSION. ONE MORE TIME, YOU CAN PROUDLY SAY, "RANGERS LEAD THE WAY."

ALL AMERICANS ARE EXTREMELY PROUD OF YOUR PROFESSIONALISM AND SKILL. AND ALL AMERICANS ARE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COURAGE AND YOUR SERVICE TO OUR COUNTRY.

THANK YOU.

*** * ***

NEWS BRIEFING



Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)

Secretary of Defense Les Aspin
Mr. Ashton Carter, ASD (Nuclear Security & Counterproliferation)
Lieutenant General Barry McCaffrey, USA, Director for Strategic Plans & Policy, JCS
Friday, October 29, 1993 - 11:45 a.m.

Ms. deLaski: Thank you all for coming today. This is an on-the-record briefing by the Secretary. We also have Ash Carter, the Assistant Secretary for Counterproliferation, and General Barry McCaffrey, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint Staff. They are co-chairing the nuclear posture review effort. With that, I turn you over to Secretary Aspin.

Secretary Aspin: Thank you, Kathleen.

Let me say this morning that we are here to announce today that we're undertaking a fundamental Defense Department reexamination of our nuclear posture in line with President Clinton's direction. At the start of this Administration, the President directed a comprehensive review to redefine the size and shape of our forces -- both nuclear and conventional. To meet the demands of the new world is the objective of the overall review. We started with the conventional forces -- that was the Bottom-Up Review. Its results will guide us in making decisions and planning for years to come. But today we are beginning to address the question of our nuclear forces and the nuclear policy. One era has ended, and a new one has begun. The world has fundamentally changed. We are responding with the first Nuclear Policy Review in 15 years. In fact, it is the first Defense Department review ever to incorporate revisions of policy, doctrine, force structure, operations, safety, security, and arms control all in one look.

This kind of comprehensive approach is demanded by new circumstances. The Cold War is over. The Soviet Union is no more. But the post-Cold War world is decidedly not post-nuclear. Of all of the threats that remain after the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons are the one threat that can still do direct harm to the continental United States, and we know it as a new nuclear threat that we face.

The old nuclear danger was the possibility of thousands of warheads from the Soviet Union. That threat has subsided, but the arsenal still exists.

The new nuclear danger stems from the possibility of a handful of nuclear weapons in less reliable hands. This new nuclear danger has two wellsprings. First, the continued existence of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal amidst revolutionary changes that are taking place in that country. This gives rise to a host of potential problems which include the creation of new nuclear states, the potential for loss of control over the weapons through accident or unauthorized use. It means the leakage of weapons or material, and of know-how -- including possibly the "brain drain" of people who know how to make nuclear weapons, and general proliferation. That's wellspring number one, the former Soviet Union going through revolutionary times.

The second source of the new nuclear danger is the familiar problem of proliferation generally, and the potential for nuclear terrorism. We must fully recognize the dangers that arise from having more nuclear weapons in the hands of a greater number of states, or even terrorist organizations. The characteristics of this new danger give rise to a need for the kind of fundamental review that we are undertaking. A couple of reasons for that.

First, the old rules might not work in the current circumstances. In the past, we dealt with a nuclear threat from the Soviet Union through a combination of deterrence and arms control. But the new possessors of nuclear weapons may not be deterrable. They may have doctrines, histories, intentions and mindsets which are totally different from those of the former Soviet Union. The traditional doctrine of nuclear deterrence presumes the other side is rational, and that we can identify the responsible parties. In the future, we may face rogue states or terrorist groups with nuclear weapons so we can't count on either of those assumptions. And, as with the states of the former Soviet Union, we face the possibility of accidental or unauthorized use.

As for arms control, the question we face is will pledges turn into deeds. We hope so, but at this point we can't count on it.

We also have to take into account the fact that we may find ourselves in a kind of nuclear role reversal in the future. During the Cold War we counted on nuclear weapons to counter the conventional numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact. For the United States, nuclear weapons were the big equalizer. In this new world, our conventional military strength is unmatched. But if a potential adversary had nuclear weapons, we could turn out to be the equalizee.

All of these considerations will go into our posture review. We're going to do a rigorous examination without any prejudiced outcome, but it's also true that we have already taken a couple of steps to meet this new threat.

First, we created a new position -- Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Security and Counterproliferation Issues, a post that's held by Ash Carter here. Second, we've helped accelerate the dismantling of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union under the Nunn/Lugar Cooperative Nuclear Threat Reduction Program.

Like the Bottom-Up Review, the Nuclear Posture Review will be a collaborative effort among OSD, the Joint Staff, the services, and the various commands, and it will be headed by Ash Carter and the Joint Staff Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, Lieutenant General Barry McCaffrey. The review will focus on six topics, each addressed by a separate working group.

Working group number one will look at the role of nuclear weapons in the United States security strategy. It will look at basic questions such as how do U.S. nuclear weapons fit into this new world.

A second working group will look at our nuclear force structure and determine our needs to carry out the required missions. It will tell us how we translate a new nuclear posture into force structure.

The third group will examine our nuclear force operations and determine such things as which forces need to be on alert.

A fourth group will review both the mechanical and physical safety of the nuclear weapons.

Groups five and six will look respectively at the relationships of our nuclear policy to our other policy objectives. One will examine the relationship between the United States' nuclear posture and our counterproliferation policy; the other will look at our nuclear posture in light of our threat reduction policy with the states of the former Soviet Union.

Few national security tasks are more important than getting the right response to the new nuclear dangers that we face in the post-Cold War world. This effort will ensure a comprehensive Defense Department contribution to Administration policymaking in determining the U.S. nuclear posture.

At this point we'd like to answer any questions. We have Dr. Carter here and Barry McCaffrey who are going to be chairing this effort. They'll be here to answer some questions, too.

Q: Mr. Secretary, can we assume that this study will include how to target these weapons? Whether or not to change current targets?

Aspin: Indeed. It will cover all of those things, exactly so.

Q: Do you think there's a need in the new world to continue to assign specific targets to specific warheads? Do you think there's a continuing need for that?

Aspin: That's one of the things we'll be looking at.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you're about to embark on a Far East trip which includes a visit to South Korea. Under the outline you've laid out for us today, one would assume that North Korea would be pretty high on the list of possible states with nuclear weapons. Do you intend to cancel or postpone next year's war games as an olive branch to North Korea so that they would stop their nuclear program?

Aspin: That will be a topic of intense discussion in the next few days.

Q: Mr. Secretary, how long will this review last? Have you set a deadline for it?

Aspin: We don't want to set a deadline, but we're looking at some time early spring or late spring of next year.

Q: Do you intend to make the results public? How...

Aspin: Oh, yes. A good part of this, maybe not every detail will be made public, but the general thrust of this thing and the basic policy will clearly be made public.

Q: Do you see a chance for further cuts in nuclear weaponry because of this, or...

Aspin: Possibly, we'll see.

Q: ...or could there be an adjustment upward?

A: We're really not doing numbers here. We're starting with doctrine and then we're going to let the numbers and things flow from the results rather than start with any pre-conceived numbers.

Q: Mr. Secretary, will your theater nuclear defense be a part of this...theater missile defense be a part of this? And how will it factor in it?

Aspin: This is basically the U.S. nuclear forces at the kind of national strategic level. Part of the defenses, the new ballistic missile defense, is a program that we have at this point in our Bottom-Up Review, it was a five year program that was basically focusing pretty heavily at the research end with the option to deploy it, should things develop in the future. That will, clearly, be part of it. The theater forces probably not. The theater is a different calculation.

Q: Earlier you alluded to the fact that in looking at the United States strategic nuclear options that you were dealing with rational states and leadership that you could predict. But in this new era can you comment on the question of how dangerous a nuclear threat the United States faces vis-a-vis the rationality of...

Aspin: What we have, and we alluded to it a little bit in the opening statement. The sheer numbers is much less now than we used to face. The old nuclear threat was thousands of nuclear warheads in the hands of the Soviet Union. And there was always the danger that if that ever got committed and if it got committed on both sides, you would eliminate two countries and probably a lot of other life on the planet,...a good chunk of life on the planet if the arsenals of both the West and the East were set off.

Q: The other side understood that as well.

Aspin: Everybody understood that. What we're facing now is a different order of magnitude, but with a certain degree more uncertainty. The order of magnitude is a lot smaller now. We're talking about maybe just a handful of nuclear weapons in the hands of a terrorist organization or a terrorist state of various kinds. So it's a mixed result. We still want to remind you, we still have a lot of warheads in the hands of Russia which is benign as long as things continue on a reformist path in Russia.

But what we have is a big variety of threats that are now involved in the new nuclear threat. The old Soviet threat, while very dangerous, had developed a certain comfort level. We'd developed kind of rules of the road. We'd developed theories of deterrence. We'd developed arms control theories. We'd had conferences with them, and we'd developed these things over time. So while the numbers of weapons on both sides were at dangerous levels, the actual operation of them, we'd gone through several crises that were near things -- Berlin, Cuba, etc. -- but it was kind of a stable, set-piece operation. All of that is less certain now. We're not sure how much of the old deterrence theory applies here, we're not sure of how much of the old arms control theory applies. That's what we're going to look at. We're going to really take a bottom-up look at this whole thing from the brand new standpoint of this is a different animal now. In fact it's not a single animal, it's a multi-headed monster.

Q: You must have some thoughts on some of the bedrock issues that this panel is going to be confronting, like whether non-nuclear states should be targeted, whether there ought to be a non-first use policy by the U.S., the relationship between testing and non-proliferation objectives.

Why aren't you furnishing more in the way of public guidance to this group rather than sitting back like a professor waiting for the students to report?

Aspin: Because I want to hear what they have to say first. I have some ideas on some of those issues, but I think it's better if you not be locked into it, and I think we ought to take a look at the whole package and see what it looks like in its comprehensive, rather than deciding little bits and pieces of it by themselves.

Q: While we have you, what is the status of the C-17?

Aspin: To be announced sometime soon.

Q: Last evening Representative Joe Kennedy from Massachusetts apparently was given a briefing in which he was told that the Pentagon now has fairly clear evidence that either chemical or biological weapons were used in the Persian Gulf War. This morning he's calling for an investigation and for further details. What can you tell us about it?

Aspin: Nothing at this point. There's really nothing to be said at this point. We're looking into these things, too.

Q: Have you changed your opinion about whether they were...

Aspin: Just say we're looking at them.

Are there any other questions on this subject here?

Q: The one thing you didn't mention was the NATO Alliance. As you know, the British within the last two weeks canceled one of their tactical nuclear weapons programs. Are you starting from the assumption here that you still expect the British and the French to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent of their own? And will you be consulting with them in this study?

Aspin: Basically what we're doing is we're looking at this thing mainly from our own national interests, and where we think this is going to come out. That doesn't mean we won't be also consulting with our allies. But the allies will be consulted on it when we get further along.

Q: Do you, however, continue with the assumption in the Defense Department that the British and the French will maintain a nuclear deterrence?

Aspin: We, at this point, continue on the assumption that all current policy is in effect until it's changed.

Q: I didn't understand your answer on the numbers of weapons. You spoke about force structure, but you said you wouldn't be dealing with numbers in this study.

Aspin: Oh, absolutely we'll deal with numbers. But numbers should be derived from the policy. You don't start with the numbers. You start with the policy and then derive the numbers.

Q: So we'll see numbers of platforms?

Aspin: Absolutely. That's the second study group. It will essentially determine the force structure. But you ought to decide what your policy is and what your policy is on a number of these questions, and that then ought to determine the number of nuclear weapons you have rather than having the thing driven by some abstract number.

Let me do one more, and then let me turn it over to these guys who will answer other questions.

Q: Aren't you pretty well locked into numbers if you assume START I and START II are real?

Aspin: We're locked in over those times, yes.

Q: So what are you going to do with a discussion of numbers when you're currently locked into a regime with the survivors of the Soviet Union?

A: We go after that. You ask the question of where do you go. I've been asked the question, maybe you've even asked it, where do you go after START II? I don't know the answer, but I hope we will after we do this review.

Q: Do you have a START II? It hasn't been ratified by anybody including the...

Aspin: Then maybe we're starting from START I. The point is, that what we need to do is determine, stand back, look at the new nuclear threat as it presents itself to the United States, in all of its variations, and say all right, what does that mean for the United States? What does it mean about a whole bunch of things that we used to assume we knew the answers to? Once we determine the answers, having thought it through, then that will tell you what kind of a force structure we ought to have; presumably, it will help us answer what kind of international situation we'll have, international cooperation we'll have with our allies. In other words, what should be our policy? What are we going to try and achieve? It ought to come out of this review.

Q: Would you define the threat for us? What countries, and what terrorist organizations, if any, now have nuclear weapons?

Aspin: The countries are the obvious list. We have a course. The Soviet Union has broken up into several parts. We have a large number of nuclear warheads in Russia. We have potential nuclear warheads being dealt with in three other countries of the former Soviet Union -- Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. In addition to that, you have a number of countries which have an ongoing nuclear program, and then you have another bunch of countries which are speculated by the intelligence community, which are attempting to get nuclear weapons.

Q: Terrorist groups?

Aspin: Terrorist groups, we do not believe any terrorist group currently has it, but I think you have to look into the future. I think that is one possibility that may arise.

Let me turn it over to Barry McCaffrey and Ash Carter to answer any questions you've got. Thank you very much.

Q: Secretary Carter, is it possible to give an example or talk about how you would have a credible defense against irrational individuals with nuclear weapons? That was one of the motivations with the Strategic Defense Initiative, and that was...

Carter: That's right, and we're going to be looking at that problem very hard in trying to see what the alternatives are and what the options are for meeting those kind of new dangers that are not a familiar part of our strategic landscape.

Q: Dr. Carter and General McCaffrey, in this day of container vessels, stoppage of drugs is extremely difficult because you can stick it in a container. What is to prevent some country, a Ghadafi or some other crazy, from sticking a nuclear weapon in a container or the hold of a merchant ship? How do you possibly counter against that?

McCaffrey: I think the Secretary properly charged us with going from what had been a very monolithic and easy to understand and to deter threat, to address these new problems. So number one on our plate is to identify the kinds of threats that might emerge and what doctrine, force structure, general posture should we take into account to deter it? We don't have the answers yet, but rest assured, that's one of the principal questions.

Q: General, is the new world order still applicable to the old triad?

McCaffrey: Dr. Carter and I have been charged by the Secretary with approaching all these questions with an open mind, and to not roll into them with an agreed-upon bias. So the nature of the triad, the numbers, the doctrine, are all on the table to be analyzed.

Q: Mr. Carter, can you even conceive that the U.S. may even go non-nuclear? The Army did so two years ago, for example, but the entire rest of the services go non-nuclear.

Carter: As the Secretary said, we're supposed to do a true, bottom-up review, so I suppose that's a conceivable option to look at and think about and consider. We're going to put all the alternatives on the table and study them. But we have no guidance in that direction at all.

Q: Mr. Carter, does the Secretary have any assurances from his counterparts in Russia or Belarus or Kazakhstan that any of their weapons are being taken off targeting on the United States? They're no longer targeted against the United States.

Carter: Some of the authorities of the former Soviet Union have made statements along those lines over time, yes. In fact President Yeltsin made that statement at the Vancouver Summit.

Q: But is there evidence to back it up?

Carter: We've asked them to provide us with information about that. I'm hopeful they will provide us some more information about that.

Q: Mr. Carter, do you have to consider in your review budgetary constraints?

Carter: Certainly as we begin to drive the force structure that results from the policy and doctrine that the review recommends, that will have to be within the basket of our budgetary capabilities, of course.

Q: What is the current cost of the maintenance of our nuclear arsenal in a round figure?

McCaffrey: I've got unclassified figures. They're in excess of \$10 billion a year.

Let me also suggest that the Secretary charged us with looking at the policy, looking at the force structure, looking at the doctrine, so we have these kinds of conclusions before we're driven into strategic choices by budgetary considerations. The whole notion of the review is to get a much broader look at our nuclear posture than one that would be dictated by the next budget.

Q: Dr. Carter, is this strictly a DoD program? Are you involving the State Department? Are you involving the White House? Are you getting an overall perspective? Can you discuss that a little bit?

Carter: The review itself is a DoD review, but we recognize that these are decisions that we need to and want to consult with our colleagues in other parts of the government so the other parts of the government can be fully informed, fully involved as it goes along.

Q: One of the problems, I suppose, in any kind of review, the Secretary alluded to it, would be the restraints by treaty and otherwise. We are currently, we being the U.S., are currently undergoing a moratorium on testing. But if part of your review is the development of newer nuclear weapons, cleaner weapons, tactical weapons, etc., how do you presume to do that without further testing?

Carter: We're not to the point of at all suggesting that that's something that's going to come out of the review. We're going to look at the force structure of the future that we need and all we can do then is recommend to the Secretary, who can recommend to the President whatever looks to him to be the arsenal needs of the future, and then we have to have the infrastructure that goes with it.

Q: If you're going to develop new weapons, will you have to have testing?

Carter: I'll have to refer that question to the experts. I don't believe in all cases that's true. Certainly for some kinds of nuclear weapons that is true, but not for all kinds.

McCaffrey: I think the Secretary's asked us to make sure he turns over to a successor a nuclear force that's safe, well trained, well commanded, and has a sound doctrine. We're also, as you know, the government is looking at the question of the nuclear test ban. I'm not sure I can link the two of them together at this time. It would probably be more prudent to defer that question. Six months from now you'll get a much better answer out of us.

Q: General McCaffrey, do the Chiefs feel that the SIOP is still a valid tool as it exists today? Or are they considering having it expanded to a broader set of countries? Will that be part of this?

McCaffrey: I don't think I can directly answer that question. I think what I am saying is that clearly the Secretary wants us to look at every aspect of it, including one of these work groups who's charged with looking at the operational nature of our nuclear posture. So we will consider the SIOP as one element of that review.

Q: Dr. Carter, Russia was in turmoil just a couple of weeks ago. Will this review still go along with the assumption that the nuclear situation there is stable? Will you start with that assumption still?

Carter: As the Secretary said, this is a review that because of its fundamental nature is going to be committing us to the force structure of 10 years, 15 years, 20 years in future. So in many other respects than just the evolution of the history of Russia we need to look ahead and think what might happen in the world. So in Russia, and elsewhere around the world, we're going to be looking at what might evolve in the next 10 and 20 years. The force structure we determine today is the one we'll be living with 10 and 20 years from now.

Q: Aren't you assuming that the situation is stable there when...

Carter: We're not assuming continuity in any country around the world. We're looking at what might happen in the future that would threaten U.S. security and what role our nuclear posture will have in contending with that danger when it arises.

McCaffrey? I might add that one of our groups specifically is charged with looking at, with the former states of the Soviet Union, cooperative disarmament.

So we have to take into account the kinds of questions you're asking.

Q: There's been a lot of talk and speculation about (inaudible) material in North Korea and their ability to build a weapon, and whether they have one. As a manager of the counter-proliferation, how do you feel? Do you have any idea how close they are to having a weapon or how much (inaudible) material they might have?

Carter: I really can't be specific on that question. We, obviously, have concerns about the nuclear program. North Korea...we registered those concerns for a long time. The rest of the international community has shared that concern with us, but I can't be specific on that.

Q: Will your working groups meet with industry and deal with industrial base issues, or will all your working groups be done in secrecy?

Carter: Where pertinent and necessary, of course, we'll deal with industry groups. I should say also that we intend to solicit advice from outside of this building from the knowledgeable community of people who have served our government in the past, served our military in the past, who have thought about these problems. We intend, as is appropriate in a review as fundamental as the Secretary's directed us to undertake, to look as widely as we can for the ingredients of the final solution.

Q: The Secretary talked about Third World countries and terrorist organizations having nuclear weapons. I understand how you could use a nuclear threat against a country like Russia to receive mutually assured destruction, whatever the concept. But how would you use your nuclear forces against a third world or a terrorist organization that doesn't respond to those moral codes?

Carter: That's one of the points the Secretary made, precisely the one he made, is that we have lived with a model of deterrence which is familiar and which was appropriate to the times. Now we face new dangers, we need to contend with those new dangers. By no means is it necessarily the case that our nuclear posture is the only ingredient to the solution of those future dangers.

Q: Does that mean that this will include a review of counterproliferation policy as well as...

Carter: No, not per se. We do have a working group, as the Secretary explained, that is charged with describing and ascertaining the relationship between our counterproliferation policy and efforts and our nuclear posture. Obviously, our nuclear posture bears upon the likelihood that other countries will proliferate, and bears upon the menu of solutions we have to that problem if it does occur. We're going to be looking at that relationship, and ways that our nuclear posture can reinforce in a constructive way our counterproliferation policy. But the counterproliferation policy is really another matter.

Q: General, as we're winding down, may I use you as a target of opportunity? I see a Ranger patch on your shoulder. Talking to the Rangers in Mogadishu, they claim they never leave a downed comrade, and the reason they took such heavy hits...is they were sent back for the downed pilot in the helicopter. In retrospect, was that a sound judgment or an emotional judgment...would you say?

McCaffrey: No, look. It takes us two or three years to train a soldier. It takes hundreds of years to get a tradition. The Ranger force clearly goes in as a team and comes out as one, so we're enormously proud not only of their fighting ability but what they stand for.

Press: Thank you.

DEFENSE DIALOG

DATELINE NBC
10:00 P.M.

NBC-TV
JULY 20

Mogadishu Retrospective**TR-561**

JANE PAULEY: Tonight we begin with a tale of valor and heroism told for the first time by the men who were there, men who live and die by a sacred code of loyalty.

Here's Stone.

STONE PHILLIPS: Jane, given the current crisis in Haiti, the story you're about to see may offer some crucial lessons for the President, his advisers and members of Congress. Join us now as we retrace the worst ground battle since the Vietnam War. The voices are eyewitnesses, soldiers who've never gone public, the pictures taken by a cameraman who returned to the hostile streets where it all happened to give you a feel for what it was like.

Mogadishu, October 3rd, 1993. It was a day of murderous combat.

SOLDIER: There were explosions all around.

SOLDIER: Vehicles were hit and there were Rangers lying in the street.

SOLDIER: Four Rangers got hit in about a minute.

SOLDIER: As soon as we made that left turn, it was just like a wall of lead.

PHILLIPS: It was a day of painful sacrifice.

SOLDIER: I want people to know, hey, my friend Casey died out there.

COLONEL LARRY JOYCE (Ret.): These guys live by a creed, and that creed says that I will not leave my comrades, dead or alive, to fall into enemy hands.

PHILLIPS: It was a day of unforgettable tragedy.

MRS. DEANNA JOYCE: I opened the door and it was the officers, and they said, "Are you Mrs. Joyce?" And then they told me that "We're sorry to inform you your husband was killed in Somalia."

GENERAL GORDON SULLIVAN:

Sicily, Anzio, Pleiku, Mogadishu. Rangers lead the way.

PHILLIPS: Fort Benning, Georgia, March 26th, 1994. At a solemn ceremony, the Army honors its elite 3rd Battalion, 76th Ranger Regiment that fought in Somalia, the living.

MAN: Sergeant Kenneth M. Thomas.

PHILLIPS: And the dead.

MAN: The President of the United States has posthumously awarded the Bronze Star Medal with V device to Sergeant James C. Joyce. Sergeant Joyce's award is being accepted by his wife, Mrs. Deanna Joyce.

MRS. JOYCE: I guess I still haven't accepted it. I just miss him so much. It means, you know, he is being acknowledged for what he did that day. But I wish he was here to get it.

COLONEL JOYCE: I'm very proud of my son. My son is a hero. There's no two ways about it. But if you ask me, did he die in vain? I'd have to say yes.

PHILLIPS: Sergeant James Casey Joyce was one of 400 Army Rangers sent to Somalia in late August of last year. They were sent to pick up the pieces of a foundering policy, a humanitarian mission to save a nation on a verge of self-destruction that turned into a lethal manhunt.

It had started almost comically in December of 1992, as Marines hit the beaches of Mogadishu under the glare of the world's media.

SOLDIER: It feels good. It feels really good to be here helping out the Somalis, doing what we can to bring the food to 'em.

PHILLIPS: They had come to end a famine that had already killed hundreds of thousands of people. Within months Operation Restore Hope was hailed as a major success. And in May of 1993, 25,000 American troops went home.

OFFICER [addressing troops]: Our mission was to relieve the famine. We've reversed that.

PHILLIPS: But the civil war that had caused the famine refused to die, so a small American force, joined by U.N. peacekeepers, tried to disarm the Somali clans that ran

Mogadishu. It quickly became a nasty game of cat-and-mouse.

SOLDIER: We're trying to help these people. I don't know why they're trying to shoot us.

PHILLIPS: The road to peace, the U.N. said, ran right through this man, General Mohamed Farah Aideed, whose clan was proving the most resistant of all.

Robert Oakley was the President's special envoy to Somalia until March of '93.

ROBERT OAKLEY: He's tricky, he's ambitious, he's tough, he's very shrewd. The United Nations came to the conclusion that General Aideed and his people were spoilers.

PHILLIPS: And that they were killers, too. That summer, following a series of clashes in which Somali civilians died, Aideed's men ambushed and murdered 24 Pakistani peacekeepers. The U.N. went on the offensive, issuing an order to use any means necessary to stop the violence, and a \$25,000 price was put on Aideed's head.

This surprise attack on Aideed's compound destroyed his villa and killed scores of his followers. But Aideed was on his home turf with much popular support. He was proving exceedingly hard to catch.

Did we underestimate Mohamed Aideed?

OAKLEY: Absolutely. The Somalis were born guerrilla-warfare men. So by the end of August the decision was made to send the Rangers in, together with Delta Force, in the hopes that they would be able to do the job when others had failed.

PHILLIPS: But that job would have to be accomplished without the armor requested on at least two occasions by the Ranger commander on the ground in Somalia. Back in Washington, his call for four tanks and 14 Bradley fighting vehicles was going nowhere. The Administration was increasingly divided over the Aideed manhunt and didn't want to heighten the military profile. In Congress, some wanted out altogether.

REP. BENJAMIN GILMAN [R-NY]: Somalia has become a deadly sand trap for our American forces. And I say it's time to get out.

PHILLIPS: Behind the scenes, a former President who knew Somalia and Mohamed Aideed was having his own misgivings about the U.S. military role in Mogadishu. Jimmy Carter

was at the White House on September 13th as an honored guest for the signing of the historic peace treaty between Israel and the PLO. That night, Jimmy Carter stayed late at the White House and talked to President Clinton about reversing course in Somalia, de-emphasizing the hunt for Aideed and trying for a political settlement. Mr. Carter had received a personal letter from Aideed pleading for a negotiated settlement, and now he was delivering a message of his own: that U.N. policy, of trying to capture or kill Aideed, was a dangerous mistake.

By mid-September, the Administration turned toward a political solution, despite the fact that the U.N. was still insisting that neutralizing Aideed was the only solution.

OAKLEY: We were arguing that the policy should be changed. The Secretary General was arguing it shouldn't be changed. But while this argument was going on, the standing orders to Task Force Ranger and General Garrison's men were: If you see Aideed, go after him.

PHILLIPS: So the political situation was stalled. Four hundred Rangers were still on the ground without the armor they'd requested, and the military situation was rapidly deteriorating.

On September 25th, an American helicopter was shot down over Mogadishu. Two Americans died. Reports circulated that the bodies were desecrated by angry Somali crowds. There wasn't much more that could go wrong, or so it seemed.

Escalating the mission while downsizing the overall military force, trying to compromise with Aideed, at the same time trying to capture him. It seems like a dangerously confused policy.

OAKLEY: I just think that the decisions were taken rapidly enough. Those orders were left in effect, and that's what produced the very tragic situation of the 3rd of October.

PHILLIPS: It was now Sunday, October 3rd. After ten months, the American policy in Somalia was about to disintegrate.

LT. LARRY D. PERINO: It was a day off usually. It was time to kind of relax a little bit. Most of us actually were out there either getting some sun, playing volleyball.

LT. THOMAS D. DITOMASSO: Everybody was just kind of chilling out.

PHILLIPS: But that morning Army

Intelligence got a tip about a meeting of Aideed's top lieutenants. An order was issued: Go get them.

LT. DITOMASSO: As the intelligence developed, the state of alert increased, until we finally had everybody geared up and ready to go. And once the targets were confirmed, we went ahead and launched at 1533.

PHILLIPS: 3:33 in the afternoon, Mogadishu time. The plan is one they've rehearsed for months and have been using in a series of lightning raids to try to capture Aideed and his men. This one would be in broad daylight deep within what their commander called Indian country.

Fifteen helicopters would bring in 140 Rangers and Delta Force commandos. Their target, a compound near the Olympic Hotel, where they believe Aideed's men are meeting. They would drop to the ground on ropes, capture them and get out on a waiting convoy of trucks.

There had been six missions prior to this one. How was this one different?

LT. PERINO: The only thing that was different is that we knew it was in a bad area of town, it was near a bad section of town.

PHILLIPS: It's only a two-mile jump from their base at the Mogadishu airport, only minutes away by helicopter. But they're headed into the heart of Aideed's stronghold. As they come in, the helicopter props churn up dark clouds of dust, making it hard to see.

PFC ANTON P. BERENDSEN: We were way up there, and the dust propelled so much dirt that we had to go even higher. And he couldn't really see where he wanted us to go.

SGT. MICHAEL T. KURTH: And once the bird comes in and flares, there was a brownout for a good ten seconds. You couldn't see anything.

PFC BERENDSEN: From right there it felt, you know, you just knew something was up.

PHILLIPS: When did the shooting begin?

[Laughter]

SGT. KENNETH M. THOMAS: Before we came in there.

PHILLIPS: Before you were even out of the choppers they were firing.

LT. DITOMASSO: I could hear rounds explode right outside the chopper door.

PHILLIPS: Amidst the flying dust and

intense gunfire, the Delta commandos began rounding up nearly two dozen of Aideed's top lieutenants. What they lacked in surprise they're making up for with speed. They plan to be in and out in just 40 minutes, despite an unexpected problem. A Ranger, PFC Todd Blackburn, has fallen off the rope 60 feet to the ground below.

PFC TODD BLACKBURN: I was on the rope and I fell and I heard firing. And I remember looking back and seeing that the door was already gone and thinking "Jeez. We're just sitting up here like sitting ducks," and wanting to get out of the helicopter. And that's all I can remember.

PHILLIPS: His comrades later tell him that Sergeant Casey Joyce is the man who coordinated his rescue, laying down cover fire for medic Marcus Good.

MARCUS GOOD: You have to decide whether you want to move him, because if we don't get him out of there he's going to die. We loaded him up and Sergeant Joyce said, "You're going to stay with him." And I said, "Yeah," and shut the tailgate. And he headed back toward his blocking position.

PFC BLACKBURN: And he really saved my life, actually.

PHILLIPS: With Blackburn taken care of, Sergeant Joyce and his fellow Rangers have things under control for the moment.

What's happening back at the target location?

LT. DITOMASSO: I got the call that the targets have been secured. Prepare for extraction.

LT. PERINO: We were all lined up in the street. I mean we were...

SGT THOMAS: The mission was done, as far as we were concerned, and waiting to go.

LT. PERINO: We were this far from actually getting on the trucks and leaving when it happened.

PHILLIPS: The entire operation is right on schedule when disaster strikes. An American helicopter is in trouble.

SGT. KURTH: I could just see the bird come into sight and I looked up at it and I noticed it was spinning kind of funny. I thought it was turning around and trying to hit a target. But it was kind of drifting down towards the ground.

LT. DITOMASSO: My forward

observer saw the bird go down.

BLACK: It disappeared and I knew it had crashed.

LT. DITOMASSO: And then the whole thing changed. It was a whole different mission then.

PHILLIPS: That was the decisive moment, wasn't it? Once the chopper went down, what went through your minds?

LT. PERINO: I guess we're going to be here a little bit longer than expected.

PHILLIPS: When we come back, the rescue mission, the battle, and the political miscalculation in Washington that cost American lives in Somalia.

* * *

PHILLIPS: Continuing our story now.

You've heard about the vehement debate that had been going on here in Washington: Go after Aideed. Negotiate with him. Stay in Somalia. Get out.

Meanwhile, thousands of miles away in Mogadishu, a pivotal moment, a battle that never would have happened and a controversy that might never have erupted if it weren't for a random shot in the sky that brought down an American helicopter.

Todd Blackburn, the Ranger who'd fallen from the chopper, had been rescued by Sergeant Casey Joyce. But Blackburn would never see him again. And neither would Joyce's 22-year-old wife, Deanna, who had talked to her husband just after midnight that Sunday, October 3rd.

MRS. JOYCE: It was one o'clock, Somalia time, when I spoke to Casey.

PHILLIPS: What was he like? What did he talk about?

MRS. JOYCE: He was tired. He said he was ready to come home, that he missed me and he loved me, and to tell his parents that he missed them and loved them. And he gave me a list of things he wanted. He had a -- he had broken his Walkman and he wanted a new Walkman.

And then we got off the phone and the funniest thing was that I was putting down the phone and I heard him going "Hey! Hey!" And so I picked it back up and said, "Yes?"

He said, "Tell me one more time you love me."

That's how it ended.

PHILLIPS: Hours later, Sergeant Casey

Joyce and the other 140 men of Task Force Ranger are about to make a fateful decision. That Black Hawk helicopter is down on the hostile streets of Mogadishu.

LT. PERINO: You knew you weren't leaving till you made sure that whoever was there was out, you know. That's what I mean by "We're going to be here a little bit longer."

SGT. THOMAS: Your first instinct is, pfttt, "Let's go get 'em," because you know someone's in there hurting.

PHILLIPS: The chopper, downed by rocket-propelled grenades, falls into a narrow alley about three blocks to the east of where the Rangers are. What happens over the next ten hours is a story most Americans have not heard. The nine Rangers we interviewed at Fort Benning, Georgia survived a battle the Army has called the most intense ground combat since the Tet offensive in Vietnam. But the critical decisions they made on the streets that day were based on a solemn Ranger creed: I will never allow a fallen comrade to fall into the hands of the enemy.

SGT. KURTH: The first thing I thought of was I hoped they could get there before the Somalis could. Because like a week or two before, a helicopter crashed before and there was no one there for them, and I didn't want that to happen to our guys. I wanted, you know, I wanted the Rangers to get there and to protect them.

PHILLIPS: So the first in a succession of rescue missions is launched, each more costly than the one before it.

LT. DITOMASSO: I had 15 guys with me. I left eight there and took seven to go secure the crash site.

PHILLIPS: Lieutenant Tom DiTomaso and his men begin running through the twisted alleys and courtyards of Mogadishu, racing a large Somali crowd that has the same objective: the helicopter.

LT. DITOMASSO: So we were running on a street parallel to them. They were running down one street, we were down running the other, and the crash site was right in between us.

PHILLIPS: What was it like as you made your way there?

LT. DITOMASSO: As we were running down the street, every time we went by a window a muzzle would come out and just spray

the street, and then they would pull back in. The crowd is running. You can hear them all yelling and screaming. I mean they're right on the other side of the building.

And we came around the corner and one of the smaller aircraft had landed at the crash site and tried to extract some wounded men.

PHILLIPS: That smaller aircraft called a little bird, has made a perilous landing to try to save the survivors of the crashed Black Hawk.

LT. DITOMASSO: They took two men, two wounded men, put them on that helicopter and that helicopter took off. And I tapped my head at the pilot, which means headcount, and he shook his head no.

PHILLIPS: What did that mean?

LT. DITOMASSO: That there were still bodies, still men there.

PHILLIPS: That he hadn't gotten them all.

LT. DITOMASSO: Right.

PHILLIPS: The Rangers arrived seconds before the Somalis and set up a perimeter around the downed helicopter. The body of the pilot killed in the crash, Chief Warrant Officer Clifton Wilcott, is pinned in the wreckage. The Rangers would guard his body for 12 hours until 5:00 A.M. the next day. Their loyalty measured in American lives.

And how would you describe the level of fire?

LT. DITOMASSO: I just remember explosions all over the place. And we just started returning fire. It was just so close. I mean they were only right across the street. And out of the buildings around that area, people were just throwing grenades outside the top, from the top windows.

PHILLIPS: 4:25. Crowds are building. Enemy fire is taking its toll as more Rangers advance on the crash site.

LT. PERINO: The element that I was in charge of was 16 men, and very quickly it turned to three. One guy was down because of shrapnel wounds, because an RPG exploded right over his head. I started my forward observer. You know, he got shot. Because the streets are so narrow, it's like shooting fish in a barrel. We were about 200 meters away, but as soon as he made that left turn it was just like a wall of lead.

SGT. THOMAS: You know, for a minute there it seems like training. You're out

there doing what you're trained to do. And then you'll hear someone start screaming, "I've been hit," and it snaps you into reality.

PHILLIPS: They're under withering fire but they have a problem returning fire because, in classic guerrilla fashion, the Somalis are exploiting the rules of engagement.

LT. DITOMASSO: People were using other people for shields. The men would stand behind the women and put their weapon up underneath their armpits, so the barrel was just coming out like this, and shooting.

PHILLIPS: 4:30 in the afternoon. Rangers and hundreds of Somalis are fighting pitched battles at close range.

SSGT. MATTHEW P. EVERSMAN: We were taking fire from three directions, from, you know, directly to our front, from our left and right.

LT. PERINO: And they came from about 100 meters away and on in. You'd see women darting across the street, men darting across the street.

SGT. THOMAS: It was that quick. You'd see them move to an alley and then the fire would come out of windows.

PHILLIPS: By now, the Rangers trying to free the pilot's body are outnumbered 30-to-1. So the rest of the force, waiting back at the original landing site near the Olympic Hotel, including Sergeant Casey Joyce, rushed to the crash site. But in unarmored vehicles, the trucks and Humvees they used to get there become death traps.

You were basically sitting ducks.

SSGT EVERSMAN: Yes, sir.

PHILLIPS: As long as you stayed in the truck.

SSGT EVERSMAN: Yes, sir.

PHILLIPS: Specialist Dave Ritchie was part of the team trying to rescue the Rangers at the crash site. He declined to tell us what he did that day, but his lieutenant did.

LT. DITOMASSO: Let me tell you, I know he's not going to tell this story because of the way he is. But just to give you a picture of how much fire they were under, on the vehicles you have a top gunner. Well, he was in one of the vehicles. That gunner got shot. The squad leader in that vehicle pulled down the gunner, started doing first aid. He jumped up there -- this is Sergeant Ruiz -- and started firing the

weapon system. He was killed there. Specialist Ritchie pulled him down and jumps back up there.

PHILLIPS: Five o'clock. As they struggle to reach the crash site, the Somalis are setting up roadblocks. The three-block trip becomes a nightmare.

SPEC. DAVE RITCHIE: They'd go down one street and be blocked. They'd have to come back around and try to go through another way. And a lot of times they'd just end up going in a circle.

SSGT. THOMAS: And now all of a sudden they can't find us. Well, we had no idea what they were going through.

PHILLIPS: In fact, the second group of Rangers is stopped dead in its tracks. Sergeant Casey Joyce would be the next to fall.

SSGT EVERSMAN: Vehicles were hit and there were Rangers lying in the street. Sergeant Joyce turned and was engaging the enemy when a round came and hit him in the back.

COLONEL JOYCE: It was instantaneous, I'm sure. They could tell that he had a sucking chest wound. And with a sucking chest wound, you don't last long. But I think he was unconscious through all of that. I want to believe that and I do.

MRS. JOYCE: At about 6:30 in the morning, I got a knock at the door. I was walking down the stairs and I was thinking -- I was telling myself, "He's dead. He's dead." And I opened the door and it was the two children of my neighbors. And, you know, I was kind of kicking myself for thinking, when those kids came by, that -- you know, I was thinking "Why were you thinking that?"

And then I came downstairs and I had school that morning, so I fixed me some cereal, and I got another knock at the door. And this time I, you know, I let my guard down because I thought it was the children again, you know, maybe going to tell me something that they had forgotten. I opened the door and it was the officers. And they told me that -- they had my name wrong, so I started to close the door and told them that I wasn't who -- they said, "Are you Dina?"

I said, "No." I shut the door.

And they said, "Are you Mrs. Joyce?" And then they told me that "We're sorry to

inform you your husband was killed in Somalia.

PHILLIPS: Back in Mogadishu, night falls. The second group of Rangers, now carrying the body of Casey Joyce, finally gives up its rescue mission. Still another group tries to get to the crash site. But without the armored vehicles that Washington has denied them, they're unable to fight through an ambush at this traffic circle.

At six o'clock in the evening, they too turn back. The 90 Americans at the crash site, still struggling to free the dead pilot, are on their own.

LT. DITOMASSO: We dragged all the casualties inside a building and we couldn't yet leave because that one pilot was still trapped in the helicopter.

PHILLIPS: The Rangers can do nothing more than hunker down in the nearby buildings, buildings still occupied by frightened Somalis.

SSGT THOMAS: We moved them out of the front rooms because, you know, we didn't want them to get hit.

LT. DITOMASSO: And they understood that, believe me. I mean I was holding one of their babies.

PHILLIPS: Helicopters fly all night long, dropping supplies and ammunition on the American position. Finally, at 2:00 A.M., almost eleven hours after their mission began, a column of friendly troops fights its way in.

What was it like when those guys arrived?

LT. DITOMASSO: I wanted to hug 'em and -- "Got any water?" They gave us water and they had some extra IVs. We were really happy to see 'em.

PHILLIPS: But as it turned out, U.S. commanders had spent five hours trying to assemble the equipment they needed to rescue the Rangers. And to do it, the most powerful army in the world had to go asking for help to save its own soldiers.

COLONEL JOYCE: And what kind of vehicles got through? Malaysian and Pakistani armor and APCs made it through. But the American commanders on the ground literally had to cajole, through the U.N. command, their allies to free up their vehicles.

LT DITOMASSO: We put our casualties on the armored personnel carriers, they drove off, and we continued to work on the pilot.

PHILLIPS: By 5:00 A.M., 18 Rangers are dead, 75 others wounded. At least 300 Somalis have been killed. Their total casualties well over a thousand. But the Rangers have honored their creed. The body of helicopter pilot Clifton Wilcott has finally been freed from the crash wreckage and kept from enemy hands.

There's no reason to stay any longer. The battle is over. But the fallout is about to begin.

Only hours after their terrible ordeal, the Rangers were in for another staggering blow. The very thing they had fought so valiantly to prevent had happened anyway. American soldiers had fallen into enemy hands.

That story when we come back.

* * *

PHILLIPS: Just last week the State Department told Dateline that U.S. policy in Somalia last year was murky. The reality is, when the Rangers returned to their barracks that day in October, they had no idea that the powers that be here in Washington were looking for a diplomatic settlement. They were exhausted, drained, the battle was behind them. But as they soon found out, the nightmare was far from over.

This is the first thing the surviving Rangers saw when they got back to base [body of soldier being dragged through street] and this is the first thing they heard.

CWO MICHAEL DURANT [on TV]:
Mike Durant, U.S. Army.

PHILLIPS: At about the same time that Casey Joyce was killed, there had been a second helicopter crash about a mile away. The four Rangers on board were killed by a Somali mob. So were the two Delta Force commandos who roped down to help them and fought to their death. Pilot Michael Durant was taken hostage and the dead dragged through the streets.

Despite the valor they displayed and the sacrifices they made, the Rangers now understood the worst had happened anyway.

GOOD: You know, you saw on the news exactly what was going on. And that's was probably -- that's what, you know, hit hard for all of us and the reality just kicked in.

PHILLIPS: Shocking images of dead Americans were already being broadcast around the world. The Rangers were furious at the media.

LT. DITOMASSO: I don't know who

the heck they think they are, whether they think we're machines or something. But that affected every single one of us.

NEWSMAN: Images of Somalis dragging through the streets of Mogadishu the body of one of the dead Americans.

PHILLIPS: Those pictures seemed to instantly galvanize U.S. public opinion against American policy in Somalia. The hunt for Aideed was effectively ended the next day. A complete withdrawal was ordered.

On October 8th, five days after the battle, Casey Joyce was buried at Arlington National Cemetery.

COLONEL JOYCE: Casey had requested, in writing before he left, that if he was killed in action, he wanted to be buried in Arlington with full military honors.

MRS. JOYCE: It was a hard day. Casey wanted to be buried there, so we did it for him. You know, everything he wanted, I stuck with it.

PHILLIPS: The family received a call from the Secretary of Defense offering to take part in the ceremony.

Les Aspin asked to drape the colors on your husband's casket.

MRS. JOYCE: And to give me the flag also.

PHILLIPS: And to give you the flag.

MRS. JOYCE: Uh-huh. And we just said no. I said no.

PHILLIPS: For Larry Joyce, a retired Army colonel with two combat tours in Vietnam, the burial of his son was the beginning of a mission to confront the generals and politicians he believed had sent his son to war for all the wrong reasons.

COLONEL JOYCE: If we were working toward a diplomatic solution the last two or three weeks in September, why would we conduct a raid on October the 3rd? That makes absolutely no sense at all.

PHILLIPS: The hunt for Aideed, he says, was not vital to American interests. The mission, he says, lacked a clear objective. And the politicians in Washington, he insists, did not have the will to stay the course.

COLONEL JOYCE: October the 3rd, capturing him was the most important thing we had going. We lose 18 soldiers, 76 more are wounded, and on October the 4th we suddenly

do an about-face.

PHILLIPS: That kind of confusion about foreign military adventures was painfully reminiscent of what Larry Joyce had lived through 25 years ago.

COLONEL JOYCE: I contend that Casey and I served the same misguided policy a generation apart.

PHILLIPS: You in Vietnam.

COLONEL JOYCE: And Casey in Somalia.

PHILLIPS: In the weeks after his son's death, Joyce published articles, met with congressmen, and spoke out about what he considered unnecessary deaths in Somalia.

Secretary of Defense Les Aspin acknowledged that his decision not to provide armor to Task Force Ranger was a tragic mistake.

SECRETARY ASPIN: Had I known at that time what I knew after the events of Sunday, I would have made a very different decision.

PHILLIPS: He resigned on December 15th.

That same month, in a bitter irony for the Rangers, American troops were actually providing security for the very man they had once tried to kill. Mohamed Aideed, the warlord, was now a welcome participant at a peace conference in Ethiopia.

It was kind of a two-track policy, a carrot and stick, if you will. We often engage in that kind of...

COLONEL JOYCE: Stone, it didn't work, did it?

SENATOR SAM NUNN: The meeting will come to order.

PHILLIPS: This spring Larry Joyce's crusade reached Washington. The Senate Armed Services Committee began hearings on the disaster in Somalia, with inconclusive testimony about whether American lives would have been saved with additional armor. But Larry Joyce finally had a chance to put a human face on a flawed policy that claimed the life of his son.

COLONEL JOYCE: Maybe some of you remember where you were and what you were doing last October 3. Now, my life was about as close to being perfect as it has ever been or ever will be again. I had a 7:30 tee time on a public course that runs along Lake

Michigan. It was a cool and beautiful Sunday morning in Chicago. But halfway around the world in Mogadishu, it was a hot and dusty Sunday afternoon, where Casey and his Ranger and Delta Force comrades were taking off in helicopters.

As I was putting on the third green, Casey was dodging AK-47 rounds as he was rescuing PFC Todd Blackburn. As I was getting out of the rough and onto the fifth fairway, Casey was fighting his way to the crash site. As I was walking off the ninth green, some of Casey's buddies were fighting their way back to the Mogadishu airport in a Humvee with Casey's lifeless body aboard.

in the time it takes to play nine holes of golf, a tragedy of enormous proportions had unfolded. Lives, including my son's, had been taken.

PHILLIPS: What's even more disturbing is that nine months after Casey Joyce was shot dead in the streets of Mogadishu, even those insiders who had a hand in the Somalia policy can't quite figure out how the disaster on October 3rd came to be.

Where were you on October 3rd?

OAKLEY: I was here in Washington and I was shocked. I couldn't see just how in the world we could be pursuing a policy of shifting from the military to the political track while at the same time allowing these military actions by our forces out there who were under our control to continue. And I was totally mystified.

PHILLIPS: So word just hadn't filtered down? The standing orders...

OAKLEY: The standing orders were never changed. Why? I don't know. I wasn't there.

PHILLIPS: Les Aspin is gone. All the troops are out of Somalia. Mistakes have been acknowledged. What more do you want?

COLONEL JOYCE: What do I want out of this? I want to make sure it doesn't happen again. How do you do that? Through the hearings. Identify those who were responsible and hold them accountable for what happened in Somalia.

PHILLIPS: With all due respect, is there a little bit of Monday morning quarterbacking going on here?

COLONEL JOYCE: Sure. Don't you

think I'm authorized to do a little Monday morning quarterbacking? I do.

PHILLIPS: What questions have you been left with?

MRS. JOYCE: I really don't have any questions. I mean now I'm just trying to deal day-to-day with the loss of my husband. So -- with the man I was supposed to spend the rest of my life with.

LT DITOMASSO: When the government says, "Hey, go do it," we will go do it. All these men volunteered to do this. And when the government says go do it, we'll do it.

All I ask, in my own opinion, is that they make the right decision. You know, they've got to understand that there may be casualties, and they need to be willing to accept that. They need to be able to look at Colonel Joyce and all the other families in the face and say, you know, "We understand and we are willing to accept those casualties." Don't send me somewhere and expect me to do a job and not take casualties. That's impossible.

SGT THOMAS: I want people to know, hey, my friend Casey died out there. And, you know, a guy doing what he was doing and he did it for -- he was doing it for you, you know.

We do -- we're not the policymakers. We're the doers, you know. And we entrust our faith in the people who make the rules or tell us what to do. That's what makes the country great. Where would we be if we didn't have people like Joyce and Pilla and [unintelligible] or Ruiz and Cavaco? Where would we be without them?


I want people to remember that, that you had people who died enforcing the policies of this government for you.

Make any sense?

PHILLIPS: While our story focused on one American who died, Sergeant James Casey Joyce, keep in mind that at least 300 Somalis were killed, as well as 17 other U.S. soldiers.

Here are the names of those Americans who lost their lives that day [on-screen scroll].

SOMALIA OPERATIONS: *Lessons Learned*





**NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY PRESS
FORT LESLEY J. McNAIR
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20319-6000**